BEDBTE 30 3)27 HAZMI - MIHDHAR ot INTERVIEW SUMMARY CG Dina Corsi, Intelligence Operati 105 On November 4, 2002, FBI Headquarters Intelligence Operations Specialist (IOS) Dina Corsi was interviewed by OIG Special Investigative Counsel Barbara Grewe and OIG SA Craig Trautner. Prior to any questioning, Corsi was admonished of her rights via an OIG Form Ill 226/3 (Warnings and Assurances to Employee Required to Provide Information). The interview was audio recorded, Corsi entered on duty with the FBI as a Clerk-Typist in 1988 while attending college. After graduating from college in 1989, Corsi was sent to language training and in 1990 started working as a Language Specialist (Russian) in the Foreign Counter Intelligence (FCI) Section. In November 1997, Corsi transferred to an Intelligence Research Specialist (IRS) position in the FBI National Security Division. In November 1998, Corsi was detailed to the ITOS Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) for the Embassy Bombings (EB) investigation. On an unknown date in 2000, Corsi was permanently transferred to an IOS position in the newly created Usama Bin Laden (UBL) Unit. ‘As to the difference between an IRS and JOS, Corsi explained an IRS and IOS are both analysts and share the same OPM job series classification. Within the FBI, [RSs are assigned to handle “strategic analysis” in a broad nationwide manner. They spend more time in strict analysis and work ata slower pace. IOSs are responsible for “tactical analysis” and the administrative management of analysis function for specific cases. 108s work in a faster paced environment handling more immediate action items. 108 positions are only located at HQ. IRS positions are assigned to both HQ and field offices. The field offices IRSs are responsible for strategic analysis only within their geographic (field office) area. {As to her work on the EB bombing trial, Corsi related she worked on both criminal and intelligence matters and IOSs normally work both criminal and intelligence information. Corsi stated there had been differences in sharing information depending on the program. In her EB assignment, Corsi mainly supported the trial and completed requested activities in support of the trial As to any specific training on “the wall” (FISA restrictions on information sharing), Corsi responded the FBI's National Security Law Unit (NSLU) would provided periodic training and guidance. During certain periods, Corsi described FISA restrictions as “fluid and changing” so it was difficult to remain fully cognizant of the procedures. Corsi stated the FISAs caused the most consternation in New York due to the criminal al Qaeda (AQ) cases being conducted in New York. NCTA000057318Corsi asserted HQ personnel are not considered part of a criminal investigation; therefore, they are not directly impacted by the FISA restrictions. Corsi related HQ personnel are able to access both “criminal and intelligence” information without restriction. Corsi contended larger problems relating to information sharing arose due to “the walls” established by the NSA and CIA in response to their interpretation of FISA court provisions. Corsi described the FISA Court's decisions as a “snowball” (on a slope) affect that caused unintended consequences in other areas. According to Corsi, the NSA asserted they would be unable to practically differentiate FISA-derived from non-FISA-derived information. Therefore, NSA considered all their information as FISA-derived thus cutting off SIGINT information from criminal Wvestigators without overcoming bureaucratic hurdles to “pass” the information. Toa lesser extent, caveats on CIA information also restricted practical use in certain cases. Corsi claimed she tried to overcome the limitations on NSA information with assistance from NSLU Attomey Shari Sabol. According to Corsi, Sabol was able to work out an agreement with NSA Office of General Counsel that certain information could be redacted into “tear line” version that would not attributable to a source. This information could then be provided directly to the field for criminal investigations. Unfortunately, these redacted versions often provided insufficient information for investigative purposes. Corsi asserted her position has always been that all information provided to the FBI is available to intelligence and/or criminal functions. However, certain procedures, often slow and cumbersome, must be followed before certain intelligence information can be provided for purposes of a criminal investigation. Corsi emphasized there is no absolute bar to utilizing intelligence information but there are limitations and procedures that must be followed. As to accessing NSA or CIA information, Corsi responded she normally accesses this information through the CT/INTEL LINK terminal. CT LINK contains information for dissemination within the intelligence community. Corsi also receives information from detailees from the various agencies assigned in each other's offices. As to the millennium threat period (12/99 - 01/00), Corsi responded “ots of people” were detailed into HQ to assist with the workload and Strategic Intelligence Operations Center (SIOC) was activated. Normally, attempts are made to allow the HQ units to continue to work autonomously but HQ personnel end up being tasked during these periods with additional duties. During this period, Corsi was predominantly continuing to work on EB bombing trial preparation along with any developing millennium threat issues. As to information flow during these periods of heightened activity, Corsi responded the process “does not work that well” but she could not think of a better system. Corsi explained the TDY’ers have “good intentions” but lack the knowledge on the appropriate NCTA000057319information flow. Additionally, there is a tendency to take information directly to the ‘executive management without passing the information up through the appropriate channels. Therefore, there is a resulting disconnect between the working line personnel that need the information and managers dictating actions to subordinates who lacked the predicating foundation, Corsi stated the SIOC is a 24/7 operation. Normally, an analyst or Special Agent is assigned to receive and distribute information within the SIOC. Unfortunately, most of the SIOC personnel are on TDY and they do not always know what information is significant or how the information should be distributed As to the Malaysian meeting, Corsi claimed to have no recollection of having received the information in real-time, Corsi emphasized the focus was on millennium threats, including Ressam and the break up of a terrorist cell in Jordan, and the Malaysian meeting would not have been a priority. Based on her knowledge, the Malaysian meeting would have been similar to "99% of the traffic” with no “flags” or other indicator of the particular significance at that time. As to the status of SSAs Kurtz and Minton at the time of the Malaysian meeting, Corsi responded Minton and Kurtz had both worked in the UBL/RFU unit(s) but she did not know their status during this period. Corsi posited they had already left the units and they were detailed back to HQ for the millennium threat. As to the disposition of the information if it had come to her, Corsi responded the information would have been reviewed and determined not to be actionable. Corsi would normally then forward the information to an IRS for further potential study. However, the UBL did not have an IRS to conduct this type of analysis at the time. Corsi posited the information would have been placed in a control file ("62F”) as intelligence information from another agency. When advised there was no actual cable or documentation other than an e-mail, Corsi responded she does not know what would have happened to the information. Corsi related e-mail is not normally uploaded into a control file. E-mail can be uploaded for inclusion in a case but this normally only occurs where there is an open investigative file. Corsi asserted all e-mail is archived so a record would be maintained although this record would not be searchable or retrievable within the FBI. Corsi described the information exchange in this case as an anomaly. Normally, the CLA sends information to the FBI in the form of a cable especially when the CIA believes the information could be important. Even if information is passed through a different conduit, CLA normally follows up with a cable or other documentation. Corsi described it as “possible” but unlikely the CLA sent Mihdhar’s passport information without predication or follow-up documentation. If'she had known Mihdhar had a U.S. visa, Corsi contended the significance of the information would have grown substantially and potentially made the information NCTA000057320actionable. Although ORCON would apply, Corsi would have checked with the CIA to ensure they had placed Mihdhar on the watch list, Corsi emphasized the passport information coming to the FBI without predication would bbe “very rare.” Corsi insisted she does not know how that could happen and she described the receipt of the passport at the FBI without attached predicating information as “implausible.” Corsi posited the FBI would have run a trace on the name if the passport had arrived with no predication, In November 2000, Corsi had been assigned to work on the investigation of the attack on the USS Cole. Corsi related she had been working on tracking and comparing telephone calls obtained during the investigation in an effort to determine the veracity of information provided by Quso (Cole subject in Yemen custody). According to Corsi, her focus was on Quso’s alleged travel and the identity of "Khallad” (the alleged Cole ringleader). Corsi claimed she was still unaware of the Malaysian meeting, By January 2001, Corsi was still working on the phone numbers including checking the phone numbers in CT LINK for any connection. Corsi posited the Malaysian meeting information could have been @ hit based on the phone numbers. However, Corsi reiterated the Malaysian meeting would not have been immediately significant and she does not recall receiving the information. Corsi reiterated the Cole investigation, not the Malaysian meeting, was her focus at that time. Com avin she ad been working with CIA CTC Analyst B30 ctnes oy seat dele othe ciceat——In he ColeinvesNgATORTRBUgh her 9701 clones ny sea contact with he CIA, CART DECOR TWAT ofthe Malayan meting information The ‘etter evlienton Cer larsed to have atures awa cf Une Malayan mmecingin May 001) Corsi stated CTC Deputy Chief sevetoped an interes in the Closes ny staruee significance of the Malaysian meeting and the potential connection to the Cole. a cleo ee subsequently provided Corsi with three surveillance photographs taken in MalaysTa Corsi definitively recalled receiving the photographs because they “took all day to print of printer. ‘At the time[—Jposited one of the photographs could relate to’ Quso showing Quso had been in Malaysia contradicting his earlier statements. According to Corsi, the FBI ‘was attempting to determine the veracity of Quso's information so the photographs were potentially significant. Corsi also received a timeline from| oncemning the Malaysian meeting and related information. According to Corsi, Mihdhar’s visa information was not included in the timeline. Upon receiving the photographs from[ ____] Corsi noted on the back the few details provided Lk .e-taker in Malaysian during @ wieeting, Khalid Mihdhar’s name). According 1o Corsi, ihe photographs would be shown to the FBUNY agents to determine whether they could identify Quso in any of the photographs. Since the photos came from NCTAQ00057322Corsi contended there was no time during the meeting when she told FBUNY personnel that she could not share any particular information. {As to the photographs, Corsi indicated this occurred toward the end of the meeting. Corsi could not recall whether she had told Bongardi that she would be bringing photographs. At this point in the meeting, Corsi related many of the FBUNY personnel had left due to an upcoming detail to the Middle East. Corsi described her recollection of the photograph display portion of the meeting as “not that great.” According to Corsi, she slid the photographs across the table to the FBU/NY agents and asked if they recognized Quso in any of the photographs. Corsi contended she provided the FBUNY agents with the limited information that she knew at the time (Malaysian meeting at Millennium, name Khalid Al-Mihdhar) Corsi posited the FBUNY agents asked about additional photographs and the specifies conceming the surveillance. Corsi provided all the information she had received from the GIA. Daring the meeting olunteeed Ab-Mindhar had travelet'on a Saudi 3/22 2 passport which was new information to Corsi (in her notes). Corsi advised FBI/NY agents asked her several times about additional photographs and surveillance logs throughout the rest of the day (she remained at NY afer the meeting) and she can not delineate how many times the questions arose in the actual meeting. Based on her meeting notes, Corsi posted there had not been substantial questions about the potential for additional information (i.e. she would have noted the requests fora follow-up) Bongardt did not mention he had already seen or knew about the photographs (January in Pakistan). Corsi posited Bongardt would have recognized the photographs if he had previously seen them. Corsi disputed the assertion that the meeting had been contentious and voices had been raised. Corsi explained only after the meeting were there “heated discussions” about ‘whether there were additional photographs and the surveillance logs. Corsi specifically recalled Bongardt and George Crouch asking about additional photographs. Corsi contended she is not an agent and she did not know that surveillances normally involved ‘numerous pictures and additional information would have been maintained in a surveillance log. Corsi continued to advise FBUNY that she had provided them with all the information, As to any “wall” issues (FISA-related), Corsi responded “the wall” was not an issue at this meeting and “the wall” could only have dealt with the limited NSA information. However, Corsi stated “the wall” was always an issue with FBV/NY and there was a great deal of misunderstanding about “the wall” in FBUNY. Since FBUNY had a high percentage of criminal investigations with potential wall implications, FBVNY bad become overly sensitive and some of the agents believed “the wall” was the rationale for any limiting of information. Corsi related Steve Bongardt had @ serious “hang up” about “the wall.” NCTA000057323Corsi reiterated there was no FISA wall issue in relation to the photographs but FBUNY did not differentiate, ‘The limitation on the photographs was an ORCON issue, not a wall issue, because the photographs belonged to the CIA. The CIA had not received permission from the source to release the photographs. Corsi reiterated the photographs had not been officially passed to the FBI although Corsi had copies of the photographs for basically informational purposes only. Afier leaving New York on June 11, Corsi contended she was not contacted by Bongardt or anyone else from New York concerning additional photographs or surveillance logs. Corsi claimed she had contact with FBUINY SA George Crouch because he had been working on the phone number project with her but she could not recall him asking about the photographs. Asto the August 7 e-mail wit | Corsi responded she was trying to check Midhar’s flight manifest and compare The information to her phone work on Quso to determine whether Quso had traveled with Mihdhar. Corsi stated she was attempting to “fill in holes” based on her phone record review. At that time, Corsi did not have any knowledge of Mihdhar’s USS. travel or U.S. visa. on August, 201 [ected 1 norman ing ad Mi Sadrveed othe USTTAhtary 200 and Mndhar fa a US visa Cor went toe TNS detailee to the FBI in reference to Hazmi and Mihdhar. Corsi discovered Mihdhar hd vented United State on July 4201 ar here warn ecordof Hann eparing orhavingeentered the Uned Stats, Tough es contac with the INS deal, Com dieovered was not uncommon that INS wosld ol receive a epatre record Haz could have Sepred the country wis record Cons mer wif ancciingNihdbar's US. en. Corsi and 1Iso-contacted the State Department arid obtained Mihdhar’s U.S. visa Tea indicating Mi to slay atthe Marriot Hotel in New York City nF, Conde iscussd the need (find Mifidar. Corsi (mphasizea MIRURIPT gnffeance athe ime remained his connection 10 "Khallad Quso, and the Cole, There was no indication at the time that Mihdhar was a direct threat although there was always that potential with an AQ associate. ‘After conferring with Acting Unit Chief (SSA) Rod Middlelton, Corsi drafted an EC requesting an intelligence investigation at FBUNY to find Mikdhar, Corsi also telephonically contacted FBUNY “intelligence” SA Craig Donnache to give him a “heads xp" that the request would be coming, Corsi also forwarded via e-mail adrafl of the EC to Donnache and his supervisor, SSA John Liguori. The draft EC was then improperly forwarded to the enti squad including the “criminal” SAs. FBISA Steve Bongardt wanted the case opened as a criminal, not an intelligence, investigation connected to the Cole, Middleton and Corsi then had a conference call with Bongardt concerning the type of investigation. According to Corsi, they (HQ) asserted the entire case was based on intelligence information and there was no nexus to a b/21 Closed by Statute NCTA000057324predicating criminal offense to justify a criminal investigation. Bongards disagreed and asked for a legal opinion, NLSU Attomey Sherry Sabol agreed the case should be opened as an intelligence investigation. In response to another question from Bongardt, Sabol asserted a criminal agent should not be present for the interview of Mihdhar once he is loceted. As to why the investigative request only went to New York and not an all points bulletin, (APB) throughout the FBI, Corsi responded it was not the practice to send out ABP types of requests during this period. Since 9/11, the FBI has begun to send out APB types of requests although there are investigative resource considerations that need to be made, Additionally, FBUNY was the logical choice for the investigation due to the available information on Mihdhar (at this point, Corsi believed Hazrni had departed the US and not, returned) and FBUNY could send out a “APB” request. AAs to why she had not checked Choicepoint®, state driver’s licenses or other background information on Mihdhar before sending the lead, Corsi responded this was not the practice. FBUNY Robert Fuller advised Corsi that he had run Choicepoint® with negative result. The field office normally conducted the background investigation and made decisions on logical investigative activity. At that time, investigations could not be opened at HQ and all investigations were run out of a field office. There was no requirement that the field office brief HQ on the status of an investigation. Corsi emphasized “the wall” (FISA) was not an issue in this i tion: The information was intelligence-based and there was no predicating criminal nexus. Corsi asserted Bongardt defined all issues or potential impediments as “the wall.” Corsi claimed she had “countless” conversations (some heated) with Bongard and she was “sick of arguing” with Bongardt. Corsi advised FBUNY had a bias toward criminal cases and they did not like to open intelligence cases. [As to why she had not referred Bongardt to a supervisor, Corsi responded Bongardt had spoken with supervisors and these issues had been discussed over and over. Corsi related Middleton had the final authority on how the EC would be sent, Corsi also explained these decisions had been relegated to the SSA level (by this time) and the FBUNY SSA (Liguori) could have opened the case as criminal if he made Corsi reiterated there was no predication for opening 2 cri Asto the August31, 2001 CLA cable to the FBI, Corsi stated this cable documented the “Toma asin” ofthe Malaysian ghotographs nd related infoation ete FI. Cor described the tof 32 CTC employee that often worked om issies with a domestic connection and she occasionally worked withL___] ARer 9/11, Corsi discovered there were additional Malaysian photographs ("5 or 6 total”) including the photograph of “Khallad.”” As to the joint Pakistani source who was allegedly shown the Malaysian photographs, Corsi stated she discovered this information during the Congressional hearings. Corsi indicated the ALAT would have been responsible for reporting any information relevant NCTA000057325to the FBI. However, Corsi stated the CIA and FBI avoided dual reporting so the information should only be contained in the CLA or FBI documents (not both). Corsi posited she would have expected some FBI reporting if this information had arisen earlier from the source. As to other impediments to the sharing of information, Corsi related the post 9/11 reviews have been detrimental to the CIA/FBUINSA relationship at the field level. Due to the allegations and recriminations back and forth, field personnel have become more cautious in exchanging information. Corsi claimed the FBI's lack of adequate information technology is detrimental to sharing information both within the FBI and to outside agencies. Corsi used the analogy of the soviet railroad system for the FBI information technology. The soviet railroad system does not have standardized track size but they try to keep the trains running on different size railroad tracks NCTA000057326