The Past and Present Society

The War of the Pacific and the National and Colonial Problem in Peru
Author(s): Heraclio Bonilla
Source: Past & Present, No. 81 (Nov., 1978), pp. 92-118
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/650365 .
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 THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC AND THE
NATIONAL AND COLONIAL PROBLEM
IN PERU*
I
AFTER THE BATTLES OF SAN JUAN AND MIRAFLORES WHICH LED TO THE
occupation ofLimabytheChileans, Patricio
Lynch, thecommander-
in-chiefof the Chileanexpeditionary force,visitedone of the
hospitalsofthecityin thecompany oftheFrenchadmiralDu Petit
Thouars.Lynchwastrying toexplaintotheFrenchman thereasons
forthePeruvian defeat.
He approached twowounded Peruvians,and
aftersomeexpressions of sympathy, he putthefollowing question
separatelyto eachone:"Andwhydidyoutakepartin thebattle?"
"I foughtfordonNicolas",answered one;andtheother:"I, fordon
Miguel". Don Nicolas was the well-known Peruvianstatesman
Pi&rola;don Miguelwas ColonelIglesias.Lynchput the same
questionto two Chileancasualties,whobothappearedsurprised
as theyanswered: "Formyfatherland, Sir".AndLynchturned toDu
PetitThouarswiththeremark: "Thatis whywewon.Thesefought
fortheircountry, theothersfordonSo-and-So".'
Fortyyearslater,in a beautifulstoryhalfwaybetween fantasy
and reality,thePeruvianwriter EnriqueL6pezAlbuijar presentsa
dialoguebetweenthe IndianAparicioPomaresand the members
of thevillagecommunity of Obas in thedepartment of Huinuco.
Pomaresis thefirst mantoseektorousethesepeasantstoresistthe
Chileanoccupation:
"Perhapsnoneof youremembers me.I am AparicioPomaresof Chupain, an
Indianlikeyourselves,
butI am a Peruvianat heart.I haveaskedyouto come
downfromthehillsto tellyouthata greatdangeris nowthreatening all these
becausea fortnight
villages, ago abouttwohundred Chileansoldiers
arrived in
Huanuco.Anddo youknowwhothesemenare?I willtellyou.Theyarethemen
* The main evidence in
support of the argumentof this paper comes from
documentsin the NationalArchivesof Washingtonand thePublic RecordOfficein
London, which I was able to consultas VisitingFellow of the WoodrowWilson
InternationalCenterforScholarsin thesecondsemesterof 1974, and theCentrefor
Latin AmericanStudiesat theUniversity of LiverpoolbetweenJanuaryand March
1977. I wishto expressmythanksto ProfessorsJamesH. Billington,Harold Blake-
more,David Brading,JohnFisher,E. J. Hobsbawm,JohnLynch,RoryMillerand
CliffordT. Smith for theirhelp and theircomments.If, in spiteof them,errors
remain,the responsibility
is entirelymine.The articlehas been translatedfromthe
originalSpanishbyE. J.Hobsbawm.
' Cited by Gonzalo Bulnes, Guerra del Pacifico,3 vols. (Santiago, 1911-19), ii,
p. 699.

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 THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL PROBLEM IN PERU 93
who entered Peru with fire and blood three years ago. They are supaypa-
huachashganand theymustbe exterminated. These menburndownthe villages
throughwhichtheypass, theykill the wounded,theyshoot the prisoners,they
rape the women,theyslaughterthebabies withtheirbayonets,theyrideintothe
churcheson theirhorses,theyrob the sanctuariesof the saints,and now they
quarterthemselvesin the houses of God. They show God no respect,turnthe
chapelsintostablesand cook theirfoodon thealtars.I have foughtthemin many
places.. ."
"And whydo Chileansdo such thingswith'piruvians'?"askedtheheadmanof
thepeopleofObas. "Are theynotjustthesame mistis?"2
"No, theyare different.They are mistisfromanotherland wherethePeruvians
do notrule.Theirland is called Chile".
"And whyare theyfighting the'piruvians'?",theman fromObas asked.
"Because theyare greedyforour riches,because theyknowthatPeru is very
richand theyare verypoor.They are a miserablefamishedlot".
The assemblybrokeinto loud laughter.So thiswas the reasonwhytheywere
such robbers:theywere hungry.But the headmanfromObas asked foran ex-
planation.He did notlikethephrase"our riches".
"Whydid yousay 'our riches',Pomares?Areour richesthesameas thoseofthe
mistis?Anyway,whatricheshave we got?All we have is sheep,cows,a littlebitof
land, and potatoesand wheatforfood.Arethosethingsenoughto makethesemen
comefromso faraway to takethemaway fromus?"
"I will speak moreclearly",answeredPomares."They did not come forour
cattle,but theydid come forour lands,whichare down therein the south.First
theyseized those,then theywent on to seize the ones closer by. What do you
imagine,good people?In a war he who has morepowertakeseverything fromhim
who has less power".
"But thelands in the southbelongto the mistis",arguedthe man fromObas.
"They are lands which have nothingto do with us. What have the lands of
Pisagua, about whichyou spoke,to do withthoseof Obas, Chupan, Chavinillo,
Pachas and theothercommunities?"
"They have much to do with them.You forgetthat in those lands thereis
Cuzco, the holy city of our ancestors.And to say that the Chilean mistihas
nothingto do withus is like sayingthatif tomorrow, forinstance,somebandits
were to attackObas and burn thisand that,the men fromthe othervillagesto
whomtheyhave done nothing,will see no reason whytheyshould not join the
banditsor whythe banditsshouldbe pursued.Is thathow peoplethinkin these
partssinceI wentaway fromhere?... Or are youperhapsafraid?Let thosestand
up who are afraidoftheChileans.. ."
But old Cusasquiche,who was the chiefof themenof Chavinillo,an old man
witha venerablehead and theexpressionofa sphinx,stoppedcaressingthemusket
he carriedoverhis shoulder,and witha passionunsuitedto his yearshe said:
"Aparicio,you knowthatthereare no cowardsamongus; but we are prudent
men. Indians are veryprudentand have sufferedmuch,but whentheirpatience
runsout theyattackand hitback. Your questionis unreasonable.But I, in turn,
willask you: Whyshouldwe makecommoncause withthe'piruvian'mistis?The
'piruvian' mistishave always treatedus badly.Not a year passes but thesemen
come hereand extorttaxesfromus and take away our animalsand also our sons,
sometimesforsoldiers,sometimesforpongos [forcedlabourers].Have you for-
gottenthat,Pomares?"

2 The term
mistiis a Quechua wordsignifying whitemenor mestizosexercising
power.(Mestizo,in the socio-racialterminology of Spanish America,describesthe
stratumof inhabitantsdescendedfromunionsof Indians and whites,and therefore
superiorto theformerand inferiorto thelatter.Defacto it tendedto includeanyone
enjoyingthestatusofthisstratum,thoughthetermcholois perhapsmorecommonly
used to includeIndiansassimilatingto mestizostatus.Translator'snote.)

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94 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 81
"No, Cusasquiche. How can I forgetit whentheseverythingshappen to me?
Four yearsago theytookme in Huainucoand putme intothearmyand sentmeto
fightin thesouthagainsttheChileans.And I wentaway to fightcarryingwithme
in myheartmywifeand mychildren.What would becomeof themwithoutme?
Everyday I thoughtabout this,and everyday I thoughtI woulddesert.But they
kepta sharpeyeon us. And in thesouththesergeantin mybattaliontoldme why
we werefighting, and I saw othercomradeswho werenotIndians but who were
surelyof thesame sortas myself.They sang and dancedand laughedin thesame
barracksas I, and in battletheyfoughtlike lions crying'Long live Peru!' and
'Down withtheenemy!'And thenI was ashamedof mysorrowand made up my
mindto fightas theydid. Did theynothave wivesand littlechildrenas I did?And
when I heard that all thesemen called themselvesPeruvians,I called myselfa
Peruviantoo. Some werePeruviansfromLima, somePeruviansfromArequipa,
some PeruviansfromTacna. Myself,I was a PeruvianfromChupann... from
Huainuco.And thenI forgavethePeruvianmistiswho had put me intothearmy,
whereI learnedmanythings.I learnedthatPeru is a nationand Chile is another
nation;thatPeruis thefatherland ofthemistisand oftheIndians;thatwe Indians
live in ignoranceof manythings,because we live tiedto our lands and we despise
theknowledgeofthemistis,whichis whythemistisknowmorethanwe do. AndI
learnedthat when the fatherlandis in danger,I mean whenmen fromanother
nation attack it, then all its sons must defendit. No more or less than we do
hereaboutswhensomecommunity attacksus. Do thePeruvianmistismistreatus?
Yes, they do. But the Chilean mistiswould treat us worse. At bottom,the
Peruviansare our brothersand theothersare our enemies.And you mustchoose
betweenthem".3
Both ColonelPatricioLynchand thecomuneroAparicioPomares
are speakingabouttheattitudesofimportant groupsofthePeruvian
popularclassesduringthe so-calledWar of the Pacific,the military
conflictbetweenChile and Peru between I879 and 1883. These
attitudesare plainlysymptomatic. They pointto a majorproblem:
what was the social dimensionof the War of the Pacific,or if we
prefer,how was a nationalwar combinedwiththe internalconflict
of both class and race? That the war broughtmilitary,political
and economicdisasterto the Peruvianrulingclass is well known.
However,the experienceof the war also providesan exceptional
opportunity to testthe solidityof the nationalassumptionswhich
underlaythefoundationof thePeruvianrepublicsixtyyearsearlier.
There is no betterway of testingthe foundationsof a societyand
the motivationsof its members'behaviourthana situationof crisis.
The objectof thispaper is to explorethisproblem.Beforedoingso,
however,it will be convenientto define,as exactlyas possible,the
scopeand significance ofmyanalysis.
The word"explore"is notchosencasually.The WarofthePacific,
like some other historicalprocesses,has been insufficiently in-
vestigated.4Beforefirmconclusionscan be drawn or a definitive
3 Enrique L6pez Albiijar,"El hombrede la bandera",CuentosAndinos,9thedn.
(Lima, 1975),PP. 57-68.
4 Amongtheworkson thePacificWar thefollowing deservemention:Bulnes,op.
cit.; A. BlanlotHolley,Historiade la paz entreChiley el Perfi,1879-1882,2nd edn.
(Santiago, 191o); M. F. Paz Soldfin,Narracionhist6ricade la guerrade Chile contra
el Perziy Bolivia (BuenosAires,1924); Sir ClementsR. Markham,The Warbetween
(cont. on p. 95)

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 THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL PROBLEM IN PERU 95

synthesis attempted, further carefulresearchinto the different

aspectsof the war mustbe undertaken. The veryfullnational
literatureon theWarof thePacific,written in thethreecountries
concerned forpurposes ofapologetics orexculpation, is scientifically
worthless. Thepresent paper is thereforenot an attempt towritethe
complete history ofthewarbetween PeruandChile,butmerely an
effort
tosurvey andanalyseoneofitsmoresignificant aspects.
Again,theemphasis onthesocialas distinct from otherdimensions
oftheconflict isdeliberate.In Peruatleast,theofficial interpretation
ofthewarhas beenchallenged, curiously enough, byan alternative
versionwhichamountsto no morethanwhatmightbe calledthe
foreignconspiracy thesis.In itssimplest form thisthesissuggests that
thedirectactorsin thewarwerein reality mereshadows, or in the
bestofcasespuppets whosestrings werebeingpulledfrom Europe
thatis,fromBritainor France- andfromtheU.S.A.In so faras
thisphantasmagoric interpretation ofnationalhistory seekstoplace
a nationalconflict withina widercontext, we may approveits
intentions. The factremains thatitsanalysisis mistaken andlacks
anything like sufficientsupporting evidence. not
Though wishing to
digresstoofar,twopreliminary observations nevertheless needtobe
madehere.
The Warof thePacificbrokeout at thestartof theimperialist
period,to useLenin'sterm, thatis tosaya periodcharacterized by
substantial modifications in theinternal structure oftheEuropean
powersand in themodalities oftheiroverseasexpansion. Thisfact
alone fullyjustifiestheneedto examinetheroleof international
forcesin theorigin, progress andconclusion ofthewar.However, in
doingso wemustdistinguish between twolevelsofanalysis:thatof
the publicpoliciesof the variousstatesinvolvedand thatof the
privatepoliciesofthevariousbusiness houseswhichcontrolled the
principalresources ofBolivia,ChileandPeru.Astothefirst, twenty-
fiveyearsago V. G. Kiernanpublished a documented articlewhose
principalconclusion stillappearstobe unchallengeable. Apropos the
opinionexpressed in 1882bytheUnitedStatesSecretary of State
that"it is a complete mistake to see thisas a Chileanwaragainst
Peru.It is a BritishwaragainstPeruusingChileas itsinstrument",
Kiernanwrote:
Fewofthewiderconsequences ofthewarcouldhavebeenforeseen whenitbegan;
a factwhichtellsagainstBlaine'sideathatthiswasan "Englishwar".So faras
Snote
4 cO tt.)
Peru and Chile, 1879-1882 (London, 1882); Tommaso Caivano, Historia de la
guerra de America entre Chile, Perziy Bolivia, 2 vols. (Iquique, 1904); W. J. Dennis,
Tacna and Arica: An Account of the Chile-Peru Boundary Dispute and of the
Arbitrations by the United States (New Haven, 1931); Edmundo Civati Bernasconi,
Guerra del Pacifico (Buenos Aires, 1946); William F. Sater, The Heroic Image in
Chile: Arturo Prat, Secular Saint (Berkeley, 1973); and above all, V. G. Kiernan,
"Foreign Interest in the War of the Pacific", Hispanic Amer. Hist. Rev., xxxv
(1955), PP. 14-36.

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96 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 8I

his suspicionswereconcernedwiththe Britishcapitalestablishedin Chile in the

nitratefields,theremustremain- as withanalogousproblems- an elementof
doubt. This capital had close connectionswith Chile's financialand political
interests,and throughthemcould exertbehindthescenesan influenceofthesort
thattendsto leave littlepositiverecordofitsactivity.The Scottishlegalverdictof
"not proven" may be the mostsuitableone here. Blaine's suspicions,however,
extendedmuch further,to the aggregateof Britishinterests,and the British
Governmentas their representative;and here the verdictcan only be "not
guilty".,
On theotherhandtheroleofthevariousforeign firms in theorigin
and developmentof the war still remainsin total obscurity.The
analysisoftheprivatearchivesofthevariousgroupsofbondholders,
of Dreyfus,of theownersof thenitratedeposits,thetradinghouses,
thebanks,as wellas oftheircorrespondence withthegovernments or
factionswithinthegovernments of Chile,Peru and Bolivia,willone
day throwlighton thisrole- butonlyifwe abandontheingenuous
viewthatcapitaland itsforeignagentstookup a firmand immutable
positionforor againstone or otherofthebelligerents. Afterall, some
sixtyyearsof experiencein theirrelationswithLatin Americahad
inoculatedthemagainstthiskindofinflexibility.6
However,itis nottheobjectofthispapertopursuethesequestions.
Rather,itattempts a provisionalassessment ofthesocialdimensionof
thewar,in thebeliefthatboththedevelopment ofthewar itselfand
its effectscan be betterexplainedby an adequate understanding of
theinternalstructuring ofPeruviansociety.
The originsof thewar and themilitary eventsare, at leaston the
surface,reasonablyfamiliar.In theAtacamaregionof Bolivia there
were importantnitratedepositsexploitedby Chilean and British
capital.A lengthy borderconflictbetweenChileand Boliviaaboutthe
controlofthiszone had led to theConventionof I 872 and theTreaty
of I874. The firstfixedthe 24thparallelas theborderbetweenthe
two countries,whilearticleIV of the TreatystipulatedthatBolivia
would not increasetaxes on Chilean enterprises operatingbetween
the 23rd and 24thparallelon Bolivianterritory in thecourseof the
nexttwenty-five years.The Treatywas not ratifiedby the Bolivian
Congresswhich,moreover,decidedon 14 February1878 to raise a
furtherdutyof ten centavosforeveryquintal of nitrateexported
since I874. The Chileanresponsewas themilitary occupationofthe
Atacamadesertexactlyone yearlater.Peru,tiedto Boliviasince1873
by a "secrettreaty"of mutualdefence,attempted at firstto mediate

5 Kiernan,op. cit.,pp. 35-6.

6 The archivesof AnthonyGibbs and Sons Ltd. (the merchantbankerswho
organizedthe tradein guano and nitrate)are to be foundin theGuildhallLibrary,
London.These papersare essentialto an understanding oftheroleofprivatecapital
in the PacificWar. See in particular,L 64.22/MSS. 11,120-11,126; MS. 11,470,
I
vols. 3-7; MS. 1,471, vols. 7-18; MS. I 1,472,VOls.I-4.

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 THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL PROBLEM IN PERU 97
but,sincethecountryrefusedto declareitselfneutral,was drawninto
thewarfrom5 AprilI879.7
It is equally easy to describethe militaryoperations.Once the
Chileans had occupied Atacama, the war became exclusivelya
conflictbetween Chile and Peru. Its main phases were partly
determinedby the constraintsof geography.Given the distances
betweenthe centresof powerand the difficulty of land communi-
cations,the initialphase of the war was naval. Here the battleof
Angamos(8 October 1879) establishedthe definitive of
superiority
Chile. This enabled her to supportthe landingof troopsand their
further overlandadvance. In effect,once the Pacificfronthad been
opened,the landingat Pisagua (28 October1879) enabledChile to
take Iquique and Tarapacai.And it is at thispointthatthe political
decomposition ofPerubegins.

Since i840 thePeruvianeconomyhad dependedalmosttotallyon

the exploitationand exportfromher offshore islands of guano, a
fertilizerused primarilyin Britishagriculture.Guano not only
enabled the Peruvianeconomyto recoverafterseveraldecades of
exhaustion,but also made it possible for native merchantsand
landownersto re-establish themselves.8 In spiteof internalfrictions
theyconstituted thebackboneof thenativerulingclass. Its growing
economic power was reinforcedin turn by doubtfulfinancial
speculations,by its sharein the guano trade,by its participationin
thenewlydevelopingfinancecapital,and bytheprofits derivingfrom
a notablyfavourableagriculturalconjoncture.Politicallythis was
translatedinto the formationof the Civil Party(PartidoCivil) and
theriseof itsleaderManuel Pardo to thepresidency of thePeruvian
statein 1872. Five decadesof admittedly erraticpoliticalcontrolby
numerousmilitarychieftains(caudillos)were thus forthe moment
broughtto an end. Anothereminentmemberof thisgroup,Colonel
Mariano Ignacio Prado, was presidentof Peru when the Pacific
conflictbrokeout.
How solid was thisoligarchicalstate,and howfarhad thenative
rulingclass succeededin establishingeffectivenational cohesion?
Would the militarythreatclose the fissuresbetweenthe various
classesof Peruviansociety,betweenrusticprovincialoligarchiesand
theeducatedeliteofLima, and betweenthedifferent ethnicestatesof
so profoundly heterogenousa countryas Peru? Or would it rather
intensify the country'sinternaldislocationas the feeblebonds of
7 J. Valerie Fifer,Bolivia: Land, Location and Politicssince 1825 (Cambridge,
1972), pp. 59-60.
8 Cf. HeraclioBonilla,Guanoy burguesiaen el Periu'
(Lima, 1974).

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98 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 8I

cohesionsnapped- thusprovidingan essentialfactordetermining

Chilean victory?The mere account of eventsin itselfimpliesa
possibleanswerto thesequestions.Let us beginbycitingtheevidence
of a contemporary witness,SpencerSt. John,head of the British
legationin Lima. On 29 October I879 he wroteas followsto his
ForeignSecretary,themarquessofSalisbury:
I have the honorto informyourLordshipthaton thearrivalon the9thinstantof
the news of the takingof the "Huascar" by the Chileans, a Ministerialcrisis
ensued; General Mendiburu and the rest of the Cabinet resigned,and the
PresidentsentforGeneralLa Cotera to aid himin forming anotherMinistry.Up
to the presenttimenothinghas reallybeen done to thateffect,foralthoughthe
posts of Foreign Affairsand Justicewere occupied during a few days, the
incapacityoftheoccupantswas too apparentforthemto remainlongin power.
At the presenttimethereappears to be no government whatever.The Vice-
Presidentis confinedto his bed by illnessand transactsno businesswhileGeneral
La Coterawho is notconsideredcapable is theonlyMinisteras yetappointed.
Everythingappears to be in a chaotic state: thereis no general named to
commandthe army,nothingis beingdone to strengthen theirforcesto fortify
the
town, althoughit is believedthat the Chileans are preparingan expeditionto
attackthecapital.
On all sides incapacityappears to be in possessionof everyimportantpart: in
the south it is reportedthat the chiefsof the armyare givingthemselvesup to
amusementas ifno war existed....
Perii appears to be struckas withparalysis;the people themselvesseem as
indifferent to the futureas the governingclasses,who are thinkingmoreof their
personalambitionsthanthewelfareoftheircountry.9
Two monthslater,in December,St. Johnsentfurther
information:
In mydespatchn. 176 of the ioth instantI referred to the increasedconfidence
resultingfromthe returnof GeneralPrado. It was generallyhopedthathe would
introducesomestrengthintothegovernment and by summoningable menabout
him to give confidenceto the country.None of these expectationshave been
realized.Unable to obtainthecooperationofthepoliticalleaders,he keptGeneral
La Puerta,an incapableMinistry, and everydepartment ofGovernment appeared
paralysed,whenon Thursdaythe 18thinstant,thepeoplewereastonishedto hear
thatGeneral Prado had embarkedon boardthe EnglishMail Steamerand sailed
forthe UnitedStates. Afterhis departurea proclamationwas publishedsaying
thathe had leftin orderto procurethemeansnecessaryto ensureultimatevictory:
his friendsfaintlysustainthisdeclarationbut in generalhis departureis looked
upon as a disgraceful flight.
I have everthoughtGeneral Prado to be totallyunworthyof his position:on
everygreat occasionhe has showna lamentablewantofpersonalcourageand it is
remarkablethattheman who in Peru goesbythenameof"the herooftheSecond
ofMay" shouldgenerallybe lookedon as an arrantcoward.The 2nd ofMay is the
date oftherepulseoftheSpanishfleetat Callao in I866.
The financialreputationof GeneralPrado is on a par withthatof hiscourage:
he is accusedby all partiesoftheworstsystemofspoliation.
It is generallythoughtthatsomeambitiouschiefsanxiousto arriveat supreme
powerdiligentlypressedon General Prado's attentionthe existenceof a plot to
murderhim and thathis mindbeingweakenedby illnessand anxietycould not
resist these promptingsand he fled beforewhat was probablyan imaginary
danger.10
9 SpencerSt. Johnto theMarquisofSalisbury,Lima, 29 Oct. 1879: PublicRecord
Office(hereafter P.R.O.), F.O. 61/319.
10
SpencerSt. Johnto Salisbury,Lima, 22 Dec. 1879: P.R.O., F.O. 61/319.

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 THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL PROBLEM IN PERU 99
The curiousbehaviour ofPresident Prado,described
bySt. John,
providesan extreme of
illustration the taken
attitude bythecivilista
oligarchy as a wholeduringtheconflict. Attheverystartofthewar
thegovernment, askingfora nationalloanoftenmillionsoles,could
obtainlittlemorethanone million,and thatsum was basically
contributed bythepopularclassesinthefaceoftheresistance ofthe
wealthy Limacapitalists," thoughthelackofmonetary liquidityat
thistimemustalso be bornein mind.12 However,thedeparture of
President Pradowas littlemorethanthepreludeto a fargreater
politicalcrisis,ofwhichthepotential forthepossess-
consequences
ing class wereincalculable.AnteroAspillaga,the ownerof the
haciendaCayaltionthenorthern coast,predictedthepossible
results
ofthisinternal disorganization
veryclearly:
Anyinternal disorder
wouldprobably bedisastrous,
sincewedonotlackimitators
ofwhathappened in Francein I871,andwemight wellseea horrible
parodyof
theCommune, whichwouldplungeus intothegreatesttroublesandmisfortunes.
Thiswaroughtto teachus to be morethoughtful. Aboveall, itshouldteachus
truepatriotism- notonlytodefend ourcountry againsttheexternal
enemy but
alsoagainstthedevouringmonster ofcivilwar."
The powervacuumleftby Prado's flightmade possiblethe
establishmentofNicolasde Pierola'sdictatorship.
Apartfrom declar-
ing himself "protector of the nativerace"14 he concentrated his
efforts
onthedefence ofLima.However, inspiteofhisefforts, defeat
in thebattlesofSan Juanand Miraflores (January I88I) ledto the
collapseof his government and theChileanoccupation of Lima.
Duringhisbriefgovernment thecrackswithin thesocialstructure
deepened.Neitherthe Chileaninvasionnor the economicand
militarycollapseofPerureconciled thecivilista
oligarchy toPierola,
thehatedaristocrat fromArequipawho,as Balta'sminister in I868,
had deprived themofthefabulousguanotradein orderto handit
overto theFrenchtraderAugusteDreyfus. "RathertheChileans
thanPierola"' was theverdict oftheoligarchy, whichthussubor-
dinateda superficialnationalconsciousnessto itsclassfeeling. The
war thustooksecondplace to the simultaneous and muchmore
internal
significant strugglebetween thevariousclassesandpolitical
patronagesofa profoundly dividedsociety.
AftertheChileans occupiedLima,theoligarchic statefelltopieces.
Governments succeededeach otherat briefintervals or competed
11 JorgeBasadre, Historia de la Repziblicadel Perfi,5th edn., io vols. (Lima,
1962-4), iv, pp. 2380-1.
12 Cf. RobertG.Greenhilland RoryM. Miller,"The PeruvianGovernment and
theNitrateTrade, 1873-1879", Jl. Latin AmericanStudies,v (1973), pp. 107-31.
13 Anteroto Ram6n Aspillaga,Hacienda Cayalti,6 Junei88o: Archivodel Fuero
Agrariode Lima (hereafterA.F.A.), vol. 20.
14 Basadre,
op. cit., v, p. 2444.
15Jorge Basadre, Perzi, problema y posibilidad (Lima, 193
I), p. 139.

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I00 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 8I

with each other to impose authority.This civil war reflected,at

bottom,the irreconcilableinterestsof individualchieftainsand
patrons,and theirdependantsand followers.Since none of them
enjoyed a sufficientbase of autonomouspower, the result was
profoundinstability.Only the supportof the Chilean army of
occupationcould enable a government to maintainor enlargeits
sphere of authority.Thus the governmentof Francisco Garcia
Calderon (January 1881) was followedby Lizardo Montero (6
December1881) and in turnbyMiguelIglesias(30 December1882),
whilethe Chileanswonderedwithwhomto negotiatetheconditions
ofpeace. The disintegrationoftheoligarchicstatethusdemonstrated
the profoundinstabilityof Peruvian society,and how extremely
vulnerablewas the national cohesionachievedby the rule of the
oligarchy.Different groupsof patronsand clientsbeganto fightover
thedebrisof power,notmerelyin thevariousprovincialassemblies,
but also by recourse to arms. Thus four differentlegislative
assemblieswere almost simultaneously established- by Garcia
in
Calderon Chorrillos(June I88I), by Pierola in Ayacucho(July
I88I), by Iglesias Cajamarca (December1882) and byMonteroin
in
Arequipa(April-June 1883).16
However, the sword prevailed over rhetoric.Caiceresfought
Garcia Calderon at San Mateo and Chicla in July1881,17 Panizo
at Achicumay on 22 February 1882,18 and Iglesias after the
"pronunciamento"of Montin, while the followersof Puga and
Iglesiasfoughtone another.The war withChile had virtuallyended
in January 188I with the occupationof Lima, in spite of the
admirableresistanceof Caceres and his guerrillabands, the mon-
toneras.On itssmokingashesa dividedsocietycontinuedto do battle
- and in themindsof itspeoplethiswar maywellhave beenmore
important thanthenationalone. Yet,in additionto this"horizontal"
conflictbetweenthe various fractionsof the rulingclass, it also
broughtinto the open an even more significant opposition:that
betweentherulingclass and thebodyoftheoppressedclasses.Andas
all thegovernments fromGarciaCalderonto Iglesiasconsidered their
centralproblem,thepeace treatywithChile,theydid so againstthe
backgroundofthisclass conflict.
Indeed,afterthe fall of Lima all thegovernments, installedwith
thesupportoftheChileanarmy,agreedon theneedto makepeace as
soon as possible.Theymerelydiffered on thequestionofterms.With
thisabdicationoftherulingclass as a whole,in I 882 onlyAndresA.

16Basadre,Historiade la
Repaiblicadel Perai,vi,p. 2613.
17 Ibid., pp. 2578-9.
18Ibid., p. 2584.

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 THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL PROBLEM IN PERU IOI

Caceres and his montonerasin the Andeanmountainsremainedto

launchanysortof resistance,and theireffortsweredirectedas much
against the Peruvian civilista oligarchy,as against the Chilean
occupation.As Caicereshimselfwas laterto putit:
Chile devotedall itsactivitiesto thepursuitofthistask,utilizingthemostvileand
unscrupulousmeans.And,evenmoreunhappily,it foundamongour compatriots
thosewho,movedby personalambitionratherthanbythe supremeneedsof our
country,turnedthemselvesinto efficientcollaboratorswith the invader.This
misfortune was not due to the pressureof enemyarms,but ratherto the stateof
disorganizationwhichthenprevailedin Peru,to theblundersofitsleaders,and to
the miserableattitudeof wealthyelementswhichneitherknewhowto maintaina
firmwillto fightto theend fortheterritorial ofthenation,nordesiredto
integrity
do so. Instead, theyaided the subtlelabours of the enemy,not only failingto
provideany supportforthe country'sarmy,but actuallywithdrawing such sup-
portas theymighthave provided.
In the south the armyof Arequipa,witha strengthof morethan 4,000 men,
dispersedwithoutfighting,never having seen action. In the northpeace was
proclaimedat all costs,and theinvader'speace termswereaccepted.In thecapital
of the republic,men of means who had wantedwar at the outset,now thought
onlyofsavingtheirpersonsand property throughpeace.19
Whatsocialinterests favouredan immediatepeace?Theirdemand
naturally reflectedan awareness of Peru's militaryweakness.To
continuethewarundersuchconditionswouldbe pointless.However,
much more urgentconsiderationsplayed theirpart. The national
breakdownof PeruviansocietywhichfollowedtheChilean victories
was probablyeven moredramaticat theregionallevel.Landowners
and merchants, thatis to say thebodyoflocal rulers,suddenlyfound
themselvestotallyunable to controltheirsubordinates.Locally as
well as nationally,the snappingof the linksof social and political
subjectionproducedtheirinevitableconsequence:looting,pillage,
murder,and destruction ofproperty.Here is a landlord'stestimony:
Shame on Chiclayo! I am talkingnot about the Chileans but - you will be
amazed to hear- about thelootingbyChiclayo'sown sons,themoststupidand
degradedamongthe commonpeople.Not onlydid theyjoin theChileans as they
burnedand sacked - furniture, local productslike rice and maize, scavenging
behindthem.More thanthis:thelocal inhabitantsbusiedthemselves denouncing
property-ownersto Sr. Lynchand his commanders.In short,all thedirtylinenof
thehousewas on opendisplayto theChileans.20
foran oligarchfromLima or a haughtyland-
It was not difficult
lord to make the choice betweenthe Chileans and the sackingof
by excitedmobs,notonlyofpeopletheyhad exploited
his properties
for centuriesbut, incrediblyenough, of Negroes, Chinese and
Indians!This deep social panic explainswhythemayorof Lima was
anxious that his cityshould be promptlyoccupiedby the Chilean

19AndresA. Ciceres, La guerradel 79: sus campafias(Lima, 1973), p. 250.

20 Anteroto Ram6nAspillaga,Hacienda Cayalti,18 Oct. i88o: A.F.A., vol. 20.

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102 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 8I

army,21 and the desire of the rulingclass for continuedmilitary

occupation.As SpencerSt. Johnreported:
Indeed,thefearof thereturnoftheGovernment ofPi&rola,supported,as it is, by
thelowerorderswhobuttheothernightcommitted suchexcesses,makesall those
who possessproperty desirethattheChileansshouldprolongtheoccupationofthe
country,untilall excitementshall have cooleddown.22
SimilarlyGarcia Calderon,who organizedthe government after
Pi~irola'sin Magdalena,accusedhispredecessorof sowing"anarchy
amongthe social classes"23and wrotein his "Proclamation"to the
peopleon 28 February1881:
The war has caused thosewithfortunesmoresuffering than thosewho onlylive
by theirlabour .... The devastationcaused by the enemyhas led to the loss of
hundredsofestatesand buildingswhichrepresented a value ofmillionsofsoles.If
theseestatesare notcultivated,ifthesehousesare notrebuilt,thehonestlabourer
who livesby thetoilofhis handswillhave no one to givehimhissubsistence.The
ills fromwhichour countryhas suffered forthelast twoyearswillnotend unless
workis resumed,and untilthereis peace, therewillbe no work.Arethosewhoare
called rich- if any are left- responsibleforthesack of theirestatesand their
houses?Certainlynot.The cause ofour misfortunes is thewar,a warwhichwe are
unfortunatelyin no positionto continue.24
Andthesame "Proclamation"continuedwitha defenceofpeace and
a clearwarningto the"honestlabourers":
You willbe thevictimsifthemenwho are calledrichlosetheirwealth.Those men
have thesameinterestsas youhave,and youwillsuffer iftheydisappear.The only
peopleto profitbydisorderare thoseperverseindividualswhosowthefatalseedof
discord.25
It is easy to imaginewithwhat profoundreliefthe rulingclass
hailed the energeticcall for peace launched from"Montin" by
ColonelMiguelIglesias- a reliefreflected bytheirmilitary
support
forIglesias,theirrefusalto recognizethe authoritiesnominatedby
Ciceres, and their financial support for the Chilean army of
occupation.Gone werethenationaldreamsand thepromisesof 182I.
Perhaps the most tragic epitaph on the political historyof the
Peruvianrulingclass is writtenin theirdeterminedsupportforthe
ChileangeneralMartinianoUrriolaat theverymomentwhenhe was
beingfoughtbythepeopleof Huanta underthecommandofMiguel
Laz6n.26
However,not only the Lima rulingclass, but also the regional
oligarchies,clamouredforpeace, refusedto resist,and showedfear

21 HenriFavre,"Remarquessurla luttedes classesau Peroupendantla guerredu

Pacifique",Litteratureet socidtdau Pdrou du XIXe sikcled nos jours (Grenoble,

1975),PP. 58-9-
22 SpencerSt. Johnto Earl Granville,Lima, 22 Jan.
188I: P.R.O., F.O. 61/333.
23 Documentcitedby Favre,op. cit.,p. 6o.
24Ibid., p. 59-
25Ibid.
26
Basadre,Historiade la Repuiblicadel Perui,vi,pp. 2637-8.

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 THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL PROBLEM IN PERU 103
and contemptforthe popularclasses. Thus AnteroAspillagacould
writefromthenortherncoastlands:
Here, as far as the peace is concerned,the intransigent
partyhas achievedthe
resultsof its iniquitousand anti-patrioticpropaganda:iniquitous,because they
proclaimtheirobjectwithouteitherdesiringit or beingin a positionto achieveit;
and anti-patriotic, becausetheyare simplydeepeningtheabyssintowhichall ofus
Peruvianshave sunksincethememorabledisastersof San Juanand Miraflores.
Of course,thosewho have nothing,lose nothing.And unfortunately theyare
the verymen who composethe groupswhichblindlyclamourforan impossible
war,followingPi6rolaand hissupporters.
to finda countrywhichhas suffereda moretragicfatethanour
It is difficult
unfortunate fatherland,and nonewhereitsown sonshavedone moretodestroyit
and bringit intocontempt.
In theend our troubleswillcease and thetempestwhichis destroyingus willdie
down only if our domesticpoliticschange, and we lose the illusion that our
salvationlies onlyin theProvisionalGovernment.27
A journalisticaccount of the Chilean armyexpeditioninto the
region in question throwslighton the politicalbehaviourof its
regionaloligarchy:
During the day (24 September i880) the prefectreceiveda note fromthe
commanderof the expeditionaryforce, Sefior Lynch, which demanded the
surrenderof the cityand also paymentof we do not knowhow manythousands
of soles. We do not know the prefect'sanswer,but are informedthat it was in
suitableand patriotictermswhichappeared to commithimfirmly to a patriotic
course. Nevertheless,the above-mentioned officialdecidedto abandon Monsefi
and at io p.m. movedwith all his people to Chiclayo,whencehe travelledby
special trainto the hacienda Patapo and fromthereto Chongoyape.This town
was therefore leftcompletelyto itsown devices,abandonedby its authoritiesand
guardedentirelyby the urban guard composedof foreigners, foreveryonedown
to themayorand themajorityofhiscolleagueshad fledthecity.28
Lynchhimselfreportedexactlythesamethingin a letterto Adolfo
ofLa Libertad:
Salm6n,prefect
I have pleasurein tellingyou thatin thecourseofmyexpeditionsyou are theonly
chiefwho has understoodwherehis dutylies. I have observedwithsadnessthat
everywhereplaces which deservebetterare governedby cowards who know
nothingof the modernlaws ofwar. Not a singleprefector governorhas remained
at his post,in spiteof my urgentrequestsforthemto do so. All have fledto the
mountains,terrifying the inhabitantsof the places throughwhich theyoass,
profitingfrom the situation to rob them. In Paita I was able to capture
comandantePardo de Zela, and lefthimpeacefullyin hispost....29
It remainsto estimatethe cost of this combinationof national
disintegrationand clientelist
politics.The twomainobjectivesofthe
Chilean armywereto seize the guano depositsand to destroythose
economicresourceswhichmighthave enabledPeru to continuethe
war or to resistoccupation.The firstaim was achievedpracticallyat

27Anteroto Ram6nAspillaga,Hacienda Cayalti,9 May

I881: A.F.A., vol 24.
28El Nacional, Chiclayo,24 Oct. I880: National Archives,
Washington,Micro-
filmPubns. (hereafterN.A.W.,M.P.), T 393, 3.
29Patricio Lynch to AdolfoSalm6n, San Pedro, 14 Oct. i88o: N.A.W., M.P.,
T 393, 3.

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104 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 8I
theoutsetof thewar,whileLynch'snorthern expedition (intothe
zoneoftheimportant sugarandcotton plantations)aimedtoweaken
P'erueconomically, bothby establishing directcontrolover the
productiveenterprisesand byextortinglargesumsin forced levies.
The northern landowning classmet Lynch's advance byseeking the
protectionof theChileanarmy,and also by therealor fictitious
transfer
ofitsestatestoforeign so that,as neutral
subjects property,
theywould be safe
from destruction
and financiallevies.
Thus,whentheChileanarmyoccupied thehaciendaCayaltion 7
Octoberi 88o andthreatened torazeittotheground, itwasAntero
Aspillagawho,in thenameofPrevost andCompany, issueda firm
protest
underlining theneutralownership oftheproperty. However,
as hewroteprivatelytohisbrotherRam6n:
The decisionto transferCayaltiand its capitalon leaseholdto Prevostand
Company madetheestateintoAmerican property,andthishassavedus,andwill
continueto saveus,frommajordamage.The reasonwefoundourselves insuch
extremesis becauseofdelaysdueto legaladvice;forit is months
sincewe took
stepstomakethetransfer.30
Similartransactionstookplaceon thehaciendas Leche,Chiclinand
Galindo,inLa Libertad; onPuenteandPaloSeco,inChimbote; and
onSan Jose,inNepeiia.1
Lynchandhisofficers thereforefoundthemselves obligedtodecide
whichestatesweregenuine foreign
property andwhichhadbeenthe
subjectoflast-minute or fictitious
transfers.
Yet thistaskofdocu-
mentary which
clarification, historians
todaywouldno doubtenvy,
was not withoutconsiderable complexities.For in effect,
a large
partoftheseestateswereformally Peruvian butatthesame
property,
timesubjecttoheavymortgages duetotheimprovidence orexcessive
expenditure oftheirowners.32 Theseoperations, and aboveall the
profits flowingfromthem,werecontrolled by British,Frenchor
NorthAmerican banks.Atall eventsitwasthrough thecombination
of all thesemechanisms thatthede-nationalizationoftheagrarian
estateson the Peruviannorthcoastbegan.Theyalso led to the
amalgamation ofestates, andreachedits
a processwhichintensified
culmination after
shortly the endof thewar.
Similarchangesin landedproperty alsooccurred in theAndean
highlands. Thusin theHuancavelica region,forexample, agrarian
development beforeI883 had beencharacterized by a permanent
fragmentation ofthegreatestates, incontrasttothegreaterpartof
rural Peru. This processhad probablybeen due to a greater
Io Oct. 188o: A.F.A., vol. 24.
30 Anteroto Ram6nAspillaga,Hacienda Cayalti,
31 S. C. Montjoyto WilliamHunter,Second Assistantof State Secretary,Lam-
bayeque, 25 Jan. and 6 May I881: N.A.W., M.P., T 393, 3; SpencerSt. Johnto
Lynch,Lima, II Sept. I88o: N.A.W.,M.P., T 393, 3.
32 Alejandro Garland, La industriaazucarera en el Perzi, 550-1895 (Lima,
1895).

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 THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL PROBLEM IN PERU I05

competitionfor land by reason of the peculiarpositionof Huan-

cavelicawithinthearea ofthecolony.However,duringthecourseof
the war the consolidationof medium-sizedpropertywas haltedor
evenreversed,as themiddlinglandownersabandonedtheirproperties
under the threatof the peasant insurrectionand the activitiesof
CGceres'smontoneras.In thismanner,hereas in thenorththeway
was openedforthe expansionof large landedproperty in the years
immediatelyfollowingthewarwithChile.33

III
We have a full and detaileddescriptionof the compositionand
characteristics of the Peruvianarmydefending Lima, itsequipment
and clothing,fromthepen of Carey Brenton,an Englishlieutenant
attachedto the fieldheadquartersof the Peruvianarmyduringthe
defenceof Lima in JanuaryI881. While he expressedunstinted
admirationforthe rabonas,the humblewomenwho werealwaysat
the side of the Peruviansoldiersthroughthickand thin,thisis what
he wroteaboutthemento hissuperior,WilliamDyke:
I'he majorityoftheofficers,
moreespeciallythesuperiorones,are thedescendants
of theold Spanish colonists,and have, therefore,
but littlein commonwiththeir
men. Espritde Corps is unknown;and althoughthe shoutof "Viva el Peru" is
invariablyraised by the Peruviansoldierbeforehe eitherattacksor runs away
fromhis enemy,he is probablyunawareofitsmeaningand merelyshoutsbecause
he has been orderedto do so. Many of themweretotallyignorantofthecause for
which theywere fighting,imaginingthat it was a revolution,the contending
partiesbeingheaded respectively by GeneralChili and Pierola; whilstI was also
informedby an officerthatmanyof the soldiershad been heard to declare that
"They werenotgoingto be shotforthesake ofthewhitemen".34
SimilarlySpencerSt. John,describedtheeventsduringthegloomy
nightof i6th January,whenthe Peruviansweredefeatedat Mira-
floresand theChileantroopspoisedto enterLima:
.. as soon, however,as darknesscame overthe townshotsbegan to be heardin
everydirection,and firesto breakout; a verylargeone was in the market-place
and the streetsadjoining.The cowardlymob were attackingand murderingthe
Chineseshopkeepers, who,totallyunprepared,wereeasilykilled;fromseventyto
eightyare supposedto have fallen.The mob was headedby Peruvianofficers in
uniform, who are knownto theChinese. It was an anxiousnight,as no one knew
how manyofthedefeatedarmyof30,000 menwerestillin Lima, and thefiringat
33Henri Favre, "Evoluci6n y situaci6nde las haciendasen la regi6nde Huan-
cavelica, Perui",in Henri Favre, Claude Collin Delavaud and JoseMatos Mar, La
hacienda en el Perui (Lima, 1967), pp. 240-2. For the effectsof the war with Chile on
otherregions,see some recentworkssuch as Bill Albert,An Essay on thePeruvian
Sugar Industry, 1880-1920 (Norwich, 1977); Douglas E. Horton, Haciendas and
Cooperatives: A Preliminary Study of Latifundist Agriculture and Agrarian Reform
in Northern Peru (Madison, i973); Peter F. Klaren, Modernization, Dislocation and
Aprismo (Austin, 1973).
34 "Report of Proceedingsof Lieut. Carey-Brenton while attachedto the Head-
QuartersStaffof the PeruvianArmy,engagedin thedefenceof Lima againstthe
Chilians": P.R.O., F.O. 61/337,fo. 156.

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io6 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 8I

timeswasveryheavy.The scenein theEnglishLegation wasa sad one.Atleast

700 ladiesandchildrenofthebestfamiliesin Limafilled everyroom;all fearing
notonlyto hearofthedeathofrelatives in therecent butthatthemob
battles,
wouldendbyattacking us. It wasa trying
night toall,thoughthepresence ofthe
Admiral andhisstaff,
withfiveblue-jackets,gaveconfidence.35
The eventsrelatedby the two Englishobserversmay serve to
introducetheproblemto whichthesecondpartof thispaperwillbe
devoted:splitsand ethnicconflicts withina nationalwar.For thewar
generatednot only, as we have seen, confrontations betweenthe
rulingclass and the subordinateclasses as a whole,and fractures
withinthe rulingclass and its different patronagegroups,but also
ethnicconfrontations which,in someways,cutacrossclass lines.
The well-known ethnicheterogeneity ofPeru has remainedto this
day as a heritagefromcolonial times. Division and opposition
betweenwhites,blacks and Indians was both a consequenceand a
conditionof the maintenanceof colonialdomination.The republic
not only failed to resolve these racial divisions.The civilista
oligarchy,basicallywhitesfromLima, took good care - and for
goodreason- to keepthesubjectofftheagendaofpublicdebate.In
fact,the crueldefeatof the Indian masseswiththecrushingof the
Tupac Amarurebellion,theirsubsequentweakness and geographical
dispersion, made them easy to controlsocially and politicallyby
powerfullocal chieftains(caciques). As for the Negroes, their
numericalweakness,the safety-valve providedin theirconditionsof
slaveryby the possibilityof individualflight,and a geographical
dispersionsimilarto thatoftheIndians,also removedanythreatthat
this racial group mightpresentto whitedomination.This racial
jigsawbecameeven morecomplicatedwhenthewhiteoligarchyfelt
obligedto importan estimated92,I30 Chinese into Peru between
1849 and I874, in responseto theshortageoflabourand thegrowth
of the Peruvian economydue to the exploitationof the guano
deposits,theconstruction of railwaysand thedevelopment ofcotton
and sugarcultivation.36 However,once again thedistribution of the
Chineseamongthesedifferent and widelydispersedactivitiesgreatly
attenuatedthe dangerof theirrevoltsagainstthe exploitationthey
suffered.Their rebellionswerenevermorethanstrictly localized.37
The destruction of the oligarchicalstate,the scatteringof the army
and the disorganizationof Peruvian society transformedthis
situationbetweenI879 and I884. The impactof thisbreakdownin
the social frameworkon the various ethnic groups and their
mobilization mustnowbe examined.
35 Spencer St. John to Granville, Lima, 22 Jan. I881: P.R.O., F.O. 61/333.
36 Wilma E. Derpich,"Introducci6nal estudiodel trabajador'coolie' chino en el
Peruidel sigloXIX" (Univ. ofSan Marcosde Lima, M.A. thesis,1976), pp. 158-62.
37 Watt Stewart,ChineseBondage in Peru: A Historyof the Chinese Coolie in
Peru, 1849-1874 (Durham, N.C., i951).

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 THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL PROBLEM IN PERU 107

As soon as the Chilean army arrivedin the northerncoastal

plantations,theChineserapidlyjoinedit,activelyparticipatingin the
sack of theirformermasters'estatesand indicatingto the Chileans
where machineryand other estate equipmenthad been hidden.
Obviouslytheydid notdo so fromany senseof loyaltyto or support
foreitherChile or thearmyofoccupation.We can speakneitherofa
"Chileanpatriotism" on thepartoftheChineseindentured labourers
norof "treasonto Peru". A Chinesecoolieoftheperiodcouldhardly
be expectedto distinguishbetweena Chilean and a Peruvian.The
simplefactwas that the Chinesewere atrociouslyexploitedby the
nationallandowners,and the mostlogical way of expressingtheir
hatredfortheirformer masterswas to jointheChileans.This was not
an unprecedentedphenomenon.Afterall, Pizarro had succeeded
witha handfulof menin overthrowing the impressive
Inca empire,
precisely because he to
managed gain the and
support complicityof
the variousethnicgroupswhichresentedthedominationoftheInca
state. The problemforthe Chinesewas that theirsupportforthe
Chilean armymade no difference whateverto theirmaterialand
social situation.Some of themwere sentby Lynchto workon the
nitrateand guano depositsin thesouth.3"Two thousandmorewere
incorporated in the Chilean army,by orderof theMinisterof War,
Vargara,and againsttheoppositionofLynchand otherofficers, and
giventhe task of buryingthe dead and caringforthe wounded.39
Finally,duringtheoccupationofLima,as SpencerSt. Johnreported:
On the 31st March theywere exposed almostto equal bad treatmentfromthe
Chilians.Underthepretextthatsomethieveshad escapedintotheChinesetheatre
theChilian soldiersburstopen thedoors,and rushedin and beganill treatingand
arrestingthe audience.Some oftheChinese,it is said, firedat themand wounded
two,upon whichtheChilian officers sentforreinforcements, capturedabout five
hundredmen,and plunderedall theChinesehousesand shopsin thatneighbour-
hood.40

WhenLyncharrivedat Guadalupe in theprovinceof Pacasmayo,

betweensix and eighthundredChineseputthemselves at thedisposal
of the armyand proceededto sack estatesand privatehouses,41as
theyalso did in Casagrande,in theChicamavalley.In thehacienda
Patapo (provinceof Chiclayo)the ChineselabourersshowedLynch
wherethe locomotivesof the local railwayhad been concealed.42
AnteroAspillagaobservedthat "all thisis enoughto driveeven the

38Montjoyto Hunter,Lambayeque,3 Nov. i88o: N.A.W.,M.P., T 393, 2.

39Favre, "Remarques sur la lutte des classes au P6rou pendant la guerredu
Pacifique",p. 68.
40 SpencerSt. Johnto Granville,Lima, 3 May
41 Ibid.
I88I: P.R.O., F.O. 61/333-
42
El Nacional, Chiclayo, 24 Oct. 188o: N.A.W., M.P., T 393, 3.

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Io8 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 8I

moststolidmanclean out ofhismind";buthe also explainedwhythe

Chineseon thehaciendaCayaltiremainedrelativelypeaceful:
Whentheenemyarrivedat Ucupe,we called all theChineseoftheestatetogether
and explainedthe dangerand the threatfacingus. But we also said thatwe had
confidencein theirloyaltyand good feelingstowardsus. We may tell you with
somesatisfactionthattheirreplyfilledus withprideand gratitude.They all said
that nobodywould run away, theywerecontent,the masterwas good - better
thanin all theotherhaciendas- and so we neednotworry.In fact,theirconduct
has been and remainssatisfactoryand we mustrewardit,as a signof confidence
and encouragement forthefuture.Fromthenextpay-daywe are payingtheman
additionalfifty And indeed,what are aorunawayChinese
centavosa fortnight.
amongthe 354 indentured labourerswe have here?43
When Lynch went south in December I880 about a thousand
Chineselabourersjoinedhis armyin theCaiiete valley.44As in the
norththeadhesionoftheChineseto "the redprince"(as Lynchwas
on theirmasters.
called) was a meansforthemto revengethemselves
As a Chileanpopularsongputit:
The red princeset freethe Chinese of Blue Hill (Cerro Azul), the red princeset
themfree,thatwas theend ofslavery,and theymarchedas regiments behindthe
greatLynch.Theylefttheplantationsand followedhimto theend.
"By thedevil",criedLiaotangSinchin,"let's cut offtheirheads,let'seat their
kidneyswithchopsticksofivory".
Theyputgrotesquemasksovertheirheads and advancedon Lurinwithdragon
banners. They followedLiaotang Sinchin and ran throughthe streets.They
enteredthecitylongbeforethetroopsofthegeneral.
The Chinesein theirfurytookvengeancefortheChineseof Blue Hill. That is
how theybroketheirchains,and slaverywas at an end. They werethevanguard
forthegreatPatricioLynchand theydiedbravelyfollowingLiaotangSinchin.45
The loss of their Chinese to the Chilean army added to the
of the already troubledsituationof many northern
difficulties
plantation-owners.Theirpreoccupation,in themidstoftheprofound
nationalcrisis,withtheirownmaterialsituationis clearlyevident.As
AdolfoSalm6n,prefectofLa Libertad,wroteto theNorthAmerican
consulMontjoy:
What chieflygrievesme is thattheChineseare all off,afterhavingcaused great
disorder.They can be of no use to them,but we need themverybadly. If you
could,discreetly,persuadeLynchto sell themagain to theestateowners,I would
buy themfor theirweightin gold. Do see what you can do along these lines,
because thisis extremely
importantforus .. ..46
On theotherhand thedisordersduringtheoccupationofLima in
JanuaryI88I began to reveal unequivocalsignsof a new typeof
ethnicconflict.This time it was not the revoltof the oppressed
Chinese against the oppressorgroup of whites,but the sack of
Chineseshopsand the massacreof theirproprietors by Indiansand
mestizos fromthe disorganizedand disbandingPeruvian army.
43Anteroto Ram6nAspillaga,Hacienda Cayalti,io Oct. i88o: A.F.A., vol. 24.
44 Basadre,Historiade la Repziblica del vi,p. 2506.
45 "Los chinosde CerroAzul", Chilean Perti,
popularsong.
46
Salm6nto Montjoy,Malabrigo,15 Oct. i88o: N.A.W.,M.P., T 393, 3.

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 THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL PROBLEM IN PERU Iog09

Accordingto the Committeeof ChineseMerchants?364,777 worth

of damagewas done in Lima.47Similareventstookplace in Cafiete,
forcingthe Asian communityof Pisco to petitionfor diplomatic
protectionbyBritain.48
In December1879and againin February1881thisdramaticracial
conflictamongthepopularmassesreachedpeaksofintensity. In 1879
theNegroesof Chinchabegan a revoltagainstthewhitelandowners
of the region,49while in I88I the Negroes of Cafiete took the
opportunity to attackestates,killingbothwhiteownersand Chinese
labourers,even thoughobjectivelythe Chinese were in a similar
situationto themselves.SpencerSt. Johnestimatedthe numberof
Chinesemassacredby theNegroesduringthisrevoltas between700
and 1,500.50 No doubt the secular frustrationsand humiliations of
theblack slave populationfounda compensatory releasein thisrace
war. Colonial divisionand oppressionhad not merelyimpededthe
articulationofthecollectiveinterests
oftheoppressedas a group,but
also concealedtherealenemy,displacedtheconflict, and thusled the
popular masses intomutual destruction. More researchis neededinto
thestructure ofinter-ethnicrelationsin Peruviansocietyifwe are to
understandthedeeperreasonsforthismodelofprotest.We also need
to turnto social psychology to decode the meaningof the ritualof
such massacres.However,forits documentary value,passagesfrom
Juande Arona'saccountoftheNegrorisingin theCafietevalleymay
usefullybe quoted:
The most heroicaction of the Chinese colonyin those unhappydays, and one
whichmightwell be forgotten if we do not recallit here,was its threemonths'
improviseddefenceagainst the besiegingrebel forcesof the Cafietevalley.The
Negroesand cholosof thearea had forthirtyyearsnourisheda gratuitoushatred
fortheseunfortunate immigrants. The collapseof government in thesettlements
whichfollowedtheChilean occupationofLima in thepreviousmonth,gave them
the opportunityto risein February1881 to massacretheChinese.The immediate
and futilepretextwas a disputebetweena Chinese man and a Negro woman,
whomhe accused of havingpouredwateroverhimin the carnival.The carnival
was one of blood,and Ash Wednesdayone of uncountedashes,because whilethe
Negroesand cholos killedChinese,theyalso burneddown the cane fieldsof the
emptyhaciendas,wheretheyhad livedas parasitessincetheabolitionofslaveryin
1855. The firstoperationwas completedin littleless than a day. The second
continuedfor some time. It was not so easy to destroythe cane fieldsof eight
haciendas,in manyofwhichthecane startedto growagain afterthefires;to make
an end,byslowand dailylooting,oftheirimmensestocksofsugar,rum,livestock
and the rest;forclumsyhands to destroytheworksof secularcivilizationto the
pointof completedevastation....

47 JimYutings,P. A. Ponky,F. Git Sang, L. Quen Tong to Spencer St. John,

Lima, i Julyi88i: P.R.O., F.O. 61/334.
48 La Colonia Asidticaal Excmo. Sr. Enviado Extraordinario MinistroPleni-
y
potenciariode su Majestad Britinica,Pisco,7 Mar. 1881: P.R.O., F.O. 177/168.
49 DenysCuche, Poder blancoy resistencianegraen el Pertu(Lima, 1975), P. 159.
50 SpencerSt. Johnto Granville,Lima, 3 May
I88I: P.R.O., F.O. 61/333.

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110 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 8I

The mobofarmedand mountedNegroesand cholos,withnobodyto resistthem

- since in facttheyhad alwaysmade up the entirepopulationof thevalley-
wentroundone haciendaafteranother.The Chinese,takenby surprise,lacking
any defenceand sure of theirinnocence,were killedwithclubs, knives,stones,
machetes,in a thousandways.Some subalternestatedependants- theonlymen
in chargeof the abandonedpropertiesat thattime- lockedthelabourersinto
theirquarters.The attackersburnedthesedown,or brokedownthedoorsto reach
and killtheinnocentswithin.
Some soughtsafetyin thesewers;buttheNegroeswaitedforthemat theoutlets
and killedthemas theycame out. Otherunfortunates, who stillbelievedin what
sacred,soughtasylumin theCasagrandeschool.... There,they
was traditionally
werealso killedbytherenegades,benton vengeanceand rapine.As theystormed
through,they smashed furniture,windows,doors, destroyingeverythingand
makingbonfiresin the veryheartof the homesof theirformerand apparently
"dear masters".
The corpsesoftheChineseweredraggedout intothecourtyards ofthemasters'
houses. There, beforebeingleftto be tornto pieces by the birds,theywerethe
subjectsofsavage profanation,as in someBacchiccarnival,bythewomenand the
boys. The veryNegro womenwho had once been the paid concubinesof their
victims,now mutilatedtheirbodies, cuttingofftheirbleedingand palpitating
organsand placingthemintotheiropen mouths,as witha cigar."Leave thisone
forme!", the Negro womenscreamed,quarrellingover the victims,drunkwith
bloodlikethewomenwhotorePentheuslimbfromlimb....51
Withinthisprocessof decomposition the ethnicsolidaritiesthem-
selvesbrokedown,as new conflictsresultingfromsocial and econ-
omic disagreements appeared withineach group. In short,ethnic
and social relationsand antagonismsreinforcedone anotherto
producea multi-faceted and complexstruggle.This was onlyto be
expected,given that the ethnicgroupsthemselveshad long been
characterizedby internaldifferences - differences not hitherto
made manifestsimplybecausethewhiteshad succeededin exploiting
all ethnicgroupsalike and as a whole.The followingexamplemay
serveas an illustration.
A representative of theChinesecommunity namedChengIsao Ju
wroteto theBritishcharged'affairesWilliamBarrington, askinghim
to inquirewhetheror notthegovernorofCantonwouldbe willingto
take responsibility for the custodyin Hong Kong and subsequent
transportto Canton of ten Chinesekidnappers, whomthe Chinese
to
legationproposed ship to China from Callao. In 188I and I882,
according to Cheng Isao Ju, these men had spent their time
kidnappingtheir compatriotsand selling them to the ownersof
Peruvianestates.Betweenthreeand fourthousandChinesehad been
sold in thisway. In 1883 and I884 theypursueda different tactic,
and specializedin lendingmoneyto theChinese,encouraging themto
gamble,and thenobligingthosewho could not pay theirlosses-
perhapstwo thousandof them- to sell themselves in settlementof
theirdebts.52
en el Peruz(Lima, 1971), pp. 99-I02.
51 Juande Arona,La inmigraci6n
52 Cheng Isao Ju to William Barrington,Lima, 13 Oct. 1884: P.R.O., F.O.
177/183-

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 THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL PROBLEM IN PERU I II

Meanwhile therisingsof theChineseand theblacksweresoon

overshadowed bythoseof thehighland Indians- clearlya much
largerphenomenon, giventhenumerical predominance oftheIndians
overtheotherethnicgroups.Hencetheefforts oftherulingclassto
secureIndian support,symbolized by Pierola'sproclamation of
himselfon 22 April188oas "Protector oftheNativeRace". Since
Independence thenativepopulation hadbeenkeptonthemargins in
thebuildingofa Peruvian nation;in 1879itwassummoned todefend
thefatherland in danger.Aftersixdecadesofexclusion, couldthe
Indiansbeexpected tocommitthemselves tosucha cause?
As in 1821, theIndianpresence wasmanifest betweenI879 and
I885. Afterall, no Peruvianarmy could havebeenraised
possibly
withouttheforced recruitmentofthenativepeople.However, careful
inquiryis neededifwe are to understand thenatureofthisIndian
andtheinterests
participation whichlaybehindit.The fallofLima
and the collapseof the oligarchic statetriggered variousIndian
risingsthroughout the Andeanhighlands. The progress of these
risingsreflected
themilitary fortunesofCiceres's montoneras. As we
have alreadyseen,Ciceres had initiatedhis heroicresistanceto the
Chilean occupationat the verymomentwhenthecivilistaoligarchy
was debatingconditionsofpeace. In practicethemontoneras formed
the relativelyorderlymilitaryframework forthe resistanceof the
Andean peoples to the Chilean occupation. However, whether
fightingwith the montonerasor independently, Indian resistance
reflectednot only the aims of Ciceres himselfbut also, simul-
taneously,muchmoreconcretesocial and politicalobjectivesarising
out oftheconditionsofthenativepeople.
Withthe Chineseand the Negroes,the highlandIndians formed
the mostexploitedsectionof the rural population.As membersof
peasant communities, as serfsand as agriculturallabourers,they
producedthe economicsurplusor providedthe labourforceforthe
maintenanceand perpetuation of theregionalsystemofdomination.
Theircontrolbytherulingclass had hitherto beenfacilitatedbytheir
own divisionintodifferent productiveunits.Now, however,thewar
not only dislocatedthe usual channelsof power and control,but
stimulatedIndian mobilization.In effect,each incursionof the
Chilean armybroughtwithit the spoliationof the peasantry,the
destructionof its villages,forcedleviesof money,the ruinof crops,
the confiscationof livestockand property,and thus a progressive
deteriorationin the peasants' economicconditions- all of which
provided further stimulusto rebellionand servedto sustainit. Yet
thoughthenationaldefenceinitiatedby Ciceres actuallymilitarized
thepeasants,once in armstheynaturallyturnednotonlyagainstthe
Chilean armybut also against theirmore ancientand immediate
oppressors.

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112 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 8I
In August 1882 Graham, the Britishconsul, reportedon the
montonerosmovementin the vicinityof Lima and theextentof its
supportamongtheIndians.The Indians,he wrote:
have beendrivento desperationbytheoutrageswhichhave beencommitted upon
thembytheinvaders,and . . are nowstarvingas thewholeoftheinterioris lying
waste,it havingbeen foundimpossibleto sow cropsthisyear,all thegrain,cattle,
forageand animals,etc.,havingbeencarriedoffbyone partyor theother.53
In NovemberI883 AlfredSt. Johnalso reportedthat"the Indians
in thedepartmentofAyacuchohave risenagainstthewhitesand are
committingatrocities",'4and that:
The agitationamong the Indians is to be attributedto the state of lawlessness
whichhas prevailedin theinlandDepartmentsduringthelast threeyears.
The exaction of the various Chilian expeditionswhich have scoured those
districtshave also servedto rousethemto arms.
There is no doubt that those unfortunatepeople have suffereda great deal
throughout thewar betweenPeru and Chile.
They are naturallyproneto accuse thesuperiorclassesofthiscountryofbeing
the cause of the misfortuneswhich have befallen them, and perhaps their
complaintsare wellgrounded,as thesuccessivePeruvianGovernments have never
seriouslyattemptedto improvetheconditionoftheindigenousraces.55
However,the exact natureof Andeanpeasantbehaviourduring
the Chilean war is perhapsbest seen in an analysisof the so-called
"campaignof la Brefia",so brilliantly captainedby Caceres. In the
followingsectionI relyon a briefbut remarkableworkby Henri
Favreon theclassconflict in Peruduringthisperiod.56
Probably Caceres never intendedhis resistancemovementagainst
theChileansto developin anywayintoa distinctsocialstruggle.His
objectivein movinginto the highlandswas merelyto forcethe
Chileansto fragment theirforces,and to givebattleon terrainmore
suitedto hisownmontoneras.57 In theareasofHuancavelica,Huanta
and Huancayoin thecentralhighlands,however,theguerrillaunits
whichwereformedconsistedprimarily of peasantsorganizedin and
aroundthe settlements of theregion.Ethnically,thesepuebloswere
inhabitedby mistisas well as Indians.The populationwas thusnot
homogeneous, butthearea itselfwas geographically remotefromthe
landlordsof the region.Scatteredwithinthesesettlements by the
fluctuationsof an unfavourableeconomicand politicalfortune,the
livelihoodof the mistisdependedeitheron the exploitationof the
Indiansor on regionaltrade.Fromamongthisgroupthereemerged
the leadersof local resistance.Their economicand politicalcontrol
overtheIndiansrapidlyenabledthemto formthefamousmontonera
3 M. E. Grahamto Granville,Lima, 4 Aug. 1882: P.R.O., F.O. 61/340.
4 AlfredSt. Johnto Granville,Lima, 13 Nov. 1883: P.R.O., F.O. 61/348.
55 AlfredSt. Johnto Granville,Lima, 3 Dec. 1883: P.R.O., F.O. 61/348.
56 Favre, "Remarques sur la lutte des classes au P6rou pendantla guerredu
Pacifique".
57Ibid., p. 60.

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 THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL PROBLEM IN PERU I 13

bands whichsupportedCiceres. By so doing,theywereable at one

and thesametimeto reinforce theirauthority overtheIndiansand to
improvetheirpositionvis-d-vis thestratumofregionallandowners.58
The guerrillabands thus formedoften acted in considerable
independenceof Ciceres's ordersand, whilefighting the Chileans,
did not hesitateto take possessionof the lands, cropsand animals
of the local landownersin orderto keep themselvessuppliedwith
provisions.Thus in Colca, a villagein the mountainsabove Huan-
cayo, the local guerrillaunit, whichhad been organizedby three
local and powerfulmistis,T6mas Bastidas,JoseGuerraand Manuel
Echavaudis, immediatelyset about occupyingthe neighbouring
hacienda Tucle,59the bordersof which had been extendedin the
courseoftimebytheannexationofthecommunallandsofColca.
Similarly,in 1882 theguerrillasoccupiedthecontiguoushaciendas
of La Virgen,Antapongoand Ingahuasi,thus establishingthem-
selves in all of the large estatesof the region.However,as Favre
observes,this action was no longerinitiatedby the mistis,but by
the Indian rank and file,which to this extentat least, therefore,
had managed to escape fromtheirleaders' control.In fact,three
Indian leaders had emergedin oppositionto Bastidas,Guerra and
Echavaudis,namelyLaymes,Vilchezand Santisteban.Togetherwith
otherIndianguerrilleros theynow proceededto attackand capture
theproperties notonlyofwhitebutalso ofmistiowners.60
The followingyear, I883, saw the Indian guerrillasgain control
not only of Colca itselfbut, withthe fall of the strategiccentreof
Acostambo,of the entirecentralregionof Peru.6' The whitepopu-
lation abandonedHuando, anotherimportantsettlement.62 Favre
cites the writtentestimony of a Chilean commanderin November
I883, whicheloquentlydemonstrates the significanceof the Indian
mobilization:"All theIndiansofHuanta and Huancayoare in revolt.
The few with whom we could make contactdeclared that their
objectivewas not to fightthe Chileansor thePeruvianpeace party,
but the entirewhiterace".63In consequenceof thisIndianrebellion
againstbothwhitesand mestizos,theentirenon-Indianpopulation,
facedwiththreatto bothlifeand property, inclinedto collaboration
withtheChileans,whosearmyprovidedtheironlyhopeofsafety.64
The race war describedby Favre continueduntilthe middleof
1884. For reasonswhichhave notso farbeen adequatelyexplained,
Ciceres,whomustcertainly havebeenawareofwhatwas happening,
"5 Ibid., p. 69.
59Ibid.
60
Ibid., p. 62.
61
Ibid., p. 63.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., p. 64.

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114 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER8I
madenoattempt tosteertheguerrilla
mobilization
backtohisinitial
Indeed,as lateas February
objectives. when
1884, themistiBastidas
madea desperate attempttoretakeColcaanddisarmLaymes'smen,
Ciceresactuallyaccusedtheformer offomenting
discord
amongthe
patriots.65
Withthe end of the war anti-Chilean resistance fell
naturally
away,but thisdoes not mean thatthe peasantmovement was
contained.
Indeed,in someregions itcontinuedtogrow.Meanwhile
Cicereswhonowaimedat nationalpoliticalpower,rapidly gained
thesupportoftherulingclass,sinceitsmembers sawinhimtheonly
leaderwithsufficientprestigeand armedsupportto re-establish
order. How were the montonerasdirectlydependingon Ciceres
actuallybroughtundercontrol?In the case of Colca, Favre shows
thattheirresistancewas broughtto an end withthecaptureof their
leaders. In June 1884 Laymes, Vilchez and Santisteban were
summonedto Huancayoto receivefromthehandsofCiceres himself
the rewardfor theiractions in the resistance.However,on their
returnfromthe town,theywerecapturedby a unitof the regular
army,summarilyconvictedby courtmartial,and executedin the
cathedralsquareofHuancayo.66Ciceres justifiedthisas followsin a
lettercitedbyFavre:
These individuals,forgetfulof the noblemissionentrustedto them,and far
fromsafeguarding thelivesand property ofthepopulation,
committed horrible
murders,burned andsackedentire andindulged
villages, interrible
actsofprivate
vengeance.... So monstrous weretheaccusationsagainstthem,andso difficult
tobelieve,
thatI feltobliged
tocollectfullproof
oftheircrimes.67
This was thefirstbutbyno meansthelastor themostsurprising of
Ciceres's about-turns.Only a littlelater,and by one of thosecruel
ironiesof history,
he was obligedto cometo termswiththePeruvian
rulingclasswhichhad beenthetargetofhisattacksduringthewar.It
is as thoughthePeruofthosetimeshad in somewayto exactrevenge
on theman who had led theresistance.Morethanthis:theveryman
who had beenthestubborndefender oftheterritorial ofthe
integrity
nation,in thecourseofthreeAssemblies and afterhavingexpelledall
his opponentsfromparliament,was requiredto sign the notorious
"Grace contract"whichconsolidatedthe economiccolonizationof
thecountry.
However,in otherpartsofthePeruvianinterior thedemobilization
of thepeasantrywas notas easyas in thecentralregion.Iglesiaswas
proclaimed"regenerator"of therepublicin December1882,but the
withdrawalof theChileanforcesaftertheTreatyofAnc6ndeprived
his governmentof militarysupport,and until I886 Iglesias and
65 Ibid.
66Ibid., pp. 64-5-
67Ibid., p. 65.

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 THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL PROBLEM IN PERU I 15

Cacereswerein openconflict overpower.These developments hardly

facilitatedthe reimpositionof social controlover the Indian popu-
lation.The withdrawalof theChileanforces,who had been theonly
protectorsof theirpropertyagainstthe popularmassesduringthe
yearsofcrisis,horrifiedthepossessingclass morethananything else.
Given the disorganization of thePeruvianarmy,theChileanswere
theonlyforcecapable ofcontainingthepeasantmobilization. Thus,
as theyretiredfromthecountry,thepeasantrisinggrewin scale and
intensity.
A fewexampleswillserveto illustratethesituation.In April1884
Nemesio Viaiia led a risingof fourhundredIndians in Cerro de
Pasco, takingadvantageoftheabsenceoftheprefectPedroMas who
had leftwithtwohundredsoldierstoputdowna risinginHuinuco.68
Viafiarevoltedin the name of Ciceres, Mis havingbeen appointed
prefectby Iglesias. The risingwas briefand soon suppressed.69 In
May I884 the highlandpeasants rebelledin Huinuco, while the
montonerastook Chincha Alta.70A month later similar risings
occurredin Cuzco, in Vilcabamba (Junin),and in Cajamarca.71
Finally, in August I884 Puga and his montoneras,having con-
solidated their power in Cajamarca, occupied Lambayeque, thus
extending theircontrolto thewholeofnorthern Peru.72
In short,the extremeweaknessof Iglesias'sgovernment and the
powervacuumleftby theChilean withdrawal, generatedsignificant
rebellionin somepartsof thecountry.As AlfredSt. Johnobserved:
"This countryis entirelygivenup to anarchyand everyone feelsthat
the authorityof General Iglesias will only last while he has the
supportofChilianbayonets".73
Unfortunately we do notknowexactlyhowa newpax andina was
imposed on the rebelliouspeasantry.Nevertheless someconclusions
may be drawn about the consequencesof the war forthe Andean
peasants. During the conflictthey had, thoughno doubt in an
unsystematic manner,acquiredsomeconsciousness oftheirsituation.
Theyhad learnedto establishbondsofsolidarity whichwentbeyond
the limitsof theirtraditionalcommunities. Populationgrowthand
thesubdivisionofland in thevalleycommunities led totheformation
ofnewsettlements at higheraltitudesin Huancavelicaand elsewhere.
But itmaybe suggestedthatitwas thisnewconsciousness thatled the
68 E. Steel to AlfredSt. John,Cerro de Pasco, 12 Apr. 1884: P.R.O., F.O.

177/182.
69
"Supplementoal registrooficialn. 13", Cerrode Pasco, 9 Apr. 1884: P.R.O.,
F.O. 177/182.
70 AlfredSt. Johnto Granville,Lima, 7 May 1884: P.R.O., F.O. 61/353.
71 AlfredSt. Johnto Granville,Lima, 5 June1884: P.R.O., F.O. 61/353.
72 BritishVice-Consulto Barrington, Lambayeque, r6 Aug. r884: P.R.O., F.O.
177/182.
73 AlfredSt. Johnto Granville,Lima, 5 June1884: P.R.O., F.O. 61/353.

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I I6 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 8I
new settlements to organizethemselves as independentunitsand to
breakthelinksofsubordination withthemothercommunities below,
thatis to say withcommunities dominatedbythewhites.74 Again,it
was this consciousnesswhich was later to inspirethe remarkable
movement led by Atusparia,theheadmanof theIndians(Alcaldede
Indios) of Huaraz in the northernhighlands;and thismovementin
turnwas merelytheprecursorof a further cycleofpeasantrisingsin
centraland southernPeru.
In somecases,moreover, directexperience ofthenakedaggression
and spoliationoftheforeigninvaderactuallybeganto transform the
hithertopurelyethnicconsciousnessof theAndeanpeasantryintoa
sense of national solidarity- the feelingof a defeatedpeople
confronting a commondestiny.In the patheticwordsof the Indian
Pomaresin L6pez Albfijar'sstory:"And whenI heardthatall these
mencalled themselves Peruvians,I called myselfa Peruviantoo...
I learnedthatPeruis a nationand Chileis anothernation".

IV
By wayofepilogue,and as a suggestionforfutureresearch,it may
be appropriateto add a fewreflections
on thesignificanceoftheWar
of the Pacificforthe subsequenteconomicand politicalhistoryof
Peru,and forlaterdevelopments in theparalleldivisionsofrace and
class. In the absence of more exact information, Clavero's notes,
writtenin I896, may allow us to make a preliminary evaluationof
thisimpact.The following Table summarizes hisobservations.

TABLE
THE IMPACT OF THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC ON PERUVIAN SOCIAL
STRUCTURE 1870-1894*

1870 1894
Millionaires I8
Rich 1,587 1,725
Well-off 22,148 2,000
Labourers 1,236,000 345,000
Beggars 500,000
* Source:
Jose Clavero, El tesoro del Perz. (Lima, 1896), p. 5 I.

The word "collapse" best describesthe situationof Peru afterthe

of Peruvian
alteredthestratification
war. This collapsesignificantly
74 Henri Favre, "The Dynamics of Indian Peasant Society and Migrationto
Coastal Plantationsin CentralPeru", in KennethDuncan and Ian Rutledge(eds.),
Land and Labour in Latin America: Essays on the Developmentof Agrarian
Capitalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Cambridge, 1977),
pp. 253-67,at pp. 259-60.

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 THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL PROBLEM IN PERU I 17

society,as indicatedby thevirtualdisappearanceof theoligarchyat

the top, and the enormousincreasein pauperismamongthe lower
classes. In addition,thePeruvianeconomywas effectively paralysed
in theimmediateaftermath of thewar. In 1885 importsto thevalue
of 8, 8 i,ooo soles were offsetby no more than 2,400,000 in exports.75
Moreover, this social disequilibriumand economic exhaustion
occurredat a timeofpoliticalcrisis,bornofthedestruction ofsocial
controland oftheoligarchicstate.
These immediatepost-waryearsformthe pointof departurefor
contemporaryPeru, because of the way the countrywas then
"reconstructed" - theformsgivento thenewalignmentofdifferent
social forcesand the way Peru was insertedintothe worldmarket.
Brieflyput, the recuperationof Peru's economywas the resultof
three convergentprocesses: the monopolizationof the nation's
resources,their removalfromnational control,and the growing
inflowof foreigncapital, thoughwitha different modusoperandi.
The creation of the Peruvian Corporationin I89o formedthe
keystone of thecountry'seconomicreconstruction. Peruwas obliged,
in returnforthecancellationof its externaldebts,to hand overthe
principal productiveresources of the country to the British
bondholders.Henceforth, and witha fewinsignificant exceptions,it
was the imperialistenclaves which became the agents for the
reactivation ofthePeruvianeconomy,bydirectly channelling foreign
investment into the exploitationof the principalnaturalresources
and thecreationofnewareas oftheeconomy.By thismeansthebasis
was laid fortheintensivedevelopment ofsugar,copperand oil.
Alongsideeconomicreconstruction, it was necessaryto initiatethe
institutional reorganization of societyand the re-establishment of a
politicalcontrolwhichwould be compatiblewiththe new require-
mentsof an international economy.However,thisprocesswas less
straightforward, and thedecade 1885-95saw onlythebeginnings ofa
definitivesolutionto theproblem.
For thewar had notonlydisruptedtheentirestructure of control
imposedby the civilistaoligarchy;it had also demonstrated to the
oligarchyitselfits absoluteincapacityto re-establishits own rule.
BetweentheTreatyof Anc6nand 1886 twosoldiers,MiguelIglesias
and AndresA. Caceres,competedin thestruggle forpower.Whenthe
civilistaoligarchygrewdisenchanted withIglesias,Ciceres emerged
as theonlyleaderwithsufficient authority and prestigeto re-establish
the domesticordernecessaryforthe conductof businessaffairs.In
spiteofthefactthatCacereshad foughtagainstthemduringthewar,
theoligarchs,on purelymaterialistic grounds,nowwillingly gavehim
their support.Their agreementwith Ciceres, renewedin i 890,

7 Basadre,Historiade la ReptiblicadelPeru',vi,p. 2695.

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II8 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 8I

allowedthemthenecessaryscopeto re-establish themselves as a class,

and to prepareto share power in 1895 with Nicolas de Pierola,
anotheroftheirmostdetermined opponentsin thewar.
However,if the processof economicand politicalreconstruction
markedthe restoration of the system'sstability,it also had certain
disruptiveeffects.For the mostdifficulttaskof stabilizationwas to
a pax andina withinthepeasantry.As we have seen,the
re-establish
war had made possiblean impressivemobilizationof the Andean
peasants, and this had been intensified by the withdrawalof the
Chileanarmy.The reconstitution oftheregionalsystemofcontrolby
patronsand notables(caciquismo)impliedthe repressionof these
highlandrevolts- butthevictory was a precariousone. As capitalist
enclaves were implantedalmost immediatelyin agricultureand
mining,and as importantsectorsof the peasant populationwere
proletarianizedand pauperized,the flamesof rebelliousness sprang
up from the still smoulderingembers of the conflictof 1879.
Henceforth, however,theywereto taketheformofpeasantrebellions
ratherthan nativerebellions.What is more,the revelationof what
Gonzalez Prada was to call "the suppuratingwounds"of Peruvian
society,stimulatedthe birthof radical ideologieswhichquestioned
theessenceand legitimacy ofoligarchicdomination.

Universidad Catolica,and HeraclioBonilla

Institutode EstudiosPeruanos,Lima

ANNUAL CONFERENCE 1979

on
THE TRANSMISSION OF IDEAS
IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE c. I350-1700
The 1979 AnnualConference ofthePast and PresentSociety
willbe heldon WEDNESDAY, 4 JULY 1979 in theroomsof
theGeologicalSociety,Burlington House,LondonWI.
Anyoneinterestedin receivingfurtherinformation or in
in theConference
participating is invitedto writeto:
The Editor,Past and Present,
CorpusChristiCollege,
OxfordOXI 4JF.
Furtherdetailsand Registration Formswillbe available in the
nextissue.

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