G.R. No.

168557, February 16, 2007

FELS Energy, Inc. vs Province of Batangas and the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Batangas
Ponente: Callejo, Sr.

Facts:
January 1993, NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy over MW diesel engine power barges in
Batangas for a period of 5 years. Subsequently, Polar assigned its rights under the agreement to FELS. NPC initially
opposed.
August 1995, FELS received an assessment of real property taxes on the barges. FELS referred the matter to NPC
reminding it of its obligation under the agreement to pay the real estate taxes. NPC sought for reconsideration of
the decision but the motion was denied.
NPC filed a petition to the Local Board Assessment Appeals. The provincial Assessor averred that the barges were
real property for the purpose of taxation. LBAA still denied the petition filed by NPC and ordered FELS to pay the
taxes.
LBAA Ruling: power plant facilities are considered real property because they are installed at a specific location with
a character of permanency. The owner of the barges-FELS is a private corporation-is the one being taxed, not NPC.
The agreement will not justify the exemption of FELS.
FELS then appealed to Central BAA. CBAA rendered s decision finding the power barges exempt from real property
tax.
CBAA Ruling: the power barges belong to NPC since they are actually used by it. FELS appealed before the CA but
was denied as well.

Held:
YES. The CBAA and LBAA power barges are real property and are thus subject to real property tax. This is also the
inevitable conclusion, considering that G.R. No. 165113 was dismissed for failure to sufficiently show any reversible
error. Tax assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct and made in good faith, with the taxpayer having
the burden of proving otherwise. Besides, factual findings of administrative bodies, which have acquired expertise
in their field, are generally binding and conclusive upon the Court; we will not assume to interfere with the sensible
exercise of the judgment of men especially trained in appraising property. Where the judicial mind is left in doubt, it
is a sound policy to leave the assessment undisturbed. We find no reason to depart from this rule in this case.

Moreover, Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that docks and structures which, though floating, are
intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast are considered immovable
property. Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the nature of
machinery and other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or work.

Petitioners maintain nevertheless that the power barges are exempt from real estate tax under Section 234 (c) of
R.A. No. 7160 because they are actually, directly and exclusively used by petitioner NPC, a government- owned and
controlled corporation engaged in the supply, generation, and transmission of electric power.

We affirm the findings of the LBAA and CBAA that the owner of the taxable properties is petitioner FELS, which in
fine, is the entity being taxed by the local government. As stipulated under Section 2.11, Article 2 of the Agreement:

OWNERSHIP OF POWER BARGES. POLAR shall own the Power Barges and all the fixtures, fittings, machinery and
equipment on the Site used in connection with the Power Barges which have been supplied by it at its own cost.
POLAR shall operate, manage and maintain the Power Barges for the purpose of converting Fuel of NAPOCOR into
electricity.
It follows then that FELS cannot escape liability from the payment of realty taxes by invoking its exemption in
Section 234 (c) of R.A. No. 7160. Indeed, the law states that the machinery must be actually, directly and exclusively
used by the government owned or controlled corporation; nevertheless, petitioner FELS still cannot find solace.

Abakada Guro Party-list et. al vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 168056) - Digest
Facts:
On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act. Before the law took
effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a
slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.

The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6: That the President, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to
12%, after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two
and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);

or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent
(1%)

Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is an abdication by
Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti.
They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which cant be included within the
purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon
merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods.

Petitioners further alleged that delegating to the President the legislative power to tax is contrary to republicanism.
They insist that accountability, responsibility and transparency should dictate the actions of Congress and they
should not pass to the President the decision to impose taxes. They also argue that the law also effectively nullified
the Presidents power of control, which includes the authority to set aside and nullify the acts of her subordinates
like the Secretary of Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Justice.

Issue:
Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of
the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power?

Ruling:
The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively,
legislative. Purely legislative power which can never be delegated is the authority to make a complete law-
complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the
expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its use or the manner of its
exercise which determines the validity of its delegation.

The exceptions are:

(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution

(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments
(e) delegation to administrative bodies

For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A sufficient standard is one which
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.

In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the
operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the
entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No
discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word
SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute
denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.

Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the
conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to
impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.

Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact--- whether by
December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national
government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and 1%. If either of these two
instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the
President.

In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of
Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the
legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The
Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented,
considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective
to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and
verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.

Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who
must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which
the legislative process can go forward.

There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp v. CIR

G.R. No. 172598; December 21, 2007

Facts: In 1988, BIR sent a collection letter to Petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) for alleged
deficiency excise tax liabilities of PhP 1,705,028,008.06 for the taxable years 1992 and 1994 to 1997, inclusive of
delinquency surcharges and interest. As basis for the collection letter, the BIR alleged that PSPC is not a qualified
transferee of the TCCs it acquired from other BOI-registered companies. These alleged excise tax deficiencies
covered by the collection letter were already paid by PSPC with TCCs acquired through, and issued and duly
authorized by the Center, and duly covered by Tax Debit Memoranda (TDM) of both the Center and BIR, with the
latter also issuing the corresponding Accept Payment for Excise Taxes (APETs).

PSPC protested the collection letter, but it was denied. Because of respondent inaction on a motion for
reconsideration PSPC filed a petition for review before the CTA.

In 1999, the CTA ruled that the use by PSPC of the TCCs was legal and valid, and that respondents attempt to
collect alleged delinquent taxes and penalties from PSPC without an assessment constitutes denial of due process.
Respondent elevated CTA Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for review.

Despite the pendency of this case, PSPC received assessment letter from respondent for excise tax deficiencies,
surcharges, and interest based on the first batch of cancelled TCCs and TDM covering PSPCs use of the TCCs. All
these cancelled TDM and TCCs were also part of the subject matter of the now pending before the CA.

PSPC protested the assessment letter, but the protest was denied by the BIR, constraining it to file another case
before the CTA. Subsequently, CTA ruled in favor of PSPC and accordingly cancelled and set aside the assessment
issued by the respondent. Respondent motion for reconsideration of the above decision which was rejected thus
respondent appealed the above decision before the CTA En Banc.

The CTA En Banc ruled in favor of respondent and ordered PSPC to pay the amount of P570,577,401.61 as
deficiency excise tax for the taxable years 1992 and 1994 to 1997, inclusive of 25% surcharge and 20% interest.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for the assessment of deficiency excise tax after the validly issued TCCs
were subsequently cancelled for having been issued fraudulently

Held: No. Petitioner is not liable for the assessment of deficiency excise tax.

In the instant case, with due application, approval, and acceptance of the payment by PSPC of the subject TCCs for
its then outstanding excise tax liabilities in 1992 and 1994 to 1997, the subject TCCs have been canceled as the
money value of the tax credits these represented have been used up. Therefore, the DOF through the Center may
not now cancel the subject TCCs as these have already been canceled and used up after their acceptance as
payment for PSPCs excise tax liabilities. What has been used up, debited, and canceled cannot anymore be
declared to be void, ineffective, and canceled anew.

Besides, it is indubitable that with the issuance of the corresponding TDM, not only is the TCC canceled when fully
utilized, but the payment is also final subject only to a post-audit on computational errors. Under RR 5-2000, a
TDM is a certification, duly issued by the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative, reduced in a BIR
Accountable Form in accordance with the prescribed formalities, acknowledging that the taxpayer named therein
has duly paid his internal revenue tax liability in the form of and through the use of a Tax Credit Certificate, duly
issued and existing in accordance with the provisions of these Regulations. The Tax Debit Memo shall serve as the
official receipt from the BIR evidencing a taxpayers payment or satisfaction of his tax obligation. The amount
shown therein shall be charged against and deducted from the credit balance of the aforesaid Tax Credit Certificate.

Thus, with the due issuance of TDM by the Center and TDM by the BIR, the payments made by PSPC with the use of
the subject TCCs have been effected and consummated as the TDMs serve as the official receipts evidencing PSPCs
payment or satisfaction of its tax obligation. Moreover, the BIR not only issued the corresponding TDM, but it also
issued ATAPETs which doubly show the payment of the subject excise taxes of PSPC.

Based on the above discussion, we hold that respondent erroneously and without factual and legal basis levied the
assessment. Consequently, the CTA En Banc erred in sustaining respondents assessment.

Case # 26.
PASCUAL V. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS, 110 Phil. 33, December 29, 1960.

FACTS: R. A 920 (An act appropriating for public works) was enacted in 1953 containing an item for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension of Pasig feeder road terminals- currently projected and planned
subdivision roads, which were not yet constructed, within Antonio Subdivision owned by Senator Jose C. Zulueta.
The provincial governor of Rizal, Wenceslao Pascual, questioned the constitutionality of the item in R. A 920, it
being not for a public purpose. The lower court dismissed the petition upon the ground that petitioner may not
contest the legality because the same does not affect him directly. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Does petitioner have legal standing to sue?

RULING: Yes. It is well-stated that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct
injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are as many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers,
laws providing the disbursement of public funds. Thus, the general rule is that not only persons individually
affected, but also taxpayer, have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by
taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public money. Thus,
the records are remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. Where the land on which feeder roads to be
constructed belongs to a private person, an appropriation made by congress for that purpose is null and void, and a
donation to the government made five (5) months after the approval of the Act does not cure the basic defect of
the law.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONON
GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG)

Vs.

COCOFED, ET AL. and BALLARES, ET AL., EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO JR. and

the SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division)

G.R No.147062
December 14, 2001

FACTS:

The PCGG issued and implemented numerous sequestrations, freeze orders and provisional takeovers of
allegedly ill-gotten companies, assets and properties, real or personal. Among the properties sequestered by
the Commission were shares of stock in the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) registered in the names
of the alleged "one million coconut farmers," the so-called Coconut Industry Investment Fund companies
(CIIF companies) and Private Respondent Eduardo Cojuangco Jr.On January 23, 1995, the trial court
rendered its final Decision nullifying and setting aside the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which lifted the
sequestration of the subject UCPB shares.

ISSUE:
Are the Coconut Levy Funds raised through the States police and taxing
Powers?

RULING:
Indeed, coconut levy funds partake of the nature of taxes which, in general, are enforced proportional
contributions from persons and properties, exacted by the State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support
of government and for all public needs. Based on this definition, a tax has three elements, namely: a) it is
an enforced proportional contribution from persons and properties; b) it is imposed by the State by virtue of
its sovereignty; and c) it is levied for the support of the government.

BATANGAS POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
BATANGAS CITY and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondent

G.R. No. 149110

April 9, 2003

FACTS:

The facts show that in the early 1990s, the country suffered from a crippling power crisis. Power
outages lasted 8-12 hours daily and power generation was badly needed. Addressing the problem, the
government, through the National Power Corporation (NPC), sought to attract investors in power plant
operations by providing them with incentives, one of which was through the NPCs assumption of payment
of their taxes in the Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) Agreement.
 On June 29, 1992, Enron Power Development Corporation (Enron) and petitioner NPC entered into
a Fast Track BOT Project. Enron agreed to supply a power station to NPC and transfer its plant to the latter
after ten (10) years of operation. Section 11.02 of the BOT Agreement provided that NPC shall be
responsible for the payment of all taxes that may be imposed on the power station, except income taxes and
permit fees. Subsequently, Enron assigned its obligation under the BOT Agreement to petitioner Batangas
Power Corporation (BPC).

On September 13, 1992, BPC registered itself with the Board of Investments (BOI) as a pioneer
enterprise. On September 23, 1992, the BOI issued a certificate of registration1 to BPC as a pioneer
enterprise entitled to a tax holiday for a period of six (6) years. The construction of the power station in
respondent Batangas City was then completed. BPC operated the station.

On October 12, 1998, Batangas City (the city, for brevity), thru its legal officer Teodulfo A.
Deguito, sent a letter to BPC demanding payment of business taxes and penalties, commencing from the
year 1994 as provided under Ordinance XI or the 1992 Batangas City Tax Code. BPC refused to pay, citing
its tax-exempt status as a pioneer enterprise for six (6) years under Section 133 (g) of the Local
Government Code (LGC).3

On April 15, 1999, city treasurer Benjamin S. Pargas modified the citys tax claim4 and demanded
payment of business taxes from BPC only for the years 1998-1999. He acknowledged that BPC enjoyed a
6-year tax holiday as a pioneer industry but its tax exemption period expired on September 22, 1998, six (6)
years after its registration with the BOI on September 23, 1992. The city treasurer held that thereafter BPC
became liable to pay its business taxes.

BPC still refused to pay the tax. BPC asserted that the city should collect the tax from the NPC as
the latter assumed responsibility for its payment under their BOT Agreement. While admitting assumption
of BPCs tax obligations under their BOT Agreement, NPC refused to pay BPCs business tax as it
allegedly constituted an indirect tax on NPC which is a tax-exempt corporation under its Charter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not NPC, as a national government instrumentality is liable to pay taxes, as agreed in
the BOT agreement, to the local government?

Ruling:

Yes. The effect of the LGC on the tax exemption privileges of the NPC has already been
extensively discussed and settled in the recent case of National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan.
In said case, this Court recognized the removal of the blanket exclusion of government instrumentalities
from local taxation as one of the most significant provisions of the 1991 LGC. Specifically, we stressed that
Section 193 of the LGC, an express and general repeal of all statutes granting exemptions from local taxes,
withdrew the sweeping tax privileges previously enjoyed by the NPC under its Charter.

Consequently, when NPC assumed the tax liabilities of the BPC under their 1992 BOT Agreement,
the LGC which removed NPCs tax exemption privileges had already been in effect for six (6) months.
Thus, while BPC remains to be the entity doing business in said city, it is the NPC that is ultimately liable
to pay said taxes under the provisions of both the 1992 BOT Agreement and the 1991 Local Government
Code.

CIR v Tokyo Shipping Co.

G.R. No. L-68252 May 26, 1995

Facts:
 Private respondent is a foreign corporation represented in the Philippines by Soriamont Steamship
Agencies, Incorporated. It owns and operates tramper vessel M/V Gardenia. In December 1980,
NASUTRA 2 chartered M/V Gardenia to load 16,500 metric tons of raw sugar in the Philippines. 3 On
December 23, 1980, Mr. Edilberto Lising, the operations supervisor of Soriamont Agency, 4 paid the
required income and common carrier's taxes in the respective sums of (P59,523.75) and (P47,619.00), or a
total of (P107,142.75) based on the expected gross receipts of the vessel. 5 Upon arriving, however, at
Guimaras Port of Iloilo, the vessel found no sugar for loading. On January 10, 1981, NASUTRA and
private respondent's agent mutually agreed to have the vessel sail for Japan without any cargo.

Claiming the pre-payment of income and common carrier's taxes as erroneous since no receipt was realized
from the charter agreement, private respondent instituted a claim for tax credit or refund of the sum ONE
HUNDRED SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-TWO PESOS and SEVENTY-FIVE
CENTAVOS (P107,142.75) before petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue on March 23, 1981.
Petitioner failed to act promptly on the claim, hence, on May 14, 1981, private respondent filed a petition
for review 6 before public respondent Court of Tax Appeals.

Petitioner contested the petition. As special and affirmative defenses, it alleged the following: that taxes are
presumed to have been collected in accordance with law; that in an action for refund, the burden of proof is
upon the taxpayer to show that taxes are erroneously or illegally collected, and the taxpayer's failure to
sustain said burden is fatal to the action for refund; and that claims for refund are construed strictly against
tax claimants.

Issue:Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to a tax refund it erroneously paid.

Held:

We cannot but bewail the unyielding stance taken by the government in refusing to refund the sum
of (P107,142.75) erroneously prepaid by private respondent. The tax was paid way back in 1980 and
despite the clear showing that it was erroneously paid, the government succeeded in delaying its refund for
fifteen (15) years. After fifteen (15) long years and the expenses of litigation, the money that will be finally
refunded to the private respondent is just worth a damaged nickel. This is not, however, the kind of success
the government, especially the BIR, needs to increase its collection of taxes. Fair deal is expected by our
taxpayers from the BIR and the duty demands that BIR should refund without any unreasonable delay what
it has erroneously collected. Our ruling in Roxas v. Court of Tax Appeals is apropos to recall:

The power of taxation is sometimes called also the power to destroy. Therefore it should be exercised with
caution to minimize injury to the proprietary rights of a taxpayer. It must be exercised fairly, equally and
uniformly, lest the tax collector kill the "hen that lays the golden egg." And, in order to maintain the general
public's trust and confidence in the Government this power must be used justly and not treacherously.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
CITY OF CABANATUAN, respondent
G.R. No. 149110
April 9, 2003
FACTS:
 Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Commonwealth Act No.
120, as amended.4 It is tasked to undertake the "development of hydroelectric generations of power and the
production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal and other sources, as well as, the transmission of electric
power on a nationwide basis."5 Concomitant to its mandated duty, petitioner has, among others, the power
to construct, operate and maintain power plants, auxiliary plants, power stations and substations for the
purpose of developing hydraulic power and supplying such power to the inhabitants.6

For many years now, petitioner sells electric power to the residents of Cabanatuan City, posting a
gross income of P107,814,187.96 in 1992.7 Pursuant to section 37 of Ordinance No. 165-92,8 the
respondent assessed the petitioner a franchise tax amounting to P808,606.41, representing 75% of 1% of
the latter's gross receipts for the preceding year.9

Petitioner, whose capital stock was subscribed and paid wholly by the Philippine
Government,10 refused to pay the tax assessment. It argued that the respondent has no authority to impose
tax on government entities. Petitioner also contended that as a non-profit organization, it is exempted from
the payment of all forms of taxes, charges, duties or fees11 in accordance with sec. 13 of Rep. Act No.
6395, as amended.

The respondent filed a collection suit in the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, demanding
that petitioner pay the assessed tax due, plus a surcharge equivalent to 25% of the amount of tax, and 2%
monthly interest.13Respondent alleged that petitioner's exemption from local taxes has been repealed by
section 193 of Rep. Act No. 7160,14

On January 25, 1996, the trial court issued an Order15 dismissing the case. It ruled that the tax
exemption privileges granted to petitioner subsist despite the passage of Rep. Act No. 7160 for the
following reasons: (1) Rep. Act No. 6395 is a particular law and it may not be repealed by Rep. Act No.
7160 which is a general law; (2) section 193 of Rep. Act No. 7160 is in the nature of an implied repeal
which is not favored; and (3) local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the national
government.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's Order17 on the ground that section 193, in
relation to sections 137 and 151 of the LGC, expressly withdrew the exemptions granted to the petitioner.18

ISSUE:W/N the respondent city government has the authority impose an annual tax on the petitioner?

HELD:Yes, Petitioner was created to "undertake the development of hydroelectric generation of power and
the production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal and other sources, as well as the transmission of
electric power on a nationwide basis." Pursuant to this mandate, petitioner generates power and sells
electricity in bulk. Certainly, these activities do not partake of the sovereign functions of the government.
They are purely private and commercial undertakings, albeit imbued with public interest. The public
interest involved in its activities, however, does not distract from the true nature of the petitioner as a
commercial enterprise, in the same league with similar public utilities like telephone and telegraph
companies, railroad companies, water supply and irrigation companies, gas, coal or light companies, power
plants, ice plant among others; all of which are declared by this Court as ministrant or proprietary functions
of government aimed at advancing the general interest of society.67

Reading together sections 137 and 193 of the LGC, we conclude that under the LGC the
local government unit may now impose a local tax at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross
annual receipts for the preceding calendar based on the incoming receipts realized within its
territorial jurisdiction. The legislative purpose to withdraw tax privileges enjoyed under existing law
or charter is clearly manifested by the language used on (sic) Sections 137 and 193 categorically
withdrawing such exemption subject only to the exceptions enumerated. Since it would be not only
tedious and impractical to attempt to enumerate all the existing statutes providing for special tax
exemptions or privileges, the LGC provided for an express, albeit general, withdrawal of such
exemptions or privileges. No more unequivocal language could have been used."76(emphases
supplied).