Republic of the Philippines vs.

SUPREME COURT
Manila GENERAL MANUEL YAN, GEN. EDU GARCIA, respondents.

EN BANC G.R. No. L-34004 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUSIN BEHALF

OF GERARDO TOMAS, ALSO KNOWN AS "GERRY TOMAS" AND FOR
G.R. No. L-33964 December 11, 1971 RETURN OF DOCUMENTS ILLEGALLY SEIZED. DOMINGO E. DE LARA, in
his capacity as Chairman, Committee on Legal Assistance, Philippine Bar
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF Association, petitioner,
TEODOSIO LANSANG RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI
ALCALA, petitioners, vs.
vs.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine BRIG. GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
Constabulary, respondent. CONSTABULARY, respondent.

G.R. No. L-33965 December 11, 1971 G.R. No. L-34013 December 11, 1971

ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, petitioner, REYNALDO RIMANDO, petitioner,

vs. vs.

SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, and CHIEF, PHIL. BRIG. GEN. EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief of the Philippine
CONSTABULARY, respondents. Constabulary, respondent.

G.R. No. L-33973 December 11, 1971 G.R. No. L-34039 December 11, 1971

LUZVIMINDA DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine Constabulary,
COL. N. C. CAMELLO, in his capacity as Chief of Staff, Philippine
Constabulary and HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE in his capacity as Secretary,
Department of National defense, respondents.
G.R. No. L-33982 December 11, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NEMESIO
E. PRUDENTE FELICIDAD G. PRUDENTE, petitioners,
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUSIN BEHALF
OF SGT. FILOMENO M. DE CASTRO AND HIS WIFE, MRS. BARCELISA
C. DE CASTRO. CARLOS C. RABAGO, in his capacity as President of the
Conference Delegates Association of the Philippines (CONDA),petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine
Constabulary, respondent.
G.R. No. L-34265 December 11, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ANTOLIN
ORETA, JR. ANTOLIN ORETA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA and COL. PROSPERO OLIVAS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-34339 December 11, 1971
GARY B. OLIVAR, assisted by his father, GEORGE OLIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine Constabulary,
et al., respondents.
Ignacio P. Lacsina for petitioners Teodosio Lansang, et al.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner Rogelio V. Arienda.
E. Voltaire Garcia II for petitioner Luzvimindo David.
Verzola, Africa and Atencio, Lorenzo M. Tanada, Wigberto E. Taada, Fortunato
de Leon, R. G. Suntay and Juan T. David for petitioner Felicidad G. Prudente.
Ruben L. Roxas for petitioner Reynaldo Rimando.
Nuez, Acob, Del Rosario and Ramos for petitioner Carlos Rabago, etc.
E. Voltaire Garcia II and M. P. Vivo for petitioner Gary Olivar, etc., et al.
Jose W. Diokno and Juanito R. Remulla for petitioner Antolin Oreta, Jr.
Domingo E. de Lara for and in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio and Assistant Solicitor General
Bernardo P. Pardo for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the
Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the
presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November
8, 1971, two (2) hand grenades were thrown, one after the other, at the platform
where said candidates and other persons were. As a consequence, eight (8)
persons were killed and many more injured, including practically all of the
aforementioned candidates, some of whom sustained extensive, as well as
serious, injuries which could have been fatal had it not been for the timely
medical assistance given to them.
On August 23, soon after noontime, the President of the Philippines announced
the issuance of Proclamation No. 889, dated August 21, 1971, reading as follows:
WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluated information, it is
definitely established that lawless elements in the country,
which are moved by common or similar ideological conviction,
design and goal and enjoying the active moral and material
support of a foreign power and being guided and directed by a
well trained, determined and ruthless group of men and taking
advantage of our constitutional liberties to promote and attain
their ends, have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact
joined and banded their forces together for the avowed
purpose of actually staging, undertaking and waging an armed
insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize political
power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted
government, and supplant our existing political social, economic
and legal order with an entirely new one whose form of
government, whose system of laws, whose conception of God and
religion, whose notion of individual rights and family relations,
and whose political, social and economic precepts are based on
the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist teachings and beliefs;
WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through
front organizations that are seemingly innocent and harmless,
have continuously and systematically strengthened and
broadened their memberships through sustained and careful
recruiting and enlistment of new adherents from among our
peasantry, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and
mass media personnel, and through such sustained and careful
recruitment and enlistment have succeeded in infiltrating
 almost every segment of our society in their ceaseless
determination to erode and weaken the political, social,
economic and moral foundations of our existing government and
to influence many peasant, labor, professional, intellectual,
student and mass media organizations to commit acts of
violence and depredations against our duly constituted
authorities, against the members of our law enforcement
agencies, and worst of all, against the peaceful members of our
society;
WHEREAS, these lawless elements have created a state of
lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the
security of the State, the latest manifestation of which has
been the dastardly attack on the Liberal Party rally in Manila on
August 21, 1971, which has resulted in the death and serious
injury of scores of persons;
WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective
action be taken in order to maintain peace and order, secure
the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the
State;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do
hereby suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for
the persons presently detained, as well as others who may be
hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or
rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them
in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto,
or in connection therewith.
Presently, petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed, in the above-entitled
cases, by the following persons, who, having been arrested without a warrant
therefor and then detained, upon the authority of said proclamation, assail its
validity, as well as that of their detention, namely:
1. TEDORO LANSANG, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO and BAYANI ALCALA, the
petitioners in Case No. L-33964 filed on August 24, 1971 who, on August 22,
1971, between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m., were "invited" by agents of the Philippine
Constabulary which is under the command of respondent Brig. Gen. Eduardo M.
Garcia to go and did go to the headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, at
Camp Crame, Quezon City, for interrogation, and thereafter, detained;
2. ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, the petitioner in Case No. L-33965 filed, also, on
August 24, 1971 who was picked up in his residence, at No. 55 Road, 3, Urduja
Village, Quezon City, by members of the Metrocom and then detained;
3. Soon after the filing of the petition in Case No. L-33965 or on August 28,
1971 the same was amended to include VICENTE ILAO and JUAN
CARANDANG, as petitioners therein, although, apart from stating that these
additional petitioners are temporarily residing with the original petitioner,
Rogelio V. Arienda, the amended petition alleged nothing whatsoever as regards
the circumstances under which said Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang are said to
be illegally deprived of their liberty;
4. LUZVIMINDO DAVID, petitioner in Case No. L-33973 filed on August 25,
1971 who was similarly arrested in his residence, at No. 131-B Kamias Road,
Quezon City, and detained by the Constabulary;
5. Felicidad G. Prudente, who filed the petition in Case No. L-33982 on August
27, 1971 upon the ground that her father, Dr. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, had,
on August 22, 1971, at about 8 p.m., been apprehended by Constabulary agents in
his house, at St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City, and then detained at the Camp
Crame stockade, Quezon City;
6. ANGELO DE LOS REYES, who was allowed on August 30, 1971 to
intervene as one of the petitioners in Cases Nos. L-33964, L-33965 and L-
33973, he having been arrested by members of the Constabulary on August 22,
1971, between 6:30 and 7:30 p.m., in his residence, at 86 Don Manuel Street,
Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and brought to Camp Crame, Quezon City,
where he is detained and restrained of liberty;
7. VICTOR FELIPE, who was similarly allowed to intervene as one of the
petitioners in said three (3) cases, upon the ground that, on August 23, 1971, at
about 8 a.m., he was, likewise, apprehended at Sta. Rosa, Laguna, by members of
the Philippine Constabulary and brought, first to the Constabulary headquarters
at Canlubang, Laguna, and, then, to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is
detained and restrained of liberty;
8. TERESITO SISON, who was, also, allowed to intervene as one of the
petitioners in the same three (3) cases, he having been arrested in his residence,
at 318 Lakandula St., Angeles City, on August 22, 1971, between 6 and 7 p.m., and
taken to the PC offices at Sto. Domingo, Angeles City, then to Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, and eventually to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is
restrained and deprived of liberty;
9. GERARDO TOMAS, alias Gerry Tomas, a 17-year old second year college
students of St. Louis University, Baguio City, on whose behalf, Domingo E. de
Lara in his capacity as Chairman, Committee on Legal Assistance, Philippine Bar
Association filed on September 3, 1971, the petition in Case No. L-34004, upon
the ground that said Gerardo Tomas had, on August 23, 1971, at about 6 a.m.,
been arrested by Constabulary agents, while on his way to school in the City of
Baguio, then brought to the Constabulary premises therein at Camp Holmes, and,
thereafter, taken, on August 24, 1971, to Camp Olivas, Pampanga, and thence, on
August 25, 1971, to the Constabulary headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City,
where he is detained;
10. REYNALDO RIMANDO, petitioner in Case No. L-34013 filed on September
7, 1971 a 19-year old student of the U.P. College in Baguio city who, while
allegedly on his way home, at Lukban Road, Baguio, on August 23, 1971, at about 1
a.m., was joined by three (3) men who brought him to the Burnham Park, thence,
to Camp Olivas at San Fernando, Pampanga, and, thereafter, to Camp Crame,
Quezon City, where he is detained;
11. Sgt. FILOMENO M. DE CASTRO and his wife, Mrs. BARCELISA C. DE
CASTRO, on whose behalf Carlos C. Rabago as President of the Conference
Delegates Association of the Philippines (CONDA) filed the petition in Case
No. L-34039 on September 14, 1971 against Gen. Eduardo M. Garcia, alleging
that, on August 27, 1971, at about 3 p.m., Mrs. De Castro was arrested, while at
Liamzon Subdivision, Rosario, Pasig, Rizal, by agents of the Constabulary, and
taken to the PC headquarters at Camp Crame, where, later, that same afternoon,
her husband was brought, also, by PC agents and both are detained;
12. ANTOLIN ORETA, JR., who filed the petition in Case No. L-34265 on
October 26, 1971 against said Gen. Garcia, as Chief of the Constabulary, and
Col. Prospero Olivas, Chief of the Central Intelligence Service (CIS), Philippine
Constabulary, alleging that, upon invitation from said CIS, he went, on October
20, 1971, to Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, to see Gen. Manuel Yan, Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, who referred petitioner to Col. Laroya of
the CIS; that the latter, in turn, referred him to CIS Investigator Atty. Berlin
Castillo and another CIS against, whose name is unknown to the petitioner; and
that, after being interrogated by the two (2), petitioner was detained illegally;
and
13. GARY OLIVAR, petitioner in Case No. L-34339 filed on November 10, 1971
who was apprehended, by agents of the Constabulary, in the evening of
November 8, 1941, in Quezon City, and then detained at Camp Crame, in the same
City.
Upon the filing of the aforementioned cases, the respondents were forthwith
required to answer the petitions therein, which they did. The return and answer
in L-33964 which was, mutatis mutandis, reproduced substantially or by
reference in the other cases, except L-34265 alleges, inter alia, that the
petitioners had been apprehended and detained "on reasonable belief" that they
had "participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion;" that "their continued
detention is justified due to the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to Proclamation No. 889 of the President of the
Philippines;" that there is "a state of insurrection or rebellion" in this country,
and that "public safety and the security of the State required the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus," as "declared by the President of the
Philippines in Proclamation No. 889; that in making said declaration, the
"President of the Philippines acted on relevant facts gathered thru the
coordinated efforts of the various intelligence agents of our government but
(of) which the Chief Executive could not at the moment give a full account and
disclosure without risking revelation of highly classified state secrets vital to its
safely and security"; that the determination thus made by the President is "final
and conclusive upon the court and upon all other persons" and "partake(s) of the
nature of political question(s) which cannot be the subject of judicial inquiry,"
pursuant to Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87, and Montenegro v. Castaeda, 91 Phil.
882; that petitioners "are under detention pending investigation and evaluation
of culpabilities on the reasonable belief" that they "have committed, and are still
committing, individually or in conspiracy with others, engaged in armed struggle,
insurgency and other subversive activities for the overthrow of the Government;
that petitioners cannot raise, in these proceedings for habeas corpus, "the
question of their guilt or innocence"; that the "Chief of Constabulary had
petitioners taken into custody on the basis of the existence of evidence
sufficient to afford a reasonable ground to believe that petitioners come within
the coverage of persons to whom the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has
been suspended"; that the "continuing detention of the petitioners as an urgent
bona fide precautionary and preventive measure demanded by the necessities of
public safety, public welfare and public interest"; that the President of the
Philippines has "undertaken concrete and abundant steps to insure that the
constitutional rights and privileges of the petitioners as well as of the other
persons in current confinement pursuant to Proclamation 889 remain unimpaired
and unhampered"; and that "opportunities or occasions for abuses by peace
officers in the implementation of the proclamation have been greatly minimized,
if not completely curtailed, by various safeguards contained in directives issued
by proper authority."
These safeguards are set forth in:
1. A letter of the President to the Secretary of National Defense, dated August
21, 1971, directing, inter alia, in connection with the arrest or detention of
suspects pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, that, except when caught
in flagrante delicto, no arrest shall be made without warrant authorized in
writing by the Secretary of National Defense; that such authority shall not be
granted unless, "on the basis of records and other evidences," it appears
satisfactorily, in accordance with Rule 113, section 6(b), of the Rules of Court,
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of the acts mentioned in the
proclamation; that, if such person will be charged with a crime subject to an
afflictive penalty under the Anti-Subversion Act, the authorization for his
arrest shall not be issued unless supported by signed intelligence reports citing
at least one reliable witness to the same overt act; that no unnecessary or
unreasonable force shall be used in effecting arrests; and that arrested persons
shall not be subject to greater restraint than is necessary for their detention;
2. Communications of the Chief of the Constabulary, dated August 23, 27, and
30, 1971, to all units of his command, stating that the privilege of the writ is
suspended for no other persons than those specified in the proclamation; that
the same does not involve material law; that precautionary measures should be
taken to forestall violence that may be precipitated by improper behavior of
military personnel; that authority to cause arrest under the proclamation will be
exercised only by the Metrocom, CMA, CIS, and "officers occupying position in
the provinces down to provincial commanders"; that there shall be no
indiscriminate or mass arrests; that arrested persons shall not be harmed and
shall be accorded fair and humane treatment; and that members of the
detainee's immediate family shall be allowed to visit him twice a week;
3. A memorandum of the Department of National Defense, dated September 2,
1971, directing the Chief of the Constabulary to establish appropriate Complaints
and Action Bodies/Groups to prevent and/or check any abuses in connection with
the suspension of the privilege of the writ; and
4. Executive Order No. 333, dated August 26, 1971, creating a Presidential
Administrative Assistance Committee to hear complaints regarding abuses
committed in connection with the implementation of Proclamation No. 889.
Respondents in L-33965 further alleged that therein petitioners Vicente Ilao
and Juan Carandang had been released from custody on August 31, 1971, "after
it had been found that the evidence against them was insufficient."
In L-34265, the "Answer and Return" filed by respondents therein traversed
some allegations of fact and conclusions of law made in the petition therein and
averred that Antolin Oreta, Jr., the petitioner therein, had been and is detained
"on the basis of a reasonable ground to believe that he has committed overt acts
in furtherance of rebellion or insurrection against the government" and,
accordingly, "comes within the class of persons as to whom the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus has been suspended by Proclamation No. 889, as amended,"
the validity of which is not contested by him.
On August 30, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No. 889-A, amending
Proclamation No. 889, so as to read as follows:
WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluated information, it is
definitely established that lawless elements in the country,
which are moved by common or similar ideological conviction,
design and goal and enjoying the active moral and material
support of a foreign power and being guided and directed by a
well-trained, determined and ruthless group of men and taking
advantage of our constitutional liberties to promote and attain
their ends, have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact
joined and banded their forces together for the avowed
purpose of [actually] staging, undertaking, [and] wagging and
are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion in
order to forcibly seize political power in this country,
overthrow the duly constituted government, and supplant our
existing political, social, economic and legal order with an
entirely new one whose form of government, whose system of
laws, whose conception of God and religion, whose notion of
individual rights and family relations, and whose political, social
and economic precepts are based on the Marxist-Leninist-
Maoist teaching and beliefs;
WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through
front organizations that are seemingly innocent and harmless,
have continuously and systematically strengthened and
broadened their memberships through sustained and careful
recruiting and enlistment of new adherents from among our
peasantly, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and
 mass media personnel, and through such sustained and careful A. PROVINCES:
recruitment and enlistment have succeeded in infiltrating
almost every segment of our society in their ceaseless 1. Batanes 15. Negros Occ.
determination to erode and weaken the political, social, 2. Ilocos Norte 16. Negros Or.
economic and moral foundations of our existing government and 3. Ilocos Sur 17. Cebu
influence many peasant, labor, professional, intellectual, student 4. Abra 18. Bohol
and mass media organizations to commit acts of violence and 5. Abra 19. Capiz
depredations against our duly constituted authorities, against 6. Pangasinan 20. Aklan
the members of our law enforcement agencies, and worst of all, 7. Batangas 21. Antique
against the peaceful members of our society; 8. Catanduanes 22. Iloilo
9. Masbate 23. Leyte
WHEREAS, these lawless elements, by their acts of rebellion 10. Romblon 24. Leyte del Sur
and insurrection, have created a state of lawlessness and 11. Marinduque 25. Northern Samar
disorder affecting public safety and security of the State, the 12. Or. Mindoro 26. Eastern Samar
latest manifestation of which has been the dastardly attack on 13. Occ. Mindoro 27. Western Samar
the Liberal Party rally in Manila on August 21, 1971, which has 14. Palawan.
resulted in the death and serious injury of scores of persons;
B. SUB-PROVINCES:
WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective
action be taken in order to maintain peace and order, secure 1. Guimaras 3. Siquior
the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the 2. Biliran
State;
C. CITIES:
NOW THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by 1. Laog 10. Bacolod
Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do 2. Dagupan 11. Bago
hereby suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for 3. San Carlos 12. Canlaon
the persons presently detained, as well as all others who may be 4. Batangas 13. La Carlota
hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or 5. Lipa 14. Bais
rebellion [,] and [all] other [crimes and offenses] overt acts 6. Puerto Princesa 15. Dumaguete
committed by them in furtherance [or on the occasion] 7. San Carlos (Negros 16. Iloilo
thereof[,]. [or incident thereto, or in connection therewith.] 1 Occ.) 17. Roxas
8. Cadiz 18. Tagbilaran
On September 1, 1971, Cases Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33973 and L-33982 9. Silay 19. Lapu-lapu
were jointly heard and then the parties therein were allowed to file memoranda,
which were submitted from September 3 to September 9, 1971. 20. Cebu 24. Tacloban
21. Mandaue 25. Ormoc
Soon thereafter, or on September 18, 1971, Proclamation No. 889 was further 22. Danao 26. Calbayog
amended by Proclamation No. 889-B, lifting the suspension of the privilege of 23. Toledo
the writ of habeas corpus in the following provinces, sub-provinces and cities of
the Philippine, namely: On September 25, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No. 889-C, restoring
the privilege of the writ in the following provinces and cities:
 A. PROVINCES: 1. Bataan 10. North Cotabato
2. Benguet 11. Nueva Ecija
1. Surigao del Norte 8. Agusan del Sur 3. Bulacan 13. Pampanga
2. Surigao del Sur 9. Misamis Or. 4. Camarines Sur 14. Quezon
3. Davao del Norte 10. Misamis Occ. 5. Ifugao 15. Rizal
4. Davao del Sur 11. Zamboanga del Norte 6. Isabela 16. South Cotabato
5. Davao Oriental 12. Basilan 7. Laguna 17. Tarlac
6. Bukidnon 13. Pagadian 8. Lanao del Norte 18. Zambales
7. Agusan del Norte 9. Lanao del Norte

B. CITIES: B. SUB-PROVINCES:

1. Surigao 8. Tangub 1. Aurora 2. Quirino

2. Davao 9. Dapitan
3. Butuan 10. Dipolog C. CITIES:
4. Cagayan 11. Zamboanga
5. Gingoong 12. Basilan 1. Angeles 10. Manila
6. Ozamiz 13. Pagadian. 2. Baguio 11. Marawi
7. Oroquieta 3. Cabanatuan 12. Naga
4. Caloocan 13. Olongapo
On October 4, 1971, the suspension of the privilege was further lifted by 5. Cotabato 14. Palayan
Proclamation No. 889-D, in the following places: 6. General Santos 15. Pasay
7. Iligan 16. Quezon
A. PROVINCES: 8 Iriga 17. San Jose
9 Lucena 18. San Pablo
1. Cagayan 5. Camarines
2. Cavite 6. Albay The first major question that the Court had to consider was whether it would
3. Mountain Province 7. Sorsogon adhere to the view taken in Barcelon v. Baker, 2 and reiterated in Montenegro v.
4. Kalinga-Apayao Castaeda, 3 pursuant to which, "the authority to decide whether the exigency
has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus)
B. CITIES: belongs to the President and his 'decision is final and conclusive' upon the courts
and upon all other persons." Indeed, had said question been decided in the
1. Cavite City 3. Trece Martires affirmative the main issue in all of these cases, except
2. Tagaytay 4. Legaspi L-34339, would have been settled, and, since the other issues were relatively of
minor importance, said cases could have been readily disposed of. Upon mature
deliberation, a majority of the Members of the Court had, however, reached,
As a consequences, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is still suspended
although tentatively, a consensus to the contrary, and decided that the Court
in the following eighteen (18) provinces, two (2) sub-provinces and eighteen (18)
had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases
cities, to wit:
required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ; but
before proceeding to do so, the Court deemed it necessary to hear the parties
A. PROVINCE:
on the nature and extent of the inquiry to be undertaken, none of them having
previously expressed their views thereof. Accordingly, on October 5, 1971, the
Court issued, in L-33964, L-33965, L-33973 and L-33982, a resolution stating in
part that
... a majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a
consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the
existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential
Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A (suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus for all persons detained or to be
detained for the crimes of rebellion or insurrection throughout
the Philippines, which area has lately been reduced to some
eighteen provinces, two subprovinces and eighteen cities with
the partial lifting of the suspension of the privilege effected
by Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889-B, 889-C and 889-D)
and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases
in the light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14,
and Article VII, sec. 10, par. 2, of the Philippine Constitution;
and considering that the members of the Court are not agreed
on the precise scope and nature of the inquiry to be made in the
premises, even as all of them are agreed that the Presidential
findings are entitled to great respect, the Court RESOLVED
that these cases be set for rehearing on October 8, 1971 at
9:30 A.M.
xxx xxx xxx
On October 8, 1971, said four cases were, therefore, heard, once again, but, this
time jointly with cases Nos. L-34004, L-34013, and L-34039, and the parties
were then granted a period to file memoranda, in amplification of their
respective oral arguments, which memoranda were submitted from October 12 to
October 21, 1971.
Respondents having expressed, during the oral arguments, on September 1 and
October 8, 1971, their willingness to impart to the Court classified information
relevant to these cases, subject to appropriate security measures, the Court met
at closed doors, on October 28 and 29, 1971, and, in the presence of three (3)
attorneys for the petitioners, chosen by the latter, namely, Senator Jose W.
Diokno, Senator Salvador H. Laurel, and Atty. Leopoldo Africa, as well as of the
Solicitor General and two (2) members of his staff, was briefed, by Gen. Manuel
Yan, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Gen. Fidel Ramos,
Deputy Chief of Staff, Gen. Felizardo Tanabe, Col. Tagumpay Nanadiego, Judge
Advocate General, JAGS (GSC), and other ranking officers of said Armed
Forces, on said classified information, most of which was contained in reports
and other documents already attached to the records. During the proceedings,
the members of the Court, and, occassionally, counsel for the petitioners,
propounded pertinent questions to said officers of the Armed Forces. Both
parties were then granted a period of time within which to submit their
respective observations, which were filed on November 3, 1971, and
complemented by some documents attached to the records on November 6, 1971,
and a summary, submitted on November 15, 1971, of the aforesaid classified
information.
In the meantime, cases Nos. L-34265 (Oreta) and L-34339 (Olivar) had been
filed and the parties therein were heard in oral argument on November 4, and 16,
1971, respectively.
On November 15, 1971, the Solicitor General filed manifestations motions
stating that on November 13, 1971, the following petitioners were:
(a) released from custody:
(1) Teodosio Lansang -- G.R. No. L-33964
(2) Bayani Alcala -- " " L-33964
(3) Rogelio Arienda -- " " L-33965
(4) Nemesio Prudente -- " " L-33982
(5) Gerardo Tomas -- " " L-34004
(6) Reynaldo Rimando -- " " L-34013
(7) Filomeno M. de Castro -- " " L-34039
(8) Barcelisa de Castro -- " " L-34039
(9) Antolin Oreta, Jr. -- " " L-34264.
(b) charged, together with other persons named in the criminal complaint filed
therefor, with a violation of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act), in the
City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City:
(1) Angelo de los Reyes -- G.R. No. L-22982 *
(2) Teresito Sison -- " " L-33982 *
(c) accused, together with many others named in the criminal complaint filed
therefor, of a violation of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion
Act), in the Court of First Instance of Rizal:
(1) Rodolfo del Rosario -- G.R. No. L-33969 **
(2) Luzvimindo David -- " " L-33973
(3) Victor Felipe -- " " L-33982 *
and continue under detention pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, as amended, and
praying that the petitions in G.R. Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-
34013 and L-34039 be dismissed, without prejudice to the resolution of the
remaining cases. Copy of the criminal complaint filed, as above stated, with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal and docketed therein as Criminal Case No. Q-
1623 of said court which was appended to said manifestations-motions of the
respondent as Annex 2 thereof shows that Gary Olivar, the petitioner in L-
34339, is one of the defendants in said case.
Required to comment on said manifestations-motions, Luzvimindo David,
petitioner in L-33973, in his comment dated November 23, 1971, urged the Court
to rule on the merits of the petitions in all of these cases, particularly on the
constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 889, as amended, upon the
ground that he is still detained and that the main issue is one of public interest
involving as it does the civil liberties of the people. Angelo de los Reyes, one of
the petitioners in L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, Nemesio E. Prudente and
Gerardo Tomas, for whose respective benefit the petitions in L-33982 and L-
34004 have been filed, maintained that the issue in these cases is not moot, not
even for the detainees who have been released, for, as long as the privilege of
the writ remains suspended, they are in danger of being arrested and detained
again without just cause or valid reason. In his reply, dated and filed on
November 29, 1971, the Solicitor General insisted that the release of the above-
named petitioners rendered their respective petitions moot and academic.
I Whatever may be the merit of this claim, the same has been rendered moot and
Petitioners herein, except Antolin Oreta, Jr. in L-34265, question the formal
validity of the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. In this connection, it should be noted that, as originally formulated,
Proclamation No. 889 was contested upon the ground that it did not comply with
the pertinent constitutional provisions, namely, paragraph (14) of section 1,
Article III of our Constitution, reading:
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, in any way of which events
the same may be suspended wherever during such period the
necessity for such suspension shall exist.
and paragraph (2), section 10, Article VII of the same instrument, which
provides that:
The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces
of the Philippines, and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof when the
public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the
writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law.
Regardless of whether or not the President may suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in case of "imminent danger" of invasion, insurrection or
rebellion which is one of the grounds stated in said paragraph (2), section 10
of Art. VII of the Constitution, but not mentioned in paragraph (14), section 1 of
its Bill of Rights petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not
declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent
danger thereof," and that, consequently, said Proclamation was invalid. This
contention was predicated upon the fact that, although the first "whereas" in
Proclamation No. 889 stated that "lawless elements" had "entered into
a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for
the avowed purpose of actually staging, undertaking and waging an armed
insurrection and rebellion," the actuality so alleged refers to the
existence, not of an uprising that constitutes the essence of a rebellion or
insurrection, but of the conspiracy and the intent to rise in arms.
academic by Proclamation No. 889-A, issued nine (9) days after the promulgation
of the original proclamation, or on August 30, 1971. Indeed, said Proclamation No.
889-A amended, inter alia, the first "whereas" of the original proclamation by
postulating the said lawless elements "have entered into a conspiracy and have in
fact joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of staging,
undertaking, waging and are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and
rebellion in order to forcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow the
duly constituted government, and supplant our existing political, social, economic
and legal order with an entirely new one ...." Moreover, the third "whereas" in the
original proclamation was, likewise, amended by alleging therein that said lawless
elements, "by their acts of rebellion and insurrection," have created a state of
lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security of the State.
In other words, apart from adverting to the existence of actual conspiracy and
of the intent to rise in arms to overthrow the government, Proclamation No. 889-
A asserts that the lawless elements "are actually engaged in an armed
insurrection and rebellion" to accomplish their purpose.
It may not be amiss to note, at this juncture, that the very tenor of the original
proclamation and particularly, the circumstances under which it had been issued,
clearly suggest the intent to aver that there was and is, actually, a state of
rebellion in the Philippines, although the language of said proclamation was hardly
a felicitous one, it having in effect, stressed the actuality of the intent to rise in
arms, rather than of the factual existence of the rebellion itself. The pleadings,
the oral arguments and the memoranda of respondents herein have consistently
and abundantly emphasized to justify the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus the acts of violence and subversion committed prior to
August 21, 1971, by the lawless elements above referred to, and the conditions
obtaining at the time of the issuance of the original proclamation. In short, We
hold that Proclamation No. 889-A has superseded the original proclamation and
that the flaws attributed thereto are purely formal in nature.
II
Let us now consider the substantive validity of the proclamation, as amended.
Pursuant to the above-quoted provisions of the Constitution, two (2) conditions
must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to
the writ, to wit: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or
pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution
"imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension
of the privilege. The Presidential Proclamation under consideration declares that
there has been and there is actually a state of rebellion and
that 4 "public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in
order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve
the authority of the State."
Are these findings conclusive upon the Court? Respondents maintain that they
are, upon the authority of Barcelon v. Baker 5 and Montenegro v.
Castaeda. 6 Upon the other hand, petitioners press the negative view and urge a
reexamination of the position taken in said two (2) cases, as well as a reversal
thereof.
The weight of Barcelon v. Baker, as a precedent, is diluted by two (2) factors,
namely: (a) it relied heavily upon Martin v. Mott 7 involving the U.S. President's
power to call out the militia, which he being the commander-in-chief of all the
armed forces may be exercised to suppress or prevent any lawless violence,
even without invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, and
is, accordingly, much broader than his authority to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, jeopardizing as the latter does individual liberty; and (b)
the privilege had been suspended by the American Governor-General, whose act,
as representative of the Sovereign, affecting the freedom of its subjects, can
hardly be equated with that of the President of the Philippines dealing with the
freedom of the Filipino people, in whom sovereignty resides, and from whom all
government authority emanates. The pertinent ruling in the Montenegro case was
based mainly upon the Barcelon case, and hence, cannot have more weight than
the same. Moreover, in the Barcelon case, the Court held that it could go into the
question: "Did the Governor-General" acting under the authority vested in him
by the Congress of the United States, to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus under certain conditions "act in conformance with such
authority?" In other words, it did determine whether or not the Chief Executive
had acted in accordance with law. Similarly, in the Montenegro case, the Court
held that petitioner therein had "failed to overcome the presumption of
correctness which the judiciary accords to acts of the Executive ...." In short,
the Court considered the question whether or not there really was are rebellion,
as stated in the proclamation therein contested.
Incidentally, even the American jurisprudence is neither explicit nor clear on the
point under consideration. Although some cases 8 purport to deny the judicial
power to "review" the findings made in the proclamations assailed in said cases,
the tenor of the opinions therein given, considered as a whole, strongly suggests
the court's conviction that the conditions essential for the validity of said
proclamations or orders were, in fact, present therein, just as the opposite view
taken in other cases 9 had a backdrop permeated or characterized by the belief
that said conditions were absent. Hence, the dictum of Chief Justice Taney to
the effect that "(e)very case must depend on its own circumstances." 10 One of
the important, if not dominant, factors, in connection therewith, was intimated in
Sterling v. Constantin, 11 in which the Supreme Court of the United States,
speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, declared that:
.... When there is a substantial showing that the exertion of
state power has overridden private rights secured by that
Constitution, the subject is necessarily one for judicial
inquiry in an appropriate proceeding directed against the
individuals charged with the transgression. To such a case the
Federal judicial power extends
(Art. 3, sec. 2) and, so extending, the court has all the
authority appropriate to its
exercise. .... 12
In our resolution of October 5, 1971, We stated that "a majority of the Court"
had "tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy
itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential
Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A ... and thus determine the constitutional
sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1,
par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par 2, of the Philippine Constitution...." Upon
further deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in the
conviction that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual
bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof.
Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor
unqualified. The authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of
Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The
precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception
thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to
stress its importance, by providing that "(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended ...." It is only by way of exception that it permits
the suspension of the privilege "in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion"
or, under Art VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger thereof" "when the
public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended
wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall
exist." 13 For from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege
of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the
prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as
regards the time when and the place where it may be exercised. These factors
and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the
extent, the confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist.
And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon
the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may,
within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise, the
explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the
framers of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful
exercise in futility.
Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind that our
political system is essentially democratic and republican in character and that
the suspension of the privilege affects the most fundamental element of that
system, namely, individual freedom. Indeed, such freedom includes and connotes,
as well as demands, the right of every single member of our citizenry to freely
discuss and dissent from, as well as criticize and denounce, the views, the
policies and the practices of the government and the party in power that he
deems unwise, improper or inimical to the commonwealth, regardless of whether
his own opinion is objectively correct or not. The untrammelled enjoyment and
exercise of such right which, under certain conditions, may be a civic duty of
the highest order is vital to the democratic system and essential to its
successful operation and wholesome growth and development.
Manifestly, however, the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is
one enjoyed and exercised, not in derogation thereof, but consistently
therewith, and, hence, within the framework of the social order established by
the Constitution and the context of the Rule of Law. Accordingly, when individual
freedom is used to destroy that social order, by means of force and violence, in
defiance of the Rule of Law such as by rising publicly and taking arms against
the government to overthrow the same, thereby committing the crime of
rebellion there emerges a circumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal
of the aforementioned guarantee or protection, by suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety requires it. Although we must be
forewarned against mistaking mere dissent no matter how emphatic or
intemperate it may be for dissidence amounting to rebellion or insurrection,
the Court cannot hesitate, much less refuse when the existence of such
rebellion or insurrection has been fairly established or cannot reasonably be
denied to uphold the finding of the Executive thereon, without, in effect,
encroaching upon a power vested in him by the Supreme Law of the land and
depriving him, to this extent, of such power, and, therefore, without violating
the Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the Court is called upon to
epitomize.
As heretofore adverted to, for the valid suspension of the privilege of the writ:
(a) there must be "invasion, insurrection or rebellion" or pursuant to paragraph
(2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution "imminent danger thereof"; and
(b) public safety must require the aforementioned suspension. The President
declared in Proclamation No. 889, as amended, that both conditions are present.
As regards the first condition, our jurisprudence 14 attests abundantly to the
Communist activities in the Philippines, especially in Manila, from the late
twenties to the early thirties, then aimed principally at incitement to sedition or
rebellion, as the immediate objective. Upon the establishment of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, the movement seemed to have waned notably;
but, the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific and the miseries, the
devastation and havoc, and the proliferation of unlicensed firearms concomitant
with the military occupation of the Philippines and its subsequent liberation,
brought about, in the late forties, a resurgence of the Communist threat, with
such vigor as to be able to organize and operate in Central Luzon an army
called HUKBALAHAP, during the occupation, and renamed Hukbong Mapagpalaya
ng Bayan (HMP) after liberation which clashed several times with the armed
forces of the Republic. This prompted then President Quirino to issue
Proclamation No. 210, dated October 22, 1950, suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the validity of which was upheld in Montenegro v.
Castaeda. 15 Days before the promulgation of said Proclamation, or on October
18, 1950, members of the Communist Politburo in the Philippines were
apprehended in Manila. Subsequently accused and convicted of the crime of
rebellion, they served their respective sentences. 16
The fifties saw a comparative lull in Communist activities, insofar as peace and
order were concerned. Still, on June 20, 1957, Rep. Act No. 1700, otherwise
known as the Anti-Subversion Act, was approved, upon the ground stated in
the very preamble of said statute that.
... the Communist Party of the Philippines, although purportedly
a political party, is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, not only by
force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other
illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a
totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control;
... the continued existence and activities of the Communist
Party of the Philippines constitutes a clear,
present and grave danger to the security of the
Philippines; 17 and
... in the face of the organized, systematic and persistent
subversion, national in scope but international in direction,
posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its
activities, there is urgent need for special legislation to cope
with this continuing menace to the freedom and security of the
country....
In the language of the Report on Central Luzon, submitted, on September 4,
1971, by the Senate Ad Hoc Committee of Seven copy of which Report was
filed in these cases by the petitioners herein
The years following 1963 saw the successive emergence in the
country of several mass organizations, notably the Lapiang
Manggagawa (now the Socialist Party of the Philippines) among
the workers; the Malayang Samahan ng mga Magsasaka
(MASAKA) among the peasantry; the Kabataang Makabayan
(KM) among the youth/students; and the Movement for the
Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) among the
intellectuals/professionals. The PKP has exerted all-out effort
to infiltrate, influence and utilize these organizations in
promoting its radical brand of
nationalism. 18
Meanwhile, the Communist leaders in the Philippines had been split into two (2)
groups, one of which composed mainly of young radicals, constituting the
Maoist faction reorganized the Communist Party of the Philippines early in
1969 and established a New People's Army. This faction adheres to the Maoist
concept of the "Protracted People's War" or "War of National Liberation." Its
"Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution" states, inter alia:
The Communist Party of the Philippines is determined to
implement its general programme for a people's democratic
revolution. All Filipino communists are ready to sacrifice their
lives for the worthy cause of achieving the new type of
democracy, of building a new Philippines that is genuinely and
completely independent, democratic, united, just and
prosperous ...
xxx xxx xxx
The central task of any revolutionary movement is to seize
political power. The Communist Party of the Philippines assumes
this task at a time that both the international and national
situations are favorable of asking the road of armed
revolution ... 19
In the year 1969, the NPA had according to the records of the Department of
National Defense conducted raids, resorted to kidnappings and taken part in
other violent incidents numbering over 230, in which it inflicted 404 casualties,
and, in turn, suffered 243 losses. In 1970, its records of violent incidents was
about the same, but the NPA casualties more than doubled.
At any rate, two (2) facts are undeniable: (a) all Communists, whether they
belong to the traditional group or to the Maoist faction, believe that force and
violence are indispensable to the attainment of their main and ultimate objective,
and act in accordance with such belief, although they may disagree on the means
to be used at a given time and in a particular place; and (b) there is a New
People's Army, other, of course, that the arm forces of the Republic and
antagonistic thereto. Such New People's Army is per se proof of
the existence of a rebellion, especially considering that its establishment
was announced publicly by the reorganized CPP. Such announcement is in the
nature of a public challenge to the duly constituted authorities and may be
likened to a declaration of war, sufficient to establish a war status or a condition
of belligerency, even before the actual commencement of hostilities.
We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of
men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus
been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.
In fact, the thrust of petitioners' argument is that the New People's Army
proper is too small, compared with the size of the armed forces of the
Government, that the Communist rebellion or insurrection cannot so endanger
public safety as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. This argument does not negate, however, the existence of a rebellion,
which, from the constitutional and statutory viewpoint, need not be widespread
or attain the magnitude of a civil war. This is apparent from the very provision of
the Revised Penal Code defining the crime of rebellion, 20 which may be limited in
its scope to "any part" of the Philippines, and, also, from paragraph (14) of
section 1, Article III of the Constitution, authorizing the suspension of the
privilege of the writ "wherever" in case of rebellion "the necessity for such
suspension shall exist." In fact, the case of Barcelon v. Baker referred to a
proclamation suspending the privilege in the provinces of Cavite and Batangas
only. The case of In re Boyle 21 involved a valid proclamation suspending the
privilege in a smaller area a country of the state of Idaho.
The magnitude of the rebellion has a bearing on the second condition essential to
the validity of the suspension of the privilege namely, that the suspension be
required by public safety. Before delving, however, into the factual bases of the
presidential findings thereon, let us consider the precise nature of the Court's
function in passing upon the validity of Proclamation No. 889, as amended.
Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the
principle of separation of powers underlying our system of government, the
Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers,
under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with
the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as
regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the
sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether
or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this
respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.
In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely
to check not to supplant 22 the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether
he had gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise
the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. To be sure, the
power of the Court to determine the validity of the contested proclamation is
far from being identical to, or even comparable with, its power over ordinary civil
or criminal cases elevated thereto by ordinary appeal from inferior courts, in
which cases the appellate court has all of the powers of the court of origin.
Under the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances, the judicial authority to review decisions of administrative bodies or
agencies is much more limited, as regards findings of fact made in said decisions.
Under the English law, the reviewing court determines only whether there
is some evidentiary basis for the contested administrative findings; no
quantitative examination of the supporting evidence is undertaken. The
administrative findings can be interfered with only if there is no evidence
whatsoever in support thereof, and said finding is, accordingly, arbitrary,
capricious and obviously unauthorized. This view has been adopted by some
American courts. It has, likewise, been adhered to in a number of Philippine
cases. Other cases, in both jurisdictions, have applied the "substantial evidence"
rule, which has been construed to mean "more than a mere scintilla" or "relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion," 23 even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise.
Manifestly, however, this approach refers to the review of administrative
determinations involving the exercise of quasi-judicial functions calling for or
entailing the reception of evidence. It does not and cannot be applied, in its
aforesaid form, in testing the validity of an act of Congress or of the Executive,
such as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for, as a
general rule, neither body takes evidence in the sense in which the term is
used in judicial proceedings before enacting a legislation or suspending the
writ. Referring to the test of the validity of a statute, the Supreme Court of
the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts, expressed, in the
leading case of Nebbia v. New York, 24 the view that:
... If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied,
and judicial determination to that effect renders a court
functus officio ... With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with
 the adequacy or practically of the law enacted to forward it,
the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal ...
Relying upon this view, it is urged by the Solicitor General
... that judicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned
proclamation can go no further than to satisfy the
Court not that the President's decision is correct and that
public safety was endanger by the rebellion and justified the
suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the
President did not act arbitrarily.
No cogent reason has been submitted to warrant the rejection of such test.
Indeed, the co-equality of coordinate branches of the Government, under our
constitutional system, seems to demand that the test of the validity of acts of
Congress and of those of the Executive be, mutatis mutandis, fundamentally the
same. Hence, counsel for petitioner Rogelio Arienda admits that the proper
standard is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
Did public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889, as amended? Petitioners submit a
negative answer upon the ground: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to
and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was
functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident,
confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after
August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of said
plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in the
Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as
to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
As above indicated, however, the existence of a rebellion is obvious, so much so
that counsel for several petitioners herein have admitted it.
With respect to the normal operation of government, including courts, prior to
and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, suffice it to say that, if the
conditions were such that courts of justice no longer functioned, a suspension of
the privilege would have been unnecessary, there being no courts to issue the
writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, petitioners' reference to the normal operation of
courts as a factor indicative of the illegality of the contested act of the
Executive stems, perhaps, from the fact that this circumstance was adverted to
in some American cases to justify the invalidation therein decreed of said act of
the Executive. Said cases involved, however, the conviction by military courts of
members of the civilian population charged with common crimes. It was
manifestly, illegal for military courts to assume jurisdiction over civilians so
charged, when civil courts were functioning normally.
Then, too, the alleged absence of any untoward incident after August 21, 1971,
does not necessarily bear out petitioners' view. What is more, it may have been
due precisely to the suspension of the privilege. To be sure, one of its logical
effects is to compel those connected with the insurrection or rebellion to go into
hiding. In fact, most of them could not be located by the authorities, after
August 21, 1971.
The alleged July-August Plan to terrorize Manila is branded as incredible, upon
the theory that, according to Professor Egbal Ahman of Cornell University,
"guerrilla use of terror ... is sociological and psychologically selective," and that
the indiscriminate resort to terrorism is bound to boomerang, for it tends to
alienate the people's symphaty and to deprive the dissidents of much needed
mass support. The fact, however, is that the violence used is some
demonstrations held in Manila in 1970 and 1971 tended to terrorize the bulk of
its inhabitants. It would have been highly imprudent, therefore, for the
Executive to discard the possibility of a resort to terrorism, on a much bigger
scale, under the July-August Plan.
We will now address our attention to petitioners' theory to the effect that the
New People's Army of the Communist Party of the Philippines is too small to pose
a danger to public safety of such magnitude as to require the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The flaw in petitioners' stand becomes
apparent when we consider that it assumes that the Armed Forces of the
Philippines have no other task than to fight the New People's Army, and that the
latter is the only threat and a minor one to our security. Such assumption is
manifestly erroneous.
The records before Us show that, on or before August 21, 1971, the Executive
had information and reports subsequently confirmed, in many respects, by the
abovementioned Report of the Senate Ad-Hoc Committee of Seven 25 to the
effect that the Communist Party of the Philippines does not merely adhere to
Lenin's idea of a swift armed uprising; that it has, also, adopted Ho Chi Minh's
terrorist tactics and resorted to the assassination of uncooperative local
official; that, in line with this policy, the insurgents have killed 5 mayors, 20
barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful
bombing incidents in the Greater Manila Area in 1970; that the Constitutional
Convention Hall was bombed on June 12, 1971; that, soon after the Plaza Miranda
incident, the NAWASA main pipe, at the Quezon City-San Juan boundary, was
bombed; that this was followed closely by the bombing of the Manila City Hall,
the COMELEC building, the Congress Building and the MERALCO substation at
Cubao, Quezon City; and that the respective residences of Senator Jose J. Roy
and Congressman Eduardo Cojuangco were, likewise, bombed, as were the
MERALCO main office premises, along Ortigas Avenue, and the Doctor's
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Building, in Caloocan City.
Petitioners, similarly, fail to take into account that as per said information and
reports the reorganized Communist Party of the Philippines has, moreover,
adopted Mao's concept of protracted people's war, aimed at the paralyzation of
the will to resist of the government, of the political, economic and intellectual
leadership, and of the people themselves; that conformably to such concept, the
Party has placed special emphasis upon a most extensive and intensive program of
subversion by the establishment of front organizations in urban centers, the
organization of armed city partisans and the infiltration in student groups, labor
unions, and farmer and professional groups; that the CPP has managed to
infiltrate or establish and control nine (9) major labor organizations; that it has
exploited the youth movement and succeeded in making Communist fronts of
eleven (11) major student or youth organizations; that there are, accordingly,
about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP interests, among
which are the Malayang Samahan ng Magsasaka (MASAKA), the Kabataang
Makabayan (KM), the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN), the
Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan (SDK), the Samahang Molave (SM) and the
Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino(MPKP); that, as of August, 1971, the
KM had two hundred forty-five (245) operational chapters throughout the
Philippines, of which seventy-three (73) were in the Greater Manila Area, sixty
(60) in Northern Luzon, forty-nine (49) in Central Luzon, forty-two (42) in the
Visayas and twenty-one (21) in Mindanao and Sulu; that in 1970, the Party had
recorded two hundred fifty-eight (258) major demonstrations, of which about
thirty-three (33) ended in violence, resulting in fifteen (15) killed and over five
hundred (500) injured; that most of these actions were organized, coordinated
or led by the aforementioned front organizations; that the violent
demonstrations were generally instigated by a small, but well-trained group of
armed agitators; that the number of demonstrations heretofore staged in 1971
has already exceeded those of 1970; and that twenty-four (24) of these
demonstrations were violent, and resulted in the death of fifteen (15) persons
and the injury of many more.
Subsequent events as reported have also proven that petitioners' counsel
have underestimated the threat to public safety posed by the New People's
Army. Indeed, it appears that, since August 21, 1971, it had in Northern Luzon
six (6) encounters and staged one (1) raid, in consequence of which seven (7)
soldiers lost their lives and two (2)others were wounded, whereas the insurgents
suffered five (5) casualties; that on August 26, 1971, a well-armed group of NPA,
trained by defector Lt. Victor Corpus, attacked the very command port of TF
LAWIN in Isabela, destroying two (2) helicopters and one (1) plane, and wounding
one (1) soldier; that the NPA had in Central Luzon a total of four (4) encounters,
with two (2) killed and three (3) wounded on the side of the Government, one (1)
BSDU killed and three (3) NPA casualties; that in an encounter at Botolan,
Zambales, one (1) KM-SDK leader, an unidentified dissident, and Commander
Panchito, leader of the dissident group were killed; that on August 26, 1971,
there was an encounter in the barrio of San Pedro. Iriga City, Camarines Sur,
between the PC and the NPA, in which a PC and two (2) KM members were killed;
that the current disturbances in Cotabato and the Lanao provinces have been
rendered more complex by the involvement of the CPP/NPA, for, in mid-1971, a
KM group, headed by Jovencio Esparagoza, contacted the Higa-onan tribes, in
their settlement in Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, and offered them books,
pamphlets and brochures of Mao Tse Tung, as well as conducted teach-ins in the
reservation; that Esparagoza an operation of the PC in said reservation; and that
there are now two (2) NPA cadres in Mindanao.
It should, also, be noted that adherents of the CPP and its front organizations
are, according to intelligence findings, definitely capable of preparing powerful
explosives out of locally available materials; that the bomb used in the
Constitutional Convention Hall was a "clay-more" mine, a powerful explosive
device used by the U.S. Army, believed to have been one of many pilfered from
the Subic Naval Base a few days before; that the President had received
intelligence information to the effect that there was a July-August Plan involving
a wave of assassinations, kidnappings, terrorism and mass destruction of
property and that an extraordinary occurence would signal the beginning of said
event; that the rather serious condition of peace and order in Mindanao,
particularly in Cotabato and Lanao, demanded the presence therein of forces
sufficient to cope with the situation; that a sizeable part of our armed forces
discharge other functions; and that the expansion of the CPP activities from
Central Luzon to other parts of the country, particularly Manila and its suburbs,
the Cagayan Valley, Ifugao, Zambales, Laguna, Quezon and Bicol Region, required
that the rest of our armed forces be spread thin over a wide area.
Considering that the President was in possession of the above data except
those related to events that happened after August 21, 1971 when the Plaza
Miranda bombing took place, the Court is not prepared to hold that the
Executive had acted arbitrarily or gravely abused his discretion when he then
concluded that public safety and national security required the suspension of the
privilege of the writ, particularly if the NPA were to strike simultaneously with
violent demonstrations staged by the two hundred forty-five (245) KM chapters,
all over the Philippines, with the assistance and cooperation of the dozens of CPP
front organizations, and the bombing or water mains and conduits, as well as
electric power plants and installations a possibility which, no matter how
remote, he was bound to forestall, and a danger he was under obligation to
anticipate and arrest.
He had consulted his advisers and sought their views. He had reason to feel that
the situation was critical as, indeed, it was and demanded immediate action.
This he took believing in good faith that public safety required it. And, in the
light of the circumstances adverted to above, he had substantial grounds to
entertain such belief.
Petitioners insist that, nevertheless, the President had no authority to suspend
the privilege in the entire Philippines, even if he may have been justified in doing
so in some provinces or cities thereof. At the time of the issuance of
Proclamation No. 889, he could not be reasonably certain, however, about the
placed to be excluded from the operation of the proclamation. He needed some
time to find out how it worked, and as he did so, he caused the suspension to be
gradually lifted, first, on September 18, 1971, in twenty-seven (27) provinces,
three (3) sub-provinces and twenty six (26) cities; then, on September 25, 1971,
in order fourteen (14) provinces and thirteen (13) cities; and, still later, on
October 4, 1971, in seven (7) additional provinces and four (4) cities, or a total
of forty-eight (48) provinces, three (3) sub-provinces and forth-three (43)
cities, within a period of forty-five (45) days from August 21, 1971.
Neither should We overlook the significance of another fact. The President
could have declared a general suspension of the privilege. Instead, Proclamation
No. 889 limited the suspension to persons detained "for crimes of insurrection
or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance
or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith." Even
this was further limited by Proclamation No. 889-A, which withdrew from the
coverage of the suspension persons detained for other crimes and offenses
committed "on the occasion" of the insurrection or rebellion, or "incident
thereto, in or connection therewith." In fact, the petitioners in L-33964, L-
33982 and L-34004 concede that the President had acted in good faith.
In case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, the
President has, under the Constitution, three (3) courses of action open to him,
namely: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, which measure,
however, proved inadequate to attain the desired result. Of the two (2)other
alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.
In view of the foregoing, it does not appear that the President has acted
arbitrary in issuing Proclamation No. 889, as amended, nor that the same is
unconstitutional.
III
The next question for determination is whether petitioners herein are covered
by said Proclamation, as amended. In other words, do petitioners herein belong
to the class of persons as to whom privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has
been suspended?
In this connection, it appears that Bayani Alcala, one of the petitioners in L-
33964, Gerardo Tomas, petitioner in L-34004, and Reynaldo Rimando, petitioner
in L-34013, were, on November 13, 1971, released "permanently" meaning,
perhaps, without any intention to prosecute them upon the ground that,
although there was reasonable ground to believe that they had committed an
offense related to subversion, the evidence against them is insufficient to
warrant their prosecution; that Teodosio Lansang, one of the petitioners in L-
33964, Rogelio Arienda, petitioner in L-33965, Nemesio Prudente, petitioner in
L-33982, Filomeno de Castro and Barcelisa C. de Castro, for whose benefit the
petition in L-34039 was filed, and Antolin Oreta, Jr., petitioner in L-34265,
were, on said date, "temporarily released"; that Rodolfo del Rosario, one of the
petitioners in
L-33964, Victor Felipe, an intervenor in L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, as well
as Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L-33973, and Gary Olivar, petitioner in L-
34339, are still under detention and, hence, deprived of their liberty, they
together with over forty (40) other persons, who are at large having been
accused, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, of a violation of section 4 of
Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act); and that Angelo delos Reyes and
Teresito Sison, intervenors in said L-33964, L-33965 and
L-33973, are, likewise, still detained and have been charged together with
over fifteen (15) other persons, who are, also, at large with another violation
of said Act, in a criminal complaint filed with the City Fiscal's Office of Quezon
City.
With respect to Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang petitioners in L-33965
who were released as early as August 31, 1971, as well as to petitioners Nemesio
Prudente, Teodosio Lansang, Rogelio Arienda, Antolin Oreta, Jr., Filomeno de
Castro, Barcelisa C. de Castro, Reynaldo Rimando, Gerardo Tomas and Bayani
Alcala, who were released on November 13, 1971, and are no longer deprived of That all the above-named accused, as such officers and/or
their liberty, their respective petitions have, thereby, become moot and ranking leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines
academic, as far as their prayer for release is concerned, and should, conspiring, confederating and mutual helping one another, did
accordingly, be dismissed, despite the opposition thereto of counsel for Nemesio then and there knowingly, wilfully, and feloniously and by overt
Prudente and Gerardo Tomas who maintain that, as long as the privilege of the acts committed subversive acts all intended to overthrow the
writ remains suspended, these petitioners might be arrested and detained again, government of the Republic of the Philippines, as follows:
without just cause, and that, accordingly, the issue raised in their respective
petitions is not moot. In any event, the common constitutional and legal issues 1. By rising publicly and taking arms against the
raised in these cases have, in fact, been decided in this joint decision. forces of the government, engaging in war
against the forces of the
Must we order the release of Rodolfo del Rosario, one of the petitioners in government, destroying property or
L-33964, Angelo de los Reyes, Victor Felipe and Teresito Sison, intervenors in L- committing serious violence, exacting
33964, L-33965 and L-33973, Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L-33973, and Gary contributions or diverting public lands or
Olivar, petitioner in L-34339, who are still detained? The suspension of the property from the law purposes for which they
privilege of the writ was decreed by Proclamation No. 889, as amended, for have been appropriated;
persons detained "for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion and other overt
acts committed by them in furtherance thereof." 2. By engaging by subversion thru expansion
and requirement activities not only of the
The records shows that petitioners Luzvimindo David, Rodolfo del Rosario, Victor Communist Party of the Philippines but also of
Felipe, Angelo de los Reyes, Teresito Sison and Gary Olivar are accused in the united front organizations of the
Criminal Case No. Q-1623 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal with a violation Communist Party of the Philippines as the
of the Anti-Subversion Act and that the similar charge against petitioners Kabataang Makabayan (KM), Movement for the
Angelo de los Reyes and Teresito Sison in a criminal complaint, originally filed Democratic Philippines (MDP), Samahang
with the City Fiscal of Quezon City, has, also, been filed with said court. Do the Demokratikong Kabataan (SDK), Students'
offenses so charged constitute one of the crimes or overt acts mentioned in Alliance for National Democracy (STAND),
Proclamation No. 889, as amended? MASAKA Olalia-faction, Student Cultural
Association of the University of the
In the complaint in said Criminal Case No. 1623, it is alleged: Philippines (SCAUP), KASAMA, Pagkakaisa ng
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (PMP) and many
That in or about the year 1968 and for sometime prior thereto others; thru agitation promoted by rallies,
and thereafter up to and including August 21, 1971, in the city demonstration and strikes some of them
of Quezon, Philippines, and elsewhere in the Philippines, within violent in nature, intended to create social
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named discontent, discredit those in power and
accused knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts became officers weaken the people's confidence in the
and/or ranking leaders of the Communist Party of the government; thru consistent propaganda by
Philippines, a subversive association as defined by Republic Act publications, writing, posters, leaflets of
No. 1700, which is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the similar means; speeches, teach-ins, messages,
government of the Republic of the Philippines by force, lectures or other similar means; or thru the
violence, deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for the media as the TV, radio or newspapers, all
purpose of establishing in the Philippines a communist intended to promote the Communist pattern of
totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control; subversion;
 3. Thru urban guerilla warfare characterized
by assassinations, bombings, sabotage,
kidnapping and arson, intended to advertise
the movement, build up its morale and
prestige, discredit and demoralize the
authorities to use harsh and repressive
measures, demoralize the people and weaken
their confidence in the government and to
weaken the will of the government to resist.
That the following aggravating circumstances attended the
commission of the offense:
a. That the offense was committed in contempt of and with
insult to the public authorities;
b. That some of the overt acts were committed in the Palace of
the Chief Executive;
c. That craft, fraud, or disguise was employed;
d. That the offense was committed with the aid of armed men;
e. That the offense was committed with the aid of persons
under fifteen(15) years old.
Identical allegations are made in the complaint filed with the City Fiscal of
Quezon City, except that the second paragraph thereof is slightly more
elaborate than that of the complaint filed with the CFI, although substantially
the same. 26
In both complaints, the acts imputed to the defendants herein constitute
rebellion and subversion, of in the language of the proclamation "other
overt acts committed ... in furtherance" of said rebellion, both of which are
covered by the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ. It is clear,
therefore, that the crime for which the detained petitioners are held and
deprived of their liberty are among those for which the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus has been suspended.
Up to this point, the Members of the Court are unanimous on the legal principles
enunciated.
After finding that Proclamation No. 889, as amended, is not invalid and that
petitioners Luzvimindo David, Victor Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes,
Rodolfo del Rosario and Teresito Sison are detained for and actually accused of
an offense for which the privilege of the writ has been suspended by said
proclamation, our next step would have been the following: The Court, or a
commissioner designated by it, would have received evidence on whether as
stated in respondents' "Answer and Return" said petitioners had been
apprehended and detained "on reasonable belief" that they had "participated in
the crime of insurrection or rebellion."
It is so happened, however, that on November 13, 1971 or two (2) days before
the proceedings relative to the briefing held on October 28 and 29, 1971, had
been completed by the filing 27 of the summary of the matters then taken up
the aforementioned criminal complaints were filed against said petitioners. What
is more, the preliminary examination and/or investigation of the charges
contained in said complaints has already begun. The next question, therefore, is:
Shall We now order, in the cases at hand, the release of said petitioners herein,
despite the formal and substantial validity of the proclamation suspending the
privilege, despite the fact that they are actually charged with offenses covered
by said proclamation and despite the aforementioned criminal complaints against
them and the preliminary examination and/or investigations being conducted
therein?
The Members of the Court, with the exception of Mr. Justice Fernando, are of
the opinion, and, so hold, that, instead of this Court or its Commissioner taking
the evidence adverted to above, it is best to let said preliminary examination
and/or investigation to be completed, so that petitioners' released could be
ordered by the court of first instance, should it find that there is no probable
cause against them, or a warrant for their arrest could be issued, should a
probable cause be established against them. Such course of action is more
favorable to the petitioners, inasmuch as the preliminary examination or
investigation requires a greater quantum of proof than that needed to establish
that the Executive had not acted arbitrary in causing the petitioners to be
apprehended and detained upon the ground that they had participated in the
commission of the crime of insurrection or rebellion. And, it is mainly for the
reason that the Court has opted to allow the Court of First Instance of Rizal to
proceed with the determination of the existence of probable cause, although
ordinarily the Court would have merely determined the existence of the
substantial evidence of petitioners' connection with the crime of rebellion.
Besides, the latter alternative would require the reception of evidence by this
Court and thus duplicate the proceedings now taking place in the court of first
instance. What is more, since the evidence involved in the same proceedings
would be substantially the same and the presentation of such evidence cannot be
made simultaneously, each proceeding would tend to delay the other.
Mr. Justice Fernando is of the opinion in line with the view of Mr. Justice
Tuason, in Nava v. Gatmaitan, 28 to the effect that "... if and when formal
complaint is presented, the court steps in and the executive steps out. The
detention ceases to be an executive and becomes a judicial concern ..." that
the filing of the above-mentioned complaint against the six (6) detained
petitioners herein, has the effect of the Executive giving up his authority to
continue holding them pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, as amended, even if he
did not so intend, and to place them fully under the authority of courts of
justice, just like any other person, who, as such, cannot be deprived of his liberty
without lawful warrant, which has not, as yet, been issued against anyone of
them, and that, accordingly, We should order their immediate release. Despite
the humanitarian and libertarian spirit with which this view had been espoused,
the other Members of the Court are unable to accept it because:
(a) If the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
valid and We so hold it to be and the detainee is covered by the
proclamation, the filing of a complaint or information against him does not affect
the suspension of said privilege, and, consequently, his release may not be
ordered by Us;
(b) Inasmuch as the filing of a formal complaint or information does not detract
from the validity and efficacy of the suspension of the privilege, it would be
more reasonable to construe the filing of said formal charges with the court of
first instance as an expression of the President's belief that there are
sufficient evidence to convict the petitioners so charged and that hey should not
be released, therefore, unless and until said court after conducting the
corresponding preliminary examination and/or investigation shall find that the
prosecution has not established the existence of a probable cause. Otherwise,
the Executive would have released said accused, as were the other petitioners
herein;
(c) From a long-range viewpoint, this interpretation of the act of the
President in having said formal charges filed is, We believe, more beneficial to
the detainees than that favored by Mr. Justice Fernando. His view
particularly the theory that the detainees should be released immediately,
without bail, even before the completion of said preliminary examination and/or
investigation would tend to induce the Executive to refrain from filing formal
charges as long as it may be possible. Manifestly, We should encourage the early
filing of said charges, so that courts of justice could assume jurisdiction over
the detainees and extend to them effective protection.
Although some of the petitioners in these cases pray that the Court decide
whether the constitutional right to bail is affected by the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, We do not deem it proper to pass upon
such question, the same not having been sufficiently discussed by the parties
herein. Besides, there is no point in settling said question with respect to
petitioners herein who have been released. Neither is necessary to express our
view thereon, as regards those still detained, inasmuch as their release without
bail might still be decreed by the court of first instance, should it hold that
there is no probable cause against them. At any rate, should an actual issue on
the right to bail arise later, the same may be brought up in appropriate
proceedings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring that the President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No.
889, as amended, and that, accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional;
2. Dismissing the petitions in L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013, L-
34039 and L-34265, insofar as petitioners Teodosio Lansang, Bayani Alcala,
Rogelio Arienda, Vicentellao, Juan Carandang, Nemesio E. Prudente, Gerardo
Tomas, Reynaldo Rimando, Filomeno M. de Castro, Barcelisa C. de Castro and
Antolin Oreta, Jr. are concerned;
3. The Court of First Instance of Rizal is hereby directed to act with utmost
dispatch in conducting the preliminary examination and/or investigation of the
charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act filed against herein petitioners
Luzvimindo David, Victor Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes, Rodolfo del
Rosario and Teresito Sison, and to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest, if
probable cause is found to exist against them, or, otherwise, to order their
release; and
4. Should there be undue delay, for any reason whatsoever, either in the
completion of the aforementioned preliminary examination and/or investigation,
or in the issuance of the proper orders or resolution in connection therewith, the
parties may by motion seek in these proceedings the proper relief.
5. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, G.R. No. L-35540 September 17, 1974
JJ., concur.
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, AND JOSE MARI
Republic of the Philippines VELEZ, petitioners,
SUPREME COURT vs.
Manila HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON.
FRANCISCO TATAD, PRESS SECRETARY; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS,
EN BANC CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35547 September 17, 1974 *2

G.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO
S. AQUINO, JR., RAMON MITRA, JR., FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND
NAPOLEON RAMA, petitioners,
vs.
HON JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN.
ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-35538 September 17, 1974
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOAQUIN
P. ROCES, TEODORO M. LOCSIN, SR., ROLANDO FADUL, ROSALINA
GALANG, GO ENG GUAN, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, RENATO
CONSTANTINO, AND LUIS R. MAURICIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-35539 September 17, 1974
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOSE W.
DIOKNO, CARMEN I. DIOKNO, *1 petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; ROMEO
ESPINO, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES. respondents.
ENRIQUE VOLTAIRE GARCIA II, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; GEN.
ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES; AND HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, respondents.
G.R. No. L-35556 September 17, 1974
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VERONICA
L. YUYITUNG AND TAN CHIN HIAN, petitioners,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT.
GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-35567 September 17, 1974
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AMANDO
DORONILA JUAN L. MERCADO, HERNANDO L. ABAYA, ERNESTO
GRANADA, LUIS D. BELTRAN, TAN CHIN HIAN, BREN GUIAO, RUBEN
CUSIPAG, ROBERTO ORDOEZ, MANUEL ALMARIO AND WILLIE
BAUN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE;
LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-35571 September 17, 1974. *3
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BREN Z.
GUIAO, TERESITA M. GUIAO, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LT.
GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES: AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-35573 September 17, 1974
ERNESTO RONDON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; AND MAJOR
RODULFO MIANA, respondents.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p
These cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been
arrested and detained by the military by virtue of the President's Proclamation
No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972.
At the outset a word of clarification is in order. This is not the decision of the
Court in the sense that a decision represents a consensus of the required
majority of its members not only on the judgment itself but also on the
rationalization of the issues and the conclusions arrived at. On the final result
the vote is practically unanimous; this is a statement of my individual opinion as
well as a summary of the voting on the major issues. Why no particular Justice
has been designated to write just one opinion for the entire Court will presently
be explained.
At one point during our deliberations on these cases it was suggested that as
Chief Justice I should write that opinion. The impracticability of the suggestion
shortly became apparent for a number of reasons, only two of which need be
mentioned. First, the discussions, as they began to touch on particular issues,
revealed a lack of agreement among the Justices as to whether some of those
issues should be taken up although it was not necessary to do so, they being
merely convenient for the purpose of ventilating vexing questions of public
interest, or whether the decision should be limited to those issues which are
really material and decisive in these cases. Similarly, there was no agreement as
to the manner the issues should be treated and developed. The same destination
would be reached, so to speak, but through different routes and by means of
different vehicles of approach. The writing of separate opinions by individual
Justices was thus unavoidable, and understandably so for still another reason,
namely, that although little overt reference to it was made at the time, the
future verdict of history was very much a factor in the thinking of the members,
no other case of such transcendental significance to the life of the nation having
before confronted this Court. Second and this to me was the insuperable
obstacle I was and am of the opinion, which was shared by six other
Justices 1 at the time the question was voted upon, that petitioner Jose W.
Diokno's motion of December 28, 1973 to withdraw his petition (G.R. No. L-
35539) should be granted, and therefore I was in no position to set down the
ruling of the Court on each of the arguments raised by him, except indirectly,
insofar as they had been raised likewise in the other cases.
It should be explained at this point that when the Court voted on Diokno's
motion to withdraw his petition he was still under detention without charges, and
continued to remain so up to the time the separate opinions of the individual
Justices were put in final form preparatory to their promulgation on September
12, which was the last day of Justice Zaldivars tenure in the Court. 2 Before
they could be promulgated, however, a major development supervened: petitioner
Diokno was released by the President in the morning of September 11, 1974. In
view thereof all the members of this Court except Justice Castro agreed to
dismiss Diokno's petition on the ground that it had become moot, with those who
originally voted to grant the motion for withdrawal citing said motion as an
additional ground for such dismissal.
The petitioners in the other cases, except Benigno Aquino, Jr. (G.R. No. L-
35546), either have been permitted to withdraw their petitions or have been
released from detention subject to certain restrictions. 3 In the case of Aquino,
formal charges of murder, subversion and illegal possession of firearms were
lodged against him with a Military Commission on August 11, 1973; and on the
following August 23 he challenged the jurisdiction of said Commission as well as
his continued detention by virtue of those charges in a petition
for certiorari and prohibition filed in this Court (G.R. No.
L-37364). The question came up as to whether or not Aquino's petition
for habeas corpus should be dismissed on the ground that the case as to him
should more appropriately be resolved in this new petition. Of the twelve
Justices, however, eight voted against such dismissal and chose to consider the
case on the merits. 4
On Diokno's motion to withdraw his petition I voted in favor of granting it for
two reasons. In the first place such withdrawal would not emasculate the
decisive and fundamental issues of public interest that demanded to be resolved,
for they were also raised in the other cases which still remained pending.
Secondly, since it was this petitioner's personal liberty that was at stake, I
believed he had the right to renounce the application for habeas corpus he
initiated. Even if that right were not absolute I still would respect his choice to
remove the case from this Court's cognizance, regardless of the fact that I
disagreed with many of his reasons for so doing. I could not escape a sense of
irony in this Court's turning down the plea to withdraw on the ground, so he
alleges among others, that this is no longer the Court to which he originally
applied for relief because its members have taken new oaths of office under the
1973 Constitution, and then ruling adversely to him on the merits of his petition.
It is true that some of the statements in the motion are an affront to the
dignity of this Court and therefore should not be allowed to pass unanswered.
Any answer, however, would not be foreclosed by allowing the withdrawal. For my
part, since most of those statements are of a subjective character, being
matters of personal belief and opinion, I see no point in refuting them in these
cases. Indeed my impression is that they were beamed less at this Court than at
the world outside and designed to make political capital of his personal situation,
as the publicity given to them by some segments of the foreign press and by
local underground propaganda news sheets subsequently confirmed. It was in
fact from that perspective that I deemed it proper to respond in kind, that is,
from a non-judicial forum, in an address I delivered on February 19, 1974 before
the LAWASIA, the Philippine Bar Association and the Philippine Lawyers'
Association. Justice Teehankee, it may be stated, is of the opinion that a simple
majority of seven votes out of twelve is legally sufficient to make the withdrawal
of Diokno's petition effective, on the theory that the requirement of a majority
of eight votes applies only to a decision on the merits.
In any event, as it turned out, after petitioner Diokno was released by the
President on September 11 all the members of this Court except Justice Castro
were agreed that his petition had become moot and therefore should no longer
be considered on the merits. This notwithstanding, some of the opinions of the
individual members, particularly Justices Castro and Teehankee, should be taken
in the time setting in which they were prepared, that is, before the order for
the release of Diokno was issued.
The Cases.
The events which form the background of these nine petitions are related,
either briefly or in great detail, in the separate opinions filed by the individual
Justices. The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General Order No.
2 of the President (September 22, 1972), "for being participants or for having
given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the
country and to take over the Government by force ..."
General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the powers
he assumed by virtue of Proclamation No. 1081 (September 21, 1972) placing the
entire country under martial law. The portions of the proclamation immediately in
point read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of
the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do
hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article I,
Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion
and to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.
In addition, I do hereby order that all persons presently
detained, as well as all others who may hereafter be similarly
detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all
other crimes and offenses committed in furtherance or on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith, for crimes against national security and the law of
nations, crimes against public order, crimes involving usurpation
of authority, rank, title and improper use of names, uniforms
and insignia, crimes committed by public officers, and for such
other crimes as will be enumerated in orders that I shall
subsequently promulgate, as well as crimes as a consequence of
any violation of any decree, order or regulation promulgated by
me personally or promulgated upon my direction shall be kept
under detention until otherwise ordered released by me or by
my duly designated representative.
The provision of the 1935 Constitution referred to in the proclamation reads:
"the President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case
of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the
public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law."
1. The first major issue raised by the parties is whether this Court may inquire
into the validity of Proclamation No. 1081. Stated more concretely, is the
existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to declare
martial law subject to judicial inquiry? Is the question political or justiciable in
character?
Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino hold that the
question is political and therefore its determination is beyond the jurisdiction of
this Court. The reasons are given at length in the separate opinions they have
respectively signed. Justice Fernandez adds that as a member of the Convention
that drafted the 1973 Constitution he believes that "the Convention put
an imprimatur on the proposition that the validity of a martial law proclamation
and its continuation is political and non-justiciable in character."
Justice Barredo, on the other hand, believes that political questions are not per
se beyond the Court's jurisdiction, the judicial power vested in it by the
Constitution being plenary and all-embracing, but that as a matter of policy
implicit in the Constitution itself the Court should abstain from interfering with
the Executive's Proclamation, dealing as it does with national security, for which
the responsibility is vested by the charter in him alone. But the Court should act,
Justice Barredo opines, when its abstention from acting would result in manifest
and palpable transgression of the Constitution proven by facts of judicial notice,
no reception of evidence being contemplated for purposes of such judicial action.
It may be noted that the postulate of non-justiciability as discussed in those
opinions involves disparate methods of approach. Justice Esguerra maintains that
the findings of the President on the existence of the grounds for the
declaration of martial law are final and conclusive upon the Courts. He disagrees
vehemently with the ruling in Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, December 11,
1971, and advocates a return to Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 (1905),
and Montenegro vs. Castaeda, 91 Phil. 882 (1952). Justice Barredo, for his part,
holds that Lansang need not be overturned, indeed does not control in these
cases. He draws a distinction between the power of the President to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which was the issue in Lansang, and his
power to proclaim martial law, calling attention to the fact that while the Bill of
Rights prohibits suspension of the privilege except in the instances specified
therein, it places no such prohibition or qualification with respect to the
declaration of martial law.
Justice Antonio, with whom Justices Makasiar, Fernandez and Aquino concur,
finds that there is no dispute as to the existence of a state of rebellion in the
country, and on that premise emphasizes the factor of necessity for the
exercise by the President of his power under the Constitution to declare martial
law, holding that the decision as to whether or not there is
such necessity is wholly confided to him and therefore is not subject to judicial
inquiry, his responsibility being directly to the people.
Arrayed on the side of justiciability are Justices Castro, Fernando, Teehankee
and Muoz Palma. They hold that the constitutional sufficiency of the
proclamation may be inquired into by the Court, and would thus apply the
principle laid down in Lansang although that case refers to the power of the
President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The recognition
of justiciability accorded to the question in Lansang, it should be emphasized, is
there expressly distinguished from the power of judicial review in ordinary civil
or criminal cases, and is limited to ascertaining "merely whether he (the
President) has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act." The
test is not whether the President's decision is correct but whether, in
suspending the writ, he did or did not act arbitrarily. Applying this test, the
finding by the Justices just mentioned is that there was no arbitrariness in the
President's proclamation of martial law pursuant to the 1935 Constitution; and I
concur with them in that finding. The factual bases for the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, particularly in regard to the existence of
a state of rebellion in the country, had not disappeared, indeed had been
exacerbated, as events shortly before said proclamation clearly demonstrated.
On this Point the Court is practically unanimous; Justice Teehankee merely
refrained from discussing it.
Insofar as my own opinion is concerned the cleavage in the Court on the issue of
justiciability is of not much more than academic interest for purposes of arriving
at a judgment. I am not unduly exercised by Americas decisions on the subject
written in another age and political clime, or by theories of foreign authors in
political science. The present state of martial law in the Philippines is peculiarly
Filipino and fits into no traditional patterns or judicial precedents.
In the first place I am convinced (as are the other Justices), without need of
receiving evidence as in an ordinary adversary court proceeding, that a state of
rebellion existed in the country when Proclamation No. 1081 was issued. It was a
matter of contemporary history within the cognizance not only of the courts but
of all observant people residing here at the time. Many of the facts and events
recited in detail in the different "Whereases" of the proclamation are of
common knowledge. The state of rebellion continues up to the present. The
argument that while armed hostilities go on in several provinces in Mindanao
there are none in other regions except in isolated pockets in Luzon, and that
therefore there is no need to maintain martial law all over the country, ignores
the sophisticated nature and ramifications of rebellion in a modern setting. It
does not consist simply of armed clashes between organized and identifiable
groups on fields of their own choosing. It includes subversion of the most subtle
kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is no actual
fighting. Underground propaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors
disseminated in whispers; recruitment of armed and ideological adherents,
raising of funds, procurement of arms and material, fifth-column activities
including sabotage and intelligence all these are part of the rebellion which by
their nature are usually conducted far from the battle fronts. They cannot be
counteracted effectively unless recognized and dealt with in that context.
Secondly, my view, which coincides with that of other members of the Court as
stated in their opinions, is that the question of validity of Proclamation No. 1081
has been foreclosed by the transitory provision of the 1973 Constitution [Art.
XVII, Sec. 3(2)] that "all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts
promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law
of the land and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after ... the
ratification of this Constitution ..." To be sure, there is an attempt in these
cases to resuscitate the issue of the effectivity of the new Constitution. All
that, however, is behind us now. The question has been laid to rest by our
decision in Javellana vs. Executive Secretary (L-36142, 50 SCRA 30, March 31,
1973), and of course by the existing political realities both in the conduct of
national affairs and in our relations with other countries.
On the effect of the transitory provision Justice Muoz Palma withholds her
assent to any sweeping statement that the same in effect validated, in the
constitutional sense, all "such proclamations, decrees, instructions, and acts
promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President." All that she concedes
is that the transitory provision merely gives them "the imprimatur of a law but
not of a constitutional mandate," and as such therefore "are subject to judicial
review when proper under the Constitution.
Finally, the political-or-justiciable question controversy indeed, any inquiry by
this Court in the present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual
bases for the proclamation of martial law has become moot and purposeless as
a consequence of the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973. The question
propounded to the voters was: "Under the (1973) Constitution, the President, if
he so desires, can continue in office beyond 1973. Do you want President Marcos
to continue beyond 1973 and finish the reforms he initiated under Martial Law?"
The overwhelming majority of those who cast their ballots, including citizens
between 15 and 18 years, voted affirmatively on the proposal. The question was
thereby removed from the area of presidential power under the Constitution and
transferred to the seat of sovereignty itself. Whatever may be the nature of
the exercise of that power by the President in the beginning whether or not
purely political and therefore non-justiciable this Court is precluded from
applying its judicial yardstick to the act of the sovereign.
2. With respect to the petitioners who have been released from detention but
have not withdrawn their petitions because they are still subject to certain
restrictions, 5 the ruling of the Court is that the petitions should be dismissed.
The power to detain persons even without charges for acts related to the
situation which justifies the proclamation of martial law, such as the existence
of a state of rebellion, necessarily implies the power (subject, in the opinion of
the Justices who consider Lansang applicable, to the same test of arbitrariness
laid down therein), to impose upon the released detainees conditions or
restrictions which are germane to and necessary to carry out the purposes of
the proclamation. Justice Fernando, however, "is for easing the restrictions on
the right to travel of petitioner Rodrigo" and others similarly situated and so to
this extent dissents from the ruling of the majority; while Justice Teehankee
believes that those restrictions do not constitute deprivation of physical liberty
within the meaning of the constitutional provision on the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
It need only be added that, to my mind, implicit in a state of martial law is the
suspension of the said privilege with respect to persons arrested or detained for
acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation, which is to suppress
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against
imminent danger thereof. The preservation of society and national survival take
precedence. On this particular point, that is, that the proclamation of martial law
automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to,
the Court is practically unanimous. Justice Fernando, however, says that to him
that is still an open question; and Justice Muoz Palma qualifiedly dissents from
the majority in her separate opinion, but for the reasons she discusses therein
votes for the dismissal of the petitions.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING AND FOR THE REASONS STATED BY
THE MEMBERS OF THE COURT IN THEIR SEPARATE OPINIONS,
JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED DISMISSING ALL THE PETITIONS,
EXCEPT THOSE WHICH HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY WITHDRAWN BY THE
RESPECTIVE PETITIONERS WITH THE APPROVAL OF THIS COURT, AS
HEREINABOVE MENTIONED. NO COSTS.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29755 January 31, 1969
DOMINGO N. SARCOS, as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RECAREDO CASTILLO, as Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur, and
THE HON. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF SURIGAO DEL SUR, respondents.
Sisenando Villaluz, Jr. for respondents.
Cristeto O. Cimagala for petitioner.
FERNANDO, J.:
Is the power of preventive suspension of a municipal mayor against whom
charges have been filed still vested in the provincial governor? That is the novel
question presented in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Such an
authority he did possess under the former law. 1 Then came the Decentralization
Act of 1967, which took effect on September 12 of that year. 2
What before could not be denied apparently no longer holds true. The statutory
provision now controlling yields a contrary impression. The question must thus be
answered in the negative. We hold that such a power has been withheld from the
provincial governor and may no longer be exercised by him.
Petitioner Domingo N. Sarcos, the duly elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del
Sur, running as an independent candidate but winning, nonetheless, in the
November 14, 1967 election, was charged with misconduct and dishonesty in
office by respondent Recaredo Castillo, the Provincial Governor of Surigao del
Sur. 3 The act constituting the alleged dishonesty and misconduct in office
consisted in petitioner allegedly "[conniving] with certain private individuals to
cut and fell [timber] and [selling] the [timber] or logs so cut or felled for their
own use and benefit, within the communal forest reserve of the Municipality of
Barobo, Province of Surigao del Sur, to the damage and prejudice of the public
and of the government; ...." 4
In the answer of respondent Castillo as well as the other respondent, the
Provincial Board of Surigao del Sur, there was an admission of the fact that as
set forth in the petition on October 4, 1968, such an administrative complaint
for such an alleged offense was indeed filed by respondent Governor with
respondent Provincial Board. What was sought to be stressed in the answer,
however, was that as early as April 18, 1968, a charge under oath for abuse of
official power in consenting to and authorizing the violations of forestry laws
was filed against petitioner by the Municipal Council of Barobo, Surigao del Sur.
He was then given the opportunity to answer and explain within 72 hours, in an
order of respondent Governor date May 21, 1968. The explanation offered by
petitioner contained the following: "These logs which I caused to be hauled
sometime within the month of January, 1968, were the same logs cut and
tumbled down by the persons abovementioned within the communal forests of
Barobo, Surigao del Sur, and which were seized by the patrolmen of the
undersigned. The said logs were sold in order to raise funds for the purchase of
the police uniforms and arms." 5
It was on the basis of the above administrative complaint that respondent
Governor, according to the petition, ordered the "immediate suspension
[ofpetitioner] from his position as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur; the same
Administrative Order ... [containing] the immediate designation of Vice-Mayor
[Brigido L. Mercader] of the same town as Acting [Mayor]." 6
Such administrative order for the preventive suspension of petitioner was
admitted by respondent Governor and sought to be justified thus: "[Considering]
that the acts charged against and admitted by the petitioner 'affects his
official integrity,' as such Municipal Mayor, by his having taken the law into his
own hands; ..., there was an urgent necessity to order the immediate 'preventive
suspension' of the petitioner, in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, of
Republic Act No. 5185, otherwise known as the 'Decentralization Act of 1967'." 7
The decisive issue therefore, as set forth at the outset of this opinion, is
whether or not respondent Provincial Governor is vested with power to order
such preventive suspension under the Decentralization Act of 1967, more
specifically Section 5 thereof. For if no such authority exists, then whatever be
the alleged justification for preventive suspension cannot validate the action
taken by theGovernor. To assert otherwise would be to negate the rule of law.
What does Section 5 provide? It opens with the categorical declaration: "Any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the suspension and removal of
elective local officials shall be governed exclusively by the provisions of this
section."
After setting forth in the next paragraph the grounds for suspension and
removal of elective local officials, namely, disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines, dishonesty, oppression, and misconduct in office, it continues:
"Written subscribed and sworn charges against any elective provincial and city
official shall be preferred before the President of the Philippines; against any
elective municipal official before the provincial governor or the secretary of the
provincial board concerned; and against any elective barrio official before the
municipal or city mayor or the municipal or city secretary concerned."
Then comes the portion specifically dealing with preventive suspension. This
paragraph reads thus: "Within seven days after the charges are preferred, the
President, Governor, or Mayor, as the case may be, or his duly authorized
representative, as provided in the preceding paragraph, shall notify the
respondent of such charges. The President, Provincial Board and City or
Municipal Council, as the case may be, shall hear and investigate the truth or
falsity of the charges within ten days after receipt of such notice: Provided,
That no investigation shall commence or continue within ninety days immediately
prior to an election. The preventive suspension of the respondent officer shall
not extend beyond sixty days after the date of his suspension. At the expiration
of sixty days, the suspended officer, shall be reinstated in office without
prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until their
completion, unless the delay in the decision of the case is due to the fault,
neglect or request of the suspended officer, in which case, the time of delay
shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension: Provided, however,
That if the suspended officer shall have been found guilty as charged before the
expiration of the thirty days, his suspension, in the case of municipal and barrio
officials, may continue until the case is finally decided by the Provincial Board."
Considering that Section 5 leaves no doubt as to this particular paragraph
governing exclusively the suspension and removal of elective local officials, it
must be apparent why, as previously stated, respondent Provincial Governor lacks
the authority to order the preventive suspension of petitioner.
1. Under the former law then in force which stands repealed by virtue
of the Decentralization Act, 8 the provincial governor, if the charge
against a municipal official was one affecting his official integrity could
order his preventive suspension. 9 At present, the law is anything but
that. A reading of the pertinent paragraph above quoted makes manifest
that it is the provincial board to which such a power has been granted
under conditions therein specified. The statutory provision is worded
differently. The principle, that the deliberate selection of language
other than that used in an earlier act is indicative that a change in the
law was intended, calls for application. 10
2. This conclusion has reinforcement from a fundamental postulate of
constitutional law. Public officials possess powers, not rights. There
must be, therefore, a grant of authority whether express or implied, to
justify any action taken by them. In the absence thereof, what they do
as public officials lacks validity and, if challenged, must be set aside. To
paraphrase a leading American decision, 11 law is the only supreme power
under constitutional government, and every man who by accepting office
participates in its function is only the more strongly bound to submit to
that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the
exercise of the authority which it gives.
Here, clearly, no such authority is vested in the provincial governor. Instead,
the statutory scheme, complete on its face, would locate such power in the
provincial board. There would be no support for the view, then, that the action
taken by the provincial governor in issuing the order of preventive suspension in
this case was in accordance with law.
3. Moreover, any other view would be to betray lack of fidelity to the
purpose so manifest in the controlling legal provision. It is fundamental
that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect
should be given to it by the judiciary. From Ty Sue v. Hord, 12 decided in
1909, it has been our constant holding that the choice between
conflicting theories falls on that which best accords with the letter of
the law and with its purpose. The next year, in an equally leading
decision, United States v. Toribio, 13 there was a caveat against a
construction that would tend "to defeat the purpose and object of the
legislator." Then came the admonition in Riera v. Palmaroli, 14 against an
application so narrow "as to defeat the manifest purpose of the
legislator." This was repeated in the latest case, Commissioner of
Customs v. Caltex, 15 in almost identical language.1awphil.t
 So it is in the United States. 16 Thus, in an 1898 decision, the then Justice,
later Chief Justice, White minimized reliance on the subtle signification of
words and the niceties of verbal distinction stressing the fundamental rule of
carrying out the purpose and objective of legislation. 17 As succinctly put by the
then Justice, later Chief Justice, Stone: "All statutes must be construed in the
light of their purpose." 18 The same thought has been phrased differently. Thus:
"The purpose of Congress is a dominant factor in determining meaning." 19 For, to
paraphrase Frankfurter, legislative words are not inert but derive vitality from
the obvious purposes at which they are aimed. 20 The same jurist likewise had
occasion to state: "Regard for [its] purposes should infuse the construction of
the legislation if it is to be treated as a working instrument of government and
not merely as a collection of English words." 21 In the sixth annual Benjamin
Nathan Cardozo lecture delivered by him, entitled "Some Reflections on the
Reading of Statutes", he developed the theme further: "The generating
consideration is that legislation is more than composition. It is an active
instrument of government which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws
have ends to be achieved. It is in this connection that Holmes said, 'words are
flexible.' Again it was Holmes, the last judge to give quarter to loose thinking or
vague yearning, who said that "the general purpose is a more important aid to the
meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down." And it was
Holmes who chided courts for being 'apt to err by sticking too closely to the
words of a law where those words import a policy that goes beyond them.' Note,
however, that he found the policy in 'those words'." 22
It may be noted parenthetically that earlier, the United States Supreme Court
was partial more to the term "objective" or "policy" rather than "purpose." So it
was in the first decision where this fundamental principle of construction was
relied upon, the opinion coming from Chief Justice Marshall. Thus: "The two
subjects were equally within the province of the legislature, equally demanded
their attention, and were brought together to their view. If, then, the words
making provision for each, fairly admit of an equally extensive interpretation,and
of one of which will effect the object that seems to have been in contemplation,
and which was certainly desirable, they ought to receive that interpretation." 23
So, too, with his successor, Chief Justice Taney. Thus: "This construction
cannot be maintained. In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single
sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the whole law, and to its object
and policy." 24 It should not escape attention that the above excerpt was quoted
with approval by the present Chief Justice Warren as late as 1957. 25
What is the purpose of the Decentralization Act of 1967? It is set forth in its
declaration of policy. 26 It is "to transform local governments gradually into
effective instruments through which the people can in a most genuine fashion,
govern themselves and work out their own destinies." 27 In consonance with such
policy, its purpose is "to grant to local governments greater freedom and ampler
means to respond to the needs of their people and promote their prosperity and
happiness and to effect a more equitable and systematic distribution of
governmental powers and resources." 28
It is undeniable therefore that municipalities, as much as cities and provinces,
are by this act invested with "greater freedom and ampler means to respond to
the needs of their people and promote their prosperity and happiness." It is
implicit in our constitutional scheme that full autonomy be accorded the
inhabitants of the local units to govern themselves. Their choice as to who should
be theirpublic officials must be respected. Those elected must serve out their
term. If they have to be removed at all it should be for cause in accordance with
the procedure prescribed and by the specific officials of higher category
entrusted with such responsibility.
It is easily understandable why as held in a leading case, Lacson v.
Roque, 29 "strict construction of law relating to suspension and removal is the
universal rule." As was further emphasized by Justice Tuason who penned the
opinion: "When dealing with elective posts, the necessity for restricted
construction is greater." Deference to such a doctrine possessed of intrinsic
merit calls for due care lest by inadvertence the power to suspend preventively
is given to officials other than those specifically mentioned in the act. For any
other view would result in a dilution of the avowed purpose to vest as great a
degree of local autonomy as is possible to municipal corporations. That would be
to defeat and frustrate rather than to foster the policy of the act.1awphil.t
4. Lastly, the construction here reached, as to the absence of power on
the part of provincial governors to suspend preventively a municipal
mayor is buttressed by the avoidance of undesirable consequences
flowing from a different doctrine. Time and time again, it has been
stressed that while democracy presupposes the right of the people to
govern themselves in elections that call for political parties contending
for supremacy, once the election is over the equally pressing and urgent
concern for efficiency would necessitate that purely partisan
considerations be ignored, and if not entirely possible, be restricted to
a minimum.
The present litigation gives rise to the suspicion that politics did intrude itself.
Petitioner Municipal Mayor, an independent candidate, and thus of a different
political persuasion, appeared to have been placed at a disadvantage. It would be
a realistic assumption that there is the ever present temptation on the part of
provincial governors, to utilize every opportunity to favor those belonging to his
party. At times, it may even prove irresistible.
It is desirable therefore that such opportunity be limited. The statutory
provision then should be given such a construction that would be productive of
such a result. That is what we do in this case. To paraphrase Justice Tuason, we
test a doctrine by its consequences.
It could be said, of course, that to deny such a power to a provincial governor
but at the same time to affirm the existence thereof insofar as the provincial
board is concerned would not advance the cause of decentralization any. In
answer, it suffices to note that the Decentralization Act having so recognized
such an authority in the provincial board, the judiciary must perforce recognize
its existence. Until after the legislature decrees otherwise, the courts have no
alternative but to accord deference to such declared congressional policy. It may
also be stated that the provincial board being a collective body, the first, second
and third class provinces being composed of the provincial governor, the vice-
governor and three other members elected at large by the qualified electors of
the province, and that in the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh class provinces
having in addition to the provincial governor and the vice-governor two other
members likewise elected at large, 30 there is a safeguard against the temptation
to utilize this power of preventive suspension for purely partisan ends. What one
person may feel free to do, fully conscious as he is that the authority belongs to
him alone, may not even be attempted when such an individual shares such power
with others who could possibly hold dissenting views. At any rate, there is a
brake, which it is hoped would suffice on most if not all occasions.
Such a restraining influence is indeed needed for the undeniable facts of the
contemporary political scene bear witness to efforts, at times disguised, at
other times quite blatant, on the part of local officials to make use of their
positions to gain partisan advantage. Harassment of those belonging to opposing
factions or groups is not unknown. Unfortunately, no stigma seems to attach to
what really amounts to a misuse of official power. The truism that a public office
is a public trust, implicit in which is the recognition that public advantage and not
private benefit should be the test of one's conduct, seems tohave been ignored
all too often. The construction of any statute therefore, even assuming that it is
tainted by ambiguity, which would reduce the opportunity of any public official to
make use of his position for partisan ends, has much to recommend it.
5. We hold, therefore, that under Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of
1967, the power of preventive suspension is not lodged in the provincial governor.
To rule otherwise would be at war with the plain purpose of the law and likewise
fraught with consequences far from desirable. We close with this appropriate
excerpt from an opinion of Justice Holmes rendered on circuit duty: "The
Legislature has the power to decide what the policy of the law shall be, and if it
has intimated its will, however indirectly, that should be recognized and obeyed.
The major premise of the conclusion expressed in a statute, the changeof policy
that induces the enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an
adequate discharge of duty for the courts to say: We see what you are driving at
but you have not said it, and therefore, we shall go on as before." 31
WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for are granted, the preventive suspension of
petitioner by respondent Castillo annulled and set aside with the result that his
immediate reinstatement to his position as Municipal Mayor of Barobo, Surigao
del Sur, is ordered, without prejudice to any further proceedings to be taken by
respondent Provincial Board in connection with the charge of misconduct and
dishonesty in office against petitioner, respondent Provincial Board being strictly
enjoined in the disposition of such administrative complaint to act strictly in
accordance with the applicable law. Without costs.
Concepcion. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015
JOSE J. FERRER, JR., Petitioner, v. CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA,
CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY,
AND CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) seeking to
declare unconstitutional and illegal Ordinance Nos. SP-2095, S-2011 and SP-
2235, S-2013 on the Socialized Housing Tax and Garbage Fee, respectively,
which are being imposed by the respondents.
The Case
On October 17, 2011,1 respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No.
SP-2095, S-2011,2or the Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City, Section 3 of On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-20135 was enacted on
which provides: December 16, 2013 and took effect ten days after when it was approved by
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary respondent City Mayor.6 The proceeds collected from the garbage fees on
SECTION 3. IMPOSITION. A special assessment equivalent to one-half percent residential properties shall be deposited solely and exclusively in an earmarked
(0.5%) on the assessed value of land in excess of One Hundred Thousand Pesos special account under the general fund to be utilized for garbage
(Php100,000.00) shall be collected by the City Treasurer which shall accrue to collections.7 Section 1 of the Ordinance set forth the schedule and manner for
the Socialized Housing Programs of the Quezon City Government. The special the collection of garbage fees:
assessment shall accrue to the General Fund under a special account to be chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
established for the purpose. SECTION 1. The City Government of Quezon City in conformity with and in
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary relation to Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Effective for five (5) years, the Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) shall be utilized Code of 1991 HEREBY IMPOSES THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE AND MANNER
by the Quezon City Government for the following projects: (a) land FOR THE ANNUAL COLLECTION OF GARBAGE FEES, AS FOLLOWS:
purchase/land banking; (b) improvement of current/existing socialized housing
facilities; (c) land development; (d) construction of core houses, sanitary cores, On all domestic households in Quezon City;
medium-rise buildings and other similar structures; and (e) financing of public- LAND AREA IMPOSABLE FEE
private partnership agreement of the Quezon City Government and National Less than 200 sq. m. PHP 100.00
Housing Authority (NHA) with the private sector.3 Under certain conditions, a
201 sq. m. 500 sq. m. PHP 200.00
tax credit shall be enjoyed by taxpayers regularly paying the special assessment:
501 sq. m. 1,000 sq. m. PHP 300.00
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1,001 sq. m. 1,500 sq. m. PHP 400.00
SECTION 7. TAX CREDIT. Taxpayers dutifully paying the special assessment
tax as imposed by this ordinance shall enjoy a tax credit. The tax credit may be 1,501 sq. m. 2,000 sq. m. or more PHP 500.00
availed of only after five (5) years of continue[d] payment. Further, the On all condominium unit and socialized housing projects/units in Quezon City;
taxpayer availing this tax credit must be a taxpayer in good standing as certified FLOOR AREA IMPOSABLE FEE
by the City Treasurer and City Assessor. Less than 40 sq. m. PHP25.00
41 sq. m. 60 sq. m. PHP50.00
The tax credit to be granted shall be equivalent to the total amount of the 61 sq. m. 100 sq. m. PHP75.00
special assessment paid by the property owner, which shall be given as follows:
101 sq. m. 150 sq. m. PHP100.00
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
151 sq. m. 200 sq. [m.] or more PHP200.00
1. 6th year - 20%
On high-rise Condominium Units
2. 7 th
year - 20% a) High-rise Condominium The Homeowners Association of high- rise
condominiums shall pay the annual garbage fee on the total size of the entire
3. 8th year - 20% condominium and socialized Housing Unit and an additional garbage fee shall
be collected based on area occupied for every unit already sold or being
4. 9th year - 20% amortized.

5. 10th year - 20% b) High-rise apartment units Owners of high-rise apartment units shall pay
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the annual garbage fee on the total lot size of the entire apartment and an
Furthermore, only the registered owners may avail of the tax credit and may not additional garbage fee based on the schedule prescribed herein for every
be continued by the subsequent property owners even if they are buyers in good unit occupied.
faith, heirs or possessor of a right in whatever legal capacity over the subject The collection of the garbage fee shall accrue on the first day of January and
property.4 shall be paid simultaneously with the payment of the real property tax, but not
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary later than the first quarter installment.8 In case a household owner refuses to
pay, a penalty of 25% of the garbage fee due, plus an interest of 2% per month
or a fraction thereof, shall be charged.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner alleges that he is a registered co-owner of a 371-square-meter
residential property in Quezon City which is covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 216288, and that, on January 7, 2014, he paid his realty tax
which already included the garbage fee in the sum of
Php100.00.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The instant petition was filed on January 17, 2014. We issued a TRO on February
5, 2014, which enjoined the enforcement of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-
2235 and required respondents to comment on the petition without necessarily
giving due course thereto.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Respondents filed their Comment12 with urgent motion to dissolve the TRO on
February 17, 2014. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Reply and a Memorandum on
March 3, 2014 and September 8, 2014, respectively.
Procedural Matters
A. Propriety of a Petition for Certiorari
Respondents are of the view that this petition for certiorari is improper since
they are not tribunals, boards or officers exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Petitioner, however, counters that in enacting Ordinance Nos. SP-
2095 and SP-2235, the Quezon City Council exercised quasi-judicial function
because the ordinances ruled against the property owners who must pay the SHT
and the garbage fee, exacting from them funds for basic essential public
services that they should not be held liable. Even if a Rule 65 petition is
improper, petitioner still asserts that this Court, in a number of cases like
in Rosario v. Court of Appeals,13 has taken cognizance of an improper remedy in
the interest of justice.
We agree that respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial
prerogatives.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to
determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the
parties.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is a term which applies to the
actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature.
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it
is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of
persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the
controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer
clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the
respective rights of the contending parties.14
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must
be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The enactment by the Quezon
City Council of the assailed ordinances was done in the exercise of its legislative,
not judicial or quasi-judicial, function. Under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, or
the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), local legislative power shall be
exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod for the city.15 Said law likewise is
specific in providing that the power to impose a tax, fee, or charge, or to
generate revenue shall be exercised by the sanggunian of the local government
unit concerned through an appropriate ordinance.16ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Also, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, it
essentially seeks to declare the unconstitutionality and illegality of the
questioned ordinances. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Despite these, a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for
prohibition or mandamus, over which We exercise original jurisdiction, in cases
with far-reaching implications or one which raises transcendental issues or
questions that need to be resolved for the public good.18 The judicial policy is
that this Court will entertain direct resort to it when the redress sought cannot
be obtained in the proper courts or when exceptional and compelling
circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise
of Our primary jurisdiction.19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lay down under what circumstances a
petition for prohibition may be filed:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding in the
action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs
as law and justice may require.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions who has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the
petitioner prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the respondents to
desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified in the petition.
In this case, petitioner's primary intention is to prevent respondents from
implementing Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235. Obviously, the writ being
sought is in the nature of a prohibition, commanding desistance.
We consider that respondents City Mayor, City Treasurer, and City Assessor are
performing ministerial functions. A ministerial function is one that an officer or
tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner
and without regard for the exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done.20 Respondent Mayor, as chief executive
of the city government, exercises such powers and performs such duties and
functions as provided for by the LGC and other laws.21 Particularly, he has the
duty to ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the city are collected, and
that city funds are applied to the payment of expenses and settlement of
obligations of the city, in accordance with law or ordinance.22 On the other hand,
under the LGC, all local taxes, fees, and charges shall be collected by the
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay treasurer, or their duly-authorized
deputies, while the assessor shall take charge, among others, of ensuring that all
laws and policies governing the appraisal and assessment of real properties for
taxation purposes are properly executed.23 Anent the SHT, the Department of
Finance (DOF) Local Finance Circular No. 1-97, dated April 16, 1997, is more
specific:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
6.3 The Assessors office of the Id.ntified LGU shall:
a. immediately undertake an inventory of lands within its
jurisdiction which shall be subject to the levy of the Social
Housing Tax (SHT) by the local sanggunian concerned;
b. inform the affected registered owners of the effectivity of
the SHT; a list of the lands and registered owners shall also be
posted in 3 conspicuous places in the city/municipality;
c. furnish the Treasurers office and the local sanggunian
concerned of the list of lands affected;
6.4 The Treasurers office shall:
a. collect the Social Housing Tax on top of the Real Property Tax,
SEF Tax and other special assessments;
b. report to the DOF, thru the Bureau of Local Government
Finance, and the Mayors office the monthly collections on
Social Housing Tax (SHT). An annual report should likewise be
submitted to the HUDCC on the total revenues raised during
the year pursuant to Sec. 43, R.A. 7279 and the manner in
which the same was disbursed.
Petitioner has adduced special and important reasons as to why direct recourse
to Us should be allowed. Aside from presenting a novel question of law, this case
calls for immediate resolution since the challenged ordinances adversely affect
the property interests of all paying constituents of Quezon City. As well, this
petition serves as a test case for the guidance of other local government units
(LGUs). Indeed, the petition at bar is of transcendental importance warranting a
relaxation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. In Social Justice Society
(SJS) Officers, et al. v. Lim,24 the Court cited the case of Senator Jaworski v.
Phil. Amusement & Gaming Corp.,25 where We ratiocinated:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a
petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved
in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take
primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. x x x This is in accordance with
the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration
of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed.26
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
B. Locus Standi of Petitioner
Respondents challenge petitioners legal standing to file this case on the ground
that, in relation to Section 3 of Ordinance No. SP-2095, petitioner failed to
allege his ownership of a property that has an assessed value of more than
Php100,000.00 and, with respect to Ordinance No. SP-2335, by what standing or
personality he filed the case to nullify the same. According to respondents, the
petition is not a class suit, and that, for not having specifically alleged that
petitioner filed the case as a taxpayer, it could only be surmised whether he is a
party-in-interest who stands to be directly benefited or injured by the judgment
in this case.
It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest, who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to
be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." "To qualify a person to be a
real party-in-interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must
appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced."27
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Legal standing or locus standi calls for more than just a generalized
grievance.28 The concept has been defined as a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged.29 The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show not
only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement,
and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must be
shown that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which
he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute complained of.31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Tested by the foregoing, petitioner in this case clearly has legal standing to file
the petition. He is a real party-in-interest to assail the constitutionality and
legality of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235 because respondents did not
dispute that he is a registered co-owner of a residential property in Quezon City
and that he paid property tax which already included the SHT and the garbage
fee. He has substantial right to seek a refund of the payments he made and to
stop future imposition. While he is a lone petitioner, his cause of action to
declare the validity of the subject ordinances is substantial and of paramount
interest to similarly situated property owners in Quezon City.
C. Litis Pendentia
Respondents move for the dismissal of this petition on the ground of litis
pendentia. They claim that, as early as February 22, 2012, a case
entitled Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners, Inc., et al., v. Hon. Herbert
Bautista, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12-7-820, has been pending in the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, which assails the legality of
Ordinance No. SP-2095. Relying on City of Makati, et al. v. Municipality (now
City) of Taguig, et al.,32 respondents assert that there is substantial identity of
parties between the two cases because petitioner herein and plaintiffs in the
civil case filed their respective cases as taxpayers of Quezon City.
For petitioner, however, respondents contention is untenable since he is not a
party in Alliance and does not even have the remotest identity or association
with the plaintiffs in said civil case. Moreover, respondents arguments would
deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of laws
under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Litis pendentia is a Latin term which literally means a pending suit and is
variously referred to in some decisions as lis pendens and auter action
pendant.34 While it is normally connected with the control which the court has on
a property involved in a suit during the continuance proceedings, it is more
interposed as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action pending in
court.35 In Film Development Council of the Philippines v. SM Prime Holdings,
Inc.,36 We elucidated:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to a
situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same
cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is
based on the policy against multiplicity of suit and authorizes a court to dismiss a
case motu proprio.
xxxx
The requisites in order that an action may be dismissed on the ground of litis
pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the
same interest in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of
the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other.
xxxx
The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not
allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and
for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the
same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts more
than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the
sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons, and also to avoid the
costs and expenses incident to numerous suits.
Among the several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to
a single or common cause of action are: (1) whether the same evidence would
support and sustain both the first and second causes of action; and (2) whether
the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other.
The determination of whether there is an identity of causes of action for
purposes of litis pendentia is inextricably linked with that of res judicata, each
constituting an element of the other. In either case, both relate to the sound
practice of including, in a single litigation, the disposition of all issues relating to
a cause of action that is before a court.37
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There is substantial identity of the parties when there is a community of
interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case albeit
the latter was not impleaded in the first case.38Moreover, the fact that the
positions of the parties are reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first case are the
defendants in the second case or vice-versa, does not negate the identity of
parties for purposes of determining whether the case is dismissible on the
ground of litis pendentia.39ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this case, it is notable that respondents failed to attach any pleading
connected with the alleged civil case pending before the Quezon City trial court.
Granting that there is substantial identity of parties between said case and this
petition, dismissal on the ground of litis pendentia still cannot be had in view of
the absence of the second and third requisites. There is no way for Us to
determine whether both cases are based on the same set of facts that require
the presentation of the same evidence. Even if founded on the same set of facts,
the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for could be different. Moreover, there is
no basis to rule that the two cases are intimately related and/or intertwined
with one another such that the judgment that may be rendered in one,
regardless of which party would be successful, would amount to res judicata in
the other.
D. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Respondents contend that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies
for his non-compliance with Section 187 of the LGC, which mandates:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and
Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of
local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the
provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the
purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any question on
the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be
raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the
Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the
date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have
the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and
payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within
thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day
period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved
party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The provision, the constitutionality of which was sustained in Drilon v. Lim,40 has
been construed as mandatory41 considering that
A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose taxes. The
power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to
finance and support the myriad activities of local government units for the
delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and
enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. Consequently, any
delay in implementing tax measures would be to the detriment of the public. It is
for this reason that protests over tax ordinances are required to be done within
certain time frames. x x x.42
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The obligatory nature of Section 187 was underscored in Hagonoy Market
Vendor Asso. v. Municipality of Hagonoy:43cralawlawlibrary
x x x [T]he timeframe fixed by law for parties to avail of their legal remedies
before competent courts is not a mere technicality that can be easily brushed
aside. The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are
mandatory. x x x Being its lifeblood, collection of revenues by the government is
of paramount importance. The funds for the operation of its agencies and
provision of basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived from its
revenues and collections. Thus, it is essential that the validity of revenue
measures is not left uncertain for a considerable length of time. Hence, the law
provided a time limit for an aggrieved party to assail the legality of revenue
measures and tax ordinances.44
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Despite these cases, the Court, in Ongsuco, et al. v. Hon. Malones,45 held that
there was no need for petitioners therein to exhaust administrative remedies
before resorting to the courts, considering that there was only a pure question
of law, the parties did not dispute any factual matter on which they had to
present evidence. Likewise, in Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc. v. City
of Cagayan de Oro,46 We relaxed the application of the rules in view of the more
substantive matters. For the same reasons, this petition is an exception to the
general rule.
Substantive Issues
Petitioner asserts that the protection of real properties from informal settlers
and the collection of garbage are basic and essential duties and functions of the
Quezon City Government. By imposing the SHT and the garbage fee, the latter
has shown a penchant and pattern to collect taxes to pay for public services that
could be covered by its revenues from taxes imposed on property, idle land,
business, transfer, amusement, etc., as well as the Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA) from the National Government. For petitioner, it is noteworthy that
respondents did not raise the issue that the Quezon City Government is in dire
financial state and desperately needs money to fund housing for informal
settlers and to pay for garbage collection. In fact, it has not denied that its
revenue collection in 2012 is in the sum of P13.69 billion.
Moreover, the imposition of the SHT and the garbage fee cannot be justified by
the Quezon City Government as an exercise of its power to create sources of
income under Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.47 According to
petitioner, the constitutional provision is not a carte blanche for the LGU to tax
everything under its territorial and political jurisdiction as the provision itself
admits of guidelines and limitations.
Petitioner further claims that the annual property tax is an ad valorem tax, a
percentage of the assessed value of the property, which is subject to revision
every three (3) years in order to reflect an increase in the market value of the
property. The SHT and the garbage fee are actually increases in the property
tax which are not based on the assessed value of the property or its
reassessment every three years; hence, in violation of Sections 232 and 233 of
the LGC.48ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
For their part, respondents relied on the presumption in favor of the
constitutionality of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235, invoking Victorias
Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, etc.,49People v. Siton, et
al.,50 and Hon. Ermita v. Hon. Aldecoa-Delorino.51 They argue that the burden of
establishing the invalidity of an ordinance rests heavily upon the party
challenging its constitutionality. They insist that the questioned ordinances are
proper exercises of police power similar to Telecom. & Broadcast Attys. of the
Phils., Inc. v. COMELEC52 and Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza,
Jr.53 and that their enactment finds basis in the social justice principle
enshrined in Section 9,54 Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
As to the issue of publication, respondents argue that where the law provides
for its own effectivity, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary so
long as it is not punitive in character, citing Balbuna, et al. v. Hon. Secretary of
Education, et al.55 and Askay v. Cosalan.56 Thus, Ordinance No. SP-2095 took
effect after its publication, while Ordinance No. SP-2235 became effective
after its approval on December 26, 2013.
Additionally, the parties articulate the following positions:
On the Socialized Housing Tax
Respondents emphasize that the SHT is pursuant to the social justice principle
found in Sections 1 and 2, Article XIII57 of the 1987 Constitution and Sections 2
(a)58 and 4359 of R.A. No. 7279, or the Urban Development and Housing Act of
1992 (UDHA).
Relying on Manila Race Horse Trainers Assn., Inc. v. De La
Fuente,60 and Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias,
etc.,61 respondents assert that Ordinance No. SP-2095 applies equally to all real
property owners without discrimination. There is no way that the ordinance could
violate the equal protection clause because real property owners and informal
settlers do not belong to the same class.
Ordinance No. SP-2095 is also not oppressive since the tax rate being imposed is
consistent with the UDHA. While the law authorizes LGUs to collect SHT on
properties with an assessed value of more than P50,000.00, the questioned
ordinance only covers properties with an assessed value exceeding P100,000.00.
As well, the ordinance provides for a tax credit equivalent to the total amount of
the special assessment paid by the property owner beginning in the sixth (6th)
year of the effectivity of the ordinance.
On the contrary, petitioner claims that the collection of the SHT is tantamount
to a penalty imposed on real property owners due to the failure of respondent
Quezon City Mayor and Council to perform their duty to secure and protect real
property owners from informal settlers, thereby burdening them with the
expenses to provide funds for housing. For petitioner, the SHT cannot be viewed
as a charity from real property owners since it is forced, not voluntary.
Also, petitioner argues that the collection of the SHT is a kind of class
legislation that violates the right of property owners to equal protection of the
laws since it favors informal settlers who occupy property not their own and pay
no taxes over law-abiding real property owners who pay income and realty taxes.
Petitioner further contends that respondents characterization of the SHT as
nothing more than an advance payment on the real property tax has no
statutory basis. Allegedly, property tax cannot be collected before it is due
because, under the LGC, chartered cities are authorized to impose property tax
based on the assessed value and the general revision of assessment that is made
every three (3) years.
As to the rationale of SHT stated in Ordinance No. SP-2095, which, in turn, was
based on Section 43 of the UDHA, petitioner asserts that there is no specific
provision in the 1987 Constitution stating that the ownership and enjoyment of
property bear a social function. And even if there is, it is seriously doubtful and
far-fetched that the principle means that property owners should provide funds
for the housing of informal settlers and for home site development. Social
justice and police power, petitioner believes, does not mean imposing a tax on
one, or that one has to give up something, for the benefit of another. At best,
the principle that property ownership and enjoyment bear a social function is but
a reiteration of the Civil Law principle that property should not be enjoyed and
abused to the injury of other properties and the community, and that the use of
the property may be restricted by police power, the exercise of which is not
involved in this case.
Finally, petitioner alleges that 6 Bistekvilles will be constructed out of the SHT
collected. Bistek is the monicker of respondent City Mayor.
The Bistekvilles makes it clear, therefore, that politicians will take the credit
for the tax imposed on real property owners.
On the Garbage Fee
Respondents claim that Ordinance No. S-2235, which is an exercise of police
power, collects on the average from every household a garbage fee in the meager
amount of thirty-three (33) centavos per day compared with the sum of
P1,659.83 that the Quezon City Government annually spends for every household
for garbage collection and waste management.62ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In addition, there is no double taxation because the ordinance involves a fee.
Even assuming that the garbage fee is a tax, the same cannot be a direct
duplicate tax as it is imposed on a different subject matter and is of a different
kind or character. Based on Villanueva, et al. v. City of Iloilo63 and Victorias
Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, etc.,64 there is no taxing twice
because the real property tax is imposed on ownership based on its assessed
value, while the garbage fee is required on the domestic household. The only
reference to the property is the determination of the applicable rate and the
facility of collection.
Petitioner argues, however, that Ordinance No. S-2235 cannot be justified as an
exercise of police power. The cases of Calalang v. Williams,65Patalinghug v. Court
of Appeals,66 and Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza,
Jr.,67 which were cited by respondents, are inapplicable since the assailed
ordinance is a revenue measure and does not regulate the disposal or other
aspect of garbage.
The subject ordinance, for petitioner, is discriminatory as it collects garbage
fee only from domestic households and not from restaurants, food courts, fast
food chains, and other commercial dining places that spew garbage much more
than residential property owners.
Petitioner likewise contends that the imposition of garbage fee is tantamount to
double taxation because garbage collection is a basic and essential public service
that should be paid out from property tax, business tax, transfer tax,
amusement tax, community tax certificate, other taxes, and the IRA of the
Quezon City Government. To bolster the claim, he states that the revenue
collection of the Quezon City Government reached Php13.69 billion in 2012. A
small portion of said amount could be spent for garbage collection and other
essential services.
It is further noted that the Quezon City Government already collects garbage
fee under Section 4768of R.A. No. 9003, or the Ecological Solid Waste
Management Act of 2000, which authorizes LGUs to impose fees in amounts
sufficient to pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid waste
management plan, and that LGUs have access to the Solid Waste Management
(SWM) Fund created under Section 4669 of the same law. Also, according to
petitioner, it is evident that Ordinance No. S-2235 is inconsistent with R.A. No.
9003 for while the law encourages segregation, composting, and recycling of
waste, the ordinance only emphasizes the collection and payment of garbage fee;
while the law calls for an active involvement of the barangay in the collection,
segregation, and recycling of garbage, the ordinance skips such mandate.
Lastly, in challenging the ordinance, petitioner avers that the garbage fee was
collected even if the required publication of its approval had not yet elapsed. He
notes that on January 7, 2014, he paid his realty tax which already included the
garbage fee.
The Courts Ruling
Respondents correctly argued that an ordinance, as in every law, is presumed
valid.
An ordinance carries with it the presumption of validity. The question of
reasonableness though is open to judicial inquiry. Much should be left thus to the
discretion of municipal authorities. Courts will go slow in writing off an ordinance
as unreasonable unless the amount is so excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary,
unreasonable, oppressive, or confiscatory. A rule which has gained acceptance is
that factors relevant to such an inquiry are the municipal conditions as a whole
and the nature of the business made subject to imposition.70
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For an ordinance to be valid though, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the LGU to enact and must be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it should also conform to the following requirements: (1) not
contrary to the Constitution or any statute; (2) not unfair or oppressive; (3) not
partial or discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) not unreasonable.71 As jurisprudence
indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was
enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU and whether it was passed in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e.,
involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations
under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of
fairness and reason, and its consistency with public
policy).72ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An ordinance must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test
of consistency with the prevailing laws.73 If not, it is void.74 Ordinance should
uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution.75 As to conformity
with existing statutes, Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals76 has this to say:
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It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and
subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of
general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid. The
principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities,
under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit
of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state. In every power to
pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied restriction that the
ordinances shall be consistent with the general law. In the language of Justice
Isagani Cruz (ret.), this Court, in Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., ruled
that:
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The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a
statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national
government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred
on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be
superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is
a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of
Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and
negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
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Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights
wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without
which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it
may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the
right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so
great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal
corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of
no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned.
They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government
units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution
strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from
that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local
government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our
previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy.
The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are
certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the
local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by
mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal
of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.77
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LGUs must be reminded that they merely form part of the whole; that the policy
of ensuring the autonomy of local governments was never intended by the
drafters of the 1987 Constitution to create an imperium in imperio and install an
intra-sovereign political subdivision independent of a single sovereign
state.78 [M]unicipal corporations are bodies politic and corporate, created not
only as local units of local self-government, but as governmental agencies of the
state. The legislature, by establishing a municipal corporation, does not divest
the State of any of its sovereignty; absolve itself from its right and duty to
administer the public affairs of the entire state; or divest itself of any power
over the inhabitants of the district which it possesses before the charter was
granted.79ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
LGUs are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power
from the national legislature; they are mere agents vested with what is called
the power of subordinate legislation.80Congress enacted the LGC as the
implementing law for the delegation to the various LGUs of the States great
powers, namely: the police power, the power of eminent domain, and the power of
taxation. The LGC was fashioned to delineate the specific parameters and
limitations to be complied with by each LGU in the exercise of these delegated
powers with the view of making each LGU a fully functioning subdivision of the
State subject to the constitutional and statutory
limitations.81ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Specifically, with regard to the power of taxation, it is indubitably the most
effective instrument to raise needed revenues in financing and supporting myriad
activities of the LGUs for the delivery of basic services essential to the
promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and
prosperity of the people.82 As this Court opined in National Power Corp. v. City of
Cabanatuan:83cralawlawlibrary
In recent years, the increasing social challenges of the times expanded the
scope of state activity, and taxation has become a tool to realize social justice
and the equitable distribution of wealth, economic progress and the protection
of local industries as well as public welfare and similar objectives. Taxation
assumes even greater significance with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
Thenceforth, the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local
legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other
charges pursuant to Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
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Section 5. Each Local Government unit shall have the power to create its own
sources of revenue, to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines
and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
governments.
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This paradigm shift results from the realization that genuine development can be
achieved only by strengthening local autonomy and promoting decentralization of
governance. For a long time, the countrys highly centralized government
structure has bred a culture of dependence among local government leaders upon
the national leadership. It has also dampened the spirit of initiative, innovation
and imaginative resilience in matters of local development on the part of local
government leaders. The only way to shatter this culture of dependence is to
give the LGUs a wider role in the delivery of basic services, and confer them
sufficient powers to generate their own sources for the purpose. To achieve this
goal, Section 3 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution mandates Congress to enact
a local government code that will, consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy, set the guidelines and limitations to this grant of taxing powers x x
x84
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Fairly recently, We also stated in Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. Province of
Benguet85 that:
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The rule governing the taxing power of provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays is summarized in Icard v. City Council of Baguio:
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It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is clothed with
no inherent power of taxation. The charter or statute must plainly show an
intent to confer that power or the municipality, cannot assume it. And the power
when granted is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity
arising out of the term used in granting that power must be resolved against the
municipality. Inferences, implications, deductions all these have no place in
the interpretation of the taxing power of a municipal corporation. [Underscoring
supplied]
xxxx
Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, the power to tax is no longer
vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct
authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges. Nevertheless, such authority is
subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide.
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In conformity with Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991. Book II of the LGC governs local taxation and fiscal matters.86
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Indeed, LGUs have no inherent power to tax except to the extent that such
power might be delegated to them either by the basic law or by the
statute.87 Under the now prevailing Constitution, where there is neither a grant
nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power must be deemed to exist although
Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The
basic rationale for the current rule is to safeguard the viability and self-
sufficiency of local government units by directly granting them general and
broad tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the
delegation to be absolute and unconditional; the constitutional objective
obviously is to ensure that, while the local government units are being
strengthened and made more autonomous, the legislature must still see to it that
(a) the taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple and
unreasonable impositions; (b) each local government unit will have its fair share
of available resources; (c) the resources of the national government will not be
unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be fair, uniform, and
just.88ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Subject to the provisions of the LGC and consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy, every LGU is now empowered and authorized to create its own sources
of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall accrue exclusively to
the local government unit as well as to apply its resources and assets for
productive, developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or furtherance
of their governmental or proprietary powers and functions.89 The relevant
provisions of the LGC which establish the parameters of the taxing power of the
LGUs are as follows:
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SECTION 130. Fundamental Principles. The following fundamental principles
shall govern the exercise of the taxing and other revenue-raising powers of local
government units:
(a) Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit;
(b) Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:
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(1) be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayers ability to pay;
(2) be levied and collected only for public purposes;
(3) not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;
(4) not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in restraint
of trade;
(c) The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in no
case be let to any private person;
(d) The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall inure
solely to the benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the local
government unit levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition unless otherwise
specifically provided herein; and,
(e) Each local government unit shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive
system of taxation.
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SECTION 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government
Units. Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the
following:
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(a) Income tax, except when levied on banks and other financial institutions;
(b) Documentary stamp tax;
(c) Taxes on estates, inheritance, gifts, legacies and other acquisitions mortis
causa, except as otherwise provided herein;
(d) Customs duties, registration fees of vessel and wharfage on wharves, tonnage
dues, and all other kinds of customs fees, charges and dues except wharfage on
wharves constructed and maintained by the local government unit concerned;
(e) Taxes, fees, and charges and other impositions upon goods carried into or out
of, or passing through, the territorial jurisdictions of local government units in
the guise of charges for wharfage, tolls for bridges or otherwise, or other
taxes, fees, or charges in any form whatsoever upon such goods or merchandise;
(f) Taxes, fees or charges on agricultural and aquatic products when sold by
marginal farmers or fishermen;
(g) Taxes on business enterprises certified to by the Board of Investments as
pioneer or non-pioneer for a period of six (6) and four (4) years, respectively
from the date of registration;
(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue
Code, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products;
(i) Percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar
transactions on goods or services except as otherwise provided herein;
(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons
engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire and common
carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this Code;
(k) Taxes on premiums paid by way of reinsurance or retrocession;
(l) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for the
issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving thereof, except
tricycles;

(m) Taxes, fees, or other charges on Philippine products actually exported,
except as otherwise provided herein;
(n) Taxes, fees, or charges, on Countryside and Barangay Business Enterprises
and cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6810 and Republic Act
Numbered Sixty-nine hundred thirty-eight (R.A. No. 6938) otherwise known as
the Cooperative Code of the Philippines respectively; and
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies
and instrumentalities, and local government units.
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SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. Except as otherwise provided in this
Code, the city, may levy the taxes, fees, and charges which the province or
municipality may impose: Provided, however, That the taxes, fees and charges
levied and collected by highly urbanized and independent component cities shall
accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
The rates of taxes that the city may levy may exceed the maximum rates
allowed for the province or municipality by not more than fifty percent (50%)
except the rates of professional and amusement taxes.
SECTION 186. Power To Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. Local government
units may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or
subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed under the
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other
applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust,
excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy:
Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall
not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose.
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On the Socialized Housing Tax
Contrary to petitioners submission, the 1987 Constitution explicitly espouses the
view that the use of property bears a social function and that all economic
agents shall contribute to the common good.90The Court already recognized this
in Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.:91cralawlawlibrary
Property has not only an individual function, insofar as it has to provide for the
needs of the owner, but also a social function insofar as it has to provide for the
needs of the other members of society. The principle is this:
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Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of property, however
absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that
his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an
equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the right of the
community. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are
subject to reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from
being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by
law as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them
by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.92
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Police power, which flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema
lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law), is the plenary power vested in
the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people.93 Property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government in the exercise of
police power. 94 In this jurisdiction, it is well-entrenched that taxation may be
made the implement of the states police power.95ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ordinance No. SP-2095 imposes a Socialized Housing Tax equivalent to 0.5% on
the assessed value of land in excess of Php100,000.00. This special assessment
is the same tax referred to in R.A. No. 7279 or the UDHA.96 The SHT is one of
the sources of funds for urban development and housing program.97Section 43 of
the law provides:
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Sec. 43. Socialized Housing Tax. Consistent with the constitutional principle
that the ownership and enjoyment of property bear a social function and to raise
funds for the Program, all local government units are hereby authorized to
impose an additional one-half percent (0.5%) tax on the assessed value of all
lands in urban areas in excess of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
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The rationale of the SHT is found in the preambular clauses of the subject
ordinance, to wit:
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WHEREAS, the imposition of additional tax is intended to provide the City
Government with sufficient funds to initiate, implement and undertake
Socialized Housing Projects and other related preliminary activities;
WHEREAS, the imposition of 0.5% tax will benefit the Socialized Housing
Programs and Projects of the City Government, specifically the marginalized
sector through the acquisition of properties for human settlements;
WHEREAS, the removal of the urban blight will definitely increase fair market
value of properties in the city[.]
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The above-quoted are consistent with the UDHA, which the LGUs are charged to
implement in their respective localities in coordination with the Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council, the national housing agencies, the
Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor, the private sector, and other non-
government organizations.98 It is the declared policy of the State to undertake a
comprehensive and continuing urban development and housing program that shall,
among others, uplift the conditions of the underprivileged and homeless citizens
in urban areas and in resettlement areas, and provide for the rational use and
development of urban land in order to bring about, among others, reduction in
urban dysfunctions, particularly those that adversely affect public health,
safety and ecology, and access to land and housing by the underprivileged and
homeless citizens.99 Urban renewal and resettlement shall include the
rehabilitation and development of blighted and slum areas100 and the
resettlement of program beneficiaries in accordance with the provisions of the
UDHA.101ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Under the UDHA, socialized housing102 shall be the primary strategy in providing
shelter for the underprivileged and homeless.103 The LGU or the NHA, in
cooperation with the private developers and concerned agencies, shall provide
socialized housing or resettlement areas with basic services and facilities such
as potable water, power and electricity, and an adequate power distribution
system, sewerage facilities, and an efficient and adequate solid waste disposal
system; and access to primary roads and transportation facilities.104 The
provisions for health, education, communications, security, recreation, relief and
welfare shall also be planned and be given priority for implementation by the LGU
and concerned agencies in cooperation with the private sector and the
beneficiaries themselves.105ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, within two years from the effectivity of the UDHA, the LGUs, in
coordination with the NHA, are directed to implement the relocation and
resettlement of persons living in danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places like
sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds.106 In coordination with the NHA, the
LGUs shall provide relocation or resettlement sites with basic services and
facilities and access to employment and livelihood opportunities sufficient to
meet the basic needs of the affected families.107ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Clearly, the SHT charged by the Quezon City Government is a tax which is within
its power to impose. Aside from the specific authority vested by Section 43 of
the UDHA, cities are allowed to exercise such other powers and discharge such
other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental
to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities which
include, among others, programs and projects for low-cost housing and other
mass dwellings.108 The collections made accrue to its socialized housing programs
and projects. The tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise
revenue; it is levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the
exercise of the police power for the general welfare of the entire city. It is
greatly imbued with public interest. Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not
only beneficial to the underprivileged and homeless constituents but
advantageous to the real property owners as well. The situation will improve the
value of the their property investments, fully enjoying the same in view of an
orderly, secure, and safe community, and will enhance the quality of life of the
poor, making them law-abiding constituents and better consumers of business
products.
Though broad and far-reaching, police power is subordinate to constitutional
limitations and is subject to the requirement that its exercise must be
reasonable and for the public good.109 In the words of City of Manila v. Hon.
Laguio, Jr.:110cralawlawlibrary
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised
with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or
despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction
demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental
law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it
bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due
process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of
the person to his life, liberty and property.
xxxx
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional
infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It
must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose
less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to
be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process
clause.111
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As with the State, LGUs may be considered as having properly exercised their
police power only if there is a lawful subject and a lawful method or, to be
precise, if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise
and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.112ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this case, petitioner argues that the SHT is a penalty imposed on real
property owners because it burdens them with expenses to provide funds for the
housing of informal settlers, and that it is a class legislation since it favors the
latter who occupy properties which is not their own and pay no taxes.
We disagree.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.113 The
guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances.114 Similar subjects should not be treated differently so as to give
undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.115 The law may,
therefore, treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided
there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from
another.116ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for
a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of
the same class.117ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
For the purpose of undertaking a comprehensive and continuing urban
development and housing program, the disparities between a real property owner
and an informal settler as two distinct classes are too obvious and need not be
discussed at length. The differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of
justice and equity and is not discriminatory within the meaning of the
Constitution. Notably, the public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the
motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one over
another.118 It is inherent in the power to tax that a State is free to select the
subjects of taxation.119 Inequities which result from a singling out of one
particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional
limitation.120ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Further, the reasonableness of Ordinance No. SP-2095 cannot be disputed. It is
not confiscatory or oppressive since the tax being imposed therein is below what
the UDHA actually allows. As pointed out by respondents, while the law
authorizes LGUs to collect SHT on lands with an assessed value of more than
P50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only covers lands with an assessed value
exceeding P100,000.00. Even better, on certain conditions, the ordinance grants
a tax credit equivalent to the total amount of the special assessment paid
beginning in the sixth (6th) year of its effectivity. Far from being obnoxious, the
provisions of the subject ordinance are fair and just.
On the Garbage Fee
In the United States of America, it has been held that the authority of a
municipality to regulate garbage falls within its police power to protect public
health, safety, and welfare.121 As opined, the purposes and policy underpinnings
of the police power to regulate the collection and disposal of solid waste are: (1)
to preserve and protect the public health and welfare as well as the environment
by minimizing or eliminating a source of disease and preventing and abating
nuisances; and (2) to defray costs and ensure financial stability of the system
for the benefit of the entire community, with the sum of all charges marshalled
and designed to pay for the expense of a systemic refuse disposal
scheme.122ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ordinances regulating waste removal carry a strong presumption of
validity.123 Not surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of U.S. cases addressing
a city's authority to impose mandatory garbage service and fees have upheld the
ordinances against constitutional and statutory
challenges.124ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A municipality has an affirmative duty to supervise and control the collection of
garbage within its corporate limits.125 The LGC specifically assigns the
responsibility of regulation and oversight of solid waste to local governing bodies
because the Legislature determined that such bodies were in the best position to
develop efficient waste management programs.126 To impose on local governments
the responsibility to regulate solid waste but not grant them the authority
necessary to fulfill the same would lead to an absurd result.127 As held in one
U.S. case:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x When a municipality has general authority to regulate a particular subject
matter, the manner and means of exercising those powers, where not specifically
prescribed by the legislature, are left to the discretion of the municipal
authorities. x x x Leaving the manner of exercising municipal powers to the
discretion of municipal authorities "implies a range of reasonableness within
which a municipality's exercise of discretion will not be interfered with or upset
by the judiciary."128
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC and in the proper exercise
of its corporate powers under Section 22 of the same, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Quezon City, like other local legislative bodies, is empowered to
enact ordinances, approve resolutions, and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants.129 Section 16 of the LGC provides:
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SECTION 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance,
and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within
their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture,
promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police
power of the State to LGUs.130 The provisions related thereto are liberally
interpreted to give more powers to LGUs in accelerating economic development
and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community.131 Wide
discretion is vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what the
interests of the public require but also what measures are necessary for the
protection of such interests since the Sanggunian is in the best position to
determine the needs of its constituents.132ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
One of the operative principles of decentralization is that, subject to the
provisions of the LGC and national policies, the LGUs shall share with the national
government the responsibility in the management and maintenance of ecological
balance within their territorial jurisdiction.133 In this regard, cities are allowed
to exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and
effective provision of the basic services and facilities which include, among
others, solid waste disposal system or environmental management system and
services or facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation.134 R.A. No. 9003,
or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000,135 affirms this
authority as it expresses that the LGUs shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation and enforcement of its provisions within their respective
jurisdictions while establishing a cooperative effort among the national
government, other local government units, non-government organizations, and the
private sector.136ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Necessarily, LGUs are statutorily sanctioned to impose and collect such
reasonable fees and charges for services rendered.137 Charges refer to
pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or property, while Fee
means a charge fixed by law or ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a
business or activity.138ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a
charge fixed for the regulation of an activity. The basis for this could be
discerned from the foreword of said Ordinance, to wit:
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WHEREAS, Quezon City being the largest and premiere city in the Philippines in
terms of population and urban geographical areas, apart from being competent
and efficient in the delivery of public service, apparently requires a big
budgetary allocation in order to address the problems relative and connected to
the prompt and efficient delivery of basic services such as the effective system
of waste management, public information programs on proper garbage and proper
waste disposal, including the imposition of waste regulatory measures;
WHEREAS, to help augment the funds to be spent for the citys waste
management system, the City Government through the Sangguniang
Panlungsod deems it necessary to impose a schedule of reasonable fees or
charges for the garbage collection services for residential (domestic household)
that it renders to the public.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Certainly, as opposed to petitioners opinion, the garbage fee is not a tax.
In Smart Communications, Inc. v. Municipality of Malvar, Batangas,139 the Court
had the occasion to distinguish these two concepts:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, the Court declared that
if the generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely
incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the
fact that incidentally revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a
tax.
In Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, the Court reiterated
that the purpose and effect of the imposition determine whether it is a tax or a
fee, and that the lack of any standards for such imposition gives the
presumption that the same is a tax.
We accordingly say that the designation given by the municipal authorities does
not decide whether the imposition is properly a license tax or a license fee. The
determining factors are the purpose and effect of the imposition as may be
apparent from the provisions of the ordinance. Thus, [w]hen no police inspection,
supervision, or regulation is provided, nor any standard set for the applicant to
establish, or that he agrees to attain or maintain, but any and all persons
engaged in the business designated, without qualification or hindrance, may come,
and a license on payment of the stipulated sum will issue, to do business, subject
to no prescribed rule of conduct and under no guardian eye, but according to the
unrestrained judgment or fancy of the applicant and licensee, the presumption is
strong that the power of taxation, and not the police power, is being exercised.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Georgia, U.S.A., assessments for garbage collection services have been
consistently treated as a fee and not a tax.140 In another U.S. case,141 the
garbage fee was considered as a "service charge" rather than a tax as it was
actually a fee for a service given by the city which had previously been provided
at no cost to its citizens.
Hence, not being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee under Ordinance No.
SP-2235 violates the rule on double taxation142 must necessarily fail.
Nonetheless, although a special charge, tax, or assessment may be imposed by a
municipal corporation, it must be reasonably commensurate to the cost of
providing the garbage service.143 To pass judicial scrutiny, a regulatory fee must
not produce revenue in excess of the cost of the regulation because such fee will
be construed as an illegal tax when the revenue generated by the regulation
exceeds the cost of the regulation.144ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner argues that the Quezon City Government already collects garbage fee
under Section 47 of R.A. No. 9003, which authorizes LGUs to impose fees in
amounts sufficient to pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing a
solid waste management plan, and that it has access to the SWM Fund under
Section 46 of the same law. Moreover, Ordinance No. S-2235 is inconsistent
with R.A. No. 9003, because the ordinance emphasizes the collection and
payment of garbage fee with no concern for segregation, composting and
recycling of wastes. It also skips the mandate of the law calling for the active
involvement of the barangay in the collection, segregation, and recycling of
garbage.
We now turn to the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9003.
Under R.A. No. 9003, it is the declared policy of the State to adopt a
systematic, comprehensive and ecological solid waste management program which
shall, among others, ensure the proper segregation, collection, transport,
storage, treatment and disposal of solid waste through the formulation and
adoption of the best environmental practices in ecological waste
management.145 The law provides that segregation and collection of solid waste
shall be conducted at the barangay level, specifically for biodegradable,
compostable and reusable wastes, while the collection of non-recyclable
materials and special wastes shall be the responsibility of the municipality or
city.146 Mandatory segregation of solid wastes shall primarily be conducted at
the source, to include household, institutional, industrial, commercial and
agricultural sources.147Segregation at source refers to a solid waste management
practice of separating, at the point of origin, different materials found in solid
waste in order to promote recycling and re-use of resources and to reduce the
volume of waste for collection and disposal.148 Based on Rule XVII of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative
Order No. 2001-34, Series of 2001,149 which is the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9003, barangays shall be responsible for the
collection, segregation, and recycling of biodegradable, recyclable, compostable
and reusable wastes.150 For the purpose, a Materials Recovery Facility (MRF),
which shall receive biodegradable wastes for composting and mixed non-
biodegradable wastes for final segregation, re-use and recycling, is to be
established in every barangay or cluster of
barangays.151ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
According to R.A. 9003, an LGU, through its local solid waste management board,
is mandated by law to prepare a 10-year solid waste management plan consistent
with the National Solid Waste Management Framework.152 The plan shall be for
the re-use, recycling and composting of wastes generated in its jurisdiction;
ensure the efficient management of solid waste generated within its jurisdiction;
and place primary emphasis on implementation of all feasible re-use, recycling,
and composting programs while identifying the amount of landfill and
transformation capacity that will be needed for solid waste which cannot be re-
used, recycled, or composted.153 One of the components of the solid waste
management plan is source reduction:
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(e) Source reduction The source reduction component shall include a program
and implementation schedule which shows the methods by which the LGU will, in
combination with the recycling and composting components, reduce a sufficient
amount of solid waste disposed of in accordance with the diversion requirements
of Section 20.

The source reduction component shall describe the following:
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(1) strategies in reducing the volume of solid waste generated at source;
(2) measures for implementing such strategies and the resources necessary to
carry out such activities;
(3) other appropriate waste reduction technologies that may also be considered,
provided that such technologies conform with the standards set pursuant to this
Act;
(4) the types of wastes to be reduced pursuant to Section 15 of this Act;
(5) the methods that the LGU will use to determine the categories of solid
wastes to be diverted from disposal at a disposal facility through re-use,
recycling and composting; and
(6) new facilities and of expansion of existing facilities which will be needed to
implement re-use, recycling and composting.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The LGU source reduction component shall include the evaluation and
identification of rate structures and fees for the purpose of reducing the
amount of waste generated, and other source reduction strategies, including but
not limited to, programs and economic incentives provided under Sec. 45 of this
Act to reduce the use of non-recyclable materials, replace disposable materials
and products with reusable materials and products, reduce packaging, and
increase the efficiency of the use of paper, cardboard, glass, metal, and other
materials. The waste reduction activities of the community shall also take into
account, among others, local capability, economic viability, technical
requirements, social concerns, disposition of residual waste and environmental
impact: Provided, That, projection of future facilities needed and estimated cost
shall be incorporated in the plan. x x x154
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The solid waste management plan shall also include an implementation schedule
for solid waste diversion:
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SEC. 20. Establishing Mandatory Solid Waste Diversion. Each LGU plan shall
include an implementation schedule which shows that within five (5) years after
the effectivity of this Act, the LGU shall divert at least 25% of all solid waste
from waste disposal facilities through re-use, recycling, and composting
activities and other resource recovery activities: Provided, That the waste
diversion goals shall be increased every three (3) years thereafter: Provided,
further, That nothing in this Section prohibits a local government unit from
implementing re-use, recycling, and composting activities designed to exceed the
goal.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The baseline for the twenty-five percent (25%) shall be derived from the waste
characterization result155 that each LGU is mandated to
undertake.156ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In accordance with Section 46 of R.A. No. 9003, the LGUs are entitled to avail
of the SWM Fund on the basis of their approved solid waste management plan.
Aside from this, they may also impose SWM Fees under Section 47 of the law,
which states:
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SEC. 47. Authority to Collect Solid Waste Management Fees The local
government unit shall impose fees in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of
preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid waste management plan prepared
pursuant to this Act. The fees shall be based on the following minimum factors:
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(a) types of solid waste;
(b) amount/volume of waste; and
(c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility.
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The fees shall be used to pay the actual costs incurred by the LGU in collecting
the local fees. In determining the amounts of the fees, an LGU shall include only
those costs directly related to the adoption and implementation of the plan and
the setting and collection of the local fees.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule XVII of the IRR of R.A. No. 9003 sets forth the details:
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Section 1. Power to Collect Solid Waste Management Fees. The Local SWM
Board/Local SWM Cluster Board shall impose fees on the SWM services
provided for by the LGU and/or any authorized organization or unit. In
determining the amounts of the fees, a Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster
Board shall include only those costs directly related to the adoption and
implementation of the SWM Plan and the setting and collection of the local fees.
This power to impose fees may be ceded to the private sector and civil society
groups which have been duly accredited by the Local SWM Board/Local SWM
Cluster Board; provided, the SWM fees shall be covered by a Contract or
Memorandum of Agreement between the respective board and the private sector
or civil society group.
The fees shall pay for the costs of preparing, adopting and implementing a SWM
Plan prepared pursuant to the Act. Further, the fees shall also be used to pay
the actual costs incurred in collecting the local fees and for project
sustainability.
Section 2. Basis of SWM Service Fees
Reasonable SWM service fees shall be computed based on but not limited to the
following minimum factors:
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a) Types of solid waste to include special waste
b) amount/volume of waste
c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility
d) capacity or type of LGU constituency
e) cost of construction
f) cost of management
g) type of technology
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 3. Collection of Fees. Fees may be collected corresponding to the
following levels:
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a) Barangay The Barangay may impose fees for collection and segregation of
biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes from households, commerce,
other sources of domestic wastes, and for the use of Barangay MRFs. The
computation of the fees shall be established by the respective SWM boards.
The manner of collection of the fees shall be dependent on the style of
administration of respective Barangay Councils. However, all transactions shall
follow the Commission on Audit rules on collection of fees.
b) Municipality The municipal and city councils may impose fees on the barangay
MRFs for the collection and transport of non-recyclable and special wastes and
for the disposal of these into the sanitary landfill. The level and procedure for
exacting fees shall be defined by the Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster
Board and supported by LGU ordinances, however, payments shall be consistent
with the accounting system of government.
c) Private Sector/Civil Society Group On the basis of the stipulations of
contract or Memorandum of Agreement, the private sector or civil society group
shall impose fees for collection, transport and tipping in their SLFs. Receipts and
invoices shall be issued to the paying public or to the government.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
From the afore-quoted provisions, it is clear that the authority of a municipality
or city to impose fees is limited to the collection and transport of non-
recyclable and special wastes and for the disposal of these into the sanitary
landfill. Barangays, on the other hand, have the authority to impose fees for the
collection and segregation of biodegradable, compostable and reusable
wastes from households, commerce, other sources of domestic wastes, and for
the use of barangay MRFs. This is but consistent with Section 10 of R.A. No.
9003 directing that segregation and collection of biodegradable, compostable
and reusable wastes shall be conducted at the barangay level, while the collection
of non-recyclable materials and special wastes shall be the responsibility of the
municipality or city.
In this case, the alleged bases of Ordinance No. S-2235 in imposing the garbage
fee is the volume of waste currently generated by each person in Quezon City,
which purportedly stands at 0.66 kilogram per day, and the increasing trend of
waste generation for the past three years.157 Respondents did not elaborate any
further. The figure presented does not reflect the specific types of wastes
generated whether residential, market, commercial, industrial,
construction/demolition, street waste, agricultural, agro-industrial, institutional,
etc. It is reasonable, therefore, for the Court to presume that such amount
pertains to the totality of wastes, without any distinction, generated by Quezon
City constituents. To reiterate, however, the authority of a municipality or city
to impose fees extends only to those related to the collection and transport
of non-recyclable and special wastes.
Granting, for the sake of argument, that the 0.66 kilogram of solid waste per
day refers only to non-recyclable and special wastes, still, We cannot sustain the
validity of Ordinance No. S-2235. It violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution and the provisions of the LGC that an ordinance must be equitable
and based as far as practicable on the taxpayers ability to pay, and not unjust,
excessive, oppressive, confiscatory.158ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the subject ordinance, the rates of the imposable fee depend on land or floor
area and whether the payee is an occupant of a lot, condominium, social housing
project or apartment. For easy reference, the relevant provision is again quoted
below:
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On all domestic households in Quezon City;
 LAND AREA IMPOSABLE FEE attack their common mindless attitude in over-consuming the present resources
Less than 200 sq. m. PHP 100.00 and in generating waste.160 Instead of simplistically categorizing the payee into
land or floor occupant of a lot or unit of a condominium, socialized housing
201 sq. m. 500 sq. m. PHP 200.00
project or apartment, respondent City Council should have considered factors
501 sq. m. 1,000 sq. m. PHP 300.00
that could truly measure the amount of wastes generated and the appropriate
1,001 sq. m. 1,500 sq. m. PHP 400.00
fee for its collection. Factors include, among others, household age and size,
1,501 sq. m. 2,000 sq. m. or accessibility to waste collection, population density of the barangay or district,
PHP 500.00
more capacity to pay, and actual occupancy of the property. R.A. No. 9003 may also be
On all condominium unit and socialized housing projects/units in Quezon City; looked into for guidance. Under said law, SWM service fees may be computed
FLOOR AREA IMPOSABLE FEE based on minimum factors such as types of solid waste to include special waste,
Less than 40 sq. m. PHP25.00 amount/volume of waste, distance of the transfer station to the waste
41 sq. m. 60 sq. m. PHP50.00 management facility, capacity or type of LGU constituency, cost of construction,
61 sq. m. 100 sq. m. PHP75.00 cost of management, and type of technology. With respect to utility rates set by
municipalities, a municipality has the right to classify consumers under
101 sq. m. 150 sq. m. PHP100.00
reasonable classifications based upon factors such as the cost of service, the
151 sq. m. 200 sq. [m.] or more PHP200.00
purpose for which the service or the product is received, the quantity or the
On high-rise Condominium Units amount received, the different character of the service furnished, the time of
a) High-rise Condominium The Homeowners Association of high rise its use or any other matter which presents a substantial difference as a ground
condominiums shall pay the annual garbage fee on the total size of the entire of distinction.161cralawlawlibrary
condominium and socialized Housing Unit and an additional garbage fee shall [A] lack of uniformity in the rate charged is not necessarily unlawful
be collected based on area occupied for every unit already sold or being discrimination. The establishment of classifications and the charging of
amortized. different rates for the several classes is not unreasonable and does not violate
the requirements of equality and uniformity. Discrimination to be unlawful must
b) High-rise apartment units Owners of high-rise apartment units shall pay draw an unfair line or strike an unfair balance between those in like
the annual garbage fee on the total lot size of the entire apartment and an circumstances having equal rights and privileges. Discrimination with respect to
additional garbage fee based on the schedule prescribed herein for every rates charged does not vitiate unless it is arbitrary and without a reasonable
unit occupied. fact basis or justification.162
For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no substantial distinction chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
between an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a On top of an unreasonable classification, the penalty clause of Ordinance No. SP-
condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, on the other hand. Most 2235, which states:
likely, garbage output produced by these types of occupants is uniform and does chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and SECTION 3. Penalty Clause A penalty of 25% of the garbage fee due plus an
equitable.159ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary interest of 2% per month or a fraction thereof (interest) shall be charged
against a household owner who refuses to pay the garbage fee herein imposed.
The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a resident chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
of a 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or socialized housing project has to pay lacks the limitation required by Section 168 of the LGC, which provides:
twice the amount than a resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed rate of SECTION 168. Surcharges and Penalties on Unpaid Taxes, Fees, or Charges.
Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless of The sanggunian may impose a surcharge not exceeding twenty-five (25%) of the
whether the resident is from a condominium or from a socialized housing project. amount of taxes, fees or charges not paid on time and an interest at the rate not
exceeding two percent (2%) per month of the unpaid taxes, fees or charges
Indeed, the classifications under Ordinance No. S-2235 are not germane to its including surcharges, until such amount is fully paid but in no case shall the
declared purpose of promoting shared responsibility with the residents to total interest on the unpaid amount or portion thereof exceed thirty-six
(36) months. (Emphasis supplied)
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Finally, on the issue of publication of the two challenged ordinances.
Petitioner argues that the garbage fee was collected even if the required
publication of its approval had not yet elapsed. He notes that he paid his realty
tax on January 7, 2014 which already included the garbage fee. Respondents
counter that if the law provides for its own effectivity, publication in the
Official Gazette is not necessary so long as it is not penal in nature. Allegedly,
Ordinance No. SP-2095 took effect after its publication while Ordinance No. SP-
2235 became effective after its approval on December 26, 2013.
The pertinent provisions of the LGC state:
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SECTION 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. (a) Unless otherwise
stated in the ordinance or the resolution approving the local development plan
and public investment program, the same shall take effect after ten (10) days
from the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of
the provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and
in at least two (2) other conspicuous places in the local government unit
concerned.
(b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an
ordinance or resolution in the bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial
capitol and the city, municipal, or barangay hall in at least two (2) conspicuous
places in the local government unit concerned not later than five (5) days after
approval thereof.
The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in
Filipino or English and in the language or dialect understood by the majority of
the people in the local government unit concerned, and the secretary to the
sanggunian shall record such fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the
dates of approval and posting.
(c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation within the province where the local legislative
body concerned belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of general circulation
within the province, posting of such ordinances shall be made in all municipalities
and cities of the province where the sanggunian of origin is situated.
(d) In the case of highly urbanized and independent component cities, the main
features of the ordinance or resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition
to being posted, be published once in a local newspaper of general circulation
within the city: Provided, That in the absence thereof the ordinance or
resolution shall be published in any newspaper of general circulation.
SECTION 188. Publication of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures. Within
ten (10) days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city,
and municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for
three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation: Provided,
however, That in provinces, cities and municipalities where there are no
newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2)
conspicuous and publicly accessible places. (Emphasis supplied)
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On October 17, 2011, respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-
2095, which provides that it would take effect after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.163 On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235,
which was passed by the City Council on December 16, 2013, provides that it
would be effective upon its approval.164 Ten (10) days after its enactment, or on
December 26, 2013, respondent City Mayor approved the
same.165ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The case records are bereft of any evidence to prove petitioners negative
allegation that respondents did not comply with the posting and publication
requirements of the law. Thus, We are constrained not to give credit to his
unsupported claim.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The constitutionality and
legality of Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011, or the Socialized Housing Tax of
Quezon City, is SUSTAINED for being consistent with Section 43 of Republic
Act No. 7279. On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which
collects an annual garbage fee on all domestic households in Quezon City, is
hereby declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL. Respondents
are DIRECTED to REFUND with reasonable dispatch the sums of money
collected relative to its enforcement.
The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on February 5, 2014
is LIFTED with respect to Ordinance No. SP-2095. In contrast, respondents
are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from taking any further action to enforce
Ordinance No. SP. 2235.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
FIRST DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 135962. March 27, 2000]
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts to solve
urgent problems of the people. But even when government is armed with the best
of intention, we cannot allow it to run roughshod over the rule of law. Again, we
let the hammer fall and fall hard on the illegal attempt of the MMDA to open for
public use a private road in a private subdivision. While we hold that the general
welfare should be promoted, we stress that it should not be achieved at the
expense of the rule of law. h Y
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic
services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is
a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air
Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered
owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its
Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open
Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. The notice
reads: Court
"SUBJECT: NOTICE of the Opening of Neptune Street to
Traffic
"Dear President Lindo,
"Please be informed that pursuant to the mandate of the
MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924 which requires the
Authority to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares
for the safe and convenient movement of persons, Neptune
Street shall be opened to vehicular traffic effective January 2,
1996.
"In view whereof, the undersigned requests you to voluntarily
open the points of entry and exit on said street.
"Thank you for your cooperation and whatever assistance that
may be extended by your association to the MMDA personnel
who will be directing traffic in the area.
"Finally, we are furnishing you with a copy of the handwritten
instruction of the President on the matter.
"Very truly yours,
PROSPERO I. ORETA
Chairman"[1]
On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating
the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. Sppedsc
On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for injunction.
Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting
the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a temporary
restraining order the following day.
On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a
preliminary injunction.[2] Respondent questioned the denial before the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549. The appellate court conducted an ocular
inspection of Neptune Street[3] and on February 13, 1996, it issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the MMDAs proposed
action.[4]
On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of
the case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of
Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its
perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati
by ordinance. The decision disposed of as follows: Jurissc
"WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the challenged Order
dated January 23, 1995, in Civil Case No. 96-001, is SET ASIDE
 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on February 13,
1996 is hereby made permanent.
"For want of sustainable substantiation, the Motion to Cite
Roberto L. del Rosario in contempt is denied.[5]
"No pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED."[6]
The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied on September 28,
1998. Hence, this recourse. Jksm
Petitioner MMDA raises the following questions:
"I
HAS THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY (MMDA) THE MANDATE TO OPEN NEPTUNE
STREET TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC PURSUANT TO ITS
REGULATORY AND POLICE POWERS?
II
IS THE PASSAGE OF AN ORDINANCE A CONDITION
PRECEDENT BEFORE THE MMDA MAY ORDER THE OPENING
OF SUBDIVISION ROADS TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC?
III
IS RESPONDENT BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.
ESTOPPED FROM DENYING OR ASSAILING THE
AUTHORITY OF THE MMDA TO OPEN THE SUBJECT
STREET? Jlexj
V this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking
WAS RESPONDENT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS DESPITE
THE SEVERAL MEETINGS HELD BETWEEN MMDA AND THE
AFFECTED BEL-AIR RESIDENTS AND BAVA OFFICERS?
V
HAS RESPONDENT COME TO COURT WITH UNCLEAN
HANDS?"[7]
Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-Air
Village, a private residential subdivision in the heart of the financial and
commercial district of Makati City. It runs parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a national
road open to the general public. Dividing the two (2) streets is a concrete
perimeter wall approximately fifteen (15) feet high. The western end of Neptune
Street intersects Nicanor Garcia, formerly Reposo Street, a subdivision road
open to public vehicular traffic, while its eastern end intersects Makati Avenue,
a national road. Both ends of Neptune Street are guarded by iron gates. Edp mis
Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to
public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in
the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is
traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to
insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged
that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated
cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court.[8] From the premise that it
has police power, it is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to
enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public.[9]
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the
power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge
to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of
the same.[10] The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching
and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the
general welfare.[11]
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National
Legislature.[12] It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power.[13] The National Legislature, however, may delegate
bodies of municipal corporations or local government units.[14] Once delegated,
the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by
the national lawmaking body.[15]
A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs."[16] The Local
Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a "body politic and
corporate"[17]-- one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National
Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its
territory.[18] Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays.[19] They are also the territorial and political subdivisions of the
state.[20]
Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the
Local Government Code of 1991. This delegation is found in Section 16 of the
same Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz: Chief
"Sec. 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those
which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things,
the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-
reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote
full employment among their residents, maintain peace and
order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants."[21]
Local government units exercise police power through their respective
legislative bodies. The legislative body of the provincial government is
the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government is the sangguniang
panlungsod, that of the municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, and that
of the barangay is the sangguniang barangay. The Local Government Code of
1991 empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and
sangguniang bayan to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality, as the case
may be], and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper
exercise of the corporate powers of the [province, city municipality] provided
under the Code x x x."[22] The same Code gives the sangguniang barangay the
power to "enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the
inhabitants thereon."[23]
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government
units - i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of
Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las
Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon, ,
Navotas, , Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of Republic Act (R.
A.) No. 7924[24] in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special
development and administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-
wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development
authority" referred to as the MMDA.[25]
"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and
transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it
would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local
government units comprising Metro Manila."[26] There are seven (7) basic metro-
wide services and the scope of these services cover the following: (1)
development planning; (2) transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste
disposal and management; (4) flood control and sewerage management; (5) urban
renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter services; (6) health and
sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public safety. The basic
service of transport and traffic management includes the following: Lexjuris
"(b) Transport and traffic management which include the
formulation, coordination, and monitoring of policies,
standards, programs and projects to rationalize the existing
transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use
of thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient
movement of persons and goods; provision for the mass
transport system and the institution of a system to regulate
road users; administration and implementation of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and
traffic education programs, including the institution of a
single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila;"[27]
In the delivery of the seven (7) basic services, the MMDA has the following
powers and functions: Esm
"Sec. 5. Functions and powers of the Metro Manila Development
Authority.The MMDA shall:
(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of
medium and long-term plans and programs for the delivery of
metro-wide services, land use and physical development within
Metropolitan Manila, consistent with national development
objectives and priorities;
(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of
medium-term investment programs for metro-wide services
which shall indicate sources and uses of funds for priority
programs and projects, and which shall include the packaging of
projects and presentation to funding institutions; Esmsc
(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and
projects for the delivery of specific services under its
jurisdiction, subject to the approval of the Council. For this
purpose, MMDA can create appropriate project management
offices;
(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans,
programs and projects in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks
and adopt solutions to problems of implementation;
(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in
Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the
implementation of all programs and projects concerning
traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement,
engineering and education. Upon request, it shall be
extended assistance and cooperation, including but not
limited to, assignment of personnel, by all other government
agencies and offices concerned;
(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix,
impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of
violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or
non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke
drivers licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and
regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the
contrary notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority
shall impose all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila,
through its traffic operation center, and may deputize
members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government
units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-
governmental organizations to whom may be delegated
certain authority, subject to such conditions and
requirements as the Authority may impose; and
(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the
objectives of the MMDA, including the undertaking of delivery
of basic services to the local government units, when deemed
necessary subject to prior coordination with and consent of the
local government unit concerned." Jurismis
The implementation of the MMDAs plans, programs and projects is undertaken
by the local government units, national government agencies, accredited peoples
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector as well as
by the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into
contracts, memoranda of agreement and other cooperative arrangements with
these bodies for the delivery of the required services within Metro Manila.[28]
The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is
composed of the mayors of the component 12 cities and 5 municipalities, the
president of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors League and the president of the
Metro Manila Councilors League.[29] The Council is headed by a Chairman who is
appointed by the President and vested with the rank of cabinet member. As the
policy-making body of the MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide
plans, programs and projects, and issues the necessary rules and regulations for
the implementation of said plans; it approves the annual budget of the MMDA
and promulgates the rules and regulations for the delivery of basic services,
collection of service and regulatory fees, fines and penalties. These functions
are particularly enumerated as follows: LEX
"Sec. 6. Functions of the Metro Manila Council. -
(a) The Council shall be the policy-making body of the MMDA;
(b) It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects
and issue rules and regulations deemed necessary by the MMDA
to carry out the purposes of this Act;
(c) It may increase the rate of allowances and per diems of the
members of the Council to be effective during the term of the
succeeding Council. It shall fix the compensation of the
officers and personnel of the MMDA, and approve the annual
 budget thereof for submission to the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM);
(d) It shall promulgate rules and regulations and set policies and
standards for metro-wide application governing the delivery of
basic services, prescribe and collect service and regulatory
fees, and impose and collect fines and penalties." Jj sc
Clearly, the scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven
(7) basic services. One of these is transport and traffic management which
includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to
rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the
use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods.
It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system of road
regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic
engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of
a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this
service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning
traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic
management programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a
single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic
violations. Ca-lrsc
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There
is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated
any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units,
there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to
"enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the
charter itself, a "development authority."[30] It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and
the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in
the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and
these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:
"Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority. -- x x x.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and
coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory
and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide
services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the
autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local
matters."[31]
Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate
Appellate Court[32] where we upheld a zoning ordinance issued by the Metro
Manila Commission (MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of
police power. The first Sangalang decision was on the merits of the
petition,[33] while the second decision denied reconsideration of the first case
and in addition discussed the case of Yabut v. Court of Appeals.[34]
Sangalang v. IAC involved five (5) consolidated petitions filed by respondent
BAVA and three residents of Bel-Air Village against other residents of the
Village and the Ayala Corporation, formerly the Makati Development Corporation,
as the developer of the subdivision. The petitioners sought to enforce certain
restrictive easements in the deeds of sale over their respective lots in the
subdivision. These were the prohibition on the setting up of commercial and
advertising signs on the lots, and the condition that the lots be used only for
residential purposes. Petitioners alleged that respondents, who were residents
along Jupiter Street of the subdivision, converted their residences into
commercial establishments in violation of the "deed restrictions," and that
respondent Ayala Corporation ushered in the full commercialization" of Jupiter
Street by tearing down the perimeter wall that separated the commercial from
the residential section of the village.[35]
The petitions were dismissed based on Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal Council
of Makati and Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC).
Municipal Ordinance No. 81 classified Bel-Air Village as a Class A Residential
Zone, with its boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter
Street. The Municipal Ordinance was adopted by the MMC under the
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital Region and
promulgated as MMC Ordinance No. 81-01. Bel-Air Village was indicated therein
as bounded by Jupiter Street and the block adjacent thereto was classified as a
High Intensity Commercial Zone.[36]
We ruled that since both Ordinances recognized Jupiter Street as the boundary
between Bel-Air Village and the commercial district, Jupiter Street was not for
the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. We also held that the perimeter wall
on said street was constructed not to separate the residential from the
commercial blocks but simply for security reasons, hence, in tearing down said
wall, Ayala Corporation did not violate the "deed restrictions" in the deeds of
sale. Scc-alr
We upheld the ordinances, specifically MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, as a legitimate
exercise of police power.[37] The power of the MMC and the Makati Municipal
Council to enact zoning ordinances for the general welfare prevailed over the
"deed restrictions".
In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision, we held that the opening of Jupiter
Street was warranted by the demands of the common good in terms of "traffic
decongestion and public convenience." Jupiter was opened by the Municipal Mayor
to alleviate traffic congestion along the public streets adjacent to the
Village.[38] The same reason was given for the opening to public vehicular traffic
of Orbit Street, a road inside the same village. The destruction of the gate in
Orbit Street was also made under the police power of the municipal government.
The gate, like the perimeter wall along Jupiter, was a public nuisance because it
hindered and impaired the use of property, hence, its summary abatement by the
mayor was proper and legal.[39]
Contrary to petitioners claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the
case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal
council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the proposed
opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent
by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not
cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or
by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street.
Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize
the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of
persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts
that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. By no stretch of
the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an express or implied grant
of ordinance-making power, much less police power. Misjuris
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC
in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an
examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the
MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not
bestowed on the present MMDA. Jjlex
Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
824. It comprised the Greater Manila Area composed of the contiguous four (4)
cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan, and the thirteen (13) municipalities
of Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las Pinas, Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros,
Paranaque, Marikina, Muntinlupa and Taguig in the province of Rizal, and
Valenzuela in the province of Bulacan.[40] Metropolitan Manila was created as a
response to the finding that the rapid growth of population and the increase of
social and economic requirements in these areas demand a call for simultaneous
and unified development; that the public services rendered by the respective
local governments could be administered more efficiently and economically if
integrated under a system of central planning; and this coordination, "especially
in the maintenance of peace and order and the eradication of social and economic
ills that fanned the flames of rebellion and discontent [were] part of reform
measures under Martial Law essential to the safety and security of the
State."[41]
Metropolitan Manila was established as a "public corporation" with the
following powers: Calrs-pped
"Section 1. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila.There is hereby
created a public corporation, to be known as the Metropolitan
Manila, vested with powers and attributes of a corporation
including the power to make contracts, sue and be sued,
acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold, transfer and dispose
of property and such other powers as are necessary to
carry out its purposes. The Corporation shall be administered
by a Commission created under this Decree."[42]
The administration of Metropolitan Manila was placed under the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC) vested with the following powers:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions of the Commission. - The
Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
1. To act as a central government to establish and
administer programs and provide services common to the
area;
2. To levy and collect taxes and special assessments, borrow
and expend money and issue bonds, revenue certificates, and
other obligations of indebtedness. Existing tax measures
should, however, continue to be operative until otherwise
modified or repealed by the Commission;
3. To charge and collect fees for the use of public service
facilities;
4. To appropriate money for the operation of the metropolitan
government and review appropriations for the city and municipal
units within its jurisdiction with authority to disapprove the
same if found to be not in accordance with the established
policies of the Commission, without prejudice to any contractual
obligation of the local government units involved existing at the
time of approval of this Decree;
5. To review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances,
resolutions and acts of cities and municipalities within
Metropolitan Manila;
6. To enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and to fix
penalties for any violation thereof which shall not exceed a
fine of P10,000.00 or imprisonment of six years or both
such fine and imprisonment for a single offense;
7. To perform general administrative, executive and policy-
making functions;
8. To establish a fire control operation center, which shall
direct the fire services of the city and municipal governments
in the metropolitan area;
9. To establish a garbage disposal operation center, which shall
direct garbage collection and disposal in the metropolitan area;
10. To establish and operate a transport and traffic center,
which shall direct traffic activities; Jjjuris
11. To coordinate and monitor governmental and private
activities pertaining to essential services such as
transportation, flood control and drainage, water supply and
sewerage, social, health and environmental services, housing,
park development, and others;
12. To insure and monitor the undertaking of a comprehensive
social, economic and physical planning and development of the
area;
13. To study the feasibility of increasing barangay participation
in the affairs of their respective local governments and to
propose to the President of the Philippines definite programs
and policies for implementation;
14. To submit within thirty (30) days after the close of each
fiscal year an annual report to the President of the Philippines
and to submit a periodic report whenever deemed necessary;
and
15. To perform such other tasks as may be assigned or directed
by the President of the Philippines." Sc jj
The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of
establishing and administering programs providing services common to the area.
As a "central government" it had the power to levy and collect taxes and special
assessments, the power to charge and collect fees; the power to appropriate
money for its operation, and at the same time, review appropriations for the city
and municipal units within its jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power to enact or
approve ordinances, resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinances
and resolutions. It also had the power to review, amend, revise or repeal all
ordinances, resolutions and acts of any of the four (4) cities and thirteen (13)
municipalities comprising Metro Manila.
P. D. No. 824 further provided:
"Sec. 9. Until otherwise provided, the governments of the four
cities and thirteen municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila
shall continue to exist in their present form except as may be
inconsistent with this Decree. The members of the existing
city and municipal councils in Metropolitan Manila shall, upon
promulgation of this Decree, and until December 31, 1975,
become members of the Sangguniang Bayan which is hereby
created for every city and municipality of Metropolitan
Manila.
In addition, the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as
many barangay captains as may be determined and chosen by
the Commission, and such number of representatives from
other sectors of the society as may be appointed by the
President upon recommendation of the Commission.
 x x x.
The Sangguniang Bayan may recommend to the Commission
ordinances, resolutions or such measures as it may adopt;
Provided, that no such ordinance, resolution or measure shall
become effective, until after its approval by the
Commission; and Provided further, that the power to impose
taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money and
the power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal
sanctions shall be vested exclusively in the Commission."
The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the
Sangguniang Bayan. This was composed of the members of the component city
and municipal councils, barangay captains chosen by the MMC and sectoral
representatives appointed by the President. The Sangguniang Bayan had the
power to recommend to the MMC the adoption of ordinances, resolutions or
measures. It was the MMC itself, however, that possessed legislative
powers. All ordinances, resolutions and measures recommended by
the Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMCs approval. Moreover, the
power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money, and the
power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions were vested
exclusively in the MMC. Sce-dp
Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMC which
fully possessed legislative and police powers. Whatever legislative powers the
component cities and municipalities had were all subject to review and
approval by the MMC.
After President Corazon Aquino assumed power, there was a clamor to restore
the autonomy of the local government units in Metro Manila. Hence, Sections 1
and 2 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provided: Sj cj
"Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as herein provided.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy
local autonomy."
The Constitution, however, recognized the necessity of creating metropolitan
regions not only in the existing National Capital Region but also in potential
equivalents in the Visayas and Mindanao.[43] Section 11 of the same Article X thus
provided:
"Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special
metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set
forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and
municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be
entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies.
The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby
be created shall be limited to basic services requiring
coordination."
The Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create
"special metropolitan political subdivisions" which shall be subject to approval by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected; the jurisdiction of this subdivision shall be limited to basic services
requiring coordination; and the cities and municipalities comprising this
subdivision shall retain their basic autonomy and their own local executive and
legislative assemblies.[44] Pending enactment of this law, the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution gave the President of the Philippines the power to
constitute the Metropolitan Authority, viz:
"Section 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President
may constitute the Metropolitan Authority to be composed of
the heads of all local government units comprising the
Metropolitan Manila area."[45]
In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and
constituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The powers and
functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA.[46] It ought to be
stressed, however, that not all powers and functions of the MMC were
passed to the MMA. The MMAs power was limited to the "delivery of basic
urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila."[47] The MMAs
governing body, the Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the
mayors of the component cities and municipalities, was merely given the
power of: (1) formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services
requiring coordination and consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions
and other issuances, approval of a code of basic services and the exercise
of its rule-making power.[48]
Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily
responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions.
The MMAs jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving
basic services that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative
power. Its power was merely to provide the local government units technical
assistance in the preparation of local development plans. Any semblance of
legislative power it had was confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed by the
local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments and
with the comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila," and to "advise the
local governments accordingly."[49]
When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special
development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special
development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the
autonomy of the affected local government units." The character of the
MMDA was clearly defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter.
R. A. No. 7924 originated as House Bill No. 14170/ 11116 and was introduced by
several legislators led by Dante Tinga, Roilo Golez and Feliciano Belmonte. It was
presented to the House of Representatives by the Committee on Local
Governments chaired by Congressman Ciriaco R. Alfelor. The bill was a product of
Committee consultations with the local government units in the National Capital
Region (NCR), with former Chairmen of the MMC and MMA,[50]and career
officials of said agencies. When the bill was first taken up by the Committee on
Local Governments, the following debate took place:
"THE CHAIRMAN [Hon. Ciriaco Alfelor]: Okay, Let me explain.
This has been debated a long time ago, you know. Its a special
we can create a special metropolitan political
subdivision. Supreme
Actually, there are only six (6) political subdivisions provided
for in the Constitution: barangay, municipality, city, province,
and we have the Autonomous Region of Mindanao and we have
the Cordillera. So we have 6. Now.
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman. In the case
of the Autonomous Region, that is also specifically mandated by
the Constitution.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thats correct. But it is considered to be a
political subdivision. What is the meaning of a political
subdivision? Meaning to say, that it has its own government,
it has its own political personality, it has the power to tax,
and all governmental powers: police power and everything.
All right. Authority is different; because it does not have
its own government. It is only a council, it is an organization
of political subdivision, powers, no, which is not imbued with
any political power. Esmmis
If you go over Section 6, where the powers and functions of
the Metro Manila Development Authority, it is purely
coordinative. And it provides here that the council is policy-
making. All right.
Under the Constitution is a Metropolitan Authority with
coordinative power. Meaning to say, it coordinates all of the
different basic services which have to be delivered to the
constituency. All right.
There is now a problem. Each local government unit is given its respective as a
political subdivision. Kalookan has its powers, as provided for and protected and
guaranteed by the Constitution. All right, the exercise. However, in the exercise
of that power, it might be deleterious and disadvantageous to other local
government units. So, we are forming an authority where all of these will be
members and then set up a policy in order that the basic services can be
effectively coordinated. All right. justice
Of course, we cannot deny that the MMDA has to survive.
We have to provide some funds, resources. But it does not
possess any political power. We do not elect the Governor.
We do not have the power to tax. As a matter of fact, I was
trying to intimate to the author that it must have the power to
sue and be sued because it coordinates. All right. It coordinates
practically all these basic services so that the flow and the
distribution of the basic services will be continuous. Like
traffic, we cannot deny that. Its before our eyes. Sewerage,
flood control, water system, peace and order, we cannot deny
these. Its right on our face. We have to look for a solution.
What would be the right solution? All right, we envision that
there should be a coordinating agency and it is called an
authority. All right, if you do not want to call it an authority, its
alright. We may call it a council or maybe a management agency.
x x x."[51]
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated
to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate
administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs
functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations
for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. This was
explicitly stated in the last Committee deliberations prior to the bills
presentation to Congress. Thus: Ed-p
"THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah, but we have to go over the suggested
revision. I think this was already approved before, but it was
reconsidered in view of the proposals, set-up, to make the
MMDA stronger. Okay, so if there is no objection to paragraph
"f" And then next is paragraph "b," under Section 6. "It shall
approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue
ordinances or resolutions deemed necessary by the MMDA to
carry out the purposes of this Act." Do you have the
powers? Does the MMDA because that takes the form of a
local government unit, a political subdivision.
HON. [Feliciano] BELMONTE: Yes, I believe so, your Honor.
When we say that it has the policies, its very clear that those
policies must be followed. Otherwise, whats the use of
empowering it to come out with policies. Now, the policies may
be in the form of a resolution or it may be in the form of a
ordinance. The term "ordinance" in this case really gives it more
teeth, your honor. Otherwise, we are going to see a situation
where you have the power to adopt the policy but you cannot
really make it stick as in the case now, and I think here is
Chairman Bunye. I think he will agree that that is the case now.
Youve got the power to set a policy, the body wants to follow
your policy, then we say lets call it an ordinance and see if they
will not follow it.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thats very nice. I like that. However, there
is a constitutional impediment. You are making this MMDA a
political subdivision. The creation of the MMDA would be
subject to a plebiscite. That is what Im trying to avoid. Ive
been trying to avoid this kind of predicament. Under the
Constitution it states: if it is a political subdivision, once it
is created it has to be subject to a plebiscite. Im trying to
make this as administrative. Thats why we place the
Chairman as a cabinet rank.
HON. BELMONTE: All right, Mr. Chairman, okay, what you are
saying there is .
THE CHAIRMAN: In setting up ordinances, it is a political
exercise. Believe me.
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: Mr. Chairman, it can be changed into
issuances of rules and regulations. That would be it shall
also be enforced. Jksm
HON. BELMONTE: Okay, I will .
HON. LOPEZ: And you can also say that violation of such
rule, you impose a sanction. But you know, ordinance has a
different legal connotation.
HON. BELMONTE: All right. I defer to that opinion, your
Honor. sc
THE CHAIRMAN: So instead of ordinances, say rules and
regulations.
HON. BELMONTE: Or resolutions. Actually, they are
actually considering resolutions now.
THE CHAIRMAN: Rules and resolutions.
HON. BELMONTE: Rules, regulations and resolutions."[52]
The draft of H. B. No. 14170/ 11116 was presented by the Committee to the
House of Representatives. The explanatory note to the bill stated that the
proposed MMDA is a "development authority" which is a "national agency, not a
political government unit."[53] The explanatory note was adopted as the
sponsorship speech of the Committee on Local Governments. No interpellations
or debates were made on the floor and no amendments introduced. The bill was
approved on second reading on the same day it was presented.[54]
When the bill was forwarded to the Senate, several amendments were made.
These amendments, however, did not affect the nature of the MMDA as
originally conceived in the House of Representatives.[55]
It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a
public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special
metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the
Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision"
requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.[56] R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the
inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an
official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and
privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such
other duties as may be assigned to him by the President,[57] whereas in local
government units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This
emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA. Newmiso
Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the
MMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to
enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government
units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative
power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of
Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and
the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling
on the other issues as they are unnecessary. Esmso
We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDAs noble efforts to
solve the chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and
traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling boulevards
and avenues are now crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with
motorists and pedestrians. Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our
peoples productivity and the efficient delivery of goods and services in the
country. The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan
transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are
limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private
street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the
general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law. Sdjad
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549 are affirmed. Sppedsc
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005]
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs. DANTE O. GARIN, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
At issue in this case is the validity of Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924
creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), which
authorizes it to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the
enforcement of traffic laws and regulations.
The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a
lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers license
confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on 05
August 1995. The following statements were printed on the TVR:
YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO REPORT TO THE MMDA TRAFFIC
OPERATIONS CENTER PORT AREA MANILA AFTER 48 HOURS FROM DATE
OF APPREHENSION FOR DISPOSITION/APPROPRIATE ACTION THEREON.
CRIMINAL CASE SHALL BE FILED FOR FAILURE TO REDEEM LICENSE
AFTER 30 DAYS.
VALID AS TEMPORARY DRIVERS LICENSE FOR SEVEN DAYS FROM DATE OF
APPREHENSION.[1]
Shortly before the expiration of the TVRs validity, the respondent
addressed a letter[2] to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the
return of his drivers license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed
in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint[3] with
application for preliminary injunction in Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Paraaque, on 12 September 1995, contending that, in the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the
MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-
empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby
violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The respondent further
contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose
unspecified and therefore unlimited - fines and other penalties on erring
motorists.
 In support of his application for a writ of preliminary injunction, Garin alleged
that he suffered and continues to suffer great and irreparable damage because
of the deprivation of his license and that, absent any implementing rules from the
Metro Manila Council, the TVR and the confiscation of his license have no legal
basis.
For its part, the MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
pointed out that the powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are
limited to the fixing, collection and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic
violations, which powers are legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary
retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty imposed. It further
argued that the doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude admixture of
the three powers of government in administrative agencies.[4]
The MMDA also refuted Garins allegation that the Metro Manila Council, the
governing board and policy making body of the petitioner, has as yet to formulate
the implementing rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 and directed the courts
attention to MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 dated 15 April 1995.
Respondent Garin, however, questioned the validity of MMDA Memorandum
Circular No. TT-95-001, as he claims that it was passed by the Metro Manila
Council in the absence of a quorum.
Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort issued a temporary restraining order on 26
September 1995, extending the validity of the TVR as a temporary drivers license
for twenty more days. A preliminary mandatory injunction was granted on 23
October 1995, and the MMDA was directed to return the respondents drivers
license.
On 14 August 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision[5] in favor
of the herein respondent and held that:
a. There was indeed no quorum in that First Regular Meeting of the MMDA
Council held on March 23, 1995, hence MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-
001, authorizing confiscation of drivers licenses upon issuance of a TVR, is
void ab initio.
b. The summary confiscation of a drivers license without first giving the driver
an opportunity to be heard; depriving him of a property right (drivers license)
without DUE PROCESS; not filling (sic) in Court the complaint of supposed
traffic infraction, cannot be justified by any legislation (and is) hence
unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the temporary writ of preliminary injunction is hereby made
permanent; th(e) MMDA is directed to return to plaintiff his drivers license;
th(e) MMDA is likewise ordered to desist from confiscating drivers license
without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate
proceeding.
In filing this petition,[6] the MMDA reiterates and reinforces its argument in
the court below and contends that a license to operate a motor vehicle is neither
a contract nor a property right, but is a privilege subject to reasonable regulation
under the police power in the interest of the public safety and welfare. The
petitioner further argues that revocation or suspension of this privilege does not
constitute a taking without due process as long as the licensee is given the right
to appeal the revocation.
To buttress its argument that a licensee may indeed appeal the taking and
the judiciary retains the power to determine the validity of the confiscation,
suspension or revocation of the license, the petitioner points out that under the
terms of the confiscation, the licensee has three options:
1. To voluntarily pay the imposable fine,
2. To protest the apprehension by filing a protest with the MMDA
Adjudication Committee, or
3. To request the referral of the TVR to the Public Prosecutors Office.
The MMDA likewise argues that Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 was
validly passed in the presence of a quorum, and that the lower courts finding that
it had not was based on a misapprehension of facts, which the petitioner would
have us review. Moreover, it asserts that though the circular is the basis for the
issuance of TVRs, the basis for the summary confiscation of licenses is Sec. 5(f)
of Rep. Act No. 7924 itself, and that such power is self-executory and does not
require the issuance of any implementing regulation or circular.
Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani
Fernando, implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the
procedures for the use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under
the circular, erring motorists are issued an MTT, which can be paid at any
Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers licenses as
a matter of course in cases of traffic violations. All motorists with unredeemed
TVRs were given seven days from the date of implementation of the new system
to pay their fines and redeem their license or vehicle plates.[7]
It would seem, therefore, that insofar as the absence of a prima facie case
to enjoin the petitioner from confiscating drivers licenses is concerned, recent
events have overtaken the Courts need to decide this case, which has been
rendered moot and academic by the implementation of Memorandum Circular No.
04, Series of 2004.
 The petitioner, however, is not precluded from re-implementing Memorandum
Circular No. TT-95-001, or any other scheme, for that matter, that would entail
confiscating drivers licenses. For the proper implementation, therefore, of the
petitioners future programs, this Court deems it appropriate to make the following
observations:
1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold
in the exercise of its police power.
The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle
is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the state, which may be
suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power, in the
interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to the procedural due process
requirements. This is consistent with our rulings in Pedro v. Provincial Board of
Rizal[8] on the license to operate a cockpit, Tan v. Director of Forestry[9]and Oposa
v. Factoran[10] on timber licensing agreements, and Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v.
Municipality of Surigao[11] on a legislative franchise to operate an electric plant.
Petitioner cites a long list of American cases to prove this point, such
as State ex. Rel. Sullivan,[12] which states in part that, the legislative power to
regulate travel over the highways and thoroughfares of the state for the general
welfare is extensive. It may be exercised in any reasonable manner to conserve
the safety of travelers and pedestrians. Since motor vehicles are instruments of
potential danger, their registration and the licensing of their operators have been
required almost from their first appearance. The right to operate them in public
places is not a natural and unrestrained right, but a privilege subject to reasonable
regulation, under the police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare.
The power to license imports further power to withhold or to revoke such license
upon noncompliance with prescribed conditions.
Likewise, the petitioner quotes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Commonwealth v. Funk,[13] to the effect that: Automobiles are vehicles of great
speed and power. The use of them constitutes an element of danger to persons
and property upon the highways. Carefully operated, an automobile is still a
dangerous instrumentality, but, when operated by careless or incompetent
persons, it becomes an engine of destruction. The Legislature, in the exercise of
the police power of the commonwealth, not only may, but must, prescribe how and
by whom motor vehicles shall be operated on the highways. One of the primary
purposes of a system of general regulation of the subject matter, as here by the
Vehicle Code, is to insure the competency of the operator of motor vehicles. Such
a general law is manifestly directed to the promotion of public safety and is well
within the police power.
The common thread running through the cited cases is that it is the
legislature, in the exercise of police power, which has the power and responsibility
to regulate how and by whom motor vehicles may be operated on the state
highways.
2. The MMDA is not vested with police power.
In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association,
Inc.,[14] we categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA
with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are
administrative in nature.
The said case also involved the herein petitioner MMDA which claimed that
it had the authority to open a subdivision street owned by the Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc. to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with
police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From this premise,
the MMDA argued that there was no need for the City of Makati to enact an
ordinance opening Neptune Street to the public.
Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the MMDA, we
concluded that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation
endowed with legislative power, and, unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila
Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.
Thus, in the absence of an ordinance from the City of Makati, its own order to
open the street was invalid.
We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies to the case at
bar: police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by
the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good
and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.
Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be
exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The
National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or
local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such
legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government
Code of 1991.[15] A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state
which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs.[16] Local
government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which
exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government
units. With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was
declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the
administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under
"a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus:
. . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring,
setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no
syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any
legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government
units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or
its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds
for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is,
as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency
created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its
functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the
charter itself, viz:
Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- -x x x.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative
functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory
authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro
Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local
government units concerning purely local matters.
. This is also consistent with the fundamental rule of statutory construction
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to
the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate
administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs
functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations
for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. [17] (footnotes
omitted, emphasis supplied)
Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the
lower court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers licenses without need of any other legislative
enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power.
3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and
regulations.
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the Functions and Powers of the
Metro Manila Development Authority. The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states
that the petitioner shall install and administer a single ticketing system, fix,
impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules
and regulations, whether moving or nonmoving in nature, and confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and
regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136[18] and P.D. No. 1605[19] to the
contrary notwithstanding, and that (f)or this purpose, the Authority shall enforce
all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation
center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local
government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental
organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such
conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose.
Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the
legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated (the
City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not precluded and in fact is duty-
bound to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the exercise of its
mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and
implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services
and traffic education programs.[20]
This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a development
authority created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with
the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector, which may enforce, but not enact,
ordinances.
that a statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than
defeat it,[21] and is supported by the criteria in cases of this nature that all
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute.[22]
A last word. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-wide
impact that transcend local political boundaries or would entail huge expenditures
if provided by the individual LGUs, especially with regard to transport and traffic
management,[23] and we are aware of the valiant efforts of the petitioner to
untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled roads of Metro Manila. But these
laudable intentions are limited by the MMDAs enabling law, which we can but
interpret, and petitioner must be reminded that its efforts in this respect must
be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate
source. Antecedents

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and
SO ORDERED. Communications, entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement)
Republic of the Philippines with Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No.
Supreme Court 6957 (Build, Operate and Transfer Law), under which MRTC undertook to build
Manila MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years, upon the
expiration of which the ownership would transfer to the Government.

FIRST DIVISION The BLT agreement stipulated, among others, that MRTC could build and
develop commercial premises in the MRT3 structures, or obtain advertising income
METROPOLITAN MANILA G.R. No. 179554 therefrom, viz:
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
Petitioner, Present: 16.1. Details of Development Rights. DOTC hereby
PUNO, C.J., Chairper confirms and awards to Metro Rail the rights to (a) develop
son, commercial premises in the Depot and the air space above the
-versus- CARPIO MORALES, Stations, which shall be allowed to such height as is legally and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, technically feasible, (b) lease or sub-lease interests or assign
BERSAMIN, and such interests in the Depot and such air space and (c) obtain any
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. advertising income from the Depot and such air space and LRTS
TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT Phase I.
ADVERTISING, VENDING Promulgated:
AND PROMOTIONS, INC., LRTS Phase I means the rail transport system comprising
Respondent. December 16, 2009 about 16.9 line kilometers extending from Taft Avenue, Pasay
x------------------------------------------------------------- City, to North Avenue, Quezon City, occupying a strip in the
----------------------------x center of EDSA approximately 10.5 meters wide (approximately
12 meters wide at or around the Boni Avenue, Santolan and
Buendia Stations), plus about 0.1 to 0.2 line kilometers extending
R E S O L U T I O N from the North Avenue Station to the Depot, together with the
Stations, 73 Light Rail Vehicles and all ancillary plant, equipment
BERSAMIN, J.: and facilities, as more particularly detailed in the Specifications.

This case concerns whether the Metropolitan Manila Development 16.2. Assignment of Rights. During the Development
Authority (MMDA) could unilaterally dismantle the billboards, signages and other Rights Period, Metro Rail shall be entitled to assign all or any of
advertizing media in the structures of the Metro Rail Transit 3 (MRT3) installed its rights, titles and interests in the Development Rights to bona
by respondent advertising company by virtue of its existing contract with the fide real estate developers. In this connection, Metro Rail may
owner of the MRT3. enter into such development, lease, sub-lease or other
agreements or contracts relating to the Depot and the air space
The trial and appellate courts ruled that MMDA did not have the authority to above the Stations (the space not needed for all or any portion
dismantle. MMDA is now before the Court to assail such adverse ruling. of the operation of the LRTS) for all or any portion of the
Development Rights Period.

In 1998, respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions,
Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a contract for advertising services with MRTC.
Trackworks thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and other
advertizing media in the different parts of the MRT3. In 2001, however, MMDA
requested Trackworks to dismantle the billboards, signages and other advertizing
media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, whereby MMDA prohibited the
posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters,
streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and
open space. After Trackworks refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded
to dismantle the formers billboards and similar forms of advertisement.
On March 1, 2002, Trackworks filed against MMDA in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Pasig City an injunction suit (with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order [TRO] and preliminary injunction), docketed as Civil
Case No. 68864.
On March 6, 2002, the RTC (Branch 155) issued a TRO, enjoining MMDA
from dismantling or destroying Trackworks billboards, signages and other
advertizing media. On March 25, 2002, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary
injunction for the same purpose.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration to challenge the RTCs
issuances, MMDA brought a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 70932, but the CA denied the
petition and affirmed the RTC on August 31, 2004. The CA ultimately denied
MMDAs motion for reconsideration through its resolution issued on March 14,
2005.
Thence, MMDA appealed to this Court (G.R. No. 167514), which denied
MMDAs petition for review on October 25, 2005.[1]
Ruling of the RTC
In the meanwhile, on October 10, 2005, the RTC (Branch 155) rendered
its decision permanently enjoining MMDA from dismantling, removing or destroying
the billboards, signages and other advertizing media installed by Trackworks on
the interior and exterior structures of the MRT3.[2]
Ruling of the CA
MMDA appealed the RTCs decision to the CA.
On April 30, 2007, the CA denied the MMDAs appeal,[3] holding that
Trackworks right to install billboards, signages and other advertizing media on the
interior and exterior structures of the MRT3 must be protected by a writ of
permanent injunction; and that MMDA had no power to dismantle, remove or
destroy Trackworks billboards, signages and other advertizing media.[4]
MMDA moved for reconsideration, but the CA resolution denied
the motion for reconsideration on September 3, 2007.[5]
Hence, this appeal by petition for review.
Issues
MMDA claims that its mandate under its charter[6] of formulating,
coordinating and monitoring of policies, standards, progress and projects for the
use of thoroughfares and the promotion of safe and convenientmovement of
persons and goods prompted its issuance of MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, which
reads in part:
h. ) It is unlawful for any person/s, private or public
corporations, advertising and promotions companies, movie
producers, professionals and service contractors to post, install,
display any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers,
professional service advertisements and other visual clutters in
any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees
parks and open space.
MMDA avers that the conversion of the center island of Epifanio Delos
Santos Avenue (EDSA) into the carriageway of the MRT3 line did not exempt the
EDSA center island from the coverage of the MMDA regulation;[7] that the
Governments grant of development rights to MRTC was not an abdication of its
right to regulate, and, therefore, the development of the MRT3 remained subject
to all existing and applicable national and local laws, ordinances, rules and
regulations;[8] that MMDA was merely implementing existing and applicable
laws;[9] that Trackworks advertising materials were placed indiscriminately and
without due regard to safety, and as such might be classified as obstructions and
distractions to the motorists traversing EDSA;[10] and that the interests of a few
should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose
safety and general welfare MMDA was mandated to protect.[11]
Trackworks maintains, on the other hand, that MMDAs petition was defective for
its failure to raise any genuine question of law; and that the CAs decision
dated April 30, 2007 was valid and correct.[12]
 Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other
advertizing media in the MRT3 from MRTCs authority under the BLT agreement
to develop commercial premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain advertising
income therefrom is no longer debatable. Under the BLT agreement, indeed, MRTC
owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which MRTC would transfer
ownership of the MRT3 to the Government.
Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the
time material to this case, and until this date, MRTCs entering into the contract
for advertising services with Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership by the
former. In fact, in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Trackworks Rail
Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc.,[13] this Court expressly
recognized Trackworks right to install the billboards, signages and other
advertising media pursuant to said contract. The latters right should, therefore,
be respected.
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling
of Trackworks billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had
no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and
other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by
Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc.,[14] Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron
Transportation Co., Inc.,[15] and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Garin,[16] the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDAs powers were limited to
the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and
administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power.[17]
Clarifying the real nature of MMDA, the Court held:
xxx The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a development
authority. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government
agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations
and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery
of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions
are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in
the charter itself, viz:
Sec.2. Creation of the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.- xxx.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and
coordinative functions, and in the process exercise
regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery
of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without
diminution of the autonomy of local government units
concerning purely local matters.[18]
The Court also agrees with the CAs ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-
009 and MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks
billboards, signages and other advertising media. The prohibition against posting,
installation and display of billboards, signages and other advertising media applied
only to public areas, but MRT3, being private property pursuant to the BLT
agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to
which the prohibition applied. Moreover, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did
not apply to Trackworks billboards, signages and other advertising media in MRT3,
because it did not specifically cover MRT3, and because it was issued a year prior
to the construction of MRT3 on the center island of EDSA. Clearly, MMC
Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 could not have included MRT3 in its prohibition.
MMDAs insistence that it was only implementing Presidential Decree No. 1096
(Building Code) and its implementing rules and regulations is not persuasive. The
power to enforce the provisions of the Building Codewas lodged in the Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), not in MMDA, considering the laws
following provision, thus:
Sec. 201. Responsibility for Administration and Enforcement.
The administration and enforcement of the provisions of this
Code including the imposition of penalties for administrative
violations thereof is hereby vested in the Secretary of Public
Works, Transportation and Communications, hereinafter
referred to as the Secretary.
There is also no evidence showing that MMDA had been delegated by DPWH to
implement the Building Code.
WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review, and affirm
the decision dated April 30, 2007 and the resolution dated September 3, 2007.
Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT G.R. Nos. 171947-48
AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES,DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND Present:
SPORTS,[1]DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH,DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE,DEPARTMENT OF PUBLICWORKS CORONA, C.J.,
AND HIGHWAYS,DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET CARPIO,
ANDMANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINECOAST GUARD, CARPIO MORALES,
PHILIPPINENATIONAL POLICE MARITIMEGROUP, VELASCO, JR.,
and DEPARTMENT OFTHE INTERIOR AND NACHURA,
LOCALGOVERNMENT, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
Petitioners, BRION,
PERALTA,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OFMANILA BAY, ABAD,
represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS, VILLARAMA, JR.,
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, PEREZ,
JR., DINAH MENDOZA, and
DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS SERENO, JJ.
QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA
LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA
QUITAIN, VENICE
SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA,
SARAH JOELLE LINTAG,
HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS,
FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and
JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA,
Respondents.

Promulgated:
February 15, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x Government Code of 1991, the DILG, in exercising the Presidents
R E S O L U T I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
On December 18, 2008, this Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48
ordering petitioners to clean up, rehabilitate and preserve Manila Bay in their
different capacities. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005
Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944
and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No.
1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of
subsequent developments or supervening events in the case. The
fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up,
rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain
its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water
Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34
[1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other
forms of contact recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as
the primary agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development, and proper use of the countrys
environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275,
designating the DENR as the primary government agency
responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR
is directed to fully implement its Operational Plan for the Manila
Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and
conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It
is ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned
government departments and agencies to ensure the successful
implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with
its indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local
power of general supervision and its duty to promulgate
guidelines in establishing waste management programs under Sec.
43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all
LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga,
and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments,
and private homes along the banks of the major river systems in
their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to
the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote,
Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros
Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the
Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De
Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that eventually
discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the
bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment
facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws,
ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these
LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments
and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a
reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and
human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros,
and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines
and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the MWSS is
directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary
adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal,
and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, the LWUA, through the local
water districts and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to
provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation
facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and
disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, the DA, through the
BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the marine life of
the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro
Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in
developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic
resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and
the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550,
in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD
979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed
to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to
prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and
other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from
vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of
programs and projects for flood control projects and drainage
services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG,
affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies,
shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and
other encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279,
and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan
Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-
Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways
and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal
implementor of programs and projects for flood control services
in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan,
Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG,
affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other
concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all
structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in
breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the
Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay
(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and
other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge
wastewater into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate,
and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within
a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters
within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the
discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills
and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the
apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against
violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003, Sec. 27
of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on
pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067
and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this
Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies
have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal
sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give
the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time
within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of
cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, Sec. 118 of RA
8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003, the DepEd shall integrate lessons
on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental
protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels
to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through
them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty
toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful
ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate
budget in the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding
years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration,
and preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line
with the countrys development objective to attain economic
growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation,
and revival of our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR,
DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG,
and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of
continuing mandamus, shall, from finality of this Decision, each
submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the
activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
 The government agencies did not file any motion for reconsideration and
the Decision became final in January 2009.
The case is now in the execution phase of the final and executory
December 18, 2008 Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to
receive and evaluate the quarterly progressive reports on the activities
undertaken by the agencies in accordance with said decision and to monitor the
execution phase.
In the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee
recommended that time frames be set for the agencies to perform their assigned
tasks. This may be viewed as an encroachment over the powers and functions of
the Executive Branch headed by the President of the Philippines.
This view is misplaced.
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise
of judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of
the Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court. None
of the agencies ever questioned the power of the Court to implement the
December 18, 2008 Decision nor has any of them raised the alleged encroachment
by the Court over executive functions.
While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of
plans of action, data or status reports, these directives are but part and parcel of
the execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Section
47 of Rule 39 reads:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.The
effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of
the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows:
xxxx
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties of
their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears
upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually
and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged but also those matters actually and necessarily included
therein or necessary thereto. Certainly, any activity that is needed to fully
implement a final judgment is necessarily encompassed by said judgment.
Moreover, the submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and
8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases:
Sec. 7. Judgment.If warranted, the court shall grant
the privilege of the writ of continuing mandamus requiring
respondent to perform an act or series of acts until the judgment
is fully satisfied and to grant such other reliefs as may be
warranted resulting from the wrongful or illegal acts of the
respondent. The court shall require the respondent to submit
periodic reports detailing the progress and execution of the
judgment, and the court may, by itself or through a
commissioner or the appropriate government agency, evaluate
and monitor compliance. The petitioner may submit its comments
or observations on the execution of the judgment.
Sec. 8. Return of the writ.The periodic reports submitted by the
respondent detailing compliance with the judgment shall be
contained in partial returns of the writ. Upon full satisfaction of
the judgment, a final return of the writ shall be made to the
court by the respondent. If the court finds that the judgment
has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall
be entered in the court docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus
issued in MMDA means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance
with the Courts orders, the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until
full execution of the judgment.
There being no encroachment over executive functions to speak of, We shall now
proceed to the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee.
Several problems were encountered by the Manila Bay Advisory Committee.[2] An
evaluation of the quarterly progressive reports has shown that (1) there are
voluminous quarterly progressive reports that are being submitted; (2) petitioner-
agencies do not have a uniform manner of reporting their cleanup, rehabilitation
and preservation activities; (3) as yet no definite deadlines have been set by
petitioner DENR as to petitioner-agencies timeframe for their respective duties;
(4) as of June 2010 there has been a change in leadership in both the national and
local levels; and (5) some agencies have encountered difficulties in complying with
the Courts directives.
In order to implement the afore-quoted Decision, certain directives have to be
issued by the Court to address the said concerns.
Acting on the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee, the
Court hereby resolves to ORDER the following:
(1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as
lead agency in the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004, shall submit to the Court
on or before June 30, 2011 the updated Operational Plan for the Manila Bay
Coastal Strategy.
The DENR is ordered to submit summarized data on the overall quality
of Manila Bay waters for all four quarters of 2010 on or before June 30, 2011.
The DENR is further ordered to submit the names and addresses of
persons and companies in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga
and Bataan that generate toxic and hazardous waste on or before September 30,
2011.
(2) On or before June 30, 2011, the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) shall order the Mayors of all cities in Metro Manila; the
Governors of Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan; and the Mayors
of all the cities and towns in said provinces to inspect all factories, commercial
establishments and private homes along the banks of the major river systemssuch
as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital
Region (Paranaque-Zapote, Las Pinas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-
Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay
(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, and the Laguna De Bayand other minor
rivers and waterways within their jurisdiction that eventually discharge water into
the Manila Bay and the lands abutting it, to determine if they have wastewater
treatment facilities and/or hygienic septic tanks, as prescribed by existing laws,
ordinances, rules and regulations. Said local government unit (LGU) officials are
given up to September 30, 2011 to finish the inspection of said establishments and
houses.
In case of non-compliance, the LGU officials shall take appropriate action
to ensure compliance by non-complying factories, commercial establishments and
private homes with said law, rules and regulations requiring the construction or
installment of wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks.
The aforementioned governors and mayors shall submit to the DILG on or
before December 31, 2011 their respective compliance reports which will contain
the names and addresses or offices of the owners of all the non-complying
factories, commercial establishments and private homes, copy furnished the
concerned environmental agency, be it the local DENR office or the Laguna Lake
Development Authority.
The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain
measures intended to ensure compliance of all non-complying factories, commercial
establishments, and private homes.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DILG and the mayors of all cities in
Metro Manila shall consider providing land for the wastewater facilities of the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) or its concessionaires
(Maynilad and Manila Water, Inc.) within their respective jurisdictions.
(3) The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the
list of areas in Metro Manila, Rizal and Cavite that do not have the necessary
wastewater treatment facilities. Within the same period, the concessionaires of
the MWSS shall submit their plans and projects for the construction of
wastewater treatment facilities in all the aforesaid areas and the completion
period for said facilities, which shall not go beyond 2037.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MWSS is further required to have its
two concessionaires submit a report on the amount collected as sewerage fees in
their respective areas of operation as of December 31, 2010.
(4) The Local Water Utilities Administration is ordered to submit on or
before September 30, 2011 its plan to provide, install, operate and maintain
sewerage and sanitation facilities in said cities and towns and the completion
period for said works, which shall be fully implemented by December 31, 2020.
(5) The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Fisheries
and Aquatic Resources, shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 a
report on areas in Manila Bay where marine life has to be restored or improved
and the assistance it has extended to the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite,
Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan in developing the fisheries and aquatic
resources in Manila Bay. The report shall contain monitoring data on the marine
life in said areas. Within the same period, it shall submit its five-year plan to
restore and improve the marine life in Manila Bay, its future activities to assist
the aforementioned LGUs for that purpose, and the completion period for said
undertakings.
The DA shall submit to the Court on or before September 30, 2011 the
baseline data as of September 30, 2010 on the pollution loading into
the Manila Bay system from agricultural and livestock sources.
(6) The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its quarterly
reports the list of violators it has apprehended and the status of their cases. The
PPA is further ordered to include in its report the names, make and capacity of
the ships that dock in PPA ports. The PPA shall submit to the Court on or before
June 30, 2011 the measures it intends to undertake to implement its compliance
with paragraph 7 of the dispositive portion of the MMDA Decision and the
completion dates of such measures.
The PPA should include in its report the activities of its concessionaire
that collects and disposes of the solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated
wastes, which shall state the names, make and capacity of the ships serviced by it
since August 2003 up to the present date, the dates the ships docked at PPA
ports, the number of days the ship was at sea with the corresponding number of
passengers and crew per trip, the volume of solid, liquid and other wastes collected
from said ships, the treatment undertaken and the disposal site for said wastes.
(7) The Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group shall submit on or
before June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities it
intends to undertake to apprehend the violators of Republic Act No. (RA) 8550 or
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 and other pertinent laws, ordinances and
regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful
prosecution of violators.
The Philippine Coast Guard shall likewise submit on or before June 30,
2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities they intend to
undertake to apprehend the violators of Presidential Decree No. 979 or
the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976 and RA 9993 or the Philippine Coast Guard
Law of 2009 and other pertinent laws and regulations to prevent marine pollution
in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful prosecution of violators.
(8) The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) shall submit
to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the informal
settlers in Metro Manila who, as of December 31, 2010, own and occupy houses,
structures, constructions and other encroachments established or built along the
Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the
Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways
and esteros, in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws. On or before June
30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit its plan for the removal of said informal settlers
and the demolition of the aforesaid houses, structures, constructions and
encroachments, as well as the completion dates for said activities, which shall be
fully implemented not later than December 31, 2015.
The MMDA is ordered to submit a status report, within thirty (30) days
from receipt of this Resolution, on the establishment of a sanitary landfill facility
for Metro Manila in compliance with the standards under RA 9003 or
the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit a report of the
location of open and controlled dumps in Metro Manila whose operations are illegal
after February 21, 2006,[3] pursuant to Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003, and its plan
for the closure of these open and controlled dumps to be accomplished not later
than December 31, 2012. Also, on or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary,
as Chairperson of the National Solid Waste Management Commission (NSWMC),
shall submit a report on the location of all open and controlled dumps in
Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as
NSWMC Chairperson, shall submit a report on whether or not the following
landfills strictly comply with Secs. 41 and 42 of RA 9003 on the establishment and
operation of sanitary landfills, to wit:
National Capital Region
1. Navotas SLF (PhilEco), Brgy. Tanza (New Site), Navotas City
2. Payatas Controlled Dumpsite, Barangay Payatas, Quezon City
Region III
3. Sitio Coral, Brgy. Matictic, Norzagaray, Bulacan
4. Sitio Tiakad, Brgy. San Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan
5. Brgy. Minuyan, San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan
6. Brgy. Mapalad, Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija
7. Sub-zone Kalangitan, Clark Capas, Tarlac Special
Economic Zone
Region IV-A
8. Kalayaan (Longos), Laguna
9. Brgy. Sto. Nino, San Pablo City, Laguna
10. Brgy. San Antonio (Pilotage SLF), San Pedro, Laguna
 11. Morong, Rizal waste management, environmental protection, environmental laws and the like that
12. Sitio Lukutan, Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez (Montalban), Rizal it has integrated into the school curricula in all levels for the school year 2011-
(ISWIMS) 2012.
13. Brgy. Pintong Bukawe, San Mateo, Rizal (SMSLFDC)
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA and the seventeen (17) LGUs in On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of action
Metro Manila are ordered to jointly submit a report on the average amount of to ensure compliance of all the schools under its supervision with respect to the
garbage collected monthly per district in all the cities in Metro Manila from integration of the aforementioned subjects in the school curricula which shall be
January 2009 up to December 31, 2010 vis--vis the average amount of garbage fully implemented by June 30, 2012.
disposed monthly in landfills and dumpsites. In its quarterly report for the last (11) All the agencies are required to submit their quarterly reports
quarter of 2010 and thereafter, MMDA shall report on the apprehensions for electronically using the forms below. The agencies may add other key performance
violations of the penal provisions of RA 9003, RA 9275 and other laws on pollution indicators that they have identified.
for the said period.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the LGUs in Rizal, Laguna, SO ORDERED.
Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan shall submit the names and addresses of
the informal settlers in their respective areas who, as of September 30, 2010,
own or occupy houses, structures, constructions, and other encroachments built Republic of the Philippines
along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) SUPREME COURT
River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna de Bay, and other rivers, connecting Manila
waterways and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay, in breach
of RA 7279 and other applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and EN BANC
the aforesaid LGUs shall jointly submit their plan for the removal of said informal
settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid structures, constructions and G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007
encroachments, as well as the completion dates for such activities which shall be THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI
implemented not later than December 31, 2012. FERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development
(9) The Department of Health (DOH) shall submit to the Court on or Authority, petitioners,
before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the owners of septic and sludge vs.
companies including those that do not have the proper facilities for the treatment VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., respondent.
and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.

x --------------------------------------------- x
The DOH shall implement rules and regulations on Environmental
Sanitation Clearances and shall require companies to procure a license to operate
G.R. No. 170657 August 15, 2007
from the DOH.
HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, the METROPOLITAN
MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman
The DOH and DENR-Environmental Management Bureau shall develop a
of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority,petitioners,
toxic and hazardous waste management system by June 30, 2011 which will
vs.
implement segregation of hospital/toxic/hazardous wastes and prevent mixing
MENCORP TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC., respondent.
with municipal solid waste.

On or before June 30, 2011, the DOH shall submit a plan of action to D E C I S I O N
ensure that the said companies have proper disposal facilities and the completion
dates of compliance. CARPIO MORALES, J.:
(10) The Department of Education (DepEd) shall submit to the Court on
or before May 31, 2011 a report on the specific subjects on pollution prevention, The following conditions in 1969, as observed by this Court:
 Vehicles have increased in number. Traffic congestion has moved from
bad to worse, from tolerable to critical. The number of people who use
the thoroughfares has multiplied x x x,1
have remained unchecked and have reverberated to this day. Traffic jams
continue to clog the streets of Metro Manila, bringing vehicles to a standstill at
main road arteries during rush hour traffic and sapping peoples energies and
patience in the process.
The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the traffic congestion
problem, questions the authority of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) to order the closure of provincial bus terminals along Epifanio
de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.
Specifically challenged are two Orders issued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 26 in Civil Case Nos. 03-105850
and 03-106224.
The first assailed Order of September 8, 2005,2 which resolved a motion for
reconsideration filed by herein respondents, declared Executive Order (E.O.) No.
179, hereafter referred to as the E.O., "unconstitutional as it constitutes an
unreasonable exercise of police power." The second assailed Order of November
23, 20053denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The following facts are not disputed:
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the E.O. on February 10, 2003,
"Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System," the
pertinent portions of which read:
WHEREAS, Metro Manila continues to be the center of employment
opportunities, trade and commerce of the Greater Metro Manila area;
WHEREAS, the traffic situation in Metro Manila has affected the
adjacent provinces of Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna, and Rizal, owing to the
continued movement of residents and industries to more affordable and
economically viable locations in these provinces;
WHEREAS, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) is
tasked to undertake measures to ease traffic congestion in Metro
Manila and ensure the convenient and efficient travel of commuters
within its jurisdiction;
WHEREAS, a primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has
been the numerous buses plying the streets that impedes [sic] the flow
of vehicles and commuters due to the inefficient connectivity of the
different transport modes;
WHEREAS, the MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by
eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass
transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass
transport terminal facilities that would integrate the existing transport
modes, namely the buses, the rail-based systems of the LRT, MRT and
PNR and to facilitate and ensure efficient travel through the improved
connectivity of the different transport modes;
WHEREAS, the national government must provide the necessary funding
requirements to immediately implement and render operational these
projects; and extent to MMDA such other assistance as may be
warranted to ensure their expeditious prosecution.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby
order:
Section 1. THE PROJECT. The project shall be identified as
GREATER MANILA TRANSPORT SYSTEM Project.
Section 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES. In accordance with the plan
proposed by MMDA, the project aims to develop four (4) interim
intermodal mass transport terminals to integrate the different
transport modes, as well as those that shall hereafter be developed, to
serve the commuting public in the northwest, north, east, south, and
southwest of Metro Manila. Initially, the project shall concentrate on
immediately establishing the mass transport terminals for the north and
south Metro Manila commuters as hereinafter described.
Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY. The Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA), is hereby designated as the
implementing Agency for the project. For this purpose, MMDA is
directed to undertake such infrastructure development work as may be
necessary and, thereafter, manage the project until it may be turned-
over to more appropriate agencies, if found suitable and convenient.
 Specifically, MMDA shall have the following functions and
responsibilities:
a) Cause the preparation of the Master Plan for the
projects, including the designs and costing;
b) Coordinate the use of the land and/or properties
needed for the project with the respective agencies
and/or entities owning them;
c) Supervise and manage the construction of the
necessary structures and facilities;
d) Execute such contracts or agreements as may be
necessary, with the appropriate government agencies,
entities, and/or private persons, in accordance with
existing laws and pertinent regulations, to facilitate
the implementation of the project;
e) Accept, manage and disburse such funds as may be
necessary for the construction and/or implementation
of the projects, in accordance with prevailing
accounting and audit polices and practice in
government.
f) Enlist the assistance of any national government
agency, office or department, including local
government units, government-owned or controlled
corporations, as may be necessary;
g) Assign or hire the necessary personnel for the above
purposes; and
h) Perform such other related functions as may be
necessary to enable it to accomplish the objectives and
purposes of this Executive Order.4 (Emphasis in the
original; underscoring supplied)
As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the primary cause of traffic
congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets and
the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes;5 and the MMDA
had "recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals
now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and
convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through
the provision of mass transport terminal facilities"6 which plan is referred to
under the E.O. as the Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project (the
Project).
The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project.
Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and
policymaking body of the MMDA, issued Resolution No. 03-07 series of
20037 expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing the imperative to
integrate the different transport modes via the establishment of common bus
parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the bus terminals
located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.8
On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial bus
operation,9 filed a petition for declaratory relief10 before the RTC11 of Manila.
In its petition which was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-105850, Viron alleged
that the MMDA, through Chairman Fernando, was "poised to issue a Circular,
Memorandum or Order closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial bus
terminals along EDSA and in the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of
traffic regulation."12 This impending move, it stressed, would mean the closure of
its bus terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon City.
Alleging that the MMDAs authority does not include the power to direct
provincial bus operators to abandon their existing bus terminals to thus deprive
them of the use of their property, Viron asked the court to construe the scope,
extent and limitation of the power of the MMDA to regulate traffic under R.A.
No. 7924, "An Act Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority,
Defining its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes."
Viron also asked for a ruling on whether the planned closure of provincial bus
terminals would contravene the Public Service Act and related laws which
mandate public utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals as a requisite
for the privilege of operating as common carriers.13
Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp), another provincial bus
operator, later filed a similar petition for declaratory relief14 against Executive
Secretary Alberto G. Romulo and MMDA Chairman Fernando.
Mencorp asked the court to declare the E.O. unconstitutional and illegal for
transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land
transportation units over their respective terminals.
Averring that MMDA Chairman Fernando had begun to implement a plan to close
and eliminate all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole of the
metropolis and to transfer their operations to common bus terminals, 15 Mencorp
prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the impending closure of its bus terminals
which it was leasing at the corner of EDSA and New York Street in Cubao and at
the intersection of Blumentritt, Laon Laan and Halcon Streets in Quezon City.
The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-106224 and was raffled to
Branch 47 of the RTC of Manila.
Mencorps petition was consolidated on June 19, 2003 with Virons petition which
was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, Manila.
Mencorps prayer for a TRO and/or writ of injunction was denied as was its
application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.16
In the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed
down to whether 1) the MMDAs power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila
included the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their
duly established and existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a
common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act and the
Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real
properties without due process of law should they be required to use the
common bus terminals.
Upon the agreement of the parties, they filed their respective position papers in
lieu of hearings.
By Decision18 of January 24, 2005, the trial court sustained the constitutionality
and legality of the E.O. pursuant to R.A. No. 7924, which empowered the MMDA
to administer Metro Manilas basic services including those of transport and
traffic management.
The trial court held that the E.O. was a valid exercise of the police power of the
State as it satisfied the two tests of lawful subject matter and lawful means,
hence, Virons and Mencorps property rights must yield to police power.
On the separate motions for reconsideration of Viron and Mencorp, the trial
court, by Order of September 8, 2005, reversed its Decision, this time holding
that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police power"; that the authority
of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power
to order the closure of Virons and Mencorps existing bus terminals; and that
the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution of November
23, 2005.
Hence, this petition, which faults the trial court for failing to rule that: (1) the
requisites of declaratory relief are not present, there being no justiciable
controversy in Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 and 03-106224; and (2) the President
has the authority to undertake or cause the implementation of the Project.19
Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable controversy in the cases for
declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or orders the
closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro
Manila. Viron and Mencorp, they argue, failed to produce any letter or
communication from the Executive Department apprising them of an immediate
plan to close down their bus terminals.
And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to
government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use
government property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add
that the only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive
and the implementing officials, but not between third persons.
The petition fails.
It is true, as respondents have pointed out, that the alleged deficiency of the
consolidated petitions to meet the requirement of justiciability was not among
the issues defined for resolution in the Pre-Trial Order of January 12, 2004. It
is equally true, however, that the question was repeatedly raised by petitioners
in their Answer to Virons petition,20 their Comment of April 29, 2003 opposing
Mencorps prayer for the issuance of a TRO,21 and their Position Paper of August
23, 2004.22
In bringing their petitions before the trial court, both respondents pleaded the
existence of the essential requisites for their respective petitions for
declaratory relief,23 and refuted petitioners contention that a justiciable
controversy was lacking.24 There can be no denying, therefore, that the issue
was raised and discussed by the parties before the trial court.
The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition: (a)
there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief
must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be
ripe for judicial determination.25
The requirement of the presence of a justiciable controversy is satisfied when
an actual controversy or the ripening seeds thereof exist between the parties,
all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and the declaration sought will
help in ending the controversy.26 A question becomes justiciable when it is
translated into a claim of right which is actually contested.27
In the present cases, respondents resort to court was prompted by the issuance
of the E.O. The 4th Whereas clause of the E.O. sets out in clear strokes the
MMDAs plan to "decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located
along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to
the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of
mass transport terminal facilities x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2 of the E.O. thereafter lays down the immediate establishment of
common bus terminals for north- and south-bound commuters. For this purpose,
Section 8 directs the Department of Budget and Management to allocate funds
of not more than one hundred million pesos (P100,000,000) to cover the cost of
the construction of the north and south terminals. And the E.O. was made
effective immediately.
The MMDAs resolve to immediately implement the Project, its denials to the
contrary notwithstanding, is also evident from telltale circumstances, foremost
of which was the passage by the MMC of Resolution No. 03-07, Series of 2003
expressing its full support of the immediate implementation of the Project.
Notable from the 5th Whereas clause of the MMC Resolution is the plan to
"remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila
and an urgent need to integrate the different transport modes." The 7th
Whereas clause proceeds to mention the establishment of the North and South
terminals.
As alleged in Virons petition, a diagram of the GMA-MTS North Bus/Rail
Terminal had been drawn up, and construction of the terminal is already in
progress. The MMDA, in its Answer28 and Position Paper,29 in fact affirmed that
the government had begun to implement the Project.
It thus appears that the issue has already transcended the boundaries of what
is merely conjectural or anticipatory.lawphil
Under the circumstances, for respondents to wait for the actual issuance by the
MMDA of an order for the closure of respondents bus terminals would be
foolhardy for, by then, the proper action to bring would no longer be for
declaratory relief which, under Section 1, Rule 6330 of the Rules of Court, must
be brought before there is a breach or violation of rights.
As for petitioners contention that the E.O. is a mere administrative issuance
which creates no relation with third persons, it does not persuade. Suffice it to
stress that to ensure the success of the Project for which the concerned
government agencies are directed to coordinate their activities and resources,
the existing bus terminals owned, operated or leased by third persons like
respondents would have to be eliminated; and respondents would be forced to
operate from the common bus terminals.
It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents.
The closure of their bus terminals would mean, among other things, the loss of
income from the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely,
respondents claim a deprivation of their constitutional right to property without
due process of law.
Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial interest
in the case such that [they have] sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of [the E.O.s] enforcement."31 Consequently, the established rule that the
constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who
will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied by
respondents.
On to the merits of the case.
Respondents posit that the MMDA is devoid of authority to order the elimination
of their bus terminals under the E.O. which, they argue, is unconstitutional
because it violates both the Constitution and the Public Service Act; and that
neither is the MMDA clothed with such authority under R.A. No. 7924.
Petitioners submit, however, that the real issue concerns the Presidents
authority to undertake or to cause the implementation of the Project. They
assert that the authority of the President is derived from E.O. No. 125,
"Reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communications Defining its
Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes," her residual power and/or E.O.
No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. They add that the
E.O. is also a valid exercise of the police power.
E.O. No. 125,32 which former President Corazon Aquino issued in the exercise of
legislative powers, reorganized the then Ministry (now Department) of
Transportation and Communications. Sections 4, 5, 6 and 22 of E.O. 125, as
amended by E.O. 125-A,33 read:
SECTION 4. Mandate. The Ministry shall be the primary policy,
planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating
and administrative entity of the Executive Branch of the
government in the promotion, development and regulation of
dependable and coordinated networks of transportation and
communication systems as well as in the fast, safe, efficient and reliable
postal, transportation and communications services.
To accomplish such mandate, the Ministry shall have the following
objectives:
(a) Promote the development of dependable and
coordinated networks of transportation and
communications systems;
(b) Guide government and private investment in
the development of the countrys intermodal
transportation and communications systems in a most
practical, expeditious, and orderly fashion for
maximum safety, service, and cost effectiveness;
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxxx
SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the
Ministry shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) Formulate and recommend national policies and
guidelines for the preparation and implementation of
integrated and comprehensive transportation and
communications systems at the national, regional and
local levels;
(b) Establish and administer comprehensive and
integrated programs for transportation and
communications, and for this purpose, may call on any
agency, corporation, or organization, whether public or
private, whose development programs include
transportation and communications as an integral part
thereof, to participate and assist in the preparation
and implementation of such program;
(c) Assess, review and provide direction to
transportation and communications research and
development programs of the government in
coordination with other institutions concerned;
(d) Administer all laws, rules and regulations in the
field of transportation and communications;
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxxx
SECTION 6. Authority and Responsibility. The authority and
responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the Ministry and
for the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the
Minister of Transportation and Communications, hereinafter referred
to as the Minister, who shall have supervision and control over the
Ministry and shall be appointed by the President. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
SECTION 22. Implementing Authority of Minister. The Minister
shall issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as
may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the
provisions of this Executive Order. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
It is readily apparent from the abovequoted provisions of E.O. No. 125, as
amended, that the President, then possessed of and exercising legislative
powers, mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming,
coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote,
develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications. The grant
of authority to the DOTC includes the power
to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for
transportation and communications.
As may be seen further, the Minister (now Secretary) of the DOTC is vested
with the authority and responsibility to exercise the mandate given to the
department. Accordingly, the DOTC Secretary is authorized to issue such
orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the
effective implementation of the law.
Since, under the law, the DOTC is authorized to establish and administer
programs and projects for transportation, it follows that the President may
exercise the same power and authority to order the implementation of the
Project, which admittedly is one for transportation.
Such authority springs from the Presidents power of control over all executive
departments as well as the obligation for the faithful execution of the laws
under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution which provides:
SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
This constitutional provision is echoed in Section 1, Book III of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Notably, Section 38, Chapter 37, Book IV of the
same Code defines the Presidents power of supervision and control over the
executive departments, viz:
SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. Unless
otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other laws defining the
special relationships of particular agencies, administrative relationships
shall be categorized and defined as follows:
(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include
authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted
by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty;
restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts
and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in
the execution of plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is
explicitly provided in the specific law governing the relationship of
particular agencies the word "control" shall encompass supervision and
control as defined in this paragraph. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Thus, whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate, the President may act directly or merely direct the performance of
a duty.34
Respecting the Presidents authority to order the implementation of the Project
in the exercise of the police power of the State, suffice it to stress that the
powers vested in the DOTC Secretary to establish and administer comprehensive
and integrated programs for transportation and communications and to issue
orders, rules and regulations to implement such mandate (which, as previously
discussed, may also be exercised by the President) have been so delegated for
the good and welfare of the people. Hence, these powers partake of the nature
of police power.
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant
to the Constitution, for the good and welfare of the people.35 This power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people flows from the recognition that salus
populi est suprema lex the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be
delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being delegated.36 By virtue of a valid
delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and administrative
boards37 as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
governments under an express delegation by the Local Government Code of
1991.38
The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project
notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the implementing agency for
the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis
therefor.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is
the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a
project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President,
although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project,
must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by
law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion,
development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so
authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the
President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law,
rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of
a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. No. 7924.
To recall, R.A. No. 7924 declared the Metropolitan Manila area39 as a "special
development and administrative region" and placed the administration of "metro-
wide" basic services affecting the region under the MMDA.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7924 specifically authorizes the MMDA to perform
"planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise
regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services,"
including transport and traffic management.40 Section 5 of the same law
enumerates the powers and functions of the MMDA as follows:
(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of
medium and long-term plans and programs for the delivery of
metro-wide services, land use and physical development within
Metropolitan Manila, consistent with national development
objectives and priorities;
(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of
medium-term investment programs for metro-wide services
which shall indicate sources and uses of funds for priority
programs and projects, and which shall include the packaging of
projects and presentation to funding institutions;
(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and
projects for the delivery of specific services under its
jurisdiction, subject to the approval of the Council. For this
purpose, MMDA can create appropriate project management
offices;
(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans,
programs and projects in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks
and adopt solutions to problems of implementation;
(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in
Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the
implementation of all programs and projects concerning
traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement,
engineering and education. Upon request, it shall be extended
assistance and cooperation, including but not limited to,
assignment of personnel, by all other government agencies and
offices concerned;
(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix,
impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of
violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or
non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke
drivers licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and
regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the
contrary notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority shall
impose all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through
its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the
PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed
security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations
to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such
conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose; and
(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the
objectives of the MMDA, including the undertaking of delivery
of basic services to the local government units, when deemed
necessary subject to prior coordination with and consent of the
local government unit concerned." (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The scope of the function of MMDA as an administrative, coordinating and
policy-setting body has been settled in Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.41 In that case, the Court
stressed:
Clearly, the scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of
the seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport and traffic
management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies,
standards and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations,
infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of
the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass
transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the
 administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering
services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a
single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this
service, the MMDA is expressly authorized to "to set the policies
concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of
all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may install
and administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines
and penalties for all traffic violations.
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the
following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of
a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that
grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the
Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative
power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government
units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the
MMDA or its Council to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
development authority. It is an agency created for the purpose of
laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are
actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:
SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority. . . .
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and
coordinative functions, and in the process exercise
regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of
metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution
of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely
local matters.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is
devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it
could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the
Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of
respondents terminals.
Even the MMDAs claimed authority under the police power must necessarily fail
in consonance with the above-quoted ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc. and this Courts subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Garin43 that the MMDA is not vested with police
power.
Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its
exercise of such power does not satisfy the two tests of a valid police power
measure, viz: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that
of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.44 Stated differently, the police power legislation
must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation
must exist between the purposes and the means.
As early as Calalang v. Williams,45 this Court recognized that traffic congestion
is a public, not merely a private, concern. The Court therein held that public
welfare underlies the contested statute authorizing the Director of Public
Works to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control traffic on
national roads.
Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at
the bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic,
which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety."47 As such, measures
calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people using the
thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject
for the exercise of police power.
Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern
that needs to be addressed immediately. Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the
felt need to address the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the
MMDA so determined, is caused by the increasing volume of buses plying the
major thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of existing transport
systems. It is thus beyond cavil that the motivating force behind the issuance of
the E.O. is the interest of the public in general.
Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly oppressive?
With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro Manila, the E.O.
seeks to "eliminate[e] the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares and provid[e] more convenient access to the mass transport
system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal
facilities x x x."48Common carriers with terminals along the major thoroughfares
of Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close down their existing bus
terminals and use the MMDA-designated common parking areas.
In Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc.,49 two city ordinances
were passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena, directing public utility
vehicles to unload and load passengers at the Lucena Grand Central Terminal,
which was given the exclusive franchise to operate a single common terminal.
Declaring that no other terminals shall be situated, constructed, maintained or
established inside or within the city of Lucena, the sanggunian declared as
inoperable all temporary terminals therein.
The ordinances were challenged before this Court for being unconstitutional on
the ground that, inter alia, the measures constituted an invalid exercise of police
power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against monopolies.
Citing De la Cruz v. Paras50 and Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,51 this Court held
that the assailed ordinances were characterized by overbreadth, as they went
beyond what was reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem in the city.
And it found that the compulsory use of the Lucena Grand Terminal was unduly
oppressive because it would subject its users to fees, rentals and charges.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between
authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework
of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.
A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more
careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.
From the memorandum filed before this Court by petitioner, it is
gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of
traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of
passengers by buses on the streets of the city proper, hence, the
conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses
obstructing traffic on the city streets.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of
traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all
terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be
considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic
problem, this Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack
adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload
passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then
reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted,
with permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to meet
the specifications.
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription
against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities
which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised
terminal are barred from operating at all. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As in Lucena, this Court fails to see how the prohibition against the existence of
respondents terminals can be considered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic
congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of respondents
bus terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing
reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of transference
from one site to another.
Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of "colorum" buses,
vans and taxis entering Metro Manila and using the streets for parking and
passenger pick-up points, as respondents suggest, might even be more effective
in easing the traffic situation. So would the strict enforcement of traffic rules
and the removal of obstructions from major thoroughfares.
As to the alleged confiscatory character of the E.O., it need only to be stated
that respondents certificates of public convenience confer no property right,
and are mere licenses or privileges.52 As such, these must yield to legislation
safeguarding the interest of the people.
Even then, for reasons which bear reiteration, the MMDA cannot order the
closure of respondents terminals not only because no authority to implement the
Project has been granted nor legislative or police power been delegated to it, but
also because the elimination of the terminals does not satisfy the standards of a
valid police power measure.
Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the interpret, not change, the law, however. It needs only to be reiterated that it is
provisions of the Public Service Act. the DOTC as the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating,
implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and
Paragraph (a), Section 13 of Chapter II of the Public Service Act (now Section 5 regulate networks of transportation and communications which has the power
of Executive Order No. 202, creating the Land Transportation Franchising and to establish and administer a transportation project like the Project subject
Regulatory Board or LFTRB) vested the Public Service Commission (PSC, now the of the case at bar.
LTFRB) with "x x x jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services
and their franchises, equipment and other properties x x x." No matter how noble the intentions of the MMDA may be then, any plan,
strategy or project which it is not authorized to implement cannot pass muster.
Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC was empowered to "impose such
conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or operation WHEREFORE, the Petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisition, DENIED.
as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require"53 in approving E.O. No. 179 is declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires.
any franchise or privilege.
SO ORDERED.
Further, Section 16 (g) and (h) of the Public Service Act54 provided that the EN BANC
Commission shall have the power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance
with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and
exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary: ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., G.R. No. 166501
Petitioner,
(g) To compel any public service to furnish safe, adequate, and proper Present:
service as regards the manner of furnishing the same as well as the
maintenance of the necessary material and equipment. PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
(h) To require any public service to establish, construct, maintain, and QUISUMBING,
operate any reasonable extension of its existing facilities, where in YNARES-SANTIAGO,
the judgment of said Commission, such extension is reasonable and SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
practicable and will furnish sufficient business to justify the - versus - CARPIO,
construction and maintenance of the same and when the financial AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
condition of the said public service reasonably warrants the original CORONA,
expenditure required in making and operating such extension.(Emphasis CARPIO MORALES,
and underscoring supplied) CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or TINGA,
passenger terminals, is generally considered a necessary service to be provided CHICO-NAZARIO,
by provincial bus operators like respondents, hence, the investments they have GARCIA, and
poured into the acquisition or lease of suitable terminal sites. Eliminating the VELASCO, JJ.
terminals would thus run counter to the provisions of the Public Service Act. HON. BAYANI F. FERNANDO,
in his capacity as Chairman of the
Metropolitan Manila Development
This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in the way
Authority, and METROPOLITAN
of its efforts at solving the pestering problem of traffic congestion in Metro
MANILA DEVELOPMENT Promulgated:
Manila. These efforts are commendable, to say the least, in the face of the
AUTHORITY,
abominable traffic situation of our roads day in and day out. This Court can only
Respondents. November 16, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x
R E S O L U T I O N
CARPIO, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (petitioner), as member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and taxpayer, filed this original action for the issuance of the
writs of Prohibition and Mandamus. Petitioner prays for the Prohibition writ to
enjoin respondents Bayani F. Fernando, Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) and the MMDA (respondents) from further
implementing its wet flag scheme (Flag Scheme).[1] The Mandamus writ is to compel
respondents to respect and uphold the x x x rights of pedestrians to due process
x x x and equal protection of the laws x x x.
Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because
the MMDAs governing body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2)
violates the Due Process Clause because it is a summary punishment for jaywalking;
(3) disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading, and inhuman
punishment; and (4) violates pedestrian rights as it exposes pedestrians to various
potential hazards.[2]
In their Comment, respondents sought the dismissal of the petition for petitioners
lack of standing to litigate and for violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Alternatively, respondents contended that the Flag Scheme is a valid preventive
measure against jaywalking.
Petitioner filed a Reply, claiming that the Court should take cognizance of the case
as it raises issues of paramount and transcendental importance. Petitioner also
contended that he filed this petition directly with the Court because the issues
raised in the petition deserve the direct x x x intervention of the x x x [C]ourt x
x x.
We dismiss the petition.
A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) a favorable action will likely redress the injury.[3] On the
other hand, a party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has a
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of
the questioned statute.[4] Petitioner meets none of the requirements under either
category.
Nor is there merit to petitioners claim that the Court should relax the standing
requirement because of the transcendental importance of the issues the petition
raises. As an exception to the standing requirement, the transcendental
importance of the issues raised relates to the merits of the petition.[5] Thus, the
party invoking it must show, among others, the presence of a clear disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition.[6]Petitioner has not shown such clear
constitutional or statutory violation.
On the Flag Schemes alleged lack of legal basis, we note that all the cities and
municipalities within the MMDAs jurisdiction,[7] except Valenzuela City, have each
enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic management codes with provisions
for pedestrian regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for respondents
implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking
ordinances and similar regulations. After all, the MMDA is an administrative
agency tasked with the implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper
authorities.[8] The absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance in Valenzuela Citydoes
not detract from this conclusion absent any proof that respondents implemented
the Flag Scheme in that city.
Further, the petition ultimately calls for a factual determination of whether the
Flag Scheme is a reasonable enforcement of anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar
enactments. This Court is not a trier of facts.[9] The petition proffers mere
surmises and speculations on the potential hazards of the Flag Scheme. This Court
cannot determine the reasonableness of the Flag Scheme based on mere surmises
and speculations.
Lastly, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when he filed this
petition directly with us. This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with the
Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained
freedom of choice of forum from which to seek such relief.[10] We relax this rule
only in exceptional and compelling circumstances.[11] This is not the case here.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989
DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, DATU BLO UMPAR ADIONG, DATU
MACALIMPOWAC DELANGALEN, CELSO PALMA, ALI MONTANA BABAO,
JULMUNIR JANNARAL, RASHID SABER, and DATU JAMAL ASHLEY
ABBAS, representing the other taxpayers of Mindanao, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE GUILLERMO C.
CARAGUE, DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, respondents.
G.R. No. 89965 November 10, 1989
ATTY. ABDULLAH D. MAMA-O, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Budget, and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Abbas, Abbas, Amora, Alejandro-Abbas & Associates for petitioners in G.R. Nos.
89651 and 89965.
Abdullah D. Mama-o for and in his own behalf in 89965.
CORTES, J.:
The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and
nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, 1 scheduled for November 19, 1989, in
implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."
These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of
Budget and Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose;
and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional .
After a consolidated comment was filed by Solicitor General for the
respondents, which the Court considered as the answer, the case was deemed
submitted for decision, the issues having been joined. Subsequently, petitioner
Mama-o filed a "Manifestation with Motion for Leave to File Reply on
Respondents' Comment and to Open Oral Arguments," which the Court noted.
The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be
categorized into either of the following:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between the
government of the Republic of the Philippines of the Philippines and Moro
National Liberation Front with the Participation of the Quadripartie Ministerial
Commission Members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of
the Organization of Islamic Conference" took effect on December 23, 1976. It
provided for "[t]he establishment of Autonomy in the southern Philippines within
the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines" and enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the "areas of
autonomy." 2
In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which the for the first time provided
for regional autonomy, Article X, section 15 of the charter provides that
"[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of
the Republic of the Philippines."
To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further provides:
Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over
autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed.
Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted
by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall
be vested in the National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from
multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of the
executive and representative of the constituent political units.
The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with
personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with
the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units
in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only the
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 19 The first Congress elected under this Constitution
shall, within eighteen months from the time of organization of
both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act
of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning
development;
(6) Economic, social and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the
cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized
by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region.
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions
shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which
shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in
accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of
the region shall be the responsibility of the National
Government.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and signed
into law on August 1, 1989.
1. The Court shall dispose first of the second category of arguments raised by
petitioners, i.e. that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the
provisions of the Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli
Agreement is part of the law of the land, being a binding international agreement
. The Solicitor General asserts that the Tripoli Agreement is neither a binding
treaty, not having been entered into by the Republic of the Philippines with a
sovereign state and ratified according to the provisions of the 1973 or 1987
Constitutions, nor a binding international agreement.
We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature
of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine Government
whether under public international or internal Philippine law. In the first place, it
is now the Constitution itself that provides for the creation of an autonomous
region in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A.
No. 6734 would therefore be what is so provided in the Constitution. Thus, any
conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of the
Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the implementation of
the Organic Act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement
is a binding treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute part of
the law of the land. But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734,
an enactment of the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the same
class as the latter [SALONGA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (4th ed.,
1974), citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster v. Nelson, 2 Pet.
253 (1829)]. Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli
Agreement, being a subsequent law. Only a determination by this Court that R.A.
No. 6734 contravened the Constitution would result in the granting of the reliefs
sought. 3
2. The Court shall therefore only pass upon the constitutional questions which
have been raised by petitioners.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an
autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the
Constitution on the autonomous region which make the creation of such region
dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No.
6734 which declares that "[t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the
plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution." Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision makes
the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two
provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created
composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.
The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs
to be clarified.
Firs, the questioned provision itself in R.A. No. 6734 refers to Section 18,
Article X of the Constitution which sets forth the conditions necessary for the
creation of the autonomous region. The reference to the constitutional provision
cannot be glossed over for it clearly indicates that the creation of the
autonomous region shall take place only in accord with the constitutional
requirements. Second, there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions
(Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same
requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of
Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be
held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred
twenty (120) days after the approval of this
Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in
the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous
Region shall remain the existing administrative determination,
merge the existing regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous
region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by
the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a
majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous
region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not
be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous
region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities
mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein.
The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will
therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region
in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated
in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it. [See III RECORD OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 482-492 (1986)].
As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the Autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao is made effective upon the approval "by majority of the votes cast by
the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose" [Art. X, sec. 18]. The
question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a
majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a
majority in each of the constituent units, or both?
We need not go beyond the Constitution to resolve this question.
If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a majority of
all the votes cast in the plebiscite they would have so indicated. Thus, in Article
XVIII, section 27, it is provided that "[t]his Constitution shall take effect
immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
held for the purpose ... Comparing this with the provision on the creation of the
autonomous region, which reads:
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units
in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X,
sec, 18, para, 2].
it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to
depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the
majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if
the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the
totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology
as that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose."
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of
votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double
majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the
individual constituent units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in
which the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18
must have been understood by the people when they ratified the Constitution.
Invoking the earlier cited constitutional provisions, petitioner Mama-o, on the
other hand, maintains that only those areas which, to his view, share common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics should be properly included within the coverage of
the autonomous region. He insists that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because
only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte
and Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the
thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess
such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant
characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly share the same
characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly share the same
characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the
scope of the autonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to
be limited.
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards
by which Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous
region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of
the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the
legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into
the wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do without doing violence to the
separation of governmental powers. [Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139
(1936); Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424].
After assailing the inclusion of non-Muslim areas in the Organic Act for lack of
basis, petitioner Mama-o would then adopt the extreme view that other non-
Muslim areas in Mindanao should likewise be covered. He argues that since the
Organic Act covers several non-Muslim areas, its scope should be further
broadened to include the rest of the non-Muslim areas in Mindanao in order for
the other non-Muslim areas denies said areas equal protection of the law, and
therefore is violative of the Constitution.
Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very same constitutional provision he
had earlier invoked. Any determination by Congress of what areas in Mindanao
should compromise the autonomous region, taking into account shared historical
and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics, would necessarily carry with it the exclusion of other areas. As
earlier stated, such determination by Congress of which areas should be covered
by the organic act for the autonomous region constitutes a recognized legislative
prerogative, whose wisdom may not be inquired into by this Court.
Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification [People v. Vera,
65 Phil. 56 (1963); Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 (1946); J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Land
tenure Administration, G.R. No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413].
In Dumlao v. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA
392], the Court ruled that once class may be treated differently from another
where the groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions. The
guarantee of equal protection is thus not infringed in this case, the classification
having been made by Congress on the basis of substantial distinctions as set
forth by the Constitution itself.
Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it
violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec.
5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that
should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the
Tribal Code (still be enacted) on the one had, and the national law on the other
hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply national law.
Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran,
which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-
made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating
possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national
law, wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's
religious convictions.
As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.
[Art. VIII, Sec. 11. As a condition precedent for the power to be exercised, an
actual controversy between litigants must first exist [Angara v. Electoral
Commission, supra; Tan v. Macapagal, G.R. No. L-34161, February 29, 1972, 43
SCRA 677]. In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants
exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the application of national law
resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in
this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential
conflict between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.
Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article XIX, section 13 of R.A.
No. 6734 which, among others, states:
. . . Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably
in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the
plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region
shall remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided,
however, that the President may, by administrative
determination, merge the existing regions.
According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge
regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President.
That the President may choose to merge existing regions pursuant to the
Organic Act is challenged as being in conflict with Article X, Section 10 of the
Constitution which provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger
of administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region,
which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes
[Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the
land by Pres. dec. No. 1, Pres. Dec. No. 742]. Administrative regions are not
territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. While the power to merge
administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a
power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the
exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X,
sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict between the power of the
President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision
requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the
requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces,
cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.
Petitioners likewise question the validity of provisions in the Organic Act which
create an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer to the autonomous
region of the powers, appropriations, and properties vested upon the regional
government by the organic Act [Art. XIX, Secs. 3 and 4]. Said provisions
mandate that the transfer of certain national government offices and their
properties to the regional government shall be made pursuant to a schedule
prescribed by the Oversight Committee, and that such transfer should be
accomplished within six (6) years from the organization of the regional
government.
It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are unconstitutional because
while the Constitution states that the creation of the autonomous region shall
take effect upon approval in a plebiscite, the requirement of organizing an
Oversight committee tasked with supervising the transfer of powers and
properties to the regional government would in effect delay the creation of the
autonomous region.
Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the
result of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes
cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the
autonomous region immediately takes effect delay the creation of the
autonomous region.
Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the
result of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes
cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the
autonomous region immediately takes effect. The questioned provisions in R.A.
No. 6734 requiring an oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not
provide for a different date of effectivity. Much less would the organization of
the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to the operation of the Organic
Act, for such is evidently aimed at effecting a smooth transition period for the
regional government. The constitutional objection on this point thus cannot be
sustained as there is no bases therefor.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality [Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387 (1925); Salas v. Jarencio, G.R. No. L-29788, August 30,
1979, 46 SCRA 734; Morfe v. Mutuc, supra; Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-
47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30]. Those who petition this Court to declare a
law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a
declaration. otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by
petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds
that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these
two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995
CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN (Third District, South Cotobato)
ADELBERT W. ANTONINO (First District, South Cotobato), WILFREDO G.
CAINGLET (Third District, Zamboanga del Norte), HILARION RAMIRO,
JR. (Second Division, Misamis Occidental), ERNESTO S. AMATONG (Second
District, Zamboanga del Norte), ALVIN G. DANS (Lone District, Basilan),
ABDULLAH M. DIMAPORO (Second District, Lanao del Norte), and
CONGRESSWOMAN MARIA CLARA A. LOBREGAT (Lone District,
Zamboanga City) petitioners,
vs.
HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS, Executive Secretary; COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN
SEC. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS X AND XII, CHAIRMAN OF THE
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL FOR REGION X, CHAIRMAN JESUS
V. AYALA, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR
REGIONS XI and XII, DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY SECRETARIAT,
PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT STAFF, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE,
Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT; and HON.
ROSALINA S. CAJUCUM, OIC National Treasurer, respondents.
IMMANUEL JALDON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR M. ORBOS, HON. FIDEL RAMOS,
HON. SECRETARY LUIS SANTOS, AND HON. NATIONAL TREASURER
ROSALINA CAJUCOM, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734), authorizing the
President of the Philippines to "merge" by administrative determination the
regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the
Executive Order issued by the President pursuant to such authority, "Providing
for the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao." A temporary
restraining order prayed for by the petitioners was issued by this Court on
January 29, 1991, enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Executive Order
and statute in question.
The facts are as follows:
Pursuant to Art. X, 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734,
the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling for a
plebiscite to be held in the provinces of Basilan, Cotobato, Davao del Sur, Lanao
del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat,
Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of
Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto
Princesa and Zamboanga. In the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989,
four provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous region. These are the
provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with
the constitutional provision, these provinces became the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao.
On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of the
Autonomous Region, Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides,
That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such
plebiscites shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do
not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in
the existing administrative regions. Provided, however, that the
 President may, by administrative determination, merge the
existing regions.
Pursuant to the authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C.
Aquino issued on October 12, 1990 Executive Order No. 429, "providing for the
Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao." Under this Order, as
amended by E.O. No. 439
(1) Misamis Occidental, at present part of Region X, will become
part of Region IX.
(2) Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at present
parts of Region X will become parts of Region IX.
(3) South Cotobato, at present a part of Region XI, will become
part of Region XII.
(4) General Santos City, at present part of Region XI, will
become part of Region XII.
(5) Lanao del Norte, at present part of Region XII, will become
part of Region IX.
(6) Iligan City and Marawi City, at present part of Region XII,
will become part of Region IX.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 96754 are, or at least at the time of the filing of their
petition, members of Congress representing various legislative districts in South
Cotobato, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del Norte and Zamboanga City.
On November 12, 1990, they wrote then President Aquino protesting E.O. No.
429. They contended that
There is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain
provinces and cities within the existing regions some of which
did not even take part in the plebiscite as in the case of the
province of Misamis Occidental and the cities of Oroquieta,
Tangub and Ozamiz and restructure them to new
administrative regions. On the other hand, the law (Sec. 13,
Art. XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to the point, that is, that "the
provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for
inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing
administrative regions."
The transfer of the provinces of Misamis Occidental from
Region X to Region IX; Lanao del Norte from Region XII to
Region IX, and South Cotobato from Region XI to Region XII
are alterations of the existing structures of governmental
units, in other words, reorganization. This can be gleaned from
Executive Order No. 429, thus
Whereas, there is an urgent need to
reorganize the administrative regions in
Mindanao to guarantee the effective delivery
of field services of government agencies
taking into consideration the formation of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
With due respect to Her Excellency, we submit that while the
authority necessarily includes the authority to merge, the
authority to merge does not include the authority to
reorganize. Therefore, the President's authority under RA
6734 to "merge existing regions" cannot be construed to
include the authority to reorganize them. To do so will violate
the rules of statutory construction.
The transfer of regional centers under Executive Order 429 is
actually a restructuring (reorganization) of administrative
regions. While this reorganization, as in Executive Order 429,
does not affect the apportionment of congressional
representatives, the same is not valid under the penultimate
paragraph of Sec. 13, Art. XIX of R.A. 6734 and Ordinance
appended to the 1986 Constitution apportioning the seats of
the House of Representatives of Congress of the Philippines to
the different legislative districts in provinces and cities. 1
As their protest went unheeded, while Inauguration Ceremonies of the New
Administrative Region IX were scheduled on January 26, 1991, petitioners
brought this suit for certiorari and prohibition.
On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 96673, Immanuel Jaldon, is a
resident of Zamboanga City, who is suing in the capacity of taxpayer and citizen
of the Republic of the Philippines.
Petitioners in both cases contend that Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is
unconstitutional because (1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the
President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the
existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the
power delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the
law.
In addition, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 challenges the validity of E.O. No. 429
on the ground that the power granted by Art. XIX, 13 to the President is only
to "merge regions IX and XII" but not to reorganize the entire administrative
regions in Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional center of Region
IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
The Solicitor General defends the reorganization of regions in Mindanao by E.O.
No. 429 as merely the exercise of a power "traditionally lodged in the
President," as held in Abbas v. Comelec, 2 and as a mere incident of his power of
general supervision over local governments and control of executive departments,
bureaus and offices under Art. X, 16 and Art. VII, 17, respectively, of the
Constitution.
He contends that there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only a
grant of the power to "fill up" or provide the details of legislation because
Congress did not have the facility to provide for them. He cites by analogy the
case of Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan, 3 in which the
power of the Governor-General to fix municipal boundaries was sustained on the
ground that
[such power] is simply a transference of certain details with
respect to provinces, municipalities, and townships, many of
them newly created, and all of them subject to a more or less
rapid change both in development and centers of population, the
proper regulation of which might require not only prompt action
but action of such a detailed character as not to permit the
legislative body, as such, to take it efficiently.
The Solicitor General justifies the grant to the President of the power "to
merge the existing regions" as something fairly embraced in the title of R.A. No.
6734, to wit, "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao," because it is germane to it.
He argues that the power is not limited to the merger of those regions in which
the provinces and cities which took part in the plebiscite are located but that it
extends to all regions in Mindanao as necessitated by the establishment of the
autonomous region.
Finally, he invokes P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772 which provides:
1. The President of the Philippines shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the National Government. In exercising
this authority, the President shall be guided by generally
acceptable principles of good government and responsive
national government, including but not limited to the following
guidelines for a more efficient, effective, economical and
development-oriented governmental framework:
(a) More effective planning implementation,
and review functions;
(b) Greater decentralization and
responsiveness in decision-making process;
(c) Further minimization, if not, elimination, of
duplication or overlapping of purposes,
functions, activities, and programs;
(d) Further development of as standardized as
possible ministerial, sub-ministerial and
corporate organizational structures;
(e) Further development of the regionalization
process; and
(f) Further rationalization of the functions of
and administrative relationships among
government entities.
For purposes of this Decree, the coverage of
the continuing authority of the President to
reorganize shall be interpreted to encompass
all agencies, entities, instrumentalities, and
units of the National Government, including all
government owned or controlled corporations
as well as the entire range of the powers,
functions, authorities, administrative
relationships, acid related aspects pertaining
to these agencies, entities, instrumentalities,
and units.
 2. [T]he President may, at his discretion, take the following
actions:
xxx xxx xxx
f. Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge,
or integrate entities, agencies,
instrumentalities, and units of the National
Government, as well as expand, amend, change,
or otherwise modify their powers, functions
and authorities, including, with respect to
government-owned or controlled corporations,
their corporate life, capitalization, and other
relevant aspects of their charters.
g. Take such other related actions as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes and
objectives of this Decree.
Considering the arguments of the parties, the issues are:
(1) whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative in
character, as petitioners contend, or whether it is executive in character, as
respondents claim it is, and, in any event, whether Art. XIX, 13 is invalid
because it contains no standard to guide the President's discretion;
(2) whether the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the statute; and
(3) whether the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions the
provinces and cities in which either did not take part in the plebiscite on the
creation of the Autonomous Region or did not vote in favor of it; and
(4) whether the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer
the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
It will be useful to recall first the nature of administrative regions and the basis
and purpose for their creation. On September 9, 1968, R.A. No. 5435 was passed
"authorizing the President of the Philippines, with the help of a Commission on
Reorganization, to reorganize the different executive departments, bureaus,
offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the government, including banking or
financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it." The purpose
was to promote "simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government." 4 The
Commission on Reorganization created under the law was required to submit an
integrated reorganization plan not later than December 31, 1969 to the
President who was in turn required to submit the plan to Congress within forty
days after the opening of its next regular session. The law provided that any
reorganization plan submitted would become effective only upon the approval of
Congress. 5
Accordingly, the Reorganization Commission prepared an Integrated
Reorganization Plan which divided the country into eleven administrative
regions. 6 By P.D. No. 1, the Plan was approved and made part of the law of the
land on September 24, 1972. P.D. No. 1 was twice amended in 1975, first by P.D.
No. 742 which "restructur[ed] the regional organization of Mindanao, Basilan,
Sulu and Tawi-Tawi" and later by P.D. No. 773 which further "restructur[ed] the
regional organization of Mindanao and divid[ed] Region IX into two sub-regions."
In 1978, P.D. No. 1555 transferred the regional center of Region IX from Jolo
to Zamboanga City.
Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have
been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring
on the President the power "to merge [by administrative determination] the
existing regions" following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous
legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in
1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of
the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of
local governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law
requires should have regional offices. As this Court observed in Abbas, "while
the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the
Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President
to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local
governments [see Art. X, 4 of the Constitution]." The regions themselves are
not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
purposes." 7 The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to
adjust municipal boundaries 8which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor
General 9 or as "administrative in nature."
There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in
conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions. The
question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the
President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted and whether in
any event the grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed in the
title of the law.
First, the question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It
may simply be gathered or implied. 10 Nor need it be found in the law challenged
because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the
challenged legislation. 11
With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the
standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President
in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit:
"to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to
pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and
economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public
business." 12 Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions were
established in accordance with this policy, it is logical to suppose that in
authorizing the President to "merge [by administrative determination] the
existing regions" in view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the
provinces now constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was
to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative regions.
Nor is Art. XIX, 13 susceptible to charge that its subject is not embraced in
the title of R.A. No. 6734. The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed
by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof" 13 has always been given a practical rather than a technical
construction. The title is not required to be an index of the content of the bill.
It is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement if the title
expresses the general subject and all provisions of the statute are germane to
that subject. 14 Certainly the reorganization of the remaining administrative
regions is germane to the general subject of R.A. No. 6734, which is the
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
Finally, it is contended that the power granted to the President is limited to the
reorganization of administrative regions in which some of the provinces and
cities which voted in favor of regional autonomy are found, because Art. XIX,
13 provides that those which did not vote for autonomy "shall remain in the
existing administrative regions." More specifically, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673
claims:
The questioned Executive Order No. 429 distorted and, in fact,
contravened the clear intent of this provision by moving out or
transferring certain political subdivisions (provinces/cities) out
of their legally designated regions. Aggravating this
unacceptable or untenable situation is EO No. 429's effecting
certain movements on areas which did not even participate in
the November 19, 1989 plebiscite. The unauthorized action of
the President, as effected by and under the questioned EO No.
429, is shown by the following dispositions: (1) Misamis
Occidental, formerly of Region X and which did not even
participate in the plebiscite, was moved from said Region X to
Region IX; (2) the cities of Ozamis, Oroquieta, and Tangub, all
formerly belonging to Region X, which likewise did not
participate in the said plebiscite, were transferred to Region
IX; (3) South Cotobato, from Region XI to Region XII; (4)
General Santos City: from Region XI to Region XII; (5) Lanao
del Norte, from Region XII to Region IX; and (6) the cities of
Marawi and Iligan from Region XII to Region IX. All of the said
provinces and cities voted "NO", and thereby rejected their
entry into the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as
provided under RA No. 6734. 15
The contention has no merit. While Art. XIX, 13 provides that "The provinces
and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain
in the existing administrative regions," this provision is subject to the
qualification that "the President may by administrative determination merge the
existing regions." This means that while non-assenting provinces and cities are to
remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region,
they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other
regions as the exigency of administration may require.
The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or
redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of
facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the
President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services. There will be
no "transfer" of local governments from one region to another except as they
may thus be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at
present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or
to the division or merger of local governments, which all have political
consequences on the right of people residing in those political units to vote and
to be voted for. It cannot be overemphasized that administrative regions are
mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for
political representation.
Petitioners nonetheless insist that only those regions, in which the provinces and Supreme Court
cities which voted for inclusion in the Autonomous Region are located, can be Manila
"merged" by the President.
EN BANC
To be fundamental reason Art. XIX, 13 is not so limited. But the more
fundamental reason is that the President's power cannot be so limited without
neglecting the necessities of administration. It is noteworthy that the DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, G.R. No. 196271
petitioners do not claim that the reorganization of the regions in E.O. No. 429 is in his personal capacity, and in representation of
irrational. The fact is that, as they themselves admit, the reorganization of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS Present:
administrative regions in E.O. No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: (1) IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI
contiguity and geographical features; (2) transportation and communication MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, CORONA, C.J.,
facilities; (3) cultural and language groupings; (4) land area and population; (5) JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, CARPIO,
existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6) socio-economic MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-E, VELASCO, JR.,
development programs in the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities. KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
SAUPI, BRION,
What has been said above applies to the change of the regional center from Petitioners, PERALTA,
Zamboanga City to Pagadian City. Petitioners contend that the determination of BERSAMIN,
provincial capitals has always been by act of Congress. But as, this Court said in DEL CASTILLO,
Abbas, 16 administrative regions are mere "groupings of contiguous provinces for - versus - ABAD,
administrative purposes, . . . [They] are not territorial and political subdivisions VILLARAMA, JR.,
like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays." There is, therefore, no basis PEREZ,
for contending that only Congress can change or determine regional centers. To SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by MENDOZA,
the contrary, the examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742, 773 and 1555 suggest that the its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF SERENO,
power to reorganize administrative regions carries with it the power to REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO REYES, and
determine the regional center. BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR.,
It may be that the transfer of the regional center in Region IX from Zamboanga PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Promulgated:
City to Pagadian City may entail the expenditure of large sums of money for the Executive Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR.,
construction of buildings and other infrastructure to house regional offices. Secretary of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, October 18, 2011
That contention is addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its Treasurer of the Philippines,
legality and it is settled that courts are not the arbiters of the wisdom or Respondents.
expediency of legislation. In any event this is a question that we will consider x----------------------------------------------x
only if fully briefed and upon a more adequate record than that presented by BASARI D. MAPUPUNO,
petitioners. Petitioner,

WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are DISMISSED for
- versus -
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman G.R. No. 196305
of the Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO
ABAD, JR. in his capacity as Secretary of the
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Budget and Management,
PACQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL,
Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his Petitioner,
capacity as Senate President, and FELICIANO
BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of the
House of Representatives, - versus -
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, OF THE PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE
Petitioner, SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
- versus -
LUIS BAROK BIRAOGO,
Petitioner,
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the G.R. No. 197282
Executive Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, - versus -
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 197221
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
CASAN CONDING CANA, and PARTIDO JR.,
DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN Respondents.
(PDP-LABAN), x----------------------------------------------x
Petitioners,
JACINTO V. PARAS,
Petitioner,
- versus -
- versus -

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its G.R. No. 197392

Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management, and HON.
ROBERTO B. TAN, in his capacity as Treasurer of
the Philippines,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------
------x
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
G.R. No. 197280 JR., and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Respondents-Intervenor.

G.R. No. 197454
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing
for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other
Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August
2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to
coincide with the countrys regular national and local elections. The law as well
granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the
Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of
the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to
the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office.
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153
already spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate
Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court.These petitions
multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.
Factual Antecedents
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,
mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact
an organic act for these autonomous regions to concretely carry into effect the
granted autonomy.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from
multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of the
executive department and legislative assembly, both of which
shall be elective and representative of the constituent political
units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts
with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent
with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided
that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably
in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. A
plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X
of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM). The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu
and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional
officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days
after its ratification.
RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act
No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, as Amended) was the next legislative act passed. This law provided
further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the original
organic act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to
the second Monday of September 2001.
Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM RA No. 9140 [1] - on June
22, 2001. This law reset the first regular elections originally scheduled under RA
No. 9054, to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No.
9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.
RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001.
The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the same date.
RA No. 9333[2] was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM
regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every
3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not
ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections
and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to
be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM
elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of
the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill
(HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the ARMM elections scheduled
on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of Representatives passed HB
No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version,
Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13) Senators voted
favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of Representative concurred
with the Senate amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No.
10153 into law.
As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a
petition filed with this Court G.R. No. 196271[3] - assailing the constitutionality
of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity of RA No. 9333
as well for non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement.
Thereafter, petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 filed another
petition[4] also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.
With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its
preparations for the ARMM elections. The law gave rise as well to the filing of the
following petitions against its constitutionality:
a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[5] filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a
member of the House of Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in
his capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the COMELEC, docketed
as G.R. No. 197221;
b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition[6] filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal
as a taxpayer against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197282;
c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary
Injunction[7] filed by Louis Barok Biraogo against the COMELEC and
Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R. No.
197392; and
d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[8] filed by Jacinto Paras as a
member of the House of Representatives against Executive Secretary
Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197454.
Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as
registered voters from the ARMM, with the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng
Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM regional elections scheduled
for August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus [9] against
the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197280, to assail the constitutionality of
RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.
Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc.
and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed their own Motion for Leave to Admit
their Motion for Intervention and Comment-in-Intervention dated July 18, 2011.
On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the Court
ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the constitutionality of
HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.
Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16, 2011. Thereafter, the
parties were instructed to submit their respective memoranda within twenty (20)
days.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials
of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be
decided by the end of their term on September 30, 2011.
The Arguments
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that
these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority
vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII
of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional
for its failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2),
Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of
the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to
the elective and representative character of the executive and legislative
departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the
President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective
ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections
shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of
appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in
complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.
The Issues
From the parties submissions, the following issues were recognized and argued by
the parties in the oral arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:
I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections
II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section
26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a
supermajority vote and plebiscite
A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular
elections constitute an amendment to Section 7,
Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?
B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for
amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate
Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the corollary doctrine on
irrepealable laws?
C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in
the creation of autonomous regions under paragraph
2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?
IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted
to the ARMM
V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:
A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and
legal.
We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.
OUR RULING
We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.
I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate
The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the
Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this position, cites
Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under
this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May,
1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined
by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of
the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all
Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan
Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
 Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve
obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six year
and the remaining twelve for three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and
Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to
noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President
under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of
May, 1992.
We agree with this position.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective
can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution,[10] which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought
to attain synchronization of elections.[11]
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective
officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve
winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of
all future elections whether national or local to once every three years.[12] This
intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission
deliberations.[13]
These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of
the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting
the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the
national and local elections as a constitutional mandate. In Osmea v. Commission on
Elections,[14] we explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987
Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of
the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President
and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the
same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-
mentioned Sections that the term of synchronization is used
synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is
the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the
same day or occasion. This common termination date will
synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas,
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p.
605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House
of Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art.
XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for
President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is
likewise evident from the x x x records of the proceedings in the
Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included
among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the
wording and structure of the Constitution.
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should
be understood in the sense that they have in common use and given their ordinary
meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails.[15] As this Court explained in People v.
Derilo,[16] [a]s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, its language
should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its words should
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to something that primarily
serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor
political subdivision.[17] Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of
governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives obviously fall
within this classification, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve
within the limited region of ARMM.
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are
considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article X of
the Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous regions are established
and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted
to Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form of local
government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which
provides:
 Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
Thus, we find the contention that the synchronization mandated by the
Constitution does not include the regional elections of the ARMM
unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in the course of our discussions
below, as this concept permeates the consideration of the various issues posed in
this case and must be recalled time and again for its complete resolution.
II. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No.
10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of the
Constitution[18] which provides that before bills passed by either the House or the
Senate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days.
The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills
immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[19] explained the effect
of the Presidents certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill
on separate days. The phrase "except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in
Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before
a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on
separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally approved.
xxx
That upon the certification of a bill by the President,
the requirement of three readings on separate days and of
printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by
the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining
the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation
with the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was
passed on second and third readings in the House of
Representatives on the same day [May 14, 1968] after the bill
had been certified by the President as urgent.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national
and local elections.[20] Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification
exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three
separate readings requirement.
On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate
enactment of these bills since there was no public calamity or emergency that had
to be met, again we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art.
VII, Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency
justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the
President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial
review because basic rights of individuals may be of
hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of
bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements
designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members
of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of
review. [Emphasis supplied.]
The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their
legislative discretion gave full recognition to the Presidents certification and
promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our
intrusion under our power of judicial review.[21]
The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or
justification for this course of action. Hence, while the judicial department and
this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the President's certification by
both the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our
powers and respect due our co-equal branches of government in matters
committed to them by the Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand.[22]
In any case, despite the Presidents certification, the two-fold purpose
that underlies the requirement for three readings on separate days of every bill
must always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties interested in
pending bills to intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with
respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters
they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is in progress through
the enactment process.[23]
We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both
advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had sufficient
opportunities to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA
No. 10153 on the cited ground.
III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been
challenged because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA
No. 9054 in amending this law. These provisions require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this
Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the
Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of
the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting
separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall
become effective only when approved by a majority of the vote
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not
earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after
the approval of such amendment or revision.
We find no merit in this contention.
In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No.
9054. As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for
the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular
elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of
the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and
thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws RA No. 9333 and RA
No. 10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not
change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA
No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent regular
elections.
This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the
date of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion finds support in
ARMMs recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the
ARMM elections. The First Organic Act RA No. 6734 not only did not fix the date
of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first
ARMM elections,[24] leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment.
Consequently, RA No. 7647,[25] RA No. 8176,[26] RA No. 8746,[27] RA No.
8753,[28] and RA No. 9012[29] were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the
ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provision
of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there
was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March 31,
2001, provided that the first elections would be held on the second Monday of
September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 [30] to reset the date
of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the
plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new
date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the
provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter,
Congress passed RA No. 9333,[31] which further reset the date of the ARMM
regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to
treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate
and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this
intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the
amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA
No. 9054.
III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No.
9054 the character of an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA
No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1,
Article XVII of RA No. 9054[32] has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution
demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of
each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. In other words, as long as
majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are
present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold
session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws
or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no
less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and
of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054.
Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires
for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to
amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The Courts pronouncement in City
of Davao v. GSIS[33] on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the
unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic
principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the
actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies
are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do the same
plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes
desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts
to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments
labors under delusions of omniscience.
xxx
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all
subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its
territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the
old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal
constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself
or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so
restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts
passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be
exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed;
and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a
law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a
particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the
intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent
legislation upon existing statutes.[34] (Emphasis ours.)
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a
limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and
is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future
legislators room for action and flexibility.
III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the
plebiscite requirement found in Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution
The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted
supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its
Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement,
we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section 18,
Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a
violation of the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is
required only for the creation of autonomous regions and for determining which
provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions.
While the settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with
the plebiscite requirement in order to become effective,[35] questions on the
extent of the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of the
seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would
result if a plebiscite were to be required for every statutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that The creation
of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by the majority of the
votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. With
these wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only
amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the
creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the
Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require
ratification through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those
that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the regions
judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally
conceded to the regional government under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution.[36]
The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters
that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic
Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the plebiscite
requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as
a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with
these requirements.
IV. The synchronization issue
As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local elections is a
constitutional mandate that Congress must provide for and this synchronization
must include the ARMM elections. On this point, an existing law in fact already
exists RA No. 7166 as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No. 7166
already provides for the synchronization of local elections with the national and
congressional elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for
local governments (with the exception
of barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms are not
constitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of what is already
reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local elections by
express constitutional recognition.[37]
To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the
schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August
2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local
elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to
Congress in order to resolve this problem. These options are: (1) to allow the
elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant
to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office;[38] (2) to hold special elections in the
ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the President to appoint
OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office.
As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in choosing
to grant the President the power to appoint OICs, chose the correct option and
passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.
V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153
A. Basic Underlying Premises
To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material
premises must be fully understood. The first is the extent of the powers of
Congress to legislate; the second is the constitutional mandate for the
synchronization of elections; and the third is on the concept of autonomy as
recognized and established under the 1987 Constitution.
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive.[39] The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes
of civil government.[40] Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition,
is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere.[41] Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly,
legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of general
concern or common interest.[42]
The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or
implied. The express limitations are generally provided in some provisions of the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of
Rights (Article 3). Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and
referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions of
Article X) provide their own express limitations. The implied limitations are found
in the evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical
events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a part of organic
law.[43]
The constitutional provisions on autonomy specifically, Sections 15 to 21
of Article X of the Constitution constitute express limitations on legislative power
as they define autonomy, its requirements and its parameters, thus limiting what
is otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to legislate on the governance of the
autonomous region.
Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the
limitations posed by the prescribed basic structure of government i.e., that the
government must have an executive department and a legislative assembly, both
of which must be elective and representative of the constituent political units;
national government, too, must not encroach on the legislative powers granted
under Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as expressly reflected in Section 17,
Article X, all powers and functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to
the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve as a
standard that Congress must observe in dealing with legislation touching on the
affairs of the autonomous regions. The terms of these sections leave no doubt on
what the Constitution intends the idea of self-rule or self-government, in
particular, the power to legislate on a wide array of social, economic and
administrative matters. But equally clear under these provisions are the
permeating principles of national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the
Republic, as expressed in the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section 15.[44] In
other words, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand,
reject the notion of imperium et imperio[45] in the relationship between the
national and the regional governments.

In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization
of national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional
mandates, with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling force
differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and
affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests directly
carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be
discounted.
These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and limitations
of Congress when it acted on RA No. 10153. To succinctly describe the legal
situation that faced Congress then, its decision to synchronize the regional
elections with the national, congressional and all other local elections (save
for barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections) left it with the problem of how
to provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening period between the
expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the assumption to
office twenty-one (21) months away of those who will win in the synchronized
elections on May 13, 2013.
The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this period,
consistent with the terms of the Constitution and its established supporting
jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept of autonomy. Interim
measures, to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape.
The Constitutions Transitory Provisions themselves collectively provide measures
for transition from the old constitution to the new [46] and for the introduction of
new concepts.[47] As previously mentioned, the adjustment of elective terms and
of elections towards the goal of synchronization first transpired under the
Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look far enough or
deeply enough, particularly into the problems that synchronizing regional
autonomous elections would entail; thus, the present problem is with us today.
The creation of local government units also represents instances when
interim measures are required. In the creation of Quezon del Sur[48] and Dinagat
Islands,[49] the creating statutes authorized the President to appoint an interim
governor, vice-governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan although
these positions are essentially elective in character; the appointive officials were
to serve until a new set of provincial officials shall have been elected and
qualified.[50] A similar authority to appoint is provided in the transition of a local
government from a sub-province to a province.[51]
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-
of-the-way arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust
to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the
Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations, the
choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.
To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as
the guideposts and markers in our discussion of the options available to Congress
to address the problems brought about by the synchronization of the ARMM
elections, properly understood as interim measures that Congress had to
provide. The proper understanding of the options as interim measures assume
prime materiality as it is under these terms that the passage of RA No. 10153
should be measured, i.e., given the constitutional objective of synchronization
that cannot legally be faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or
violate the Constitution when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the
concomitant problems that the adjustment of elections necessarily brought
with it?
B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected in
executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an
option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot
extend their term through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmea v. COMELEC:[52]
It is not competent for the legislature to extend the
term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their
successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has
in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when
the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall
begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office
beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify
within the time.
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated
as follows:

It has been broadly stated that the
legislature cannot, by an act postponing the
election to fill an office the term of which is
limited by the Constitution, extend the term
of the incumbent beyond the period as limited
by the Constitution. [Emphasis ours.]
Independently of the Osmea ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as
the supreme law of the land dictates that where the Constitution has itself made
a determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined or mandated
should be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by amendment or
repeal through the applicable constitutional process. A necessary corollary is that
none of the three branches of government can deviate from the constitutional
mandate except only as the Constitution itself may allow.[53] If at all, Congress may
only pass legislation filing in details to fully operationalize the constitutional
command or to implement it by legislation if it is non-self-executing; this Court,
on the other hand, may only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is
appropriate and called for.[54]
In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and
unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to the
fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this
Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3)
years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated
by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint
the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term
is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do
directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the
incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.[55] Congress cannot also create a new
term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This
is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion
into the constitutional appointment power of the President.[56] Hence, holdover
whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could
not have undertaken.
Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the question of
holdover was brought before, and given the imprimatur of approval by, this Court.
The present case though differs significantly from past cases with contrary
rulings, particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC,[57] Adap v.
[58] [59]
Comelec, and Montesclaros v. Comelec, where the Court ruled that the
elective officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.
All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang
kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for
in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, refers to local elective
officials the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly whose terms fall within the three-year term limit
set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Because of their constitutionally
limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension beyond the term for which
they were originally elected.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had
been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the
past,[60] we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an
available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary
exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.[61]
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the
intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by
completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly
within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative
powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation,[62] except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.
C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections
Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this
Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special elections pursuant to
Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature,
as evident from, and exemplified by, the following provisions of the Constitution:
Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the
regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House
of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
[Emphasis ours]
Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the
President and Vice-President, states:
xxxx
Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the
regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on
the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government
code which shall provide for xxx the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions
and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours]
These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on
any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of
Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress,
or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either
the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of
that power.[63]
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the
scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13, 2011 for
regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise
of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment
measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can
act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the
COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby
supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the
Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being
unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion.[64] But
our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening
act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate
what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative
powers. Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot
compel COMELEC to call for special elections.
Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of
the COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress to call for, and to set the
date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election.[65] Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to
call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory
grant. True, Congress did grant, viaSections 5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the
power to postpone elections to another date. However, this power is limited to,
and can only be exercised within, the specific terms and circumstances provided
for in the law. We quote:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any
serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of
election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other
analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free,
orderly and honest election should become impossible in any
political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a
verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice
and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal
opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to
a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the
cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or
failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on
the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed
by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during
the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or
in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election,
the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the
holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to
the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in
a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of
the election or failure to elect. [Emphasis ours]

A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to address
instances where elections have already been scheduled to take place but have
to be postponed because of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of
election paraphernalia or records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogous
causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election
should become impossible in any political subdivision. Under the principle
of ejusdem generis, the term analogous causes will be restricted to
those unforeseen or unexpected events that prevent the holding of the
scheduled elections. These analogous causes are further defined by the phrase of
such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become
impossible.
Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where
elections have already been scheduled but do not take place because of (a) force
majeure, (b) violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other analogous causes the
election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the
voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or
in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect. As
in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances where the elections do not
occur or had to be suspended because
of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances.
In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by
law i.e., by congressional policy and is pursuant to the constitutional mandate of
synchronization of national and local elections. By no stretch of the imagination
can these reasons be given the same character as the circumstances contemplated
by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal causes that
obstruct the holding of elections.Courts, to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope of
a statute under the guise of interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor
intended by the lawmakers.[66] Clearly, neither Section 5 nor Section 6 of BP 881
can apply to the present case and this Court has absolutely no legal basis to compel
the COMELEC to hold special elections.
D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials
Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the
COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis likewise exists to rule that the
newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the ARMM officials
elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of
elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the term of office
of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case
of barangay officials,[67] is specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may
be denied such power, as shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of
twelve Senators obtaining the least votes,[68] and extended the terms of the
President and the Vice-President[69] in order to synchronize elections; Congress
was not granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the
Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute.[70] More particularly, not even
Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms of
elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more, than the constitutionally
mandated three years[71] as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot
be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an
expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself
commands. This is what will happen a term of less than two years if a call for
special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the
result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials
to be elected in the ARMM elections instead of acting on their term (where the
term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right
and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
another, while the tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually
holds the office).[72] As with the fixing of the elective term, neither Congress nor
the Court has any legal basis to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials.
They would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if
they do so.
E. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs
The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA
No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM
during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law
as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should
be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and
the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly
construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized.[73] The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the
Constitution, which states: appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads
were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and
of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not
ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the
in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional
appoint all other officers of the Government whose
Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. This power is
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank
far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term
in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
elections.
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President
As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority and
can appoint. These are:
plebiscite requirements, the legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend
RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public
elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And
ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the
this is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was written and based on
rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested
its unambiguous facial terms.[75]Aside from its order for synchronization, it is
in the President in this Constitution;
purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires.
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim measure is
an unreasonable move for Congress to adopt, given the legal situation that the
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
synchronization unavoidably brought with it. In more concrete terms and based on
appoint; and
the above considerations, given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a
holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by
shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the
law vest in the President alone.[74]
Presidents power to appoint for a fixed and specific period as an interim
measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution an
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No.
unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?
10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint
pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed
Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other
law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
situations or where the power of appointment would extend beyond the
adjustment period for synchronization would be to foster a government that is not
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to
democratic and republican. For then, the peoples right to choose the leaders to
appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the
govern them may be said to be systemically withdrawn to the point of fostering
Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be
an undemocratic regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the elective
elective and representative of the constituent political units. This requirement
and representative governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution.
But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances
contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is fixed and, more importantly,
the terms of governance both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and
RA No. 9054 will not systemically be touched nor affected at all. To repeat what
has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously, with
full effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim and
temporary measures that synchronization of elections requires.
Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily
disrupt the election process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the
communitys choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of
necessity and as an interim measure in the manner that interim measures have
been adopted and used in the creation of local government units [76] and the
adjustments of sub-provinces to the status of provinces.[77] These measures, too,
are used in light of the wider national demand for the synchronization of elections
(considered vis--vis the regional interests involved). The adoption of these
measures, in other words, is no different from the exercise by Congress of the
inherent police power of the State, where one of the essential tests is the
reasonableness of the interim measure taken in light of the given circumstances.
Furthermore, the representative character of the chosen leaders need
not necessarily be affected by the appointment of OICs as this requirement is
really a function of the appointment process; only the elective aspect shall be
supplanted by the appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly
seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments by providing, under
Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC,
the Manner and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 viewed in its
proper context is a law that is not violative of the Constitution (specifically, its
autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the circumstances.
VI. Other Constitutional Concerns
Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral
arguments that upholding the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 would set a
dangerous precedent of giving the President the power to cancel elections
anywhere in the country, thus allowing him to replace elective officials with OICs.
This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board
cancellation of elections is a matter for Congress, not for the President, to
address. It is a power that falls within the powers of Congress in the exercise of
its legislative powers. Even Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can
legislatively undertake with respect to elections.
If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a
very specific and limited purpose the synchronization of elections. It was a
temporary means to a lasting end the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No.
10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and
specific, and cannot be transferred or applied to any other cause for the
cancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation of elections and call for
special elections can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated by
Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.
Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue to act
in a holdover capacity upon the expiration of their terms, and this Court cannot
compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal with
the dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.
To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be
forgotten that a period of 21 months or close to 2 years intervenes from the time
that the incumbent ARMM elective officials terms expired and the time the new
ARMM elective officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of
our Mindanao history past and current teach us, many developments, some of them
critical and adverse, can transpire in the countrys Muslim areas in this span of
time in the way they transpired in the past.[78] Thus, it would be reckless to assume
that the presence of an acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a
fully functioning Regional Legislative Assembly can be done away with even
temporarily. To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the present
circumstances is an absolute necessity.
Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier
pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:[79]
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588
and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is
empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public
offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws
deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions.
However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local
Government Code and in the best interest of public service,
we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by
 the two laws may not be similarly applied in the present case.
The respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct
appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the
President who has supervision over local governments as provided
by law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-
governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President,
until the law provides otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no
approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of
their right of representation and governance in their own local
government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules
through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or
absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that
extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a
consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the
people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is
missing.[80](Emphasis ours.)
As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor,
and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost
2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services
to the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional government,
and in responding to critical developments that may arise. When viewed in this
context, allowing the President in the exercise of his constitutionally-recognized
appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to
take.
B. Autonomy in the ARMM
It is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally
mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to impede the autonomy that the
Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume
that there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional mandates
synchronization and regional autonomy such that it is necessary to choose one over
the other.
We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle
in constitutional construction ut magis valeat quam pereat: that the Constitution
is to be interpreted as a whole,[81] and one mandate should not be given importance
over the other except where the primacy of one over the other is clear.[82] We
refer to the Courts declaration in Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al.,[83] thus:
A provision of the constitution should not be construed
in isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution must be
interpreted as a whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions
should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that may
give to all of them full force and effect. [Emphasis supplied.]
Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional
autonomy. They are interests that this Court should reconcile and give effect to,
in the way that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the measure to transit
to synchronized regional elections with the least disturbance on the interests that
must be respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead of
being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or modify its governing
features, except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated by the
attendant circumstances.
Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be
synchronized with the national and local elections in order to maintain the
autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from the rough
and tumble of nationwide and local elections. This argument leaves us far from
convinced of its merits.
As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions are
granted political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never equated
autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to
operate within the larger framework of the State and is still subject to the
national policies set by the national government, save only for those specific areas
reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous determination. As reflected
during the constitutional deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions:
Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete
separation from the central government, but rather an efficient
working relationship between the autonomous region and the
central government. We see this as an effective partnership, not
a separation.
Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really
thought of as complete independence.
Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-
government within the larger political framework of the
nation.[84] [Emphasis supplied.]
This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the above-quoted
Section 17, Article X of the Constitution, and by the express reservation under
Section 1 of the same Article that autonomy shall be within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to
remove Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be unnecessary in light of the
enumeration of powers granted to autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X of
the Constitution. Upon further reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the
provision in order to make it clear, once and for all, that these are the limits of
the powers of the autonomous government. Those not enumerated are actually
to be exercised by the national government[.][85] Of note is the Courts
pronouncement in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre[86] which we quote:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the
national government has not completely relinquished all its
powers over local governments, including autonomous
regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are
delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the
delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and
effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and
social development at the smaller political units are expected to
propel social and economic growth and development. But to
enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and
policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated
towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the
entire country still lies in the President and
Congress. [Emphasis ours.]
In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to
defeat national policies and concerns. Since the synchronization of elections is not
just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional
autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from having
to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than the
Constitution.
Conclusion
Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate
the synchronization of national and local elections when it enacted RA No.
10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this
task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation.[87] As judges, we can only interpret and apply the law
and, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it.[88]
Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should
address what is essentially a legislative problem. It is not within the Courts power
to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping the
exclusive prerogative of Congress.[89] The petitioners, in asking this Court to
compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of authority to do so,
are essentially asking us to venture into the realm of judicial legislation, which is
abhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic
government the separation of powers.
The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted
with grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion
is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.[90]
We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its
constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due
constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary
adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be
accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We
thus find no reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of
discretion.
On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only
reiterate the established rule that every statute is presumed valid.[91] Congress,
thus, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the party
challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this
presumption.[92] Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be
resolved in favor of its constitutionality.[93]As this Court declared in Garcia v.
Executive Secretary:[94]
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the
political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to
sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation
of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming
 respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR.,
that as the joint act of Congress and the President of PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Promulgated:
the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and Executive Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR.,
determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law Secretary of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, October 18, 2011
before it was finally enacted.[95] [Emphasis ours.] Treasurer of the Philippines,
Respondents.
Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of x----------------------------------------------x
constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and confirm its BASARI D. MAPUPUNO,
validity. Petitioner,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated
petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the
constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we - versus -
issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.

SO ORDERED. SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman G.R. No. 196305

of the Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO
ABAD, JR. in his capacity as Secretary of the
Republic of the Philippines Department of Budget and Management,
Supreme Court PACQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as
Manila Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his
capacity as Senate President, and FELICIANO
EN BANC BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of the
House of Representatives,
Respondents.
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, G.R. No. 196271 x----------------------------------------------x
in his personal capacity, and in representation of
MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS Present: REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN,
IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI Petitioner,
MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, CORONA, C.J.,
JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, CARPIO,
MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-E, VELASCO, JR., - versus -
KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
SAUPI, BRION,
Petitioners, PERALTA, PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the
BERSAMIN, Executive Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON
DEL CASTILLO, ELECTIONS,
- versus - ABAD, Respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR., x----------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 197221
PEREZ,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by MENDOZA, ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU
its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF SERENO, CASAN CONDING CANA, and PARTIDO
REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO REYES, and DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN
BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. (PDP-LABAN),
Petitioners,
- versus -
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its
Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management, and HON.
ROBERTO B. TAN, in his capacity as Treasurer of
the Philippines,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------
------x
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL,
Petitioner,
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
LUIS BAROK BIRAOGO,
Petitioner,
- versus -
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
JACINTO V. PARAS,
Petitioner,
- versus -
G.R. No. 197392
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
G.R. No. 197280 JR., and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Respondents-Intervenor.
G.R. No. 197454
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing
for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
G.R. No. 197282 Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other
Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August
2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to
coincide with the countrys regular national and local elections. The law as well
granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the
Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of
the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to
the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office.
 Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153
already spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate
Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court.These petitions
multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.
Factual Antecedents
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,
mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact
an organic act for these autonomous regions to concretely carry into effect the
granted autonomy.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from
multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of the
executive department and legislative assembly, both of which
shall be elective and representative of the constituent political
units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts
with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent
with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided
that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably
in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. A
plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X
of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM). The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu
and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional
officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days
after its ratification.
RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act
No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, as Amended) was the next legislative act passed. This law provided
further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the original
organic act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to
the second Monday of September 2001.
Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM RA No. 9140[1] - on June
22, 2001. This law reset the first regular elections originally scheduled under RA
No. 9054, to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No.
9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.
RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001.
The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the same date.
RA No. 9333[2] was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM
regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every
3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not
ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections
and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to
be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM
elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of
the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill
(HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the ARMM elections scheduled
on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of Representatives passed HB
No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version,
Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13) Senators voted
favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of Representative concurred
with the Senate amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No.
10153 into law.
As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a
petition filed with this Court G.R. No. 196271[3] - assailing the constitutionality
of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity of RA No. 9333
as well for non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement.
Thereafter, petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 filed another
petition[4] also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.
With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its
preparations for the ARMM elections. The law gave rise as well to the filing of the
following petitions against its constitutionality:
a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[5] filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a
member of the House of Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in
his capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the COMELEC, docketed
as G.R. No. 197221;
b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition[6] filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal
as a taxpayer against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197282;
c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary
Injunction[7] filed by Louis Barok Biraogo against the COMELEC and
Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R. No.
197392; and
d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[8] filed by Jacinto Paras as a
member of the House of Representatives against Executive Secretary
Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197454.
Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as
registered voters from the ARMM, with the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng
Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM regional elections scheduled
for August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus [9] against
the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197280, to assail the constitutionality of
RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.
Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc.
and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed their own Motion for Leave to Admit
their Motion for Intervention and Comment-in-Intervention dated July 18, 2011.
On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the Court
ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the constitutionality of
HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.
Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16, 2011. Thereafter, the
parties were instructed to submit their respective memoranda within twenty (20)
days.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials
of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be
decided by the end of their term on September 30, 2011.
The Arguments
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that
these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority
vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII
of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional
for its failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2),
Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of
the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to
the elective and representative character of the executive and legislative
departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the
President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective
ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections
shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of
appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in
complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.
The Issues
From the parties submissions, the following issues were recognized and argued by
the parties in the oral arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:
I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections
II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section
26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
 III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a
supermajority vote and plebiscite
A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular
elections constitute an amendment to Section 7,
Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?
B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for
amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate
Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the corollary doctrine on
irrepealable laws?
C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in
the creation of autonomous regions under paragraph
2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?
IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted
to the ARMM
V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:
A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and
legal.
We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.
OUR RULING
We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.
I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate
The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the
Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this position, cites
Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under
this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May,
1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined
by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of
the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all
Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan
Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve
obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six year
and the remaining twelve for three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and
Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to
noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President
under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of
May, 1992.
We agree with this position.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective
can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution,[10] which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought
to attain synchronization of elections.[11]
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective
officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve
winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of
all future elections whether national or local to once every three years.[12] This
intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission
deliberations.[13]
 These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of
the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting
the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the
national and local elections as a constitutional mandate. In Osmea v. Commission on
Elections,[14] we explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987
Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of
the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President
and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the
same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-
mentioned Sections that the term of synchronization is used
synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is
the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the
same day or occasion. This common termination date will
synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas,
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p.
605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House
of Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art.
XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for
President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is
likewise evident from the x x x records of the proceedings in the
Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included
among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the
wording and structure of the Constitution.
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should
be understood in the sense that they have in common use and given their ordinary
meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails.[15] As this Court explained in People v.
Derilo,[16] [a]s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, its language
should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its words should
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to something that primarily
serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor
political subdivision.[17] Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of
governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives obviously fall
within this classification, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve
within the limited region of ARMM.
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are
considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article X of
the Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous regions are established
and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted
to Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form of local
government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which
provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
Thus, we find the contention that the synchronization mandated by the
Constitution does not include the regional elections of the ARMM
unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in the course of our discussions
below, as this concept permeates the consideration of the various issues posed in
this case and must be recalled time and again for its complete resolution.
II. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No.
10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of the
Constitution[18] which provides that before bills passed by either the House or the
Senate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days.
The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills
immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[19] explained the effect
of the Presidents certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill
on separate days. The phrase "except when the President
 certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in
Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before
a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on
separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally approved.
The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their
legislative discretion gave full recognition to the Presidents certification and
promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our
intrusion under our power of judicial review.[21]

xxx The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or

justification for this course of action. Hence, while the judicial department and
That upon the certification of a bill by the President,
this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the President's certification by
the requirement of three readings on separate days and of
both the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our
printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by
powers and respect due our co-equal branches of government in matters
the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining
committed to them by the Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand.[22]
the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation
with the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was
In any case, despite the Presidents certification, the two-fold purpose
passed on second and third readings in the House of
that underlies the requirement for three readings on separate days of every bill
Representatives on the same day [May 14, 1968] after the bill
must always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties interested in
had been certified by the President as urgent.
pending bills to intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with
respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the
they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is in progress through
Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the
the enactment process.[23]
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national
and local elections.[20] Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification
We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both
exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three
advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had sufficient
separate readings requirement.
opportunities to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA
No. 10153 on the cited ground.
On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate
enactment of these bills since there was no public calamity or emergency that had
III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054
to be met, again we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino:
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been
challenged because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension
No. 9054 in amending this law. These provisions require:
of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art.
VII, Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this
justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the
Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the
President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial
Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of
review because basic rights of individuals may be of
the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting
hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of
separately.
bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements
designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall
of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of
become effective only when approved by a majority of the vote
review. [Emphasis supplied.]
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not
earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after
the approval of such amendment or revision.
 We find no merit in this contention.
In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No.
9054. As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for
the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular
elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of
the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and
thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws RA No. 9333 and RA
No. 10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not
change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA
No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent regular
elections.
This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the
date of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion finds support in
ARMMs recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the
ARMM elections. The First Organic Act RA No. 6734 not only did not fix the date
of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first
ARMM elections,[24] leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment.
Consequently, RA No. 7647,[25] RA No. 8176,[26] RA No. 8746,[27] RA No.
8753,[28] and RA No. 9012[29] were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the
ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provision
of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there
was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March 31,
2001, provided that the first elections would be held on the second Monday of
September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 [30] to reset the date
of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the
plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new
date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the
provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter,
Congress passed RA No. 9333,[31] which further reset the date of the ARMM
regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to
treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate
and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this
intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the
amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA
No. 9054.
III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No.
9054 the character of an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA
No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1,
Article XVII of RA No. 9054[32] has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution
demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of
each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. In other words, as long as
majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are
present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold
session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws
or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no
less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and
of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054.
Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires
for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to
amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The Courts pronouncement in City
of Davao v. GSIS[33] on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the
unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic
principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the
actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies
are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do the same
plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes
desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts
to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments
labors under delusions of omniscience.
xxx
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all
subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its
territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the
old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal
constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself
or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so
 restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts
passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be
exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed;
and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a
law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a
particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the
intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent
legislation upon existing statutes.[34] (Emphasis ours.)
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a
limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and
is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future
legislators room for action and flexibility.
III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the
plebiscite requirement found in Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution
The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted
supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its
Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement,
we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section 18,
Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a
violation of the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is
required only for the creation of autonomous regions and for determining which
provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions.
While the settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with
the plebiscite requirement in order to become effective,[35] questions on the
extent of the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of the
seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would
result if a plebiscite were to be required for every statutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that The creation
of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by the majority of the
votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. With
these wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only
amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the
creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the
Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require
ratification through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those
that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the regions
judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally
conceded to the regional government under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution.[36]
The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters
that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic
Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the plebiscite
requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as
a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with
these requirements.
IV. The synchronization issue
As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local elections is a
constitutional mandate that Congress must provide for and this synchronization
must include the ARMM elections. On this point, an existing law in fact already
exists RA No. 7166 as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No. 7166
already provides for the synchronization of local elections with the national and
congressional elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for
local governments (with the exception
of barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms are not
constitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of what is already
reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local elections by
express constitutional recognition.[37]
To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the
schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August
2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local
elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to
Congress in order to resolve this problem. These options are: (1) to allow the
elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant
to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office;[38] (2) to hold special elections in the
ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the President to appoint
OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office.
 As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in choosing
to grant the President the power to appoint OICs, chose the correct option and
passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.
V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153
A. Basic Underlying Premises
To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material
premises must be fully understood. The first is the extent of the powers of
Congress to legislate; the second is the constitutional mandate for the
synchronization of elections; and the third is on the concept of autonomy as
recognized and established under the 1987 Constitution.
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive.[39] The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes
of civil government.[40] Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition,
is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere.[41] Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly,
legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of general
concern or common interest.[42]
The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or
implied. The express limitations are generally provided in some provisions of the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of
Rights (Article 3). Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and
referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions of
Article X) provide their own express limitations. The implied limitations are found
in the evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical
events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a part of organic
law.[43]
The constitutional provisions on autonomy specifically, Sections 15 to 21
of Article X of the Constitution constitute express limitations on legislative power
as they define autonomy, its requirements and its parameters, thus limiting what
is otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to legislate on the governance of the
autonomous region.
Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the
limitations posed by the prescribed basic structure of government i.e., that the
government must have an executive department and a legislative assembly, both
of which must be elective and representative of the constituent political units;
national government, too, must not encroach on the legislative powers granted
under Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as expressly reflected in Section 17,
Article X, all powers and functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to
the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve as a
standard that Congress must observe in dealing with legislation touching on the
affairs of the autonomous regions. The terms of these sections leave no doubt on
what the Constitution intends the idea of self-rule or self-government, in
particular, the power to legislate on a wide array of social, economic and
administrative matters. But equally clear under these provisions are the
permeating principles of national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the
Republic, as expressed in the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section 15.[44] In
other words, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand,
reject the notion of imperium et imperio[45] in the relationship between the
national and the regional governments.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization
of national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional
mandates, with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling force
differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and
affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests directly
carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be
discounted.
These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and limitations
of Congress when it acted on RA No. 10153. To succinctly describe the legal
situation that faced Congress then, its decision to synchronize the regional
elections with the national, congressional and all other local elections (save
for barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections) left it with the problem of how
to provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening period between the
expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the assumption to
office twenty-one (21) months away of those who will win in the synchronized
elections on May 13, 2013.
The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this period,
consistent with the terms of the Constitution and its established supporting
jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept of autonomy. Interim
measures, to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape.
The Constitutions Transitory Provisions themselves collectively provide measures
for transition from the old constitution to the new[46] and for the introduction of
new concepts.[47] As previously mentioned, the adjustment of elective terms and
of elections towards the goal of synchronization first transpired under the
Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look far enough or
deeply enough, particularly into the problems that synchronizing regional
autonomous elections would entail; thus, the present problem is with us today.
The creation of local government units also represents instances when
interim measures are required. In the creation of Quezon del Sur[48] and Dinagat
Islands,[49] the creating statutes authorized the President to appoint an interim
governor, vice-governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan although
these positions are essentially elective in character; the appointive officials were
to serve until a new set of provincial officials shall have been elected and
qualified.[50] A similar authority to appoint is provided in the transition of a local
government from a sub-province to a province.[51]
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-
of-the-way arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust
to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the
Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations, the
choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.
To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as
the guideposts and markers in our discussion of the options available to Congress
to address the problems brought about by the synchronization of the ARMM
elections, properly understood as interim measures that Congress had to
provide. The proper understanding of the options as interim measures assume
prime materiality as it is under these terms that the passage of RA No. 10153
should be measured, i.e., given the constitutional objective of synchronization
that cannot legally be faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or
violate the Constitution when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the
concomitant problems that the adjustment of elections necessarily brought
with it?
B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected in
executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an
option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot
extend their term through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmea v. COMELEC:[52]
It is not competent for the legislature to extend the
term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their
successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has
in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when
the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall
begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office
beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify
within the time.
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated
as follows:
It has been broadly stated that the
legislature cannot, by an act postponing the
election to fill an office the term of which is
limited by the Constitution, extend the term
of the incumbent beyond the period as limited
by the Constitution. [Emphasis ours.]
Independently of the Osmea ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as
the supreme law of the land dictates that where the Constitution has itself made
a determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined or mandated
should be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by amendment or
repeal through the applicable constitutional process. A necessary corollary is that
none of the three branches of government can deviate from the constitutional
mandate except only as the Constitution itself may allow.[53] If at all, Congress may
only pass legislation filing in details to fully operationalize the constitutional
command or to implement it by legislation if it is non-self-executing; this Court,
on the other hand, may only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is
appropriate and called for.[54]
In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and
unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to the
fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this
Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3)
years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated
by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint
the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term
is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do
directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the
incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.[55] Congress cannot also create a new
term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This
is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion
into the constitutional appointment power of the President.[56] Hence, holdover
whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could
not have undertaken.
Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the question of
holdover was brought before, and given the imprimatur of approval by, this Court.
The present case though differs significantly from past cases with contrary
rulings, particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC,[57] Adap v.
[58] [59]
Comelec, and Montesclaros v. Comelec, where the Court ruled that the
elective officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.
All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang
kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for
in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, refers to local elective
officials the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly whose terms fall within the three-year term limit
set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Because of their constitutionally
limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension beyond the term for which
they were originally elected.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had
been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the
past,[60] we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an
available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary
exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.[61]
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the
intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by
completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly
within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative
powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation,[62] except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.
C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections
Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this
Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special elections pursuant to
Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature,
as evident from, and exemplified by, the following provisions of the Constitution:
Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the
regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House
of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
[Emphasis ours]
Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the
President and Vice-President, states:
xxxx
Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the
regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on
the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government
code which shall provide for xxx the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions
and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours]
These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on
any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of
Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress,
or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either
the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of
that power.[63]
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the
scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13, 2011 for
regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise
of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment
measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can
act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the
COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby
supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the
Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being
unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion.[64] But
our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening
act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate
what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative
powers. Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot
compel COMELEC to call for special elections.
Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of
the COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress to call for, and to set the
date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election.[65] Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to
call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory
grant. True, Congress did grant, viaSections 5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the
power to postpone elections to another date. However, this power is limited to,
and can only be exercised within, the specific terms and circumstances provided
for in the law. We quote:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any
serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of
election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other
analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free,
orderly and honest election should become impossible in any
political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a
verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice
and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal
opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to
a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the
cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or
failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on
the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed
by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during
the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or
in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election,
the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the
holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to
the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in
a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of
the election or failure to elect. [Emphasis ours]
A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to address
instances where elections have already been scheduled to take place but have
to be postponed because of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of
election paraphernalia or records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogous
causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election
should become impossible in any political subdivision. Under the principle
of ejusdem generis, the term analogous causes will be restricted to
those unforeseen or unexpected events that prevent the holding of the
scheduled elections. These analogous causes are further defined by the phrase of
such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become
impossible.
Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where
elections have already been scheduled but do not take place because of (a) force
majeure, (b) violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other analogous causes the
election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the
voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or
in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect. As
in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances where the elections do not
occur or had to be suspended because
of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances.
In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by
law i.e., by congressional policy and is pursuant to the constitutional mandate of
synchronization of national and local elections. By no stretch of the imagination
can these reasons be given the same character as the circumstances contemplated
by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal causes that They would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if
obstruct the holding of elections.Courts, to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope of they do so.
a statute under the guise of interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor
intended by the lawmakers.[66] Clearly, neither Section 5 nor Section 6 of BP 881 E. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs
can apply to the present case and this Court has absolutely no legal basis to compel
the COMELEC to hold special elections. The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA
No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM
D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law
as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should
be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the
COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis likewise exists to rule that the At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and
newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the ARMM officials the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly
elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed office. construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of recognized.[73] The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the
elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the term of office Constitution, which states:
of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case
of barangay officials,[67] is specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
be denied such power, as shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads
twelve Senators obtaining the least votes,[68] and extended the terms of the
of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
President and the Vice-President[69] in order to synchronize elections; Congress
ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the
was not granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute.[70] More particularly, not even
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms of
appoint all other officers of the Government whose
elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more, than the constitutionally
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
mandated three years[71] as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8,
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
Article X of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank
in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an
expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President
commands. This is what will happen a term of less than two years if a call for
can appoint. These are:
special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the
result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public
ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the
Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials
rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested
to be elected in the ARMM elections instead of acting on their term (where the
in the President in this Constitution;
term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right
and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not
another, while the tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually
otherwise provided for by law;
holds the office).[72] As with the fixing of the elective term, neither Congress nor
the Court has any legal basis to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials.
 Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by
law vest in the President alone.[74]
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No.
10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint
pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed
law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to
appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the
Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be
elective and representative of the constituent political units. This requirement
indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the
appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional
problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153
were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and
representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not
in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in
terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is
to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional
Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected
in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. This power is
far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term
ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013
elections.
As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority and
plebiscite requirements, the legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend
RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of
elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And
this is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was written and based on
its unambiguous facial terms.[75]Aside from its order for synchronization, it is
purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires.
Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim measure is
an unreasonable move for Congress to adopt, given the legal situation that the
synchronization unavoidably brought with it. In more concrete terms and based on
the above considerations, given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a
holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or
shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the
Presidents power to appoint for a fixed and specific period as an interim
measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution an
unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?
Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other
situations or where the power of appointment would extend beyond the
adjustment period for synchronization would be to foster a government that is not
democratic and republican. For then, the peoples right to choose the leaders to
govern them may be said to be systemically withdrawn to the point of fostering
an undemocratic regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the elective
and representative governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution.
But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances
contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is fixed and, more importantly,
the terms of governance both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and
RA No. 9054 will not systemically be touched nor affected at all. To repeat what
has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously, with
full effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim and
temporary measures that synchronization of elections requires.
Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily
disrupt the election process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the
communitys choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of
necessity and as an interim measure in the manner that interim measures have
been adopted and used in the creation of local government units [76] and the
adjustments of sub-provinces to the status of provinces.[77] These measures, too,
are used in light of the wider national demand for the synchronization of elections
(considered vis--vis the regional interests involved). The adoption of these
measures, in other words, is no different from the exercise by Congress of the
inherent police power of the State, where one of the essential tests is the
reasonableness of the interim measure taken in light of the given circumstances.
Furthermore, the representative character of the chosen leaders need
not necessarily be affected by the appointment of OICs as this requirement is
really a function of the appointment process; only the elective aspect shall be
supplanted by the appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly
seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments by providing, under
Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC,
the Manner and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 viewed in its
proper context is a law that is not violative of the Constitution (specifically, its
autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the circumstances.
VI. Other Constitutional Concerns
Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral
arguments that upholding the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 would set a
dangerous precedent of giving the President the power to cancel elections
anywhere in the country, thus allowing him to replace elective officials with OICs.
This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board
cancellation of elections is a matter for Congress, not for the President, to
address. It is a power that falls within the powers of Congress in the exercise of
its legislative powers. Even Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can
legislatively undertake with respect to elections.
If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a
very specific and limited purpose the synchronization of elections. It was a
temporary means to a lasting end the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No.
10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and
specific, and cannot be transferred or applied to any other cause for the
cancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation of elections and call for
special elections can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated by
Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.
Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue to act
in a holdover capacity upon the expiration of their terms, and this Court cannot
compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal with
the dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.
To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be
forgotten that a period of 21 months or close to 2 years intervenes from the time
that the incumbent ARMM elective officials terms expired and the time the new
ARMM elective officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of
our Mindanao history past and current teach us, many developments, some of them
critical and adverse, can transpire in the countrys Muslim areas in this span of
time in the way they transpired in the past.[78] Thus, it would be reckless to assume
that the presence of an acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a
fully functioning Regional Legislative Assembly can be done away with even
temporarily. To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the present
circumstances is an absolute necessity.
Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier
pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:[79]
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588
and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is
empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public
offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws
deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions.
However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local
Government Code and in the best interest of public service,
we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by
the two laws may not be similarly applied in the present case.
The respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct
appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the
President who has supervision over local governments as provided
by law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-
governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President,
until the law provides otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no
approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of
their right of representation and governance in their own local
government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules
through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or
absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that
extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a
consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the
people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is
missing.[80](Emphasis ours.)
As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor,
and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost
2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services
to the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional government,
and in responding to critical developments that may arise. When viewed in this
context, allowing the President in the exercise of his constitutionally-recognized
appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to
take.
B. Autonomy in the ARMM
It is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally
mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to impede the autonomy that the
Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume
that there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional mandates
synchronization and regional autonomy such that it is necessary to choose one over
the other.
We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle
in constitutional construction ut magis valeat quam pereat: that the Constitution
is to be interpreted as a whole,[81] and one mandate should not be given importance
over the other except where the primacy of one over the other is clear.[82] We
refer to the Courts declaration in Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al.,[83] thus:
A provision of the constitution should not be construed
in isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution must be
interpreted as a whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions
should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that may
give to all of them full force and effect. [Emphasis supplied.]
Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional
autonomy. They are interests that this Court should reconcile and give effect to,
in the way that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the measure to transit
to synchronized regional elections with the least disturbance on the interests that
must be respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead of
being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or modify its governing
features, except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated by the
attendant circumstances.
Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be
synchronized with the national and local elections in order to maintain the
autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from the rough
and tumble of nationwide and local elections. This argument leaves us far from
convinced of its merits.
As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions are
granted political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never equated
autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to
operate within the larger framework of the State and is still subject to the
national policies set by the national government, save only for those specific areas
reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous determination. As reflected
during the constitutional deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions:
Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete
separation from the central government, but rather an efficient
working relationship between the autonomous region and the
central government. We see this as an effective partnership, not
a separation.
Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really
thought of as complete independence.
Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-
government within the larger political framework of the
nation.[84] [Emphasis supplied.]
This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the above-quoted
Section 17, Article X of the Constitution, and by the express reservation under
Section 1 of the same Article that autonomy shall be within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to
remove Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be unnecessary in light of the
enumeration of powers granted to autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X of
the Constitution. Upon further reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the
provision in order to make it clear, once and for all, that these are the limits of
the powers of the autonomous government. Those not enumerated are actually
to be exercised by the national government[.][85] Of note is the Courts
pronouncement in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre[86] which we quote:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the
national government has not completely relinquished all its
powers over local governments, including autonomous
regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are
delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the
delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and
effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and
social development at the smaller political units are expected to
propel social and economic growth and development. But to
enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and
policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated
 towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the
entire country still lies in the President and
Congress. [Emphasis ours.]
In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to
defeat national policies and concerns. Since the synchronization of elections is not
just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional
autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from having
to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than the
Constitution.
Conclusion
Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate
the synchronization of national and local elections when it enacted RA No.
10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this
task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation.[87] As judges, we can only interpret and apply the law
and, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it.[88]
Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should
address what is essentially a legislative problem. It is not within the Courts power
to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping the
exclusive prerogative of Congress.[89] The petitioners, in asking this Court to
compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of authority to do so,
are essentially asking us to venture into the realm of judicial legislation, which is
abhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic
government the separation of powers.
The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted
with grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion
is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.[90]
We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its
constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due
constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary
adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be
accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We
thus find no reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of
discretion.
On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only
reiterate the established rule that every statute is presumed valid.[91] Congress,
thus, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the party
challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this
presumption.[92] Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be
resolved in favor of its constitutionality.[93]As this Court declared in Garcia v.
Executive Secretary:[94]
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the
political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to
sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation
of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming
respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is
that as the joint act of Congress and the President of
the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and
determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law
before it was finally enacted.[95] [Emphasis ours.]
Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and confirm its
validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated
petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the
constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we
issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, G.R. No. 196271
in his personal capacity, and in representation
of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF
AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as
ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. the Executive Secretary, and the
USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL Respondents.
JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL- X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - XALMARIM
SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, CENTI TILLAH, DATU
and BASSAM ALUH SAUPI, CASAN CONDING CANA, and PARTIDO
Petitioners, DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN
- versus - (PDP-LABAN),
Petitioners, G.R. No. 197221
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented - versus -
by its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, thru THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through
SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR.,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his
Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., capacity as Executive Secretary, HON.
PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his capacity as
President Executive Secretary, FLORENCIO Secretary of the Department of Budget and
ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in
ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the Philippines, his capacity as Treasurer of the Philippines,
Respondents. Respondents. G.R. No. 197280
X----------------------X X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - XATTY.
BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, ROMULO B. MACALINTAL,
Petitioner, Petitioner,
- versus - - versus -

SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE

Chairman of the Commission on Elections, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, through
FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in his capacity as EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
Secretary of the Department of Budget and OCHOA, JR.,
Management, PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his Respondents.
capacity as Executive Secretary, JUAN X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - XLOUIS
PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate G.R. No. 196305 BAROK C. BIRAOGO,
President, and FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his Petitioner,
capacity as Speaker of the House of - versus -
Representatives,
Respondents. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - XREP. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
EDCEL C. LAGMAN, OCHOA, JR.,
Petitioner, Respondents.
- versus - X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X JACINTO
V. PARAS,
Petitioner,
 PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

G.R. No. 197282 Promulgated:

- versus - February 28, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x

RESOLUTION

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. BRION, J.:

OCHOA, JR., and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------x
MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES,
INC.,
Respondents-Intervenor.
We resolve: (a) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Datu
G.R. No. 197392 Michael Abas Kida, et al. in G.R. No. 196271; (b) the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Rep. Edcel Lagman in G.R. No. 197221; (c) the ex abundante ad
cautelam motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R.
No. 196305; (d) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo
Macalintal in G.R. No. 197282; (e) the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, Datu Casan Conding Cana and Partido
Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan in G.R. No. 197280; (f) the manifestation and
motion filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, et al. in G.R. No. 197280; and (g)
the very urgent motion to issue clarificatory resolution that the temporary
restraining order (TRO) is still existing and effective.

G.R. No. 197454 These motions assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we
upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the
Present: constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional
CORONA, C.J., elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were
CARPIO, scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday
VELASCO, JR., of May 2013 and recognized the Presidents power to appoint officers-in-charge
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of
BRION, the elected officials.
PERALTA, The Motions for Reconsideration
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,* The petitioners in G.R. No. 196271 raise the following grounds in support of their
ABAD, motion:
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, I. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN
MENDOZA, CONCLUDING THAT THE ARMM ELECTIONS ARE
SERENO,** LOCAL ELECTIONS, CONSIDERING THAT THE
REYES, and CONSTITUTION GIVES THE ARMM A SPECIAL
 STATUS AND IS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM
ORDINARY LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.
II. R.A. 10153 AND R.A. 9333 AMEND THE ORGANIC
ACT.
III. THE SUPERMAJORITY PROVISIONS OF THE
ORGANIC ACT (R.A. 9054) ARE NOT IRREPEALABLE
LAWS.
IV. SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVII OF R.A. 9054 DOES
NOT VIOLATE SECTION 18, ARTICLE X OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
V. BALANCE OF INTERESTS TILT IN FAVOR OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE[.][1]
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 raises similar grounds, arguing that:
I. THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE AND
LEGISLATIVE OFFICIALS OF ARMM CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED AS OR EQUATED WITH THE
TRADITIONAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS (LGUs) BECAUSE
(A) THERE IS NO EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION ON SUCH PARITY; AND (B) THE ARMM
IS MORE SUPERIOR THAN LGUs IN STRUCTURE,
POWERS AND AUTONOMY, AND CONSEQUENTLY IS
A CLASS OF ITS OWN APART FROM TRADITIONAL
LGUs.
II. THE UNMISTAKABLE AND UNEQUIVOCAL
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE FOR AN ELECTIVE
AND REPRESENTATIVE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
AND LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY IN ARMM
INDUBITABLY PRECLUDES THE APPOINTMENT BY
THE PRESIDENT OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE (OICs),
ALBEIT MOMENTARY OR TEMPORARY, FOR THE
POSITIONS OF ARMM GOVERNOR, VICE GOVERNOR
AND MEMBERS OF THE REGIONAL ASSEMBLY.
III. THE PRESIDENTS APPOINTING POWER IS
LIMITED TO APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS AND DOES
NOT EXTEND TO ELECTIVE OFFICIALS EVEN AS
THE PRESIDENT IS ONLY VESTED WITH
SUPERVISORY POWERS OVER THE ARMM, THEREBY
NEGATING THE AWESOME POWER TO APPOINT
AND REMOVE OICs OCCUPYING ELECTIVE
POSITIONS.
IV. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROSCRIBE THE
HOLDOVER OF ARMM ELECTED OFFICIALS PENDING
THE ELECTION AND QUALIFICATION OF THEIR
SUCCESSORS.
V. THE RULING IN OSMENA DOES NOT APPLY TO
ARMM ELECTED OFFICIALS WHOSE TERMS OF
OFFICE ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR BY THE
CONSTITUTION BUT PRESCRIBED BY THE ORGANIC
ACTS.
VI. THE REQUIREMENT OF A SUPERMAJORITY OF
VOTES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND
THE SENATE FOR THE VALIDITY OF A
SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE
ORGANIC ACTS DOES NOT IMPOSE AN
IRREPEALABLE LAW.
VII. THE REQUIREMENT OF A PLEBISCITE FOR THE
EFFECTIVITY OF A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT OR
REVISION OF THE ORGANIC ACTS DOES NOT
UNDULY EXPAND THE PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT
OF THE CONSTITUTION.
VIII. SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ARMM ELECTION
WITH THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS IS
NOT MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION.
IX. THE COMELEC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD
AND CONDUCT SPECIAL ELECTIONS IN ARMM, AND
THE ENACTMENT OF AN IMPROVIDENT AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE IS AN
ANALOGOUS CAUSE WARRANTING COMELECS
 HOLDING OF SPECIAL ELECTIONS.[2] (italics PLEBISCITE IS NOT NECESSARY IN AMENDING
supplied) THE ORGANIC ACT.

xxxx
The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 further asserts that:
V. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A
SERIOUS ERROR IN DECLARING THE HOLD-OVER
I. BEFORE THE COURT MAY CONSTRUE OR OF ARMM ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
INTERPRET A STATUTE, IT IS A CONDITION SINE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
QUA NON THAT THERE BE DOUBT OR AMBIGUITY
IN ITS LANGUAGE. xxxx

THE TRANSITORY PROVISIONS HOWEVER ARE CLEAR AND VI. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A
UNAMBIGUOUS: THEY REFER TO THE 1992 SERIOUS ERROR IN UPHOLDING THE
ELECTIONS AND TURN-OVER OF ELECTIVE APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE.[3] (italics
OFFICIALS. and underscoring supplied)
IN THUS RECOGNIZING A SUPPOSED INTENT OF
THE FRAMERS, AND APPLYING THE SAME TO
ELECTIONS 20 YEARS AFTER, THE HONORABLE The petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 contends that:
SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE
VIOLATED THE FOREMOST RULE IN STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION. A.

xxxx ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING THAT THE

APPOINTMENT OF OICs FOR THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT
II. THE HONORABLE COURT SHOULD HAVE OF THE ARMM IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO BEGIN
CONSIDERED THAT RA 9054, AN ORGANIC ACT, WITH, SUCH APPOINTMENT OF OIC REGIONAL OFFICIALS
WAS COMPLETE IN ITSELF. HENCE, RA 10153 WILL CREATE A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE BASIC
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN ENACTED STRUCTURE OF THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT SUCH THAT
PRECISELY TO AMEND RA 9054. R.A. NO. 10153 SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO A
PLEBISCITE IN THE ARMM FOR APPROVAL BY ITS PEOPLE,
xxxx WHICH PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT CANNOT BE
CIRCUMVENTED BY SIMPLY CHARACTERIZING THE
III. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 10153 ON APPOINTMENT OF OICs
COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN DECLARING THE AS AN INTERIM MEASURE.
2/3 VOTING REQUIREMENT SET FORTH IN RA 9054
AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. B.

xxxx THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF OICs FOR THE ARMM
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE
A SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT A CONSTITUTION.
 C.
THE HOLDOVER PRINCIPLE ADOPTED IN R.A. NO. 9054 DOES
NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION, AND BEFORE THEIR
SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN EITHER AN ELECTION TO BE
HELD AT THE SOONEST POSSIBLE TIME OR IN MAY 2013,
THE SAID INCUMBENT ARMM REGIONAL OFFICIALS MAY
VALIDLY CONTINUE FUNCTIONING AS SUCH IN A
HOLDOVER CAPACITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 7,
ARTICLE VII OF R.A. NO. 9054.
D.
WITH THE CANCELLATION OF THE AUGUST 2011 ARMM
ELECTIONS, SPECIAL ELECTIONS MUST IMMEDIATELY BE
HELD FOR THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL OFFICIALS OF THE
ARMM WHO SHALL SERVE UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE
ELECTED IN THE MAY 2013 SYNCHRONIZED ELECTIONS.[4]
Finally, the petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 argue that:
a) the Constitutional mandate of synchronization does not apply
to the ARMM elections;
b) RA No. 10153 negates the basic principle of republican
democracy which, by constitutional mandate, guides the
governance of the Republic;
c) RA No. 10153 amends the Organic Act (RA No. 9054) and,
thus, has to comply with the 2/3 vote from the House of
Representatives and the Senate, voting separately, and be
ratified in a plebiscite;
d) if the choice is between elective officials continuing to hold
their offices even after their terms are over and non-elective
individuals getting into the vacant elective positions by
appointment as OICs, the holdover option is the better choice;
e) the President only has the power of supervision over
autonomous regions, which does not include the power to appoint
OICs to take the place of ARMM elective officials; and
f) it would be better to hold the ARMM elections separately
from the national and local elections as this will make it easier
for the authorities to implement election laws.
In essence, the Court is asked to resolve the following questions:
(a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM
regional elections with national and local elections?
(b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No.
10153 have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements?
(c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?
(d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections
in ARMM?
(e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate
the elective and representative nature of ARMM regional
legislative and executive offices?
(f) Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed
the Presidents supervisory powers over autonomous regions?
The Courts Ruling
We deny the motions for lack of merit.
Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections
The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the
synchronization of national and local elections. While the Constitution does not
expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local elections, the
intention can be inferred from the following provisions of the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which state:

Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under
this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May,
1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined
by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of
the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all
Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan
Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives, and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve
obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six years
and the remaining twelve for three years.
xxxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and
Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to
noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President
under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of
May, 1992.
To fully appreciate the constitutional intent behind these provisions, we
refer to the discussions of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will now read
a section which we will temporarily indicate as Section 14. It
reads: THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS ELECTED
IN THE FIRST ELECTION SHALL SERVE FOR FIVE YEARS, TO
EXPIRE AT NOON OF JUNE 1992.
This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we ask that
Commissioner Davide be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner Davide
is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would
only state that in view of the action taken by the Commission on
Section 2 earlier, I am formulating a new proposal. It will read as
follows: THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST
ELECTED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE
UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992.
I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article
on Transitory Provisions giving a term to the incumbent President
and Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily then, since the term
provided by the Commission for Members of the Lower House
and for local officials is three years, if there will be an election
in 1987, the next election for said officers will be in 1990, and it
would be very close to 1992. We could never attain, subsequently,
any synchronization of election which is once every three years.
So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual
synchronization in 1992, and consequently, we should not have
a local election or an election for Members of the Lower House
in 1990 for them to be able to complete their term of three years
each. And if we also stagger the Senate, upon the first election
it will result in an election in 1993 for the Senate alone, and there
will be an election for 12 Senators in 1990. But for the remaining
12 who will be elected in 1987, if their term is for six years, their
election will be in 1993. So, consequently we will have elections in
1990, in 1992 and in 1993. The later election will be limited to
only 12 Senators and of course to the local officials and the
Members of the Lower House. But, definitely, thereafter we can
never have an election once every three years, therefore
defeating the very purpose of the Commission when we adopted
the term of six years for the President and another six years for
the Senators with the possibility of staggering with 12 to serve
for six years and 12 for three years insofar as the first Senators
are concerned. And so my proposal is the only way to effect
the first synchronized election which would mean, necessarily,
a bonus of two years to the Members of the Lower House and
a bonus of two years to the local elective officials.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the
committee say?
MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner de
Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
During the discussion on the legislative and the synchronization
of elections, I was the one who proposed that in order to
synchronize the elections every three years, which the body
approved the first national and local officials to be elected in
1987 shall continue in office for five years, the same thing the
Honorable Davide is now proposing. That means they will all serve
until 1992, assuming that the term of the President will be for
six years and continue beginning in 1986. So from 1992, we will
again have national, local and presidential elections. This time, in
1992, the President shall have a term until 1998 and the first
12 Senators will serve until 1998, while the next 12 shall
serve until 1995, and then the local officials elected in 1992
will serve until 1995. From then on, we shall have an election
every three years.
So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner Davide is in
order, if we have to synchronize our elections every three years
which was already approved by the body.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
xxxx
MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is the
election of the incumbent President and Vice-President in 1992.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not
synchronize the election of the Senators and local officials with
the election of the President?
MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The
attempt here is on the assumption that the provision of the
Transitory Provisions on the term of the incumbent President and
Vice-President would really end in 1992.
MR. GUINGONA. Yes.
MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in
1992 for all, from the President up to the municipal
officials.[5] (emphases and underscoring ours)
The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective
more clearly there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials from
the President down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even
willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order
to meet this objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate.
We came to the same conclusion in Osmea v. Commission on
Elections,[6] where we unequivocally stated that the Constitution has mandated
synchronized national and local elections."[7] Despite the length and verbosity of
their motions, the petitioners have failed to convince us to deviate from this
established ruling.
Neither do we find any merit in the petitioners contention that the ARMM
elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization
because the ARMM elections were not specifically mentioned in the above-quoted
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution.
That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean
that the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of
synchronization. We have to consider that the ARMM, as we now know it, had not
yet been officially organized at the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified
by the people. Keeping in mind that a constitution is not intended to provide merely
for the exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for as long
as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign, a constitution should
be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing instrument to govern not
only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although
the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the
time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process
intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not static.[8]
 To reiterate, Article X of the Constitution, entitled Local Government,
clearly shows the intention of the Constitution to classify autonomous regions,
such as the ARMM, as local governments. We refer to Section 1 of this Article,
which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political
subdivisions of the State under the heading Local Government indicates quite
clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the
forms of local governments.
That the Constitution mentions only the national government and the local
governments, and does not make a distinction between the local government and
the regional government, is particularly revealing, betraying as it does the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions
not as separate forms of government, but as political units which, while having
more powers and attributes than other local government units, still remain under
the category of local governments. Since autonomous regions are classified as local
governments, it follows that elections held in autonomous regions are also
considered as local elections.
The petitioners further argue that even assuming that the Constitution
mandates the synchronization of elections, the ARMM elections are not covered
by this mandate since they are regional elections and not local elections.
In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis,
that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.[9] Applying this
principle to determine the scope of local elections, we refer to the meaning of the
word local, as understood in its ordinary sense. As defined in Websters Third New
International Dictionary Unabridged, local refers to something that primarily
serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor
political subdivision. Obviously, the ARMM elections, which are held within the
confines of the autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao, fall within this definition.
To be sure, the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than other
provinces, cities, or municipalities is not enough reason to treat the ARMM
regional elections differently from the other local elections. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not distinguish, we must not
distinguish.[10]
RA No. 10153 does not amend RA No. 9054
The petitioners are adamant that the provisions of RA No. 10153, in postponing
the ARMM elections, amend RA No. 9054.
We cannot agree with their position.
A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for
only the first ARMM elections;[11] it does not provide the date for the succeeding
regular ARMM elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections,
RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws
do not change or revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the
ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153
merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.
We reiterate our previous observations:
This view that Congress thought it best to leave the
determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to
legislative discretion finds support in ARMMs recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that
rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act RA No.
6734 not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections;
it did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM elections,
leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment.
Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No. 8176, RA No. 8746, RA No.
8753, and RA No. 9012 were all enacted by Congress to fix the
dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or
modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not
amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was no need
to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed
into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections
would be held on the second Monday of September 2001.
Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 to reset the date of
the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also
scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the Second
Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional
elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions
 ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054.
Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, which further reset
the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not
ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention
of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the
subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the
Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent
when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with
the amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section
3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.[12] (emphases supplied)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 contends, however, that there is no
lacuna in RA No. 9054 as regards the date of the subsequent ARMM elections. In
his estimation, it can be implied from the provisions of RA No. 9054 that the
succeeding elections are to be held three years after the date of the first ARMM
regional elections.
We find this an erroneous assertion. Well-settled is the rule that the
court may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and
include therein situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission
at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially
supplied however later wisdom may recommend the inclusion.[13] Courts are not
authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to supply what
they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention had been called to
the omission.[14] Providing for lapses within the law falls within the exclusive
domain of the legislature, and courts, no matter how well-meaning, have no
authority to intrude into this clearly delineated space.
Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but merely fills in the gap in RA No.
9054, there is no need for RA No. 10153 to comply with the amendment
requirements set forth in Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
Supermajority vote requirement makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, we have
already established that the supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section
1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054[15] is unconstitutional for violating the principle
that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.
The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal
these laws. Where the legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its power to
amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike down such act for
interfering with the plenary powers of Congress. As we explained in Duarte v.
Dade:[16]
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all
subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its
territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal
the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the
federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot
bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except
when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish
the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of
repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original
act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before
it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future
legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare
in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect
of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. [emphasis
ours]
Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve
bills by a mere majority vote, provided there is quorum. [17] In requiring all laws
which amend RA No. 9054 to comply with a higher voting requirement than the
Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly
violated the very principle which we sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate,
the act of one legislature is not binding upon, and cannot tie the hands of, future
legislatures.[18]
We also highlight an important point raised by Justice Antonio T. Carpio
in his dissenting opinion, where he stated: Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054
erects a high vote threshold for each House of Congress to surmount, effectively
and unconstitutionally, taking RA 9054 beyond the reach of Congress amendatory
powers. One Congress cannot limit or reduce the plenary legislative power of
succeeding Congresses by requiring a higher vote threshold than what the
Constitution requires to enact, amend or repeal laws. No law can be passed fixing
such a higher vote threshold because Congress has no power, by ordinary
legislation, to amend the Constitution.[19]
Plebiscite requirement in RA No. 9054 overly broad
 Similarly, we struck down the petitioners contention that the plebiscite
requirement[20] applies to all amendments of RA No. 9054 for being an
unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set forth in the
Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that [t]he creation of
the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose[.] We
interpreted this to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic
Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those
aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide
for in the Organic Act[21] require ratification through a plebiscite. We stand by
this interpretation.
The petitioners argue that to require all amendments to RA No. 9054 to
comply with the plebiscite requirement is to recognize that sovereignty resides
primarily in the people.
While we agree with the petitioners underlying premise that sovereignty
ultimately resides with the people, we disagree that this legal reality necessitates
compliance with the plebiscite requirement for allamendments to RA No. 9054.
For if we were to go by the petitioners interpretation of Section 18, Article X of
the Constitution that all amendments to the Organic Act have to undergo
the plebiscite requirement before becoming effective, this would lead to
impractical and illogical results hampering the ARMMs progress by impeding
Congress from enacting laws that timely address problems as they arise in the
region, as well as weighing down the ARMM government with the costs that
unavoidably follow the holding of a plebiscite.
Interestingly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 posits that RA No. 10153,
in giving the President the power to appoint OICs to take the place of the elective
officials of the ARMM, creates a fundamental change in the basic structure of
the government, and thus requires compliance with the plebiscite requirement
embodied in RA No. 9054.
Again, we disagree.
The pertinent provision in this regard is Section 3 of RA No. 10153, which
reads:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The President
shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining
to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May
2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.
We cannot see how the above-quoted provision has changed the basic
structure of the ARMM regional government. On the contrary, this provision
clearly preserves the basic structure of the ARMM regional government when it
recognizes the offices of the ARMM regional government and directs the OICs
who shall temporarily assume these offices to perform the functions pertaining to
the said offices.
Unconstitutionality of the holdover provision
The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article
VII of RA No. 9054, which allows the regional officials to remain in their positions
in a holdover capacity. The petitioners essentially argue that the ARMM regional
officials should be allowed to remain in their respective positions until the May
2013 elections since there is no specific provision in the Constitution which
prohibits regional elective officials from performing their duties in a holdover
capacity.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution is Section 8, Article X which provides:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
On the other hand, Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054 provides:
Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. (1)
Terms of Office. The terms of office of the Regional Governor,
Regional Vice Governor and members of the Regional Assembly
shall be for a period of three (3) years, which shall begin at noon
on the 30th day of September next following the day of the
election and shall end at noon of the same date three (3) years
thereafter. The incumbent elective officials of the autonomous
region shall continue in effect until their successors are elected
and qualified.
 The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses
the intent of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on
the period within which all elective local officials can occupy their offices. We
have already established that elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they
are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It,
therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit
elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the
Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit
by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years
for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and
cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover
provisions in various laws. One significant difference between the present case
and these past cases[22] is that while these past cases all refer to
elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office are not
explicitly provided for in the Constitution, the present case refers to local
elective officials - the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice Governor, and the
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly - whose terms fall within the three-
year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there
had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054), the
rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied
legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent
is evident.[23]
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option, has
made it clear that it wants to suppress the holdover rule expressed in RA No.
9054. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers, has clearly acted
within its discretion when it deleted the holdover option, and this Court has no
authority to question the wisdom of this decision, absent any evidence of
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion. It is for the legislature and the
executive, and not this Court, to decide how to fill the vacancies in the ARMM
regional government which arise from the legislature complying with the
constitutional mandate of synchronization.
COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections
Neither do we find any merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) is sufficiently empowered to set the date of special elections in the
ARMM. To recall, the Constitution has merely empowered the COMELEC to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election.[24] Although the legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the power to postpone
elections to another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and
circumstances provided for in the law. Specifically, this power falls within the
narrow confines of the following provisions:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious
cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of
election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other
analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free,
orderly and honest election should become impossible in any
political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a
verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice
and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal
opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to
a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the
cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or
failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on
the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed
by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during
the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or
in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election,
the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the
holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to
the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in
a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of
the election or failure to elect. [emphases and underscoring ours]
As we have previously observed in our assailed decision, both Section 5
and Section 6 of BP 881 address instances where elections have already been
scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be suspended because
of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances, such as violence, fraud, terrorism,
and other analogous circumstances.
In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance
of the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local elections.
Obviously, this does not fall under any of the circumstances contemplated by
Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881.
More importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next
ARMM elections and the COMELEC has no authority to set a different election
date.
Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to hold special elections, and
this Court can compel the COMELEC to do so, there is still the problem of having
to shorten the terms of the newly elected officials in order to synchronize the
ARMM elections with the May 2013 national and local elections. Obviously, neither
the Court nor the COMELEC has the authority to do this, amounting as it does to
an amendment of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which limits the term
of local officials to three years.
Presidents authority to appoint OICs
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 argues that the Presidents power to
appoint pertains only to appointive positions and cannot extend to positions held
by elective officials.
The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in
nature.[25] Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution describes in broad strokes
the extent of this power, thus:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest
the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
The 1935 Constitution contained a provision similar to the one quoted
above. Section 10(3), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provides:
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from
the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of
captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the
Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers,
in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments. [emphasis ours]
The main distinction between the provision in the 1987 Constitution and its
counterpart in the 1935 Constitution is the sentence construction; while in the
1935 Constitution, the various appointments the President can make are
enumerated in a single sentence, the 1987 Constitution enumerates the various
appointments the President is empowered to make and divides the enumeration in
two sentences. The change in style is significant; in providing for this change, the
framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly sought to make a distinction between the
first group of presidential appointments and the second group of presidential
appointments, as made evident in the following exchange:
MR. FOZ. Madame President x x x I propose to put a period (.)
after captain and x x x delete and all and substitute it with HE
SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, the Committee accepts the
proposed amendment because it makes it clear that those other
officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.[26]
The first group of presidential appointments, specified as the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the Armed Forces, and other officers whose appointments are vested
in the President by the Constitution, pertains to the appointive officials who have
to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
The second group of officials the President can appoint are all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.[27] The second
sentence acts as the catch-all provision for the Presidents appointment power, in
recognition of the fact that the power to appoint is essentially executive in
nature.[28] The wide latitude given to the President to appoint is further
demonstrated by the recognition of the Presidents power to appoint
officials whose appointments are not even provided for by law. In other words,
where there are offices which have to be filled, but the law does not provide the
process for filling them, the Constitution recognizes the power of the President
to fill the office by appointment.
Any limitation on or qualification to the exercise of the Presidents
appointment power should be strictly construed and must be clearly stated in
order to be recognized.[29] Given that the President derives his power to appoint
OICs in the ARMM regional government from law, it falls under the classification
of presidential appointments covered by the second sentence of Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution; the Presidents appointment power thus rests on
clear constitutional basis.
The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the
President the power to appoint OICs in elective positions, violates Section 16,
Article X of the Constitution,[30] which merely grants the President the power of
supervision over autonomous regions.
This is an overly restrictive interpretation of the Presidents appointment
power. There is no incompatibility between the Presidents power of supervision
over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the
President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.
The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see to it
that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law.[31] This is
distinguished from the power of control or the power of an officer to alter or
modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.[32]
The petitioners apprehension regarding the Presidents alleged power of
control over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the Presidents appointment
power includes the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the
petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President,
and act as representatives of the President and not of the people.
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners
supposition. The provision states:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The President
shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining
to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May
2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.
The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the
OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are
replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this
provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments
he already made. Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent
than real.
RA No. 10153 as an interim measure
We reiterate once more the importance of considering RA No. 10153 not
in a vacuum, but within the context it was enacted in. In the first place, Congress
enacted RA No. 10153 primarily to heed the constitutional mandate to synchronize
the ARMM regional elections with the national and local elections. To do this,
Congress had to postpone the scheduled ARMM elections for another date, leaving
it with the problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in the
intervening period, between the expiration of the term of those elected in August
2008 and the assumption to office twenty-one (21) months away of those who will
win in the synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.
In our assailed Decision, we already identified the three possible
solutions open to Congress to address the problem created by synchronization (a)
allow the incumbent officials to remain in office after the expiration of their
terms in a holdover capacity; (b) call for special elections to be held, and shorten
the terms of those to be elected so the next ARMM regional elections can be held
on May 13, 2013; or (c) recognize that the President, in the exercise of his
appointment powers and in line with his power of supervision over the ARMM, can
appoint interim OICs to hold the vacated positions in the ARMM regional
government upon the expiration of their terms. We have already established the
unconstitutionality of the first two options, leaving us to consider the last available
option.
In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted to
respond to the adjustment that synchronization requires. Given the context, we
have to judge RA No. 10153 by the standard of reasonableness in responding to
the challenges brought about by synchronizing the ARMM elections with the
national and local elections. In other words, given the plain unconstitutionality of
providing for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for
lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the
choice of the Presidents power to appoint for a fixed and specific period as
an interim measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to
make?[33]
We admit that synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election
process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the communitys choice of
leaders. However, we have to keep in mind that the adoption of this measure is a
matter of necessity in order to comply with a mandate that the Constitution itself
has set out for us. Moreover, the implementation of the provisions of RA No. 10153
as an interim measure is comparable to the interim measures traditionally
practiced when, for instance, the President appoints officials holding elective
offices upon the creation of new local government units.
The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs in place of the
elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor
innovative. The power granted to the President, via RA No. 10153, to appoint
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is comparable to the power granted
by BP 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) to the President to fill any vacancy for any
cause in the Regional Legislative Assembly (then called the Sangguniang
Pampook).[34]
Executive is not bound by the principle of judicial courtesy
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280, in their Manifestation and Motion dated
December 21, 2011, question the propriety of the appointment by the President of
Mujiv Hataman as acting Governor and Bainon Karon as acting Vice Governor of the
ARMM. They argue that since our previous decision was based on a close vote of
8-7, and given the numerous motions for reconsideration filed by the parties, the
President, in recognition of the principle of judicial courtesy, should have
refrained from implementing our decision until we have ruled with finality on this
case.
We find the petitioners reasoning specious.
Firstly, the principle of judicial courtesy is based on the hierarchy of courts and
applies only to lower courts in instances where, even if there is no writ of
preliminary injunction or TRO issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a
lower court to suspend its proceedings for practical and ethical
considerations.[35] In other words, the principle of judicial courtesy applies where
there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be
rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in
the lower court or court of origin.[36] Consequently, this principle cannot be applied
to the President, who represents a co-equal branch of government. To suggest
otherwise would be to disregard the principle of separation of powers, on which
our whole system of government is founded upon.
Secondly, the fact that our previous decision was based on a slim vote of 8-7 does
not, and cannot, have the effect of making our ruling any less effective or binding.
Regardless of how close the voting is, so long as there is concurrence of the
majority of the members of the en banc who actually took part in the deliberations
of the case,[37] a decision garnering only 8 votes out of 15 members is still a
decision of the Supreme Court en banc and must be respected as such. The
petitioners are, therefore, not in any position to speculate that, based on the
voting, the probability exists that their motion for reconsideration may be
granted.[38]
Similarly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282, in his Very Urgent Motion to Issue
Clarificatory Resolution, argues that since motions for reconsideration were filed
by the aggrieved parties challenging our October 18, 2011 decision in the present
case, the TRO we initially issued on September 13, 2011 should remain subsisting
and effective. He further argues that any attempt by the Executive to implement
our October 18, 2011 decision pending resolution of the motions for
reconsideration borders on disrespect if not outright insolence[39] to this Court.
In support of this theory, the petitioner cites Samad v.
COMELEC,[40] where the Court held that while it had already issued a decision
lifting the TRO, the lifting of the TRO is not yet final and executory, and can also
be the subject of a motion for reconsideration. The petitioner also cites the
minute resolution issued by the Court in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance,[41] where the Court reproached the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue for manifesting its intention to implement the decision of the
Court, noting that the Court had not yet lifted the TRO previously issued.[42]
We agree with the petitioner that the lifting of a TRO can be included as a subject
of a motion for reconsideration filed to assail our decision. It does not follow,
however, that the TRO remains effective until after we have issued a final and
executory decision, especially considering the clear wording of the dispositive
portion of our October 18, 2011 decision, which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the
consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for
lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We
likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we issued in
our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.[43] (emphases
ours)
In this regard, we note an important distinction between Tolentino and
the present case. While it may be true that Tolentino and the present case are
similar in that, in both cases, the petitions assailing the challenged laws were
dismissed by the Court, an examination of the dispositive portion of the decision
in Tolentino reveals that the Court did not categorically lift the TRO. In sharp
contrast, in the present case, we expressly lifted the TRO issued on September
13, 2011. There is, therefore, no legal impediment to prevent the President from
exercising his authority to appoint an acting ARMM Governor and Vice Governor
as specifically provided for in RA No. 10153.
Conclusion
As a final point, we wish to address the bleak picture that the petitioner
in G.R. No. 197282 presents in his motion, that our Decision has virtually given the
President the power and authority to appoint 672,416 OICs in the event that the
elections of barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials are postponed or
cancelled.
We find this speculation nothing short of fear-mongering.
This argument fails to take into consideration the unique factual and legal
circumstances which led to the enactment of RA No. 10153. RA No. 10153 was
passed in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. In the course of synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national
and local elections, Congress had to grant the President the power to appoint OICs
in the ARMM, in light of the fact that: (a) holdover by the incumbent ARMM
elective officials is legally impermissible; and (b) Congress cannot call for special
elections and shorten the terms of elective local officials for less than three
years.
Unlike local officials, as the Constitution does not prescribe a term limit
for barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials, there is no legal proscription
which prevents these specific government officials from continuing in a holdover
capacity should some exigency require the postponement
of barangay or Sangguniang Kabataan elections. Clearly, these fears have neither
legal nor factual basis to stand on.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petitioners motions for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY with FINALITY the
motions for reconsideration for lack of merit and UPHOLD the constitutionality
of RA No. 10153.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 93054 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 100
Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO, (Banaue),
Ifugao Provincial Board Member CORAZON MONTINIG, (Mayoyao), Former
Vice-Mayor MARTIN UDAN (Banaue), Municipal Councilors MARTIN GANO,
(Lagawe), and TEODORO HEWE, (Hingyon), Barangay Councilman PEDRO W.
DULAG (Lamut); Aguinaldo residents SANDY B. CHANGIWAN, and DONATO
TIMAGO; Lamut resident REY ANTONIO; Kiangan residents ORLANDO
PUGUON, and REYNAND DULDULAO; Lagawe residents TOMAS KIMAYONG,
GREGORIO DANGO, GEORGE B. BAYWONG, and VICENTE LUNAG; Hingyon
residents PABLO M. DULNUAN and CONSTANCIO GANO; Mayoyao residents
PEDRO M. BAOANG, LEONARDO IGADNA, and MAXIMO IGADNA; and
Banaue residents PUMA-A CULHI, LATAYON BUTTIG, MIGUEL PUMELBAN,
ANDRES ORDILLO, FEDERICO MARIANO, SANDY BINOMNGA, GABRIEL
LIMMANG, ROMEO TONGALI, RUBEN BAHATAN, MHOMDY GABRIEL, and
NADRES GHAMANG, Petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
The Honorable FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Secretary of Justice; Hon.
CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive Secretary; The Cabinet Officer for
Regional Development; Hon. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and
Management; and Hon. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC, National Treasurer,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being
the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera
Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.
The antecedent facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows:
On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a
plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for
an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed
that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only
the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest
of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259
stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by
majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. On the same date, the
Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the President reiterating the
COMELEC resolution and provided:
". . . [A]nd considering the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and city
voting favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only
province which voted favorably then, alone, legally and validly constitutes the
CAR." (Rollo, p. 7)
As a result of this, on March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861
setting the elections in the Cordillera Autonomous Region of Ifugao on the first
Monday of March 1991.: nad
Even before the issuance of the COMELEC resolution, the Executive Secretary on
February 5, 1990 issued a Memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs
of the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly created
under Executive Order No. 220.
On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the
non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The COMELEC merely noted
said petition.
On March 30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring
among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional
Assembly and all the offices created under Executive Order No. 220 were
abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act.- nad
The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region
in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that
the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.
The petitioners, then, pray that the Court: (1) declare null and void COMELEC
resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the
memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and
Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and restrain the respondents from
implementing the same and spending public funds for the purpose and (2) declare
Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and the
Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until
another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by
Congress and the same is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units. We
treat the Comments of the respondents as an answer and decide the case.
This petition is meritorious.
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and
the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of
the Philippines." (Emphasis Supplied)
The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote
that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region"
used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the
fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for
administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. (Integrated
Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by P.D.
No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it
must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins
other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The
Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.- nad
The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the
Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in
common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then, be
applied in this case. (See Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770, [1988]; J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, 422-423 [1970]).
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No.
6766 strengthens the petitioner's position that the Region cannot be constituted
from only one province.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera
Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting
of the Regional Government and local government units. It further provides that:
"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and
functions necessary for the proper governance and development of all
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous
Region . . ."
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single
province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with
the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials
and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative
powers over exactly the same small area.
Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in the
Cordillera Assembly whose members shall be elected from regional assembly
districts apportioned among provinces and the cities composing the Autonomous
Region. chanrobles virtual law library
If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly
shall then be elected only from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward
predicament of having two legislative bodies the Cordillera Assembly and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan exercising their legislative powers over the province
of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines,
population-wise, it would have too many government officials for so few people.:-
cralaw
Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and Development
Board composed of the Cordillera Governor, all the provincial governors and city
mayors or their representatives, two members of the Cordillera Assembly, and
members representing the private sector. The Board has a counterpart in the
provincial level called the Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator. The
Board's functions (Article XII, Section 10, par. 2, Republic Act No. 6766) are
almost similar to those of the Provincial Coordinator's (Title Four, Chapter 3,
Article 10, Section 220 (4), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 Local Government Code).
If it takes only one person in the provincial level to perform such functions while
on the other hand it takes an entire Board to perform almost the same tasks in
the regional level, it could only mean that a larger area must be covered at the
regional level. The respondent's theory of the Autonomous Region being made up
of a single province must, therefore, fail.
Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) alloting the huge amount of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00) to the Regional Government for its initial organizational
requirements cannot be construed as funding only a lone and small province.
These sections of Republic Act No. 6766 show that a one province Cordillera
Autonomous Region was never contemplated by the law creating it.
The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total population of the areas
enumerated in Article I, Section 2 (b) of Republic Act No. 6766 which include
Benguet, Mountain Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio City. It has the
second smallest number of inhabitants from among the provinces and city above
mentioned. The Cordillera population is distributed in round figures as follows:
Abra, 185,000; Benguet, 486,000; Ifugao, 149,000; Kalinga-Apayao, 214,000;
Mountain Province, 116,000; and Baguio City, 183,000; Total population of these
five provinces and one city; 1,332,000 according to the 1990 Census (Manila
Standard, September 30, 1990, p. 14).
There are other provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 which are either violated or
which cannot be complied with. Section 16 of Article V calls for a Regional
Commission on Appointments with the Speaker as Chairman and are (6) members
coming from different provinces and cities in the Region. Under the respondents'
view, the Commission would have a Chairman and only one member. It would never
have a quorum. Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet members, as far as
practicable, to come from various provinces and cities of the Region. Section 1 of
Article VII creates a system of tribal courts for the various indigenous cultural
communities of the Region. Section 9 of Article XV requires the development of a
common regional language based upon the various languages and dialects in the
region which regional language in turn is expected to enrich the national language.
The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region
is infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao
constituting the Region.:-cralaw
To contemplate the situation envisioned by the respondent would not only violate
the letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would also
be impractical and illogical.
Our decision in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC, (G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1969), is
not applicable in the case at bar contrary to the view of the Secretary of Justice.
The Abbas case laid down the rate on the meaning of majority in the phrase "by
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units called for the purpose" found
in the Constitution, Article X, Section 18. It stated:
 x x x SO ORDERED.

". . . [I]t is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is simple
majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put
Manila
together, as well as in the individual constituent units."

This was the pronouncement applied by the Secretary of Justice in arriving at his EN BANC
conclusion stated in his Memorandum for the President that:

x x x G.R. No. 79956 January 29, 1990

". . . [i]t is believed that the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region
(CAR) as mandated by R.A. No. 6766 became effective upon its approval
by the majority of the votes cast in the province of Ifugao. And
considering the proviso in Section 13 (a) that only the provinces and city
voting favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being
the only province which voted favorably can, alone, legally and validly
constitute the CAR." (Rollo. p. 40).
The plebiscites mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 for the
Cordillera and Republic Act No. 6734 for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao determine (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in the
Cordillera and in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those
enumerated in the two Republic Acts, shall comprise said Autonomous Regions.
(See III, Record of the Constitutional Commission, 487-492 [1986]).
The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces and cities shall
comprise the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao which is, consequently, the
same rule to follow with regard to the autonomous region in the Cordillera.
However, there is nothing in the Abbas decision which deals with the issue on
whether an autonomous region, in either Muslim Mindanao or Cordillera could exist
despite the fact that only one province or one city is to constitute it.chanrobles
virtual law library
Stated in another way, the issue in this case is whether the sole province of Ifugao
can validly and legally constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The issue is
not whether the province of Ifugao is to be included in the Cordillera Autonomous
Region. It is the first issue which the Court answers in the instant case.
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
G.R. No. 82217 January 29, 1990
LILIA YARANON and BONA BAUTISTA, assisted by their spouses, BRAULIO
D. YARANON and DEMETRIO D. BAUTISTA, JR., respectively; JAMES BRETT
and SINAI C. HAMADA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive
Secretary, HON. VICENTE JAYME, Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO N.
CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management, and HON. ROSALINA S.
CAJUCOM, OIC National Treasurer, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
220, dated July 15, 1987, which created the (Cordillera Administrative Region, is
assailed on the primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act
by the Congress and the creation of' the autonomous region in the Cordilleras
conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 2259 of the Relative to the creation of autonomous regions, the constitution, in Article X,
Commission on Elections, insofar as it upholds the creation of an autonomous provides:
region, the February 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the
February 5, 1990 memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while Executive
Order No. 220 is declared to be still in force and effect until properly repealed
or amended.
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
SEC. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over
autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted
Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be
vested in the National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multi-
sectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of the
executive department and legislative assembly, both of which
shall be elective and representative of the constituent political
units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts
with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent
with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units
in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution
shall, within eighteen months from the time of organization of
both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act
of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social and tourism development ;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the
promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions
shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which
shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in
accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of
the regions shall be the responsibility of the National
Government.
A study of E.O. No. 220 would be incomplete Without reference to its historical
background.
In April 1986, just after the EDSA Revolution, Fr. Conrado M.
Balweg, S.V.D., broke off on ideological grounds from the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm
the New People's Army. (NPA).
After President Aquino was installed into office by People
Power, she advocated a policy of national reconciliation. She
called on all revolutionary forces to a peace dialogue. The CPLA
heeded this call of the President. After the preliminary
negotiations, President Aquino and some members of her
Cabinet flew to Mt. Data in the Mountain Province on
September 13, 1986 and signed with Fr. Conrado M. Balweg (As
 Commander of the CPLA and Ama Mario Yag-ao (as President of
Cordillera Bodong Administration, the civil government of the
CPLA a ceasefire agreement that signified the cessation of
hostilities (WHEREAS No. 7, E.O. 220).
The parties arrived at an agreement in principle: the Cordillera
people shall not undertake their demands through armed and
violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as political
negotiations. The negotiations shall be a continuing process until
the demands of the Cordillera people shall have been
substantially granted.
On March 27, 1987, Ambassador Pelaez [Acting as Chief
Negotiator of the government], in pursuance of the September
13, 1986 agreement, flew to the Mansion House, Baguio City,
and signed with Fr. Balweg (as Chairman of the Cordillera panel)
a joint agreement, paragraphs 2 and 3 of which state:
Par. 2- Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create
a preparatory body that could perform policy-making and
administrative functions and undertake consultations and
studies leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.
Par. 3- Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the
study group of the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by
a panel of the Philippine government and of the representatives
of the Cordillera people.
On July 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed the joint
draft into law, known now as E.O. 220. [Rejoinder G.R. No.
82217, pp. 2-3].
Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her
legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created the
Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) , which covers the provinces of Abra,
Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio
[secs. 1 and 2]. It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the
region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras [sec. 3]. Its main function is to coordinate the planning and
implementation of programs and services in the region, particularly, to
coordinate with the local government units as well as with the executive
departments of the National Government in the supervision of field offices and
in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the
region [sec. 5]. It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national
and local government projects in the region [sec. 20]. The CAR shall have a
Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera
Executive Board as an implementing arm [secs. 7, 8 and 10]. The CAR and the
Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous
regional government is established and organized [sec. 17].
Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O. No. 220, its last "Whereas"
clause provides:
WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first Congress and the
enactment of the organic act for a Cordillera autonomous
region, there is an urgent need, in the interest of national
security and public order, for the President to reorganize
immediately the existing administrative structure in the
Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political realities therein
and the Government's legitimate concerns in the areas, without
attempting to pre-empt the constitutional duty of the first
Congress to undertake the creation of an autonomous region on
a permanent basis.
During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was enacted
and signed into law. The Act recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies
created under E.O. No. 220 and its transitory nature is reinforced in Art. XXI
of R.A. No. 6766, to wit:
SEC. 3. The Cordillera Executive Board, the Cordillera Region
Assembly as well as all offices and agencies created under
Execute Order No. 220 shall cease to exist immediately upon
the ratification of this Organic Act.
All funds, properties and assets of the Cordillera Executive
Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly shall automatically
be transferred to the Cordillera Autonomous Government.
I
It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that respect for the inherent and stated
powers and prerogatives of the law-making body, as well as faithful adherence to
the principle of separation of powers, require that its enactment be accorded
the presumption of constitutionality. Thus, in any challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute, the burden of clearly and unequivocally proving its
unconstitutionality always rests upon the challenger. Conversely, failure to so
prove will necessarily defeat the challenge.
We shall be guided by these principles in considering these consolidated
petitions.
In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the
President, in the exercise of her legislative powers prior to the convening of the
first Congress under the 1987 Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress
from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous
region in the Cordilleras. We have carefully studied the Constitution and E.O. No.
220 and we have come to the conclusion that petitioners' assertions are
unfounded. Events subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220 also bear out this
conclusion.
1. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is
the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line
departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by
the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the
Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the
Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the
enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short,
it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the
provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions, as we shall show later.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous
region in the Cordilleras. A regional consultative commission shall first be
created. The President shall then appoint the members of a regional consultative
commission from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. The commission
shall assist the Congress in preparing the organic act for the autonomous region.
The organic act shall be passed by the first Congress under the 1987
Constitution within eighteen months from the time of its organization and
enacted into law. Thereafter there shall be held a plebiscite for the approval of
the organic act [Art. X, sec. 18]. Only then, after its approval in the plebiscite,
shall the autonomous region be created.
Undoubtedly, all of these will take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising
legislative powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to
provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the
meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous
region created. These measures we find in E.O. No. 220. The steps taken by the
President are obviously perceived by petitioners, particularly petitioner Yaranon
who views E.O. No. 220 as capitulation to the Cordillera People's Liberation Army
(CPLA) of Balweg, as unsound, but the Court cannot inquire into the wisdom of
the measures taken by the President, We can only inquire into whether or not
the measures violate the Constitution. But as we have seen earlier, they do not.
2. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it
is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous
region in the Cordilleras" [Petition, G.R. No. 79956, p. 25].
The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous
region composed of an elective executive and legislature and special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction [Art. X, sec. 18]. Using this as a
guide, we find that E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional
government. It created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative
purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation
of programs and services [secs. 2 and 5]. To determine policy, it created a
representative assembly, to convene yearly only for a five-day regular session,
tasked with, among others, identifying priority projects and development
programs [sec. 9]. To serve as an implementing body, it created the Cordillera
Executive Board composed of the Mayor of Baguio City, provincial governors and
representatives of the Cordillera Bodong Administration, ethno-linguistic groups
and non-governmental organizations as regular members and all regional directors
of the line departments of the National Government as ex-officio members and
headed by an Executive Director [secs. 10 and 11]. The bodies created by E.O.
No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are they
autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an
"umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of
the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-
governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the
Cordilleras.
The creation of the CAR for purposes of administrative coordination is
underscored by the mandate of E.O. No. 220 for the President and appropriate
national departments and agencies to make available sources of funds for
priority development programs and projects recommended by the CAR [sec. 21]
and the power given to the President to call upon the appropriate executive
departments and agencies of the National Government to assist the CAR [sec.
24].
3. Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220, the Congress, after it was
convened, enacted Republic Act No. 6658 which created the Cordillera Regional
Consultative Commission. The President then appointed its members. The
commission prepared a draft organic act which became the basis for the
deliberations of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The result was
Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous region,
which was signed into law on October 23, 1989. A plebiscite for the approval of
the organic act, to be conducted shortly, shall complete the process outlined in
the Constitution.
In the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in force and effect for more than two
years and we find that, despite E.O. No. 220, the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras is still to be created, showing the lack of basis of petitioners'
assertion. Events have shown that petitioners' fear that E.O. No. 220 was a
"shortcut" for the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras was
totally unfounded.
Clearly, petitioners' principal challenge has failed.
II
A collateral issue raised by petitioners is the nature of the CAR: whether or not
it is a territorial and political subdivision. The Constitution provides in Article X:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
provided.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras contemplated by the Constitution, Thus, we now address petitioners'
assertion that E. 0. No. 220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a new
territorial and political subdivision.
After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did
not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a
larger subdivision.
1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political
subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces,
cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally
granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to
own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue,
etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning
and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas.
The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the
delivery of services is nothing new. The Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972,
which was made as part of the law of the land by virtue of Presidential Decree
No. 1, established eleven (11) regions, later increased to twelve (12), with
definite regional centers and required departments and agencies of the
Executive Branch of the National Government to set up field offices therein.
The functions of the regional offices to be established pursuant to the
Reorganization Plan are: (1) to implement laws, policies, plans, programs, rules and
regulations of the department or agency in the regional areas; (2) to provide
economical, efficient and effective service to the people in the area; (3) to
coordinate with regional offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies in
the area; (4) to coordinate with local government units in the area; and (5) to
perform such other functions as may be provided by law. [See Part II, chap. III,
art. 1, of the Reorganization Plan].
We can readily see that the CAR is in the same genre as the administrative
regions created under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220 the
operation of the CAR requires the participation not only of the line departments
and agencies of the National Government but also the local governments, ethno-
linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations in bringing about the
desired objectives and the appropriation of funds solely for that purpose.
2. Then, considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over
the CAR and the offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further
the indispensable participation of the line departments of the National
Government, the CAR may be considered more than anything else as a regional
coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to the regional
development councils which the President may create under the Constitution
[Art. X, sec. 14]. These councils are "composed of local government officials,
regional heads of departments and other government offices, and
representatives from non-governmental organizations within the region for
purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the
units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development
of the units in the region." [Ibid.] In this wise, the CAR may be considered as a
more sophisticated version of the regional development council.
III
Finally, petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of the CAR contravened
the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces (Abra,
Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) and city (Baguio City)
which compose the CAR.
We find first a need to clear up petitioners' apparent misconception of the
concept of local autonomy.
It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the
Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local
government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of
government authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L-31004, January 8, 1971, 37
SCRA 1]. Local autonomy is not unique to the 1987 Constitution, it being
guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution [Art. II, sec. 10]. And while there
was no express guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the
Local Autonomy Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No.
5185), which ushered the irreversible march towards further enlargement of
local autonomy in the country [Villegas v. Subido, supra.]
On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the
grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy these regions.
Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government
with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative
assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in
each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that
would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the
resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and
political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an
autonomous region vested with political autonomy.
Anent petitioners' objection, we note the obvious failure to show how the
creation of the CAR has actually diminished the local autonomy of the covered
provinces and city. It cannot be over-emphasized that pure speculation and a
resort to probabilities are insufficient to cause the invalidation of E.O. No. 220.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 118303. January 31, 1996]
SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D. LINA, JR., MR.
NICASIO B. BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS P. GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON
D. MAYLEM, LEONORA C. MEDINA, CASIANO S.
ALIPON, petitioners, vs. HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in
his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. RAFAEL ALUNAN, in his
capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. JOSE MIRANDA, in his capacity
as Municipal Mayor of Santiago and HON. CHARITO MANUBAY,
HON. VICTORINO MIRANDA, JR., HON. ARTEMIO ALVAREZ,
HON. DANILO VERGARA, HON. PETER DE JESUS, HON. NELIA
NATIVIDAD, HON. CELSO CALEON and HON. ABEL MUSNGI, in
their capacity as SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS, MR. RODRIGO
L. SANTOS, in his capacity as Municipal Treasurer, and ATTY.
ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, in his capacity as Municipal
Administrator, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Of main concern to the petitioners is whether Republic Act No. 7720, just
recently passed by Congress and signed by the President into law, is
constitutionally infirm.
 Indeed, in this Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners assail the validity of
Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago,
Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago,
mainly because the Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the
minimum average annual income required under Section 450 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a component city.
Undisputed is the following chronicle of the metamorphosis of House Bill No.
8817 into Republic Act No. 7720:
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled An Act Converting
the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as
the City of Santiago, was filed in the House of Representatives with
Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author. Other sponsors included
Representatives Ciriaco Alfelor, Rodolfo Albano, Santiago Respicio and Faustino
Dy. The bill was referred to the House Committee on Local Government and the
House Committee on Appropriations on May 5, 1993.
On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993, November 28, 1993, and December 1, 1993,
public hearings on HB No. 8817 were conducted by the House Committee on Local
Government. The committee submitted to the House a favorable report, with
amendments, on December 9, 1993.
On December 13, 1993, HB No. 8817 was passed by the House of
Representatives on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading
on December 17, 1993. On January 28, 1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the
Senate.
Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, An
Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent] Component City to be Known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the
Senate. It was introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto III, as principal sponsor,
on May 19, 1993. This was just after the House of Representatives had conducted
its first public hearing on HB No. 8817.
On February 23, 1994, or a little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was
transmitted to the Senate, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted
public hearings on SB No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the said committee submitted
Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the recommendation that it be
approved without amendment, taking into consideration the reality that H.B. No.
8817 was on all fours with SB No. 1243. Senator Heherson T. Alvarez, one of the
herein petitioners, indicated his approval thereto by signing said report as member
of the Committee on Local Government.
On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on
Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on March 14, 1994. On March
22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the
Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.
The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by
the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite
on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters
of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.
The question as to the validity of Republic Act No. 7720 hinges on the
following twin issues: (I) Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs)
are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a
municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component city,
and (II) Whether or not, considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own
version of HB No. 8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated in
the House of Representatives.
I
The annual income of a local
government unit includes the IRAs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city
because its average annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on
1991 constant prices falls below the required annual income of Twenty Million
Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for its conversion into a city, petitioners having
computed Santiagos average annual income in the following manner:
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1991 P20,379,057.07
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1992 P21,570,106.87
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P41,949,163.94
Minus:
IRAs for 1991 and 1992 P15,730,043.00
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P26,219,120.94
Average Annual Income P13,109,960.47
By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992,
after deducting the IRAs, the average annual income arrived at would only be
P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim
that Santiagos income is far below the aforesaid Twenty Million Pesos average
annual income requirement.
The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the
Department of Finance, which indicates Santiagos average annual income to be
P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were
not excluded from the computation. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not
actually income but transfers and! or budgetary aid from the national government
and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like
population, land and equal sharing.
In this regard, we hold that petitioners asseverations are untenable because
Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units.
It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it
must, among others, have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos
for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices.1Such income
must be duly certified by the Department of Finance.2
Resolution of the controversy regarding compliance by
the Municipality of Santiago with the aforecited income requirement hinges on a
correlative and contextual explication of the meaning of internal revenue
allotments (IRAs) vis-a-vis the notion of income of a local government unit and the
principles of local autonomy and decentralization underlying the
institutionalization and intensified empowerment of the local government system.
A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is
constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own
affairs.3 Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation,
but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio,4 the local government unit
is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities
and resources.5 Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby
deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to
develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also with their oWn resources
and assets.6
The practical side to development through a decentralized local government
system certainly concerns the matter of financial resources. With its broadened
powers and increased responsibilities, a local government unit must now operate
on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses.
Understandably, the vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every
local government unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate
resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its
functions.7 Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in
every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source
of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share
being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be
given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the
national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.8.
The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization
proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to
finance its operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided
for in the Local Government Code and its implementing rules and regulations. For
instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs must be set aside for
local development projects.9 As such, for purposes of budget preparation, which
budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the local government unit,
among others, the IRAs and the share in the national wealth utilization proceeds
are considered items of income. This is as it should be, since income is defined in
the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received
forming the gross accretions of funds of the local government unit.10
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion
of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically
accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the
local government unit.11 They thus constitute income which the local government
can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the
Department of Finance certified, among others, that the municipality had an
average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. This, the Department of Finance
did after including the IRAs in its computation of said average annual income.
Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that
the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. To reiterate, IRAs
are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the
same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and
meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes
it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of
funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and
government-owned-or-controlled corporations.12
Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 359313 correctly encapsulizes the
full import of the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be
revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular
sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and
other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive
of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial assistance,
loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others (Italics ours).14 Such
order, constituting executive or contemporaneous construction of a statute by an
administrative agency charged with the task of interpreting and applying the same,
is entitled to full respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts,
unless such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the
Constitution, the governing statute, or other laws.15
II
In the enactment of RA No. 7720,
there was compliance with Section 24,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
-----------------------------------------------------------
Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional
prescription,16 originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of
petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in
the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed
in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate.
Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817 was
filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of
HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of
SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process
that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section
24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances
attending the instant controversy.
Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was
already approved on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when the
Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on HB No.
8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December 17, 1993 and
transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a month
thereafter, or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government
conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance
any action on SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on the
Third Reading, from the House of Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not
contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should
originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act
thereupon until it receives the House bill.
We have already addressed this issue in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary
of Finance.17 There, on the matter of the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law,
which, as a revenue bill, is nonetheless constitutionally required to originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, we explained:
x x x To begin with, it is not the law-but the revenue bill-which is required by
the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. It is
important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo
such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the
whole. x x x as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To
insist that a revenue statute-and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law-must substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with
amendments but also to propose amendments. It would be to violate the
coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make
the House superior to the Senate.
xxx xxx xxx
It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No.
11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the
Senate did was merely to take [H. No. 11197] into consideration in enacting S.
No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No.
11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the
enacting clause (which, it would seem petitioners admit is an amendment by
substitution), and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on
the same subject matter. In either case the result are two bills on the same
subject.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing
revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt,
private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs
and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are
expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both
views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the
Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. x x x18

III

Every law, including RA No. 7720,

has in its favor the presumption
of constitutionality
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It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies

the presumption of constitutionality.19 Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be
nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other words, the grounds
for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.20 Those who petition this
court to declare a law to be unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the
basis that will justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail. Taking
into consideration the justification of our stand on the immediately preceding
ground raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 7720,
the Court stands on the holding that petitioners have failed to overcome the
presumption. The dismissal of this petition is, therefore, inevitable.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit with

costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.