LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

2008 DECISION UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATES EQUAL

PROTECTION CLAUSE; classification must apply to
all similarly situated.
2009 DECISION CONSTITUTIONAL - municipalities were qualified
cityhood applicants before the enactment of R.A. No.
9009
2010 DECISION UNCONSTITUTIONAL; 2008 DECISION WAS
REINSTATED
FEBRUARY 2011 DECISION CONSTITUTIONAL
APRIL 2011 DECISION; MOTION FOR AD MOTION FOR AD CAUTELAM DENIED; CITYHOOD
CAUTELAM LAWS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL
JUNE 2011 DECISION; Motion for Leave to File Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the Resolution WAS DENIED. Grants the
respondents Motion for Entry of Judgment

1ST CASE: 2008 DECISION

FACTS:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 which took effect on 2001. It amended Section
450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution
No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities
whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the
Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the HOR readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded
it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.

Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed individual cityhood bills. The 16
cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million
income requirement in RA 9009.

December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the
cityhood bills. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the Presidents signature.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause

ISSUE: Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

RULING:
CITYHOOD LAWS WERE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional because such exemption must
be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. (SEE
NOTE FOR DISCUSSION)
 Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause. The exemption provision merely states, Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009The
City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
This one sentence exemption provision contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the
exempted municipalities from those that are not exempted.

Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood
bills should be exempt from the P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to
satisfy the equal protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16
municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not
a valid classification between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption from the P100 million
income requirement.

The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following
conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only;
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class;

There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress
and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress
is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income
requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of
income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have
lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification
criterionmere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congressis not rationally related to the purpose of
the law which is to prevent fiscally non viable municipalities from converting into cities.

The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition
existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the
requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only.

limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must
apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities
cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption
provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

NOTE: petitioners invoked non-retroactivity of RA 9009 should be applied. RA 9009 became effective on 30
June 2001 or during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood
bills which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-
retroactivity of laws. This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws,
is not being applied retroactively but prospectively.

The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law,
not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that
the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, nondiscriminatory criteria
found solely in the Local Government Code. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code
to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took
effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any
municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450
of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income
 requirement. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent
municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is
thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government
Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

2ND CASE (2009)

2008 Decision:
In its first decision, the Court declared the 16 cityhood laws unconstitutional on the ground that they violated
Article X, Section 10 and the Equal Protection Clause under Article III, Section 1. In essence, the Court held
that since the municipalities did not meet the P100 million income requirement under Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by R.A. No. 9009, the cityhood laws converting the 16 municipalities into
cities were unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the cityhood laws violate

(1) Sec. 10. Art. X of the Constitution and
(2) the equal protection clause.

HELD: No. Declared as CONSTITUTIONAL the 16 cityhood laws, thus converting the 16 municipalities into
cities.
***Earlier Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Art. X, 10 In accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code Clause
1. The only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs the clause "in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code" is to lay stress that it is Congress alone, and no other, which can
impose the criteria.
2. Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a 35 consolidated set of
laws or a much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria
need not be embodied in the local government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much
as possible, the element of uniformity. Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory
law, adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same.
In this case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified income requirement from PhP20 million to
PhP100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws is no different from the enactment of
laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier
mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified indicators.
3. The Court said that based on Congress deliberations, the clear legislative intent was that the then pending
cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of P100 million and that R.A.
No. 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned.

Art. III, 1 Equal Protection Clause

No deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCP's claim that the
IRA of its member-cities will be substantially reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the
respondent LGUs would not suffice to bring it within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is
presumptuous on the part of the LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their
property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, the municipalities that are not covered by the
uniform exemption clause in the cityhood laws cannot validly invoke constitutional protection. For, at this
point, the conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its
property as such.

The favorable treatment accorded the sixteen municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial
distinction. The Court stressed that the 16 municipalities were qualified cityhood applicants before the
enactment of R.A. No. 9009 and to impose on them the much higher income requirement after what
they have gone through would be unfair. The reasoning behind was that fairness would dictate that the 16
municipalities be given a means by which they could prove that they had the necessary qualifications for
cityhood under the old law, the Local Government Code of 1991, and not R.A. No. 9009.
3rd CASE: 2010 DECISION

FACTS:
After the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision and without any exceptional and compelling reason, the
Court En Banc unprecedentedly reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision by upholding the constitutionality
of the Cityhood Laws in the Decision of 21 December 2009.

Upon reexamination, the Court finds the motions for reconsideration meritorious and accordingly reinstates
the 18 November 2008 Decision declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional.

4TH CASE: FEBRUARY 25, 2011 DECISION

The Resolution was promulgated on February 15, 2011 granted the Motion for Reconsideration of the
respondents presented against the Resolution dated 2010, reversed the said Resolution, and declared the 16
Cityhood LawsCONSTITUTIONAL.

5th CASE: APRIL 2011 DECISION

The petitioners anchor their Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration upon the primordial ground that the
Court could no longer modify, alter, or amend its judgment declaring the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional due
to such judgment having long become final and executory. They submit that the Cityhood Laws violated
Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection Clause.

RULING:
Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011) is denied with finality - the
16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but
have also complied with the requirements of the LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9009.

These laws are NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. There should also be no question that
the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class of their own. They have proven
themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. They are and have
been centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural,
mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In his speech delivered on the floor of the
Senate to sponsor House Joint Resolution No. 1, Senator Lim recognized such unique traits.

NOTE: Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted
from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. The then Senate President was cognizant of the fact that there were
municipalities that then had pending conversion bills during the 11th Congress prior to the adoption of
Senate Bill No. 2157 as R.A. No. 9009, including the municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws. It is worthy
of mention that the pertinent deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157 occurred on October 5, 2000 while the
11th Congress was in session, and the conversion bills were then pending in the Senate. Thus, the responses
of Senator Pimentel made it obvious that R.A. No. 9009 would not apply to the conversion bills then pending
deliberation in the Senate during the 11th Congress.

The then Senate President was cognizant of the fact that there were municipalities that then had pending
conversion bills during the 11th Congress prior to the adoption of Senate Bill No. 2157 as R.A. No. 9009,
including the municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws. It is worthy of mention that the pertinent
deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157 occurred on October 5, 2000 while the 11th Congress was in session,
and the conversion bills were then pending in the Senate. Thus, the responses of Senator Pimentel made it
obvious that R.A. No. 9009 would not apply to the conversion bills then pending deliberation in the Senate
during the 11th Congress.

6TH CASE: JUNE 2011 DECISION

The Court denies the petitioners Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 12
April 2011 and the attached Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 12 April 2011; grants the
respondents Motion for Entry of Judgment dated May 9, 2011.

The Motion for Reconsideration, being a second motion for reconsideration, cannot be entertained. As to that,
Section 2 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court is unqualified. The Court has firmly held that a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading, and only for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an
express leave has been first obtained may a second motion for reconsideration be entertained.

The restrictive policy against a second motion for reconsideration has been reemphasized in the recently
promulgated Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, whose Section 3, Rule 15 states: Section 3. Second motion for
reconsideration.The Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any exception
to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at
least twothirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration in the higher interest of justice when
the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of
causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for
reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by
operation of law or by the Courts declaration.