Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Lozada, Jr., 3.
3. Petitioners are ENTITLED to keep whatever fruits and income they may have obtained from Lot
February 25, 2010
FACTS: Subject of this case is a lot (Lot No. 88) located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner
was Anastacio Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated by
Republic, represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the expansion and
improvement of the Lahug Airport. During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings,
respondent Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine. The trial court ruled for
the Republic and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of the lot. However, the
projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport, however, was not pursued.
The plaintiff-respondents initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession and reconveyance
of ownership the subject lot. On the other hand, the petitioners asked for the immediate dismissal
of the complaint. They specifically denied that the Government had made assurances to reconvey
Lot No. 88 to respondents in the event that the property would no longer be needed for airport
operations. Petitioners instead asserted that the judgment of condemnation was unconditional,
and respondents were, therefore, not entitled to recover the expropriated property notwithstanding
non-use or abandonment thereof. The lower court ruled for herein plaintiff-respondents, which
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: W/N there is a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain?
RULING: Obviously, Fery was not decided pursuant to our now sacredly held constitutional right
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.[15] It is well
settled that the taking of private property by the Governments power of eminent domain is subject
to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just
compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of implied
conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property
expropriated.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use
the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it
should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator
to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same.
Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the
particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property
owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owners
right to justice, fairness, and equity.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent
to the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition
that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if
this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned,
then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the
return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of
eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 28, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the October 22, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Cebu City, and
its February 7, 2007 Resolution are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows:
1. Respondents are ORDERED to return to petitioners the just compensation they received for
the expropriation of Lot No. 88, plus legal interest, in the case of default, to be computed from the
time petitioners comply with their obligation to reconvey Lot No. 88 to them;
2. Respondents are ORDERED to pay petitioners the necessary expenses the latter incurred in
maintaining Lot No. 88, plus the monetary value of their services to the extent that respondents
were benefited thereby;
No. 88; and
4. Respondents are also ENTITLED to keep whatever interests the amounts they received as just
compensation may have earned in the meantime, as well as the appreciation in value of Lot No.
88, which is a natural consequence of nature and time;
In light of the foregoing modifications, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
57, Cebu City, only for the purpose of receiving evidence on the amounts that respondents will
have to pay petitioners in accordance with this Courts decision. No costs.
REPUBLIC vs. LIM (GR no. 161656)
FACTS:
In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu
City for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The said lots
were registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in
the PNB then took possession of the lots. Thereafter, on May 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision
ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation. The
Denzons appealed to the CA but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was
made on April 5, 1948.
In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for
rentals for the two lots, but it "denied knowledge of the matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal
rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a
reasonable time.
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons successors-
in-interest,Valdehueza and Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession
with damages against the Republic and AFP officers in possession of the property.
On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names of Valdehueza and Panerio
with the annotation "subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said
parcels of land, Lots 932 and939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value".
On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that
they are the owners and have retained their right as such over lots because of the Republics
failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10,adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in
view of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of
the Republic.
They appealed the CFIs decision to the SC. The latter held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still
the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation
by the Republic. SC still ruled that they are not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may
only demand the payment of their fair market value.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein
respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the
mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lot title was issued in his name.
On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC against the petitioners
herein. On 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim, declaring that he is the absolute
and exclusive owner of the lot with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to
possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In its Decision dated September 18, 2003, it
sustained the RTC Decision saying: ... This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the
concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be
paid to the owners of the land,but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its
taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just"...
Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review alleging that they remain as the National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, 656
owner of Lot 932. SCRA 60 (2011)

ISSUE:
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondents
predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI
rendered as early as May 14, 1940.

HELD:
One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his
private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of
due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public
use. Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution mandates: "Private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation." The Republic disregarded the foregoing
provision when it failed and refused to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the just
compensation for Lots 932 and 939.

The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republics delay is contrary to the rules of fair play.
In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment
of compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the
party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.

As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondents
predecessors-in- interest the sum of P16,248.40 as "reasonable market value of the two lots in
question." Unfortunately, it did not comply
and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Courts mandate. It is tantamount to
confiscation of private property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to the need
of government, and the government may take them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the
occasion demands, however from the taking of private property by the government under the
power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss.
There is a recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. So, how could the Republic acquire
ownership over Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the just compensation, required by law, for
more than 50 years? Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer
of title from the landowner to the expropriator.

SC ruled in earlier cases that expropriation of lands consists of two stages. First is concerned with
the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise. The second is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken." It is only upon the completion of these two
stages that expropriation is said to have been completed In Republic v. Salem Investment
Corporation, we ruled that, "the process is not completed until payment of just compensation."
Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a
period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete.

Thus, SC ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle respondent to recover
possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic.

While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the
private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment
in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession
of their property. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private
persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court
of Appeals, we defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to
be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just."

Is prior unsuccessful negotiation a condition precedent for the exercise of eminent
domain?
SMI Development Corporation v. Republic, 323 SCRA 862, Jan. 28, 2000, 3rd Div. [Panganiban]
Current effective law on delegated authority to exercise the power of eminent domain is found in
Section 12, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides:
SEC. 12. Power of Eminent Domain The President shall determine when it is necessary or
advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the National Government, and
direct the Solicitor General, whenever he deems the action advisable, to institute expropriation
proceedings in the proper court.
The foregoing provision does not require prior unsuccessful negotiation as a condition precedent
for the exercise of eminent domain. In Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of Appeals, the President
chose to prescribe this condition as an additional requirement instead. In the instant case,
however, no such voluntary restriction was imposed.
Philippine Press Institute, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No.119694 May 22, 1995
Petitioner: Philippine Press Institute, Inc.
Respondent: Commission on Elections
Facts: On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 which reads in part Sec. 2.
Comelec Space. The Commission shall procure free print space of not less than one half (1/2)
page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city for use as "Comelec
Space" from March 6, 1995 in the case of candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until
May 12, 1995. In the absence of said newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from any
magazine or periodical of said province or city.
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order, PPI asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void
on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government,
and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation.
Issue: Whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 constitute a valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain
Ruling: The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution,
but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the
necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided
by respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI
reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space
for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free
print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to
prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec
for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does
not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind
of factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does
not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain
TELEBAP, Inc. v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337, April 21, 1998
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and
GMA NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
Vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 132922. April 21, 1998]
FACTS: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.
(TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They
are suing as citizens, taxpayers and registered voters. It was declared to be without legal standing
to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from
actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc.,
appears to have the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates
radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Sec. 92
of B.P Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies to provide free air time to the
COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other political purposes. Petitioners
challenge the validity of Sec. 92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of
law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the
equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to
supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of
election. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing
COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election
and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners
claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time
to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of
private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time
for one hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of
COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for COMELEC
Time.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies
the equal protection of the laws.
(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process
of law and without just compensation.
RULING:
Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television
stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are
more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television
broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary
privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate
broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable
public funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time
as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print
space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires
spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast
industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken
by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC. The use of property bears a social
function and is subject to the states duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can
find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in
connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.

NPC v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1


Secretary of the DPWH vs. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334. July
1, 2013
Respondent spouses Heracleo and Ramona Tecson (respondents) are co-owners of a parcel of
land with an area of 7,268 square meters located in San Pablo, Malolos, Bulacan and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-430064 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Said parcel
of land was among the properties taken by the government sometime in 1940 without the owners
consent and without the necessary expropriation proceedings and used for the construction of the
MacArthur Highway.5
In a letter dated December 15, 1994, respondents demanded the payment of the fair market value
of the subject parcel of land. Petitioner Celestino R. Contreras (petitioner Contreras), then District
Engineer of the First Bulacan Engineering District of petitioner Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH), offered to pay the subject land at the rate of P0.70 per square meter per
Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Bulacan.7 Unsatisfied with the offer,
respondents demanded for the return of their property or the payment of compensation at the
current fair market value.8
As their demand remained unheeded, respondents filed a Complaint9 for recovery of possession
with damages against petitioners, praying that they be restored to the possession of the subject
parcel of land and that they be paid attorneys fees.10 Respondents claimed that the subject parcel
of land was assessed at P2,543,800.00.11
Instead of filing their Answer, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the following
grounds: (1) that the suit is against the State which may not be sued without its consent; (2) that
the case has already prescribed; (3) that respondents have no cause of action for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; and (4) if respondents are entitled to compensation, they should be paid
only the value of the property in 1940 or 1941.12
On June 28, 1995, the RTC issued an Order13 granting respondents motion to dismiss based on
the doctrine of state immunity from suit. As respondents claim includes the recovery of damages,
there is no doubt that the suit is against the State for which prior waiver of immunity is required.
When elevated to the CA,14 the appellate court did not agree with the RTC and found instead that
the doctrine of state immunity from suit is not applicable, because the recovery of compensation
is the only relief available to the landowner. To deny such relief would undeniably cause injustice
to the landowner. Besides, petitioner Contreras, in fact, had earlier offered the payment of
compensation although at a lower rate.Thus, the CA reversed and set aside the dismissal of the
complaint and, consequently, remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose of determining
the just compensation to which respondents are entitled to recover from the government.15 With
the finality of the aforesaid decision, trial proceeded in the RTC.
The Branch Clerk of Court was initially appointed as the Commissioner and designated as the
Chairman of the Committee that would determine just compensation,16 but the case was later
referred to the PAC for the submission of a recommendation report on the value of the subject
property.17 In PAC Resolution No. 99-007,18 the PAC recommended the amount of P1,500.00
per square meter as the just compensation for the subject property.
ISSUE: Procedurally, too, prescription and laches are no longer proper issues in this appeal. In
the pre-trial order issued on May 17, 2001, the RTC summarized the issues raised by the
defendants, to wit: (a) whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to just compensation; (b) whether
or not the valuation would be based on the corresponding value at the time of the taking or at the
time of the filing of the action; and (c) whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to damages.
Nowhere did the pre-trial order indicate that prescription and laches were to be considered in the
adjudication of the RTC.
HELD: Just compensation is "the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one
who desires to sell, x x x fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government." This rule holds
true when the property is taken before the filing of an expropriation suit, and even if it is the
property owner who brings the action for compensation.
Clearly, petitioners had been occupying the subject property for more than fifty years without the
benefit of expropriation proceedings. In taking respondents property without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings and without payment of just compensation, petitioners clearly acted in
utter disregard of respondents proprietary rights which cannot be countenanced by the Court.42
For said illegal taking, respondents are entitled to adequate compensation in the form of actual or
compensatory damages which in this case should be the legal interest of six percent (6%) per
annum on the value of the land at the time of taking in 1940 until full payment.43 This is based on
the principle that interest runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of the landowner to be
placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as of the date of taking.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated July 31, 2007 in CAG.R. CV No. 77997 is MODIFIED, in that the valuation
of the subject property owned by respondents shall be F0.70 instead of P1,500.00 per square
meter, with interest at six percent ( 6o/o) per annum from the date of taking in 1940 instead of
March 17, 1995, until full payment.
Secretary of the DPWH vs. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, April
21, 2015 (Resolution to the MR)
Facts:
property. In this case, since the property was already taken, the complainants must be equitably
compensated for the loss thereof.
For purposes of just compensation, the value of the land should be determined from the time the
property owners filed the initiatory complaint, earning interest therefrom. To hold otherwise would
validate the States act as one of expropriation in spite of procedural infirmities which, in turn,
would amount to unjust enrichment on its part. To continue condoning such acts would be
licensing the government to continue dispensing with constitutional requirements in taking private
property.

Spouses Heracleo are the co-owners of a land which is among the private properties traversed
by MacArthur Highway in Bulacan, a government project undertaken sometime in 1940. The taking
was taken without the requisite expropriation proceedings and without their consent. In 1994,
Heracleo demanded the payment of the fair market value of the property. The DPWH offered to
pay 0.70 centavos per sqm., as recommended by the appraiser committee of Bulacan.
Unsatisfied, Heracleo filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages. Favorable
decisions were rendered by the RTC and the CA, with valuation of P 1,500 per sqm and 6%
interest per annum from the time of filing of the until full payment. The SC Division reversed the
CA ruling and held that computation should be based at the time the property was taken in 1940,
which is 0.70 per sqm. But because of the contrasting opinions of the members of the Division
and transcendental importance of the issue, the case was referred to the En Banc for resolution.

Issue 1: W/N the taking of private property without due process should be nullified

No. The governments failure to initiate the necessary expropriation proceedings prior to actual
taking cannot simply invalidate the States exercise of its eminent domain power, given that the
property subject of expropriation is indubitably devoted for public use, and public policy imposes
upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services to the public. To hastily nullify said
expropriation in the guise of lack of due process would certainly diminish or weaken one of the
States inherent powers, the ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater good.

Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the
property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.

Issue 2: W/N compensation is based on the market value of the property at the time of taking

Yes. While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive an outdated valuation, the
long-established rule is that the fair equivalent of a property should be computed not at the time
of payment, but at the time of taking. This is because the purpose of just compensation is not to
reward the owner for the property taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof. The owner
should be compensated only for what he actually loses, and what he loses is the actual value of
the property at the time it is taken.

Issue 3: W/N the principle of equity should be applied in this case

No. The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of
the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal
application is impossible. To entertain other formula for computing just compensation, contrary to
those established by law and jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of economic
policies a matter which this Court has no competence to take cognizance of. Equity and
equitable principles only come into full play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence.

Velasco Dissent:
The States power of eminent domain is not absolute; the Constitution is clear that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law. As such, failure of the
government to institute the necessary proceedings should lead to failure of taking an individuals

EPZA (now PEZA) vs. Pulido, 656 SCRA 315 (2011)
FACTS: The controversy has its genesis in the action for the expropriation of three parcels of
irrigated riceland situated in Rosario, Cavite that the petitioner commenced on May 15, 1981 in
the Court of First Instance of Cavite against the several individual owners.[4] The parcels of
Riceland were: (a) Lot 1408, with an area of 31,426 square meters and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2908 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite in the names of Jose Pulido
and Vicenta Panganiban; (b) Lot 1409-B-2, with an area of 32,907 square meters and covered by
TCT No. T-70724 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite co-owned by Francisco Prodigalidad and
Medardo Prodigalidad; and (c) Lot 1406, with an area of 26,008 square meters and covered by
TCT No. T-113498 registered in the name of Salud Jimenez.
During the pendency of the case, Lot 1406 was subdivided into Lot 1406-A (with an area of 12,890
square meters) and 1406-B (with an area of 13,118 square meters).
On July 11, 1991, the RTC sustained the right of the petitioner to expropriate the three parcels of
riceland, but later partly reconsidered and released Lot 1406-A from expropriation.
The petitioner appealed to the CA.
On January 4, 1993, the petitioner and the Estate of Salud Jimenez (due to Salud Jimenez having
meanwhile died on October 30, 1984) entered into a Compromise Agreement.
Contrary to its express undertaking under the Compromise Agreement, the petitioner failed to
transfer the title of Lot 434 to the Estate of Salud Jimenez because the registered owner was
Progressive Realty Estate, Inc., not the petitioner. As a result, on March 13, 1997, the Estate of
Salud Jimenez filed a Motion to Partially Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993. On August 4,
1997, the RTC annulled the Compromise Agreement and directed the petitioner to peacefully
return Lot 1406-B to the Estate of Salud Jimenez.
The petitioner now submits that just compensation for Lot 1406-B was only P41,610.00, the
equivalent of the zonal valuation of Lot 1406-B under Tax Declaration No. 7252 issued in 1981;
that any amount above Lot 1406-Bs 1981 zonal valuation would unjustly enrich the Estate of Salud
Jimenez due to the escalated price of the expropriated property; and that the Estate of Salud
Jimenez was entitled only to compensation for the loss of its vacant and idle land at the time of
taking and/or filing of the complaint, whichever came first, and not to the incremental benefit that
has been derived therefrom after the introduction of improvements thereto by [the petitioner].
On the other hand, the Estate of Salud Jimenez maintains that just compensation for Lot 1406-B
must be based on the value of the property (and of other properties adjacent to it) in 1993 when
the parties entered into the Compromise Agreement and agreed that the just compensation for
Lot 1406-B was Lot 434, or Lot 434s equivalent value. The Estate of Salud Jimenez articulates
the reason in its Comment, thuswise:
[T]he peremptory exercise by the state of its power to expropriate the subject lot has been
extremely painful to the original owner, Salud Jimenez, who already expired on October 30, 1984
without any more enjoying the fruits of her property. Thereafter, her heirs likewise failed to savor
the produce or income of the land for twenty eight (28) long years up to the present time. In
contrast, petitioner without paying a single centavo for the land, has collected millions of pesos
from the lessee banks and bus and jitney operators and continue to reap a bounty from the
property. It cannot be gainsaid that petitioner [PEZA] has been unfairly harsh to herein respondent
when it foisted a land upon which it has no legal title. In this factual milieu, justice and equity
demand that an equitable relief be granted to herein respondent to fix the just compensation as of
1993 and not on May 15, 1981 which is the date of filing of the complaint.
ISSUE: The issue is simply whether or not just compensation should be based on the value of Lot
1406-B prevailing in 1981 or in 1993.
HELD:
1. Just compensation for Lot 1406-B must be based on value of property prevailing in 1993
To reiterate, in G.R. No. 137285, the Court upheld the annulment of the Compromise Agreement
and recognized that the agreed upon mode of payment of the just compensation for Lot 1406-B
with Lot 434 was cancelled. It is notable that the Court mentioned nothing therein about the
invalidation of the amount of just compensation corresponding to the mode of payment, which was
the value of Lot 434 at the time, which silence was the Courts acknowledgment that the parties
understood and accepted, by entering into the Compromise Agreement in 1993, that the just
compensation for Lot 1406-B was Lot 434 (or the value of Lot 434, which at the time of the swap
in 1993 was definitely much higher than Lot 434s value in 1981).
2. P6,200.00/square meter is the correct just compensation for Lot 1406-B
3. Estate of Salud Jimenez entitled to Interest of 12% per annum
The power of eminent domain is not an unlimited power. Section 9, Article III of the 1987
Constitution sets down the essential limitations upon this inherent right of the State to take private
property, namely: (a) that the taking must be for a public purpose; and (b) that just compensation
must be paid to the owner. The State must first establish that the exercise of eminent domain is
for a public purpose, which, here, is already settled. What remains to be determined is the just
compensation. In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank,[19] the Court has held that compensation
cannot be just to the owner in the case of property that is immediately taken unless there is prompt
payment, considering that the owner thereby immediately suffers not only the loss of his property
but also the loss of its fruits or income. Thus, in addition, the owner is entitled to legal interest from
the time of the taking of the property until the actual payment in order to place the owner in a
position as good as, but not better than, the position he was in before the taking occurred.
It is undeniable that just compensation was not promptly made to the Estate of Salud Jimenez for
the taking of Lot 1406-B by the petitionerThe move to compensate through the swap arrangement
under the Compromise Agreement was aborted or amounted to nothing through no fault of the
Estate of Salud Jimenez. The petitioner, which should have known about the inefficacy of the
swapping of Lot 434 for Lot 1406-B, could even be said to have resorted to the swapping for the
purpose of delaying the payment. Thus, it was solely responsible for the delay. In fact, the Estate
of Salud Jimenez was compelled to seek the rescission of the Compromise Agreement, a process
that prolonged even more the delay in the payment of just compensation. . In view of this, the CAs
fixing of legal interest at only 6% per annum cannot be upheld and must be corrected, for that rate
would not ensure that compensation was just in the face of the long delay in payment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari filed by Philippine Export Zone
Authority, and AFFIRM the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on April 20, 2009,
subject to the MODIFICATION that the legal interest chargeable on the unpaid just compensation
for Lot 1406-B is 12% per annum reckoned from August 23, 1993 on the unpaid gross value of
P81,331,600.00 for Lot 1406-B.

The Office of the Solicitor General vs. Ayala Land Incorporated,

G.R. No. 177056, September 18, 2009
ISSUE:
Issue: Whether or not revocation of PTCFOR is a violation of right to property? Whether or not
the banning of carrying firearms outside the residence is a valid exercise of police power?

Decision: Petition dismissed. Just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, PTCFOR may
be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be
exercised under existing restrictions. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as
the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might
be revoked. Revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege.

The basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. the assailed Guidelines
do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of
firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their
residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of
firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed.

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 148560,
November 19, 2001
Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes
to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent
call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because,
according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of
the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his
co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS,
BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,
RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF
OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND
THE REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR
criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS.
RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY
SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY
OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF
STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION
WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT
NAME 'JOSE VELARDE'
Issue: R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional
In view of vagueness and ambiguity
Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the
words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law
so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is
distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal
hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or
special legal meaning to those words 8 The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is
always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly
accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine
is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial
and temporal succession.
Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and
"series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. As for "pattern,"
we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec.
4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2. . . under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of
at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of
Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed
towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or
'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful
scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public
officer and others conniving with him, follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the
alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple
accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free
from ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however,
that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to
be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient
notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-
vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways,
but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define
the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute.
In view of due process
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder
Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt
or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The running fault in this reasoning is
obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes,
the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount
of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the
Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme
or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill- gotten wealth.
Fabella vs. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 256 (1997)
FACTS:
On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work order to all public school
teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period of
September to October 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month
pay, allowances and passage of debt cap bill in Congress. On October 1990, Secretary Carino
filed administrative cases against respondents, who are teachers of Mandaluyong High School.
The charge sheets required respondents to explain in writing why they should not be punished for
having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws. Administrative hearings
started on December 1990. Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of the proceedings
on the following due process grounds: first, they were not given copies of the guidelines adopted
by the committee for the investigation and denied access to evidence; second, the investigation
placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their innocence; third, that the investigating
body was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment violated Sec.9 of the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing the validity of the administrative
proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty and
ordered their immediate dismissal. The respondents filed an injunctive suit and a petition of
certiorari and mandamus with RTC and were denied. They went with the SC which ruled for the
reinstatement of the action. RTC then granted their petition. CA affirmed such grant by the RTC.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?
HELD:
YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following:
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal
vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by
said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the
hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers.
Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers
administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as
chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers organization
and a supervisor of the division. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to
hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not include a representative of
the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers organization as required
by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent
jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not
provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a
representative of a teachers organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an
impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the
right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied
in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.
Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied with because the
respondents are members of Quezon City Teachers Federation. We disagree. Mere membership
of said teachers in their respective teachers organizations does not ipso facto make them
authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under
this section, the teachers organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative
to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be
usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the
instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of
its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers organization as its
representative in said committee.
Thus, the dismissal of the teachers is not justified, it being arbitrary and violative of the teachers
right to due process.
Petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
White Light Corporation vs City of Manila G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into a law Manila City Ordinance
No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates,
and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and
Similar Establishments in the City of Manila. On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and
Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) impleading as defendant, herein
respondent City of Manila represented by Mayor Lim with the prayer that the Ordinance be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC)
and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to
admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their
business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. The RTC issued a TRO
directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. The City alleges that the
Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a
decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. On a petition for review on certiorari, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.
Issue: Whether Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power
Ruling: Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general
terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for
an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the
concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police
power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. The apparent
goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit
sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and
certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do
not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the
Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of
the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and
the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights
and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a
concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion
into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial
review when life, liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take
it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.
Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.