1
POLICE POWER
PASEI v. Drilon
FACTS:
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It
challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE
entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of
Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that such order is a
discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills,
and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise
of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity
of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and
informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in
some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and
existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare
and protection of the Filipino workers.
ISSUE: Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an
exercise of police power.
RULING: [Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is
not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. The petitioner has
shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified.
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female
contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the
Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and
women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to
all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female
workers rests on substantial distinctions.
Ichong vs Hernandez
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions
of Republic Act. No. 1180, An Act to Regulate the Retail Business, filed to
obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional contending that:
(1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives
of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the
Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates
international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the
provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino
capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail
business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of
Article XIV of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law
Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is
to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within
such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
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The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation

enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public
purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the legislatures purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary
or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the
matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative
power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not
LUTZ v. ARANETA
merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the
GR No. L-7859, December 22, 1955
questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
98 PHIL 148
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due
FACTS: Plaintiff Walter Lutz, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the
process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly
intestate estate of Antionio Ledesma,
related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The
balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the sought to recover from the CIR the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as
attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be taxes, under section 3 of the CA 567 or the Sugar Adjustment Act thereby
no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there assailing its constitutionality, for it provided for an increase of the existing tax
can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So on the manufacture of sugar, alleging that such enactment is not being levied
the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is for a public purpose but solely and exclusively for the aid and support of the
due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, sugar industry thus making it void and unconstitutional. The sugar industry
provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or situation at the time of the enactment was in an imminent threat of loss and
standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly needed to be stabilized by imposition of emergency measures.
grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been ISSUE: Is CA 567 constitutional, despite its being allegedly violative of the
made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction. equal protection clause, the purpose of which is not for the benefit of the
general public but for the rehabilitation only of the sugar industry?
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen HELD: Yes. The protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of
in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law public concern, it follows that the Legislature may determine within
clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its
privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects promotion. Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed to fully play,
their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its subject only to the test of reasonableness; and it is not contended that the
objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems means provided in the law bear no relation to the objective pursued or are
not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such oppressive in character. If objective and methods are alike constitutionally
matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for
discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made the implement of
the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers the state's police power.
from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the
population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict
with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on
the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any
treaty or any other conventional agreement.
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ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, et
al., petitioners, vs.HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondent.
FACTS: The association of the Small Landowners of the Philippines invokes
the right of retention granted by PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not
exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are cultivating on intend to cultivate the
same. Their respected lands do not exceed the statutory limits but are
occupied by tenants who re actually cultivating such lands.
Because PD No. 316 provides that no tenant-farmer in agricultural land
primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farm
holding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant-farmers and the
land owners shall have been determined, they petitioned the court for a writ
of mandamus to compel the DAR Secretary to issue the IRR, as they could
not eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention.
ISSUE
Whether or not the assailed statutes are valid exercises of police power.
Whether or not the content and manner of just compensation provided for the
CARP is violative of the Constitution.
Whether or not the CARP and EO 228 contravene a well accepted principle
of eminent domain by divesting the land owner of his property even before
actual payment to him in full of just compensation
HELD
Yes. The subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the
Constitution itself, which satisfies the first requirement of the lawful subject.
However, objection is raised to the manner fixing the just compensation,
which it is claimed is judicial prerogatives. However, there is no arbitrariness
in the provision as the determination of just compensation by DAR is only
preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts
will still have the right to review with finality the said determination.
No. Although the traditional medium for payment of just compensation is
money and no other, what is being dealt with here is not the traditional
exercise of the power and eminent domain. This is a revolutionary kind of
expropriation, which involves not mere millions of pesos. The initially
intended amount of P50B may not be enough, and is in fact not even fully
available at the time. The invalidation of the said section resulted in the
nullification of the entire program.
No. EO 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmer-beneficiaries were
deemed full owners of the land they acquired under PP 27, after proof of full
payment of just compensation. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the
transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on the
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit of DAR
of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until
then, title also remains with the landowner.
LOZANO VS MARTINEZ
FACTS: This is a consolidated case, the petition arose from cases involving
prosecution of offenses under the BP 22 also known as Bouncing Check
Law. The defendant in these case moved seasonably to quash
the information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an
offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the
respondent trial court, except in one case, which is the subject of G.R No.
75789, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and
dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to the court
for remedy. Those who question the constitutionality of the said statute insist
the following ground:
1) It offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;
2) it impairs freedom of contract;
3) it contravenes the equal protection clause;
4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and
5) its enactment is flawed in the sense that during its passage the interim
Batasan violated the constitutional provision prohibiting to a bill on Third
Reading.
ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 22 or the Bouncing Check Law is unconstitutional.
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RULING:
No, the enactment of the assailed statute is a valid exercise of Police power
and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt. It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a
person for non-payment of debt ex contractu, but certainly it is within the
prerogative of the lawmaking body to prescribe certain acts deemed
pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not only acts
which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as
inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it
inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as
malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.
The enactment of the said statute is a declaration by the legislature that, as a
matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is
deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
DECS v San Diego 180 SCRA 533 (December 21, 1989)
Facts: The respondent failed to pass the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) 3 times and he was denied admission to take the test for another
time by the petitioner under its rule that a student is allowed only to take the
NMAT 3 times and after 3 consecutive failures a student shall not be allowed
to take NMAT the 4th time. Respondent invoke his constitutional rights on
academic freedom and quality education in his petition for mandamus before
the court. Respondent judge rendered decision citing the admission rule of
the petitioner as an arbitrary exercise of police power, depriving respondent
of his right to pursue medical education thus this petition for review before
the higher court.
Issue: Whether or not the admission rule implemented by petitioner an
arbitrary exercise of police power.
Held: The court held that police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The proper
exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and
a lawful method. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within
the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of
the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the
purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is
intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical
profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. The State
needs to implement decisive steps to regulate system of education by
directing students to the course where he is best suited through initial tests
and evaluation. The decision of the respondent judge was reversed.
CASE DIGEST : Restituto Ynot Vs IAC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER,
INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV,
ILOILO CITY, respondents.
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case
was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order
and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case,
the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the
constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue: Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling: The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to
justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of
carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The
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reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme
Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of
carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they
can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it
easier to kill them there The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A
unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the
carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and
given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and
pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying due process.
City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta
Facts:
An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the
regulation of establishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to
the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial park shall be set
aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that
the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it
cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all
beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid
exercise of police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police
power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the public.
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of
private property
Ruling:
No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private
property. The ordinace is actually a taking without compensation of a certain
area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a public cemeteries.
State's exercise of the power of expropriation requires payment of just
compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the
property with just compensation or due process, would amount to unjust
taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be taken will be
used for the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will
come forward and not the police power of the state.
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA.
MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S.
LIM,Respondent.
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City
Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time
Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in
Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila (the Ordinance). The ordinance
sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and
charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more
than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC),
and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and
operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene
and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the
ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. The respondents,
in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at the personal
liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the
Constitution. Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution
encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as
well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the
observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade
could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid
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exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local
Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Also, they contended
that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to
enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and
safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality,
peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and
its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it
violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid
exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference
in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of
the ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did not violate the right to
privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or
operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays.
Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by
having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective
of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a
lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the
adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its
constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.
Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police
power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v
Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common
thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond
the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All
three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals
including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This
could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on
motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have
been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to
which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions
including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not
only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to
the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not
be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business
practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than
twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as
conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through
such implements as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its
corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been
used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of
the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do
not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must
align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance
should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then
it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that they were
capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners.
Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the
constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who would be deprived
of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments
in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights
 7
to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice
Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his
Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common
welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and
the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state interest.
Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of
its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into
the personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons
of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another
constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It
must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited
and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less
intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug
dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the
situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations
penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal
intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants.
Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by
merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in
illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect
wash rates from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the
rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest
or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from
needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned
the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into
the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well
as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The
ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice
a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
MIRASOL VS. DPWH, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011
GR # 158793, June 8, 2006 (Constitutional Law Police Power)
FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative
regulation banning the use of motorcycles at the toll way on the ground that it
is baseless and unwarranted for failure to provide scientific and objective
data on the dangers of motorcycles plying the highways. Respondent avers
that the toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that
their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic
considerations.
ISSUE: Whether or not administrative regulation banning the use of
motorcycles is unconstitutional.
HELD: No, the use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to
regulation as an exercise of the police power of the state. The sole standard
in measuring its exercise is reasonableness, not exact definition and
scientific formulation. It is evident that assailed regulation does not impose

unreasonable restrictions, but outlines precautionary measures designed to
ensure public safety.
Facts:
The Social Justice Society sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
that was enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in 2001.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed
under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses
within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
businesses situated in the area are the so-called Pandacan
Terminals of the oil companies (the brief history of the Pandacan Oil
Terminals is here).
In 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies. They
agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most
viable and practicable option. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the
MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared
that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting 25 July
2002, which period was extended up to 30 April 2003.
This is the factual backdrop of the Supreme Courts 7 March 2007 Decision.
The SC ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local
Government Code (LGC) to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to
the governance of the city, including Ordinance No. 8027. After the SC
promulgated its Decision, Chevron Philippines Inc. (Chevron), Petron
Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) (the
oil companies) and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the DOE, sought to intervene and ask for a reconsideration of the decision.
The City of Manila has the power to enact Ordinance No. 8027
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila
in the exercise of its police power. Police power is the plenary power vested
in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people. This power flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema
lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law).
8
While police power rests primarily with the national legislature, such power
may be delegated. Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare
clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments. LGUs
like the City of Manila exercise police power through their respective
legislative bodies, in this case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city
council. Specifically, the Sanggunian can enact ordinances for the general
welfare of the city.
This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila. Specifically, the Sanggunian has the power to
reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city.
The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is a legitimate exercise of police
power
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly
exercised their police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject
and a lawful method.
Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because there is a
concurrence of lawful subject and lawful method. It was enacted for the
purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety
and general welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was
impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from
catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan
Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area
defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and
safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. The
depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western
interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it there is such a
target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became
necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. Wide discretion
is vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests
of the public require but also what measures are necessary for the protection
of such interests. Clearly, the Sanggunian was in the best position to
determine the needs of its constituents.

In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and
occupations to promote the general welfare. However, the interference must
be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or
means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a
reasonable relation to the end in view.
The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning
ordinance which reclassified the area where the depot is situated from
industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or
municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and
apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and
future projection of needs. As a result of the zoning, the continued operation
of the businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no longer
be permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and
residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for
the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality. Consequently, the
enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected
cannot be said to be unjust.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not unfair, oppressive or confiscatory which amounts
to taking without compensation
According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8027 is unfair and oppressive
as it does not only regulate but also absolutely prohibits them from
conducting operations in the City of Manila. However, the oil companies are
not prohibited from doing business in other appropriate zones in Manila. The
City of Manila merely exercised its power to regulate the businesses and
industries in the zones it established.
The oil companies also argue that the ordinance is unfair and oppressive
because they have invested billions of pesos in the depot, and the forced
closure will result in huge losses in income and tremendous costs in
constructing new facilities. This argument has no merit. In the exercise of
police power, there is a limitation on or restriction of property interests to
promote public welfare which involves no compensable taking.
Compensation is necessary only when the states power of eminent
domain is exercised. In eminent domain, property is appropriated and applied
9
to some public purpose. Property condemned under the exercise of police
power, on the other hand, is noxious or intended for a noxious or forbidden
purpose and, consequently, is not compensable. The restriction imposed to
protect lives, public health and safety from danger is not a taking. It is merely
the prohibition or abatement of a noxious use which interferes with
paramount rights of the public. In the regulation of the use of the property,
nobody else acquires the use or interest therein, hence there is no
compensable taking.
In this case, the properties of the oil companies and other businesses
situated in the affected area remain theirs. Only their use is restricted
although they can be applied to other profitable uses permitted in the
commercial zone.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not partial and discriminatory
The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has discriminated
against and singled out the Pandacan Terminals despite the fact that the
Pandacan area is congested with buildings and residences that do not
comply with the National Building Code, Fire Code and Health and Sanitation
Code.
An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements
for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not
be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class. The law may treat and regulate one class
differently from another class provided there are real and substantial
differences to distinguish one class from another.
Here, there is a reasonable classification. What the ordinance seeks to
prevent is a catastrophic devastation that will result from a terrorist attack.
Unlike the depot, the surrounding community is not a high-value terrorist
target. Any damage caused by fire or explosion occurring in those areas
would be nothing compared to the damage caused by a fire or explosion in
the depot itself. Accordingly, there is a substantial distinction. The enactment
of the ordinance which provides for the cessation of the operations of these
terminals removes the threat they pose. Therefore it is germane to the
purpose of the ordinance. The classification is not limited to the conditions
existing when the ordinance was enacted but to future conditions as well.

Finally, the ordinance is applicable to all businesses and industries in the
area it delineated.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not inconsistent with RA 7638 and RA 8479
The oil companies and the DOE assert that Ordinance No. 8027 is
unconstitutional because it contravenes RA 7638 (DOE Act of 1992) and RA
8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Law of 1998).
It is true that ordinances should not contravene existing statutes enacted by
Congress. However, a brief survey of decisions where the police power
measure of the LGU clashed with national laws shows that the common
dominator is that the national laws were clearly and expressly in conflict with
the ordinances/resolutions of the LGUs. The inconsistencies were so patent
that there was no room for doubt. This is not the case here. The laws cited
merely gave DOE general powers to establish and administer programs
for the exploration, transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization,
conservation, stockpiling, and storage of energy resources and to
encourage certain practices in the [oil] industry which serve the public
interest and are intended to achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure
continuous supply of petroleum products. These powers can be
exercised without emasculating the LGUs of the powers granted them. When
these ambiguous powers are pitted against the unequivocal power of the
LGU to enact police power and zoning ordinances for the general welfare of
its constituents, it is not difficult to rule in favor of the latter. Considering that
the powers of the DOE regarding the Pandacan Terminals are not
categorical, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the City of Manila.
The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously protected under
the Constitution. An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been
devoted to guaranteeing and promoting the autonomy of LGUs. The LGC
was specially promulgated by Congress to ensure the autonomy of local
governments as mandated by the Constitution. There is no showing how the
laws relied upon by the oil companies and DOE stripped the City of Manila of
its power to enact ordinances in the exercise of its police power and to
reclassify the land uses within its jurisdiction.
The DOE cannot exercise the power of control over LGUs
Another reason that militates against the DOEs assertions is that
Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the Presidents power
over LGUs to one of general supervision. Consequently, the Chief Executive
10
or his or her alter egos, cannot exercise the power of control over them. The
President and his or her alter egos, the department heads, cannot interfere
with the activities of local governments, so long as they act within the scope
of their authority. Accordingly, the DOE cannot substitute its own discretion
for the discretion exercised by the sanggunian of the City of Manila. In local
affairs, the wisdom of local officials must prevail as long as they are acting
within the parameters of the Constitution and the law.
MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc.,530 SCRA 341 (2007)
Facts: PGMA issued EO 179, which provided for the establishment of a Mass
Transport System for Greater Manila. Pursuant to this EO, the Metro manila
Council of the MMDA cited the need to remove thebus terminals located
along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Respondents, provincial bus
operators who had bus terminals that were threatened to be removed,
alleges that EO should be declaredunconstitutional and illegal for
transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land
transportation units over their respective terminals
Issue: Whether or not EO 179 is a valid exercise of police power
Held: Petition denied. EO 179 is null and void. MMDA has no police power,
let alone legislative power. In light of the administrativenature of its powers
and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as
envisioned by the EO; hence it could not have been validly designated by the
President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly
order the eliminationof the respondents terminals.
Police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be
delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being delegated. By virtue of a valid
delegation, the power may be exercised by the President
andadministrative boards as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government under an express delegation by the LGC of
1991.
Measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people
using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper
subject for the exercise of police power.
On Constitutional Law, The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect
an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised
within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference
to rights.
 11
Municipality of Paraaque vs V.M. Realty Corporation GR 127820 (July
20, 1998) Posted on October 4, 2012 G.R. No. 127820 292 SCRA 676
July 20, 1998 Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-
95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Paraaque filed a Complaint for
expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation, over two parcels of land.
Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of alleviating the living
conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless
through a socialized housing project. Petitioner, pursuant to its
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made
an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private
respondent, which the latter did not accept. The RTC authorized
petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon its deposit with
the clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value.
Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) the complaint failed
to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and
not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160; and (b) the cause of action,
if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private
respondents motion, its answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. The
trial court dismissed the complaint Issue: Whether a Local Government
Unit can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by
its law-making body. Held: Under Section 19, of the present Local
Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs
can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted
by its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution
is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making body,
the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which
was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in
effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being
the law itself and the latter only an administrative rule which cannot
amend the former.
APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC., Petitioners,
vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. FACTS: APO Fruits
Corporation, Inc. (AFC) and Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI) were owners of 5
parcels of land (1338.60 has.) located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao. On
12 October 1995, the two voluntarily offered to sell the properties to the
DAR. DAR offered P86.9 million for AFCs land and P164.40 million for
HPIs land (total of about P251.3 million). AFC, HPI and DAR cannot
agree on a price hence the Complaint for Determination of Just
Compensation was filed before the DAR Adjudication Board on 14
February 1997. The DARAB failed to render a decision on the valuation
of the land for three years. But nevertheless, the government, through the
Land Bank of the Philippines, deposited P26M into AFCs account and
P45M into HPIs account as down payment in 1996. The DAR also caused
the titling of the land in the name of the Republic of the Philippines in
December 1996. Later, titles were given to farmers under the CARP
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program). Due to DARABs failure to
adjudicate, AFC and HPI filed a complaint for determination of just
compensation before the RTC of Davao which rendered a decision in favor
of AFC and HPI. The RTC ruled, based on the reports it gathered from
assessors, that the purchase price should be higher than what was offered
by DAR; that the purchase price should be at P103.33/ sq. m; that DAR
is to pay AFC and HPI a total of P1.38 billion. DAR appealed to the CA,
the CA reversed the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not there was just
compensation. FACTS: No. AFCs and HPIs land were taken in 1996
without just compensation. DARAB, an agency of the DAR which was

commissioned by law to determine just compensation, sat on the cases for
three years, which was the reason that AFC and HPI filed the cases before
the RTC. The RTCs finding is to be sustained as it based its ruling on
evidence. DAR was given chance to support its ruling on why the purchase
price should be at a lower amount but DAR failed to present such
evidence. To allow the taking of landowners properties, and to leave them
empty-handed while government withholds compensation is undoubtedly
oppressive. The concept of just compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the
land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its
taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
just inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the
consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made
to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount
necessary to cope with his loss. Just compensation is defined as the full
and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the
measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is
used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation to convey the
idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall
be real, substantial, full, and ample. The power of expropriation is by no
means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in
the constitutional injunction that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation and in the abundant jurisprudence
that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the
requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2)
just compensation. Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law) provides: SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. The
Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
12
all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners,
and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of
Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts,
unless modified by this Act. Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, which is
particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the
determination of just compensation, reads, as follows: Sec. 17.
Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation,
the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its
nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be
considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers
and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as
the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation. Note should be taken that in said
Appraisal Report, permanent improvements on AFCs and HPIs lands
have been introduced and found existing, e.g., all weather-road network,
airstrip, pier, irrigation system, packing houses, among others, wherein
substantial amount of capital funding have been invested in putting them
up. The agricultural properties of AFC and HPI are just a stones throw
from the residential and/or industrial sections of Tagum City, a fact DAR
should never ignore. The market value of the property (plus the
consequential damages less consequential benefits) is determined by such
factors as the value of like properties, its actual or potential use, its size,
shape and location. Therefore, AFC and HPI is entitled to the amount of
just compensation (Php 1.38 billion) as computed with 12% interest per
annum plus attorneys fees amounting to 10% of the just compensation or
P138 million.
 13

Manila Memorial Park Inc. vs Linsangan (November 22, 2004) Post under acts of Florencia which were outside the authority given her. As such, the
case digests, Civil Law at Tuesday, February 21, 2012 Posted by SC ruled that the principal cannot be held liable for actions of agents
Schizophrenic Mind Facts: Florencia Baluyot is authorized by the Manila outside the scope of their authority when such acts are ratified by the
Memorial Park Inc. (MMPI) to sell burial lots to those interested in principal himself. On the part of MMPI, they did not ratify Florencias
purchasing. Herein respondent Atty. Linsangan was approached by acts, nor did they know of such actions.
Florencia with an offer to sell to the former a lot that she alleges to have
already been previously sold but the owner thereof has cancelled and thus,
Atty. Linsangan shall only continue the payment thereof amounting to
P95,000, Atty. Linsangan agreed and payed an initial P35, 000.
Thereafter, Florencia advised Atty. Linsangan that there were changes in
the contract and that she needed him to sign a new contract stipulating
the total price of P132, 000 but Florencia assured Atty. Linsangan that
he would only pay the agreed P95, 000. In the new contract, Atty.
Linsangan acceded that he has read and understood all the stipulations
therein. The payment was made in installments for two years which Atty.
Linsangan completed, however, after two years, Florencia informed
Linsangan that their contract was cancelled and offered a different lot,
Atty. Linsangan refused the offer and filed a suit for breach of contract
against MMPI and Florencia. MMPI avers that Florencia acted beyond the
scope of her authority as MMPIs agent since the latter did not allow her
to renegotiate existing contracts but only to sell new contracts. Atty.
Lnsangan on the other hand argues that MMPI should be liable for the
acts of its agents. Issue: Whether or not MMPI is liable for the acts of
Florencia Held: NO. The SC ruled that Florencia acted outside the scope of
her authority as agent of MMPI and Atty. Linsangan failed to ascertain
the authority given to Florencia especially that their agreement on the
second contract had a different stipulation than what he and Florencia
agreed upon. Moreover, Atty. Linsangans signature over the new contract
signifies his agreement thereto and serves as a form of ratification for the
 14
SANIDAD VS COMELEC 73 SCRA 333; October 12, 1976 Ponente:
Martin, J FACTS: On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito
Sanidad petitioned for prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin
COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on
October 16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991 and
1033, as well as PD. 1031. Petitioners contend that the president has
no power to propose amendments to the new constitution, as such, the
referendum plebiscite has no legal basis. ISSUE: 1. Is the case at bar
justiciable? 2. Does the president have authority to propose
amendments to the Constitution? 3. Is the submission to the people of
the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed sufficient
and proper submission? HELD: The issue of whether the President can
assume the power of a constituent assembly is a justiciable question
since it is not the wisdom but the constitutional authority of the
president to perform such act is in question. The president has the
authority to propose amendments as the governmental powers are
generally concentrated to the president in times of crisis. The time for
deliberation of the referendum-plebiscite questions, 3 weeks, is not too
short especially since the questions are issues of the day and the people
have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law.
Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania)
Brief Fact Summary. The fact that the Albanian (P) authorities did not
make the presence of mines in its waters was the basis of the United
Kingdom (D) claim against them. Synopsis of Rule of Law. International
obligations in peace time are created through elementary consideration
Facts. The explosion of mines in the Albanian (P) waters resulted in the
death of a British naval personnel. It was on this basis that the United
Kingdom (D) claimed that Albania (P) was internationally responsible
for damages. Issue. Are international obligations in time of peace
created through elementary consideration?
Held. Yes. International obligations in peace time are created through
elementary consideration. Every state has an obligation not to
knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights
of other states.
Discussion. In this case, the Court found that the Hague Convention of
1907 could not be applied but the Convention was applicable only in
time of war. It was on the basis of the principle of freedom of maritime
communication that this case was decided.
PEOPLE v. POMAR November 3, 1924, G.R. No. L-22008, Johnson, J.
(Labor Standards: Police Power, basis of social legislation) FACTS: Julio
Pomar is the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a
tobacco factory pertaining to La Campania General de Tabacos de
Filipinas, a corporation duly authorized to transact business in the City
of Manila. under his employ is Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted
vacation leave by reason of her pregnancy. However, Pomar did not
pay her the wages she is entitled to corresponding to 30 days before
and 30 days after her delivery and confinement. Despite demands
made by her, Pomar still refused to pay Fajardo. The CFI found Pomar
guilty of violating section 13 in connection with section 15 of Act No.
3071. POmar appealed questioning the constitutionality of the Act.
Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands
in the exercise of its supposed police power, with the praiseworthy
purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in
factory, shop or place of labor of any description, and of insuring to
them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one month before
and one month after their delivery. ISSUE: Whether or not Act 3071
has been adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise of the police
power of the state. RULING: The police power of the state is a growing
and expanding power. As civilization develops and public conscience
becomes awakened, the police power may be extended, as has been
 15
demonstrated in the growth of public sentiment with reference to the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. But that power cannot
grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or
violate the express inhibition of the peoples law the constitution. If
the people desire to have the police power extended and applied to
conditions and things prohibited by the organic law, they must first
amend that law. It will also be noted from an examination of said
section 13, that it takes no account of contracts for the employment of
women by the day nor by the piece. The law is equally applicable to
each case. It will hardly be contended that the person, firm or
corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor, who
employs women by the day or by the piece, could be compelled under
the law to pay for sixty days during which no services were rendered.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the facts
and the law, that the provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the
Philippine Legislature, are unconstitutional and void. Therefore, the
sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the complaint is hereby
dismissed.
DEL MONTE CORPORATION and PHILIPPINE PACKING
CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SUNSHINE SAUCE
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES G.R. No. L-78325 January 25, 1990
FACTS: Petitioner Del Monte Corporation (Del Monte), through its local
distributor and manufacturer, PhilPack filed an infringement of
copyright complaint against respondent Sunshine Sauce Manufacturing
Industries (SSMI), also a maker of catsup and other kitchen sauces. In
its complaint, Del Monte alleged that SSMI are using bottles and logos
identical to the petitioner, to which is deceiving and misleading to the
public. In its answer, Sunshine alleged that it had ceased to use the Del
Monte bottle and that its logo was substantially different from the Del
Monte logo and would not confuse the buying public to the detriment
of the petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Makati dismissed the
complaint. It held that there were substantial differences between the
logos or trademarks of the parties nor on the continued use of Del
Monte bottles. The decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not SSMI committed infringement against
Del Monte in the use of its logos and bottles. HELD: Yes. In determining
whether two trademarks are confusingly similar, the two marks in
their entirety as they appear in the respective labels must be
considered in relation to the goods to which they are attached; the
discerning eye of the observer must focus not only on the precognizant
words but also on the other features appearing on both labels. It has
been correctly held that side-by-side comparison is not the final test of
similarity. In determining whether a trademark has been infringed, we
must consider the mark as a whole and not as dissected. The Court is
agreed that are indeed distinctions, but similarities holds a greater
weight in this case. The Sunshine label is a colorable imitation of the Del
Monte trademark. What is undeniable is the fact that when a
manufacturer prepares to package his product, he has before him a
boundless choice of words, phrases, colors and symbols sufficient to
distinguish his product from the others. Sunshine chose, without a
reasonable explanation, to use the same colors and letters as those used
by Del Monte though the field of its selection was so broad, the
inevitable conclusion is that it was done deliberately to deceive. With
regard to the bottle use, Sunshine despite the many choices available to
it and notwithstanding that the caution "Del Monte Corporation, Not
to be Refilled" was embossed on the bottle, still opted to use the
petitioners' bottle to market a product which Philpack also produces.
This clearly shows the private respondent's bad faith and its intention
to capitalize on the latter's reputation and goodwill and pass off its
own product as that of Del Monte.
ASIA BREWERY, INC. vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SAN
MIGUEL CORPORATION G.R. 103543 July 5, 1993 Facts: San Miguel

Corporation (SMC) filed a complaint against Asia Brewery Inc. (ABI) for
infringement of trademark and unfair competition on account of the
latter's BEER PALE PILSEN or BEER NA BEER product which has been
competing with SMC's SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN for a share of the
local beer market. The trial court dismissed SMC's complaint because
ABI "has not committed trademark infringement or unfair competition
against" SMC On appeal by SMC, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision rendered by the trial court, finding the defendant Asia
Brewery Incorporated GUILTY of infringement of trademark and unfair
competition. ABI then filed a petition for certiorari. Issue: Are the
words PALE PILSEN as part of ABIs trademark constitute
infringement of SMCs trademark? Ruling: No. The Supreme Court said
it does not constitute an infringement as the words PALE PILSEN,
which are part of ABIs trademark, are generic words descriptive of the
color (pale), of a type of beer (pilsen), which is a light bohemian
beer with a strong hops flavor that originated in the City of Pilsen,
Czechislovakia and became famous in the Middle Ages. The Supreme
Court further said that the words "pale pilsen" may not be
appropriated by SMC for its exclusive use even if they are part of its
registered trademark. No one may appropriate generic or descriptive
words. They belong to the public domain. Petitioner ABI has neither
infringed SMC's trademark nor committed unfair competition with the
latter's SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN product.
Republic vs. Meralco [G.R. No. 141314. November 15, 2002.] Facts:
On 23 December 1993, Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) filed
with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the revision
of its rate schedules. The application reflected an average increase of
P0.21/kwh in its distribution charge. The application also included a
prayer for provisional approval of the increase pursuant to Section
16(c) of the Public Service Act and Section 8 of Executive Order 172.
On 28 January 1994, the ERB issued an Order granting a provisional
16
increase of P0.184/kwh, subject to the condition that in the event that
the Board finds that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase in rates,
all excess amounts collected from the applicants customers as a result
of this Order shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly
credited in their favor for application to electric bills covering future
consumptions. Subsequent to an audit by the Commission on Audit
(COA), the ERB rendered its decision adopting COAs recommendations
and authorized MERALCO to implement a rate adjustment in the
average amount of P0.017/kwh, effective with respect to MERALCOs
billing cycles beginning February 1994. The ERB further ordered that
the provisional relief in the amount of P0.184/kwh granted under the
Boards Order dated 28 January 1994 is hereby superseded and
modified and the excess average amount of P0.167/kwh starting with
MERALCOs billing cycles beginning February 1994 until its billing
cycles beginning February 1998, be refunded to MERALCOs customers
or correspondingly credited in their favor for future consumption. The
ERB held that income tax should not be treated as operating expense
as this should be borne by the stockholders who are recipients of the
income or profits realized from the operation of their business hence,
should not be passed on to the consumers. Further, in applying the net
average investment method, the ERB adopted the recommendation of
COA that in computing the rate base, only the proportionate value of
the property should be included, determined in accordance with the
number of months the same was actually used in service during the
test year. On appeal (CA GR SP 46888), the Court of Appeals set aside
the ERB decision insofar as it directed the reduction of the MERALCO
rates by an average of P0.167/ kwh and the refund of such amount to
MERALCOs customers beginning February 1994 and until its billing
cycle beginning February 1998. Separate Motions for Reconsideration
filed by the petitioners were denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the
petition before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the
 17
petitions and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. MERALCO
was authorized to adopt a rate adjustment in the amount of
P0.017/kwh, effective with respect to MERALCOs billing cycles
beginning February 1994. Further, in accordance with the decision of
the ERB dated 16 February 1998, the excess average amount of
P0.167/kwh starting with the applicants billing cycles beginning
February 1998 is ordered to be refunded to MERALCOs customers or
correspondingly credited in their favor for future consumption. 1.
Regulation of rates by public utilities founded on the States police
powers The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is
founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing
rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise
thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is
affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and
becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the
common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the
owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is
continued, the same is subject to public regulation.
Adong vs Cheong Seng Gee 43 Phil 43 [GR No. 18081 March 3, 1922]
Facts: Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga,
Philippine Islands, on August 5, 1919. He left property worth nearly
P100,000. The estate of the deceased was claimed, on the one hand, by
Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate child by a
marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The
estate was claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora Adong who alleged
that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan,
Philippine Islands, and her daughters, Payang, married to Cheng Bian
Chay, and Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried. The conflicting claims to the
estate of Cheong Boo were ventilated in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga. The trial judge, the Honorable Quirico Abeto, after hearing
the evidence presented by both sides, reached the conclusion, with
reference to the allegations of Cheong Seng Gee, that the proof did not
sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage, but that because Cheong Seng
Gee had been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of the
deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural child. With reference
to the allegations of the Mora Adong and her daughters Payang and
Rosalia, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage between
the Mora Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved but that
under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful
marriage; accordingly, the daughters Payang and Rosalia would inherit as
natural children. The order of the trial judge, following these conclusions,
was that there should be a partition of the property of the deceased
Cheong Boo between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and
Rosalia. Issues: Whether or not the chinese marriage is valid and
recognizable in the Philippines. Whether or not the mohammedan
marriage is valid. Held: No. Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order
No. 68) provides that All marriages contracted without these Islands,
which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were
contracted, are valid in these Islands. To establish a valid foreign
marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove
before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a
question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign
marriage by convincing evidence. In the case at bar there is no competent
testimony as to what the laws of China in the Province of Amoy
concerning marriage were in 1895. As in the Encarnacion case, there is
lacking proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral
conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage.
Substitute twenty-three years for forty years and the two cases are the
same. Yes. The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is
 18

that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract,
but, it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the
public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law
leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such
is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they
thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of
children born of these unions bastards or to make them legitimate; either
to proclaim immoralit
Brief Fact Summary. William Marbury (Marbury), an end-of-term
appointee of President John Adams (President Adams) to a justice of
the peace position in the District of Columbia, brought suit against
President Thomas Jeffersons (President Jefferson) Secretary of State,
James Madison, seeking delivery of his commission.

Civil Procedure is that a man and woman deporting themselves as

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court of the United States
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
(Supreme Court) has constitutional authority to review executive
Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision actions and legislative acts. The Supreme Court has limited
intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. We can see no jurisdiction, the bounds of which are set by the United States
substantial reason for denying to the legislative power the right to remove Constitution (Constitution), which may not be enlarged by the
impediments to an effectual marriage. If the legislative power can declare Congress.
what shall be valid marriages, it can render valid, marriages which, when
Facts. Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing
they took place, were against the law. Public policy should aid acts
President Adams attempted to secure Federalist control of the
intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to
judiciary by creating new judgeships and filling them with Federalist
invalidate marriages. The courts can properly incline the scales of their
appointees. Included in these efforts was the nomination by President
decisions in favors of that solution which will mot effectively promote the
Adams, under the Organic Act of the District of Columbia (the
public policy. That is the true construction which will best carry legislative
District), of 42 new justices of the peace for the District, which were
intention into effect. And here the consequences, entailed in holding that
confirmed by the Senate the day before President Jeffersons
the marriage of the Mora Adong and the deceased Cheong Boo, in
inauguration. A few of the commissions, including Marburys, were
conformity with the Mohammedan religion and Moro customs, was void,
undelivered when President Jefferson took office. The new president
would be far reaching in disastrous result. The last census shows that there
instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold delivery of
are at least one hundred fifty thousand Moros who have been married
the commissions. Marbury sought mandamus in the Supreme Court,
according to local custom. We then have it within our power either to
requiring James Madison to deliver his commission.
nullify or to validate all of these marriages; either to make all of the
 19

Issue. Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court?

Held. No. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction. As the President
signed Marburys commission after his confirmation, the appointment
has been made, and Marbury has a right to the commission Given
that the law imposed a duty on the office of the president to deliver
Marburys commission, that the Supreme Court has the power to
review executive actions when the executive acts as an officer of the
law and the nature of the writ of mandamus to direct an officer of
the government to do a particular thing therein specified,
mandamus is the appropriate remedy, if available to the Supreme
Court. To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to
sustain an original action, which is (in this case) outside the
constitutional limits of jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court.