G.R. No. 115044 January 27, 1995
120865-71 December 7, 1995
HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of
Manila, and the City of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FELIPE G. PACQUING, as Judge, branch 40,
Regional Trial Court of Manila and ASSOCIATED
CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 117263 January 27, 1995
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR. and DOMINADOR R. CEPEDA,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. VETINO REYES and ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Facts: The City of Manila is granted by an ordinance
passed by the city council the authority issue permits
for the operation of Jai-Alai within its jurisdiction and
was compelled by respondent judge to issue one such
permit to Associated Development Corporations.
However such an issuance was contrary to a P.D. 771
which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchises and the
powers of local governments to grant them in 1975
which was used as grounds by Executive Secretary
Guingona to issue an order to hold or revoke the
issuance of such permits.
Hence the present petition by Associated
Development Corporation.
Issue: Does the City of Manila still have the authority to
issue to Jai-Alai permits as per its ordinance in light of
P.D. 771 and other laws?
Held: No. It is clear that Congress did not delegate to
the City of Manila the power to issue such franchises as
attested to by the long line of legislation prohibiting
gambling in all its forms and the explicit transfer of
authority to issue limited licenses for their operation to
specific agencies such as the Philippine Jai-Alai
Corporation and the granting of such licenses to the
GAB.
Furthermore the court clarified that even if the
City of Manila had the power to license the operation of
Jai-Alai within its jurisdiction such licenses were useless
unless the grantee was franchised by Congress which is
a wholly legislative act. Also that seeing as P.D. 771 had
not been explicitly repealed it is still good law.
Prepared by Blake Clinton Y. Dy/ ID# 2009-147
G.R. Nos.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS et al, respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Facts: Republic Act 4850, as amended by P.D. 813 and
E.O. 927, created the Laguna Lake Development
Authority which was given sole authority to issue
permits for all uses or uses involving the waters of the
Laguna De Bay region as well as to compel adjoining
municipalities to pass appropriate zoning laws to
preserve the lakes integrity.
However in with the passage of R.A. 7160 local
governments units were granted the sole jurisdiction to
grant fish pen permits and as such municipalities
around Laguna Lake granted several licenses that
caused fisheries to occupy up to 1/3rd of the entire lake.
In the LLDA issued a statement declaring all such
fisheries not registered with the LLDA were illegal and
subject to removal. The issuing municipalities hence
filed the present petition.
Issue: Did R.A. 7160 repeal the provisions of 4850
granting the sole authority for the regulation of Laguna
Lake to the LLDA?
Held: No. The Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to
issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in
Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities
situated therein and the authority to exercise such
powers as are by its charter vested on it.
Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing
authority will render nugatory its avowed purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region.
Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power would
render useless its reason for being and will in effect
denigrate, if not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development
Authority. This, the Local Government Code of 1991 had
never intended to do.
G.R. No. L-31249 August 19, 1986
SALVADOR VILLACORTA as City Engineer of Dagupan
City, and JUAN S. CAGUIOA as Register of Deeds of
Dagupan City, petitioners,
vs.
GREGORIO BERNARDO and HON. MACARIO OFILADA as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Facts: The municipal board of Dagupan city passed an
ordinance requiring the approval of the City Engineer of
any subdivision plan prior to it being registered with the
local Registrar of Deeds. Such ordinance was challenged
and declared unconstitutional by the respondent court
because such requirements were not present in Act 496
which governs the registration of subdivision plans.
Issue: Is the ordinance unconstitutional?
Held: Yes. To sustain the ordinance would be to open
the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so
violating national laws in the guise of implementing
them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing
additional requirements for the issuance of marriage
licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles,
to minimize car napping; the execution of contracts, to
forestall fraud; the validation of passports, to deter
imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce
disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means,
even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires.
We therefore urge that proper care attend the
exercise of the police power lest it deteriorate into an
unreasonable intrusion into the purely private affairs of
the individual. The so-called "general welfare" is too
amorphous and convenient an excuse for official
arbitrariness.
This advice is especially addressed to the local
governments which exercise the police power only by
virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature
under the general welfare clause. In the instant case,
Ordinance No. 22 suffers from the additional defect of
violating this authority for legislation in contravention
of the national law by adding to its requirements.
Prepared by Blake Clinton Y. Dy/ ID# 2009-147
G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983
VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, RENATO ALIPIO, JOSE TORRES III,
LEONCIO CORPUZ, TERESITA CALOT, ROSALIA
FERNANDEZ, ELIZABETH VELASCO, NANETTE
VILLANUEVA, HONORATO BUENAVENTURA, RUBEN DE
CASTRO, VICENTE ROXAS, RICARDO DAMIAN,
DOMDINO ROMDINA, ANGELINA OBLIGACION,
CONRADO GREGORIO, TEODORO REYES, LYDIA
ATRACTIVO, NAPOLEON MENDOZA, PERFECTO
GUMATAY, ANDRES SABANGAN, ROSITA DURAN,
SOCORRO BERNARDEZ, and PEDRO GABRIEL,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EDGARDO L. PARAS, MATIAS RAMIREZ
as the Municipal Mayor, MARIO MENDOZA as the
Municipal Vice-Mayor, and THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL
OF BOCAUE, BULACAN, respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
Facts: The municipal corporation of Bocaue, Bulacan
prohibits the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of
night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such
as clubs employing hostesses. It is contended that the
ordinance assailed as invalid is tainted with a nullity, the
municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful
business, occupation or calling, petitioners at the same
time alleging that their rights to due process and equal
protection of the laws were violated as the license
previously given to them was in effect withdrawn
without judicial hearing.
Issue: The issue is whether or not a municipal
corporation can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade,
the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful
occupation, such as clubs employing hostesses?
Held: It is clear that municipal corporations cannot
prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be
regulated but not prevented from carrying on their
business. All that petitioners would have to do is to
apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A
refusal to grant licenses, because no businesses could
legally open, would be subject to judicial correction.
That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the
operation and continued existence of night clubs
subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to
compel petitioners to close their establishments, the
necessary result of an affirmation, would amount to no
more than a temporary termination of their business.
G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL
OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII;
HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Facts: Quezon City council passed an ordinance
regulating the establishment, maintenance and
operation of private memorial type cemetery within the
jurisdiction of Quezon City. However, Section 9 of said
ordinance provides that at least 6% of the total area of
a memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of
deceased persons who are paupers and residents of the
City.
Issue: Is Section 9 a valid exercise of police power?
Held: Police power is the most essential of government
powers, at times the most insistent and always one of
the least limitable of the powers of government. It is
usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or
restriction in the use of property or liberty for the
promotion of general welfare. Police power does not
involve the taking or confiscation of property except
where there is necessity to confiscate obnoxious
properties in order to destroy and not to devote it to
public use. Section 9 of the said ordinance is an invalid
exercise of police power, it is not a mere regulation but
an outright confiscation, for it deprives a person of his
private property without dues process and just
compensation.
Prepared by Blake Clinton Y. Dy/ ID# 2009-147
G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979
ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, plaintiff-
appellant,
vs.
FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO., defendant-appellee.
SANTOS, J.:
Facts: When Ortigas and Co. sold two lots in highways
Hills, Mandaluyong, Rizal, the original buyers agreed to
the stipulations that the lots shall be used exlclusively
for residential purposes. Subsequently, however, on
February 4, 1960, the municipal council of Mandaluyong
passed Resolution No.27 declaring the area where the
lots were located as a commercial and industrial zone.
Two years later, the defendant bank acquired the lots
and in 1963 commenced the construction of a
commercial building. Ortigas and Co. filed action to
enjoin construction.
Issue: Which shall prevail the restrictive covenant in
the purchase agreement or the municipal ordinance?
Held: Resolution no.27 was a legitimate exercise of
police power the most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of powers and in a sense, the greatest and
most powerful attribute of government. The Court
reiterated the PLDT ruling that police power is elastic
and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is
not confined with narrow circumscriptions of
precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow
the legal progress of a democratic way of life. It took
notice of the commercial and industrial development
along E. delos Santos Avenue and found the resolution a
valid exercise of police power.
On the non-impairment of contracts issue, the
Court found the resolution a legitimate response to a
felt public need. The non-impairment clause may not
bar the municipalitys exercise of police power. The
Court also reiterated the Phil-Am Life vs. Auditor
General ruling that not only are existing laws read into
contracts in order to fix obligations as between the
parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of
sovereign power is also read into contracts as a
postulate of the legal order.
G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988
CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU
CARCEL, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE
AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch 11, and the CITY OF
BUTUAN, respondents-appellees.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Facts: The respondent city issued an ordinance making
for admission to shows (movies, events, etc) to charge it
unlawful for any person or group of persons selling
tickets full price for the admission of persons 12 years
of age and below. Plaintiffs are operators of movie
houses, hence the present petition.
Issue: Is the aforementioned ordinance valid?
Held: No. The ordinance is not justified by any necessity
for the public interest. The police power legislation
must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare,
and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes
and means. The evident purpose of the ordinance is to
help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who
have to shell out the same amount of money for the
admission of their children, as they would for
themselves, A reduction in the price of admission would
mean corresponding savings for the parents; however,
the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of
these savings. The ordinance does not only make the
petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise
penalizes them for failure to comply with it.
Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be
difficulty in its implementation because as already
experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the
ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off
their age as below 12 years in order to avail of the
benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not
provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice
and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now
suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by movie
house patrons to prove the age of children. This is,
however, not at all practicable. We can see that the
ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly
oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover,
there is no discernible relation between the ordinance
and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and
the general welfare.
Prepared by Blake Clinton Y. Dy/ ID# 2009-147
G.R. No. 97619 November 26, 1992
SPOUSES SOCRATES PILAPIL and ROSARIO PILAPIL,
petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
CEBU, BRANCH 17, and SPOUSES GORGONIO
COLOMIDA and GLORIA COLOMIDA, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J:
Facts: Private respondent Colomidas purchased a parcel
of land and claimed a road right of way which leads
towards the National Road and ends at the portion of
petitioner Pilapil's property where a camino vicinal
exists all the way to said National Road. The Colomidas
tried to improve the road or camino vicinal, but the
Pilapils harassed and threatened them. The Pilapils also
threatened to fence off the camino vecinal.
Issue: May the Pilapils fence off the portion of road
running through their property?
Held: The property of provinces, cities and
municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property. The first consists of the provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, squares, fountains,
public waters, promenades, and public works for public
service paid for by the said provinces, cities or
municipalities. In the present case, it is beyond dispute
that the establishment, closure or abandonment of the
camino vecinal is the sole prerogative of the
Municipality of Liloan. No private property can interfere
with such a right.
Under Batas Pambasa Blg. 337 (The Local
Government Code), the Sangguniang Bayan had the
power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinance or
regulations subject to the provision of existing laws, and
to provide for the construction, improvement, repair
and maintenance of municipal streets, avenues, alleys,
sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places,
regulate the use thereof and prohibit the construction
or placing of obstacles or encroachments on them. A
camino vecinal is a municipal road. It is also property for
public use. Pursuant, therefore, to the above powers of
a local government unit, the Municipality of Liloan,
through the Sangguniang Bayan had the unassailable
authority to (a) prepare and adopt a land use map, (b)
promulgate a zoning ordinance which may consider,
among other things, the municipal roads to be
constructed, maintained, improved or repaired and (c)
close any municipal road.
G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992
LEVY D. MACASIANO, Brigadier General/PNP
Superintendent, Metropolitan Traffic Command,
petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge,
Branch 62, Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila, MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE, METRO
MANILA, PALANYAG KILUSANG BAYAN FOR SERVICE,
respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
Facts: The Municipality of Paraaque passed an
ordinance which authorizes the closure of certain
streets and the establishment of a flea market theron.
Through a resolution passed by the municipal council,
the mayor entered into a contract for the operation
maintenance and management of a flea market with
respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative.
Petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP
Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command,
ordered the destruction of said stalls. Petitioner
Macasiano wrote Palanyag giving the latter ten (10)
days to discontinue the flea market otherwise the
market stalls shall be dismantled. The trial court
however upholds the validity of the ordinance.
Issue: May the Municipality ordered the closure of
public roads to open a flea market?
Held: No. The property of provinces, cities and
municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property. In the present case, the local
roads are used for public service and therefore
considered public properties. Properties of the local
government which are devoted to public service are
deemed public and are under the absolute control of
Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority
whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public
properties unless specific authority is vested upon them
by Congress
Prepared by Blake Clinton Y. Dy/ ID# 2009-147
G.R. No. L-44178 August 21, 1987
RICARDO CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LOPE S. OCAMPO, FEDERICO
TUAZON, LEON SANTOS, ANGELINA LABRADOR, CIRIACA
STO. TOMAS, VICTORIA ANONOY, CIPRIANA GONGON,
CALOS GERONIMO, LEONARDO CHAVEZ, PABLO FLORES,
NATALIA PAMINTUAN, GINI CARO, ROMAN SANTOS,
TEOTIMO GARCIA, ANACLETO BUENO, ESPERANZA
AGRAS, FIDEL ESTO, NATIVIDAD LLANES, AND OTHERS,
respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Facts: The private respondents instituted a class suit
before the then Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch VIII in behalf of the vendors and regular stall
holders in Padre Rada Market for annulment with
preliminary injunction against the then Manila Mayor
Antonio J. Villegas, petitioner Cruz, and other persons
whose names were unknown to them. The complaint
prayed, among others, that the defendant City Mayor's
decision to withdraw Padre Rada Market as a public
market be declared null and void.
Issue: May the mayor withdraw the use of a public
market which was created by a city ordinance?
Held: No. The Mayor had no legal authority to, by
himself, allow the petitioner to withdraw the major
portion of Padre Rada Market from its use as a public
market, thereby also withdrawing it from the city's
constant supervision.
The establishment and maintenance of public
markets is by law among the legislative powers of the
City of Manila. Since the operation of Padre Rada
Market was authorized by a municipal board resolution
and approved by the City Mayor, as provided by law, it
follows that a withdrawal of the whole or any portion
from use as a public market must be subject to the
same joint action of the Board and the Mayor. The
Mayor of Manila, by himself, cannot provide for the
opening, operations, and closure of a public market.
G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555 October 26, 1983
HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA et al, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN Y. REYES, Executive Judge and Presiding
Judge of Branch I, COURT OF FIRST instance OF CEBU,
and the PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, respondents
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority wishes to
expropriate 282 hectares of land for development into
integrated complexes of areas with potential tourist
value. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on grounds
of Public Use. They contend that the land is already for
land reform and that it should seek the approval of the
Court of Agrarian Relations. CFI granted writs of
possession. Petitioners brought instant petition before
SC to enjoin execution.
Issues: The basic issues are whether or not there is non-
compliance with the public use requirement under
the eminent domain provision of the Bill of Rights;
whether or not there is disregard of the land reform
nature of the property being expropriated; and whether
or not there is impairment of obligations of contracts?
Held: There is compliance with the requirement of
public use. The states power of eminent domain
extends to the expropriation of land for tourism
purposes although this specific objective is not
expressed in the Constitution. The particular mention in
the Constitution of agrarian reform, among others,
merely underscores the magnitude of the problems
sought to be remedied by these programs. They do not
preclude nor limit the exercise of the power of eminent
domain for such purposes like tourism and other
development programs. The concept of public use is not
limited to traditional purposes. The idea that public
use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the
public has been discarded.
On the second issue, there is no disregard of
the land reform nature of the property being
expropriated. Under the facts of this petition, there is
no need to rule on whether one public purpose is
superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a
balancing of competing public interests.
On the third issue, the invocation of the
contracts clause has no merit. The non-impairment
clause has never been a barrier to the exercise of police
power and likewise eminent domain. Parties by
entering into contracts may not estop the legislature
from exercising the power of eminent domain.
Prepared by Blake Clinton Y. Dy/ ID# 2009-147
G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995
CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN, et al,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS, et al, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts: Pursuant to Article X, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution, Congress passed RA No. 6734, the Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Mindanao. In the
ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, four
provinces Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and
Tawi-tawi voted in favor of creating an autonomous
region. Article XIX, Section 13 of RA 6734 authorizes the
President to merge existing regions. On October 12,
1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order
No. 429 providing for the reorganization of the
administrative regions in Mindanao.
Petitioners contend that Article XIX, Section 13,
of RA No. 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly
delegates legislative power to the President and
provides no standard for the exercise of said delegated
power. In addition, petitioners challenge the validity of
EO No. 429 on the ground that the power granted by RA
6734 to the President is only to merge Regions IX and
XII but not to reorganize the entire administrative
regions in Mindanao.
Issue: Does the administrative reorganization of regions
in Mindanao require an act of Congress?
Held: The President as delegate is a logical choice
because the division of the county into regions is
intended to facilitate not only the administration of
local government but also the direction of executive
departments that the law requires should have regional
offices. While the power to merge administrative
regions is not expressly provided in the Constitution, it
is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the
President to facilitate the exercise of the power of
general supervision over local governments.
The regions themselves are not territorial and
political division like provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays but are mere groupings of contiguous
provinces for administrative purposes. The regrouping is
done only on paper. It involves no more than a
redefinition or redrawing of the lines separating
administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the
administrative supervision of local government units by
the President and ensuring the efficient delivery of
essential services.
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN
DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,
respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Facts: The opening of a branch of Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation in Cagayan de Oro
City was opposed by the different sectors of the
community including the local government through the
mayor who brought a petition attacking, among others,
gambling as intrinsically harmful invoking the State
policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the
youth. Petitioners also impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869
which created the PAGCOR and authorizing it to
operate casinos. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City enacted Ordinance No. 3353
prohibiting the use of buildings for the operations of
casinos and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the
operation of casinos.
Issues: May an Ordinance challenge a Presidential
Decree?
Held: The morality of gambling is not an issue. It is not
illegal per se. The Congress may prohibit gambling
altogether or allow it without limitation or it may
prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for
whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Congress
has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no
authority to review, much less reverse.
Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code,
LGU's are authorized to prevent or suppress, among
other, gambling and other prohibited games of
chance. This provision excludes games of chance which
are not prohibited but in fact permitted by law.
Petitioner's argument that the Code repealed
PD 1869 is untenable. In case of conflict between P.D.
1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold
one and annul the other but to give effect to both by
harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the
present case. The proper resolution of the problem at
hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code,
local government units may (and indeed must) prevent
and suppress all kinds of gambling within their
territories except only those allowed by statutes like
P.D. 1869.
By and large, however, the national legislature
is still the principal of the local government units, which
cannot defy its will or modify or violate it
Prepared by Blake Clinton Y. Dy/ ID# 2009-147
G.R. No. 118303 January 31, 1996
SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, et al, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., et al, respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.
Facts: Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of
R.A. 7720 entitled An Act Converting the Municipality
of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component
City to be known as the City of Santiago. Petitioners
claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the
minimum average annual income required under Sec.
450 of the Local Government Code by arguing that
Internal Revenue Allotments are not income but merely
transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national
government and that they fluctuate, increase or
decrease, depending on factors like population, land
and equal sharing. Hence, the certification issued by the
Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department
of Finance, which indicates Santiagos average annual
income to be Php 20,074,581.97 is inaccurate as the
Internal Revenue Allotments were not excluded from
the computation.
Issue: Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments
(IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the
average annual income of a municipality for purposes of
its conversion into an independent component city?
Held: Petitioners asseverations are untenable because
IRAs form part of the income of Local Government
Units. The funds generated by LGUs from local taxes,
IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue to
the general fund of the local government and are used
to finance its operations subject to specified modes of
spending the same as provided in the Local Government
Code and its implementing Rules and Regulations. For
instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the
IRAs must be set aside for local development projects.
As such, for purposes of budgetary preparation, which
budget should reflect the estimates of the income of
the LGU, among others, the IRAs and the share in the
national utilization proceeds are considered items of
income.
Income is defined in the Local Government
Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or
received forming the gross accretions of funds of the
LGU. The IRAs are items of income because they form
part of the gross accretion of the funds of the LGU. IRA
regularly and automatically accrues to the local treasury
without need of any further action on the part of the
LGU.
G.R. No. 117577 December 1, 1995
ALEJANDRO B. TY AND MVR PICTURE TUBE, INC.,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. AURELIO C. TRAMPE, et al, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts: Petitioner Alejandro B. Ty is a resident of and
registered owner of lands and buildings in the
Municipality (now City) of Pasig, while petitioner MVR
Picture Tube, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and
existing under Philippine laws and is likewise a
registered owner of lands and buildings in said
Municipality. He is challenging the assessments made
by the city assessor of the City of Pasig.
The respondent court ruled that the schedule of
market values and the assessments based thereon
prepared solely by respondent assessor are valid and
legal, they having been prepared in accordance with the
provisions of Sec. 212 of R.A. 7160. It held also that said
Code had effectively repealed the previous law on the
matter, Sec. 9 of P.D. 921, which required, in the
preparation of said schedule, joint action by all the city
and municipal assessors in Metropolitan Manila.
Issue: Whether Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991, repealed the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 921?
Held: R.A. 7160 has a repealing provision (Section 534)
and if the intention of the legislature was to abrogate
P.D. 921 it would have included it in such repealing
clause as it did in expressly rendering of no force and
effect several other presidential decrees.
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that
repeals by implication is not favored. An implied repeal
will not be allowed unless it is convincingly and
unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so
clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they
cannot co-exist. This is based on the rationale that the
will of the legislature cannot be overturned by the
judicial function of construction and interpretation.
Courts cannot take the place of Congress in repealing
statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize as much
as possible seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve
doubts in favor of their validity and co-existence.
Prepared by Blake Clinton Y. Dy/ ID# 2009-147
G.R. No. 49065 June 1, 1994
EVELIO B. JAVIER, et al, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al, respondents,
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, intervenor.
VITUG, J.:
Facts: Respondent Provincial Board of Antique abolishes
the office of the Provincial Engineer. Petitioner
questioned the said action and contends that the
abolition was a circumvention of the constitutional
mandate on security of tenure and intended only to
weed out provincial officials and employees who
opposed the Provincial Boards candidacy in the 1971
election.
Respondents argue that the abolition was
motivated by an inadequate allotment for materials,
salaries, and operating expenses at the Office of the
Provincial Engineer, and that the power of the
Provincial Board to create an office carried with it the
power to abolish it.
Issue: Whether or not the provincial board had the
authority under the then existing laws to enact the
questioned resolution, and, in the affirmative, whether
or not that authority was legitimately exercised?
Held: Section 18 of Republic Act No. 5185 (Local
Autonomy Act), then still in force, empowered
provincial governments to create, among other
positions, the office of a provincial engineer. While the
law did not expressly vest on provincial governments
the power to abolish that office, absent, however, any
contrary provision, that authority should be deemed
embraced by implication from the power to create it.
Section 23 of the Act, in fact expressed that an implied
power of the province be liberally construed in its
favor and any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of
local government and it should be presumed to exist.
The Court ruled that the power of the province
of Antique to abolish the office in question did exist at
the time. The real debatable issue focuses on the real
reasons behind the questioned action of the provincial
board. An abolition of office is not per se objectionable
but this rule carries a caveat that the act is done in good
faith. The abolition of the office in the present case
could have well been justified except for the convexity
of circumstances attendant to the decision process
taken by the board. .
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995
JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY
OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL
TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI,
respondents.
G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995
JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY
OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL
TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI,
respondents.
PUNO, J.:
Facts: Petitioners assail section 2 of R.A. 7854 as
unconstitutional on the ground that it did not properly
identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati
by metes and bounds, in violation of section 10 of the
1987 Constitution in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of
the Local Government Code
Issue: Must the boundaries of a given city be exactingly
described in metes and bounds?
Held: The importance of drawing the precise strokes of
territorial boundaries cannot be overemphasized. The
boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of
the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit.
Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Any
uncertainty in the boundaries will sow costly conflicts in
the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately
will prejudice the peoples welfare. This is the evil
sought to be avoided by the Local Government Code in
requiring that the land area be spelled out in metes and
bounds, with technical description.
Given the facts, the Court cannot perceive how
this evil can be brought about by the description made
in section 2. The delineation did not change even by an
inch the land area previously covered. Section 2 did not
add, subtract, divide or multiply the established land
area of Makati.
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that
the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not
defined by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions because at the time of the consideration of
R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the
municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio
was under court litigation.
Prepared by Blake Clinton Y. Dy/ ID# 2009-147
G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989
SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner,
vs.
CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI,
PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY
TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE,
DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT, and
BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
Facts: Petitioner Alimbuses P. Limbona was expelled
from membership in the Sangunniang Pampook,
Autonomous Region XII, for filing a case before the
Supreme Court in question which should have been
resolved within the confines of the Assembly.
Presidential Decree No. 1618 which organized the
Autonomous government of Mindanao established
internal autonomy in the two regions (Region IX and
XII ) within the framework of the national sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines and its Constitution, with legislative and
executive machinery to exercise the powers and
responsibilities. It requires the autonomous regional
governments to undertake all internal administrative
matters which are within the jurisdiction and
competence of the National Government. In relation to
the central government, it provides that the President
shall have the power of general supervision and control
over the autonomous regions.
Issue: Whether the autonomous governments of
Mindanao are subject to the jurisdiction of the national
courts?
Held: An examination of the very Presidential Decree
creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao
persuades the Supreme Court that they were meant to
exercise autonomy in the second sense, i.e., in which
the central government commits an act of self-
immolation. P.D. 1618, in the first place, mandates that
the President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over Autonomous Region. In
the second place, the Sangunniang Pampook, their
legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly
administrative services. Hence, it is proper for the
Supreme Court to assume jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO
HILADO, VIRGILIO GASTON, CONCHITA MINAYA,
TERESITA ESTACIO, DESIDERIO DEFERIA, ROMEO
GAMBOA, ALBERTO LACSON, FE HOFILENA, EMILY
JISON, NIEVES LOPEZ AND CECILIA MAGSAYSAY,
petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE PROVINCIAL
TREASURER OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondents.
ALAMPAY, J.:
Facts: Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of BP
Blg. 885 An Act Creating a New Province in the Island
of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del
Norte, on the ground that the plebiscite for its
ratification was conducted only to the inhabitants of the
territory of the proposed new province Negros del
Norte.
Issues: Must the plebiscite be conducted in the unit or
units affected only or must it includes the inhabitants of
Negros Occidental as a province?
Held: The Constitution makes it imperative that there
be first obtained the approval of a majority of votes in
a plebiscite in the unit or units affected whenever a
province is created, divided, merged and there is
substantial alteration of the boundaries. In the present
case, the boundaries of the existing province of Negros
Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by
the division of its existing boundaries in order that there
can be created the proposed new province of Negros
del Norte. The Court cannot agree that the unit or units
affected referred in the fundamental law can be
diminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa to
cities and municipalities comprising the new province
thereby ignoring the evident reality that there are other
people necessarily affected. Thus BP Blg. 885 is declared
unconstitutional and the proclamation of the new
province of Negros del Norte is null and void.
Prepared by Blake Clinton Y. Dy/ ID# 2009-147
G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993
ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T.
PALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ and
MANUEL P. REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and
RICHARD J. GORDON, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Facts: Mayor Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed
Chairman/CEO of the SBMA pursuant to RA7277 Bases
Conversion & Development Act of 1992 which provides
that- The President shall appoint a professional
manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a
compensation to be determined by the Board subject to
the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be
the ex officio chairman of the Board and who shall serve
as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority:
Provided, however, That for the first year of its
operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of
the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman
and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority.
Petitioners filed an original petition before the SC,
challenging the constitutionality of the proviso above.
Issue: May the Mayor of Ologanpo sit as Chairman of
the SBMA?
Held: The proviso violates the constitutional
proscription against appointment or designation of
elective officials to other government posts. The
proscription is an affirmation that a public office is a
full-time job. A public officer should be precluded from
dissipating his effortsamong too many positions of
responsibility, which may result in inefficiency. Section
94 of LGC which permits the appointment of a local
elective official to another post if so allowed by law or
by the primary functions of his office is untenable. No
legislative act can prevail over the Constitution. This
view ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording
between the two paragraphs of Section 7 Art. IX-B, w/c
distinction was purposely sought by the drafters of the
Constitution.
G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987
FELICIDAD VILLANUEVA, FERNANDO CAISIP, ANTONIO
LIANG, FELINA MIRANDA, RICARDO PUNO, FLORENCIO
LAXA, and RENE OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MARIANO CASTAEDA, JR., Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, VICENTE
A. MACALINO, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Mayor,
San Fernando, Pampanga, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Facts: There is in the vicinity of the public market of San
Fernando, Pampanga, along Mercado Street, a strip of
land measuring 12 by 77 meters on which stands a
conglomeration of vendors stalls together forming what
is commonly known as a talipapa. This is the subject of
the herein petition. The petitioners claim they have a
right to remain in and conduct business in this area by
virtue of a previous authorization granted to them by
the municipal government. The respondents deny this
and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal
constructions on public property
Issues: May a public plaza be the subject of contractual
undertakings and leases?
Held: A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man
and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other
contractual undertaking. This is elementary. Indeed, this
point was settled as early as in Municipality of Cavite vs.
Rojas, decided in 1915, where the Court declared as null
and void the lease of a public plaza of the said
municipality in favor of a private person.
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in
dispute, the resolution could have effectively
terminated the agreement for it is settled that the
police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away
through the medium of a contract. In fact, every
contract affecting the public interest suffers a
congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied
reservation of the police power as a postulate of the
existing legal order. This power can be activated at any
time to change the provisions of the contract, or even
abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of
the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against
the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited
by the paramount police power.
Prepared by Blake Clinton Y. Dy/ ID# 2009-147
G.R. No. 71159 November 15, 1989
CITY OF MANILA, and EVANGELINE SUVA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, IRENE STO.
DOMINGO and for and in behalf of her minor children,
VIVENCIO, JR., IRIS, VERGEL and IMELDA, all surnamed
STO. DOMINGO, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Facts: Respondents husband was interred in the North
Cemetery but on the strength of an administrative
order, plaintiff exhumed the body of respondents
husband and placed it in a sack that was subsequently
lost. Respondents therefore sued the municipal
government for damages and to require them to find
the remains. City of Manila on the contrary interposes
that such was a governmental function and as such
beyond suit.
Issues: The pivotal issue of this case is whether or not
the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a
governmental, or a corporate or proprietary function of
the City of Manila?
Held: Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a
political body corporate and as such endowed with the
faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by
and through its city government in conformity with law,
and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and be
sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powers
are twofold in character-public, governmental or
political on the one hand, and corporate, private and
proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are
those exercised in administering the powers of the state
and promoting the public welfare and they include the
legislative, judicial, public and political. The
administration of the North Cemetery was ruled to be a
corporate function of the municipal government and its
contract with the respondents entitle them to sue for
the breach.
G.R. No. L-23052 January 29, 1968
CITY OF MANILA, petitioner,
vs.
GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents..
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Facts: On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro
N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P.
Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and
unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him
down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he
managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As
he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney,
and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and
unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue
and suffered several injuries. As a result he filed a suit
against the City of Manila for damages.
Issue: Does liability attach to the City of Manila for an
injury sustained on a national highway in its
jurisdiction?
Held: Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not
necessary for the liability therein established to attach
that the defective roads or streets belong to the
province, city or municipality from which responsibility
is exacted. What said article requires is that the
province, city or municipality have either "control or
supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos
Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this
circumstance would not necessarily detract from its
"control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under
Republic Act 409.
Prepared by Blake Clinton Y. Dy/ ID# 2009-147
G.R. No. 71049 May 29, 1987
BERNARDINO JIMENEZ, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Facts: The evidence of the plaintiff (petitioner herein)
shows that in the morning of August 15, 1974 he,
together with his neighbors, went to Sta. Ana public
market to buy "bagoong" at the time when the public
market was flooded with ankle deep rainwater. After
purchasing the "bagoong" he turned around to return
home but he stepped on an uncovered opening which
could not be seen because of the dirty rainwater,
causing a dirty and rusty four- inch nail, stuck inside the
uncovered opening, to pierce the left leg of plaintiff-
petitioner penetrating to a depth of about one and a
half inches. Petitioner sued for damages the City of
Manila and the Asiatic Integrated Corporation under
whose administration the Sta. Ana Public Market had
been placed by virtue of a Management and Operating
Contract.
Issue: Whether or not the Intermediate Appellate Court
erred in not ruling that respondent City of Manila
should be jointly and severally liable with Asiatic
Integrated Corporation for the injuries petitioner
suffered?
Held: It appears evident that the City of Manila is
likewise liable for damages under Article 2189 of the
Civil Code. Respondent City having retained control and
supervision over the Sta. Ana Public Market and as tort-
feasor under Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-
delicts despite the fact that in its operating contract AIC
assumed all liability. Petitioner had the right to assume
that there were no openings in the middle of the
passageways and if any, that they were adequately
covered. Had the opening been covered, petitioner
could not have fallen into it. Thus the negligence of the
City of Manila is the proximate cause of the injury
suffered, the City is therefore liable for the injury
suffered by the peti- 4 petitioner. Respondent City of
Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corporation being joint
tort-feasors are solidarily liable under Article 2194 of
the Civil Code.
G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989
FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF DAGUPAN, and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
Facts: Petitioner fell into an open manhole and
sustained injuries. Consequently she sued the city of
Dagupan for damages. The city however contends that
it is exempt from liability as the accident took place on a
national road.
Issue: Is this city liable?
Held: The express provision in the charter holding the
city not liable for damages or injuries sustained by
persons or property due to the failure of any city officer
to enforce the provisions of the charter, cannot be used
to exempt the city, as in the case at bar. There is,
therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises
control or supervision over the public works in question.
Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner under
article 2198 of the Civil Code is clear.
Prepared by Blake Clinton Y. Dy/ ID# 2009-147
G.R. No. 127820 July 20, 1998
MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE, petitioner,
vs.
V.M. REALTY CORPORATION, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution, the
Municipality of Paraaque filed a complaint for
expropriation against private respondent, over two
parcels of land to be used for a socialized housing
project. Respondent filed an answer and alleged that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action because
the complaint was filed pursuant to a resolution and not
an ordinance as required by RA 7160 and that the cause
of action, if any, was barred by res judicata.
Issues: May a local government unit authorize
expropriation by virtue of a resolution?
Held: A local government unit cannot authorize an
expropriation of private property through a mere
resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government
Code, particularly Section 19 expressly and clearly
requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A
resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or
opinion of the municipal council will not suffice.
The power of eminent domain is lodged in
Congress, which may delegate the exercise thereof to
LGU's. The latter, when authorized by Congress, is
subject to the legislature's control and restraints
imposed through the law conferring the power or in
other legislations.
The principle of res judicata does not bar
subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the
same property when all the legal requirements for its
valid exercise are complied with. The State or its agent
cannot be forever barred from exercising said right of
eminent domain by reason alone of previous non-
compliance with any legal requirement. The same is
also true of the principle of law of the case.
Hence, the State or its authorized agent may
still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate once
all the legal requirements are complied with. To rule
otherwise will not only improperly diminish the power
of eminent domain but also clearly defeat social justice.
The petition is denied without prejudice to petitioner's
proper exercise of its power of eminent domain over
the subject property.
G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV.
LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as
Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines Sur,
petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO
SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN JOAQUIN, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
Facts: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of petitioner
passed a resolution in 1988 authorizing the provincial
governor to purchase or expropriate private property
contiguous to the provincial capitol for the purpose of
establishing a pilot farm for non-food and non-
traditional agricultural crops and housing project for the
government employees. The land sought to be
expropriated belongs to the San Joaquins, which at the
time the complaint is filed, the governing law was BP
337 which authorizes expropriation by mere resolution
of the municipal council. The Court of Appeals
suspended the expropriation proceedings and requires
petitioner to submit the requisite approval of the DAR
to convert the classification of the property from
agricultural to non-agricultural. Hence, the present
petition.
Issues: Is the power of eminent domain restricted by
R.A. 6657?
Held: The authority of DAR to approve or disapprove
conversions of agricultural land cannot extend to the
exercise of eminent domain, otherwise DAR will have
the authority to scrutinize whether the expropriation is
for a public use or not. Ordinarily, it is the municipal
council that determines whether the use of the
property sought to be expropriated is for public use, the
same being an expression of legislative policy. The
courts will intervene only when no real or substantial
relation is established between the undertaking and
public use.
Under the new concept, public use means
public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends
to contribute to the general welfare and prosperity of
the whole community. In the present case, the
expropriation for the establishment of pilot
development center is for a public purpose.
Limitations on the exercise of the delegated
power must be clearly expressed, either in the law
conferring the power or in other legislations.
Prepared by Blake Clinton Y. Dy/ ID# 2009-147
G.R. No. 104786 January 27, 1994
ALFREDO PATALINGHUG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RICARDO CRIBILLO, MARTIN
ARAPOL, CORAZON ALCASID, PRIMITIVA SEDO,
respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Facts: The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Davao City
enacted ordinance number 363, for the expanded
zoning ordinance of Davao City. Section 8 of which
provide that funeral parlors shall be established not less
than 50 meters from any residential structures,
churches and other institutional buildings.
Petitioner commenced the construction of his
funeral parlor, but his permit to construct the building
was cancelled because the construction of the funeral
parlor was within the 50-meter radius measured from
the nearest residential structure owned by Wilfred
Teepot, which is leased by laundry businesses.
Petitioner argued that Teepot's building is for
commercial purposes since a business was being
undertaken therein, and its classification as residential
in tax declaration is not conclusive.
Issues: That the Tepoot building adjacent to petitioner's
funeral parlor is residential simply because it was
allegedly declared as such for taxation purposes, in
complete disregard of Ordinance No. 363 (The
Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City) declaring the
subject area as dominantly for commercial and
compatible industrial uses.
Held: Even if Teepot's building was declared for taxation
purposes as residential, once a local government has
reclassified an area as commercial, that determination
for zoning purposes must prevail. Furthermore, a tax
declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the
property for zoning purposes. Under Section 22 of the
Real Estate Tax Code, tax declaration does not bind a
provincial or city assessor. In fact, a piece of land
declared by the tax payer as residential may be
assessed by the provincial or city assessor as
commercial because its actual use is commercial.
More importantly, the declaration of the said
area as a commercial zone through a municipal
ordinance is an exercise of police power.
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, et al, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE,
respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts: On March 20, 1995, Frivaldo filed his Certificate
of Candidacy for Governor. Lee, another candidate, filed
a petition with the COMELEC praying that Frivaldo be
disqualified for not yet being a citizen of the Philippines.
During the elections, Frivaldo garnered the highest
number of votes. Lee filed a petition praying for his
proclamation as the elected governor. At 8:30 pm of
June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor. Frivaldo
filed a new petition with COMELEC seeking the
annulment of the June 30 proclamation of Lee and his
own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at
2:00pm, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the
Philippines after his petition for repatriation under P.D.
725 which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted.
The issue is whether or not repatriation of Frivaldo valid
and legal?
Issues: Does Repatriation cure the defect of lack of
citizenship for purposes of assuming elected office?
Held: Repatriation is valid and legal. Under Phil law,
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress,
by naturalization or by repatriation. Moreover,
Frivaldos repatriation seasonably cures his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and hold
office as governor. He possessed the citizenship
requirement on the day the law mandates his term of
office to begin. Section 39 of Local Government Code
must be liberally construed. The law does not specify
any particular date or time when the candidate must
possess citizenship, unlike that for residence and age.
Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his
functions only upon his proclamation and on the day
the law mandates his term of office to begin.
Furthermore, Sec 39 speaks of "Qualifications" of
"ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Literally, such
qualifications should thus be possessed when the
elective official begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is
proclaimed. Lees argument that the citizenship
qualification should be possessed at the time the
candidate registered as a voter as under the law a
"voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines is untenable.
Prepared by Blake Clinton Y. Dy/ ID# 2009-147
G.R. No. 127116 April 8, 1997
ALEX L. DAVID, in his own behalf as Barangay Chairman
of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and as President
of the LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY SA PILIPINAS,
petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Department of Interior
and Local Government, and THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY, Department of Budget and Management,
respondents.
G.R. No. 128039 April 8, 1997
LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY QUEZON CITY CHAPTER,
Represented by BONIFACIO M. RILLON, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts: Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 reads: The term of
office of barangay officials and members of the
sangguniang kabataan shall be for 3 years, which shall
begin after the regular election of barangay officials on
the second Monday of May 1994.
Issue: Whether or not the law which governs the term
of office of barangay officials is RA 7160 (and not 6679)?
Held: YES, RA 7160. In light of the historical background,
the intent and design of the legislature to limit the term
of barangay officials to only 3 years as provided under
the LGC emerges. Furthermore the 3-year term is not
repugnant to the Constitution. (Liga ng mga Barangay
posits that by excepting barangay officials whose "term
shall be determined by law" from the general provision
fixing the term of "elective local officials" at 3 years, the
Constitution thereby impliedly prohibits Congress from
legislating a 3-year term for such officers is untenable.)
The Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress
from fixing any term of office for barangay officials. It
merely left the determination of such term to the
lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or
prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full
discretion to fix such term in accordance with the
exigencies of public service.
G.R. No. 116763 April 19, 1996
GOVERNOR RODOLFO C. FARIAS and AL NACINO,
petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR ANGELO N. BARBA, VICE MAYOR MANUEL S.
HERNANDO and EDWARD PALAFOX, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts: The basic question is this case is that in case of a
permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan caused
by the cessation from office of a member who does not
belong to any political party, who can appoint the
replacement and in accordance with what procedure?
Issue: Who may appoint the vacating members
replacement?
Held: The Governor upon the recommendation of SB
concerned. Since the vacancy in this case was created
by a SB member who did not belong to any political
party, the specific provision involved is par. (c) of Sec.
45 to wit:In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a
sanggunian member who does not belong to any
political party, the local chief executive shall, upon
recommendation of the sanggunian concerned, appoint
a qualified person to fill the vacancy. To be sure the
President of the Philippines cannot be referred to as
"local chief executive" in Sec. 45(c). It is apparent that
the phrase is a misnomer and that the choice of this
phrase was simply dictated by the need to avoid, for
stylistic reasons, interminably repeating the officials on
whom the power to appoint is conferred. Perhaps
"authorities concerned" would have been a more
accurate generic phrase to use. The phrase "sanggunian
concerned" in Sec. 45(c) should more properly be
understood as referring to the Sanggunian in which the
vacancy is created. This is in keeping with the policy
implicit in Sec. 45(a)(3).
Prepared by Blake Clinton Y. Dy/ ID# 2009-147
G.R. No. 110216 September 10, 1993
IGNACIO R. BUNYE, JAIME D. FRESNEDI, LUCIO B.
CONSTANTINO, NOLASCO L. DIAZ, RUFINO J. JOAQUIN,
ROGER S. SMITH, ALEJANDRO L. MARTINEZ, and
ROMAN E. NIEFES, petitioners,
vs.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES ROMEO M. ESCAREAL, JOSE S.
BALAJADIA, NARCISO T. ATIENZA, and AUGUSTO M.
AMORES in their personalities as members of the
Second Division of the SANDIGANBAYAN and THE
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
Facts: Petitioners Municipal Mayor, Vice Mayor and
Councilors questions the resolution suspending them
from office for 90 days pending their trial for violation
of Sec3(3) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Issue: Is the suspension of the petitioners valid?
Held: Suspension of petitioners was proper. Sec. 13 of
RA3019 unequivocally provides that the accused public
official shall be suspended from office while the
criminal prosecution is pending in court. Under Gonzaga
case, such suspension is mandatory. It is not violative of
the Constitution as it is not a penalty. It is mandatory as
soon as the validity of the information is determined.
There is no merit in the contention that their admission
of the acts constituting the offense charged against
them eliminates apprehension that they might tamper
with the records. It is not for the petitioners to say that
their admissions are all the evidence that the
prosecution will need to hold up its case against them.
The prosecution must be given the opportunity to
gather and prepare the facts for trial under conditions
which would ensure non intervention and non-
interference for 90 days from petitioners camp.
The fear that the government will be paralyzed
by their suspension is remote. There are 8 councilors
left who can meet as the Sangguniang Bayan. The
President or his alter ego, the Secretary of Interior and
Local Government will know how to deal with the
problem of filling up the temporarily vacant positions in
accordance with the provisions of the LGC.