JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A.

VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of
Court II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.

FACTS:
Complainants (Juvy Cosca et al.,) are employees of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon Jr., is the Presiding Judge of the same
Court while Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is the Clerk of Court. An administrative complaint was filed
with the Office of the Court Administrator charging respondents, among others, illegal
solemnization of marriage. Complainants alleged that respondent Judge solemnized 6
marriages even without the requisite marriage license. As a consequence, their marriage
contracts did not reflect any marriage license number. The respondent Judge did not sign their
marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he
allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually
several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the
local civil registrar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of respondent Judge proper.

HELD:
The Family Code pertinently proves that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid
marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab
initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.

* The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal
marriage, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of
respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsible. The Revised Penal Code
provides that priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who
shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with
the provisions of the Marriage Law. This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial
agencies of the Government.

RESPONDENT JUDGE LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR. IMPOSED A FINE WITH STERN WARNING
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian
family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and
Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of
Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their
Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on
March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with
Editha Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to
prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:

The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid
and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However,
there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner
though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was
inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/
embassy of the country where it will be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either:

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in

the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to
receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.
G.R. No. 168328 February 28, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LAILA TANYAG-SAN JOSE and MANOLITO SAN JOSE, Respondents

FACTS:
In 1988, Laila Tanyag, then 19 years old, and Manolito San Jose, then 20 years old, got married
to each other, albeit knowing each other for only a short period. The next year, they had a
daughter.
Their marriage turned out to be not an ideal one, however. Manolito refused to get himself a
job. He spent most of his available time with his friends drinking intoxicating substances and
gambling activities. It was Laila who had to work in order to support the family. Laila gave
Manolito all the chances to change but Manolito never did.
In 1997, Laila gave birth to their second child, a boy. Laila thought this would be the beginning
of change for Manolito but that change never happened. Thus, in 1998, Laila filed a petition to
have their marriage be declared a nullity on the ground that Manolito is psychologically
incapacitated due the fact that he was oblivious of his marital obligations.
Laila submitted herself to psychological evaluation under Dr. Nedy Tayag. Laila described
Manolito to Tayag as a happy-go-lucky individual spending most of his time hanging out with
friends. Considered to be a bad influence, he was into gambling, drinking sprees and prohibited
drugs as well. Ultimately, Tayag concluded that Manolito is psychologically incapacitated this
was even without actually examining Manolito. The RTC denied Lailas petition but on appeal,
the Court of Appeals gave weight to Dr. Tayags expert testimony and the appellate court
reversed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manolito San Jose was proven to be psychologically incapacitated.
HELD:
No. It is true that the guidelines set in the case of Republic vs Court of Appeals and Molina did
not require that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such
declaration. In fact, if such incapacity can be proven by independent means, there is no reason
why the same should not be credited. However, in this case, the findings, and ultimately the
testimony in court, of Dr. Tayag is merely hearsay. The doctor had no personal knowledge of
the facts he testified to, as these had merely been relayed to him by Laila. Tayag was working
on pure suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his
testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable. This is more so because the
questioned CA decision was solely grounded on Tayags expert testimony (which was merely
based on the information fed to him by Laila) there was no other independent evidence which
will support a conclusion of psychological incapacity on the part of Manolito.
And based on Lailas description of Manolito, whcih she gave to Tayag, Manolitos alleged
psychological incapacity was merely premised on his being jobless and a drug user, as well as
his inability to support his family and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Manolitos state or condition or attitude has not been shown,
however, to be a malady or disorder rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating
psychological condition. Manolito merely has a difficulty if not outright refusal or neglect
in the performance of some marital obligations but not psychological incapacity.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

FACTS:

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel
Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got
married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both
as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his
money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their
relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio
City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned
them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes
psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction
personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not
meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness.
Reynaldos action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would
comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed
that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the
problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony
by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not
considered as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in
this case:
burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the
essentials of marital obligations of marriage
such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code
decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be
respected
court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of
the state.
G.R. No. L-28093 January 30, 1971

BASILIA BERDIN VDA. DE CONSUEGRA; JULIANA, PACITA, MARIA LOURDES, JOSE, JR.,
RODRIGO, LINEDA and LUIS, all surnamed CONSUEGRA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS,
HIGHWAY DISTRICT ENGINEER OF SURIGAO DEL NORTE, COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE,
and ROSARIO DIAZ,respondents-appellees.

Facts:

Jose Consguera had contracted 2 marriages, with Rosario Diaz first, and with Basilia Berdin also.
He had 2 children in the first marriage, while 7 in the second. When Jose died intestate, the
GSIS divided his insurance proceeds left as well as his retirement benefits equally. Basilia
questioned the decision of GSIS before the Court of First Instance, Contending that she and her
children are the legal heirs and exclusive beneficiaries of the deceased.

Issue

Whether or not the second marriage is valid, and whether or not Basilia and her children is the
exclusive beneficiary of the retirement benefits of the deceased.

Ruling

Yes. Although presumed to be void ab initio, still the second marriage is valid, unless there is a
declaration annulling or declaring the same marriage void.

No. The first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void, thus, the conjugal partnership
established by that marriage has not ceased, nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her
status as putative heir of her husband under the NCC, entitled to share in his estate upon his
death should she survive him.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance