Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
Adm. Case No. 5910 September 21, 2005
ATTY. IRENEO L. TORRES and MRS. NATIVIDAD CELESTINO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE CONCEPCION JAVIER, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By complaint1 dated November 26, 2002, Atty. Ireneo L. Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino (complainants)
charge Atty. Jose Concepcion Javier (respondent) for malpractice, gross misconduct in office as an attorney
and/or violation of the lawyers oath.
The charges stemmed from the statements/remarks made by respondent in the pleadings he filed in a petition
for audit of all funds of the University of the East Faculty Association (UEFA), as counsel for the therein
petitioners UEFA then Treasurer Rosamarie Laman, and his wife-former UEFA President Eleonor Javier, before
the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) against herein
complainants, docketed as NCR-OD-0105-004-LRD (audit case), 2 and from the pleadings filed by respondent in
another labor case as counsel for the one hundred seventy six (176) faculty members of the University of the
East complainants against herein complainant Atty. Ireneo L. Torres, et al., 3 docketed as NCR-0D-0201-0005-
LRD (attorneys fees case).4
The complaint sets forth three (3) causes of action against respondent.
The first cause of action is based on respondents "Urgent Motion to Expedite with Manifestation and Reiteration
of Position" (Motion to Expedite) filed in the audit case which complainants allege contained statements which
are absolutely false, unsubstantiated, and with malicious imputation of crimes of robbery, theft of UEFFAs funds,
destruction or concealment of UEFAs documents and some other acts tending to cause dishonor, discredit or
contempt upon their persons.5 Portions of the questioned motion read:
Undersigned attorney would like to manifest just so it can not be said later on that he kept mum on the matter
that when individual respondents-appellants realized that an audit of Union funds was looming, it appears that
they decided to destroy or conceal documents as demonstrated by an "Incident Report Re Robbery" dated May
6, 2002 (a copy just recently secured by the undersigned), attached hereto as Annex "A", where the police
investigator stated that "no forcible entry" was noted by him but "that air condition on the respective rooms were
(sic) slightly move (sic) to mislead that suspect as the same as their point of entry.["] The police officers stated
that "no cash of (sic) money were stolen but instead claimed that still undetermined documents/important papers
were stolen by the suspects."
This brings to mind the United States case against Andersen officials who shredded documents related to
theEnron scandal when they thought nobody was looking. As in the Andersen/Enron case, the individual
respondents-appellants in the instant case knew that the law was going to come knocking at their door, asking a
lot [of] questions about financial matters.
From the undersigneds standpoint, the alleged "robbery" of "still undetermined documents/papers" was an
inside job as investigation has shown that there is no evidence of forced entry. Besides, it would be a cinch to
establish a motive by individual respondents-appellants Torres and Celestino to destroy documents related to the
audit ordered by Regional Director Alex E. Maraan. In any event, the undersigned thinks that the legal process
should go on. Lumang gimmick na yang "robbery" ng mga evidensya. They may try to cover up the "looting" of
union funds, but there is such a thing as secondary evidence, not to mention the power of this Honorable Office
to issuesubpoenas even to the unions depositary banks.6 (Underscoring supplied)
Complainants aver that respondent violated the attorneys oath that he "obey the laws" and "do no falsehood,"
the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule 10.01 thereof, and Rule 138, specifically paragraph 20
(f) of the Rules of Court for directly pointing to them as the persons who intentionally committed the robbery at
the UEFA office, and for citing the Andersen/Enron case which is irrelevant, impertinent, and immaterial to the
subject of quasi-judicial inquiry.7
As second cause of action, complainants allege that in the attorneys fees case, respondent, in his "Reply to
Respondents (Torres and Marquez) Answer/Comment" filed before the DOLE, used language that was clearly
abusive, offensive, and improper,8 inconsistent with the character of an attorney as a quasi-judicial officer. 9
As third/last cause of action, complainants quote respondents statement in the aforesaid Reply, to wit:
It is not uncommon for us trial lawyers to hear notaries public asking their sons, wives, girlfriends, nephews, etc.
to operate a notarial office and sign for them. These girlfriends, nephews, etc. take affidavits, administer oaths
and certify documents. x x x,10
and allege that the statement is demeaning to the integrity of the legal profession, "uncalled for and deserve[s]
censure, [as] the same might shrink the degree of confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of the legal profession and the solemnity of a notarial document." 11
By his Comment, respondent candidly professes that he was angry 12 while he was preparing his "Motion to
Expedite" in the audit case, it having come to his knowledge that the UEFA office had been burglarized and
complainant Atty. Torres had been spreading reports and rumors implicating his clients including his wife to the
burglary. 13
Respondent stresses that he felt that it was his duty to inform the BLR of the loss of the vital documents so that
the resolution of the pending motion for reconsideration filed by complainants would be expedited; 14 and that
the information regarding the burglary and his use of the Andersen/Enron case as a figure of speech were
relevant in drawing a link between the burglary and the audit the burglary having rendered the complete
implementation of the audit unattainable.15
With respect to the attorneys fees case, respondent claims that Atty. Torres did not in his Answer confront the
issues thereof but instead "mock[ed] his wife and fabricat[ed] and distort[ed] realities" 16 by including malicious,
libelous and impertinent statements and accusations against his wife which exasperated him. 17 A portion of
Atty. Torres Answer in the attorneys fees case reads:
x x x in her incumbency as President of the UEFA for 12 years (1987-1999) she got only about P2.00/hr CBA
increase which took effect only [in] 1994, with no other substantial improvements of the teachers benefits, and
yet she spent for more than half a million negotiation expenses from the UEFAs funds. Her 1994-1999 CBA was
only a carbon copy of her old 1989-1994 CBA with no substantial improvements, with uncertain amount of her
expenses, because she removed/concealed all the financial records of the UEFA during her term. . . I and the
other lawyers/teachers denounced her unlawful deduction of 10% attorneys fees from the small backwages
received by the teachers on April 28, 1993 although there was actually no lawyer who worked for itand there
was no Board nor General Membership Assembly Resolutions passedthe assembly [Nov. 24, 2001] was
apparently irked to Mrs. Eleanor Javier when she was booed while talking on the floor, like a confused gabble
(sic)18
Not wanting to allow his wife to be maligned by Atty. Torres, respondent admits having responded with a counter-
attack in his "Reply to Respondents (Torres and Marquez) Answer/Comment" 19 wherein he stated:
What kind of a lawyer is this Atty. Torres? The undersigned feels that Atty. Torres just cannot kick the habit of
injecting immaterial, irrelevant, and impertinent matters in his pleadings. More than that, he lies through his
teeth.The undersigned thinks that if he has any common sense at all he should shut up about his accusation that
Prof. Javier spent more than half a million pesos for negotiation expensesshe obtained only P2-increase in
union members salary, etc. because of the pendency of the damage suit against him on this score. He easily
forgets the sad chapter of his life as a practitioner when he lost out to Prof. Javier in the petition for audit (Case
No. NCR-OD-M-9401-004) which he filed to gain "pogi" points prior to the UEFA election in 1994.20
xxx
To repeat, if respondent Atty. Torres has any common sense at all, he should stop making irrelevant, libelous and
impertinent allegations in his pleadings. This means changing his "standard tactic" of skirting the main issues by
injecting a web or a maze of sham, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matters. 21 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent adds that he merely wanted to bring to the BLRs attention that Atty. Torres had the habit of hurling
baseless accusations against his wife to embarrass her, including one for unjust vexation and another for
collection and damages both of which were dismissed after trial on the merits, thus prompting him to state that
"these dismissed cases indubitably indicate Atty. Torres pattern of mental dishonesty." 22
Respondent further claims that in his Answer in the same attorneys fees case, Atty. Torres accused his client,
Prof. Maguigad, of forging the signature of a notary public and of "deliberately us[ing] a falsified/expired
Community Tax Certificate" in order to justify the dismissal of the case against him (Atty. Torres); 23 and that Atty.
Torres continued harassing his clients including his wife by filing baseless complaints for falsification of public
document.24 Hence, in defense of his clients, the following statements in his Reply:
Respondent further concluded that lead petitioner Prof. Maguigad "falsified the said petition by causing it to
appear that he participated" in the falsification "when he did not in truth and in fact participate thereat" . . .
obviously oblivious of the obvious that it is highly improbable for Prof. Maguigad to have forged the signature of
the notary public. If he intended to forge it, what was the big idea of doing so? To save Fifty Pesos (P50.00) for
notarial fee? Needless to say, the allegation that lead (sic) petitioner Maguigad used a falsified Com. Tax Cert. is
patently unfounded and malicious.
But that is not all. Respondents went further and charged Profs. Mendoza, Espiritu, Ramirez and Javier with the
same crime of falsification of public document . . . "by causing it to appear that Rogelio Maguigad had indeed
participated in the act of verifying/subscribing and swearing the subject petition before notary public Atty. Jorge
M. Ventayen, when in truth and in fact he did not participate thereat."
To the mind of the undersigned, this is the height of irresponsibility, coming as it does from a member of the
Philippine Bar. There is no evidence to charge them with falsification of public document, i.e. the "verification"
appended to the present petition. They did not even sign it. The crime imputed is clearly bereft of merit. Frankly,
the undersigned thinks that even a dim-witted first-year law student would not oblige with such a very serious
charge.
It is not uncommon for us trial lawyer[s] to hear notaries public asking their sons, wives, girlfriends, nephews,
etc. to "operate" a notarial office and sign for them. These girlfriends, nephews, etc. take affidavits, administer
oaths, and certify documents. Believing that the said "veification" was signed by an impostor-relative of the
notary public [Atty. Jorge M. Ventayan] through no fault of his client, Prof. Maguigad, the undersigned sought the
assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On May 2, 2002, an NBI agent called up the
undersigned to inform him that he arrested in the area near UE one Tancredo E. Ventayen whom he caught in
flagrante delicto notarizing an affidavit of loss and feigning to be Atty. Jorge M. Ventayen, supposedly his
uncle.25
xxx
Petitioners devoted so much space in their answer/comment vainly trying to prove that Profs. Maguigad,
Mendoza, Espiritu, Ramirez, and Javier committed the crime of falsification of public document reasoning out
that they made "untruthful statements in the narration of facts" in the basic petition.
Respondent Torres is a member of the Philippine Bar. But what law books is he reading?
He should know or ought to know that the allegations in petitioners pleading are absolutely privileged because
the said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues. 26 (Underscoring supplied)
The Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) found respondent guilty of violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility for using inappropriate and offensive remarks in his pleadings.
The pertinent portions of the Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation read:
Respondent admits that he was angry when he wrote the Manifestationand alleges that Complainant
implicated his wife in a burglary. Moreover, Respondent alleges that Complainant has been "engaged in
intimidating and harassing" his wife.
It appears that herein Complainant and herein Respondents wife have had a series of charges and counter-
charges filed against each other. Both parties being protagonists in the intramurals within the University of the
East Faculty Association (UEFA). Herein Complainant is the President of the UEFA whereas Respondents wife
was the former President of UEFA. Nevertheless, we shall treat this matter of charges and counter-charges filed,
which involved the UEFA, as extraneous, peripheral, if not outright irrelevant to the issue at hand.
xxx
Clearly, [r]espondents primordial reason for the offensive remark stated in his pleadings was his emotional
reaction in view of the fact that herein Complainant was in a legal dispute with his wife. This excuse cannot be
sustained. Indeed, the remarks quoted above are offensive and inappropriate. That the Respondent is
representing his wife is not at all an excuse.27 (Underscoring supplied)
Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), by Resolution 28 of October 7, 2004,
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
The Report of the IBP faulting respondent is well-taken but not its recommendation to reprimand him.
It is well entrenched in Philippine jurisprudence that for reasons of public policy, utterances made in the course
of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, are absolutely privileged so long
as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject inquiry, however false or malicious they may be. 29
The requirements of materiality and relevancy are imposed so that the protection given to individuals in the
interest of an efficient administration of justice may not be abused as a cloak from beneath which private malice
may be gratified.30 If the pleader goes beyond the requirements of the statute and alleges an irrelevant matter
which is libelous, he loses his privilege.31
A matter, however, to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject
matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy or impropriety. 32 That matter alleged
in a pleading need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It must, however,
belegitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of
inquiry in the course of the trial.33
The first cause of action of complainants is based on respondents allegation in his "Motion to Expedite" that a
burglary of the UEFA office took place, and his imputation to complainants of a plausible motive for carrying out
the burglary the concealment and destruction of vital documents relating to the audit. The imputation may be
false but it could indeed possibly prompt the BLR to speed up the resolution of the audit case. In that light, this
Court finds that the first cause of action may not lie.
As regards the second cause of action, it appears that respondent was irked by Atty. Torres Answer to the
complaint in the attorneys fees case wherein he criticized his (respondents) wifes performance as past
President of UEFA.
This Court does not countenance Atty. Torres incorporating in his Answer in the attorneys fees case statements
such as "the assembly . . . was apparently irked by Mrs. Eleonor Javier when she was booed while talking on the
floor like a confused gabble (sic)." But neither does it countenance respondents retaliating statements like "what
kind of lawyer is Atty. Torres?," "he lies through his teeth," "if he has any common sense at all he should shut
up," and "Atty. Torres forgets the sad chapter of his life as a practitioner when he lost out to Prof. Javier in the
petition for audit which he filed to gain pogi points." Nor respondents emphasis that Atty. Torres is of the habit of
hurling baseless accusations against his wife by stating that the dismissal of the cases against his wife, of which
Atty. Torres was the complainant, "indubitably indicate Atty. Torres pattern of mental dishonesty."
The issue in the attorneys fees case was whether the 10% attorneys fees "checked off" from the initial
backwages/salaries of UEFA members is legal. Clearly, the above-quoted statements of respondent in the
immediately preceding paragraph cannot be said to be relevant or pertinent to the issue. That Atty. Torres may
have conducted himself improperly is not a justification for respondent to be relieved from observing professional
conduct in his relations with Atty. Torres.
Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants, so whatever may be the ill-feeling existing between clients should not be
allowed to influence counsel in their conduct toward each other or toward suitors in the case. 34
In the attorneys fees case, Atty. Torres was acting as counsel for himself as respondent and complainant was
acting as counsel for his wife as complainant. Although it is understandable, if not justifiable, that in the defense
of ones clients - especially of ones wife or of ones self, the zeal in so doing may be carried out to the point of
undue skepticism and doubts as to the motives of opposing counsel, the spectacle presented by two members of
the bar engaged in bickering and recrimination is far from edifying, and detract from the dignity of the legal
profession.35
Moreover, in arguing against the dismissal of the attorneys fees case on the basis of the alleged forgery of the
notary publics signature, respondent did not only endeavor to point out that Atty. Torres erred in advancing such
an argument, but personally attacked Atty. Torres mental fitness by stating that "the undersigned thinks that even
a dim-witted first-year law student would not oblige with such a very serious charge," and "[r]espondent Torres is
a member of the bar [b]ut what law books is he reading."
In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language must be dignified and choice of language
is important in the preparation of pleadings. 36 In the assertion of his clients rights, a lawyer even one gifted
with superior intellect is enjoined to rein up his temper. 37
As reflected above, the inclusion of the derogatory statements by respondent was actuated by his giving vent to
his ill-feelings towards Atty. Torres, a purpose to which the mantle of absolute immunity does not extend.
Personal colloquies between counsel which cause delay and promote unseemly wrangling should be carefully
avoided.38
If indeed Atty. Torres filed criminal complaints for falsification of public documents against respondents clients as
a scheme to harass them, they are not without adequate recourse in law, for if they plead for a righteous cause,
the course of justice will surely tilt in their favor, the courts being ever vigilant in the protection of a partys
rights.39
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
CANON 8 A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESSS AND CANDOR
TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST
OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
instructs that respondents arguments in his pleadings should be gracious to both the court and opposing
counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another. 40 The language
vehicle does not run short of expressions
which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. 41
As to the reference by respondent to the unfortunate and contemptible practice of notaries public basis of the
last cause of action, while it may detract from the dignity that should characterize the legal profession and the
solemnity of a notarial document, respondent, who justifies the same as legitimate defense of his client who was
being accused by Atty. Torres of forgery, may, given the relevance of the statement to the subject matter of the
pleading, be given the benefit of the doubt.
Respecting the verified complaint Annex "EJ-A" 42 to the Comment of respondent filed by his wife, Prof.
Eleonor R. Javier, against complainant Atty. Torres, the same cannot be consolidated with the present
administrative case since the parties and causes of action of such complaint are completely different from those
of the present complaint.
WHEREFORE, for employing offensive and improper language in his pleadings, respondent Atty. Jose C. Javier
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for One (1) Month, effective upon receipt of this Decision, and
isSTERNLY
WARNED that any future infraction of a similar nature shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6483 August 31, 2007
NICOLAS O. TAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. AMADEO E. BALON, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On July 13, 2004, Nicolas O. Tan filed a complaint against Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr. for misappropriation of
funds and issuance of bum checks.
Tan alleged that he engaged the services of Atty. Balon relative to the returned checks issued to the former by
Jose G. Guisande. Atty. Balon sent demand letters to Guisande but thereafter failed to inform Tan about the
status of the same. Tan alleged that as a fellow Rotarian, he regularly met Atty. Balon but the latter said nothing
about the case.
Tan thus engaged the services of another lawyer, Atty. Romualdo Jubay, who filed an estafa case against
Guisande. During the proceedings, Guisandes counsel informed Tan and Atty. Jubay that out of the P96,085.00
originally owed, P60,000.00 was already collected by Atty. Balon.
When confronted by Tan, Atty. Balon admitted that he collected the amount of P60,000.00 from Guisande. He
then proposed to Tan that 20% of the P60,000.00 or P12,000.00 be applied as attorneys fees. He offered to pay
the remaining balance of P48,000.00 with interest of 6% from September 29, 1999 to January 13, 2003 by
issuing two postdated checks. However, the two checks issued by Atty. Balon bounced for reason "account
closed" when presented for payment.
Upon being informed of the dishonor, Atty. Balon offered to settle his obligations by depositing cash in Tans
account. However, he was only able to deposit a total amount of P20,000.00. Despite several demands, Atty.
Balon failed to fully settle his obligations. Thus, Tan filed the instant complaint.
In his Comment, Atty. Balon alleged that he had fully paid his obligations; that on several occasions, he rendered
legal services to Tan for free; that the administrative complaint was intended to harass him and to stop him from
filing a collection case for unpaid legal services against Tan.
On December 8, 2004, we referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation.
The IBP held a mandatory conference and conducted a hearing on August 24, 2005. During the hearing, Atty.
Balon admitted that he was not able to fully pay his obligations to Tan. 1 The parties were then directed to submit
their respective position papers on or before September 12, 2005.
Complainant submitted his position paper. Respondent, however, submitted a "Motion to Suspend the Period to
File Position Paper and to Defer the Submission of the Case for Resolution and With Motion to Set Case for Trial
and/or Reception of Evidence." In the same Motion, particularly paragraph 6 thereof, respondent claimed that
"the IBP has no jurisdiction over the complaint as it concerns a contract of loan, rather than a fiduciary
transaction of lawyer-client relationship." The IBP granted the motion and scheduled the hearing on December 6,
2005.
Subsequently, however, the Investigating Commissioner learned that respondent had been disbarred by the
Court in Lemoine v. Balon, Jr. 2 on October 28, 2003, or even prior to the institution of the instant complaint.
Thus, the IBP deemed the proceedings closed and terminated for lack of disciplinary jurisdiction over respondent
in view of his prior disbarment. At the same time, it ordered respondent to show cause why he should not be
cited for contempt for failing to inform the IBP of his disbarment and for continuing to represent that he is still a
member of the Bar.
In his explanation, respondent alleged that he assumed the IBP knew of his disbarment; that his disbarment
attained finality only on April 12, 2005; and that he intended to discuss his disbarment in the position paper he is
yet to submit to the IBP.
Unsatisfied with the explanation, the IBP recommended that respondent be cited for contempt for continuing to
practice law despite his disbarment.
On March 7, 2007, we required the parties to manifest whether they are willing to submit the case for resolution.
However, on May 4, 2007, complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance claiming that the filing of the instant case
was a product of misunderstanding and misapprehension of facts; and that he and the respondent had cleared
their differences and reconciled their accounting records. Consequently, he is no longer interested in pursuing
the complaint.
On the other hand, respondent filed on May 8, 2007 a Manifestation and Motion claiming that considering
complainants Affidavit of Desistance, it would be "prudent" for the Supreme Court to refer the matter back to the
IBP.
In Lemoine v. Balon, Jr., respondent was found unfit to remain as a member of the Bar after committing
malpractice, deceit, and gross misconduct. He received the check corresponding to his clients insurance claim,
falsified the check and made it payable to himself, encashed the same and appropriated the proceeds. The
Court found his acts so appalling and his character grossly flawed that it ruled in this wise:
Specifically with respect to above-quoted provision of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Filipino lawyers principal source of ethical rules, which Canon 16 bears on the principal complaint of
complainant, a lawyer must hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that he may come to possess.
This commandment entails certain specific acts to be done by a lawyer such as rendering an accounting of all
money or property received for or from the client as well as delivery of the funds or property to the client when
due or upon demand. Respondent breached this Canon when after he received the proceeds of complainants
insurance claim, he did not report it to complainant, who had a given address in Makati, or to his co-attorney-in-
fact Garcia who was his contact with respect to complainant.
In fact, long after respondent received the December 23, 1998 check for P525,000.00 he, by his letter of March
26, 1999 to Garcia, had even the temerity to state that the claim was still pending and recommend "acceptance
of the 50% offer . . . which is P350,000.00 pesos." His explanation that he prepared and sent this letter on
Garcias express request is nauseating. A lawyer, like respondent, would not and should not commit
prevarication, documented at that, on the mere request of a friend.
By respondents failure to promptly account for the funds he received and held for the benefit of his client, he
committed professional misconduct. Such misconduct is reprehensible at a greater degree, for it was obviously
done on purpose through the employment of deceit to the prejudice of complainant who was kept in the dark
about the release of the check, until he himself discovered the same, and has to date been deprived of the use
of the proceeds thereof.
A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings with his client not only violates his duty of fidelity, loyalty
and devotion to the clients cause but also degrades himself and besmirches the fair name of an honorable
profession.
That respondent had a lien on complainants funds for his attorneys fees did not relieve him of his duty to
account for it. The lawyers continuing exercise of his retaining lien presupposes that the client agrees with the
amount of attorneys fees to be charged. In case of disagreement or when the client contests that amount for
being unconscionable, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment
of his fees. He can file, if he still deems it desirable, the necessary action or proper motion with the proper court
to fix the amount of such fees.
In respondents case, he never had the slightest attempt to bring the matter of his compensation for judicial
determination so that his and complainants sharp disagreement thereon could have been put to an end. Instead,
respondent stubbornly and in bad faith held on to complainants funds with the obvious aim of forcing
complainant to agree to the amount of attorneys fees sought. This is an appalling abuse by respondent of the
exercise of an attorneys retaining lien which by no means is an absolute right and cannot at all justify inordinate
delay in the delivery of money and property to his client when due or upon demand.
Respondent was, before receiving the check, proposing a 25% attorneys fees. After he received the check and
after complainant had discovered its release to him, he was already asking for 50%, objection to which
complainant communicated to him. Why respondent had to doubly increase his fees after the lapse of about one
year when all the while he has been in custody of the proceeds of the check defies comprehension. At any rate,
it smacks of opportunism, to say the least.
As for respondents claim in his June 2001 Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he had on several occasions
from May 1999 to October 1999 already delivered a total of P233,000.00 out of the insurance proceeds to
Garcia in trust for complainant, this does not persuade, for it is bereft of any written memorandum thereof. It is
difficult to believe that a lawyer like respondent could have entrusted such total amount of money to Garcia
without documenting it, especially at a time when, as respondent alleged, he and Garcia were not in good terms.
Not only that. As stated earlier, respondents Counter-Affidavit of February 18, 2000 and his December 7,
1999 letter to complainant unequivocally contained his express admission that the total amount of P525,000.00
was in his custody. Such illogical, futile attempt to exculpate himself only aggravates his misconduct.
Respondents claim discredited, the affidavits of Leonardo and Roxas who, acting allegedly for him, purportedly
gave Garcia some amounts forming part of the P233,000.00 are thus highly suspect and merit no consideration.
The proven ancillary charges against respondent reinforce the gravity of his professional misconduct.
The intercalation of respondents name to the Chinabank check that was
issued payable solely in favor ofcomplainant as twice certified by Metropolitan Insurance is clearly a brazen act
of falsification of a commercial document which respondent resorted to in order to encash the check.
Respondents threat in his December 7, 1999 letter to expose complainant to possible sanctions from certain
government agencies with which he bragged to have a "good network" reflects lack of character, self-respect,
and justness.
It bears noting that for close to five long years respondent has been in possession of complainants funds in the
amount of over half a million pesos. The deceptions and lies that he peddled to conceal, until its discovery by
complainant after about a year, his receipt of the funds and his tenacious custody thereof in a grossly oppressive
manner point to his lack of good moral character. Worse, by respondents turnaround in his Supplement to his
Counter-Affidavit that he already delivered to complainants friend Garcia the amount of P233,000.00 which, so
respondent claims, is all that complainant is entitled to, he in effect has declared that he has nothing more to turn
over to complainant. Such incredible position is tantamount to a refusal to remit complainants funds, and gives
rise to the conclusion that he has misappropriated them.1awphi1
In fine, by respondents questioned acts, he has shown that he is no longer fit to remain a member of the noble
profession that is the law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., is found GUILTY of malpractice, deceit and gross
misconduct in the practice of his profession as a lawyer and he is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of
Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts and the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines of this Decision.
Respondent is ordered to turn over to complainant, Daniel Lemoine, the amount of P525,000.00 within thirty (30)
days from notice, without prejudice to whatever judicial action he may take to recover his attorneys fees and
purported expenses incurred in securing the release thereof from Metropolitan Insurance.
SO ORDERED.
It appears that after the chastisement he received from the Court and despite having been stripped of the
privilege to practice law, respondent was unrepentant and unmoved as he continued to commit falsehood and
dishonest acts.
In the instant case, respondent collected the money intended for his client without informing the latter of such
receipt. Worse, he used the amount for personal purposes. It was almost four years from the time he received
the money that his client knew of the collection. Although respondent offered to pay the amount, he was not able
to fully pay the same. He even had the temerity to allege in his comment that he has fully paid the amount only
to admit during the hearing conducted by the IBP that he only paid a portion thereof. Moreover, the checks he
issued to Tan as payment bounced for insufficiency of funds.
Notwithstanding his disbarment on October 28, 2003, he continued to represent himself as a lawyer, not only
before the IBP but also before this Court. In the Motion for Extension dated October 5, 2004, respondent signed
his name under "Balon Law Office" and appended his PTR, IBP and Roll numbers. 3 He also signed as Notary
Public in the Affidavit of Service of Sally I. Leonardo. 4
In his Comment dated October 21, 2004, respondent prayed in the alternative that the case be referred to the
IBP5 despite his prior disbarment. Again he signed his name below "Balon Law Office" 6 and as Notary Public in
the Affidavit of Service.7
In the Rejoinder dated December 15, 2004, respondent reiterated his prayer that the case be referred to the IBP
for investigation8 despite knowledge of IBPs lack of jurisdiction in view of his prior disbarment. He again
appended his name under "Balon Law Office" together with his Roll number. 9
There is no merit in respondents contention that he continued to represent himself as a lawyer because the
disbarment became final only on April 12, 2005. Good faith and fair dealing require him to disclose his
disbarment. Instead, he continued to sign the pleadings as a lawyer and as notary public.
Moreover, we note that even after the disbarment became final on April 12, 2005, respondent continued to
represent himself as a lawyer. During the IBP hearing on August 24, 2005, he deliberately failed to mention his
prior disbarment. In the Motion to Suspend the Period to File Position Paper and to Defer the Submission of the
Case for Resolution and With Motion to Set Case for Trial and/or Reception of Evidence dated September 9,
2005, although he did not append the title "Attorney" to his name, yet he affixed his PTR, IBP and Roll numbers
under his signature. The same is true with the Urgent Motion for Postponement dated November 23, 2005. This
notwithstanding the Courts Decision on October 28, 2003 to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
As a former lawyer, respondent should know that the IBPs jurisdiction is limited to the members of the Bar. In
fact, in the Motion to Suspend the Period to File Position Paper and to Defer Submission of the Case for
Resolution dated September 9, 2005, respondent alleged that the IBP has no jurisdiction over the instant
complaint because it allegedly concerns a contract of loan, and not a fiduciary transaction between a lawyer and
his client. However, after the IBP found out his duplicity and referred the case back to this Court, and after the
complainant submitted his Affidavit of Desistance, respondent still has the temerity to say that "it would be
prudent for the Honorable Court, if the same will also be referred to the IBP for appropriate action x x x."
Respondent is making a mockery of the proceedings as well as of the authority of the IBP and the Court. After
claiming that the IBP has no jurisdiction over the complaint, he now alleges that it would be prudent for this Court
to refer back the case as well as the complainants affidavit of desistance to the IBP.
In Lemoine v. Balon, Jr., respondent was found guilty of grave misconduct for misappropriating the funds of his
client. In the instant case, respondent committed the same reprehensible act. In addition, he continued to
represent himself as a lawyer despite his prior disbarment, and committed contumacious acts before the IBP and
the Court. Such utter disregard of this Courts authority must not be countenanced.
It has been held that contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court, such conduct
as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect. 10 It signifies not only a willful
disregard or disobedience of the courts order but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and
the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. 11
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides that a person may be punished for indirect contempt for:
xxxx
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
xxxx
The same Rule further provides that a person may be punished for indirect contempt after a charge in writing
has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon and to be heard by himself or
counsel. In the instant case, respondent was ordered to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for
not disclosing his prior disbarment and for continuing to represent himself as a lawyer. He submitted an
explanation but we find the same unsatisfactory.
Thus, respondent was properly accorded his right to due process. The essence of due process is to be found in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense. "To
be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural
due process.12
A person adjudged guilty of indirect contempt may be punished by a fine not exceeding P30,000.00 or
imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both. 13 Under the circumstances prevailing in the instant case, we
find the fine in the maximum amount of P30,000.00 as appropriate.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Amadeo E. Balon, Jr. is found guilty of INDIRECT CONTEMPT and is ordered to
pay a FINE of P30,000.00 payable in full within a non-extendible period of five days from receipt of this
Resolution, and strongly warned to refrain from any further attempts to make a mockery of judicial processes
and that commission of the same or similar act will merit a more severe sanction. Failure to pay the fine within
the given period will subject respondent to imprisonment until full compliance.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 1481 October 17, 2008
REBECCA B. ARNOBIT, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PONCIANO P. ARNOBIT, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Rebecca B. Arnobit, in her affidavit-complaint1 dated May 11, 1975, prays that the Court exercise its disciplinary
power over her husband, respondent Atty. Ponciano Arnobit, on the grounds of Immorality and Abandonment.
In her complaint, Rebecca alleged that she and respondent were married on August 20, 1942. Twelve children
were born out of this union. Rebecca further alleged seeing respondent through law school, continuously
supporting him until he passed the bar examinations and became a member of the Philippine bar. Several years
after, however, or in 1968, respondent left the conjugal home and started cohabiting with one Benita Buenafe
Navarro who later bore him four more children. Respondents infidelity, according to Rebecca, impelled her to file
a complaint for legal separation and support. A criminal case for adultery against Benita and respondent later
followed.
In his Answer2 dated July 31, 1975, respondent admitted that Rebecca is his wedded wife and the mother of
their 12 children. He denied, however, having cohabited with Benita. And he pointed to his complaining wife as
the cause of their separation, stating the observation that she was "always traveling all over the country,
ostensibly for business purposes, without his knowledge and consent, x x x thereby neglecting her obligations
toward her family."3
Issues having been joined, hearings were conducted before the Office of the Solicitor General and,
subsequently, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission). At
the hearings, Rebecca presented both oral and documentary evidence to support her allegations of
abandonment and immorality.
Aside from her testimony, Rebecca presented two other witnesses, viz: Venancia M. Barrientos, her sister, who
identified a letter dated August 28, 1970 written by respondent to her, addressing her as "Vending" (Exhibit "B-
1"), therein asking for forgiveness for the unhappiness he caused his family; and Melecio Navarro, husband of
Benita, who testified about how respondent took his wife Benita as a mistress, knowing fully well of their lawful
marriage.
Rebecca also presented the affidavits of National Bureau of Investigation agents Eladio C. Velasco and Jose C.
Vicente (Exhibits "H-1" and "H-2") to show the existence of a prima facie case for adultery. The pictures and
baptismal and birth certificates of Mary Ann, Ma. Luisa, Caridad, and Ponciano Jr., all surnamed Arnobit, were
submitted to prove the fact that respondent sired four illegitimate children out of his illicit cohabitation with
Benita.4
According to the investigating commissioner, respondent, despite due notice, repeatedly absented himself when
it was his turn to present evidence, adding that scheduled hearings had to be postponed just to afford
respondent ample opportunity to present his side of the controversy. The investigating commissioner also stated
that, in most cases, respondent would seek postponement, pleading illness, on the very date of the hearing. And
according to the Commission, its several directives for respondent to send by mail his affidavits and
documentary exhibits in lieu of personal appearance so that the commission could finish with the investigation
proved futile.
In its Report dated June 21, 1995, the Commission found respondent liable for abandonment and recommended
his suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. The recommendation portion of the report reads, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended to the Board of Governors that the respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months as a lesson for him to change his ways. An indefinite
suspension is not recommended because it has been gathered from complainant herself that respondent
supports himself through the practice of law which would be cruel for us to curtail at this time when he is
already advanced in age the penalty of three (3) months suspension and recording of such penalty in his
record being sufficient to berate him as to his lack of responsibility as evidenced by his abandonment of the
children. [Report and Recommendation rendered by Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas]

On January 27, 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XII-96-43 adopting and approving the
Commission report aforementioned.
While the Court concurs with the inculpatory findings of the IBP on the charge of abandonment, it cannot bring
itself to agree that respondent is liable only for that offense. As it were, the charge for gross immoral conduct has
sufficiently been proven. Following established jurisprudence, respondent deserves to be disbarred.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct:

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.

As this Court often reminds members of the bar, the requirement of good moral character is of much greater
import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is
not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to
maintain ones good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the
absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and
the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because "vast interests are committed to
his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his
life, his all."5
Immoral conduct has been described as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary
action, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to virtually
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. 6
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. 7 A
member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or
keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
impression that he is flouting those moral standards.
A review of the records readily reveals that despite the protracted delay in the hearings mainly caused by
respondents failure to appear, complainant relentlessly pursued this administrative case against her husband.
She was, to be sure, able to establish by clear, convincing, and preponderant evidence his commission of marital
infidelity and abandonment of his family.
Although respondent in his answer denied abandoning complainant and their children and offered an explanation
as to the cause of his and his wifes separation, he opted not to take the witness stand and be cross- examined
on his sworn answer. Neither did he bother to call and present his alleged paramour, Benita, who could have had
disproved an existing adulterous relationship between them, or, at least, confirm his protestation about the
paternity of her four children. Significantly, Benitas husband, no less, risked personal ridicule by testifying on the
illicit liaison between his wife and respondent.
The fact that respondents philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his profession would not save
the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the
actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges with
which his license and the law invest him.8 To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza, "[t]he grounds expressed in Section
27, Rule 138,9 of the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad enough to cover any misconduct x x x of a
lawyer in his professional or private capacity." 10 To reiterate, possession of good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.
While the onus rests on the complainant proffering the charges to prove the same, respondent owes himself and
the Court the duty to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial of wrongdoing would
not suffice in the face of clear evidence demonstrating unfitness.
When ones moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is
imperiled, it behooves the individual concerned to meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the
satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to keep his name in the Roll of
Attorneys.11 Respondent has not discharged the burden in this regard. Although duly notified, he never
attended the hearings to rebut the serious charges brought against him, irresistibly suggesting that the charges
are true.
Undoubtedly, respondents act of leaving his wife and 12 children to cohabit and have children with another
woman constitutes grossly immoral conduct. And to add insult to injury, there seems to be little attempt on the
part of respondent to be discreet about his liaison with the other woman.
As we have already ruled, disbarment is warranted against a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife to maintain an
illicit relationship with another woman who had borne him a child. 12 In the instant case, respondents grossly
immoral conduct compels the Court to wield its power to disbar. The penalty is most appropriate under the
premises.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Ponciano P. Arnobit is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the
records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be furnished the IBP and circulated by the Court Administrator to all
appellate and trial courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA RUBEN T. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice