Implied Trust (Art .

1456)
Vagilidad vs. Vagalidad
G.R. No. 161136
Facts:

A parcel of land was bought by Gabino and later on without the consent of the wife of Gabino was transferred to Wilfredo
without any payment in conformity that Wilfredo can use the lot to as a collateral to obtain loan. And when the loan was
paid and the mortgaged was cancelled. Spouses GABINO and Ma. Dorothy Vagilidad (hereafter DOROTHY), as
plaintiffs, filed a Complaint for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Damages. But Wilfredo claimed that they
are the owner the land because they already bought it to from the former owner who sold the same to Gabino. Then
Gabino claimed that Wilfredo resort to fraud to obtain ownership of the said property.

Issue: Who is the rightful owner of the property?

Ruling:

The contract of sale between LORETO and GABINO, JR. on May 12, 1986 could be legally recognized. At the time of
sale, LORETO had an aliquot share of one-third of the 4,280-square meter property or some 1,426 square meters but sold
some 1,604 square meters to GABINO, JR. We have ruled that if a co-owner sells more than his aliquot share in the
property, the sale will affect only his share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.Be that as
it may, the co-heirs of LORETO waived all their rights and interests over Lot No. 1253 in favor of LORETO in an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated January 20, 1987. They declared that they have previously received their
respective shares from the other estate of their parents ZOILO and PURIFICACION. The rights of GABINO, JR. as
owner over Lot No. 1253-B are thus preserved. These rights were not effectively transferred by LORETO to WILFREDO
in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land. Nor were these rights alienated from GABINO, JR. upon the issuance of
the title to the subject property in the name of WILFREDO. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring
ownership. Its alleged incontrovertibility cannot be successfully invoked by WILFREDO because certificates of title
cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner or be used as a shield for the commission of fraud.

On the issue of prescription, petitioners contend that the appellate court failed to apply the rule that an action for
reconveyance based on fraud prescribes after the lapse of four years. They cite Article 1391 of the Civil Code and the case
of Gerona v. De Guzman.

We disagree. This Court explained in Salvatierra v. Court of Appeals, viz.:

An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not
otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is
now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the
issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The only discordant note, it seems, is Balbin v. Medalla, which states that
the prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four years. However, this variance can be explained by the erroneous
reliance on Gerona v. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud was discovered on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act
No. 190 was applied, the New Civil Code not coming into effect until August 30, 1950 xxx. It must be stressed, at this
juncture, that Article 1144 and Article 1456 are new provisions. They have no counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the
old Code of Civil Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period for an
action for reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false pretenses.

[Thus,] under the present Civil Code, xxx just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of xxx Art. 1456, xxx so
is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this context,
and vis--vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable[, viz.:]
 Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

1) Upon a written contract;

2) Upon an obligation created by law;

3) Upon a judgment.

. REPUBLIC VS. CA AND NAGUIT

FACTS:

Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of title which seeks judicial confirmation of her imperfect title
over a parcel of land in Nabas, Aklan. It was alleged that Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land
openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed
her application for registration. The MCTC rendered a decision confirming the title in the name of Naguit upon failure of
Rustico Angeles to appear during trial after filing his formal opposition to the petition.

The Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed a motion for reconsideration on the
grounds that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Naguit could not
have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since the subject land was declared as alienable and disposable only on
October 15, 1980. The alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be
first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
could even start.

RULING:

Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the
time the application for registration of title is file
 There are three requirements for registration of title, (1) that the subject property is alienable and disposable; (2)
that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession and
occupation, and; (3) that the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.

There must be a positive act of the government through a statute or proclamation stating the intention of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property, thus, declaring the land as alienable and disposable. However, if
there has been none, it is presumed that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property and the
possession of the land no matter how long would not ripen into ownership through acquisitive prescription.

To follow the Solicitor Generals argument in the construction of Section 14 (1) would render the paragraph 1 of
the said provision inoperative for it would mean that all lands of public domain which were not declared as alienable and
disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. In effect, it precludes the government from enforcing the said provision as it decides to
reclassify lands as alienable and disposable.

The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty
years old. The inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no
impediment to the application of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Naguit had the right to apply for
registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO V. COURT OF APPEALS

> This is a claim of a huge parcel of land covering lands in the provinces Nueva ecija, Bulacan, and in cities including
Quezon city.
> This case involves 2 cases, which prior to being decided by the SC were consolidated. The first case was a complaint for
recovery of possession and damages against Ocampo, Buhain, and Dela Cruz. In the complaint, it was alleged that the
defendants (Ocampo - Dela Cruz) were able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles to a portions of the
claimed estate. In the end, the lower courts ruled in favor of Ocampo - Dela Cruz, declaring
that the Torrens titles of the defendants cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad no. 4316.
> The 2nd case is a petition for letters of adiministration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro Y Esteban.
This involves a prayer to be declared as administrator. This case eventually ended in the same manner as the first case -
the Titulo de Prorpriedad was declared void and of no legal force, therefore the lands covered by the Titulo are not within
the estate of the deceased.
> Issue: W/N the Titulo de Propriedad is null and void and therefore the lands covered or claimed under such title are not
included in the estate of the deceased...
> The Titulo is null and void. It has been defeated by the title of the defendants under the Torrens system.
> It is settled that by virtue of Pd no 892 which tool effect on Feb 16 1976 the syte of registration under the Spanish
Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands coverd thereby to be
registered under the Land Registration Act within 6mos from date of effectivity of the said decree.
> Proof of compliance (Certificate of Title) with the said decree should have been presented during trial.

NOBLEJAS v TEEHANKEE

23 SCRA 405

April 29, 1968

NATURE:

Petition for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction

FACTS:

- Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration. By the terms
of section 2 of RA 1151, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and
privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance."
- On March 7, 1968, Sec of Justice Teehankee coursed to Noblejas a letter requiring him to explain in writing why no
disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of subdivision,
consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original
titles." Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and
compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner
as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the
Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140
of the Rules of Court.
- On March 17, 1968, Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary, "by authority of the
President", whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and conduct
prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the
above charges."
- On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to the Secretary of
Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In their answer
respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions,
or that the petitioner may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised
Rules of Court 140; that the function of investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive in
nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions or duties except when reasonably
incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of powers.

ISSUE:
WON the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment
upon him by RA 1151 and Appropriation Laws of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.

HELD:
it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a
member of the Judiciary.
- petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by implication the right to be
investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily
result in the same right being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had
indiscriminately conferred the same privileges.
- Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another appointee of the
President, could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General the rank and
privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the
process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).
- such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it granted these executive officials the
rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. Where the legislative design is to make the suspension or removal
procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and
unequivocal language.
- if the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of
the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon
recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the
fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory
control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such
officials.
Decision:Writs denied, petition dismissed

Spouses NOEL and JULIE ABRIGO, petitioners, vs. ROMANA DE VERA, respondent. G.R.
No. 154409, June 21, 2004
Rule on Double Sales: Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under the Torrens system, the law gives
ownership priority to (1) the first registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who
in good faith presents the oldest title. This provision, however, does not apply if the property is not registered under
the Torrens system.

Facts: On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania sold a house and lot covered by a Tax Declaration to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita
Cave-Go. The said sale became a subject of a suit for annulment of documents between the vendor and the vendees. The RTC
rendered judgment approving the Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties. Villafania was given one year to buy back
the house and lot. Gloria Villafania failed to buy back the house and lot. Unknown, however to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and
Rosita Cave-Go, Gloria Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of land involved.

On October 16, 1997, Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to the herein [Petitioner-Spouses Noel
and Julie Abrigo].

On October 23, 1997, Gloria Villafania sold the same house and lot to Romana de Vera x x x. Romana de Vera registered the
sale and as a consequence, TCT No. 22515 was issued in her name.

On November 21, 1997, petitioners filed a case for the annulment of documents, injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining
order and damages against respondent and Gloria Villafania. The lower court rendered the assailed Decision dated January 4,
1999, awarding the properties to [petitioners] as well as damages. Both parties appealed to the CA. The CA issued its March
21, 2002 Amended Decision, finding Respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good faith and for value. The appellate
court ruled that she had relied in good faith on the Torrens title of her vendor and must thus be protected.

Hence, this Petition.

Issue: Who between petitioner-spouses and respondent has a better right to the property.
Held: Respondent Romana De Vera.

Petitioners contend that Gloria Villafania could not have transferred the property to Respondent De Vera because it no longer
belonged to her. They further claim that the sale could not be validated, since respondent was not a purchaser in good faith
and for value.

Law on Double Sale

Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale. Otherwise stated, the law provides that a double sale of
immovables transfers ownership to (1) the first registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3)
finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title. There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with respect to
lands registered under the Torrens system.

In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the sale of the property. Since neither petitioners nor
their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go) knew that the property was covered by the Torrens system, they registered
their respective sales under Act 3344. For her part, respondent registered the transaction under the Torrens systembecause,
during the sale, Villafania had presented the transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering the property.

Respondent De Vera contends that her registration under the Torrens system should prevail over that of petitioners who
recorded theirs under Act 3344. De Vera relies on the following insight of Justice Edgardo L. Paras:

x x x If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act (and has therefore a Torrens Title), and it is sold but the subsequent
sale is registered not under the Land Registration Act but under Act 3344, as amended, such sale is not considered REGISTERED,
as the term is used under Art. 1544 x x x.

Soriano v. Heirs of Magali held that registration must be done in the proper registry in order to bind the land. Since the
property in dispute in the present case was already registered under the Torrens system, petitioners registration of the sale
under Act 3344 was not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.

Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is without prejudice to a third party with a better
right. The aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in ones favor does not
give him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to
somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.

Petitioners cannot validly argue that they were fraudulently misled into believing that the property was unregistered.
A Torrens title, once registered, serves as a notice to the whole world. All persons must take notice, and no one can plead
ignorance of the registration.

Good-Faith Requirement

Knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since
such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the
second buyer being able to displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must
show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyers rights) ---- from the time of
acquisition until the title is transferred to him by registration, or failing registration, by delivery of possession.

As can be gathered from the foregoing, constructive notice to the second buyer through registration under Act 3344 does not
apply if the property is registered under the Torrens system, as in this case.

"The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to registration under Act 496 Land Registration Act
(now PD 1529) which considers the act of registration as the operative act that binds the land (see Mediante vs. Rosabal, 1 O.G.
[12] 900, Garcia vs. Rosabal, 73 Phil 694). On lands covered by the Torrens System, the purchaser acquires such rights and
interest as they appear in the certificate of title, unaffected by any prior lien or encumbrance not noted therein. The purchaser
is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicates. The only exception is where the
purchaser has actual knowledge of a flaw or defect in the title of the seller or of such liens or encumbrances which, as to him, is
equivalent to registration (see Sec. 39, Act 496; Bernales vs. IAC, G.R. 75336, 18 October 1988; Hernandez vs. Sales, 69 Phil
744; Tajonera vs. Court of Appeals, L-26677, 27 March 1981),"

Respondent in Good Faith

The Court of Appeals examined the facts to determine whether respondent was an innocent purchaser for value. After its
factual findings revealed that Respondent De Vera was in good faith.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.

Prime Holdings v. Madayag

SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ANGELA V. MADAYAG, respondent.
G.R. No. 164687; February 12, 2009

Facts:
In 2001, Madayag filed with the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan an application for registration of a
parcel of land with an area of 1,492-m2 located in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. Attached
to the application was a tracing cloth of Survey Plan Psu-01-008438, approved by the LMS-DENR, Region 1,
San Fernando City. SM opposed the application because allegedly, the lot encroached on the properties it
recently purchased from several lot owners. SM also filed with the DENR a petition for cancellation of the
survey plan. Afterwhich, SM filed with the RTC an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceeding in the land
registration case alleging that the trial court should wait for DENRs resolution of the petition.
After the trial, the RTC suspended the registration proceedings on the ground that the petition for
cancellation of the survey plan filed by SM with DENR is prejudicial to the determination of the land
registration case since a survey plan is one of the mandatory requirements in such proceedings. When
Madayag appealed to CA, the latter ratiocinated that the survey plan, which was duly approved by the
DENR, should be accorded the presumption of regularity, and that the RTC has the power to hear and
determine all questions arising from an application for registration.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over land registration proceedings is affected if there is a
petition filed in DENR to cancel the survey plan, one of the mandatory requirements in such proceedings.

Ruling:
Yes.
The Court held that as an incident to its authority to settle all questions over the title of the subject
property, the land registration court may resolve the underlying issue of whether the subject property
overlaps the petitioners properties without necessarily having to declare the survey plan as void.
Furthermore, It stated that a land registration court has the duty to determine whether the issuance of a
new certificate of title will alter a valid and existing certificate of title. An application for registration of an
already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title, which is not allowed by law.
However, the RTC need not wait for the decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel the survey plan in
order to determine whether the subject property is already titled or forms part of already titled property.
The court may now verify this allegation based on the respondents survey plan vis--vis the certificates of
title of the petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest. After all, a survey plan precisely serves to
establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion
thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be
overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land.