G.R. No.
156117 May 26, 2005 Subject Lots are alienable and disposable, by virtue of Forestry
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002,1
which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999,2 granting the application for
land registration of the respondents.
Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and
David, who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application
for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in
Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners
in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from their parents,
spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.3 Together
with their application for registration, respondents submitted the following set
of documents:
(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent
Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of
respondent David;4
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;5
(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) dispensing with the need for Surveyor's
Certificates for the Subject Lots;6
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the
absence of certificates of title covering the Subject Lots;7
(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the
1
Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June 1963;8
(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No.
941800301831, in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422,
issued in 1994; and ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of David,
covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in 1994;9 and
(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses
Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the
improvements thereon to their sons and respondents herein, Jeremias
and David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot
No. 8423 was sold to David.10
On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
filed an Opposition to the respondents' application for registration of the
Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period
of adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents'
muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The
Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and
were not subject to private appropriation.11
The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. 12 All
owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice
of Initial Hearing.13 A copy of the Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in
a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of
the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were
located.14 Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on 02
August 199915 and The Freeman Banat News on 19 December 1999.16
During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of
Special Default,17 with only petitioner Republic opposing the application for
registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents, through their counsel,
proceeded to offer and mark documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional
facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive further evidence
from the respondents and to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.
On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the
registration and confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No.
8422 and of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an
Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21 December 1999,
final and executory, and directing the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots.18
Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999,
to the Court of Appeals.19 The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22
November 2002, affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus:
In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be
registered has been classified as within the alienable and disposable
zone since June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of
the Civil Code, respectively provides that "All things which are
within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless
otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions of
patrimonial character shall not be the object of prescription" and that
"Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith."
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents
already acquired the subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this
application, since 1950 and that they cultivated the same and planted
it with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated
December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that herein
appellees or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and
possessed the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and
adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that
appellees' possession can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or
from the time the subject lots had been classified as within the
alienable and disposable zone, still the argument of the appellant does
not hold water.
As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963
as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the
object of prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. By
express provision of Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater
right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section
14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any
manner provided by law. Again, even considering that possession of
appelless should only be reckoned from 1963, the year when CENRO
declared the subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been
possessing the subject parcels of land in open, continuous, and in the
concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they filed the instant
2
application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As such, this
court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the court a quo.20
The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of
the following arguments:
First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject
Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the
petitioner Republic, possession of the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963
cannot be considered in determining compliance with the periods of
possession required by law. The Subject Lots were classified as alienable and
disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENRO's certification. It also alleges
that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year acquisitive prescription
period, had overlooked the ruling in Republic v. Doldol,21 where this Court
declared that Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act, as amended and as it is presently phrased, requires that possession
of land of the public domain must be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the
same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the
subject of the application consisted of two parcels of land individually and
separately owned by two applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is
implicit in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree, as amended, that the application for
registration of title to land shall be filed by a single applicant; multiple
applicants may file a single application only in case they are co-owners. While
an application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when the
subject parcels of land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case the
subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are situated within the same
province. Where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute
and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly
complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void. Since the respondents
failed to comply with the procedure for land registration under the Property
Registration Decree, the proceedings held before the MTC is void, as the latter
did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
I
Jurisdiction
Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had
no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for registration filed
by the respondents but for reasons different from those presented by petitioner
Republic.
A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents' application for
registration.
Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even
though they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were
actually seeking the individual and separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and
8423, respectively.
Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the
respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to
proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots,
based on this Court's pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals,22 to wit:
. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-
compliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said
defects have not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction
to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining
jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not
been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null
and void.
This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This
procedural lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear their application for
registration of the Subject Lots.
The Property Registration Decree23 recognizes and expressly allows the
following situations: (1) the filing of a single application by several applicants
for as long as they are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be
registered;24 and (2) the filing of a single application for registration of several
parcels of land provided that the same are located within the same province.25
The Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the present situation
wherein two applicants filed a single application for two parcels of land, but
are seeking the separate and individual registration of the parcels of land in
their respective names.
3
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation,
then this Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of
action. Section 34 of the Property Registration Decree itself provides that,
"[t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Decree, be applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy
or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient."
Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance
with the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the
defect in the joint application for registration filed by the respondents with the
MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Instead of a
single or joint application for registration, respondents Jeremias and David,
more appropriately, should have filed separate applications for registration of
Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of
jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case.26 They are not even
accepted grounds for dismissal thereof.27 Instead, under the Rules of Court,
the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied admission
of the court's jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon
the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the severance
of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of
misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the
severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with
separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).
The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have
been corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion of the petitioner
Republic. It is regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to detect the
misjoinder when the application for registration was still pending before it;
and more regrettable that the petitioner Republic did not call the attention of
the MTC to the fact by filing a motion for severance of the causes of action
and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court.
B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements
mandated by the Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not
invested with jurisdiction as a land registration court.
Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition
did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration
proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the publication
of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from assuming
jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents' application for registration.
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,28 and jurisdiction in rem
cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through
publication and service of notice.29
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be
given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by
means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the
Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the following manner:
1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial
hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice
of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided,
however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient
to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed
to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved
including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it
may concern." Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to
appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer
of said application shall not be granted.
Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property
Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration
court, it still affirms its declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals30
that publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the
land registration court to validly confirm and register the title of the applicant
or applicants. That Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree enumerated
and described in detail the requirements of publication, mailing, and posting
of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such requirements, including
publication of the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is essential
and imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the same case, this
Court expounded on the reason behind the compulsory publication of the
Notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, thus
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation
should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by
publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting,
all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The
reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as
widely read and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in
4
its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach
the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may
not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any
other real estate. In sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land
registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against
the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as
wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the
requirements for publication, mailing and posting.31
In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact
held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed
in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially
released on 10 August 1999, it was published in The Freeman Banat News, a
daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and circulated in the province and cities
of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999,
more than three months after the initial hearing.
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial
hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice
as it was published in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject
Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late for him to appear
before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to oppose respondents'
application for registration, and to present his claim and evidence in support
of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the claimant-oppositor
fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial hearing, he would be in
default and would forever be barred from contesting respondents' application
for registration and even the registration decree that may be issued pursuant
thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03
September 1999.
The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of
general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same
ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the
MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction
over respondents' application for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC
Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the registration and
confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No.
8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February
2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and
directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the
Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC
without jurisdiction.
II
Period of Possession
Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the
Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or
incomplete title.
While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to
hear and proceed with respondents' application for registration, this Court
nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the legal issue on the required
period of possession for acquiring title to public land.
Respondents' application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis
for their title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained
title to the Subject Lots by purchase from their parents, spouses Gregorio
Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his
testimony, claimed that his parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots
in the concept of an owner since 1950.32
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents
themselves, the Subject Lots are "within Alienable and Disposable, Block I,
Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it
is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest Reservation per
Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992."33 The Subject Lots
are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and
disposable as of 25 June 1963.
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government;34
and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show
that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law.35
The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except
timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands which
reverted to the State.36 It explicitly enumerates the means by which public
lands may be disposed, as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
5
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).37
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the
Public Land Act because there are specific requirements and application
procedure for every mode.38 Since respondents herein filed their application
before the MTC,39 then it can be reasonably inferred that they are seeking the
judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title over
the Subject Lots.
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land,
not exceeding 144 hectares,40 may be availed of by persons identified under
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073, which reads
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
 entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture whether disposable or not, under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled to
the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only
be entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or
incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended.
Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the land since
12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became
alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior
to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable
is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period
of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the
land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation
of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.41 It is very apparent then that
respondents could not have complied with the period of possession required
by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or
incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or
legalized.
The confirmation of respondents' title by the Court of Appeals was based on
the erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming title to the Subject
Lots under the Property Registration Decree. According to the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, Section 14(4) of the Property
Registration Decree allows individuals to own land in any other manner
provided by law. It then ruled that the respondents, having possessed the
Subject Lots, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, since
25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their application, have
acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription under Article
1113, in relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.42
The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration
Decree, there already exists a title which is confirmed by the court; while
under the Public Land Act, the presumption always is that the land applied for
pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors only claim an
6
interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and
notorious possession.43 As established by this Court in the preceding
paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and respondents may
have acquired title thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may
acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public Land
Act, their application for judicial confirmation or legalization thereof must be
in accordance with the Property Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the
Public Land Act reads
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or
successors in right, claiming any lands or interest in lands under the
provisions of this chapter, must in every case present an application
to the proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity of the
alleged title or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title be
issued to them under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.44
Hence, respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots must have
complied with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act and the procedural requirements under the Property Registration
Decree.
Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and
other real rights apply in general to all types of land, while the Public Land
Act specifically governs lands of the public domain. Relative to one another,
the Public Land Act may be considered a special law45 that must take
precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an established rule of
statutory construction that between a general law and a special law, the special
law prevails Generalia specialibus non derogant.46
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22
November 2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion,
Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999, and its Order, dated
02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents' application
for registration is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 128750, January 18, 2001
CARQUELO OMANDAM and ROSITO ITOM1, petitioner.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, BLAS TRABASAS and AMPARO BONILLA,
respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition2 for review seeks the reversal of the decision dated October 29,
1996, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44442, reversing and
setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Del Sur,
Branch 23, dated November 15, 1996, and the resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated February 21, 1997, denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.1wphi1.nt
On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands in Pagadian City issued in favor of
Camilo Lasola Homestead Patent No. IX-6-40 covering Lot No. 8736, with
an area of 23, 985 sq. m. in Sagrada, Tambulig, Zamboanga del Sur. On April
28, 1978, the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
P-22-690 in his name.
On April 28, 1983, respondent Blas Trabasas bought the land bought the land
from a Dolores Sayson who claimed she was the owner of said land. In 1984,
Trabasas discovered that petitioners Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom had
occupied the land. Meanwhile, on July 19, 1987, Omandam protested Lasola's
homestead patent before the Bureau of Lands and prayed for cancellation of
the OCT. Upon Sayson's advice, Trabasas repurchased the land from Lasola,
who executed a deed of sale dated September 24, 1987. On August 9, 1989,
Trabasas acquired a new transfer certificate of title.
On April 16, 1990, spouses Blas Trabasas and Ampar Bonilla filed a
complaint against petitioners for recovery of possession and/or ownership of
the land with Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur. They alleged that
they were the true and registered owners of the land and Omandam and Itom
should vacate it.
Petitioners answered that they purchased the land from one Godofredo Sela
who had been in possession for almost twenty years.
After the parties were duly heard, the Regional Trial Court issued its decision
on November 15, 1993 declaring that neither respondents herein nor their
7
predecessors-in-interest were ever inpossession of the land. Citing Directorof
lands vs. Court of Appeals, 17 SCRA 71 (1966), Director of Lands vs.
Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358 (1983) and Padre vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA
446 (1992), the trial court disposed:
WHEREFORE, finding that the plaintiffs have no equitable right to the
possession of the land under litigation, judgement is hereby rendered in favor
of the defendants and against the plaintiff.
1. Finding the defendants to have equitable right to the possession of the land
in litigation.
2. Ordering the plaintiffs to reconvene the title of the land under litigation in
the name of the plaintiffs to the defendants within 30 days from the date this
decision becomes final and executory, and upon their failure to so comply,
ordering the Clerk of Court to execute ion behalf of the plaintiffs the necessary
deed of conveyance over the said land in favor of the defendants which deed
would be considered sufficient to authorize the Register of Deeds of
Zamboanga del Sur, Pagadian City, to cause the cancellation of the Torrens
Certificate of Title in the names of the plaintiffs, and in lieu thereof, to issue
another in the common names of the defendants.
SO ORDERED.3
Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pending the appeal, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Region IX
dismissed Omandam's protest previously filed with the Bureau of Lands. 4 It
said that Omandam failed to prove that Lasola, respondents' predecessor-in-
interest, committed fraud and misrepresentation in acquiring the patent, hence
there is no ground for its revocation and cancellation of its corresponding title.
On October 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. It decided
thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, a new one is hereby issued ordering
defendants-appellees to vacate the subject land and surrender it to plaintiff-
appellant.
Cost against defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED.5
The Court of Appeals declared that petitioners' collateral attack on the
homestead title, to defeat private respondents' accion publiciana, was not
sanctioned by law; that the patent and title of Camilo Lasola, private
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, had already become indefeasible since
April 28, 1977; and that petitioners' action for reconveyance in the nature of
their protest with the Bureau of Lands and counterclaim in their answer to the
complaint for recovery of possession, already prescribed.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on February
21, 1997. Hence, this petition for review. Petitioners make the following
assignment of errors, alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in:
I HOLDING THAT ONE ANOTHER UNDISPUTED FACT IS THAT
"On April 28, 1983, plaintiff bought the subject land from Dolores Sayson
who presented herself to be the true owner of the subject land;
II HOLDING THAT ONE ANOTHER UNDISPUTED FACT IS THAT "
sometime in 1984 plaintiff discovered that defendants had entered
occupied the subject land. Upon instructions of Dolores Sayson, plaintiff
approached Camilo Lasola and again bought the subject land, this time from
Camilo Lasola;
III IGNORING THE FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
WHICH THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT
LED TO ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND
CAMILO LASOLA HAD NO EQUITABLE POSSESSION ON THE
SUBJECT LAND, WHICH LACK OF EQUITABLE POSSESSION
MAKES SOME OF THE RECENT DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE.6
In the first two assigned errors, petitioners apparently question findings of fact
by the Court of Appeals while disputing the claim of possession by private
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. The appellate court had stated
firstly that respondent Trabasas bought the subject land from Sayson who
presented herself as the true owner, then secondly, that he bought the land
from Lasola also. The first two issues, in our view, raise questions of fact.
Well-entrenched is the rule that the Court's jurisdiction in a petition for review
is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law allegedly committed by the
appellate court. Findings of fact below are generally conclusive on the Court.
It is not for the Court departs from this rule.7 There are instances where the
Court departs from this ruele.8 However, petitioners did not show that
involved here is an exceptional instance. Hence, we need not tarry on the first
two assignments.
8
In the third assignment of error, petitioners aver that public respondent erred
in ignoring the trial court's finding that private respondents had no equitable
possession of the subject land. Again, we are confronted with a question of
fact. But petitioners claim the appellate court has disregarded or even
contradicted our holdings in the cited cases of Director of Lands, Abanilla,
and Padre.
In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 17 SCRA 71(1966), we ruled that
a void title may be cancelled. A title over a disposable public land is void if
its grantee failed to comply with the conditions imposed by law. In Director
of Lands vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358 (1983), we held that the indefensibility
of a Torrens Title cannot be used as a defense in an action for cancellation of
title initiated by the government, through the Solicitor General, after a finding
of fraud by the Department of Environment and Natural Resource's. In Padre
vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 446 (1992) we said that in an action for
quitting of title, the court may determine incidentally the right to the
possession thereof, in order to provide complete relief to the parties. The last
case refers to determination of rightful possession in possessory actions.
Notwithstanding the formulation by the petitioners in the third assigned, error,
the real issue in this case involves the trial court's jurisdiction vis--vis
administrative agencies. What is the effect of the trial court's decision in a
possessory action on the order of Bureau of Lands regarding a homestead
application and decision of the DENR on the protest over the homestead
patent?
Commonwealth Act. 141 as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act, gives in its sections 3 to 4 to the Director of Lands primarily and to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now the Secretary of
Department of Environment and Natural Resources) ultimately the authority
to dispose and manage public lands.9 In this regard, court have no jurisdiction
to inquire into the validity of the decree of registration issued by the Director
of Lands.10 Only the DENR Secretary can review, on appeal such decree.
It will be recalled that the Bureau of Lands approved Lasola's homestead
application on May 21, 1968. No appeal was made therefrom. Nineteen years
after, or on July 9, 1968, Omandam filed the protest with the Bureau of Lands.
Thereafter, respondents Trabasas and Bonilla instituted the present action in
the Regional Trial Court for recovery of possession and/or ownership. As
mentioned earlier, the trial court held that petitioners were entitled to a
declaration of equitable possession over the area in question. Said trial court
then ordered the cancellation of respondents' title and the issuance of a new
one. In effect, the court's order reversed the award made by the Director of
Lands in favor of Lasola. This reversal was in error, for the proper
administrative agency, the DENR under CA 141, had prior jurisdiction over
the patent on the subject matter, which is the contested homestead area.
DENR's jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the authority of court
of justice to resolve questions of possession and their decisions stand in the
meantime that the DENR has not settled the respective rights of public land
claimants.11 But once the DENR has decided, particularly with the grant of
homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later, its decision
prevails.
Camilo Lasola as early as September 24, 1987, in favor of Trabasas, who then
secured a transfer certificate of title in his name, private respondents clearly
have superior right over the land claimed by petitioners Omandam and Itom.
The appellate court did not err in upholding the right of private respondents,
and in ordering the petitioners to vacate and surrender the land to said
respondents.
WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 29, 1996, and its resolution dated February 21, 1997,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.1wphi1.nt

In the case, Lasola applied for a homestead patent over the contested area in SO ORDERED.
1967. His application was granted on May 21, 1968. The Bureau of Lands
issued the Order for the issuance of the patent on January 29, 1974 and the
Register of Deeds issued the corresponding Original Certificate of Title on
April 28, 1976. From the three latter dates, no appeal was made. It was only
on July 9, 1987, i.e., 13 years from the date of the Order directing the issuance
of the patent that petitioners protested the homestead grant with the Bureau of
Lands. Despite the said lapse of time, the Bureau of Lands gave due course to
the protest relying on our ruling in Director vs. Abanilla12 that the doctrine of
indefensibility of title does not apply when the grant is tainted with fraud and
misrepresentation. From this date, Lasola's right of possession based on his
OCT and eventually those of respondents were put on issue. In their desire to
get possession and/or ownership on April 16, 1990 with the Regional Trial
Court. Said court rendered its decision against respondents on November 15,
1993. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pending the appeal or
on March 23, 1995, the DENR-Region IX dismissed petitioners' protest on
the ground of absence of fraud and misrepresentation committed by
respondents' predecessors-in-interest.13 On October 29, 1996, the Court of
Appeals promulgated the decision subject of this petition in favor of
respondents. Petitioners then brought the instant case to us.

We note that the parties did not manifest as to whether an appeal was made
from the decision of the Regional Director of DENR-IX. Further, no mention
was ever made in their pleadings regarding the matter. From the said Order of
the DENR Regional Director up to the present, five years have lapsed. From
this, we can conclude that no appeal has been made and that the DENR
decision dismissing the petitioners' protest and upholding respondents' right
on the contested area has attained finality.

By now it appears indubitable that private respondents, spouses Trabasas and

Bonilla, have been duly confirmed in their right to possession of Lot No. 8736
as owners thereof. By virtue of the deed of sale executed by OCT holder
9
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186487 August 15, 2011
ROSITO BAGUNU, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO AGGABAO & ROSENDA ACERIT,
Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
1
We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by Rosito Bagunu
(petitioner) to reverse our April 13, 2009 Resolution2 which denied his
petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
R.L.O. Claim No. 937/DENR Case No. 5177
The present controversy stemmed from a protest filed by the spouses
Francisco Aggabao and Rosenda Acerit (respondents) against the petitioners
free patent application over a parcel of unregistered land located in Caniogan,
Sto. Tomas, Isabela (subject land), pending before the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Region II, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan
(DENR Regional Office).
The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it
(first sale) to Felicisimo Bautista (Bautista). In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold
the subject land (second sale) to Atty. Samson Binag.
On December 12, 1961, Atty. Binag applied for a free patent3 over the subject
land with the Bureau of Lands (now Lands Management Bureau).4 On
November 24, 1987, Atty. Binag sold the subject land (third sale) to the
petitioner,5 who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free patent applicant. The
parties deed of sale states that the land sold to the petitioner is the same lot
subject of Atty. Binags pending free patent application.6
10
The deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land, the Bureau of
Lands survey,7 and the free patent applications uniformly identified the
subject land as Lot 322. The deeds covering the second and third sale also
uniformly identified the boundaries of the subject land.8
On December 28, 1992, the respondents filed a protest against the petitioners
free patent application. The respondents asserted ownership over Lot 322
based on the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, dated June 23, 1971
and April 15, 1979, executed in their favor by the heirs of one Rafael
Bautista.9
The Office of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR conducted an
ocular inspection and formal investigation. The DENR Regional Office found
out that the petitioner actually occupies and cultivates "the area in dispute
including the area purchased by [the respondents]."10
On July 10, 1998, the DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner
wrongfully included Lot 322 in his free patent application since this lot
belongs to the respondents. The DENR Regional Office ordered:
1. [The respondents to] file their appropriate public land application covering
Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D xxx;
2. [The petitioners free patent application] be amended by excluding Lot No.
322, Pls-541-D, as included in Lot No. 258;
3. [A] relocation survey xxx to determine the exact area as indicated in [the
parties] respective technical description of x x x Lot Nos. 258 and 322, Pls-
541-D.11
The petitioner moved for reconsideration. The DENR Regional Office denied
the motion ruling that in determining the identity of a lot, the boundaries
and not the lot number assigned to it - are controlling. Since the boundaries
indicated in the deed of sale in the petitioners favor correspond to the
boundaries of Lot 258, what the petitioner acquired was Lot 258,
notwithstanding the erroneous description of the lot sold as Lot 322.12
On appeal, the DENR Secretary affirmed13 the ruling of the DENR Regional
Office. After noting the differences in the boundaries stated in the parties
respective Deeds of Sale, the DENR Secretary concluded that the land
claimed by the petitioner is, in fact, distinct from that claimed by the
respondents. The DENR Secretary ruled that based on the parties respective
deeds of sale, the Subdivision Plan of the lot sold to the petitioner and Atty.
Binags affidavit - claiming that the designation of Lot 322 in the Deed of
Sale in the petitioners favor is erroneous - what the petitioner really acquired
was Lot 258 and not Lot 322.14 The petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA).
COURT OF APPEALS RULING
The CA affirmed the ruling of the DENR Secretary. Applying the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, the CA ruled that since questions on the identity of a
land require a technical determination by the appropriate administrative body,
the findings of fact of the DENR Regional Office, as affirmed by the DENR
Secretary, are entitled to great respect, if not finality.15 The petitioner assails
this ruling before the Court.
Civil Case No. 751
In the meantime, on November 22, 1994 (or during the pendency of the
respondents protest), Atty. Binag filed a complaint for reformation of
instruments, covering the second and third sale, against Bautista and the
petitioner (the civil case) with the Cabagan, Isabela Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Atty. Binag alleged that while the deeds evidencing the successive sale
of the subject land correctly identified the boundaries of the land sold, the
deeds, nevertheless, erroneously identified the subject land as Lot 322, instead
of Lot 258.16
On December 9, 1994, the petitioner and Bautista filed a motion to dismiss
with the RTC, citing the pendency of the land protest before the Bureau of
Lands. The RTC held in abeyance its resolution on the motion to dismiss.17
After obtaining a favorable ruling from the DENR Regional Office, the
respondents joined Atty. Binag in the civil case by filing a complaint-in-
intervention against the petitioner. The complaint-in-intervention captioned
the respondents causes of action as one for Quieting of Title, Reivindicacion
and Damages.18 The respondents alleged that the petitioners claim over Lot
322 is a cloud on their title and ownership of Lot 322. The respondents also
alleged that they were in peaceful, continuous, public and adverse possession
of Lot 322 from the time they fully acquired it in 1979 until sometime in
August of 1992, when the petitioner, through stealth and strategy, ejected
them from Lot 322 after transferring his possession from Lot 258.19 The
respondents asked the RTC to declare them as owners of Lot 322.
11
After the CA affirmed the DENR Secretarys favorable resolution on the
respondents protest, the respondents asked the RTC to suspend the civil case
or, alternatively, to adopt the DENR Secretarys ruling.20 In their prayer, the
respondents asked the RTC to:
1. [Adopt] the findings of the DENR as affirmed by the Court of Appeals xxx
thus, the cause of action xxx for reformation of contracts be granted;
2. [Order the petitioner] to vacate Lot 322 xxx and his [Free Patent
Application] be amended to exclude Lot 322 xxx.
3. [Set the case] for hearing to receive evidence on the claim of the
[respondents] for damages[.]
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming the DENR Secretarys
jurisdiction to resolve the parties conflicting claims of ownership over Lot
322, notwithstanding that the same issue is pending with the RTC. By ruling
that the petitioner bought Lot 258 (and not Lot 322) from Atty. Binag and for
adjudicating Lot 322 to the respondents, the DENR effectively reformed
contracts and determined claims of ownership over a real property matters
beyond the DENRs competence to determine.
The petitioner faults the CA for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
since the issue of who has a better right over Lot 322 does not involve the
"specialized technical expertise" of the DENR. On the contrary, the issue
involves interpretation of contracts, appreciation of evidence and the
application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are matters within
the competence of the courts.
The petitioner claims that the DENR Secretarys factual finding, as affirmed
by the CA, is contrary to the evidence. The petitioner asserts that the Deed of
Sale in his favor clearly identified the property sold as Lot 322, which was
the same land Atty. Binag identified in his free patent application; that the
area of Lot 322, as previously determined in a survey caused by the vendor
himself (Atty. Binag), tallies with the area stated in the deed in his favor; that
he has been in possession of Lot 322 since 1987, when it was sold to him; and
that his present possession and cultivation of Lot 322 were confirmed by the
DENR Regional Office during its ocular investigation.
The petitioner also invites our attention to the incredulity of the respondents
claim of ownership over Lot 322, based on Atty. Binags testimony during
the hearing on the respondents protest. According to the petitioner, the
respondents could not have expressed interest in buying Lot 322 from Atty.
Binag had they already acquired Lot 322 from the heirs of one Rafael
Bautista. The petitioner adds that as early as 1979, the respondents were
already aware of Atty. Binags free patent application over Lot 322. Yet, they
filed their protest to the free patent application only in 1992 when the
petitioner had already substituted Atty. Binag. The petitioner claims that the
respondents inaction is inconsistent with their claim of ownership.
Lastly, the petitioner contests the adjudication of Lot 322 in the respondents
favor by claiming that the respondents presented no sufficient evidence to
prove their (or their predecessor-in-interests) title.
In our April 13, 2009 Resolution, we denied the petition for failure to
sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed CA Decision and for
raising substantially factual issues. The petitioner moved for reconsideration,
confining his arguments to the issue of jurisdiction and the consequent
applicability of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
THE RULING
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
Questions of fact generally barred under Rule 45
The main thrust of the petitioners arguments refers to the alleged error of the
DENR and the CA in identifying the parcel of land that the petitioner bought
an error that adversely affected his right to apply for a free patent over the
subject land. In his motion for reconsideration, the petitioner apparently took
a cue from our April 13, 2009 Resolution, denying his petition, since his
present motion limitedly argues against the DENRs jurisdiction and the CAs
application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
The petitioner correctly recognized the settled rule that questions of fact are
generally barred under a Rule 45 petition. In the present case, the identity of
Lots 258 and 322 is a central factual issue. The determination of the identity
of these lots involves the task of delineating their actual boundaries in
accordance with the parties respective deeds of sale and survey plan, among
others. While there are instances where the Court departs from the general
rule on the reviewable issues under Rule 45, the petitioner did not even
12
attempt to show that his case falls within the recognized exceptions.21 On top
of this legal reality, the findings and decision of the Director of Lands 22 on
questions of fact, when approved by the DENR Secretary, are generally
conclusive on the courts,23 and even on this Court, when these factual findings
are affirmed by the appellate court. We shall consequently confine our
discussions to the petitioners twin legal issues.
The determination of the identity of a public land is within the DENRs
exclusive jurisdiction to manage and dispose of lands of the public domain
The petitioner insists that under the law24 actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation, to which a suit for reformation of contracts belong, and those
involving ownership of real property fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court. Since these actions are already pending before the
RTC, the DENR Secretary overstepped his authority in excluding Lot 322
from the petitioners free patent application and ordering the respondents to
apply for a free patent over the same lot.
In an action for reformation of contract, the court determines whether the
parties written agreement reflects their true intention.25 In the present case,
this intention refers to the identity of the land covered by the second and third
sale. On the other hand, in a reivindicatory action, the court resolves the issue
of ownership of real property and the plaintiffs entitlement to recover its full
possession. In this action, the plaintiff is required to prove not only his
ownership, but also the identity of the real property he seeks to recover.26
While these actions ordinarily fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTC, the courts jurisdiction to resolve controversies involving ownership of
real property extends only to private lands. In the present case, neither party
has asserted private ownership over Lot 322. The respondents acknowledged
the public character of Lot 322 by mainly relying on the administrative
findings of the DENR in their complaint-in-intervention, instead of asserting
their own private ownership of the property. For his part, the petitioners act
of applying for a free patent with the Bureau of Lands is an acknowledgment
that the land covered by his application is a public land27 whose management
and disposition belong to the DENR Secretary, with the assistance of the
Bureau of Lands. Section 4, Chapter 1, Title XIV of Executive Order No.
29228 reads:
Section 4. Powers and Functions. - The Department [of Environment and
Natural Resources] shall:
xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and
disposable public lands, mineral resources and, in the process of exercising
such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such
form of levy and collect such revenues for the exploration, development,
utilization or gathering of such resources;
xxx
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all
lands of the public domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for
classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation
with appropriate agencies[.] (Underscoring supplied.)
Under Section 14(f) of Executive Order No. 192,29 the Director of the Lands
Management Bureau has the duty, among others, to assist the DENR
Secretary in carrying out the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A.
No. 141)30 by having direct executive control of the survey, classification,
lease, sale or any other forms of concession or disposition and management
of the lands of the public domain.
As the CA correctly pointed out, the present case stemmed from the protest
filed by the respondents against the petitioners free patent application. In
resolving this protest, the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, had to resolve
the issue of identity of the lot claimed by both parties. This issue of identity
of the land requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands, as the
administrative agency with direct control over the disposition and
management of lands of the public domain. The DENR, on the other hand, in
the exercise of its jurisdiction to manage and dispose of public lands, must
likewise determine the applicants entitlement (or lack of it) to a free patent.
(Incidentally, the DENR Regional Office still has to determine the
respondents entitlement to the issuance of a free patent31 in their favor since
it merely ordered the exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioners own
application.) Thus, it is the DENR which determines the respective rights of
rival claimants to alienable and disposable public lands; courts have no
jurisdiction to intrude on matters properly falling within the powers of the
DENR Secretary and the Director of Lands,32 unless grave abuse of discretion
exists.
After the DENR assumed jurisdiction over Lot 322, pursuant to its mandate,
the RTC must defer the exercise of its jurisdiction on related issues on the
13
same matter properly within its jurisdiction,33 such as the distinct cause of
action for reformation of contracts involving the same property. Note that the
contracts refer to the same property, identified as "Lot 322," - which the
DENR Regional Office, DENR Secretary and the CA found to actually
pertain to Lot 258. When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-
judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to
its specialization are deemed to be included within its jurisdiction since the
law does not sanction a split of jurisdiction34
The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under
the provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with the fast-changing times.
There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this function by
virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial
function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the principal
power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling under their
particular expertise.35
The DENR has primary jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of title
over public lands
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in applying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, claiming that the issue (of who has a better right over Lot 322)
does not require the "specialized technical expertise" of the DENR. He posits
that the issue, in fact, involves interpretation of contracts, appreciation of
evidence and application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are all
within the competence of regular courts.
We disagree.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from
determining a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the latter,
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact36
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply [the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction] to cases involving matters that demand the special
competence of administrative agencies[. It may occur that the Court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the
matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that
its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of
the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate
questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even
though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.] It applies "where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have
been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such
case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view."37
rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to questions
on the identity of the disputed public land since this matter requires a technical
determination by the Bureau of Lands. Since this issue precludes prior judicial
determination, the courts must stand aside even when they apparently have
statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the
administrative agency.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the motion for reconsideration. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call
for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until after the
matters within the competence of [the Lands Management Bureau] are
threshed out and determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily served.38 (Emphases added.)

The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is within

the regular courts area of competence and, concededly, this issue is judicial
in character. However, regular courts would have no power to conclusively
resolve this issue of ownership given the public character of the land, since
under C.A. No. 141, in relation to Executive Order No. 192,39 the disposition
and management of public lands fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Director of Lands, subject to review by the DENR Secretary.40

While the powers given to the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, to
alienate and dispose of public land do not divest regular courts of jurisdiction
over possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants (to protect their
respective possessions and occupations),41 the respondents complaint-in-
intervention does not simply raise the issue of possession whether de jure
or de facto but likewise raised the issue of ownership as basis to recover
possession. Particularly, the respondents prayed for declaration of ownership
of Lot 322.1avvphi1 Ineluctably, the RTC would have to defer its ruling on
the respondents reivindicatory action pending final determination by the
DENR, through the Lands Management Bureau, of the respondents
entitlement to a free patent, following the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

Undoubtedly, the DENR Secretarys exclusion of Lot 322 from the

petitioners free patent application and his consequent directive for the
respondents to apply for the same lot are within the DENR Secretarys
exercise of sound administrative discretion. In the oft-cited case of Vicente
Villaflor, etc. v. CA, et al,42 which involves the decisions of the Director of
Lands and the then Minister of Natural Resources, we stressed that the
14
 Republic of the Philippines Parcel No. 5 Angat River-Bustos Dam Forest Reserve
SUPREME COURT
Manila Parcel No. 6 Ambayawan River Forest Reserve

SECOND DIVISION Parcel No. 7 Umiray River Forest Reserve

Parcel No. 8 Kaliwa River Forest Reserve

G.R. No. 127296 January 22, 1998 Parcel No. 9 Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve

EDUBIGIS GORDULA, CELSO V. FERNANDEZ, JR., CELSO A.
FERNANDEZ, NORA ELLEN ESTRELLADO, DEVELOPMENT
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, J.F. FESTEJO AND CO., INC. AND
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAGUNA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES (represented by the National Power Corporation),
respondents.
PUNO, J.:
Before us is a petition to affirm the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, which was reversed by the respondent Court
of Appeals in its Decision1 dated June 20, 1996 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 45466.
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent court on
November 15, 1996.2
The facts show that on June 26, 1969, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 5733 withdrawing from sale and settlement and
setting aside as permanent forest reserves, subject to private rights, certain
parcels of the public domain denominated as follows:
Parcel No. 1. Magat River Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 2 Chico River Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 3 Abulug River Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 10 Barit River-Lake Buhi Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 11 Jalaur River Forest Reserve
They were primarily for use as watershed area. Their development was to be
undertaken by the Bureau of Forestry, with the cooperation of, among other
government agencies, the National Power Corporation (Napocor).
Located in Talaongan, Cavinti, Laguna with an area of Twenty Nine
Thousand Seven Hundred Seven (29,707) square meters, and bearing the
following boundaries:
North National Power Corporation
South Road and Baldomero Halili
West National Power Corporation
East National Power Corporation
the parcel of land subject of the case at bar is, by petitioners' explicit
admission,4 within Parcel No. 9, the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve.
More than three years after the land was segregated as part of the Caliraya-
Lumot River Forest Reserve, or on January 9, 1973, petitioner Edubigis
Gordula, a native of Cavinti, Laguna, filed with the Bureau of Lands, an
Application5 for a Free Patent over the land. Manuel Fernandez and several
others also filed free patent applications covering other parcels of land in the
area.

Parcel No. 4 Penaranda River Forest Reserve

15
On February 5, 1973, petitioner Gordula declared the land for taxation
purposes in his name as shown in Tax Declaration No. 0429.
The Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands referred the free patent
applications of petitioner Gordula, Fernandez, and several others to Mr.
Ravanal Ravanzo, then the General Manager of the Napocor. Mr. Ravanzo
responded through the following letter:
October 24, 1973
The Director
Regional Lands Office No. IV
757 Gen. Solano St.
San Miguel, Manila
Sir:
This refers to the Free Patent Application[s] of Manuel Fernandez, et al., of
Barrio Talaongan, Cavinti, Laguna, which were referred to this Office for
clearance it having been found that they are within the Caliraya-Lumot
Watershed Reservation under Proclamation No. 573 dated June 26, 1969.
Investigation conducted by this Office reveals that applicants have sufficient
ground to establish "priority rights" over the areas claimed and that
agricultural improvements introduced thereon are not detrimental to the
watershed.
In view thereof, this Office interpose[s] no objection to the application by the
applicants contained in your letter dated October 2, 1973.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) R.R. RAVANZO
General Manager
On December 10, 1973, petitioner Gordula had the land surveyed; Survey
Plan No. F(IV-5) 949-D under his name was approved by the Regional
16
Director of the Bureau of Lands. Thereafter, Mr. Amundo Munda, a Land
Inspector of the Bureau of Lands, conducted the requisite investigations.
On January 17, 1974, petitioner Gordula's Application for Free Patent was
approved. Free Patent No. 693 was issued in his name.
On January 30, 1974, the Register of Deeds of Laguna issued, on the basis of
Free Patent No. 693, Original Certificate of Title No. P-1405 in the name of
petitioner Gordula.
He declared the land anew for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No.
6498. He paid its real estate taxes from 1975 to 1979.
In the meantime, respondent Republic, through the Napocor, contracted the
Certeza Surveying Company to survey the area constituting the Caliraya-
Lumot River Forest Reserve. The survey plans were approved by the Regional
Director of the Bureau of Lands on October 27, 1975.
The said survey plans, as well as the Cadastral Map of Talaongan and the
Geological Plan of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, show that
petitioner Gordula's land is located in the saddle area of the watershed
recreation for the hydro-electric reservoir.
On January 22, 1979, petitioner Gordula sold the land to petitioner Celso V.
Fernandez, Jr. for six thousand pesos (P6,000.00). The Register of Deeds of
Laguna cancelled Original Certificate of Title No. P-1405 and issued, in lieu
thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-85445 in the name of petitioner
Fernandez, Jr. The latter declared the land for taxation purposes in his name.
On March 12, 1979, Fernandez, Jr. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the
land in favor of petitioner Celso A. Fernandez for six thousand five hundred
pesos (P6,500.00). Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-85445 was cancelled
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 85594 was issued on March 21, 1979 in
the name of petitioner Fernandez.
As approved by the Bureau of Lands in Psd-Plan 04-014230, petitioner
Fernandez subdivided the land into nine (9) lots. On August 16, 1985, the
Register of Deeds of Laguna issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 102492
to 102500 in his name covering the nine (9) subdivision lots.
On August 29, 1985, he sold the lots to petitioner Nora Ellen Estrellado for
twenty one thousand pesos (P21,000.00). Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
102492 to 102500 were cancelled, and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-103404 to T-103412 were issued to petitioner Estrellado.
On October 17, 1986, petitioner Estrellado mortgaged to petitioner
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) four6 (4) of the (9) lots. Another
lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 103408, was sold to petitioner
J.F. Festejo Company, Inc. to whom was issued, in lieu of the former, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 106495.
On July 16, 1987, former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 2247 vesting in the Napocor "complete jurisdiction, control and
regulation" over the "Caliraya-Lumot Watershed Reservation as covered by
Proclamation No. 573".
On July 26, 1987, Mr. Antonio Aquino, Jr., the Civil Security Officer of the
Cavinti reservoir complex, sent a Memorandum to the President of the
Napocor informing him of the fences and roads being constructed in the
saddle area, more particularly, in the lots sold by petitioner Fernandez to
petitioner Estrellado.
On July 28, 1987, Mr. A. Coronado, the Manager of the Cavinti reservoir
complex, asked petitioner Fernandez to remove all the improvements made in
the Estrellado lots. In reply, petitioner Fernandez claimed that the roads being
constructed would not adversely affect the reservoir area in case of heavy
floods because the Estrellado lots were elevated at a height of around fifty
(50) feet.
In view of petitioner Fernandez's, refusal, the Napocor assigned two (2)
security guards over the lot. The guards ordered the construction workers to
leave their posts and barred their return without permission from the Napocor.
On October 18, 1987, petitioner Fernandez, as attorney-in-fact and counsel of
petitioner Estrellado, wrote to the President of the Napocor threatening to file
a multi-million damage suit if the guards were not removed within fifteen (15)
days.
On November 18, 1987, respondent Republic, through the Napocor, filed
against petitioners a Complaint for Annulment of Free Patent and
Cancellation of Titles and Reversion with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in
the RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.8 On January 29, 1988, the trial court issued a
writ of preliminary injunction upon a bond of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00).
17
On December 28, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners. The dispositive portion of its decision states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and
against plaintiff:
(1) Dismissing plaintiff's complaint and dissolving the writ of preliminary
injunction issued in this case;
(2) Ordering National Power Corporation to pay defendant Celso A.
Fernandez P300,000.00 as actual damages and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees;
and
With costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.9
Respondent Republic, through the Napocor, elevated the case to the
respondent Court of Appeals.
On June 20, 1996, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled against petitioners.
It held, inter alia, viz:
The kernel and primal issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not Free
Patent No. IV-5 (693) and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1405 and all
derivative titles thereafter issued to the Appellees . . . are null and void. The
Appellant avers that the parcel of land covered by the aforesaid Free Patent
issued to Gordula is a portion of the vast track of land reserved by former
President Marcos as permanent forest under Proclamation No. 573 dated June
26, 196[9] . . . and hence, non-disposable and inalienable, pursuant to Section
88 in relation to Section 83 of Commonwealth Act [No.] 141, as amended. In
contrast the Court a quo dismissed Appellant's complaint, in the light of the
exclusionary clause in Proclamation No. 573 . . . that the setting up of the
permanent forest reserves over the Caliraya-Lumot Watershed area was
"subject to private rights" if there be any and the letter-clearance of the then
General Manager of [Napocor] . . . dated October 24, 1973, interposing no
objection to the Application for a free patent of Manuel Fernandez, et al.
xxx xxx xxx
We are convinced, beyond cavil, that the parcel of land subject of the Free
Patent issued to Gordula on January 17, 1974 and covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1405 issued on January 30, 1974 . . . as the two (2)
parcels of land purportedly purchased by the [Republic] from Perez and
Glorioso in 1941, were public disposable and alienable lands before the
issuance, by the former President, of Proclamation No. 573, on June 26,
196[9] . . . The property was, however, later reserved, under Proclamation No.
573, as a permanent forest, on June 26, 196[9]. Since then, the property
became non-disposable and inalienable public land. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
At the time Gordula filed his application for a Free Patent, on January 9, 1973,
the parcel of land . . . was already reserved as a permanent forest under
Proclamation No. 573. Since the property was already a forest reservation as
of June 26, 196[9], the same could no longer be disposed of or alienated in
favor of private individuals . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
We do not agree with Appellees' and the Court a quo's pose that Gordula's
property was exempt from the application of Proclamation No. 573 because,
by express provision thereof, the reservation was "subject to private rights, if
there be any" . . . .
Appellees failed to adduce proof that, as of June 26, 196[9], Gordula had
acquired ownership or title to the aforesaid property either by deed or by any
other mode of acquisition from the State by operation of law for that matter
such as for instance, alienable public land held by a possessor personally, or
through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for
the prescribed period of thirty (30) years, is converted into private property
by mere lapse of period ipso jure . . . . In the present recourse, Gordula, as of
196[9], had been in possession of the property for only [twenty-five (25)
years] years since 1944 when he commenced, as can be gleaned from his
application . . . for a free patent, possession of the property. The period of
Gordula's occupancy after 196[9] should not be tacked to the period from
1944 because by then the
property was not susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or
alienation. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The Appellees cannot find refuge in the letter of the then General Manager of
[Napocor], Ravanal Ravanzo, on October 24, 1973 . . . .
18
In the first place, Ravanzo made no explicit and unequivocal statement, in
said letter, that Gordula had priority rights to the property. What he merely
declared was that "applicants have sufficient ground to establish priority
rights over the areas claimed . . ." . Even if it may be conceded, for the nonce,
that indeed, Ravanzo declared that Gordula had priority rights over the
property claimed by him, such declaration is irrefragably erroneous. Munda
and the Director of Lands erred in recommending the approval of Gordula's
application in the same manner that the then Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources erred in issuing the patent to Gordula. But then, well-
settled is the doctrine, enunciated by the Supreme Court, in a catena of cases,
that the State cannot be bound and estopped by the errors or mistakes of its
agents or officials . . . .
The General Manager of the Appellant is not vested with authority to allow
the occupancy or acquisition, by private individuals, of such properties,
whether still needed by the Appellant or not, reserved by the President of the
Philippines for permanent forests. Only the President or [the] Congress, by
statutory fiat, can revert the property to the disposable or alienable portion of
the public domain.
Anent Appellees' plea that they are buyers of the property in good faith, they
must harken to the Decision of the Supreme Court in Republic of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 148 SCRA 480 that:
. . . even assuming that the transferees are innocent purchasers for value, their
titles to said lands derived from the titles of private respondents which were
not validly issued as they cover lands still a part of the public domain, may be
cancelled. . . .
We do not agree with Appellees' claim that Appellant's suit was barred by
prescription and by the purported indefeasibility of their title. Prescription,
basically, does not run against the State. The right of the State for the
reversion of unlawfully acquired property is not barred by prescription nor by
the perceived indefeasibility of Appellees' title for that matter. . . .10
Thus states the dispositive portion of the decision of respondent appellate
court:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Another Decision is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Free Patent No. IV-5-693 and Original Certificate of Title No. P1405 issued
under the name of Edubigis Gordula and all derivative titles issued to the
Appellees are hereby declared null and void;
2. The parcel of land covered by said titles is hereby declared reverted to the
Government under the jurisdiction, control and supervision of the [Napocor]
under Executive Order No. 224 of former President Corazon C. Aquino;
3. The Appellees and all those acting for and in their behalf are hereby
prohibited from intruding into and disturbing the Appellant of its possession
and dominion of the subject property; [and]
4. Appellees' counterclaims are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, this petition anchored on the following grounds:
FIRST
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED TANTAMOUNT TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE
SUBJECT LAND IS WITHIN THE LANDS BOUGHT BY THE NPC
EITHER FROM GERONIMO PEREZ ON MARCH 10, 1941 AND/OR
FROM CELERINO GLORIOSO ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1941;
SECOND
ON [sic] THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF PAGE 19 UP TO PAGE 23, LAST
PAGE OF THE DECISION, THE RESPONDENT COURT WENT
BEYOND THE ISSUES OF THE CASE WHICH RESULTED [IN THE]
REVERSAL OF THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT . . . ;
THIRD
THE FACTUAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL
COURT ARE IN CONFLICT WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE
RESPONDENT COURT CONCERNING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR
NOT PETITIONER EDUBIGIS GORDULA HAD ACQUIRED "PRIVATE
RIGHTS" ON THE SUBJECT LAND, WHICH IS AN EXCEPTION UNDER
PROCLAMATION NO. 573. HENCE, THIS CASE IS A QUESTION OF
FACTS AND OF LAW . . . ;
19
FOURTH
THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS WITHIN THE
AREA OF PROCLAMATION NO. 573. HOWEVER THE RESPONDENT
[COURT] GRAVELY ERRED TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT WENT TO THE EXTENT OF DISCUSSING
ON [sic] THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND INVESTIGATION RELATIVE
TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE TITLE TO PETITIONER EDUBIGIS
GORDULA AND AFTERWARD DECLARED THAT GORDULA WHO
HAS A TITLE ON THE SUBJECT LAND HAS NOT ACQUIRED
"PRIVATE RIGHTS" ON THE LAND DESPITE OF [sic] THE FACT
THAT SAID RESPONDENT COURT IS ALREADY PRECLUDED FROM
DISCUSSING THE FACTS RELATIVE ON [sic] THE ISSUANCE OF
THE TITLE BY AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, MORE SO ITS FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION IS [sic]
AGAINST THE LAW, JUSTICE AND EQUITY. THIS IS AGAINST THE
RULING IN ESPINOSA VS. MAKALINTAL, 79 PHIL. 134 and ORTUA VS.
SINGSON ENCARNACION, 5[9] PHIL. 440; and
FIFTH
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THEN GENERAL MANAGER RAVANZO OF NPC AND
UNDERSECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE BY AUTHORITY OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES ERRED IN ISSUING THE PATENT
TO PETITIONER GORDULA. THIS IS AGAINST THE RULING IN
ESPINOSA VS. MAKALINTAL, 79 PHIL. 134 and ORTUA VS. SINGSON
ENCARNACION, 5[9] PHIL. 440.12
We affirm the Court of Appeals.
We start with the proposition that the sovereign people, represented by their
lawfully constituted government, have untrammeled dominion over the
forests on their native soil. Forest lands, being the self-replenishing, versatile
and all-important natural resource that they are, need to be reserved and saved
to promote the people's welfare. By their very nature13 or by executive or
statutory fiat, they are outside the commerce of man, unsusceptible of private
appropriation in any form,14 and inconvertible into any character less than of
inalienable public domain, regardless of their actual state, for as long as the
reservation subsists and is not revoked by a subsequent valid
declassification.15
Once again, we reiterate the rule enunciated by this Court in Director of
Forestry vs. Munoz and consistently adhered to in a long line of cases the
more recent of which is Republic vs. Court Appeals, that forest lands or forest
reserves are incapable of private appropriation, and possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert them into private properties. This ruling is
premised on the Regalian doctrine enshrined
not only in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution but also in the 1987
Constitution.16
Petitioners do not contest the nature of the land in the case at bar. It is admitted
that it lies in the heart of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which
Proclamation No. 573 classified as inalienable and indisposable. Its control
was vested in the NAPOCOR under E.O. No. 224.
Petitioners, however, contend that Proclamation No. 573 itself recognizes
private rights of landowners prior to the reservation. They claim to have
established their private rights to the subject land.
We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that
there be a showing of the title from the state.17 The facts show that petitioner
Gordula, did not acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under
Proclamation No. 573. He filed his application for free patent only in January,
1973, more than three (3) years after the issuance of Proclamation No. 573 in
June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest
Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it has been classified as
public forest reserve for the public good.
Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, "private rights", in Proclamation
No. 573, should not be interpreted as requiring a title. They opine that it
suffices if the claimant "had occupied and cultivated the property for so may
number of years, declared the land for taxation purposes, [paid] the
corresponding real estate taxes [which are] accepted by the government, and
[his] occupancy and possession [is] continuos, open and unmolested and
recognized by the government".18 Prescinding from this premise, petitioners
urge that the 25-year possession by petitioner Gordula from 1944 to 1969,
albeit five (5) years short of the 30-year possession required under
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as amended, is enough to vest upon
petitioner Gordula the "private rights" recognized and respected in
Proclamation No. 573.
The case law does not support this submission. In Director of Lands v.
Reyes,19 we held that a settler claiming the protection of "private rights" to
20
exclude his land from a military or forest reservation must show ". . . by clear
and convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired by [any]
. . . means for the acquisition of public lands".
In fine, one claiming "private rights" must prove that he has complied with C.
A. No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which
prescribes the substantive as well as the procedural requirements for
acquisition of public lands. This law requires at least thirty (30) years of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for free patent. The
rationale for the 30-year period lies in the presumption that the land applied
for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and/or possessors claim an
interest therein only by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open and
notorious possession.20
Indeed, the possession of public agricultural land, however long the period
may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor.21 The
reason, to reiterate our ruling, is because the statute of limitations with regard
to public agricultural land does not operate against the State, unless the
occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the
State.22
In the case at bar, petitioners have failed to comply with the mandatory 30-
year period of possession. Their 25-year possession of the land prior to its
reservation as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve cannot be
considered compliance with C.A. No. 141, as amended. The Court has no
authority to lower this requirement for it cannot amend the law.
Next, petitioners contend that their "private rights" have been recognized by
the government itself. They point to (1) the letter dated October 24, 1973 of
then NAPOCOR General Manager, Ravanal Ravanzo, (2) the action of the
Bureau of Lands which after investigation, declared him qualified to acquire
the land; and (3) the Free Patent issued on January 17, 1974 by the
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, by authority of the
President of the Philippines. Petitioners urge that the findings and conclusions
of the aforementioned government agencies and/or officers are conclusive
and binding upon the courts, as held in the cases of Ortua v. Singson
Encarnacion23 and Espinosa v. Makalintal.24
The submissions are unconvincing.
In the first place, there is nothing in Espinosa v. Makalintal that is relevant to
petitioners' claims. On the other hand, our ruling in Ortua v. Singson
Encarnacion that "a decision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, upon a question of fact is
conclusive and not subject to be reviewed by the courts,"25 was made subject
to the categorical caveat "in the absence of a showing that such decision was
rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition, or mistake".26

Undoubtedly, then General Manager Ravanzo erred in holding that petitioner

Gordula "ha[d] sufficient ground to establish 'priority rights' over the areas
claimed". This error mothered the subsequent error of the Bureau of Lands
which culminated in the erroneous grant of a free patent on January 17, 1974.
The perpetration of these errors does not have the effect of converting a forest
reserve into public alienable land. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable
of registration, and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title.27 To be sure, the
defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free
patent does not lie against the state in an action for reversion of the land
covered thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or of a forest
reservation, the patent covering forest land being void ab initio.28 Nor can
the mistake or error of its officials or agents in this regard be invoked against
the government.29 Finally, the conversion of a forest reserve into public
alienable land, requires no less than a categorical act of declassification by the
President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head who has
the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable, timber and mineral lands.30 There is none such in this case.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is HEREBY DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED

21
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 159589 December 23, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN FABIO, namely: DOMINGA C. FABIO, SOCORRO
D. FABIO, LYDIA D. FABIO, ROLANDO D. FABIO, NORMA D.
FABIO, NORMA L. FABIO, ANGELITA FABIO, ROSALIE FABIO,
DANILO FABIO, RENATO FABIO, LEVITA FABIO, IRENE FABIO,
TERESITA MOLERA, ROSEMARIE C. PAKAY, LIGAYA C.
MASANGKAY, ALFREDO F. CASTILLO, MELINDA F. CASTILLO,
MERCEDITA F. CASTILLO, ESTELA DE JESUS AQUINO,
FELECITO FABIO, and ALEXANDER FABIO, represented herein by
ANGELITA F. ESTEIBAR as their Attorney-in-Fact, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2
dated 29 August 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66522,
which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite,
Branch 15, in LRC Case No. NC-96-782 granting respondents application
for registration of title to Lot No. 233 (Lot), Cad-617-D, Ternate Cadastre.
The Facts
On 21 November 1996, respondents, who are the heirs of Juan Fabio,
represented by Angelita F. Esteibar (Esteibar) as their Attorney-in-Fact, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, an application for
registration of title3 to the Lot with an approximate area of 1,096,866 square
meters or 109.6 hectares. The Lot is situated in Barangay Sapang, Ternate,
Cavite. The respondents sought the registration of title under the provisions
of Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529).4
22
In the application, respondents alleged that they are the owners of the Lot,
including all the improvements, having acquired the same through a bona fide
claim of ownership. They declared that they and their predecessors-in-interest
were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the Lot in the
concept of an owner for more than 100 years.5
Together with the application for registration, respondents submitted the
following documents:
1. Certificate of Death proving the fact of death of Juan Fabio;6
2. Special Power of Attorney showing that the heirs authorized Esteibar to file
the application;7
3. Order dated 25 November 1994 of Sydicious F. Panoy, Regional Technical
Director, Regional Office No. IV-A, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), giving authority to survey the Lot, which survey was
numbered SWO-042121-003369-D;8
4. Surveyors Certificate and Transmittal of Survey Returns signed by
Geodetic Engineer Susipatro Mancha proving that the Lot was surveyed;9
5. Sepia copies of the survey plan establishing that the land area is more or
less 109 hectares and that the Lot was already surveyed and the boundaries
determined;10
6. Letter of Authority dated 30 June 1997 authorizing Engineer Roberto C.
Pangyarihan (Pangyarihan) to represent the Land Management Sector,
DENR-Region IV, and to testify on plan SWO-042121-003369-D covering
the Lot;11
7. Technical Description signed by Pangyarihan proving the boundaries of the
Lot as surveyed;12
8. Letter dated 22 April 1991 of Arnaldo Conlu (Conlu), Land Management
Inspector, DENR-Region IV establishing that the Lot is alienable and
disposable;13
9. First Indorsement dated 22 April 1991 of Rufo F. Lorenzo, Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer, forwarding to the Regional
Technical Director, Land Management Division, through the Chief, Surveys
Division, DENR-Region IV the investigation report of Land Management
Inspector, Conlu;14
10. Certifications dated 4 July 1995 and 23 November 1995 of Conrado C.
Lindo, Municipal Mayor, and Flordeliza C. Soberano, Municipal Assessor of
Ternate, Cavite, respectively, establishing that Juan Fabio was the declared
owner of the Lot under Tax Declaration No. 1385 having an area of 200
hectares and situated in Calumpang and Caybangat, Zapang, Ternate,
Cavite;15
11. Tax Declarations corresponding to different years showing that the Lot
has been declared under the name of Juan Fabio for tax purposes: Tax
Declaration No. 428 for the year 1947, Tax Declaration No. 302 for the year
1961; Tax Declaration No. 227 for the year 1969, Tax Declaration No. 210
for the year 1974, Tax Declaration No. 173 for the year 1980, Tax Declaration
No. 1543 for the year 1985, and Tax Declaration No. 1385 for the year 1994;16
and
12. Certifications of the Assistant Municipal Treasurer of Ternate, Cavite
stating that the real estate taxes for the years 1994 to 1997 were paid.17
After the presentation of exhibits establishing the jurisdictional facts, the trial
prosecutor assigned to the case interposed no objection. Thus, the trial court
ordered a general default against the public except the government.
On 1 July 1997, respondents presented their evidence consisting of
documentary exhibits and the testimonies of witnesses Esteibar, Pangyarihan,
Dominga Fabio Lozano, Mariano Huerto, and Raymundo Pakay.
Esteibar, the duly appointed representative of the heirs of Juan Fabio, testified
that her grandfather, Juan, died in 1959 when she was only 13 years old. She
attested that she was born on the Lot and knows that her grandfather owned,
possessed and occupied the Lot until his death. Esteibar claimed that they and
their predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the Lot openly,
publicly, continuously, peacefully, without interruption in the concept of an
owner and adverse to the public since time immemorial up to the present or
for more than 100 years. They had paid real estate taxes; planted trees,
vegetables, rice, and banana plants; and raised animals on the Lot. Further,
she stated that the Lot is neither mortgaged nor encumbered and that no other
person other than her and her co-heirs are in possession of the Lot.
23
The next witness, Pangyarihan of the Land Management Sector, DENR-
Region IV, testified that he had been connected with DENR-Region IV since
1956. He was formerly the Chief of the Survey Division of DENR-Region IV
from 1991 until his designation as Special Assistant to the Regional Director
in 1995. Pangyarihan affirmed that the Lot is 1,096,866 square meters or
109.6 hectares and that he recommended the approval of the survey plan,
SWO-042121-003369-D, which includes the Lot, on the basis of submission
of certain requirements like tax declarations, report of investigation by the
land investigator and survey returns prepared by the geodetic engineer. He
verified that the survey plan and the technical descriptions matched with each
other and stated that there is no overlap or encroachment on other surrounding
claims on adjacent or adjoining lots. Further, he confirmed that there is a
notation at the left hand footnote of the approved survey plan which reads
"this survey falls within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation and
disposition hereof shall be subject to the final delimitation thereof as per
Proc. No. 1582-A dated September 6, 1976."
Dominga Fabio Lozano, the only living and youngest child of Juan Fabio and
who was then 63 years of age, testified that she was born in 1934 in
Calumpang, Ternate, Cavite. She alleged that she was born and has lived on
the Lot, owned by her father Juan Fabio, who in turn inherited the land from
his father Ignacio Fabio. She narrated that her father was born in 1887 and
died in 1959 at the age of 72 as evidenced by his death certificate. She stated
further that no one has ever questioned their ownership or disturbed their
peaceful possession and occupation of the Lot. As a result, their possession of
the Lot covers more than 100 years of continuous, uninterrupted, public, open
and peaceful possession.
Mariano Huerto, a helper of the late Juan Fabio, testified that since 1935,
when he was only 12 years old, he had helped cultivate the Lot until he left
the place in 1955. He stated that at the time he served as helper, Juan Fabio
and his family were the ones who possessed and occupied the Lot. He helped
plant vegetables, banana plants, papaya trees and upland rice and was familiar
with the boundaries of the Lot.
Raymundo Pakay, 70 years of age at the time and a resident of Ternate,
Cavite, testified that he knew Juan Fabio as the owner of the Lot, which has
an area of 200 hectares, more or less. He stated that Juan built a house there
and could not recall of anyone else who claimed ownership of the Lot.
On 7 August 1997, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Tagaytay City filed his
Manifestation and Comment dated 28 July 1997:
COMES NOW the government, through the undersigned Assistant City
Prosecutor of Tagaytay City, assisting the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of the Province of Cavite, by way of comment to petitioners formal offer of
evidence dated July 3, 1997 hereby manifest that the government interposes
no objection to Exhibit A up to PP together with its sub markings, the same
being material and relevant to the instant petition.
The government further manifests that considering the fact that it has no
controverting evidence in its possession to refute the material allegations of
the herein petitioner, the government is submitting the instant case for the
immediate resolution of this Honorable Court on the basis of the evidence
adduced by the petitioner and the cross examination propounded by the Trial
Prosecutor.18
On 29 September 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision ordering the
registration of the Lot in the name of Juan Fabio. The dispositive portion
states:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding the application for
registration and grant of title under Act 496, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1529 to be meritorious and fully substantiated by evidence
sufficient and requisite under the law, this Court, confirming its previous
Order of general default as against the general public, hereby decrees and
adjudges and hereby orders the registration of the parcel of land as
hereinabove described, identified, and bounded and now the subject matter of
the present application for registration of title in the above-entitled case, in
favor of, and in the name of JUAN FABIO, of Barangay Sapang, Municipality
of Ternate, Province of Cavite.
FURTHER, upon the finality of this DECISION, the Administrator, Land
Registration Authority, is hereby ordered to issue the corresponding decree of
registration and the Original Certificate of Title in favor of, and in the name
of JUAN FABIO, of Barangay Sapang, Municipality of Ternate, Province of
Cavite, over the parcel of land described, identified and bounded as
hereinabove-mentioned and subject matter of this Decision which decreed
and adjudged the registration of its title in his name.
SO ORDERED.19
The Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
claimed that the trial court erred in ruling that respondents have acquired a
24
vested right over the Lot which falls within the Calumpang Point Naval
Reservation. Petitioner asserted that the trial court disregarded the testimony
of Pangyarihan who recommended the approval of the survey plan with the
following notation:
This survey falls within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation and
disposition hereof shall be subject to the final delimitation thereof as per Proc.
No. 1582-A dated September 6, 1976. x x x
In essence, petitioner argued that the trial courts grant of registration is
contrary to the provisions of Section 88 of Commonwealth Act No. 14120 and
Proclamation No. 1582-A.21
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 29 August 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial
court.22 The appellate court ruled that the mode of appeal filed by petitioner
was wrong. Since the lone question involved was one of law, petitioner should
have filed a petition for review with this Court under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure instead of filing an appeal under Rule 41.
Nevertheless, the appellate court looked into the merits of the case and
sustained the findings of the trial court:
On the merits of the case, it may be true that the General Order 56 of the
United States War Department dated 25 March 1904 reserved the subject
property as a military reservation, however, President Ferdinand Marcos
issued Proclamation 307 on 20 November 1967 which provides x x x.
In other words, Presidential Proclamation 307 provides for an exception
those properties subject to private rights or those on which private individuals
can prove ownership by any mode acceptable under our laws and Torrens
system.
Proclamation 1582-A issued by President Marcos on 6 September 1976 again
provided the following x x x.
Without doubt, this complements and recognizes the rights acquired by
private individuals under Proclamation 307, over the portion of the properties
reserved under General Order 56 of the United States War Department dated
25 March 1904.
Considering that the annotation appearing in the survey plan merely provides
that the controversial portion shall be subject to final delimitation as per
Proclamation 1582-A, the same is consistent with the provisions of
Proclamation 307.
For wrong remedy and for lack of merit, the Court holds and so rules that the
trial court erred not in granting petitioners application for registration of title.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED and the
challenged 29 September 1997 Decision of the court a quo is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.23
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
The issues for our resolution are (1) whether petitioner correctly appealed the
ruling of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, and (2) whether the
respondents have acquired a right over the Lot.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has merit.
First Issue: Mode of Appeal
Petitioner contends that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the
appeal is determined on the basis of the averments in the notice of appeal.
Since the appeal involves questions of fact and law, petitioner correctly
appealed the ruling of the trial court to the Court of Appeals and not directly
to this Court.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the remedy resorted to by
petitioner before the Court of Appeals was not correct. Respondents contend
that the issues actually raised in the appellants brief determine the appropriate
mode of appeal, not the averments in the notice of appeal. Since the appellate
court found that petitioner only raised questions of law, the appeal is
dismissible under the Rules.
25
Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which
governs appeals from judgments and final orders of the Regional Trial Court
to the Court of Appeals, provides:
Section 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided
by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be
taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment
or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and
other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so
require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like
manner.
(b) Petition for review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided
by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall
be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are
raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition
for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. (Emphasis supplied)
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For questions to be one of law, the same
must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances.24
In its appellants brief filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner interposed a
lone assignment of error:
The trial court erred in ruling that appellees have acquired a vested right over
the subject property despite the fact that it falls within the Calumpang Point
Naval Reservation.25
Clearly, the issue stated by petitioner provides no confusion with regard to the
truth or falsity of the given facts pertaining to the Lot and its location as
established during the trial. It had been duly established that the Lot falls
within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation as shown in the survey
conducted and attested to by the DENR. Here, the only issue involved is the
interpretation of a relevant order and proclamations denominating the Lot as
part of a military reservation subject to the limitation that private rights should
be respected. Undoubtedly, this is a pure question of law.
Thus, petitioners appeal under Rule 41 having been improperly brought
before the Court of Appeals, it should have been dismissed by the appellate
court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, which provides:
Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. An appeal
under Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals
raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being
reviewable by the said court. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, the appellate court in resolving that petitioners appeal
constituted a wrong remedy, looked into the merits of the case and found that
the laws involved recognize the rights of respondents. As such, equity
considerations require that we take a similar course of action in order to put a
rest to this case.
Second Issue: Validity of Respondents Title
Petitioner asserts that both the trial and appellate courts failed to recognize
the import of the notation in the survey plan stating that the Lot falls within
the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation. At the time the application for
registration of title was filed, the Lot was no longer open to private ownership
as it had been classified as a military reservation for public service. Thus,
respondents are not entitled to have the Lot registered under the Torrens
system.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that they have acquired a vested
right over the Lot. The Presidential Proclamations, which declared the Lot
part of a naval reservation, provided for an exception that private rights shall
be respected, taking the portion covered by private rights out of the
reservation. Thus, respondents claim they are entitled to have the Lot
registered under their names.
The three proclamations cited reserving the Calumpang Point Naval
Reservation for the exclusive use of the military are the following: (1) U.S.
War Department Order No. 56 issued on 25 March 1904, (2) Proclamation
No. 30726 issued on 20 November 1967, and (3) Proclamation No. 1582-A
issued on 6 September 1976. Such proclamations state:
26
U.S. War Department General Order No. 5627
U.S. War Department General Order No. 56
Washington, March 25, 1904.
For the knowledge and governance of all interested parties, the following is
hereby announced:
The President of the United States, by the Order dated March 14, 1904, which
provides that the reservations made by Executive Order of April 11, 1902
(General Order No. 38, Army Headquarters, Office of the Adjutant General,
April 17, 1902), at the entrance of Manila Bay, Luzon, Philippine Islands, are
arranged in such a way that will include only these lands as later described,
whose lands were reserved by the Order of March 14, 1904 for military
purposes, by virtue of Article 12 of the Act of Congress approved on July 1,
1902, entitled "Act providing for the Temporary Administration of Civil
Affairs of the Government of the Philippine Islands and for Other Purposes"
(32 Stat. L., 691); namely:
1. In the northern side of the entrance to Manila Bay, in the province of
Bataan, Luzon (Mariveles Reservation), all public lands within the limits that
are described as follows:
"Starting from the mouth of the Mariveles River in the eastern border and
from here straight North to a distance of 5,280 feet; from this point straight to
the East to intercept a line, in a straight direction to the South from a stone
monument marked U.S. (Station 4); from there straight from the North until
the aforementioned Station 4; from here straight to the East to a distance of
6,600 feet until a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 5); from here straight
South to a distance of 6,600 feet until a stone monument marked U.S. (Station
6); from here straight to the East to a distance of 8,910 feet until a stone
monument marked U.S. (Station 7); from here straight to the South to a
distance of 7,730 feet until a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 8),
situated at the northwest corner of the second creek to the east of Lasisi Point,
30 feet North of the high-tide mark; from there in the same direction until the
high-tide mark; from here towards the East following the shoreline up to the
starting point."
2. In the southern side of the Manila Bay entrance, in the province of
Cavite, Luzon (Calumpan Point Reservation), all public lands within the
limits that are described as follows:
"Starting from a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 1) situated in the
cliff on the Eastern side of Asubig Point, 20 feet above the high-tide mark
and about 50 feet from the edge of the cliff and continuing from there to
the South 28 10 West, a distance of up to 22,000 feet until a stone
monument marked U.S. (Station 2); from here to North 54 10' West at
a distance of 5,146 feet until a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 3);
from here towards South 85 35 ' 30 "West, at a distance of 2,455 feet
until a stone monument marked U.S. (Station 4), situated on the beach
near the Northeast corner of Limbones Bay, about 50 feet from the high-
tide mark and following in the same direction until the high-tide mark;
from here towards North and East following the shoreline until North
28 10 ' East from the starting point and from there encompassing more
or less 5,200 acres. The markers are exact."
3. The islands of Corregidor, Pulo Caballo, La Monja, El Fraile, and Carabao,
and all other islands and detached rocks lying between Mariveles Reservation
on the north side of the entrance to Manila Bay and Calumpan Point
Reservation on the south side of said entrance.
4. The jurisdiction of the military authorities in the case of reservations in the
northern and southern beaches of the entrance to Manila Bay and all the
islands referred to in paragraph 3, are extended from the high-tide marker
towards the sea until a distance of 1,000 yards.
By Order of the Secretary of War:
GEORGE L. GILLESPIE,
General Commander, Chief of Internal General Staff,
Official copy.
W.P. HALL, Internal Adjutant General. (Emphasis supplied)
Proclamation No. 307
x x x do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for military
purposes under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, subject to private rights, if any there be, a certain parcel of land
of the public domain situated in the municipality of Ternate, province of
Cavite, Island of Luzon, more particularly described as follows:
Proposed Naval Reservation
Calumpang Point
27
A parcel of land (the proposed Calumpang Point Naval Reservation), situated
in the municipality of Ternate, province of Cavite. Bounded on the NW., N.
and E., by Manila Bay; on the SE. and S., by municipality of Ternate; and on
the W., by Manila Bay. Beginning at a point marked "1" on the attached
Sketch Plan traced from Coastal Hydrography of Limbones Island.
thence N. 54 deg. 30 E., 750.00 m. to point 2;
thence N. 89 deg. 15E., 1780.00 m. to point 3;
thence N. 15 deg. 10 E., 6860.00 m. to point 4;
thence N. 12 deg. 40 W., 930.00 m. to point 5;
thence S. 77 deg. 20 W., 2336.00 m. to point 6;
thence S. 49 deg. 30 W., 4450.00 m. to point 7;
thence S. 12 deg. 40 E., 2875.00 m. to point 8;
thence S. 30 deg. 30 E., 2075.00 m. to the point of beginning; containing an
approximate area of twenty eight million nine hundred seventy three thousand
one hundred twelve (28, 973,112) square meters.
NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future
surveys."
Proclamation No. 1582-A
WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 307 dated November 20, 1967 and U.S.
War Department Order No. 56 dated March 25, 1904 reserved for
military purposes, and withdrew from sale or settlement, a parcel of land
of the public domain situated in the Municipality of Ternate, Province of
Cavite, more particularly described as follows: x x x
WHEREAS, the Philippine Navy and the Philippine Marines now need that
portion of this area reserved under Proclamation No. 307, particularly,
Cayladme Cove, Caynipa Cove, Calumpang Cove and Sinalam Cove, for
their use as official station, not only to guard and protect the mouth of Manila
Bay and the shorelines of the Province of Cavite, Batangas and Bataan, but
also to maintain peace and order in the Corregidor area, which is now one of
the leading tourist attractions in the country; x x x
x x x containing an approximate area of EIGHT MILLION EIGHTY NINE
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETY (8,089,990) SQUARE METERS,
more or less.
The portion that remains after the segregation which are occupied shall be
released to bona fide occupants pursuant to existing laws/policies regarding
the disposition of lands of the public domain and the unoccupied portions
shall be considered as alienable or disposable lands. (Emphasis supplied)
The proclamations established that as early as 1904 a certain parcel of land
was placed under the exclusive use of the government for military purposes
by the then colonial American government. In 1904, the U.S. War Department
segregated the area, including the Lot, for military purposes through General
Order No. 56. Subsequently, after the Philippines regained its independence
in 1946, the American government transferred all control and sovereignty to
the Philippine government, including all the lands appropriated for a public
purpose. Twenty years later, two other presidential proclamations followed,
both issued by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, restating that the same
property is a naval reservation for the use of the Republic.
There is no question that the Lot is situated within a military reservation. The
only issue to be resolved is whether the respondents are entitled to have the
Lot registered under the Torrens systems based on the limitation clause cited
in the proclamations: (1) "subject to private rights, if any there be" in
Proclamation No. 307, and (2) "the portion that remains after the segregation
which are occupied shall be released to bona fide occupants pursuant to
existing laws/policies regarding the disposition of lands of the public domain
and the unoccupied portions shall be considered as alienable or disposable
lands" in Proclamation No. 1582-A. This proviso means that persons claiming
rights over the reserved land are not precluded from proving their claims. In
effect, the State gives respect and recognizes the rights of private persons who
may have acquired any vested interest to the Lot before the issuance of the
General Order or proclamations.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141), also known as the Public Land Act,
remains to this day the existing general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain, other than timber and mineral
lands.28 Under the Regalian doctrine embodied in our Constitution, land that
has not been acquired from the government, either by purchase, grant or any
other mode recognized by law, belongs to the State as part of the public
domain.29 No public land can be acquired by private persons through any
other means, and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public
28
land should show that his title was acquired through purchase or grant from
the State, or through any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.30
Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073 (PD
1073),31 provides:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.32
Similarly, Section 14 of PD 1529 or the Property Registration Decree,
governing original registration through registration proceedings, provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxx
To put it simply, Section 14(1) of PD 1529 states that there are three requisites
for the filing of an application for registration of title: (1) that the property in
question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the
applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and
(3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June
1945 or earlier.
To prove that the Lot is alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
respondents presented in evidence a letter33 dated 22 April 1991 of Conlu, a
Land Management Inspector of the DENR-Region IV. The relevant portion
of the letter states:
In examination [of] the above-noted subject, please be [informed] that I have
examined the land x x x and the following findings [were] ascertained;
That the land covers a portion of 3 (three) barangays, namely: Calumpang,
Cabangat and Zapang, all within the municipality of Ternate, Cavite;
That the land is within alienable and disposable zone under Project No. 22-
B, L.C. Map No. 3091;
That the land was declared for taxation purposes since 1945, the latest of
which is Tax Declaration No. 1543 with a market value of P1,250,000.00 in
favor of Juan Fabio x x x (Emphasis supplied)
This letter-certification is insufficient. Conlu is merely a land investigator of
the DENR. It is not enough that he alone should certify that the Lot is within
the alienable and disposable zone. Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act,
the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public domain
belongs to the President.34 The President, through a presidential proclamation
or executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to be included or excluded
from the public domain. The DENR Secretary is the only other public official
empowered by law to approve a land classification and declare such land as
alienable and disposable.35
From the records, this letter was the only evidence presented by respondents
to prove that the Lot is alienable and disposable. In fact, not even the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) certified
as correct the investigation report of the Land Management Inspector. The
most that the CENRO officer did was to indorse the report to the Regional
Technical Director of the DENR.36 In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37
we ruled that it is not enough for the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
29
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must
present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and
disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the
President. Such copy of the DENR Secretarys declaration or the Presidents
proclamation must be certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of such
official record. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.
Respondents have failed to present any of these documents. No document was
presented to show that the DENR Secretary or the President has classified the
Lot as alienable and disposable. No CENRO or PENRO certification was
presented that the Lot, per verification through survey, falls within the
alienable and disposable zone. The 22 April 1991 letter of Land Management
Inspector Conlu is not proof that the DENR Secretary or the President has
classified the Lot as alienable and disposable, or that the Lot falls within the
alienable and disposable zone. The mere issuance of the letter does not prove
the facts stated in such letter.38
Further, the burden is on respondents to prove that the Lot ceased to have the
status of a military reservation or other inalienable land of the public domain.
No proof was ever submitted by respondents that the Calumpang Point Naval
Reservation, or the Lot, ceased as a military reservation. Even if its ownership
and control had been transferred by the Americans to the Philippine
government, the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation remained as an official
military reservation. Thus, being a military reservation at the time, the
Calumpang Point Naval Reservation, to which the Lot is a part of, can not be
subject to occupation, entry or settlement.39 This is clear from Sections 83 and
88 of CA 141, which provide:
SECTION 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, the President may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of
land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Commonwealth
of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in
accordance with regulations prescribed for this purpose, or for quasi-public
uses or purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations
for highways, rights of way for railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation
systems, communal pastures or leguas comunales, public parks, public
quarries, public fishponds, working-mens village and other improvements
for the public benefit.
SECTION 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of
section eighty-three shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to
occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared
alienable under the provision of this Act or by proclamation of the
President. (Emphasis supplied)
DISMISS respondents application for registration and issuance of title to Lot
No. 233, Cad-617-D, Ternate Cadastre in LRC Case No. NC-96-782 filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15.
SO ORDERED.

Well-entrenched is the rule that unless a land is reclassified and declared

alienable and disposable, occupation in the concept of an owner, no matter
how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.40
Consequently, respondents could not have occupied the Lot in the concept of
an owner in 1947 and subsequent years when respondents declared the Lot
for taxation purposes, or even earlier when respondents predecessors-in-
interest possessed the Lot, because the Lot was considered inalienable from
the time of its declaration as a military reservation in 1904. Therefore,
respondents failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Lot is
alienable and disposable.

Public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable
land remain part of the inalienable public domain.41 In view of the lack of
sufficient evidence showing that the Lot was already classified as alienable
and disposable, the Lot applied for by respondents is inalienable land of the
public domain, not subject to registration under Section 14(1) of PD 1529 and
Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended by PD 1073. Hence, there is no need to
discuss the other requisites dealing with respondents occupation and
possession of the Lot in the concept of an owner.

While it is an acknowledged policy of the State to promote the distribution of

alienable public lands to spur economic growth and in line with the ideal of
social justice, the law imposes stringent safeguards upon the grant of such
resources lest they fall into the wrong hands to the prejudice of the national
patrimony.42 We must not, therefore, relax the stringent safeguards relative to
the registration of imperfect titles.43

In Republic v. Estonilo,44 we ruled that persons claiming the protection of

"private rights" in order to exclude their lands from military reservations must
show by clear and convincing evidence that the properties in question have
been acquired by a legal method of acquiring public lands. Here, respondents
failed to do so, and are thus not entitled to have the Lot registered in their
names. Clearly, both the trial and appellate courts gravely erred in granting
respondents application for registration of title.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 29 August

2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66522. We
30
 Republic of the Philippines On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance
SUPREME COURT expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were
Manila issued: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277,6 issued in the name of the
Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square
FIRST DIVISION meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1278,7 issued in the name of
the private respondents, covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square
G.R. No. 155450 August 6, 2008 meters.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the Regional On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with
Executive Director, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Regional Office No. 2 of the Department of Environment and Natural
Regional Office No. 2, petitioners, Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the
vs. DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG AND 381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate
VICTORIA TURINGAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF a portion of the subject property which was allegedly still classified as timber
CAGAYAN, and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN, land at the time of the issuance of Decree No. 381928.
respondents.
The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team
DECISION to conduct ground verification and ocular inspection of the subject property.

CARPIO, J.: The investigating team reported that:

The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the 21 May 20012 and 25 September 20023
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The
21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner) amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree,
cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. The 25 September 2002
Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for
spouses Carag, and covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan,
was found to be still within the timberland area at the time of the issuance of
the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan,
and the same was only released as alienable and disposable on February 22,
1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the NAMRIA on 27 May 1994.
B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have possessed
and occupied by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest the portion
of Lot 2472 Cad-151, covered by LC Project 3-L of LC Map 2999, since time
immemorial.8

On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court)
issued Decree No. 3819284 in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria
Turingan (spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of private respondents
Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), covering
a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of
7,047,673 square meters (subject property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan
issued Original Certificate of Title No. 115855 (OCT No. 11585) in the name
of spouses Carag.
31
Thus, the investigating team claimed that "a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151"
was "only released as alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982."
In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land
Management Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for
the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed
with the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the recommendation.
On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, that around 2,640,000 square meters of timberland area within Lot 2472 Cad.
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of 151, had been erroneously included in the title of the Spouses Antonio Carag
judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles9 on the ground that and Victoria Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 issued
in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject on June 2, 1930 and July 19, 1938, respectively; that hence, such adjudication
property, which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed and/or Decree and Title covering a timberland area is null and void ab initio
portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still classified as timber land at under the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
the time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was not alienable
and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the disputed portion was Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as
classified as alienable and disposable. those in the Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out
in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land
On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss.10 Private Act.14 (Citations omitted)
respondents alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court because the real ground for the complaint was mistake, not lack of Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002
jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party in the original proceedings, could Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.
have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies but failed to do so. Private respondents added Hence, this petition.
that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a certified true copy of the
decision sought to be annulled. Private respondents also maintained that the The Issues
complaint was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case and
by Section 38 of Act No. 496.11 Private respondents also stated that not all the Petitioner raises the following issues:
heirs of spouses Carag were brought before the Court of Appeals for an
effective resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents claimed that the
1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary
real party in interest was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate
an ax to grind against private respondents.12
remedies are no longer available;
On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion,
2. Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lack of
annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles.13
jurisdiction;
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the
amended complaint and in the motion to dismiss;
On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals
4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to
declared:
adjudicate a tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag
and Victoria Turingan;
The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in civil
actions which this court may annul are those which the "ordinary remedies of
5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
proceedings changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the then
longer available." The Amended Complaint contains no such allegations
Court of First Instance over the land;
which are jurisdictional neither can such circumstances be divined from its
allegations. Furthermore, such actions for Annulment may be based only on
two (2) grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither ground is 6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and
alleged in the Amended Complaint which is for Reversion/Annulment of
Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of Nullity of Titles. It merely alleges 7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case.
32
The Ruling of the Court
While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural
grounds, we will still deny the petition because the complaint for annulment
of decree has no merit.
Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the
grounds of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for
annulment of decree.15
We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated:
11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of
the Government had the authority and power to declassify or reclassify land
of the public domain, the Court did not, therefore, have the power and
authority to adjudicate in favor of the spouses Antonio Carag and
Victoria Turingan the said tract of timberland, portion of the Lot 2472
Cad-151, at the time of the issuance of the Decree and the Original
Certificate of Title of the said spouses; and such adjudication and/or Decree
and Title issued covering the timberland area is null and void ab initio
considering the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine constitution.
xxxx
15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the name of
spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles
thereto in the name of the Heirs and said spouses, specifically with respect to
the inclusion thereto of timberland area, by the then Court of First Instance
(now the Regional Trial Court), and the Register of Deeds of Cagayan is
patently illegal and erroneous for the reason that said Court and/or the
Register of Deeds of Cagayan did not have any authority or jurisdiction
to decree or adjudicate the said timberland area of Lot 2472 Cad-151,
consequently, the same are null and void ab initio, and of no force and effect
whatsoever.16 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was
seeking to annul Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the trial courts lack of
jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically over the disputed portion,
which petitioner maintained was classified as timber land and was not
alienable and disposable.
33
Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of
petitioners failure to allege that the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available."
In Ancheta v. Ancheta,17 we ruled:
In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the RTC
filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of
the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary
remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal
therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so
because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without
jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally
or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action
or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.18
Since petitioners complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the
subject of the action, petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of petitioner.
Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioners
complaint were factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial
court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.19
Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed.
Should a trial be necessary, the reception of evidence may be referred to a
member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the
complaint for the complete and proper determination of the case.
However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings, we shall decide the case on the merits.
Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit
Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to
spouses Carag the disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims
that the disputed portion was still classified as timber land, and thus not
alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In
effect, petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the
subject property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and
disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the
Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had the power to
declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain.
Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject
matter of the claim.20 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law
and is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action.21
Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa
v. Insular Government,22 we ruled:
From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with
the exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all
lands owned by the State or by the sovereign nation are public in
character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not destined to the
use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with
law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical person x x x23 (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by
the State for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands
were deemed alienable.
In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been
declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in
accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land
classification maps24 petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show
that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for
some public purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and
Resources Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no statement
that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land.25
The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No.
2874,26 which provides:
34
SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time
classify the lands of the public domain into -
(a) Alienable or disposable
(b) Timber and
(c) Mineral lands
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class
to another, for the purposes of their government and disposition.
Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed
portion of the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6
of Act No. 2874.
It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands
which have been declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides:
SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when
practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-
public uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become
private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and
recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which,
having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the
Governor-General may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the
public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries
established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their
concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the
Legislature. (Emphasis supplied)
However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as
well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not
covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of
disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish
regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or
mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance
with law.
Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in
Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private
parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become
private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner
alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be
claimed under any existing law at that time.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,27 the Republic sought to
annul the judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a
land registration court, because when the application for land registration was
filed in 1927 the land was alleged to be unclassified forest land. The Republic
also alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine whether the
land applied for was forest or agricultural land since the authority to classify
lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided in Act Nos. 92628
and 2874. The Court ruled:
We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the
authority of the Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable
would apply to lands that have become private property or lands that have
been impressed with a private right authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or
any valid law. By express declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is
quoted above, those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since July 26,
1894 may file an application with the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and these applicants
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. When the
land registration court issued a decision for the issuance of a decree
which was the basis of an original certificate of title to the land, the court
had already made a determination that the land was agricultural and
that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive
possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was
the land registration court which had the jurisdiction to determine
whether the land applied for was agricultural, forest or timber taking
into account the proof or evidence in each particular case. (Emphasis
supplied)
As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of
Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine
whether the subject property, including the disputed portion, applied for was
agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court determined that the land
was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the
35
decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the
original proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did not appeal the
decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the
trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision
rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond review.
The finality of the trial courts decision is further recognized in Section 1,
Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides:
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and
mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, it recognized that these
lands were "subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the
time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution."29 When the Commonwealth Government was established
under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already an existing right to
the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No.
381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic
of the Philippines complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation
and declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983.]
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR OF
FORESTRY, Respondent.
[G.R. No. L-30035. November 29, 1983.]
ROQUE BORRE and ENCARNACION DELFIN, Petitioners, v.
ANGEL ALPASAN, HEIRS OF MELQUIADES BORRE, EMETERIO
BEREBER and HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI and THE CAPIZ
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND;
CLASSIFICATION NOT LOST EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN STRIPPED OF
FOREST COVER; UNLESS RELEASED IN AN OFFICIAL
PROCLAMATION AS DISPOSABLE LANDS, RULES ON
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE DO NOT APPLY. A
forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of
its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other
tress growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land.
The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not
have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until
the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
2. ID.; ID.; FOREST LANDS; ACQUISITIVE OWNERSHIP NOT
ACQUIRED. This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry
v. Muoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how
long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56
SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that the ares covered by
the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part of the
forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears
36
emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land
which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes.
3. ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION, OF IMPERFECT TITLE CASES;
BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW
HAVE BEEN MET, RESTS ON THE APPLICANT. In confirmation of
imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he
meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the presumption
that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an
interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an
imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has
had continuous, open, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of
his application.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The two petitions for review on certiorari before us question the decision of
the Court of Appeals which declared the disputed property as forest land,
not subject to titling in favor of private persons.
These two petitions have their genesis in an application for confirmation of
imperfect title and its registration filed with the Court of First Instance of
Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of
the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square
meters.cralawnad
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed
the application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui,
petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the application of
Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to
a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters
be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed
an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land
was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of
the public domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a
portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was concerned and
prayed that title to said portion be confirmed and registered in his name.
During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold
whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan.
The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said
lot registered in his name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square
meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747
square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel
Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.
Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their
respective appeals with the Court of Appeals, The case was docketed as CA-
G.R. No. 34190-R.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private litigants that
have been shown to have a better right over Lot 885 are, as to the
northeastern portion of a little less than 117,956 square meters, it was
Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest of 527,747 square meters, it was the
heirs of Jose Amunategui; but the last question that must have to be
considered is whether after all, the title that these two (2) private litigants
have shown did not amount to a registerable one in view of the opposition
and evidence of the Director of Forestry; . . .
". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the application
was filed which would place it at 1925, the fact must have to be accepted
that during that period, the land was a classified forest land so much so that
timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensee before 1926 and after
that; that even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license
to cut timber within the area; and this can only mean that the Bureau of
Forestry had stood and maintained its ground that it was a forest land as
indeed the testimonial evidence referred to above persuasively indicates, and
the only time when the property was converted into a fishpond was
sometime after 1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing of the
37
application; but only after there had been a previous warning by the District
Forester that that could not be done because it was classified as a public
forest; so that having these in mind and remembering that even under
Republic Act 1942 which came into effect in 1957, two (2) years after this
case had already been filed in the lower Court, in order for applicant to be
able to demonstrate a registerable title he must have shown.
"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years, preceding the filing of
the application;
the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of the
applicants or oppositors had shown that during the required period of thirty
(30) years prescribed by Republic Act 1942 in order for him to have shown
a registerable title for the entire period of thirty (30) years before filing of
the application, he had been in
"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain,
it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all
throughout that period of thirty (30) years and even before and applicants
and their predecessors had made implicit recognition of that; the result must
be to deny all these applications; this Court stating that it had felt impelled
notwithstanding, just the same to resolve the conflicting positions of the
private litigants among themselves as to who of them had demonstrated a
better right to possess because this Court foresees that this litigation will go
all the way to the Supreme Court and it is always better that the findings be
as complete as possible to enable the Highest Court to pass final judgment;
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is hereby
reversed; the application as well as all the oppositions with the exception of
that of the Director of Forestry which is hereby sustained are dismissed; no
more pronouncement as to costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had been in the possession of
private persons for over thirty years and therefore in accordance with
Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still be the subject of registration and
confirmation of title in the name of a private person in accordance with Act
No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act. On the other hand, another
petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion
Delfin, contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Borre
complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885
executed by them in favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was
dismissed on the basis of the Court of Appeals decision that the disputed lot
is part of the public domain. The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals in passing upon the relative rights of the parties over
the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of
the public domain classified as forest land.chanrobles law library : red
The need for resolving the questions raised by Roque Borre and
Encarnacion Delfin in their petition depends on the issue raised by the Heirs
of Jose Amunategui, that is, whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land,
not capable of registration in the names of the private applicants.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be
classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a "mangrove
swamp." Although conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the
classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in
Section 1821 of said Code as first, second and third groups are found on the
land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a
mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings because
the property had been in actual possession of private persons for many
years, and therefore, said land was already "private land" better adapted and
more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by
the public interests to be kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of
its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other
trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land.
The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not
have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until
the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
38
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23
SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499),
we granted the petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and
title was not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any
patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a
positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified
as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes.
The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-grounded in the
instant petition.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised
Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of
its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain.
The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin
forest as stated by Emeterio Berebers witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that
as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly forested area as testified by
Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened
by the appellate courts finding that timber licenses had to be issued to
certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask
for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that
the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning
from the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was
classified as "public forest." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden
of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the
presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but
that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name
because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants
or that he has had continuous, open, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the
filing of his application.
The decision of the appellate court is not based merely on the presumptions
implicit in Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended. The records show that
Lot No. 88S never ceased to be classified as forest land of the public
domain.
In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands that were
not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to
the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should
have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in-
interests since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it
had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest."cralaw
virtua1aw library

In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho case does not apply. The
evidence is clear that Lot No. 885 had always been public land classified as
forest.

Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we

ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The possession of public land however long the period thereof may
have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the
statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the
State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same
under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a
grant from the State. (Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177,
195)."cralaw virtua1aw library

We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property Lot No. 885 is
part of the public domain, classified as public forest land. There is no need
for us to pass upon the other issues raised by petitioners Roque Borre and
Encarnacion Delfin, as such issues are rendered moot by this
finding.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No. L-30035 and G. R. No. L-27873

are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

39
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997
SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO and TRINIDAD PASCUAL, and
CARMEN PALOMO VDA. DE BUENAVENTURA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, FAUSTINO J. PERFECTO, RAFFY SANTILLAN,
BOY ARIADO, LORENZO BROCALES, SALVADOR DOE, and other
DOES, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
The issue in the case at bar pertains to ownership of 15 parcels of land in Tiwi,
Albay which form part of the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park." The facts of
the case are as follows.
On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the Philippine Islands, William
Cameron Forbes issued Executive Order No. 40 which reserved for provincial
park purposes some 440,530 square meters of land situated in Barrio Naga,
Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay pursuant to the provisions of Act 648
of the Philippine Commission. 1
Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District,
United States of America, ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land
covered by Executive Order No. 40 in the name of Diego Palomo on
December 9, 1916; 2 December 28, 3 and January 17, 1917. 4 Diego Palomo
donated these parcels of land consisting of 74,872 square meters which were
allegedly covered by Original Certificates of Title Nos. 513, 169, 176 and 173
5 to his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months
before his death in April 1937. 6
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Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the
Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with
the Court of First Instance of Albay on May 30, 1950. 7 The Register of Deeds
of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914
sometime in October 1953. 8
On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47
converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot
Spring National Park," under the control, management, protection and
administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a
division of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released
as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is
neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law
(CA 141) nor registrable under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).
The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real
estate taxes thereon 9 and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas,
pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen vda. de
Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged
the parcels of land covered by TCT 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 to guarantee
a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
In May 7, 1974 petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio
Palomo and Trinidad Pascual filed Civil Case No. T-143 before the then Court
of First Instance of Albay for Injunction with damages against private
respondents Faustino J. Perfecto, Raffy Santillan, Boy Ariado, Lorenzo
Brocales, Salvador Doe and other Does who are all employees of the Bureau
of Forest Development who entered the land covered by TCT No. 3913 and/or
TCT 3914 and cut down bamboos thereat, totally leveling no less than 4
groves worth not less than P2,000.00.
On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. T-
176 for annulment and cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15
parcels of land registered in the name of the petitioners and subject of Civil
Case T-143. Impleaded with the petitioners as defendants were the Bank of
the Philippine Islands, Legazpi Branch and the Register of Deeds of Albay.
The case against the Bank of Philippine Islands was dismissed because the
loan of P200,000 with the Bank was already paid and the mortgage in its favor
cancelled.
A joint trial of Civil Case T-143 and T-176 was conducted upon agreement
of the parties and on July 31, 1986, the trial court rendered the following
decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
IN CIVIL CASE No. T-143, in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiffs, dismissing the complaint for injunction and damages, as it is hereby
DISMISSED.
Costs against the plaintiffs.
In CIVIL CASE No. T-176, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants:
(1) Declaring null and void and no force and effect the Order dated September
14, 1953, as well as the Original Certificate of Titles Nos. 153, 10 169, 173
and 176 and Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 3911, T-3912, T-3913, and
T-3914, all of the Register of Deeds of Albay and all transactions based on
said titles.
(2) Forfeiting in favor of the plaintiff Government any and all improvements
on the lands in question that are found therein and introduced by the
defendants;
(3) Declaring Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 8, 9,10, 11 and 12, Plan II-9299 and
Lots 1, 21, 11 3 and 4 of Plan II-9205 as part of the Tiwi Hot Spring National
Park;
(4) and Finally, the Register of Deeds of Albay is hereby ordered to cancel
the alleged Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 513, 169, 173 and 176,
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-3911, T-3912, T-3913 and T-3914.
Costs against the defendants.
So Ordered. 12
The court a quo in ruling for the Republic found no sufficient proof that the
Palomos have established property rights over the parcels of land in question
before the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War at the end
of the century. The court further stated that assuming that the decrees of the
Court of First Instance of Albay were really issued, the Palomos obtained no
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right at all over the properties because these were issued only when Executive
Order No. 40 was already in force. At this point, we take note that although
the Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands appointed as one of the
Commissioners in the relocation survey of the properties stated in his
reamended report that of the 3,384 square meters covered by Lot 2, Plan II-
9205, only 1,976 square meters fall within the reservation area,13 the RTC
ordered TCT 3913 covering the entire Lot 21 (sic) Plan II-9205 cancelled.
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the
findings of the lower Court; hence this petition raising the following issues:
1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
affirming in toto the decision of the lower court.
2. The declaration of nullity of the original certificates of title and subsequent
transfer certificates of titles of the petitioners over the properties in question
is contrary to law and jurisprudence on the matter.
3. The forfeiture of all improvements introduced by the petitioners in the
premises in favor of the government is against our existing law and
jurisprudence.
The issues raised essentially boil down to whether or not the alleged original
certificate of titles issued pursuant to the order of the Court of First Instance
in 1916-1917 and the subsequent TCTs issued in 1953 pursuant to the petition
for reconstitution are valid.
Petitioners contend that the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-
American War at the end of the 19th century recognized the property rights
of Spanish and Filipino citizens and the American government had no
inherent power to confiscate properties of private citizens and declare them
part of any kind of government reservation. They allege that their
predecessors in interest have been in open, adverse and continuous possession
of the subject lands for 20-50 years prior to their registration in 1916-1917.
Hence, the reservation of the lands for provincial purposes in 1913 by then
Governor-general Forbes was tantamount to deprivation of private property
without due process of law.
In support of their claim, the petitioners presented copies of a number of
decisions of the Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the
United States of America which state that the predecessors in interest of the
petitioners' father Diego Palomo, were in continuous, open and adverse
possession of the lands from 20 to 50 years at the time of their registration in
1916.
We are not convinced.
The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by discovery and conquest in
the 16th century. Before the Treaty of Paris in April 11, 1899, our lands,
whether agricultural, mineral or forest were under the exclusive patrimony
and dominion of the Spanish Crown. Hence, private ownership of land could
only be acquired through royal concessions which were documented in
various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant," (2) Concesion
Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by Purchase and (4)
Informacion Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained under the
Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.
Unfortunately, no proof was presented that the petitioners' predecessors in
interest derived title from an old Spanish grant. Petitioners placed much
reliance upon the declarations in Expediente No. 5, G.L.R.O. Record Decision
No. 9820, dated January 17, 1917; Expediente No. 6, G.L.R.O. Record No.
9821, dated December 28, 1916; Expediente No. 7, G.L.R.O. Record No.
9822, dated December 9, 1916; Expediente No. 8, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9823,
dated December 28, 1916 and Expediente No. 10, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9868,
dated December 9, 1916 of the Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial
District of the United States of America presided by Judge Isidro Paredes that
their predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and continuous possession
of the subject lands for 20-50 years. 14 The aforesaid "decisions" of the Court
of First Instance, however, were not signed by the judge but were merely
certified copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the
clerk of court.
Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their predecessors in interest
were in open, adverse and continuous possession of the lands for 20 to 50
years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, the lands were surveyed only in
December 1913, the very same year they were acquired by Diego Palomo.
Curiously , in February 1913 or 10 months before the lands were surveyed for
Diego Palomo, the government had already surveyed the area in preparation
for its reservation for provincial park purposes. If the petitioners' predecessors
in interest were indeed in possession of the lands for a number of years prior
to their registration in 1916-1917, they would have undoubtedly known about
the inclusion of these properties in the reservation in 1913. It certainly is a
trifle late at this point to argue that the government had no right to include
these properties in the reservation when the question should have been raised
83 years ago.
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As regards the petitioners' contention that inasmuch as they obtained the titles
without government opposition, the government is now estopped from
questioning the validity of the certificates of title which were granted. As
correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, the principle of
estoppel, does not operate against the Government for the act of its agents. 15
Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance were really issued,
the lands are still not capable of appropriation. The adverse possession which
may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases
applies only to alienable lands of the public domain.
There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands
of the public domain. As testified by the District Forester, records in the
Bureau of Forestry show that the subject lands were never declared as
alienable and disposable and subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up to
the present. 16 Moreover, as part of the reservation for provincial park
purposes, they form part of the forest zone.
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot
be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no
matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, 17 unless such
lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove ownership
of the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax
declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases.
18
Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now come to the matter
regarding the forfeiture of improvements introduced on the subject lands. It
bears emphasis that Executive Order No. 40 was already in force at the time
the lands in question were surveyed for Diego Palomo. Petitioners also
apparently knew that the subject lands were covered under the reservation
when they filed a petition for reconstitution of the lost original certificates of
title inasmuch as the blueprint of Survey Work Order Number 21781 of Plan
II-9299 approved by the Chief of the Land Registration Office Enrique
Altavas in 1953 as a true and correct copy of the Original Plan No. II-9299
filed in the Bureau of Lands dated September 11, 1948 19 contains the
following note, "in conflict with provincial reservation." 20 In any case,
petitioners are presumed to know the law and the failure of the government to
oppose the registration of the lands in question is no justification for the
petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.
Finally, since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square meters covered by TCT
3913 fall within the reservation, TCT 3913 should be annulled only with
respect to the aforesaid area. Inasmuch as the bamboo groves leveled in TCT
3913 and subject of Civil Case T-143, 21 were within the perimeter of the
national park, 22 no pronouncement as to damages is in order.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED

with the modification that TCT 3913 be annulled with respect to the 1,976
square meter area falling within the reservation zone.

SO ORDERED.

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