Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
REGALADO, J.:
The present petition for certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in, NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-07-02500-87, dated January 16,
1986, 1 which dismissed the appeal of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) from the
decision of the labor arbiter ordering it to pay the unpaid wages, 13th month pay, incentive pay
and separation pay of herein private respondents.
Philippine Smelters Corporation (PSC), a corporation registered under Philippine law, obtained a
loan in 1983 from the Development Bank of the Philippines, a government-owned financial
institution created and operated in accordance with Executive Order No. 81, to finance its iron
smelting and steel manufacturing business. To secure said loan, PSC mortgaged to DBP real
properties with all the buildings and improvements thereon and chattels, with its President, Jose
T. Marcelo, Jr., as co-obligor.
By virtue of the said loan agreement, DBP became the majority stockholder of PSC, with
stockholdings in the amount of P31,000,000.00 of the total P60,226,000.00 subscribed and paid up
capital stock. Subsequently, it took over the management of PSC.
When PSC failed to pay its obligation with DBP, which amounted to P75,752,445.83 as of March 31,
1986, DBP foreclosed and acquired the mortgaged real estate and chattels of PSC in the auction
sales held on February 25, 1987 and March 4, 1987.
On February 10, 1987, forty (40) petitioners filed a Petition for Involuntary Insolvency in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 61 at Makati, Metropolitan Manila, docketed therein as Special
Proceeding No. M-1359, 2against PSC and DBP, impleading as co-respondents therein Olecram Mining
Corporation, Jose Panganiban Ice Plant and Cold Storage, Inc. and PISO Bank, with said petitioners
representing themselves as unpaid employees of said private respondents, except PISO Bank.
On February 13, 1987, herein private respondents filed a complaint with the Department of Labor against
PSC for nonpayment of salaries, 13th month pay, incentive leave pay and separation pay. On February
20, 1987, the complaint was amended to include DBP as party respondent. The case was thereafter
indorsed to the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). DBP filed its
position paper on September 7, 1987, invoking the absence of employer-employee relationship between
private respondents and DBP and submitting that when DBP foreclosed the assets of PSC, it did so as a
foreclosing creditor.
On January 30, 1988, the labor arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which directed that
"DBP as foreclosing creditor is hereby ordered to pay all the unpaid wages and benefits of the workers
which remain unpaid due to PSC's foreclosure." 3
On appeal by DBP, the NLRC sustained the ruling of the labor arbiter, holding DBP liable for unpaid
wages of private respondents "not as a majority stockholder of respondent PSC, but as the foreclosing
creditor who possesses the assets of said PSC by virtue of the auction sale it held in 1987." In addition,
the NLRC held that the labor arbiter is correct in assuming jurisdiction because "the worker's preference
to the amount secured by DBP by virtue of said foreclosure sales of PSC properties arose out of or are
connected or interwoven with the labor dispute brought forth by appellees against PSC and
DBP. 4 Hence, the present petition by DBP.
DBP contends that the labor arbiter and the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion (1) in assuming
jurisdiction over DBP; (2) in applying the provisions of Article 110 of the Labor Code, as amended; and (3)
in not enforcing and applying Section 14 of Executive Order No. 81.
It is to be noted that in their comment, private respondents tried to prove the existence of employer-
employee relationship based on the fact that DBP is the majority stockholder of PSC and that the majority
of the members of the board of directors of PSC are from DBP. 5 We do not believe that these
circumstances are sufficient indicia of the existence of an employer-employee relationship as would
confer jurisdiction over the case on the labor arbiter, especially in the light of the express declaration of
said labor arbiter and the NLRC that DBP is being held liable as a foreclosing creditor. At any rate, this
jurisdictional defect was cured when DBP appealed the labor arbiter's decision to the NLRC and thereby
submitted to its jurisdiction.
The pivotal issue for resolution is whether DBP, as foreclosing creditor, could be held liable for the unpaid
wages, 13th month pay, incentive leave pay and separation pay of the employees of PSC.
During the dates material to the foregoing proceedings, Article 110 of the Labor Code read:
In conjunction therewith, Section 10, Rule VIII, Book III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Labor Code provided:
Interpreting the above provisions, this Court, in Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Hon. Labor
Arbiter Ariel C. Santos, et al., 6 explicated as follows:
It is quite clear from the provisions that a declaration of bankruptcy or a judicial liquidation
must be present before the worker's preference may be enforced. ... .
Moreover, the reason behind the necessity for a judicial proceeding or a proceeding in rem
before the concurrence and preference of credits may be applied was explained by this
Court in the case of Philippine Savings Bank v. Lantin (124 SCRA 476 [1983]). We said:
The proceedings in the court below do not partake of the nature of the
insolvency proceedings or settlement of a decedent's estate. The action filed
by Ramos was only to collect the unpaid cost of the construction of the duplex
apartment. It is far from being a general liquidation of the estate of the
Tabligan spouses.
In the case at bar, although the lower court found that 'there were no known
creditors other than the plaintiff and the defendant herein,' this can not be
conclusive. It will not bar other creditors in the event they show up and present
their claim against the petitioner bank, claiming that they also have preferred
liens against the property involved. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 101864 issued in favor of the bank which is supposed to be indefeasible
would remain constantly unstable and questionable. Such could not have been
the intention of Article 2243 of the Civil Code although it considers claims and
credits under Article 2242 as statutory fines. Neither does the De Barreto case
...
The claims of all creditors whether preferred or non- preferred, the Identification of the
preferred ones and the totality of the employer's asset should be brought into the picture.
There can then be an authoritative, fair, and binding adjudication instead of the piece meal
settlement which would result from the questioned decision in this case.
Republic Act No. 6715, which took effect on March 21, 1989, amended Article 110 of the Labor Code to
read as follows:
As a consequence, Section 1 0, Rule VIII, Book III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Labor Code was likewise amended, to wit:
Sec. 10. Payment of wages and other monetary claims in case of bankruptcy. In case of
bankruptcy or liquidation of the employer's business, the unpaid wages and other monetary
claims of the employees shall be given first preference and shall be paid in full before the
claims of government and other creditors may be paid.
Despite said amendments, however, the same interpretation of Article 110 as applied in the aforesaid
case of Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Hon. Labor Arbiter Ariel C. Santos, et al., supra, was
adopted by this Court in the recent case of Development Bank of the Philippines vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, et. al., 7 For facility of reference, especially the rationalization for the conclusions
reached therein, we reproduce the salient portions of the decision in this later case.
Notably, the terms "declaration" of bankruptcy or "judicial" liquidation have been eliminated.
Does this means then that liquidation proceedings have been done away with?
Article 110 of the Labor Code, in determining the reach of its terms, cannot be
viewed in isolation. Rather, Article 110 must be read in relation to the
provisions of the Civil Code concerning the classification, concurrence and
preference of credits which provisions find particular application in insolvency
proceedings where the claims of all creditors, preferred or non-preferred, may
be adjudicated in a binding manner ... (Republic vs. Peralta (G.R. No. L-
56568, May 20, 1987, 150 SCRA 37).
2. In the same way that the Civil Code provisions on classification of credits and the
Insolvency Law have been brought into harmony, so also must the kindred provisions of the
Labor Law be made to harmonize with those laws.
5. The DBP anchors its claim on a mortgage credit. A mortgage directly and immediately
subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the
fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted (Article 2176, Civil Code). It
creates a real right which is enforceable against the whole world. It is a lien on an Identified
immovable property, which a preference is not. A recorded mortgage credit is a special
preferred credit under Article 2242 (5) of the Civil Code on classification of credits. The
preference given by Article 110, when not falling within Article 2241 (6) and Article 2242 (3)
of the Civil Code and not attached to any specific property, is an ordinary preferred credit
although its impact is to move it from second priority to first priority in the order of preference
established by Article 2244 of the Civil Code (Republic vs. Peralta, supra).
In fact, under the Insolvency Law (Section 29) a creditor holding a mortgage or hen of any
kind as security is not permitted to vote in the election of the assignee in insolvency
proceedings unless the value of his security is first fixed or he surrenders all such property
to the receiver of the insolvent's estate.
6. Even if Article 110 and its Implementing Rule, as amended, should be interpreted to
mean 'absolute preference,' the same should be given only prospective effect in line with the
cardinal rule that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided
(Article 4, Civil Code). Thereby, any infringement on the constitutional guarantee on non-
impairment of obligation of contracts (Section 10, Article III, 1987 Constitution) is also
avoided. In point of fact, DBP's mortgage credit antedated by several years the amendatory
law, RA No. 6715. To give Article 110 retroactive effect would be to wipe out the mortgage
in DBPs favor and expose it to a risk which it sought to protect itself against by requiring a
collateral in the form of real property.
In fine, the right to preference given to workers under Article 110 of the Labor Code cannot
exist in any effective way prior to the time of its presentation in distribution proceedings. It
will find application when, in proceedings such as insolvency, such unpaid wages shall be
paid in full before the 'claims of the Government and other creditors' may be paid. But, for an
orderly settlement of a debtor's assets, all creditors must be convened, their claims
ascertained and inventoried, and thereafter the preference determined in the course of
judicial proceedings which have for their object the subjection of the property of the debtor to
the payment of his debts or other lawful obligations. Thereby, an orderly determination of
preference of creditors' claims is assured (Philippine Savings Bank vs. Lantin, No. L-33929,
September 2, 1983, 124 SCRA 476); the adjudication made will be binding on all parties-in-
interest, since those proceedings are proceedings in rem; and the legal scheme of
classification, concurrence and preference of credits in the Civil Code, the Insolvency Law,
and the Labor Code is preserved in harmony.
On the foregoing considerations and it appearing that an involuntary insolvency proceeding has been
instituted against PSC, private respondents should properly assert their respective claims in said
proceeding. .
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of public respondent is hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
As I held in DBP v. NLRC 1 and more recently, in Bolinao v. Padolina, 2 that on account of the amendment
introduced by Republic Act No. 6715, workers now enjoy "absolute preference" in the payment of labor
claims, above and beyond taxes due from the Government, and credits belonging to private persons. As I
said therein, Republic Act No. 6715 was enacted, precisely, to work more favorable terms to labor-
because prior to the amendment, labor enjoyed no preference. I am afraid that the majority has misread
the clear intent of the legislature.
I dissent for the same reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in DBP vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. Nos. 82763-
64,19 March 1990.
Separate Opinions
As I held in DBP v. NLRC 1 and more recently, in Bolinao v. Padolina, 2 that on account of the amendment
introduced by Republic Act No. 6715, workers now enjoy "absolute preference" in the payment of labor
claims, above and beyond taxes due from the Government, and credits belonging to private persons. As I
said therein, Republic Act No. 6715 was enacted, precisely, to work more favorable terms to labor-
because prior to the amendment, labor enjoyed no preference. I am afraid that the majority has misread
the clear intent of the legislature.
I dissent for the same reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in DBP vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. Nos. 82763-
64,19 March 1990.
Footnotes
2 Rollo, 84.
4 Rollo, 66.
5 Ibid., 74-77.
SARMIENTO, J. dissenting: