ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and
JOSE FARLEY BEDEA vs. COURT OF APPEALS requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants
G.R. No. L-39999, May 31, 1984
The accused Roy Padilla and several others committed the crime of
grave coercion. That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00
o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of Jose Panganiban,
province of Camarines Norte, by confederating and mutually helping
one another, and acting without any authority of law, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force
and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their
stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of
said stall and brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the
furnitures by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away
the goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of
the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of P30,000.00
in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages and further
the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. The accused took
advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent
municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen, and
that it was committed with evident premeditation.
CFI of Camarines Norte: the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla and
companions guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave
coercion
Respondents claim: the petitioners appealed the judgment of
conviction to the Court of Appeals. They contended that the trial
court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence.
They claimed that the town mayor had the power to order the
clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants'
stall because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances
pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se.
where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that
arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the
defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, no civil liability arising
from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him.
Issue: WON the respondent court committed a reversible error in
after acquitting them from the criminal charge
Held: No! The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the
accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts
from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is
not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in
civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the
accused is not criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the
felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain
relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; and where the civil
liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of
which the accused was acquitted.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental
proposition that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with it. There is no implied institution when the offended
party, expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute
it separately.
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal
case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code (Elcano v. Hill). In other words, the
civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is
the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.
DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA
UMALI
G.R. No. 122445, [November 18, 1997]
Dr. Ninevetch Cruz, petitioner herein, and one Dr. Lina Ercillo, the
attending anesthesiologist during the surgical operation performed on
Lydia Umali, were charged with "reckless imprudence and negligence
resulting in homicide" for the death of the latter. Trial ensued after
both the petitioner and Dr. Lina Ercillo pleaded not guilty to the
charge. After trial, a decision was rendered by the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Pablo City discharging Ercillo of the
responsibility for the death of Umali. However, Cruz was found guilty
as charged and was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty.
The petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court, which affirmed in
toto the decision of the MTCC. She then filed a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals but to no avail, hence, this petition for certiorari
assailing the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals. In
substance, the issue raised before the Supreme Court is whether or
not the evidence on record supports the petitioner's conviction of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, arising from an
alleged medical malpractice.
According to the Supreme Court, a review of the records of this case
will show the absence of any expert testimony on the matter of the
standard of care employed by other physicians of good standing in the
conduct of similar operations. Expert testimony should have been
offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are
constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by
other physicians in good standing when performing the same
operation. When the qualifications of a physician are admitted, there
is an inevitable presumption that he takes the necessary precaution
and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his
clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established. The
presumption may be rebutted by expert opinion, which is lacking
herein. Petitioner, therefore, was acquitted of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, but she was held civilly liable for the
death of the victim and ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil liability, P100,000.00 as moral
damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Issue: WON the circumstances are suffiecient to sustain a judgment
of conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide
Held: NO! According to the Supreme Court, a review of the records of
this case will show the absence of any expert testimony on the matter
of the standard of care employed by other physicians of good
standing in the conduct of similar operations. Expert testimony should
have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts
below are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care
employed by other physicians in good standing when performing the
same operation. When the qualifications of a physician are admitted,
there is an inevitable presumption that he takes the necessary
precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in
attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established.
The presumption may be rebutted by expert opinion, which is lacking
herein. Petitioner, therefore, was acquitted of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, but she was held civilly liable for the
death of the victim and ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil liability, P100,000.00 as moral
damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The elements of reckless imprudence are:
(1) that the offender does or fails to do an act;
(2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary;
(3) that it be without malice;
(4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and
(5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place.
RECOVERY FOR AN INJURY; NEGLIGENCE MUST BE THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY. In Chan Lugay v. St.
Luke's Hospital, Inc., 10 CA Reports 415 [1966], where the attending
physician was absolved of liability for the death of the complainant's
wife and newborn baby, this Court held that: "In order that there may
be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the 'injury
for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of
the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury
must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes.' In other words, the negligence must be
the proximate cause of the injury. For, 'negligence, no matter in what it
consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate
cause of the injury complained of.' And 'the proximate cause of an
injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.
The petitioner is a doctor in whose hands a patient puts his life and
limb. For insufficiency of evidence this Court was not able to render a
sentence of conviction but it is not blind to the reckless and imprudent
manner in which the petitioner carried out her duties. A precious life
has been lost and the circumstances leading thereto exacerbated the
grief of those left behind. The heirs of the deceased continue to feel
the loss of their mother up to the present time 46 and this Court is
aware that no amount of compassion and commiseration nor words of
bereavement can suffice to assuage the sorrow felt for the loss of a
loved one. Certainly, the award of moral and exemplary damages in
favor of the heirs of Lydia Umali are proper in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. NINEVETCH
CRUZ is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide but is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased
Lydia Umali the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
as civil liability, ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00)
as moral damages, and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
exemplary damages.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 147703, April 14, 2004
Napoleon Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime
of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical
injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years, and to pay
damages. But in the event the the accused becomes insolvent, Phil.
Rabbit will be held liable for the civil liabilities. But admittedly, the
accused jumped bail and remained at large.
Issue: WON an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of
its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction
independently of the accused
Held: No! The Petition has no merit. Well-established in our
jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon motion
or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused
jumps bail. This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose
their standing in court when they abscond. Unless they surrender or
submit to the court's jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived
their right to seek judicial relief.
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they
voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise
arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them.
While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are
deemed to have waived the appeal. In the case before us, the
accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the
proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal.
Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and
executory. After a judgment has become final, vested rights are
acquired by the winning party. If the proper losing party has the right
to file an appeal within the prescribed period, then the former has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it
participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said
that the employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its
right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court. In fact, it can be
said that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court,
deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are
subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees
in the event of the latters insolvency. To allow employers to dispute
the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend,
nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. By
the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of
their employees without the latters consent would also result in
improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment. The
decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and
conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil
liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer
cannot be separated from that of the employee.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO LIGON y TRIAS
and FERNANDO GABAT
G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987
Accused-appellant, Fernando Gabat was convicted of the crime of
Robbery with homicide and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Gabat allegedly robbed Jose Rosales Ortiz, a 17 year old working
student, who was a cigarette vendor. According to Prudencio Castillo,
a taxi driver, who allegedly saw the incident that transpired on the
night Ortiz died. According to Castillo, he was at a distance of about 3
meters travelling on the same lane and was behind the Kombi driven
by Rogelio Ligon together with Gabat. Castillo, in his testimony, said
that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales. That while
waiting for the traffic light to change from red to green, Castillo
watched the Volkswagon Kombi and saw Gabat signal to Ortiz. While
Ortiz was handling the cigarettes to Gabat, the traffic light changed to
green andas the Kombi moved forward, Gabat grabbed the box from
Ortiz. Ortiz ran beside the Kombi and was able to hold on to the
windowsill with his right hand. However as the Kombi continued to
speed towards the C.M. Rector underpass, Gabat forcibly remove the
hand of Rosales from the said windowsill and as a result fell face
down on the ground. On the other hand, according to Gabat, after
Ortiz handed the two sticks cigarettes Gabat in turn paid him a 5 peso
bill. In order to change the said bill, Ortiz placed his box between the
arm of Gabat and the window frame. When the traffic light changed to
green, Ligon moved the vehicle forward. That in spite of Gabats
order to stop the vehicle, Ligon said that it could not be done due the
the moving vehicular traffic. When Ortiz fell down, Gabat shouted at
Ligon but the latter replied that they should go on to Las Pinas and
report the incident to the parents of Gabat and that later they would
come back to the scene of the incident. At this point, the Kombi was
blocked by Castillos taxi and the jeep driven by the policeman. The
trial court gave full credence to Castillos testimony and dismissed
Gabats testimony on the ground that it is of common knowledge that
cigarette vendors do not let go of their cigarette. Gabat was convicted
by the trial court; Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether a person who is not criminally liable is also free from
civil liability.
Held: According to the Court of Appeals, although Castillo is a
disinterested witness, his testimony even if not tainted with bias is not
entirely free from doubt because his observation of the event could
have been faulty. Castillos taxi was driving a car lower in height
compared to the Kombi. The windshield of the Kombi (1978 model) is
occupying approximately 1/3 of the rear end of the vehicle making it
visually difficult for Castillo to observe what clearly transpired. Also,
Castillos statement given to the police on the evening of the incident
did not mention that he saw Gabat forcibly prying off the hand of
Rosales from the windows though such appeared in the police report.
Given the circumstances, the Court is not convinced with moral
certainty that the guilt of Gabat was established beyond reasonable
doubt. As such he is acquitted. However, such does not necessarily
exempt him from civil liability as such only requires a preponderance
of evidence and such evidence is sufficient to establish Gabats
liability. The Court finds Gabats act and omission with fault and
negligence caused damage to Ortiz. That he failed to prevent the
driver from moving forward while the purchase was completed; He
failed to help Ortiz while the latter clung to the moving vehicle; e did
not enforce his order to Ligon to stop; and that he acquiesced in the
drivers act of speeding away instead of stopping and picking up Ortiz.
His acquittal in the criminal prosecution does not bar the heirs of Ortiz
from recovering damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the
civil liability only when it includes a declaration that the facts from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Wherefore, Gabat is
sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Ortiz the amount of P15,000 for
the latters death, P1,733 for hospital and medical expenses, 4,100 for
funeral expenses, and the alleged loss of income amounting to
P20,000. Gabat's wilfull act of calling Rosales, the cigarette vendor,
to the middle of a busy street to buy two sticks of cigarettes set the
chain of events which led to the death of Rosales. Through fault and
negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent the driver from moving forward
while the purchase was completed; (2) failed to help Rosales while
the latter clung precariously to the moving vehicle, and (3) did not
enforce his order to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in
the driver's act of speeding away, instead of stopping and picking up
the injured victim. These proven facts taken together are firm bases
for finding Gabat civilly liable under the Civil Code for the damage
done to Rosales.
QUASI-DELICT VS. BREACH OF CONTRACT
JOSE CANGCO vs MANILA RAILROAD CO.,
G.R. No. 12191; October 14, 1918
On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad
Co (MRC). He was an employee of the latter and he was given a pass
so that he could ride the train for free. When he was nearing his
destination at about 7pm, he arose from his seat even though the train
was not at full stop. When he was about to alight from the train (which
was still slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of
watermelons, which he failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim.
This caused him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and the
train crushed his arm and he suffered other serious injuries. He was
dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling
the sacks of watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact that
Cangco was also negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in
alighting from the train as he did not wait for it to stop.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a
common practice and a lot of people are doing so every day without
suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood,
and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was
yet moving, as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble
person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons
were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place was
dimly lit.
NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence
whatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable
for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his
employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does not
amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the
person injured.
The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon
a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere
negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. These two
fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact
that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him
from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under
such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an
extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the
parties.
Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the
performance of a contractual undertaking or in itself the source of an
extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics
are identical.
The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of
employers under Article 2180 and their liability for breach of contract
of carriage.
PAZ FORES vs. IRENEO MIRANDA
G.R. No. L-12163, March 4, 1959
Respondent was one of the passengers of a jeepney driven by
Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was descending the Sta. Mesa
bridge at an excessive speed, the driver lost control, and the jeepney
swerved to the bridge wall. Serious injuries were suffered by the
defendant. The driver was charged with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty
was sentenced accordingly. Petitioner denies liability for breach of
contract of carriage, contending that a day before the accident, the
jeepney was sold to a certain Carmen Sackerman.
Issues:
(1) Is the approval of the Public Service Commission necessary for
the sale of a public service vehicle even without conveying therewith
the authority to operate the same?
(2) To what damages is the respondent entitled?
Held: (1) The court of Appeals answered the query in the affirmative.
The ruling should be upheld. The provisions of the statute are clear
and prohibit the sale, alienation, lease, or encumbrance of the
property, franchise, certificate, privileges or rights, or any part thereof
of the owner or operator of the public service Commission. The law
was designed primarily for the protection of the public interest; and
until the approval of the public Service Commission is obtained the
vehicle is, in contemplation of law, still under the service of the owner
or operator standing in the records of the Commission which the
public has a right to rely upon.
(2) The P10,000 actual damages awarded by the Court of First
Instance of Manila were reduced by the Court of Appeals to only
P2,000, on the ground that a review of the records failed to disclose a
sufficient basis for the trial court's appraisal, since the only evidence
presented on this point consisted of respondent's bare statement that
his expenses and loss of income amounted to P20,000. On the other
hand, "it cannot be denied," the lower court said, "that appellee
(respondent) did incur expenses"' It is well to note further that
respondent was a painter by profession and a professor of Fine Arts,
so that the amount of P2,000 awarded cannot be said to be
excessive. The attorney's fees in the sum of P3,000 also awarded to
the respondent are assailed on the ground that the Court of First
Instance did not provided for the same, and since no appeal was
interposed by said respondent, it was allegedly error for the Court of
Appeals to award them motu proprio. Petitioner fails to note that
attorney's fees are included in the concept of actual damages under
the Civil Code and may be awarded whenever the court deems it is
just and equitable. We see no reason to alter these awards.
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the
same must be discarded. We have repeatedly ruled that moral
damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicted on a
breach of the contract of transportation. Where the injured passenger
does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved
that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear
that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se
constitute of justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of
the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such
malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of
Appeals.
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V. C.A. & LUISA. LUNA
G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995
Private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a
Fareast card issued by petitioner FEBTC. Clarita informed FEBTC
that she lost her credit card. In order to replace the lost card, Clarita
submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank's
internal security procedures and policy would be to record the lost
card, along with the principal card, as a "HotCard" or "Cancelled Card"
in its master file.
Luis then tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend. When he
presented his Far East card to pay for the lunch, the card was not
honored, forcing him to pay in cash the bill. Naturally, Luis felt
embarrassed by this incident. Private respondent Luis Luna, through
counsel, demanded from FEBTC the payment of damages. Adrian V.
Festejo, a vice-president of the bank, expressed the bank's apologies,
admitting that they have failed to inform Luis about its security policy.
Private respondents then filed a complaint for damages in the RTC,
which rendered a decision ordering FEBTC to pay private
respondents moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys
fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are entitled of moral
damages.
HELD: NO. In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered
where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with
malice in the breach of the contract.
Concededly, the bank was negligent for failing to inform Luis of his
own card's cancellation. Nothing in the findings of the trial court and
the appellate court can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on
the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. The failure
to inform Luis is not considered to be so gross that it would amount to
malice or bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and
intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or
moral obliguity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in
that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or ill-will.
Article 21 of the Code contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. In
relation to a breach of contract, its application can be warranted only
when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so
deliberate as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less
worse than fraud or bad faith. Most importantly, Article 21 is a mere
declaration of a general principle in human relations that clearly must,
in any case, give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the
Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa
contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith.
The decision is modified by deleting the award of moral and
exemplary damages to private respondents; in its stead, petitioner is
ordered to pay nominal damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the
Civil Code.
AIR FRANCE vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and CA
G.R. No. L-21438, September 28, 1966
In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were
tourists en route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first
class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in
Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air France to vacate
his seat because a white man allegedly has a better right than him.
Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon advise of
other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was
transferred to the planes tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines,
he sued Air France for damages for the embarrassment he suffered
during his trip. In court, Carrascoso testified, among others, that he
when he was forced to take the tourist class, he went to the planes
pantry where he was approached by a plane purser who told him that
he noted in the planes journal the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his
will, and that the captain refused to intervene. The said testimony was
admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually awarded
damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It
avers that the issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an
assurance that he will be seated in first class because allegedly in
truth and in fact, that was not the true intent between the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascosos testimony
regarding the note made by the purser because the said note was
never presented in court.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on
what basis. (2) Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding
the note which was not presented in court is admissible in evidence.
HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air Frances liability is based on culpa-
contractual and on culpa aquiliana.
Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and
Carrascoso. There was a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class
passage; Second, That said contract was breached when Air France
failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that
there was bad faith when Air Frances employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth after he was
already, seated and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of
which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations,
thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. The
Supreme Court did not give credence to Air Frances claim that the
issuance of a first class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that
he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply incredible.
Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage
between Air France and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act
based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it
is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees
towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against
the carrier. Air Frances contract with Carrascoso is one attended with
public duty. The stress of Carrascosos action is placed upon his
wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France
a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based
on res gestae. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster
incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription
of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. Besides,
when the dialogue between Carrascoso and the purser happened, the
impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be
felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in
this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. The
utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was
spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident.
Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the
operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 84698, [February 4, 1992])
Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of
Business Administration. Assailants, who were not members of the
schools academic community, while in the premises of PSBA,
stabbed Bautista to death. This incident prompted his parents to file a
suit against PSBA and its corporate officers for damages due to their
alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions,
means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant
states no cause of action against them based on quasi-delicts, as the
said rule does not cover academic institutions. The trial court denied
the motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise
dismissed, and was affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the case
was forwarded to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.
RULING: Yes! Because the circumstances of the present case evince
a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the
rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176
shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as
extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise
bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this
impression has not prevented this Court from determining the
existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
establishes the rule in in loco parentis. Article 2180 provides that the
damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of
the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its
pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation
does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the
assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts
the school could be made liable. But it does not necessarily follow that
PSBA is absolved form liability.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations
which both parties is bound to comply with. For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to
pursue higher education or a profession. This includes ensuring the
safety of the students while in the school premises. On the other
hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Failing on its contractual and implied duty to ensure the safety of their
student, PSBA is therefore held liable for his death.
Petition denied.
JUAN J. SYQUIA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 98695, January 27, 1993
Juan Syquia, father of the deceased Vicente Syquia, entered in a
contract of Deed of Sale and Interment Order with Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery Inc (MMPCI). In the contract, there contained a
provision which stated that the coffin would be placed in a sealed
concrete vault to protect the remains of the deceased from the
elements. During the preparation for the transfer of Vicentes remains
in the newly bought lot in Manila Memorial, it was discovered that
there was a hole in the concrete vault which caused total flooding
inside, damaged the coffin as well as the body of the deceased and
covered the same with filth. Syquia filed a complaint for recovery of
damages arising from breach of contract and/or quasi-delict against
the MMPCI for failure to deliver a defect-free concrete vault to protect
the remains of the deceased. In its defense, MMPCI claimed that the
boring of the hole was necessary in order to prevent the vault from
floating when water fills the grave. The trial court dismissed the
complaint holding that there was no quasi-delict because the
defendant is not guilty of any fault or negligence and because there
was a pre-existing contract between the parties. The CA affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent is guilty of tort
HELD: Denied. Decision of the CA affirmed.
We are more inclined to answer the foregoing questions in the
negative. There is not enough ground, both in fact and in law, to justify
a reversal of the decision of the respondent Court and to uphold the
pleas of the petitioners. Although a pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa
aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the respondents Court
finding that there was no negligence. Article 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict x x x. In this case, it has been established that
the Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered
into a contract entitled Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual
Care on August 27, 1969. That agreement governed the relations of
the parties and defined their respective rights and obligations. Hence,
had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170
of the Civil Code, to wit: Those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in
any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
A PRE-EXISTING CONTRACTUAL RELATION BETWEEN THE
PARTIES DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE EXISTENCE OF A CULPA
AQUILIANA. Although a pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, We
find no reason to disregard the respondent's Court finding that there
was no negligence. In this case, it has been established that the
Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a
contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care" on
August 27, 1969. That agreement governed the relations of the
parties and defined their respective rights and obligations. Hence, had
there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170 of the
Civil Code, to wit: "Those who in the performance of their obligations
are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
CALALAS V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 122039, [MAY 31, 2000]
Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging
violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise
the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the
other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the
owner of the Isuzu truck that bumped their passenger jeepney. The
lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant
and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the
Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance
of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva
and Verena for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court
held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the
damage to his jeepney. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
ruling of the lower court on the ground that Sunga's cause of action
was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the
common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the
Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint
against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.
Hence, this petition.
It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the
jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The
doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-
delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. In the case at bar,
upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at
once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had
observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. The
fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril
greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed.
Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the
presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by
Sunga, but also, the evidence showed he was actually negligent in
transporting passengers. The decision of the Court of Appeals was,
affirmed, with the modification that the award of moral damages was
deleted.
1. CIVIL LAW; TORTS AND DAMAGES; QUASI-DELICT AND
BREACH OF CONTRACT; DISTINGUISHED; CASE AT BAR. The
issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena
were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's
jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether
petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict,
also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its
source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of
contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict,
the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the
basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be
prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the
fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or
injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This
provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.

2. DOCTRINE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE; NOT APPLICABLE IN

ACTIONS INVOLVING BREACH OF CONTRACT; RATIONALE.
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for
quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is
a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is
created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create
the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the
relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned,
some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the
diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of
passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of
death or injury to passengers.

3. CASO FORTUITO; DEFINED; REQUIREMENTS THEREOF. A

caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the following
requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent
of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c)
the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in
causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the
danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into
the highway.

4. DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES; WHEN IT MAY BE

RECOVERED. As a general rule, moral damages are not
recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract
for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases
in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided
in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206 (3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the
cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in
Art. 2220.