SPL Atty.
Axel Cruz (2A)
1. Mala in se v. Mala prohibita (Article 3)
Us v Go Chico
On or about the 4th day of August, 1908, appellant Go Chico displayed in one of
the windows and one of the show cases of his store in No. 89 Calle Rosario, Manila,
a number of medallions, in the form of a small button, upon which were printed the
miniature faces of Emilio Aguinaldo and the flag or banner or device used during
the late insurrection in the Phil. Islands to designate and identify those in armed
insurrection against the United States.
On the day previous to the one set forth above, the appellant had purchased the
said medallion sold at a public sale under the authority of the sheriff of the city of
Manila. On the day in question, the appellant was arranging his stock of goods for
the purpose of displaying them to the public, and in doing so, he placed the
medallions in his showcase and on one of the windows of his store.
The appellantwas ignorant of any law against the display of such medallions and
had consequently no corrupt intention. The facts stated above are admitted.
The appellant has two propositions for his acquittal: first is that before a conviction
can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of the accused must be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. Second is that the prohibition of law is directed against the use
of identical banners, devices or emblems actually used during the Philippine
insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the United States.
Issue: Whether or not criminal intent is necessary in crimes punishable by special laws.
Held:
The court ruled that the act alone, irrespective of its motive, constitutes the crime. The words
used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in
armed rebellion against the United States mean not only the identical flags actually used in
the insurrection, but any flag which is of that type. The description refers not to a particular flag,
but to a type of flag. The literal interpretation of a statute may lead to an absurdity, or evidently
fail to give the real intent of the legislature.
Padilla v Dizon
Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and accused, Lo
Chi Fai, saying that Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate the law. He also
directed the release to Lo Chi Fai of at least the amount of US$3,000.00 under
Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while
attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the
country. An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC for violation of Sec.
6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 with a penal sanction provided by Sec. 1, PD NO.
1883. Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall take out
or transmit or attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form out of the
Philippines without an authorization by the Central Bank. Tourists and non-resident
visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign exchange in amounts
not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them.
Tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than
US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare their foreign
exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival
in the Philippines.
o Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who shall engage in the
trading or purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing
laws or rules and regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty of the
crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion temporal (minimum of 12 years and 1 day and maximum of
20 years) and a fine of no less than P50,000.00.
At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a businessman from Hongkong,
that he had come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times to invest in business in the country
with his business associates, and that he and his business associates declared all
the money they brought in and all declarations were handed to and kept by him.
Because of the revolution taking place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was
urged by his business associates to come to Manila to bring the money out of the
Philippines. Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint
against Baltazar R. Dizon for acquitting Lo Chi Fai.
ISSUE
HELD
Estrada v SB
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted
under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),
o 1 as amended by RA 7659,
o 2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively
fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid
from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this
Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly
because, according to him,
o (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness;
o (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and,
o (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear
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SPL Atty. Axel Cruz (2A)
violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY,
RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS
OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY
HIMSELF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL
VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17),
more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE
EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF
PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR
SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS.
RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH
JOHN DOES JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY
NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR
LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN
THE EQUITABLE BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE'
Issue: R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS VAGUENESS
II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO KNOW THE
NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM
III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE BY LOWERING THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
NECESSARY FOR PROVING THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER
IV. IT IS BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO
DELIMIT THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD AND TO ABOLISH THE ELEMENT OF
MENS REA IN MALA IN SE CRIMES BY CONVERTING THESE TO MALA PROHIBITA, IN
VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.
Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the
Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to
declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
Ratio:
In view of vagueness and ambiguity
Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define
the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of
the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act,
which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of
legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and
ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
technical or special legal meaning to those words 8 The intention of the lawmakers who
are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in
such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the
following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To
combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in
spatial and temporal succession.
Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination"
and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. As for
"pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently
defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2. . . under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a
'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of
overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the
public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either
be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly
understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method'
which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him, follow to
achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or
where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts
must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and
free from ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void
for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be
stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as
petitioner seems to suggest.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on
the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated
in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a
criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute.
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SPL Atty. Axel Cruz (2A)
In view of due process
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the
Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only
proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The
running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution
for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of
innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled
to an acquittal.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an
amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act
alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill- gotten wealth.
In view of mens rea
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum
in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion . . .
Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be
proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges
that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges
guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
[With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services
to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates
to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the
people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effect and
repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug
offenses involving government official, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not
be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society. Indeed, it would be absurd to
treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the
Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to
the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA
7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for
him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v.
Echegaray 38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein
that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by
necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
In view of presumption of innocence
At all events, let me stress that the power to construe law is essentially judicial. To declare
what the law shall be is a legislative power, but to declare what the law is or has been is
judicial. Statutes enacted by Congress cannot be expected to spell out with mathematical
precision how the law should be interpreted under any and all given situations. The
application of the law will depend on the facts and circumstances as adduced by evidence
which will then be considered, weighed and evaluated by the courts. Indeed, it is the
constitutionally mandated function of the courts to interpret, construe and apply the law as
would give flesh and blood to the true meaning of legislative enactments.
A construction should be rejected if it gives to the language used in a statute a meaning
that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted and that tends to
defeat the ends that are sought to be attained by its enactment. Viewed broadly, "plunder
involves not just plain thievery but economic depredation which affects not just private parties
or personal interests but the nation as a whole." Invariably, plunder partakes of the nature of
"a crime against national interest which must be stopped, and if possible, stopped
permanently."
In view of estoppel
Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080. The
case at bar has been subject to controversy principally due to the personalities involved
herein. The fact that one of petitioner's counsels was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law and
petitioner himself voted for its passage when he was still a Senator would not in any put him
in estoppel to question its constitutionality. The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact,
not of law. Moreover, estoppel should be resorted to only as a means of preventing injustice.
To hold that petitioner is estopped from questioning the validity of R.A. No. 7080 because he
had earlier voted for its passage would result in injustice not only to him, but to all others who
may be held liable under this statute.
What is RICO
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is a United States federal law that
provides for extended criminal penalties and a civil cause of action for acts performed as part
of an ongoing criminal organization. RICO was enacted by section 901(a) of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970 (Pub.L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, enacted October 15, 1970). RICO is
codified as Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. 19611968. While
its intended use was to prosecute the Mafia as well as others who were actively engaged in
organized crime, its application has been more widespread.
In view of facial challenge
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as
a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly
broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his
own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.'
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem
effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason
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alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct.
In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
Teves v COMELEC
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative
district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections.
Respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground
that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating Section 3(h),
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under
Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991.
Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office
because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.
The COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of
member of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate
of Candidacy.
Upon MR, COMELEC en banc denied the motion saying that since petitioner lost
in the last 14 May 2007 congressional elections, it thereby rendered the instant MR
moot and academic.
Issue: Whether petitioners violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.
Held:
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows:
o 1) The accused is a public officer;
o 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract or transaction;
o 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection
with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the
Constitution or by law.
Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A.
3019.
The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract, or transaction.
The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the
Constitution or by law.
In Teves v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having
pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor
of Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question.
Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his
wife, still he would have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent
Sandiganbayan, they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such
their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the
absence of evidence to the contrary.
o Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under
Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991.
However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the
same involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of
the violation of the statute must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not
include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in
their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
The Court clarified that not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for
this reason that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to
determine." In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general
rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do
not.
Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is
punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be
inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the
moral turpitude.
Consequently, considering all circumstances, the Court held that petitioners
conviction does not involve moral turpitude.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While
it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the
Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even
mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit.
In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow
it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever
reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits
lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its
own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse.
2. Relationship between special penal laws and RPC (Article 10)
Offenses not subject to the provision of this code offenses which are in the future may be
punishable under SPECIAL LAWS are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code
shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should provide to the contrary.
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SPL Atty. Axel Cruz (2A)
Sanchez v People
Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse in an Information[6] dated
August 29, 2001 which reads:
The undersigned, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses Leonilo Sanchez
alias Nilo of Lajog, Clarin, Bohol of the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of September, 2000 in the municipality of Clarin, province of
Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, acting as a Family
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to abuse, exploit and/or to inflict other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously abuse physically one [VVV],[7] a sixteen (16) year old minor, by hitting her thrice
in the upper part of her legs, and which acts are prejudicial to the child-victim's development
which acts are not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, but the same are
covered by Art. 59, par. 8 of P.D. No. 603 as amended; to the damage and prejudice of the
offended party in the amount to be proved during the trial.
The appellant argues that the injuries inflicted by him were minor in nature that it is not
prejudicial to the child-victims development and therefore P.D. No. 603 is not applicable and
he should be charged under the Revised Penal Code for slight physical injuries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. 603 as amended is applicable to the case at hand.
HELD:
In this case, the applicable laws are Article 59 of P.D. No. 603 and Section 10(a) of R.A. No.
7610. Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:
SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or
be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those
covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period.
As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b)
child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the
childs development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and
separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are
different from one another and from the act prejudicial to the childs development. Contrary to
petitioners assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a),
Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The
prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation
have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development of
the child is different from the former acts.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word or is a disjunctive term signifying
dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It should, as a
rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in Section
10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the childs development supposes that there are four punishable acts therein.
First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being
responsible for conditions prejudicial to the childs development. The fourth penalized act
cannot be interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three other
acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the questioned provision does not warrant
such construal.
Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be considered as child abuse but
merely as slight physical injuries defined and punishable under Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code. Appellant conveniently forgets that when the incident happened, VVV was a
child entitled to the protection extended by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by the
Constitution. As defined in the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether
the same is habitual or not. The act of appellant falls squarely within this definition. We,
therefore, cannot accept appellant's contention.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 10(a) in relation to Sections 3(a) and
3(b) No. 1 of Rep. Act No. 7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603, amended.
People v Saley
Antonine B. Saley, a.k.a. Annie B. Saley, seeks a reversal of the verdict finding her
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of eleven counts of estafa punishable under the
Revised Penal Code and six counts of illegal recruitment, one committed in large
scale, proscribed by the Labor Code.
The consolidated petitions provide that appellant promised the complainants job
opportunities in Korea. Appellant received acceptance fees and other fees from
complainants and when the job promises did not materialize, appellant was not able
to refund these to complainants.
The defense posited the theory that appellant merely assisted the complainants in
applying for overseas employment with duly accredited travel agencies for and from
which she derived a commission.
The trial court found her guilty and posited as follows:
In fine, accused gave the distinct assurance, albeit false, that she had the ability to
send the complainants abroad for work deployment, thereby employing false
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SPL Atty. Axel Cruz (2A)
pretenses to defraud them. This was despite her knowing very well that she was
not legally authorized. The complainants willingly parted with their money in the
hope of overseas employment deceitfully promised them by the accused. What
makes matters worse is that these amounts given to the accused come from hard-
earned money, or worse, could have been borrowed from money lenders who have
no qualms about collecting usurious interest rates. Complainants who faithfully
relied on the accused did not hesitate to painstakingly raise or even beg or borrow
money just so they could give a decent future to their families even to the extent of
leaving them for far-off lands. But now, all their dreams are gone, their hopes
shattered. Some may not have even been able to pay back what they borrowed nor
recoup their losses. Now, more than ever, their future appears bleaker. But this
time, a glimmering light appears at the end of the tunnel as the Court steps in to lay
down the iron fist of the law so as to serve the accused a lesson, a bitter one, with
the hope that those who are trekking or those who are about to trek the same
pilfered path that the accused took will reconsider their pursuits before it would be
too late, and in the end, this form of fraud which invariably victimizes the poor will
forever be stopped.
Short Version:
Appellant was charged guilty of illegal recruitment and estafa. Conviction for these
various offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the punishment of the offender for
estafa. Illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum offense where criminal intent of the accused
is not necessary for conviction while estafa is malum in se which requires criminal intent to
warrant conviction.
Facts:
1. Appellant was indicted in eleven separate informations for estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(1), of the Revised Penal Code. For the violation of Article 38, in relation
to Article 39, of the Labor Code, five separate informations were also instituted
against appellant on various dates.
2. Appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges of illegal recruitment and estafa. The
criminal cases filed were raffled off to two (2) branches of the Regional Trial Court
of Benguet; later, however, the cases were consolidated at the instance of the
prosecution.
3. The defense posited the theory that appellant merely assisted the complainants in
applying for overseas employment with duly accredited travel agencies for and from
which she derived a commission.
a. According to the 37-year-old appellant, she used to be the liaison officer
of the Friendship Recruitment Agency from 1983 to 1986. In that capacity,
she would submit to the POEA "contracts for processing job orders for
applicants" and assist applicants prior to their departure at the airport.
b. When the licensed agency closed in 1986, she went to Baguio where she
engaged in the purchase and sale of vegetables and flowers. Even then,
however, she would not hesitate extending help to applicants for overseas
employment by recommending licensed agencies which could assist said
applicants in going abroad. She named the Dynasty Travel and Tours and
the Mannings International as such licensed agencies.
4. The trial court rendered its decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes charged. It found implausible appellant's claim that she was merely an
agent of Dynasty Travel and Tours and/or Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio.
5. Appellant Antonine B. Saley, a.k.a. Annie B. Saley, seeks a reversal of the verdict
finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of eleven counts of estafa punishable
under the Revised Penal Code and six counts of illegal recruitment, one committed
in large scale, proscribed by the Labor Code.
ISSUE:
Whether ISL may be applied - YES
Whether a charge of illegal recruitment bar the prosecution for estafa? NO
Are the aggravating and mitigating circumstances applicable -NO
1) Whether the trial court had erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the
complaining witnesses and in finding her guilty of the crimes charged? (NO)
HELD
The Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal
recruitment, illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa is hereby AFFIRMED.
Ratio:
1. The Court agrees with the trial court that appellant, indeed, violated the law against illegal
recruitment.
Art. 38 (a) of the Labor Code considers illegal any recruitment activity "undertaken
by non-licensees or non-holders of authority."
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur:
o That the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to
enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers;
and
o That the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of
recruitment and placement defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34. 46
Altogether, the evidence against appellant has established beyond any discernible
shadow of doubt that appellant is indeed guilty of illegal recruitment on various
counts.
Being neither a licensee nor a holder of authority to recruit, appellant must suffer
under Article 39(c) of the Labor Code the penalty of imprisonment of not less than
four years nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00 nor more
than P100,000.00 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court.
In imposing the penalty, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on the application
of the circumstances that could modify the criminal liability of an accused cannot be
considered, these provisions being inapplicable to special laws.
2. Defendant is also guilty of estafa.
Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the
punishment of the offender for estafa.
6
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz (2A)
o Illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum offense where criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction while estafa is
malum in se which requires criminal intent to warrant conviction.
Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the
offense (estafa) are that (1) the accused has defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit and (2) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Clearly, these elements
have sufficiently been shown in the cases under review.
It would appear that of the seven complainants for illegal recruitment in large scale,
only five of them filed separate charges of estafa against appellant. Accordingly,
appellant was only and could only be held liable for five counts of estafa arising from
the charge of illegal recruitment in large scale.
Ladonga v People
The Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision, of the Court of
Appeals, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol,
in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law.
The RTC, convicted both Evangeline Ladonga and her spouse Adronico, both
are regular customers in the pawnshop business of Mr. Oculam in Tagbilaran
City, Bohol;
o sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan
from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check
No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico;
o sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May
1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00,
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26,
1990 issued by Adronico;
o between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan
in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post
dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico;
o the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason
"CLOSED ACCOUNT"; when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem
the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint
against them.
Ladonga spouses addmitted the checks issued bounced because there was no
sufficient deposit or the account was closed. Ladonga spouses claimed the checks
were issued only to guarantee obligation, with the agreement that OCulam should
not encash check until they mature.
RTC rendered decision finding accused Ladonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner appealed to CA claiming that RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for
conspiring with her husband, as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to BP Blg
22 which is a special law, and she is not a signatory thereto.
CA affirmed conviction
o Provisions of the penal code were made applicable to special laws
o Art 10 of RPC provides that its provisions are supplementary to special
laws unless the latter provide the contrary.
o Since BP Blg 22 does not prohibit the applicablity in a supplementary
character of the provisions of PRC, principle of conspiracy may be
apploed.
ISSUES OF THE CASE: In this case Evangeline Ladonga is trying to contest
her conviction on the grounds that she was not a party to the agreement and
that she was not a signatory to the checks and that the decision of the Court
of Appeals with regard to her being a co-conspirator is w/o merit.
Whether or not the cases citedby honorable CA in affirming in toto the
conviction of petitioner as conspirator applying the suppletory character of
the RPC to Special laws like BP Blg 22 is applicable?
HELD:
Conspiracy applicable to SPLs
Article 10 contains 2 clauses
First clause: offenses in the future are made punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provisionf of the RPC
Second clause: contains the soul of article: code shall be supplementary to the
special law, unless the latter provides for the contrary special legal provisions
prevail over general ones.
BP Blg 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the
provisions of RPC
Cases cited by CA:
People v Parel : application of Art. 22 (Retroactive effect of penal laws) on the violations of
Election Law if they favor accused
US v Ponte : application of Art 17 (principals in a crime) to the participation of principals in the
commission of crime of misappropriation of public funds
Us v Bruhez : application of Art 45 for confiscatin and forfeiture of the proceeds in the
instruments of the crime in violation of Opium Law
SC cited : Yu v People: Art. 39 (subsidiary penalty) applicable to BP Blg 22
There was no conspiracy in this case
Consipracy exists when 2 or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
In determining if she is liable for the same crime it must be proven that there was
conspiracy It was not proven by direct evidence even by the witness testimony that
Evangeline Ladonga was merely present at the time of the issuance of the checks.
However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal
design.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive
evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the
scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge,
acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a
party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime
with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
7
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz (2A)

Criminal liability cannot be incurred based on general allegation of conspiracy. In the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the
criminal cases, moral certainty -- not mere possibility -- determines the guilt or the purview of theft/robbery
innocence of the accused. Even when the evidence for the defense is weak, the o Exceptions to Carnapping law (Art 310, RPC is applicable)
accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has not proven guilt with the Roadrollers
requisite quantum of proof required in all criminal cases. Trolleys
Sweetsweepers
HELD: The instant petition is GRANTED. Evangeline Lodonga Acquitted. Sprinklers
Lawn mowers
Amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on public highways
People v Bustinera Vehicles which run only on rails and tracks
Luisito D. Bustinera was held guilty for Qualified Theft for the unlawful taking of a Tractors
Daewoo Taxi and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He Trailers
was accused of carnapping when he failed to return the taxi to owner Edwin Cipriano. Tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural
He claims that he had returned the taxi but left his drivers license to Cipriano when purposes.
he failed to meet his boundary, hence he could not drive; He denies abandoning the While the act of taking motor vehicle was first lawful as he was hired as a taxi driver,
taxi his possession became unlawful when he failed to return the taxi to its owner. He
RTC still found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for qualified theft admits that he was aware that taxi was in his possession and without CIprianos
Bustinera appeals to the SC to review RTC decision consent.
There was intent to gain by mere use of a thing taken without the owners consent
ISSUE: evne though his alibi for not returning was his inability to remit boundary fee.
Whether RTC erred in concluding that his failure to return the taxi to the garage manifests VIllacorta v Insurance : there is taking even if motor vehicle is later returned. Taking
intent to gain? is temporary / for joy ride
* whether RTC is correct that the crime incurred is Qualified Theft and not Carnapping under
RA 6539? When penalties of SPL and RPC are different and distinct
Trial court erred in the imposition of penalty.
HELD: Penalties of RPC and Special law is different, the same penalties under RPC
RPC Special Law (Anti-Car Napping Act) cannot be applied to acts punished in the Statute when the latter provides
Theft Sec 2, RA 6539 defines distinct penalties applicable only to the statute and are outside the rules for
- taking of personal property CARNAPPING taking with intent to gain of felonies under the Code
-belongs to another a motor vehicle belonging to another without o In this case imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months
- intent to gain the latters consent or by means of violence not more than 17 years and 4 months
-without consent of owner against or intimidation of persons or by o The alleged aggravating circumstance of garave abuse of confidence
-without use of violence/intimidation on using force upon things cannot be applied.
persons or force upon things
- the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle Indeterminate sentence law applies when offense is punishable by a special
Qualified law
- domestic servant o Maximum term not exceed maximum fixed by law and minimum term
- grave abuse of confidence not less than that prescribed by the same penalty imposed by a rance
-property stolen is motor vehicle
-consists of coconuts taken from premisses GO-Tan v Tan
-property stolen is fish Sharica Go-Tan and Steven Tan was married. They have two daughters.
-property taken on occasion of fire, etc Barely 6 months in the marriage, Sharica (petitioner) filed an action for temprorary
protection order against her husband and her parents-in-law for verbal,
psychological, economic, physical abuse and harrasment in violation of RA 9262 or
Crime here is CARNAPPING not Qualified theft. Anti Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004.
There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from the RTC granted it but the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss saying that RTC has
crime of robbery and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. However, the anti- no jurisdiction over the parents-in-law as they are not included in the definition of
carnapping law particularly deals with the theft or roberry of motor vehicles. Without the offender described under AWAC

8
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz (2A)

o Requires that

ISSUE: Whether the parents-in-law of petitioner may be included in the petition for temporary
protective order in accordance with AVAWC act of 2004?

HELD
Moreno :Court applied subsidiary penalty under Art. 39 of RPC to cases of violation of Revised
Motor Vehicle Law

Li Wai Cheung : applied rules on service of sentences provided in Art. 70 of RPC in favor of
accused found guilty of multiple violations under the Dangerous Drugs Act

Chowdury: applied Art. 17,18,19 of RPC to define words principal accomplices accessorie
under Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995

Yu : applied subsidiary imprisonment under Art 39, RPC to BP Blg 22 / Bouncing Checks Law

Temporary protection order to prevent further harrasment

Liberal construction
Look at the intent of the law express language of AVAWC reflects intent of
legislatuer for liberal construction at will best ensure the attainment of the obejct of
law according to true intent, menaing , spirit the protection and safety of victims of
violence against women and children

Ladonga: applied principle of conspiracy under Art 8, RPC to BP Blg 22 in the absecnce of
contrary provision therein.

Petition granted.

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

1. Pari materia every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other
statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence (People v Bustinera)
2. special legal provisions prevail over general ones. (Ladonga v People)
3. Look at the intent of the law express language

3.Principles of RPC applicable to special laws

People v Velasco