On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction

Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (partial listing)

T h o m a s McCarthy, g e n e r a l e d i t o r

Karl-Otto Apel, Understanding and Explanation: A Transcendental-Pragmatic Perspective

Seyla Benhabib a n d Fred Dallmayr, editors, The Communicative Ethics Controversy
James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy
James Bohman a n d Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, editors, Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's
Cosmopolitan Ideal
Craig Calhoun, editor, Habermas and the Public Sphere
J e a n Cohen a n d Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory
Maeve Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics
J o h n Forester, editor, Critical Theory and Public Life
Jiirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law
and Democracy
Jiirgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics
Jiirgen Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences
Jiirgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory
Jiirgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action
Jiirgen Habermas, The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate
Jiirgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures
Jiirgen Habermas, Philosophical-Political Profiles
Jiirgen H a b e r m a s , Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays
Jiirgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Communication
Jiirgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory
of Communicative Action
Jiirgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a
Category of Bourgeois Society
Jiirgen Habermas, editor, Observations on "The Spiritual Situation of the Age "
Axel H o n n e t h , The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory
Axel H o n n e t h , The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts
Axel H o n n e t h a n d Hans Joas, editors, Communicative Action: Essays on Jiirgen
Habermas's T h e T h e o r y of Communicative Action
Axel H o n n e t h , Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe, and Albrecht Wellmer, editors, Cul
tural-Political Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment
Axel H o n n e t h , T h o m a s McCarthy, Claud Offe, and Albrecht Wellmer, editors, Philo
sophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment
Hans Joas, G. H. Mead: A Contemporary Re-examination of His Thought
Cristina Lafont, The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy
Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves a n d Seyla Benhabib, editors, Habermas and the
Unfinished Project of Modernity: Critical Essays on T h e Philosophical Discourse of
Modernity
Kirk Pillow, Sublime Understanding: Aesthetic Reflection in Kant and Hegel
Albrecht Wellmer, Endgames: The Irreconcilable Nature of Modernity. Essays and Lectures
Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics and
Postmodernism
Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance
On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction

Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative

Action

Jiirgen Habermas

translated by Barbara Fultner

T h e MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts

This translation 2001 Massachusetts Institute of Technology

T h e lectures and essays in this volume a p p e a r e d in G e r m a n in Jiirgen H a b e r m a s ,

Vorstudien und Ergdnzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, 1984 S u h r k a m p
Verlag, Frankfurt a m Main, Germany.

Though substantially revised, the translation of "Reflections o n the Linguistic Foun

dation of Sociology" is based on Jeremy Shapiro's original translation of the Gauss
Lectures as they were delivered at Princeton.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any
electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information
storage a n d retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher.

This book was set in New Baskerville by Wellington Graphics, Westwood, Massa
chusetts a n d printed a n d b o u n d in the United States of America.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Habermas, Jiirgen
[Vorstudien u n d Erganzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. English]
O n the pragmatics of social interaction : preliminary studies in the theory of
communicative action / J i i r g e n H a b e r m a s ; translated by Barbara Fultner.
p. cm. (Studies in contemporary German social thought)
Includes bibliographical references a n d index.
ISBN 0-262-08288-8 (alk. paper)
1. Language a n d languagesPhilosophy. 2. CommunicationPhilosophy.
3. Sociolinguistics. 4. Pragmatics. 5. Communicative competence.
6. Social interaction. I. Title. II. Series.

P106 .H2513 2000

401dc21 00-055886
Contents

Translator's I n t r o d u c t i o n vii
Reflections o n the Linguistic Foundation o f Sociology:
The Christian Gauss Lecture (Princeton University,
February-March 1971) 1

I Objectivist a n d Subjectivist A p p r o a c h e s to T h e o r y
F o r m a t i o n in t h e Social Sciences 3

II T h e P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l Constitutive T h e o r y of
Society: T h e F u n d a m e n t a l Role of Claims to Validity a n d
t h e M o n a d o l o g i c a l F o u n d a t i o n s of Intersubjectivity 23

III F r o m a Constitutive T h e o r y to a C o m m u n i c a t i v e
T h e o r y of Society (Sellars a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n ) :
C o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d Cognitive Uses of L a n g u a g e 45

IV Universal Pragmatics: Reflections o n a T h e o r y of

Communicative Competence 67

V T r u t h a n d Society: T h e Discursive R e d e m p t i o n of
Factual Claims to Validity 85

Intentions, Conventions, and Linguistic Interactions

(1976) 105

Reflections o n Communicative Pathology (1974) 129

 I

vi
Contents

Notes 171

Index 183
Translator's Introduction

Philosophy in t h e twentieth century, in b o t h its analytic a n d conti

n e n t a l traditions, h a s b e e n s h a p e d by w h a t has c o m e to be k n o w n as
"the linguistic t u r n . " Be it in metaphysics, epistemology, or value t h e
ory, p h i l o s o p h y of l a n g u a g e has b e c o m e a keystone of c o n c e p t u a l
analysis. Most p r o f o u n d l y p e r h a p s , t h e linguistic t u r n has affected
t h e c o n c e p t i o n a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of r e a s o n . It is n o l o n g e r possible
t o d a y to d e f e n d t h e universal validity of a t r a n s c e n d e n t , objective
reason, n o r can l a n g u a g e be r e g a r d e d any l o n g e r as a n e u t r a l tool at
r e a s o n ' s disposal. T h e role of this m o v e m e n t in critical t h e o r y is d u e
in large m e a s u r e to the work of J i i r g e n H a b e r m a s . A n d yet, in a n in
creasingly p o s t m o d e r n era, H a b e r m a s has r e m a i n e d a d e f e n d e r of
m o d e r n i t y . W h i l e t h e reason of t h e e n l i g h t e n m e n t h a s c o m e u n d e r
g e n e r a l attack, h e c o n t i n u e s to e n d o r s e its e m a n c i p a t o r y p o t e n t i a l ,
a l b e i t in t h e a l t e r e d f o r m of a "postmetaphysical" r e a s o n t h a t is al
ways situated in c o n t e x t s of i n t e r a c t i o n . H a b e r m a s locates the r o o t s
of rationality in t h e s t r u c t u r e s of everyday c o m m u n i c a t i o n s u c h t h a t
t h e critical p o w e r of r e a s o n is i m m a n e n t in o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e f r o m
t h e start. T h e a i m of his intersubjectivist a c c o u n t of " c o m m u n i c a t i v e
r e a s o n " is to displace b o t h subjectivist a c c o u n t s that cling to Carte
sian c o n c e p t i o n s of m o n o l o g i c a l selfhood a n d objectivist a c c o u n t s
t h a t i g n o r e t h e a g e n t ' s perspective entirely.
T h e essays a n d lectures collected in this v o l u m e explain why
H a b e r m a s c o n s i d e r s a linguistic t u r n to be necessary, how he t h i n k s
it is to b e w o r k e d out, a n d w h a t h e takes its i m p l i c a t i o n s to b e . T h e y
 viii
Translator's Introduction

address questions c o n c e r n i n g t h e n a t u r e of social i n t e r a c t i o n a n d its

c o n n e c t i o n to c o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d they trace t h e implications for
d e v e l o p i n g a n a d e q u a t e social theory. T h e y will b e of i n t e r e s t n o t
o n l y t o r e a d e r s w h o have followed H a b e r m a s ' s intellectual develop
m e n t b u t also to those looking for a n i n t r o d u c t i o n to his t h e o r y of
c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. M o r e generally, p h i l o s o p h e r s of l a n g u a g e will
find in these essays a host of original ideas o n t h e relationship be
tween l a n g u a g e a n d society.
Since its p u b l i c a t i o n in 1 9 8 1 , H a b e r m a s ' s The Theory of Communica
1
tive Action h a s been widely acclaimed for its c o n t r i b u t i o n to philoso
p h y a n d social theory. However, its two v o l u m e s a r e d a u n t i n g , n o t
only for r e a s o n s of l e n g t h , b u t owing to t h e b r e a d t h of its subject
m a t t e r a n d t h e d e n s e n e s s of its a r g u m e n t a t i o n . T h e essays a n d lec
t u r e s in t h e p r e s e n t v o l u m e p r o v i d e a less a r d u o u s r o u t e to u n d e r
s t a n d i n g t h e t h e o r y b e h i n d t h a t larger work. T h e y a r e a partial
translation of Vorstudien und Erginzungen zur Theorie des kommuni
kativen Handelns, which was p u b l i s h e d in 1984 a n d c o n t a i n s not only
p r e l i m i n a r y studies l e a d i n g u p to t h e fully d e v e l o p e d t h e o r y of c o m
m u n i c a t i v e action, b u t also several essays t h a t c o m p l e m e n t The Theory
of Communicative Action in i m p o r t a n t respects. T h e first p a r t of this
v o l u m e , "Reflections on t h e Linguistic F o u n d a t i o n of Sociology,"
f o r m e d t h e text o f t h e Gauss L e c t u r e s t h a t H a b e r m a s delivered at
2
P r i n c e t o n in 1 9 7 1 . T h e s e l e c t u r e s a r e driven by t h e s a m e t h e o r e t i c a l
a i m t h a t u n d e r l i e s The Theory of Communicative Action, namely, t h e at
t e m p t to g r o u n d a t h e o r y of society o n t h e f o u n d a t i o n s of c o m m u n i
cative rationality. T h e y p r o v i d e a largely self-contained a c c o u n t of
t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l motivations b e h i n d t h e t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i v e
action as well as a n e l u c i d a t i o n of its theoretical g r o u n d i n g in w h a t
H a b e r m a s called first universal a n d later formal pragmatics. T h e p r e
s e n t a t i o n of t h e issues h e r e is m o r e accessible t h a n in The Theory of
Communicative Action precisely b e c a u s e H a b e r m a s is o c c u p i e d with
laying o u t t h e g e n e r a l p a r a m e t e r s of his project a n d situating it rela
tive to o t h e r t h e o r i e s of society. Moreover, h e discusses certain issues
h e r e , such as "systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n , " t h a t h e has
n o t a d d r e s s e d i n t h e s a m e detail again. In short, t h e s e " p r e p a r a t o r y
studies" offer i m p o r t a n t aids to u n d e r s t a n d i n g his m a t u r e philoso
p h y a n d social theory.
ix .
Translator's Introduction

H a b e r m a s ' s interest in t h e t h e o r y of l a n g u a g e a n d m e a n i n g has

always b e e n m o t i v a t e d by his w o r k in social theory a n d the theory of
action. T h r o u g h o u t his career, he has s o u g h t to i n t e g r a t e p h i l o s o p h y
a n d e m p i r i c a l social research, in p a r t i c u l a r to i l l u m i n a t e t h e f o u n d a
tions of social theory while r e m a i n i n g faithful to t h e m e t h o d s a n d re
sults of e m p i r i c a l inquiry. His p r i m a r y c o n c e r n has b e e n with
p r o b l e m s of social action a n d action c o o r d i n a t i o n , a n d with t h e use
of c o m m u n i c a t i v e r e a s o n as a m e a n s of a d d r e s s i n g such p r o b l e m s .
T h e resultant t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action a c c o r d s a f o u n d a
tional role to linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n , i n a s m u c h as c o m m u n i c a t i v e
action, as H a b e r m a s u n d e r s t a n d s it, is action o r i e n t e d toward r e a c h
ing m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , which h e r e g a r d s as t h e i n h e r e n t telos of
l a n g u a g e . I n acting communicatively, a n a g e n t seeks to r e a c h a n u n
d e r s t a n d i n g with a n o t h e r a b o u t s o m e t h i n g in t h e world. T h e goal of
formal p r a g m a t i c s is to identify t h e universal c o n d i t i o n s a n d p r e s u p
positions of such processes of r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g in lan
guage. T h e t e r m s "universal" a n d "formal" draw a t t e n t i o n to key
claims of this theory: (1) t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s it identifies a r e u n
avoidable if c o m m u n i c a t i o n is to take place at all; (2) it is n o t con
c e r n e d with t h e p r a g m a t i c s of p a r t i c u l a r speech situations b u t w i t h a
g e n e r a l "species" c o m p e t e n c e ; a n d (3) it r e c o n s t r u c t s f o r m a l r a t h e r
t h a n substantive c o n d i t i o n s of r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . F o r
H a b e r m a s , t h e s t r u c t u r e s of c o m m u n i c a t i v e rationality a r e to b e
f o u n d in t h e formal s t r u c t u r e s of speech; r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s of de
liberation a r e i m p l i c i t in t h e s t r u c t u r e of o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e c o m
m u n i c a t i o n . T h u s l a n g u a g e , r e a s o n , a n d action a r e i n h e r e n t l y
intermeshed.

T h e Gauss L e c t u r e s m a r k t h e b e g i n n i n g of H a b e r m a s ' s a p p r o p r i a
tion of s p e e c h act t h e o r y a n d c o n t a i n t h e first f o r m u l a t i o n of his for
3
m a l p r a g m a t i c s . H i s c e n t r a l c o n c e r n is with e x p l i c a t i n g t h e " b i n d i n g
a n d b o n d i n g " force of s p e e c h acts, w h i c h u n d e r w r i t e s w h a t h e calls
t h e i r a c t i o n - c o o r d i n a t i n g power. F o r this p u r p o s e , speech act theory-
offers several advantages. First, it focuses o n utterances r a t h e r t h a n
s e n t e n c e s a n d t h u s aims to be a pragmatic t h e o r y of m e a n i n g , r a t h e r
t h a n a s e m a n t i c t h e o r y completely a b s t r a c t e d f r o m c o n t e x t s of use.
S e c o n d , it gives f o r m a l r e c o g n i t i o n t o n o n a s s e r t o r i c u s e s of l a n g u a g e
Translator's Introduction

a n d to t h a t e x t e n t d e p a r t s f r o m typically "cognitivist" a p p r o a c h e s to
semantics. T h i r d , s p e e c h act t h e o r y analytically separates a s p e e c h
act's p r o p o s i t i o n a l from its illocutionary c o m p o n e n t , which m a k e s it
possible to distinguish b e t w e e n w h a t speakers say a b o u t t h e w o r l d
4
a n d t h e intersubjective relations they establish in d o i n g s o .
W h a t originally p r o m p t e d H a b e r m a s to apply this linguistic ap
p r o a c h to social t h e o r y was his desire to steer a course b e t w e e n two
d o m i n a n t p a r a d i g m s in social science, n e i t h e r of which c a n p r o v i d e
a satisfactory m o d e l . T h e first is t h e objectivist p a r a d i g m , w h i c h as
similates t h e social to t h e n a t u r a l sciences. It e x a m i n e s social situa
tions entirely f r o m t h e e x t e r n a l perspective of an o b s e r v e r l o o k i n g
for p a t t e r n s of behavior. T h i s a p p r o a c h is characteristically u n i n t e r
ested in agency or in w h a t a g i v e n b e h a v i o r m e a n s from t h e e n g a g e d
perspective of t h e a g e n t s involved, a n d as a result, it fails to p r o v i d e
a n a d e q u a t e a c c o u n t of intersubjectivity. A p r i m e e x a m p l e of this
type of a p p r o a c h is classical behaviorism. T h e s e c o n d p a r a d i g m is
t h e subjectivist, w h i c h a d o p t s t h e p o i n t of view of p a r t i c i p a n t s a n d
c o n s t r u e s society as a meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d w h o l e . T h i s a p p r o a c h
is i n t e r e s t e d in i n t e n t i o n a l actions r a t h e r t h a n m e r e behavior, it ac
k n o w l e d g e s t h e centrality of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a n d it views subjects as
i m p l i c a t e d in c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e i r worlds. However, it t o o fails to p r o
vide a n a d e q u a t e a c c o u n t of intersubjectivity, n o t b e c a u s e it i g n o r e s
t h e perspective of t h e a g e n t , b u t b e c a u s e it gets c a u g h t in t h e
m o n o l o g i c a l perspective of a Cartesian subject. A n d t h a t perspective
m a k e s it h a r d to see how m e a n i n g f u l societal s t r u c t u r e s c a n b e
f o r m e d at all. I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e subjectivistic a p p r o a c h h a s
difficulty e x p l a i n i n g h o w it is possible to b r e a k o u t of t h e c o n s t r u c
tions of a solitary c o n s t i t u t i n g subject i n t o a g e n u i n e social reality.
N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n constitution a n d i n t e r p r e t a
tion provides H a b e r m a s with the o p e n i n g he n e e d s to give critical
t h e o r y a linguistic t u r n : a n a d e q u a t e social t h e o r y m u s t a c c o u n t for
t h e fact t h a t subjects in i n t e r a c t i o n e n c o u n t e r t h e world a n d o n e an
o t h e r as meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d .

H a b e r m a s offers a t h i r d c o m m u n i c a t i v e p a r a d i g m t h a t takes
intersubjectivity i n t o a c c o u n t f r o m t h e start a n d r e g a r d s l a n g u a g e as
its p r o p e r m e d i u m . T h e differences b e t w e e n the subjectivist a n d
objectivist p a r a d i g m s t u r n o n their respective decisions to allow or
xi____
Translator's Introduction

reject " m e a n i n g " as a basic, i r r e d u c i b l e c o n c e p t . I n H a b e r m a s ' s view,

to u n d e r s t a n d the n a t u r e of intersubjectivity, we n e e d to u n d e r s t a n d
how a g e n t s i n t e r a c t i n g with o n e a n o t h e r arrive at t h e s a m e i n t e r p r e
tations of their situation; in this respect, intersubjectivity is g r o u n d e d
in sameness of m e a n i n g . H a b e r m a s r e g a r d s c o m m u n i c a t i o n in lan
g u a g e as t h e p a r a d i g m case of achieving such "identity of m e a n i n g "
a n d t h u s h o l d s t h a t linguistic normativity c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d to m e r e
behavior in t h e sense of t h e objectivist p a r a d i g m . T o distance himself
from t h e subjectivist p a r a d i g m , H a b e r m a s goes o n t o a r g u e t h a t t h e
normativity of m e a n i n g m u s t b e based o n t h e intersubjective ( r a t h e r
t h a n merely subjective) validity of a r u l e . T h u s , intersubjectivity is to
be e x p l a i n e d o n t h e m o d e l of h o w two different individuals are able
to use a t e r m with o n e a n d t h e s a m e m e a n i n g .
T h a t i n t e r l o c u t o r s s u c c e e d in assigning t h e s a m e m e a n i n g s to
t h e i r actions a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s attests to t h e i r m a s t e r y of w h a t
H a b e r m a s calls " c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e . " O n this view, if we can
d e l i n e a t e t h e s t r u c t u r e of c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e , we will also
have c a p t u r e d t h e s t r u c t u r e of c o m m u n i c a t i v e rationality. H a b e r
mas's formal p r a g m a t i c s aims to p r o v i d e a rational r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of
this c o m p e t e n c e , t h a t is, to t r a n s f o r m an implicit k n o w l e d g e , a
5
know-how, into a "second-level know-that." This is not to say, of
course, t h a t a speaker actually h a s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of t h e r e c o n
s t r u c t e d k n o w l e d g e "in t h e h e a d . " H e r know-how is p r e t h e o r e t i c : a
skill o r mastery of a p r a c t i c e in t h e W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n sense. Subjects
capable of s p e e c h a n d action have acquired a tacit m a s t e r y of
r u l e - g o v e r n e d practices that e n a b l e t h e m to r e a c h a m u t u a l u n d e r
s t a n d i n g with o n e a n o t h e r a b o u t t h e world. Successful c o m m u n i c a
tion r e q u i r e s , t h e n , that t h e r u l e s c o n s t i t u t i n g such c o m m u n i c a t i v e
c o m p e t e n c e be valid intersubjectively.
H a b e r m a s uses Husserl, Sellars, and Wittgenstein as foils for his
o w n account. T h e subjectivist a n d objectivist p a r a d i g m s a r e r e p r e
sented by E d m u n d H u s s e r l a n d Wilfrid Sellars respectively. I n The
Cartesian Meditations, Husserl explicitly sets himself t h e task of r e c o n
s t r u c t i n g intersubjectivity f r o m a subjectivist starting p o i n t . ( T h e tra
d i t i o n of i n t e r p r e t i v e sociology initiated by Alfred Schiitz is r o o t e d
i n this Husserlian enterprise.) H a b e r m a s a r g u e s t h a t H u s s e r l ' s
p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f consciousness fails i n t h e e n d t o establish t h e
xii
Translator's Introduction

intersubjectivity of a c o m m u n i t y of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l egos, a n d so h e
t u r n s to Sellars. Sellars's a p p r o a c h is initially p r o m i s i n g because h e
wants to m o d e l intentionality a n d t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h o u g h t o n t h e
s t r u c t u r e of l a n g u a g e : H e takes a linguistic t u r n w i t h i n t h e philoso
p h y of m i n d . However, his u n d e r s t a n d i n g of l a n g u a g e , a c c o r d i n g to
H a b e r m a s , is essentially objectivist. T h a t is, speakers c o m e to m e a n
t h e s a m e t h i n g s by t h e s a m e w o r d s b e c a u s e t h e y r e s p o n d similarly to
their e n v i r o n m e n t a n d m u t u a l l y observe each o t h e r ' s r e s p o n s e s
f r o m a m o n o l o g i c a l , t h i r d - p e r s o n perspective r a t h e r t h a n f r o m a
dialogical s e c o n d - p e r s o n perspective. T h e y are " m o n o l o g i c a l lan
g u a g e u s e r s " with a full, i n t e n t i o n a l ( i n n e r ) life of beliefs a n d desires,
b u t l a c k i n g a n y i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . But m o n o l o g i c a l lan
g u a g e t h a t c a n n o t b e used for p u r p o s e s of c o m m u n i c a t i n g with oth
ers, H a b e r m a s a r g u e s , is n o t really l a n g u a g e at all. T h u s , in different
ways, Husserl a n d Sellars b o t h p r e s u p p o s e r a t h e r t h a n a c c o u n t for
the existence of intersubjectivity.
It is n o a c c i d e n t that H a b e r m a s ' s a r g u m e n t against Sellars is r e m i
n i s c e n t of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s private-language a r g u m e n t . S a m e n e s s of
m e a n i n g is g r o u n d e d in t h e validity of rules, a n d H a b e r m a s , follow
ing W i t t g e n s t e i n , argues t h a t a subject c a n n o t follow rules in isola
tion. If s o m e o n e is following a r u l e , it m u s t b e at least in p r i n c i p l e
possible for s o m e o n e else to check w h e t h e r she is following t h a t r u l e
correctiy; o n e p e r s o n ' s rule-following b e h a v i o r is, in o t h e r words,
subject to evaluation a n d criticism by a n o t h e r . T h i s p r e c l u d e s any
m o n o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t of rule-following, for it p r e s u p p o s e s that differ
e n t p e o p l e have the s a m e c o m p e t e n c e and are mutually c a p a b l e of
(i
assessing e a c h o t h e r ' s p e r f o r m a n c e . Wittgenstein e m p h a s i z e d t h a t
m e a n i n g is a m a t t e r of use a n d t h a t words a n d s e n t e n c e s are used in
i n t e r a c t i o n with others; his "use theory of m e a n i n g " was in this sense
i n h e r e n t l y p r a g m a t i c a n d intersubjective. As action a n d l a n g u a g e a r e
intimately i n t e r w o v e n , to u n d e r s t a n d a n u t t e r a n c e is to grasp its role
in a l a n g u a g e g a m e , t h a t is, to u n d e r s t a n d it as a m o v e in a r u l e -
g o v e r n e d , i n t e r p e r s o n a l activity. T h u s b e i n g able to e n g a g e in a
l a n g u a g e g a m e p r e s u p p o s e s sharing a f o r m of life with o n e ' s inter
l o c u t o r s . T h e rules constitutive of such l a n g u a g e g a m e s a r e n o t stipu
l a t e d arbitrarily, b u t h a v e t h e status of c o n v e n t i o n s , a topic to w h i c h I
shall r e t u r n below. H a b e r m a s elaborates o n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s a c c o u n t
xiii
Translator's Introduction

in two ways. First, h e aims to d e v e l o p a t h e o r y of t h e s t r u c t u r e s of

intersubjectivity: T h o u g h W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s l a n g u a g e g a m e s clearly sup
pose dialogical relationships a m o n g p a r t i c i p a n t s i n interaction, h e
does n o t analyze these relationships as such. S e c o n d , H a b e r m a s
wants t o d o m o r e justice t h a n Wittgenstein did to t h e fact t h a t lan
guage refers to t h e world.
T h e early W i t t g e n s t e i n a t t e m p t e d to e l a b o r a t e a p u r e l y cognitive
l a n g u a g e , the p r i m e f u n c t i o n of which was to r e p r e s e n t the totality of
facts that m a k e u p the world. T h e later W i t t g e n s t e i n a b o r t e d t h a t at
t e m p t b e c a u s e , in H a b e r m a s ' s t e r m s , he discovered c o m m u n i c a t i v e
l a n g u a g e u s e ( s ) . I n o t h e r words, he c a m e to realize that l a n g u a g e
can b e used for all sorts of p u r p o s e s o t h e r t h a n cognitive ones a n d ,
a c c o r d i n g to H a b e r m a s , h e n c e f o r t h mistakenly d o w n p l a y e d t h e im
p o r t a n c e of t h e cognitive use altogether. By contrast, H a b e r m a s
maintains that reaching mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g requires a speaker
a n d h e a r e r to o p e r a t e at two levels: t h e level of intersubjectivity o n
which they speak with o n e a n o t h e r , a n d t h e level of objects o r states
of affairs a b o u t which they c o m m u n i c a t e . His discussion h e r e is argu
ably t h e best, m o s t extensive e l u c i d a t i o n of his c o n c e p t i o n of t h e
"double s t r u c t u r e of s p e e c h . " H e m a k e s it clear t h a t the two uses of
l a n g u a g e are interdependent. "A c o m m u n i c a t i v e t h e o r y of society m u s t
d o justice to t h e d o u b l e cognitive-communicative s t r u c t u r e of
s p e e c h " (p. 6 4 ) . T h i s d u a l s t r u c t u r e u n d e r l i e s t h e reflexive c h a r a c t e r
of l a n g u a g e : N a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s can function as t h e i r own meta-lan
guages, as D o n a l d Davidson, for e x a m p l e , has also p o i n t e d o u t . Ac
c o r d i n g to H a b e r m a s , we c a n n o t c o m m u n i c a t e a b o u t things o r states
of affairs in t h e w o r l d w i t h o u t also " m e t a - c o m m u n i c a t i n g " a b o u t
w h a t we a r e d o i n g o r h o w we a r e using t h e c o n t e n t of w h a t we a r e
saying. It is h e r e t h a t s p e e c h act t h e o r y e n t e r s t h e p i c t u r e . Every
s p e e c h act takes t h e f o r m Mp, w h e r e M expresses t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y
force of t h e u t t e r a n c e ( t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e d i m e n s i o n ) a n d p ex
presses its p r e p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t (the cognitive d i m e n s i o n ) a b o u t
which m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g is to b e r e a c h e d . I n this sense, all
s p e e c h acts h a v e a cognitive a n d a c o m m u n i c a t i v e d i m e n s i o n .

H a b e r m a s ' s key m o v e in linking c o m m u n i c a t i v e rationality with

a t h e o r y of m e a n i n g is to c o n n e c t t h e t h e o r y of m e a n i n g with a t h e
ory of a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d justification. T h e r e is, as h e p u t s it, a
xiv
Translator's Introduction

"validity basis" to speech; all s p e e c h acts carry a n implicit c o m m i t

m e n t to justification, t o giving reasons t h a t b a c k o n e ' s claims. W h e n
we use s p e e c h acts to c o m m u n i c a t e with o n e a n o t h e r , we m o v e , as
R o b e r t B r a n d o m h a s recently r e m i n d e d us, i n " t h e space of giving
7
a n d a s k i n g f o r r e a s o n s . " Or, as H a b e r m a s p u t s it, every speech act
raises certain claims to validity t h a t a r e o p e n to b e i n g c h a l l e n g e d a n d
d e f e n d e d with reasons. T h e illocutionary c o m p o n e n t of a n utter
ance expresses validity claims a speaker raises in p e r f o r m i n g s p e e c h
acts. H a b e r m a s initially identifies four s u c h claims: intelligibility,
t r u t h , n o r m a t i v e Tightness, a n d sincerity or truthfulness. T h a t is, in
m a k i n g a n u t t e r a n c e , a speaker simultaneously raises t h e claims t h a t
w h a t she says is intelligible, t h a t t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t of w h a t
she says is t r u e , t h a t s h e is m a k i n g t h e u t t e r a n c e i n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e
social context, a n d t h a t she is s p e a k i n g truthfully. Following o n this,
H a b e r m a s classifies s p e e c h acts i n t o four types, e a c h of w h i c h c o r r e
s p o n d s to o n e of t h e f o u r validity claims: c o m m u n i c a t i v e s (e.g.,
speaking, asking, r e p l y i n g ) , constatives (e.g., r e p o r t i n g , asserting,
c l a i m i n g ) , regulatives (e.g., Ordering, r e q u e s t i n g , d e m a n d i n g , re
m i n d i n g ) , a n d expressives (e.g., k n o w i n g , t h i n k i n g , fearing, h o p i n g ,
wishing). C o m m u n i c a t i v e speech acts a r e u s e d to m a k e explicit t h e
n a t u r e of a n u t t e r a n c e itself. I n constative s p e e c h acts, speakers rep
r e s e n t states of affairs in t h e objective world a n d refer to s o m e t h i n g
in t h a t world. I n p e r f o r m i n g regulative s p e e c h acts, speakers estab
lish intersubjective relationships with i n t e r l o c u t o r s a n d thus relate t o
a social world. I n expressive s p e e c h acts, speakers refer t o things i n
their subjective world by m a k i n g public i n t e n t i o n s , desires, o r o t h e r
private states o r o c c u r r e n c e s . I n The Theory of Communicative Action,
t h e number of validity claims is r e d u c e d t o t h r e e ; intelligibility d r o p s
8
out, leaving t r u t h , normative Tightness, a n d sincerity.

C o m m u n i c a t i v e action takes p l a c e a g a i n s t a b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n
sus t h a t it r e n e w s a n d develops. W h e n c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n is
p r o c e e d i n g smoothly, i n t e r l o c u t o r s m a k e w h a t t h e y a r e saying intelli
gible to o n e a n o t h e r , g r a n t w h a t they a r e saying to b e t r u e (i.e., they
a s s u m e t h e r e f e r e n t i a l expressions they a r e using pick o u t objects t o
which t h e attributes they p r e d i c a t e of t h e m actually apply), r e c o g
nize t h e Tightness of t h e n o r m t h a t t h e s p e e c h act claims to fulfill,
a n d d o n ' t d o u b t e a c h o t h e r ' s sincerity. I n short, they m u t u a l l y a c c e p t
xv____
Translator's Introduction

the validity of t h e claims being raised. I n this " n o r m a l " case, a

speaker uses expressions such t h a t t h e h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s t h e
speaker as t h e speaker wants to b e u n d e r s t o o d , she f o r m u l a t e s p r o p -
ositional c o n t e n t s such t h a t they r e p r e s e n t e x p e r i e n c e s o r facts, she
expresses h e r i n t e n t i o n s (sincerely), a n d s h e p e r f o r m s s p e e c h acts
such t h a t t h e y c o n f o r m to r e c o g n i z e d n o r m s of a c c e p t e d self-images.
At t h e same t i m e , p a r t i c i p a n t s in c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n a r e a s s u m e d
t o be p r e p a r e d to r e a c h m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t is, t h e i r atti
t u d e is c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t h e r t h a n strategic ( o r i e n t e d toward realiz
ing o n e ' s own e n d s ) . As such, they are a s s u m e d to b e a c c o u n t a b l e ,
t h a t is, c a p a b l e of justifying t h e i r actions a n d expressions. A c c o u n t
ability t h u s refers to a g e n e r a l p r e s u m p t i o n of rationality, c a s h e d o u t
in t e r m s of o n e ' s r e a d i n e s s to justify t h e claims o n e raises. Because,
normally, in raising validity claims, a s p e a k e r takes o n t h e w a r r a n t to
m a k e g o o d on t h e m , f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s as a t h e o r y of " c o m m u n i c a
tive rationality" can serve as a f o u n d a t i o n for a critical t h e o r y . As a
speaker can be called u p o n to justify t h e claims raised in h e r utter
ances, the b u r d e n of justification a n d t h e possibility of critique are
built into t h e very s t r u c t u r e of l a n g u a g e a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
W h e n t h e consensus u n d e r l y i n g s m o o t h l y f u n c t i o n i n g c o m m u n i
cative i n t e r a c t i o n breaks d o w n a n d t h e flow of t h e l a n g u a g e g a m e is
i n t e r r u p t e d , p a r t i c u l a r claims to validity may b e t h e m a t i z e d . T o re
d e e m p r o b l e m a t i c claims to t r u t h o r to n o r m a t i v e Tightness, we m u s t
r e s o r t to a level of a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h a t H a b e r m a s calls discourse,
t h r o u g h which we seek to attain a rational c o n s e n s u s on t h e s e claims.
But how a r e speakers able to d i s t i n g u i s h a t r u e (or r a t i o n a l ) f r o m a
false (or merely c o n t i n g e n t ) consensus? N o t e t h a t we routinely as
s u m e , as a m a t t e r of fact, t h a t we are able to d o so, a n d that, in this
sense, s p e e c h is f u n d a m e n t a l l y rational. To m o d e l t h e a s s u m p t i o n s
built i n t o t h e ideal of r a t i o n a l discourse, H a b e r m a s i n t r o d u c e s t h e
n o t i o n of t h e ideal speech situation. T h e ideal s p e e c h situation is sub
j e c t only to t h e " u n f o r c e d force of t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t " ; it is devoid
of all o t h e r constraints. All i n t e r l o c u t o r s a r e equally e n t i t l e d to m a k e
assertions, raise q u e s t i o n s a n d objections, o r p r o v i d e justifications
f o r their positions. A n d all express t h e i r t r u e i n t e n t i o n s . It is crucial
to r e m e m b e r t h a t discourses as a matter offact usually d o not manifest
t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e ideal s p e e c h situation, b u t t h e m o d e l c a n serve
xvi
Translator's Introduction

as a s t a n d a r d in identifying deviations from t h e ideal of r a t i o n a l

consensus.
T h e q u e s t i o n of w h e n c e t h e justifications for t h e m a t i z e d validity
claims are d r a w n brings us to t h e notion of t h e lifeworld, which is
c o m p l e m e n t a r y to t h a t of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. T h e lifeworld p r o
vides a c o n t e x t of relevance within which c o m m u n i c a t i v e actions
( a n d actors) a r e "always already" situated. As such, it always r e m a i n s
in t h e b a c k g r o u n d , s t a n d i n g "at t h e backs" of p a r t i c i p a n t s in c o m m u
n i c a t i o n , as it w e r e . It c a n n o t b e t r a n s c e n d e d : Speakers a n d actors
c a n n o t act by p l a c i n g themselves outside of it. It has, o n t h e contrary,
a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c h a r a c t e r insofar as it functions itself as a c o n d i t i o n
of possibility f o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. I n this sense, it functions as a
b a c k g r o u n d of m u t u a l intelligibility. I n t e r subjectively s h a r e d , it
makes possible t h e s m o o t h f u n c t i o n i n g of everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e
action. I n g e n e r a l , speakers d o n o t have explicit b u t only tacit knowl
edge of it; n o n e t h e l e s s , t h e lifeworld provides c o m m u n i c a t i v e actors
w i t h a s h a r e d stock of taken-for-granted i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o n w h i c h
they c a n d r a w in trying to u n d e r s t a n d others. In discourse, e l e m e n t s
of this i m p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e can b e r e n d e r e d explicit in o r d e r to re
d e e m validity claims t h a t have b e e n c h a l l e n g e d . This c o n n e c t i o n b e
tween universal p r a g m a t i c s a n d t h e lifeworld is discussed in t h e
f o u r t h G a u s s L e c t u r e , w h e r e H a b e r m a s d e f e n d s the linguistic t u r n in
p h e n o m e n o l o g y a n d suggests t h a t universal p r a g m a t i c s aims t o eluci
d a t e basic s t r u c t u r e s of t h e lifeworld. T h u s we can see t h a t h e early
o n c o n c e i v e d c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n a n d lifeworld as c o m p l e m e n
tary, a c o n n e c t i o n h e later s t r e n g t h e n e d a n d e l a b o r a t e d in The The
ory of Communicative Action.

Of special n o t e is H a b e r m a s ' s discussion of t r u t h i n t h e Gauss Lec

tures, for t r u t h claims enjoy p a r a d i g m a t i c status as validity claims
(p. 8 6 ) . W h e n we raise a t r u t h claim, we use l a n g u a g e cognitively.
A n d H a b e r m a s ' s discussion of cognitive l a n g u a g e use in t h e Gauss
L e c t u r e s focuses o n questions of r e f e r e n c e a n d p e r c e p t i o n e l e
m e n t s t h a t are n o t e m p h a s i z e d in his s u b s e q u e n t articulations of for
m a l p r a g m a t i c s . W h e n a t t r i b u t i n g a p r o p e r t y to a n object, h e claims,
a s p e a k e r p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t t h e object exists a n d t h a t t h e p r o p o s i t i o n
she asserts is t r u e . T h a t is, she assumes t h a t t h e subject e x p r e s s i o n
has a r e f e r e n t a n d t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t e can b e correctly a p p l i e d to it.
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Translator's Introduction

H a b e r m a s h e r e e n d o r s e s a d e s c r i p t i o n t h e o r y of r e f e r e n c e . Interest
ingly, h e also states t h a t o u r e x p e r i e n c e is in t h e first i n s t a n c e sensory
a n d only in t h e s e c o n d i n s t a n c e c o m m u n i c a t i v e (p. 79). In l i g h t of
r e c e n t criticisms to t h e effect t h a t h e n e e d s a t h e o r y of r e f e r e n c e to
avoid s o m e f o r m of linguistic idealism, the Gauss discussion is t h e r e
9
fore i m p o r t a n t .
It is also i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e it c o n t a i n s a n early t r e a t m e n t of t h e
so-called consensus theory of truth, which e m e r g e s f r o m H a b e r m a s ' s ac
c o u n t of t h e discursive r e d e m p t i o n or vindication of validity claims.
As we h a v e seen, a claim is discursively v i n d i c a t e d if r a t i o n a l c o n s e n
sus is r e a c h e d c o n c e r n i n g its validity, a n d t h e m e a n i n g of t r u t h , ac
cording to H a b e r m a s , is explicated by specifying t h e c o n d i t i o n s
u n d e r w h i c h validity claims can (or c o u l d ) b e vindicated. All of this
suggests an epistemic c o n c e p t i o n of t r u t h as w h a t is rationally a g r e e d
u p o n u n d e r ideal c o n d i t i o n s . T h e i n t e r e s t of t h e "consensus t h e o r y
of t r u t h , " however, lies n o t so m u c h in w h a t it says a b o u t t h e n a t u r e
of t r u t h , as in w h a t it says a b o u t h o w we reach a g r e e m e n t o n claims
to t r u t h . T h u s it is n o t so m u c h a t h e o r y of truth as a t h e o r y of
justification. A n d in fact, H a b e r m a s has since a b a n d o n e d a n epis
temic c o n c e p t i o n of t r u t h a n d has d e v e l o p e d this c o n c e p t i o n of ra
tional c o n s e n s u s primarily in the c o n t e x t of his t h e o r y of discourse
ethics, which h e d e v e l o p e d after t h e c o m p l e t i o n of The Theory of Com
municative Action.

While t h e Gauss L e c t u r e s focus o n t r u t h as a d i m e n s i o n of validity,

"Intentions, C o n v e n t i o n s , a n d Linguistic I n t e r a c t i o n s " (1976), an es
say m o r e explicitly l o c a t e d within t h e p h i l o s o p h y of action, focuses
o n t h e validity of social n o r m s a n d e x a m i n e s t h e c o n c e p t u a l inter
c o n n e c t i o n s between rules, conventions, n o r m - g o v e r n e d action, a n d
intentionality. R a t h e r t h a n establishing t h e n e e d f o r a t h e o r y of c o m
municative a c t i o n o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t o t h e r t h e o r i e s have failed to
p r o v i d e a d e q u a t e a c c o u n t s of intersubjectivity, H a b e r m a s is h e r e
c o n c e r n e d to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e n e e d for a t h e o r y of a c t i o n t h a t is
intersubjective. T h e c o n c e p t of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action is to a c c o u n t
for i n t e n t i o n a l action, t h a t is, a c t i o n caused by i n t e r n a l i n t e n t i o n a l
states (in B r e n t a n o ' s sense) of t h e agent, as well as f o r n o r m -
c o n f o r m i n g action o r b e h a v i o r in t h e sense of a c t i o n in a c c o r d a n c e
xvm
Translator's Introduction

with e x t e r n a l rules. T h e essay aims at d e v e l o p i n g a c o n c e p t of com

m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n (or, as h e p u t s it h e r e , i n t e r a c t i o n m e d i a t e d
through interpretation) that incorporates both intentional and
n o r m - g o v e r n e d action. H a b e r m a s c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e two m o d e l s of
i n t e n t i o n a l a n d n o r m - g o v e r n e d a c t i o n t h a t h e discusses a r e c o m p l e
m e n t a r y , a n d t h a t linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n can b e seen as constitu
tive for b o t h . But h e d o e s n o t advocate assimilating o r r e d u c i n g
social to linguistic t h e o r y . I n d e e d , h e a r g u e s against taking l a n g u a g e
as a p a r a d i g m for rule-following, o r assimilating semantic a n d social
c o n v e n t i o n s a n d taking t h e f o r m e r as p a r a d i g m a t i c of t h e latter,
since this w o u l d o b s c u r e t h e crucial distinction b e t w e e n c o m m u n i c a
tive a n d strategic action. Rather, h e conceives c o n v e n t i o n s "in t h e
sense of validthat is, intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d - n o r m s " as a sub
set of rules of action in g e n e r a l . T h e latter i n c l u d e s rules of instru
m e n t a l a c t i o n a n d strategic rules as well.
T h e duality of cognitive a n d n o n c o g n i t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n s c o n t i n u e s
to play a role in this essay as well. H a b e r m a s draws a n analytic distinc
t i o n b e t w e e n two types of intentionality, o n e r e f e r r i n g to a cognitive
r e l a t i o n to a w o r l d of objects, the o t h e r r e f e r r i n g to the stance a sub
j e c t adopts toward t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t she is expressing. I n t e n
tional a c t i o n c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d o n the m o d e l of teleological action,
in t h a t t h e a g e n t has a goal t h a t she i n t e n d s to a c c o m p l i s h a n d which
t h u s f u n c t i o n s as a cause of h e r actions. W h e n we e x a m i n e inten
tional action w i t h a view to t h e a g e n t ' s cognitive relation to t h e
world, it is p o s s i b l e u p to a p o i n t t o u n d e r s t a n d this relation
monologically. T h a t is, we can consider h e r as a n individual in isola
tion from o t h e r s a n d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e c u l t u r e in which she lives.
B u t as s o o n as we t r y t o give a n a c c o u n t of h o w t h e a g e n t c o m e s to
have the goals she has, this m o d e l begins to b r e a k d o w n . For h e r
goals d e p e n d o n h e r desires a n d o t h e r i n t e n t i o n a l states, w h i c h i n
t u r n result f r o m w h a t H a b e r m a s calls h e r " n e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . "
T h e s e in t u r n are a f u n c t i o n of t h e a g e n t ' s cultural values a n d
n o r m s , a n d this m e a n s t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l action c a n n o t b e a c c o u n t e d
for monologically. Rather, o u r a c c o u n t of n e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s r e
q u i r e s l o o k i n g at h o w subjects i n t e r a c t in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h m u t u a l l y
r e c o g n i z e d n o r m s a n d values, a n d this establishes a n e x u s b e t w e e n
intersubjective cultural t r a d i t i o n s a n d individual n e e d s .
r
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Translator's Introduction

O n e of t h e negative c o n s e q u e n c e s of starting f r o m t h e teleological

m e a n s - e n d s m o d e l is t h a t values a n d motives of action a r e r e p r e
sented as private n e e d s a n d w a n t s t h e m o s t serious flaw of a n em
piricist ethics, in H a b e r m a s ' s view. B u t if a p e r s o n ' s motives are to be
intelligible to o t h e r s , n e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s m u s t b e intersubjecdve,
a l t h o u g h t h e i r intelligibility does n o t yet c o n s t i t u t e a normatively
binding s t a n d a r d . An intelligible motive is n o t yet a justification; the
latter r e q u i r e s reasons t h a t all c a n share: "To say t h a t a n o r m is valid
is to say t h a t it claims to express a universalizable i n t e r e s t a n d to de
serve t h e c o n s e n t of all t h o s e affected" (p. 122). This f o r m u l a t i o n an
ticipates H a b e r m a s ' s s u b s e q u e n t f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e p r i n c i p l e of
universalizability of discourse ethics. More importantly, however,
these relatively early writings show t h e d e e p c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e
universalizability of interests a n d their origin in intersubjectivity. In
sofar as o u r wants a n d n e e d s always a p p e a r u n d e r s o m e i n t e r p r e t a
tion, they p r e s u p p o s e a c o m m u n i t y that has a l a n g u a g e c o n t a i n i n g
evaluative expressions, w h i c h in t u r n are r o o t e d in an inter-
subjectively s h a r e d t r a d i t i o n of c u l t u r a l values. T h e s e values b e c o m e
normatively b i n d i n g w h e n t h e r e is a c o n s e n s u s t h a t is r e p r o d u c e d i n
l a n g u a g e a n d s e d i m e n t e d in t h e f o r m of c o n v e n t i o n s .
C o n v e n t i o n s , of course, a r e c o m m o n l y a p p e a l e d t o in o r d e r t o ex
p l a i n how we u n d e r s t a n d o n e a n o t h e r . H a b e r m a s d o e s n o t p r e s u p
pose t h a t t h e r e simply are such c o n v e n t i o n s t h a t m a k e m u t u a l
u n d e r s t a n d i n g possible any m o r e t h a n h e p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t t h e r e
simply are subjects w h o a b i d e by t h e m (let a l o n e stipulate t h e m ) . In
stead, relying o n G. H . M e a d ' s analyses, h e offers a d e v e l o p m e n t a l ac
c o u n t of h o w such c o n v e n t i o n s are established as n o r m a t i v e
11
e x p e c t a t i o n s p r e s u p p o s e d in s p e e c h acts. O n c e we a c c e p t that b o t h
having i n t e n t i o n s a n d acting in a c c o r d a n c e with n o r m s p r e s u p p o s e
linguistic i n t e r a c t i o n , we can u n d e r s t a n d h o w subject f o r m a t i o n is
the result of linguistic i n t e r a c t i o n , h o w we a r e socialized in a n d
t h r o u g h communicative interaction.

Finally, t h e essay "Reflection on C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology" (1974)

seeks to address t h e q u e s t i o n of deviant processes of socializationa
topic t h a t any d e v e l o p m e n t a l a c c o u n t of interactive c o m p e t e n c e
m u s t a d d r e s s a n d c o n t a i n s an analysis of t h e f o r m a l c o n d i t i o n s of
XX

Translator's Introduction

systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n . H a b e r m a s ' s g u i d i n g as
s u m p t i o n h e r e is t h a t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of interactive c o m p e t e n c e is
c o n n e c t e d t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of i n t e r n a l m e c h a n i s m s for c o n t r o l
ling behavior, b u t t h a t these two d e v e l o p m e n t s a r e distinct (since
m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a n d actual b e h a v i o r in conflict r e s o l u t i o n d o n o t
c o i n c i d e ) . His analysis stresses t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n linguistic
c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d e g o d e v e l o p m e n t : " C o m m u n i c a t i v e action is t h e
m e d i u m of socialization" (p. 131). Picking u p o n a t h e m e m e n t i o n e d
above, this essay establishes t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n subjectivity a n d
intersubjectivity by showing t h a t a subject's i n t e n t i o n s a r e socially,
t h a t is, intersubjectively, s t r u c t u r e d .
H a b e r m a s w a n t s to show t h a t b o t h social a n d individual p a t h o l o
gies c a n b e analyzed in t e r m s of d i s t u r b a n c e s in interactive c o m p e
t e n c e . S u c h a n a c c o u n t , however, p r e s u p p o s e s a m o d e l of undisturbed
or normal c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d interaction in t h e t e r m s of his f o r m a l
p r a g m a t i c s . O n this a p p r o a c h t h e n o t i o n of n o r m a l c y is n o t deter
m i n e d by a n y p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e , n o r is it a statistical n o r m ; it is r a t h e r
a culturally invariant n o r m a t i v e n o t i o n .
H a b e r m a s h a s b e e n criticized for p r e s e n t i n g t o o idealized a n ac
c o u n t of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , particularly owing to his n o t i o n of t h e
ideal s p e e c h situation. This last essay shows t h a t h e is very m u c h at
t u n e d t o the e m p i r i c a l vagaries of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I n claiming t h a t
t h e validity basis of s p e e c h h a s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l status, H a b e r m a s cer
tainly does n o t m e a n to imply t h a t we c a n n o t deviate from t h e c o n d i
tions of n o r m a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n ; otherwise, we would n o t have t o
explicate t h e normative basis of s p e e c h . T h e c o n d i t i o n s of possible
c o m m u n i c a t i o n a r e t h u s n o t t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n t h e s a m e sense as, say,
Kant's t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n t u i t i o n s of space a n d time q u a c o n d i t i o n s of
possible p e r c e p t i o n . N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e f o r m a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s u n d e r
lying c o m m u n i c a t i o n a r e , a c c o r d i n g t o H a b e r m a s , unavoidable.
Moreover, as s u c h they f u n c t i o n s o m e w h a t like regulative ideals in t h e
K a n t i a n sense. T h e y a r e n o t inviolable, b u t in cases w h e r e t h e inter
n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of speech is violated, t h e p a t t e r n s of c o m m u n i c a
tion a r e pathologically distorted. We h a v e a l r e a d y seen t h a t
i n t e r l o c u t o r s m a y c h a l l e n g e t h e validity claims raised by o t h e r s a n d
t h e r e b y p r o m p t c o m m u n i c a t i o n shifts from action t o discourse. It is
also possible t h a t t h e claims t o intelligibility, t r u t h , Tightness, o r sin-
 xxi_
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cerity a r e continually s u s p e n d e d o r flawed w i t h o u t p r o m p t i n g such a

shift. If this h a p p e n s , t h e result is systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i
cation. T h e k i n d of violation of the universal p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of
c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t leads to systematic distortion is n o t the result of
a lack of c o m p e t e n c e in the l a n g u a g e , a m i s c o n c e p t i o n of the level of
discussion, or a r e t r e a t f r o m c o m m u n i c a t i v e to strategic action.
T h e s e all involve a cessation of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, w h e r e a s in t h e
cases t h a t H a b e r m a s has in m i n d , c o m m u n i c a t i v e action c o n t i n u e s
in spite of t h e violation of its f o r m a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . T h e s t r o n g e s t
cases of systematic d i s t o r t i o n a r e those in which t h e s p e a k i n g sub
jects themselves are u n a w a r e of their violation of c o m m u n i c a t i v e pre
suppositions, such as w h e n a c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r expresses herself
unintelligibly w i t h o u t r e a l i z i n g it, w h e n o n e spouse deceives herself
a b o u t h e r feelings for t h e other, or w h e n a s p e a k e r t h i n k s she is act
ing in a c c o r d a n c e with social n o r m s b u t is actually violating t h e m .
Ideally, t h e rejection of a validity claim leads to d i s c o u r s e , in which
t h e s p e a k e r seeks to justify t h e claims she is m a k i n g ; or t h e s p e a k e r
shows by h e r actions t h a t she is sincere. But this d o e s n o t h a p p e n in
cases of distorted c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t stem from conflicts t h a t can
n o t b e q u i t e suppressed yet m u s t n o t b e c o m e o p e n l y manifest
because, for e x a m p l e , they t h r e a t e n t h e identity o r self-understand
ing of o n e or m o r e i n t e r l o c u t o r s . T h i s sort of situation results in a
kind of p a r a d o x of systematic distortion of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , for the
very validity claims t h a t are b e i n g violated "serve to k e e p u p t h e ap
p e a r a n c e of c o n s e n s u a l a c t i o n " (p. 155).
This discussion m a k e s clear t h a t t h e idealizations r e q u i r e d by this
m o d e l of c o m m u n i c a t i o n m a y fail. However, t h e idealized m o d e l al
lows for a systematic u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e different sorts of failure
a n d provides t h e n o r m s or s t a n d a r d s for criticizing t h e m .
As t h e e m p i r i c a l literature u p o n w h i c h H a b e r m a s draws in this dis
cussion indicates, systematic distortions c o n n e c t e d with subject-
f o r m a t i o n occur particularly often within families. N o t only is this a
c o n t e x t i n which p e o p l e ' s identities are f o r m e d a n d c o n f i r m e d , it is a
c o n t e x t in which a particularly h i g h p r e m i u m is p l a c e d o n c o m m u n i
cative r a t h e r t h a n strategic action. O n t h e o n e h a n d , families a r e ex
p e c t e d to function as units; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e n e e d s a n d wants
of individuals have to b e m e t within t h e family structure. T h u s t h e r e
xxii
Translator's Introduction

is a tension a n d p o t e n t i a l conflict b e t w e e n t h e o r i e n t a t i o n toward

m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d t h e o r i e n t a t i o n toward individual n e e d
satisfaction. Failure t o resolve s u c h conflicts explicidy c a n l e a d t o sys
tematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n , in which m e m b e r s e m p l o y dif
f e r e n t strategies for m a i n t a i n i n g or p r o d u c i n g a "pseudo-consensus."
T h e y ma}' seek to safeguard an e n d a n g e r e d c o n s e n s u s a n d p r e v e n t
c h a l l e n g e s to it by, for instance, i n t e r r u p t i n g or b r e a k i n g off con
versation, r e f o r m u l a t i n g a d i s a g r e e m e n t as a n a g r e e m e n t , falsely re
c i p r o c a t i n g a n o t h e r ' s action, o r i n t h e most e x t r e m e case t h a t
t h r e a t e n s t h e very intelligibility of t h e i r u t t e r a n c e s a n d actions inas
m u c h as i n c o h e r e n c e violates t h e n o r m s of rationalitybehaving in
consistently. T h e n o t i o n of systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n
evidently i n t r o d u c e s a t h i r d o p t i o n between t h e successful c o m p l e
t i o n of a s p e e c h act a n d w h a t J. L. Austin t e r m s a "misfire" in w h i c h
t h e s p e e c h act itself fails.
H a b e r m a s links a family's p o t e n t i a l for conflict t o p o w e r relations,
c l a i m i n g t h a t a "family's ability to solve . . . p r o b l e m s stands in an in
verse relation to its i n t e r n a l p o t e n t i a l for conflict. T h e latter in t u r n
is a function of t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o w e r " (p. 161). H e d o e s n o t ,
however, s u g g e s t t h a t a h e a l t h y family m u s t s u c c e e d in t r a n s c e n d i n g
p o w e r relations. Rather, h e allows for a "healthy" distribution of
power, which, nevertheless, is c o n n e c t e d to an "asymmetrical distri
bution of o p p o r t u n i t i e s " for gratification. O n c e again, t h e r e is a
clear r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t empirical c i r c u m s t a n c e s e v e n in c o m m u n i
catively s t r u c t u r e d c o n t e x t s d i v e r g e significantly from t h e ideal
s p e e c h situation.

While t h e s e lectures a n d essays p r o v i d e a g o o d i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e

t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, they a r e also transitional in n a t u r e :
T h e y f o r m a b r i d g e b e t w e e n H a b e r m a s ' s work of t h e 1960s a n d t h a t
of t h e 1980s. H i s linguistic t u r n was initially motivated by t h e convic
tion t h a t a critical social t h e o r y r e q u i r e d a s o u n d m e t h o d o l o g i c a l
a n d e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n : h e n c e t h e project of p r o v i d i n g a
linguistic g r o u n d i n g for sociology. However, t h e project of develop
i n g a c o m p r e h e n s i v e t h e o r y of rationality, which is w h a t t h e t h e o r y of
c o m m u n i c a t i v e action in effect a t t e m p t s , c a n n o t be c a r r i e d o u t
m e r e l y f r o m t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l perspective of finding a n a l t e r n a -
 x x.iii__
Translator's Introduction

tivc to objectivist a n d subjectivist social t h e o r i e s . T h u s H a b e r m a s

soon f o u n d it n e c e s s a r v to d e v e l o p a n a c c o u n t of t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s
of action o r i e n t e d toward r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n d e p e n d e n t l y of
an a c c o u n t of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of social-scientific
12
k n o w l e d g e . T h i s h e l p s e x p l a i n why t h e distinction b e t w e e n cogni
tive a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e use, which is so c e n t r a l in t h e
Gauss Lectures, b e c o m e s less p r o m i n e n t in his s u b s e q u e n t f o r m u l a
13
tions of t h e t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n .
At the same time, while H a b e r m a s has b e e n w o r k i n g o u t a c o m
p l e x t h e o r y of action, h e has also e l a b o r a t e d his c o n c e p t i o n of
s p e e c h act t h e o r y a n d of f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s to serve as t h e basis f o r a
social theory of m e a n i n g . Since t h e writing of t h e Gauss Lectures, h e
has d e v e l o p e d a systematic classification s c h e m e for t h e o r i e s of
m e a n i n g , in which h e distinguishes f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s , i n t e n t i o n a l i s t
semantics, a n d use t h e o r i e s of m e a n i n g . I n his view, e a c h of these fo
cuses on but o n e of the t h r e e functions of l a n g u a g e that an a d e q u a t e
t h e o r y of m e a n i n g m u s t i n c o r p o r a t e . As we saw, in c o m m u n i c a t i n g ,
we r e p r e s e n t facts a b o u t t h e world, we express o u r subjective states,
a n d we interact w i t h others; a n d these t h r e e functions c o r r e s p o n d to
t h e t h r e e validity claims of t r u t h , sincerity, a n d Tightness t h a t f o r m a l
14
pragmatics analyzes. I n his r e c e n t work, in a d d i t i o n to s p e e c h act
theory, H a b e r m a s also draws o n Michael D u m m e t t ' s assertibilist se
mantics, a c c o r d i n g to which t h e m e a n i n g of a s e n t e n c e ( o r utter
a n c e ) is given by t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which it is a c c e p t a b l e to
h e a r e r s . D e v e l o p i n g this aspect of f o r m a l pragmatics once again u n
d e r s c o r e s t h e aspects of rationality a n d intersubjectivity; for t o say
t h a t u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n u t t e r a n c e is k n o w i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r
w h i c h it is a c c e p t a b l e entails t h a t a s p e a k e r - h e a r e r d o e s n o t fully u n
d e r s t a n d a given u t t e r a n c e unless s h e knows w h a t r e a s o n s c o u l d b e
offered t o back u p t h e claims raised i n t h e u t t e r a n c e . A n d c o n s t r u e d
in this way, acceptability c o n d i t i o n s c a n n o t b e d e t e r m i n e d i n d e
p e n d e n t l y of an intersubjective p r a c t i c e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d
justification.

H a b e r m a s has recently r e t u r n e d to s o m e of t h e t h e m e s a d u m
b r a t e d in t h e early 1970s. O n e of these is t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e n a t u r e
of t r u t h , as I i n d i c a t e d above. A n o t h e r is t h e distinction b e t w e e n
15
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d n o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e u s e . Yet t h e views
xxiv
Translator's Introduction

a r t i c u l a t e d in these early works are n o t only relevant to H a b e r m a s ' s

c u r r e n t t h o u g h t ; they b e a r o n c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o s o p h i c a l discus
sions m o r e broadly. W i t h i n Anglo-American philosophy, t h e r e has
b e e n a r e s u r g e n c e of i n t e r e s t in p r a g m a t i c s a n d in social t h e o r i e s of
m e a n i n g t h a t d o justice to t h e intersubjectivity of social i n t e r a c t i o n .
A p r i m e e x a m p l e is R o b e r t B r a n d o m ' s Making It Explicit, w h i c h is a n
e l a b o r a t e working o u t of a s e m a n t i c t h e o r y b a s e d o n social practices
a n d , in particular, practices of justification. O n B r a n d o m ' s view, se
m a n t i c s is b a s e d o n t h e giving of a n d asking for r e a s o n s : T o give t h e
m e a n i n g of a s e n t e n c e is t o articulate t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h its
assertion is justified, w h i c h is to articulate a w e b of justificatory rela
tions. However, u n l i k e H a b e r m a s , B r a n d o m does n o t distinguish be
tween i r r e d u c i b l y distinct types of validity claims; t h e focus of his
analysis r e m a i n s t h e assertion, w h i c h h e c o n t i n u e s to r e g a r d as basic.
This constitutes a p o t e n t i a l c h a l l e n g e t o H a b e r m a s ' s system n o t only
with r e s p e c t to t h e irreducibility of t h e t h r e e validity claims to t r u t h ,
Tightness, a n d sincerity, b u t also with r e s p e c t to t h e status of t h e as
sertion w i t h i n his o w n framework. Given t h e p r o f o u n d i n f l u e n c e
Sellars has h a d o n B r a n d o m , H a b e r m a s ' s discussion of Sellars m i g h t
also b e a potentially fruitful p o i n t of e n g a g e m e n t , with r e g a r d to
16
b o t h s e m a n t i c s a n d p e r c e p t i o n . It w o u l d be a way of fleshing o u t
t h e cognitive d i m e n s i o n of l a n g u a g e a n d clarifying its r e l a t i o n s h i p to
t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e d i m e n s i o n , a r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t lies at t h e h e a r t of
H a b e r m a s ' s project.

Acknowledgments

T h i s p r o j e c t w o u l d n o t have b e e n possible w i t h o u t t h e h e l p a n d sup

p o r t of o t h e r s . I a m i n d e b t e d to J e r e m y Shapiro for his e x c e l l e n t
o r i g i n a l translation of t h e Gauss L e c t u r e s , w h i c h m a d e my o w n task
i m m e a s u r a b l y easier. My t h a n k s to H a r r y Heft, J o n a t h a n Maskit, Ste
ven Vogel, C h r i s t o p h e r Z u r n , a n d especially T h o m a s M c C a r t h y w h o
all p r o v i d e d i n v a l u a b l e f e e d b a c k o n t h e translation a n d i n t r o d u c
tion. I w o u l d also like t o t h a n k Pat Davis, w h o t r a n s f e r r e d t h e origi
n a l typescript of t h e lectures o n t o disk, as well as L a r r y C o h e n a n d
J u d y F e l d m a n n of M I T Press for t h e i r assistance. Finally, I a m grate
ful to J i i r g e n H a b e r m a s for his generosity in r e s p o n d i n g to my
queries.
Reflections on the Linguistic Foundation of
Sociology
The Christian Gauss Lectures (Princeton University,
February-March 1971)
f
Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to
Theory Formation in the Social Sciences

T h e r e a r e c o m p e t i n g t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h e s in t h e social sciences
that differ n o t only in t h e k i n d s of p r o b l e m s t h e y address a n d t h e re
search strategies t h e y apply, b u t in t h e i r f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s .
They diverge i n t h e i r c h o i c e of categorial frameworks a n d i n how
they c o n c e p t u a l i z e their object d o m a i n t h a t is, in h o w they define
what it is they a r e actually studying. T h e s e differences of c o n c e p t u a l
strategy express m o r e d e e p l y r o o t e d conflicts: conflicting views of sci
e n c e a n d cognitive interests. My aim h e r e is n o t to investigate a n d
systematically e x p o u n d these theoretical a p p r o a c h e s . I i n t e n d r a t h e r
to develop a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t u a l strategy for t h e social sciences a n d
to establish its theoretical plausibility a n d p o t e n t i a l . I s h o u l d like to
b e g i n with some c o m p a r a t i v e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t
lead to some p r e l i m i n a r y classifications. T h e s e a r e to serve exclu
sively as a provisional delimitation of a c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h e o r y of so
ciety. T h i s t h e o r y d o e s n o t yet exist in a satisfactory f o r m , a n d I can
only discuss a few issues t h a t motivate m e to c o n s i d e r such a n ap
p r o a c h to b e fruitful.
In terms of c o n c e p t u a l strategy, t h e first decision t h a t is of funda
m e n t a l significance for a t h e o r e t i c a l p r o g r a m in t h e social sciences is
w h e t h e r to a d m i t o r reject " m e a n i n g " [Sinn] as a primitive t e r m . I
take t h e p a r a d i g m of " m e a n i n g " to b e t h e m e a n i n g [Bedeutung] of a
1
w o r d o r a s e n t e n c e . T h u s I a m assuming t h a t t h e r e are n o p u r e or
a priori s p e a k e r i n t e n t i o n s ; m e a n i n g always has o r finds a symbolic
expression; to attain clarity, i n t e n t i o n s m u s t always b e able to t a k e o n
4
Lecture I

symbolic f o r m a n d to b e expressed. This expression c a n b e an ele

m e n t of a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e o r linguistically derivative (it may, for ex
a m p l e , b e l o n g to a system of signs with which t h e deaf-mute or
drivers in traffic c o m m u n i c a t e ) . T h e expression may also b e n o n
verbal, t h a t is, it m a y t a k e t h e f o r m of an action o r of a bodily ex
pression (a g r i m a c e or g e s t u r e ) , or of an artistic or musical
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I a m a s s u m i n g t h a t a m e a n i n g t h a t is e x p r e s s e d
nonverbally c a n i n p r i n c i p l e b e r e n d e r e d , at least approximately, in
2
words: W h a t e v e r can b e m e a n t c a n be said. T h e converse, however,
d o e s n o t h o l d . Not e v e r y t h i n g t h a t can be said is necessarily express
ible nonverbally.
If we may d e f i n e " m e a n i n g " from t h e o u t s e t as linguistic m e a n i n g
[Sinn], t h a t is, with r e f e r e n c e to t h e signification [Bedeutung] of
w o r d s a n d s e n t e n c e s , t h e n this first basic decision in c o n c e p t u a l strat
egy can be r e f o r m u l a t e d m o r e precisely. It is in fact a m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l
decision as to w h e t h e r linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n is to b e r e g a r d e d as
a constitutive f e a t u r e of t h e object d o m a i n of t h e social sciences. T h e
t e r m "constitutive" m e a n s t h a t t h e object d o m a i n s t u d i e d by t h e so
cial sciences is itself d e t e r m i n e d in t e r m s of linguistic c o m m u n i c a
tion. S o m e t i m e s we describe l a n g u a g e by using categories of
o b s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o r or transmissible i n f o r m a t i o n a n d e x p l a i n lin
guistic processes in t e r m s of l e a r n i n g theory. I n these cases, m e a n
ingfully s t r u c t u r e d forms are t a k e n as objects a m o n g o t h e r physical
objects; t h e l a t t e r are d e s c r i b e d in a c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k t h a t is
n o t specific to a n y l a n g u a g e a n d a r e s t u d i e d by m e a n s of e m p i r i c a l
t h e o r i e s . I n contrast, l a n g u a g e is constitutive of an object d o m a i n if
its categorial framework is s u c h t h a t meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d f o r m s
(such as p e r s o n s , expressions, a n d institutions) c a n a p p e a r in it as
p h e n o m e n a r e q u i r i n g e x p l a n a t i o n . " M e a n i n g " h a s t h e status of a
primitive t e r m in t h e social sciences if we use it to characterize t h e
structure of t h e object d o m a i n itself, r a t h e r t h a n j u s t individual ele
m e n t s within it. I s h o u l d like to clarify this first m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l deci
sion by p o i n t i n g o u t t h r e e of its implications.

(a) Behavior versus action

Only if " m e a n i n g " is a d m i t t e d as a primitive t e r m in sociology c a n we
distinguish a c t i o n f r o m behavior. At p r e s e n t I s h o u l d like to set aside
 Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

the p r i o r p r o b l e m of t h e d e m a r c a t i o n b e t w e e n those o b s e r v a b l e
events t h a t we i n t e r p r e t as b e h a v i o r a n d those events t h a t we c a n n o t
i n t e r p r e t as behavior. T h e i n t e r p r e t i v e s c h e m e t h a t allows us t o u n
derstand t h e m o t i o n of a b o d y as t h e e x p r e s s i o n of a n o r g a n i s m , in
o t h e r w o r d s , as t h e m o v e m e n t of a living body, has n o t yet b e e n satis
3
factorily analyzed. By d e s c r i b i n g an o b s e r v a b l e m o t i o n as behavior,
we ascribe it to an o r g a n i s m t h a t r e p r o d u c e s its life by a d a p t i n g to its
e n v i r o n m e n t . W e u n d e r s t a n d it as a m o v e m e n t b r o u g h t a b o u t by an
organism. I n so d o i n g , we are a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e r e is a n e n d t y X that
in some b r o a d sense is "responsible" for this m o v e m e n t . I n this con
text, of course, t h e c a t e g o r y of responsibility can b e u s e d only in
scare q u o t e s , t h a t is, w i t h certain reservations. F o r a n a n i m a l c a n n o t
be h e l d responsible for its b e h a v i o r in t h e same sense t h a t a subject
capable of s p e e c h a n d c o g n i t i o n c a n b e h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e for its ac
tions. N o n e t h e l e s s , we a p p a r e n t l y derive t h e perspective from w h i c h
we i n t e r p r e t m o t i o n s as m o d e s of b e h a v i o r f r o m a private modificat
ion of the p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of o u r own social lifeworld. I call this
modification privative b e c a u s e we a r e capable of distinguishing be
havioral r e s p o n s e s f r o m o t h e r events w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o a p p e a l to t h e
category of m e a n i n g . For t h a t c a t e g o r y m a k e s it possible to differen
tiate between b e h a v i o r t h a t I can u n d e r s t a n d as i n t e n t i o n a l action
a n d b e h a v i o r t h a t c a n n o t b e c o m p r e h e n d e d u n d e r this d e s c r i p t i o n .
I call b e h a v i o r intentional if it is g o v e r n e d by n o r m s or o r i e n t e d t o
rules. R u l e s o r n o r m s d o n o t h a p p e n like events, b u t h o l d o w i n g to
a n intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d m e a n i n g [Bedeutung]. N o r m s have se
m a n t i c c o n t e n t : t h a t is, a m e a n i n g [Sinn] t h a t b e c o m e s t h e r e a s o n o r
motive for b e h a v i o r w h e n e v e r t h e y a r e o b e y e d by a subject to w h o m
things a r e m e a n i n g f u l . I n this case we speak of a n action. T h e i n t e n
tion of a n a c t o r w h o o r i e n t s his o r h e r b e h a v i o r t o a r u l e c o r r e s p o n d s
t o t h e m e a n i n g of t h a t r u l e . O n l y t h i s normatively g u i d e d b e h a v i o r is
what we call action. It is only a c t i o n s t h a t we speak of as i n t e n t i o n a l .
O b s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o r fulfills a prevailing n o r m if a n d only if this b e
havior can b e u n d e r s t o o d as p r o d u c e d by a n a c t i n g subject w h o has
g r a s p e d t h e m e a n i n g of t h e n o r m a n d o b e y e d it intentionally. Behav
ior that we o b s e r v e over a p a r t i c u l a r p e r i o d of time can de facto ac
cord with a given n o r m w i t h o u t being n o r m - g o v e r n e d . T h a t is why
we distinguish r e g u l a r b e h a v i o r f r o m r u l e - g o v e r n e d behavior, o r
6
Lecture I

action. We discover regularities t h r o u g h inductive generalizations;

e i t h e r t h e y exist o r t h e y d o n o t . In contrast, we m u s t u n d e r s t a n d t h e
m e a n i n g of r u l e s ; thev have n o r m a t i v e validity. We c a n b r e a k rules;
b u t it is m e a n i n g l e s s t o say t h a t regularities a r e violated. Rules t h a t
u n d e r l i e a practice can be a c c e p t e d o r rejected, whereas regularities
in b e h a v i o r c a n b e affirmed o r d e n i e d . Naturally we can assert t h e
existence of regularities in c o n t e x t s of i n t e n t i o n a l action as m u c h as
in a c h a i n o f b e h a v i o r a l r e s p o n s e s . But in t h e f o r m e r case, we c a n d e
d u c e t h e assertion from t h e fact t h a t n o r m s a r e followed with spe
cifiable probability, w h e r e a s in t h e l a t t e r we m u s t base o u r assertion
o n a n i n d u c t i v e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n f r o m o b s e r v e d behavior.

(b) Observation versus the understanding of meaning [Sinnverstehen]

T h e distinction we have drawn b e t w e e n b e h a v i o r a n d action leads to
a f u r t h e r distinction b e t w e e n different m o d e s of e x p e r i e n c e in
which b e h a v i o r a l responses a n d actions a r e accessible to us. W e o b
serve b e h a v i o r a n d behavioral regularities, whereas we u n d e r s t a n d
actions. O n c e a g a i n it is t h e c a t e g o r y of m e a n i n g t h a t differentiates
t h e two m o d e s o f e x p e r i e n c e . I c a n n o t o b s e r v e actions as m e r e be
havior. F o r if a g i v e n b e h a v i o r is to b e d e s c r i b e d as a n action, t h e n I
m u s t relate features of this b e h a v i o r to rules o n which it is b a s e d a n d
u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g of these rules. Of course t h e a p p r e h e n s i o n
of s t r u c t u r e s of a c t i o n t h r o u g h t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of m e a n i n g rests
on observations.
Let m e c o m p a r e two p e r c e p t u a l j u d g m e n t s o r "observation state
m e n t s . " "I see a fly b o u n c i n g against t h e window" is a s e n t e n c e in
which I r e p o r t t h e o b s e r v a t i o n o f a behavior. I n contrast, "I see J o h n
r e t u r n i n g from work" is a s e n t e n c e with w h i c h I describe an "ob
served" action. I u s e t h e e x p r e s s i o n "to see" in t h e s a m e way in b o t h
cases. F o r b o t h sentences r e p o r t e v e n t s t h a t t h e s p e a k e r claims to
perceive at t h e t i m e . Nevertheless, in t h e f o r m e r case "seeing" m e a n s
o b s e r v i n g a n e v e n t t h a t c a n b e c o m p r e h e n d e d as behavior, w h e r e a s
i n t h e latter it m e a n s u n d e r s t a n d i n g an action. Of c o u r s e this u n d e r
s t a n d i n g is based on t h e o b s e r v a t i o n of an o c c u r r e n c e ( t h e d o o r b e l l
r i n g i n g , a p e r s o n e n t e r i n g t h e r o o m , etc.); b u t t h e o b s e r v e d behav
ioral e l e m e n t s a n d events a r e interpreted with r e f e r e n c e to a s t r u c t u r e
of action. T h e latter consists in n o r m s , in this case, social n o r m s t h a t
 7____
Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

regulate work h o u r s a n d t r a n s p o r t a t i o n to a n d from work. I have to

be a c q u a i n t e d with n o r m s of this sort a n d t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e i r ap
plication in o r d e r to know when a given o c c u r r e n c e can be inter
p r e t e d as a case in w h i c h t h e n o r m applies. "I see J o h n r e t u r n i n g
from work" m e a n s t h a t I u n d e r s t a n d a n o b s e r v e d o c c u r r e n c e as t h e
fulfillment of a n o r m : t h a t is, as a p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n i n this case, as
"returning from work." To see, o b s e r v e , or perceive a n action always
involves u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n o r m (or the c o r r e s p o n d i n g i n t e n t i o n of
the actor) a n d i n t e r p r e t i n g m o v e m e n t s (or states of affairs) in t h e
light of t h e n o r m (or i n t e n t i o n ) t h a t is u n d e r s t o o d .
T h e decision w h e t h e r i n t e n d o n a l action s h o u l d be a d m i t t e d has
m e t h o d o l o g i c a l implications precisely w i t h r e g a r d to t h e m o d e of ex
4
p e r i e n c e . T h i s can be s e e n at the level of p r o b l e m s of m e a s u r e m e n t .
M e a s u r e m e n t s serve to t r a n s f o r m e x p e r i e n c e i n t o d a t a t h a t m e e t t h e
d e m a n d s of intersubjective reliability a n d o n t h e basis of which t h e
claim to empirical validity of t h e o r e t i c a l s t a t e m e n t s c a n be verified.
Observations o f events ( a n d behavioral responses) c a n b e l i n k e d
with t h e l a n g u a g e g a m e of physical m e a s u r e m e n t . B u t t h e r e is n o
c o r r e s p o n d i n g system of reliably i n c u l c a t e d basic m e a s u r e m e n t o p
erations, such as t h e o n e available for m o v i n g b o d i e s (or p o i n t s of
mass) for objects such as actions, w h i c h a r e accessible only t h r o u g h
c o m m u n i c a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e [sinnverstehende Erfahrung]. In other
w o r d s , observations t h a t can b e e x p r e s s e d in descriptive s e n t e n c e s of
a l a n g u a g e for t h i n g s a n d events can b e verified t h r o u g h r e c o g n i z e d
p r o c e d u r e s t h a t a r e r e d u c i b l e to physical m e a s u r e m e n t . T h e inter
p r e t a t i o n of t h e m e a n i n g of symbolic forms s u c h as actions, w h i c h
can b e r e p r e s e n t e d in descriptive s e n t e n c e s of a l a n g u a g e f o r per
sons a n d expressions, c a n n o t b e reliably o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d in a n a l o
gous fashion. U n t i l now, t h e m e a s u r e m e n t of symbolized m e a n i n g
has d e p e n d e d o n a d h o c p r o c e d u r e s t h a t in t h e final analysis rest o n
an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of l a n g u a g e t h a t r e m a i n s prescientific, a l t h o u g h it
m a y b e s h a p e d by t h e discipline of h e r m e n e u t i c s . In p r i n c i p l e , any
one w h o masters a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e can, by virtue of c o m m u n i c a t i v e
c o m p e t e n c e , u n d e r s t a n d a n infinite n u m b e r of expressions, if they
are a t all m e a n i n g f u l , a n d m a k e t h e m intelligible t o others. T h a t
is, she can i n t e r p r e t t h e m . Some a r e m o r e practiced at this t h a n
5
o t h e r s : H e r m e n e u t i c s is an art a n d n o t a m e t h o d . W e m a k e use of
8
Lecture I

h e r m e n e u t i c s , t h e art of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , instead of a m e a s u r e m e n t
p r o c e d u r e ; b u t it is n o t s u c h a p r o c e d u r e . T h e only t h i n g t h a t w o u l d
allow for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of basic m e a s u r e m e n t o p e r a t i o n s for
m e a n i n g w o u l d be a t h e o r y of o r d i n a r y - l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t i o n
t h a t did n o t m e r e l y g u i d e a n d discipline t h e n a t u r a l faculty of com
m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e , as h e r m e n e u t i c s d o e s , b u t t h a t could also
explain it.

(c) Conventionalism versus essentialism

N o m a t t e r h o w t h e p r o b l e m of m e a s u r i n g t h e m e a n i n g of symbolic
expressions is solved, t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l basis of a t h e o r y of action re
m a i n s distinct from t h a t of a behaviorist theory in t h e strict sense.
For t h e a d e q u a c y of a d e s c r i p t i o n of a meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d con
struct, a n u t t e r a n c e o r an action, can b e tested only by r e f e r e n c e t o
t h e k n o w l e d g e of t h e subject w h o p r o d u c e d t h e expression. I n m a n y
cases a subject c a p a b l e of a c t i o n m a y n o t b e a b l e to specify explicitly
the n o r m s a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h it orients his behavior. Nevertheless,
insofar as it m a s t e r s n o r m s a n d c a n follow t h e m , it h a s an implicit
k n o w l e d g e of rules. O n t h e basis of this know-how it can always d e
cide w h e t h e r a given b e h a v i o r a l r e s p o n s e c o r r e s p o n d s to a k n o w n
rule at all, t h a t is, w h e t h e r it can b e u n d e r s t o o d as action. T h e sub
j e c t c a n d e c i d e w h e t h e r , in a given case, s u c h a b e h a v i o r a l r e s p o n s e
a c c o r d s w i t h o r deviates f r o m a given n o r m , a n d to w h a t e x t e n t it de
viates from a n u n d e r l y i n g n o r m . T h e situation is similar w i t h r e g a r d
to linguistic u t t e r a n c e s . Usually, c o m p e t e n t speakers a r e able to ex
plicate t h e g r a m m a t i c a l r u l e s of t h e n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e in w h i c h they
f o r m a n d u n d e r s t a n d s e n t e n c e s only incompletely, if a t all. N o n e t h e
less, every a d e q u a t e l y socialized s p e a k e r has at his disposal a
know-how t h a t e n a b l e s h i m to distinguish p h o n e t i c u t t e r a n c e s f r o m
m e r e s o u n d s , to distinguish semantically m e a n i n g f u l a n d syntacti
cally well-formed s e n t e n c e s f r o m those t h a t are deviant, a n d to o r d e r
such s e n t e n c e s a c c o r d i n g to t h e d e g r e e of t h e i r deviation. T h i s intu
itively available k n o w l e d g e of rules t h a t c o m p e t e n t i y s p e a k i n g a n d
a c t i n g subjects have, which can also b e discursively a r t i c u l a t e d a t a n y
time, provides t h e r e q u i r e d e x p e r i e n t i a l basis for t h e o r i e s of action.
Strictly behaviorist theories, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , d e p e n d exclusively
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Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

on observational data. This fact gives rise to a n i m p o r t a n t difference

between t h e s t r u c t u r e s of t h e two types of t h e o r y a n d their r e l a t i o n
to their respecdve object d o m a i n .
T h e o r i e s t h a t are to explain t h e p h e n o m e n a accessible t h r o u g h
the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of m e a n i n g [Sinnverstehen]that is, t h e utter
ances a n d e x p r e s s i o n s of subjects capable of s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n
m u s t t a k e t h e f o r m of a systematic explication of t h e k n o w l e d g e of
rules based o n w h i c h c o m p e t e n t speakers a n d actors g e n e r a t e their
expressions. T h e o r y f o r m a t i o n serves to r e c o n s t r u c t the systems of
rules a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d f o r m a t i o n s , sen
tences a n d actions, a r e p r o d u c e d . T h e s e generative rules n e e d n o t
b e directly r e a d off t h e surface s t r u c t u r e of e x p r e s s i o n s . As with
grammar, t h e r e may b e d e e p s t r u c t u r e s , which u n d e r l i e t h e surface
structures t h a t have b e e n p r o d u c e d a n d yet are p a r t of a c o m p e t e n t
speaker's implicit know-how; h e n c e t h e y a r e n o n e t h e l e s s k n o w n . T h e
goal of s u c h a t h e o r y is t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of r u l e sys
tems t h a t disclose the i n t e r n a l logic of t h e r u l e - g o v e r n e d g e n e r a t i o n
of intelligible surface s t r u c t u r e s . L e t u s n o w a s s u m e t h a t these intelli
gible surface s t r u c t u r e s c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e e m p i r i c a l regularities of
observable e v e n t s ( a n d behavioral r e s p o n s e s ) . I n this case we c o u l d
c o m p a r e the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e a b s t r a c t systems of r u l e s underly
ing surface s t r u c t u r e s with t h e o r i e s of the e m p i r i c a l sciences from
w h i c h we derive laws of n a t u r e t h a t s o m e h o w " u n d e r l i e " e m p i r i c a l
regularities. B u t this c o m p a r i s o n clearly reveals t h e difference in
status of t h e two types of t h e o r i e s . T h e h y p o t h e t i c a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s
advance a n a l m o s t essentialist c l a i m t h a t is a b s e n t f r o m t h e n o m o -
logical t h e o r i e s in t h e e m p i r i c a l sciences. For, insofar as t h e l a t t e r ref
er to t h e object d o m a i n of physicallv m e a s u r a b l e events, t h e
primitive terms of systems of n o m o l o g i c a l s t a t e m e n t s are primarily
i n t r o d u c e d by c o n v e n t i o n . T h e y p r o v i d e t h e i d i o m for a t h e o r e t i c a l
c o n s t r u c t t h a t can b e c o r r o b o r a t e d indirectly t h r o u g h t h e derivation
of lawlike h y p o t h e s e s t h a t a r e subject to c o n f i r m a t i o n . O n e m i g h t say
that n o m o l o g i c a l hypotheses, if they a r e true, c o r r e s p o n d to struc
tures of a reality objectified in t e r m s of physics o r t h e b e h a v i o r a l sci
ences (or t h a t they pick o u t invariant features of this objectified
reality). B u t t h e y c a n n o t b e said m e r e l y t o r e c o n s t r u c t a n intuitive
10
Lecture I

knowledge t h a t c o m p e t e n t observers of this reality always already

possess. Rather, t h e sort of k n o w l e d g e t h u s p r o d u c e d is, as a r u l e ,
quite counterintuitive.
In contrast, t h e rational r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s of t h e k n o w l e d g e of sub
j e c t s c a p a b l e of s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n d o raise such a n essentialist claim.
T h e primitive t e r m s to b e e m p l o y e d in t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of struc
tures of o p e r a t i o n a l l y effective generative rules, t h e r e f o r e , a r e n o t in
t r o d u c e d conventionally. I n s t e a d they are i n t r o d u c e d in c o n n e c t i o n
with categories t h a t m u s t b e derivable from t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of
t h e very subjects w h o p r o d u c e these structures. As I see it, t h e
essentialist m o m e n t consists in t h e fact t h a t h y p o t h e t i c a l r e c o n s t r u c
tions, if t r u e , c o r r e s p o n d n o t to s t r u c t u r e s of a n objectified reality
b u t to s t r u c t u r e s of t h e implicit know-how of c o m p e t e n t subjects ca
pable of j u d g m e n t . W h a t is to b e explicated by t h e s e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s
are t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l y effective r u l e s themselves.
I h a v e discussed t h e m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l decision w h e t h e r m e a n i n g
s h o u l d b e a d m i t t e d as a primitive t e r m in t h e social sciences by look
i n g at t h r e e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l implications of great i m p o r t . H a v i n g
d o n e so, I c a n p r o v i d e a provisional d e m a r c a t i o n b e t w e e n objectivist
a n d subjectivist a p p r o a c h e s t o t h e o r y f o r m a t i o n . I shall call a t h e o
retical p r o g r a m subjectivist if it conceives of society as a meaningfully
s t r u c t u r e d system of life [Lebenszusammenhang], a n d as a system of
symbolic expressions a n d s t r u c t u r e s t h a t is c o n t i n u o u s l y p r o d u c e d
a c c o r d i n g t o u n d e r l y i n g abstract rules. T h u s t h e o r y is given t h e task
of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g a p r o c e s s whereby a meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d social
reality is p r o d u c e d . I n contrast, I shall call a t h e o r e t i c a l p r o g r a m
objectivist if it conceives t h e life process of society n o t internally as a
p r o c e s s of c o n s t r u c t i o n , t h a t is, of t h e p r o d u c t i o n of m e a n i n g f u l
structures, b u t externally as a n a t u r a l process that, like o t h e r p r o
cesses, c a n b e observed in its empirical regularities a n d e x p l a i n e d by
m e a n s of n o m o l o g i c a l h y p o t h e s e s . I n this sense, all strictly behavior
ist t h e o r i e s , s u c h as classical l e a r n i n g theory, are objectivist. At this
p o i n t I p r e f e r n o t to d e c i d e b e t w e e n these two c o m p e t i n g ap
p r o a c h e s . I shall c o n t e n t myself with p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t t h e objectivist
t h e o r e t i c a l p r o g r a m , w h i c h h a s b e e n q u i t e successful within its lim
its, h a s to d e a l with difficulties arising f r o m its m e t h o d o l o g i c a l n e
glect of t h e symbolic p r e s t r u c t u r i n g of social reality. T h e s e
 n___ __
Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

difficulties show u p at t h e level of t h e m e a s u r e m e n t p r o b l e m s in

volved in a t t e m p t i n g t o r e d u c e action to behavior, w h i c h have b e e n
6
discussed by Cicourel (1965) a n d o t h e r s . T h e s e difficulties are
exemplified by w h a t can n o w b e c o n s i d e r e d t h e failed a t t e m p t to de
7
velop a behaviorist theory of l a n g u a g e . 1 d o not w a n t to e n t e r i n t o
this discussion h e r e . I n s t e a d I will limit myself in these lectures to t h e
theoretical p r o g r a m of subjectivism. T h e generative t h e o r i e s of soci
ety [Erzeugungstheorien], as I shall call t h e m f r o m n o w on, h a v e c o m
p l e m e n t a r y difficulties to d e a l with. A theoretical p r o g r a m of this
kind m u s t a n s w e r t h r e e q u e s t i o n s . A s s u m i n g t h a t society is conceived
as a process of g e n e r a t i n g a meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d reality:

(a) W h o is t h e subject of this generative process, o r is t h e r e n o such

subject?
(b) H o w is the m o d e of this g e n e r a t i v e process to be c o n c e p t u a l
izedas cognitive activity (Kant a n d H e g e l ) , as linguistic expression
( H u m b o l d t ) , as l a b o r ( M a r x ) , as artistic c r e a t i o n (Schelling, Nie
tzsche), o r as instinct ( F r e u d ) ?
(c) A n d , finally: A r e t h e u n d e r l y i n g systems of r u l e s a c c o r d i n g to
which social reality is c o n s t r u c t e d invariant for all social systems, o r
do even t h e s e abstract r u l e systems d e v e l o p historically, a n d is t h e r e
possibly an i n n e r logic of their d e v e l o p m e n t t h a t can be r e c o n
structed as well?

Before setting u p a typology of h o w t h e most i m p o r t a n t g e n e r a t i v e

theories of society have a n s w e r e d t h e s e q u e s t i o n s , I w a n t to discuss
very briefly two f u r t h e r f u n d a m e n t a l decisions c o n c e r n i n g c o n c e p
tual strategy t h a t have g r e a t b e a r i n g for t h e o r y f o r m a t i o n in t h e so
cial sciences.
T h e second metatheoretical decision is w h e t h e r i n t e n t i o n a l action is t o
be c o n c e p t u a l i z e d in t h e f o r m of purposive-rational action or in t h e
f o r m of c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . L e t m e first c h a r a c t e r i z e these two
types of action with r e f e r e n c e to t h e status of t h e rules t h a t g o v e r n
b e h a v i o r in each case. By purposive-rational action! u n d e r s t a n d e i t h e r
i n s t r u m e n t a l action o r r a t i o n a l choice o r a c o m b i n a t i o n of t h e two.
I n s t r u m e n t a l action follows technical rules b a s e d o n e m p i r i c a l
k n o w l e d g e . T h e s e rules i m p l y c o n d i t i o n a l p r e d i c t i o n s r e g a r d i n g ob
servable events, w h e t h e r physical o r social. T h u s such p r e d i c t i o n s
12
Lecture I

c a n p r o v e to b e c o r r e c t or i n c o r r e c t . Rational c h o i c e is g o v e r n e d by
strategies b a s e d o n analytical k n o w l e d g e . T h e y imply derivations
from p r e f e r e n c e rules (value systems) a n d decision p r o c e d u r e s .
T h e s e p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e d e r i v e d e i t h e r correctly o r incorrectly. Pur
posive-rational action attains definite goals u n d e r given c o n d i t i o n s .
B u t w h e r e a s t h e m e a n s o r g a n i z e d by i n s t r u m e n t a l action are a p p r o
p r i a t e o r i n a p p r o p r i a t e a c c o r d i n g to criteria of effective c o n t r o l of
reality, strategic action d e p e n d s only on t h e c o r r e c t assessment of
possible b e h a v i o r a l o p t i o n s , which results from derivation u s i n g val
u e s and m a x i m s a l o n e .
By communicative action I u n d e r s t a n d symbolically m e d i a t e d inter
action. It is g o v e r n e d by b i n d i n g n o r m s t h a t define r e c i p r o c a l expec
tations a b o u t behavior a n d that must be understood a n d
a c k n o w l e d g e d o r r e c o g n i z e d by at least two a c t i n g subjects. Social
n o r m s are e n f o r c e d t h r o u g h sanctions. T h e i r m e a n i n g is objectified
in symbolic expressions a n d is accessible only t h r o u g h o r d i n a r y lan
g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t i o n . W h e r e a s t h e effectiveness of t e c h n i c a l rules
a n d strategies d e p e n d s o n t h e validity [ Gultigkeit] of empirically t r u e
o r analytically c o r r e c t p r o p o s i t i o n s , t h e validity [Geltung] of social
n o r m s is e n s u r e d by a n intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t is based o n a
c o n s e n s u s a b o u t values o r o n m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Violating a rule
has different c o n s e q u e n c e s in each case. I n c o m p e t e n t behavior,
which violates proven t e c h n i c a l rules or c o r r e c t strategies, is con
d e m n e d p e r se to failure t h r o u g h its lack of success. T h e "punish
m e n t , " so to speak, is built i n t o its f o u n d e r i n g o n t h e shoals of reality.
Deviant behavior, on t h e o t h e r h a n d , which violates prevailing
n o r m s , triggers sanctions t h a t are c o n n e c t e d with t h e rules only ex
ternally, by c o n v e n t i o n . L e a r n e d rules of purposive-rational action
p r o v i d e u s w i t h a r e g i m e of skills; i n contrast, i n t e r n a l i z e d n o r m s fur
nish u s with a r e g i m e of personality structures. Skills e n a b l e u s t o
solve p r o b l e m s , w h e r e a s motivations allow us t o c o n f o r m to n o r m s .
Table 1 s u m m a r i z e s t h e s e definitions. T h e y r e q u i r e a m o r e precise
analysis, w h i c h I c a n n o t u n d e r t a k e h e r e .
T h e o r y f o r m a t i o n in t h e social sciences h a s t h e o p t i o n of defining
t h e object d o m a i n to c o m p r i s e e i t h e r actions of t h e strategic type
only o r b o t h strategic a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e actions. Strategic action
c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d as a limiting case of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action; it oc-
 13
Qbjectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

Table 1
Rules of Action

Technical and Strategic

Social Norms Rules

Linguistic Means of intersubjectively shared context-free language

Definition ordinary language
Elements of Definition reciprocal normative ex
pectations of behavior
Mechanisms of internalization of roles
Acquisition
Function of the Type of maintenance of institu
Action tions (conformity to
norms based o n recipro
cal reinforcement)
Sanctions for Violating p u n i s h m e n t based o n
Rules conventional sanctions;
failure against social
authority
conditional predictions;
conditional imperatives
learning of skills and
qualifications
problem-solving (goal at
tainment, defined in
terms of means-ends
relations)
lack of success; failure
against reality

curs w h e n o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n i n t e r l o c u t o r s
breaks d o w n as a m e a n s of m a i n t a i n i n g consensus, a n d each assumes
an objectifying a t t i t u d e toward t h e other. For strategic action is based
on rules for t h e purposive-rational choice of m e a n s ; a n d , in princi
ple, each actor can m a k e this c h o i c e by herself. Maxims of b e h a v i o r
in strategic action are d e t e r m i n e d by t h e interests of m a x i m i z i n g
gains a n d m i n i m i z i n g losses in t h e context of c o m p e t i t i o n . In this
case, my o t h e r is n o l o n g e r a n alter e g o whose e x p e c t a t i o n s I can
fulfill (or d i s a p p o i n t ) a c c o r d i n g to intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d
n o r m s . Rather, s h e is a n o p p o n e n t whose decisions I seek t o
influence indirectly by m e a n s of p u n i s h m e n t s a n d rewards. I n s t r u
m e n t a l actions, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , are n o t social actions at all;
rather, they can a p p e a r as c o m p o n e n t s of social actions (i.e., as ele
m e n t s of role definitions). If only strategic actions are a d m i t t e d , we
can d e v e l o p r a t i o n a l choice t h e o r i e s such as t h e o r i e s of e x c h a n g e . If
c o m m u n i c a t i v e actions are a d m i t t e d as well, we can d e v e l o p conven
tional theories of action such as those of W e b e r or Parsons.
T h e third metatheoreticcd decision t h a t I c o n s i d e r to b e of major con
s e q u e n c e is w h e t h e r we s h o u l d choose an atomistic o r a so-called
14
Lecture I

holistic a p p r o a c h . I c a n n o t go i n t o the details of t h e extensive litera

8
t u r e o n this issue. B o t h c o n c e p t u a l strategies seem to m e to b e feasi
ble, a l t h o u g h t h e different t h e o r i e s have different d o m a i n s of
a p p l i c a t i o n a n d capacities. At t h e level of t h e o r i e s of action, t h e
atomistic a p p r o a c h takes t h e f o r m of m e t h o d o l o g i c a l individualism.
J. W. N. Watkins (in a g r e e m e n t with P o p p e r ) has f o r m u l a t e d two in
d e p e n d e n t postulates: (a) "the u l t i m a t e c o n s t i t u e n t s of the social
world a r e individual p e o p l e w h o act m o r e o r less appropriately in t h e
9
light of their dispositions a n d t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of their situation."
T h u s all social p h e n o m e n a m u s t be analyzable in t h e f o r m of state
m e n t s a b o u t t h e actions of individual subjects. S t a t e m e n t s in a t h e o
retical idiom, w h i c h c o n t a i n s expressions for s u p r a i n d i v i d u a l social
entities, such as roles, institutions, value systems, a n d traditions, are
inadmissible unless they c a n b e r e d u c e d to s t a t e m e n t s in a n o t h e r
t h e o r e t i c a l i d i o m in which t h e only p r e d i c a t e s a r e for acting subjects,
t h e i r u t t e r a n c e s , a n d t h e i r motivations. T h e s e c o n d p o s t u l a t e is t h a t
(b) "no social t e n d e n c y exists which could n o t b e a l t e r e d if t h e indi
viduals c o n c e r n e d b o t h w a n t e d to alter it a n d possessed t h e a p p r o
10
priate information." T h i s s t r o n g e r claim h a s t h e status of a
p h i l o s o p h i c a l a s s u m p t i o n . It states t h a t subjects capable of s p e e c h
a n d action a r e t h e only a g e n t s of c h a n g e in t h e historical develop
m e n t of social systems. Social c h a n g e can b e e x p l a i n e d with refer
e n c e to t h e p r o p e r t i e s of supraindividual units (such as systems,
g r o u p s , or s t r u c t u r e s ) if a n d only if these supraindividual p r o p e r t i e s
a r e r e d u c i b l e to p r o p e r t i e s of individual subjects c a p a b l e of s p e e c h
a n d action. T h e c o u n t e r p o s i t i o n to an individualistic t h e o r y of ac
tion is r e p r e s e n t e d today by social systems t h e o r y (such as t h e work
of D e u t s c h , P a r s o n s , a n d L u h m a n n ) . Systems t h e o r y takes i n t o ac
c o u n t t h e fact t h a t t h e s t r u c t u r e of social n o r m s t r a n s c e n d s t h e sub
jectively i n t e n d e d m e a n i n g of individuals acting a c c o r d i n g to n o r m s .
Systems a r e i n t r o d u c e d as units t h a t c a n solve objectively given p r o b
lems t h r o u g h l e a r n i n g processes t h a t t r a n s c e n d individual subjects.

T h e t h r e e o p t i o n s t h a t I have m e n t i o n e d , from w h i c h a c o n c e p t u a l
strategy for t h e social sciences m u s t b e c h o s e n , offer c o n v e n i e n t cri
teria for classifying t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t theoretical a p p r o a c h e s , as in
d i c a t e d i n table 2.
I d o n o t w a n t to e x a m i n e t h e relative fruitfulness o f these various
t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h e s . T h i s overview is i n t e n d e d r a t h e r for t h e
 15
Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

Table 2
Approaches to Social T h e o r y

Meaning as primitive term

not
admissible admissible

behavior strategic action communicative

(and strategic)
action

atomistic behaviorist rational choice "interpretive"

psychology theories (e.g., sociology (e.g.,
p u r e economics) ethnomethodology)
holistic biological sys social cybernetics structuralist and
tems theory (e.g., organiza functionalist sys
tional sociology) tems theories; sym
bolic interactionism

p u r p o s e of classifying t h e generative t h e o r i e s of society t h a t I a m in

terested in. Obviously they d o n o t b e l o n g a m o n g strictly behaviorist
theories; n o m o r e , however, d o they b e l o n g a m o n g theories of strate
gic action. T h e s e t h e o r i e s i n c o r p o r a t e a s s u m p t i o n s of rationality t h a t
o b t a i n a p p r o x i m a t e l y b u t for limited s e g m e n t s of social reality.
Both rational c h o i c e t h e o r i e s a n d social cybernetic m o d e l s have a
n o r m a t i v e analytical status. T h e y c a n be applied only o n o n e of two
presuppositions. T h e first is t h a t subjects act rationally a n d t h a t the
assumed maxims of b e h a v i o r a r e in fact t h e basis of their actions.
T h e s e c o n d is t h a t t h e self-regulating systems a r e stabilized in p r e
cisely t h e state t h a t is conventionally p o s t u l a t e d to b e o p t i m a l . G e n
erative t h e o r i e s of society c a n n o t b e l o n g to this type of theory, since
they claim to c o m p r e h e n d t h e life process of society as a w h o l e a n d ,
in particular, as a c o n c r e t e process of t h e g e n e r a t i o n of m e a n i n g
structures. T h e y d o n o t c o n t e n t themselves with s e g m e n t s of reality
t h a t can b e seen as a p p r o x i m a t i n g m o d e l s of rationality. In o t h e r
words, t h e y a r e n o t satisfied w i t h a n o r m a t i v e analytical status. T h e r e
fore t h e y m u s t b e classified u n d e r t h e type of t h e o r y t h a t a p p e a r s in
t h e r i g h t h a n d c o l u m n of t h e table.
T o be able to use this f r a m e w o r k to differentiate b e t w e e n different
c o n s t r u c t i o n t h e o r i e s of society, we m u s t r e t u r n to t h e questions t h a t
16
Lecture I

already f o r c e d themselves u p o n u s with r e g a r d to t h e as yet u n c l e a r

c o n c e p t of t h e g e n e r a t i o n of meaningfully o r g a n i z e d s t r u c t u r e s of
life. If I a m right, we can try to clarify the generative process of soci
ety by m e a n s of the following f o u r m o d e l s .
T h e first modelis that of t h e knowing or " j u d g i n g " subject. K a n t ex
a m i n e d t h e n e c e s s a r y subjective conditions of t h e possibility of em
pirical k n o w l e d g e in g e n e r a l a n d , in so d o i n g , i n t r o d u c e d the
c o n c e p t of the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the objects of e x p e r i e n c e . Following
this p a t t e r n , Husserl c o n c e i v e d t h e constitution of t h e everyday
world of lived e x p e r i e n c e (lifeworld) in which we can have experi
ences, relate to objects a n d p e r s o n s , a n d p e r f o r m actions. Alfred
Schutz in t u r n d e r i v e d a constitutive t h e o r y of society f r o m H u s s e r l ' s
analysis. T h e epistemological origins of this p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l the
ory of society are e v i d e n t in t h e title of t h e well-known study by
11
Schutz's s t u d e n t s B e r g e r a n d L u c k m a n n . T h e y speak of t h e social
c o n s t r u c t i o n of reality. T h e y conceive of t h e generative process of so
ciety as p r o d u c i n g a n i m a g e of reality in relation to which subjects
o r i e n t their b e h a v i o r toward o n e another. T h a t is why for B e r g e r a n d
L u c k m a n n sociology a n d t h e sociology of k n o w l e d g e are basically
identical. For t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of social reality coincides with the gen
e r a t i o n of a worldview t h a t o r i e n t s social action. Constitutive theories
a t t r i b u t e t h e process of g e n e r a t i o n t o a n acting subject. T h i s subject
c a n b e e i t h e r a n intelligible e g o m o d e l e d after t h e e m p i r i c a l individ
u a l subject or, as in H e g e l a n d M a r x a n d dialectical social theory, a
species-subject constituting itself in history. L a t e r we shall see t h a t
precisely t h e s e c o n c e p t s of a g e n e r a l i z e d individual ( " t r a n s c e n d e n
tal") consciousness or of a collective consciousness c r e a t e specific
difficulties for transferring t h e constitutive m o d e l f r o m t h e w o r l d of
possible e x p e r i e n c e to society.

T h e second and third models of t h e generative process of society are

subjectless rule systems. I have in m i n d structuralist social a n t h r o p o l
ogy o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d sociological systems t h e o r y o n t h e other.
B o t h s t r u c t u r a l i s m a n d systems t h e o r y conceive of society as a system
of either symbolic forms o r i n f o r m a t i o n c h a n n e l s p r o d u c e d by u n
derlying s t r u c t u r e s . I n b o t h cases t h e d e e p structures are w i t h o u t a
subject. They are a n o n y m o u s systems of rules. S t r u c t u r a l i s m m o d e l s
 17__
Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

1
these on g r a m m a r , w h e r e a s systems t h e o r y thinks of t h e m as self
regulating. T h e f o r m e r is b a s e d on structural linguistics g o i n g b a c k
to Saussure, t h e l a t t e r o n cybernetics, which h a s b e e n t r a n s p o s e d to
apply to o r g a n i s m s . T h e basic s t r u c t u r e s are subjectless in the s a m e
sense as is t h e g r a m m a r of a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e or a self-regulating ma
chine. W h a t first a p p e a r s to b e a n advantage t u r n s o u t to b e a weak
ness specific to this p o i n t of view: T h e constitutive m o d e l n o m o r e
shows t h e way o u t of t h e m o n a d i c shell of t h e active subject t h a n t h e
systems m o d e l c a n i n c o r p o r a t e s p e a k i n g a n d a c t i n g subjects a n d , es
pecially, t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s . For t h e system of g r a m m a t i c a l r u l e s re
quires c o m p e t e n t speakers f o r its actualization, w h e r e a s t h e m a c h i n e
regulates itself a n d h a s n o n e e d of a n y subject at all. I n n e i t h e r case is
the p a r a d i g m suited for giving an a c c u r a t e a c c o u n t of h o w inter-
subjectively b i n d i n g m e a n i n g s t r u c t u r e s a r e g e n e r a t e d .
For s u c h a n a c c o u n t , we c a n r e s o r t t o the fourth model, t h a t of ordi
nary l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t i o n ( s p e e c h a n d i n t e r a c t i o n ) . H e r e we
are d e a l i n g with the g e n e r a t i o n of i n t e r p e r s o n a l situations of speak
ing a n d acting t o g e t h e r t h a t is, with t h e f o r m of t h e intersubjec
tivity of possible u n d e r s t a n d i n g [Verstdndigung]. The underlying
abstract systems of r u l e s m u s t be conceived in such a way as to ex
plain two things. T h e first is t h e p r a g m a t i c g e n e r a t i o n of t h e c o m
m o n basis of intersubjectively s h a r e d m e a n i n g . T h e second is t h e
m o r e specifically linguistic g e n e r a t i o n of s e n t e n c e s t h a t we use in
speech acts for p u r p o s e s of b o t h cognition a n d action. T h i s m o d e l
p e r m i t s i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h e relation of intersubjectivity as o n e of t h e
main topics of a generative t h e o r y of society. E x a m p l e s a r e G. H .
M e a d ' s social psychology o f role-taking a n d t h e later W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s
t h e o r y of l a n g u a g e g a m e s . T h e generative r u l e s u n d e r l y i n g role-tak
ing a n d l a n g u a g e g a m e s a r e conceived as subjectless, j u s t like the
grammatical r u l e s of a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e . However, they a r e c o n
structed in s u c h a way t h a t t h e surface s t r u c t u r e s t o w h i c h t h e y give
rise i n c l u d e not only symbolic forms such as s e n t e n c e s a n d actions,
b u t also t h e subjects of speech a n d a c t i o n themselves, w h o a r e
f o r m e d t h r o u g h o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t i o n . M e a d ' s social
psychology is at t h e s a m e t i m e a t h e o r y of socialization. T h e m e a n
ingful s t r u c t u r e s t h a t a generative t h e o r y of society m u s t a c c o u n t for
18
Lecture I

c o m p r i s e b o t h personality structures a n d t h e f o r m s of i n t e r s u b
jectivity within which subjects express themselves by m e a n s of s p e e c h
and interaction.
G e n e r a t i v e t h e o r i e s of society t h a t in o n e way or a n o t h e r p r e
s u p p o s e a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject I shall from n o w o n refer to as
constitutive theories of society, those t h a t base t h e generative process o n
s t r u c t u r e s lacking a subject system theories, a n d , finally, those t h a t ac
c e p t abstract systems of r u l e s for g e n e r a t i n g intersubjective r e l a t i o n s
in which subjects themselves a r e f o r m e d , communicative theories of soci
ety. W e c a n add, as a differentiating feature, t h a t s o m e t h e o r i e s allow
for t h e historical d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e active subject or u n d e r l y i n g
rule systems, w h e r e a s o t h e r s e i t h e r keep to a strict d i c h o t o m y be
tween t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a c h i e v e m e n t s a n d c o n s t i t u t e d p h e n o m e n a or
at least e x c l u d e t h e logical r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e history of t h e con
stitutive factors. T h i s yields t h e classification s h o w n in table 3.
T h e i n f o r m a t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f this r o u g h overview is t o b e f o u n d in
thenaturally e m p t y b o t t o m right-hand c o r n e r . T h e table serves
to d e l i m i t a t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h t h a t h a s n o t yet b e e n a d e q u a t e l y
d e v e l o p e d . T h e r e f o r e I c a n n o t refer to a n existing body of work. O n
t h e o t h e r h a n d , I c a n a t l e a s t d r a w o n M e a d ' s t h e o r y of role-taking
a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s t h e o r y of l a n g u a g e games. F o r they prefigure t h e
universal p r a g m a t i c s t h a t I take to b e the r i g h t k i n d of f o u n d a t i o n for
social t h e o r y a n d whose basic tenets I should like t o develop. But I
w o u l d first like to c o n s i d e r t h e e x a m p l e of a constitutive t h e o r y of so
ciety t h a t derives f r o m Kant. T h i s e x a m p l e will allow us to b e clear
f r o m t h e o u t s e t a b o u t t h e p r e m i s e s to w h i c h we a r e c o m m i t t e d as
s o o n as we try to conceive of t h e l e a r n i n g process of society as a g e n
erative p r o c e s s . Moreover, t h e characteristic weakness of constitutive
t h e o r i e s will c o m e to light precisely in the p r o b l e m with w h i c h com
m u n i c a t i v e t h e o r y begins: t h e derivation of intersubjective r e l a t i o n s
f r o m t h e m o n o l o g i c a l f r a m e w o r k of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y of
consciousness.
G e o r g S i m m e l d e v o t e d a well-known a p p e n d i x to t h e first c h a p t e r
12
of his m a j o r w o r k to the q u e s t i o n : "How is society possible?" T h i s is
t h e a n a l o g u e to t h e basic question of t h e Critique of Pure Reason: H o w
is k n o w l e d g e of n a t u r e possible? Kant h a d s o u g h t to answer this
question by d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t t h e k n o w i n g subject itself constitutes
 K L _ _ :

Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

Table 3
Generative Theories of Society
Systems Communica
\ Types Constitutive Theories Theories tive Theories

historiX
cal de- \
velopmenK
of constitu- \
five factors \ atomistic holistic holistic holistic

not admissible Neo-Kantian- romantic so structuralism symbolic

ism (Rickert, cial theories (Levy-Strauss) interactionism
Adler); Phe (O. Spann) (G. H. Mead);
nomenology theory of lan
(Husserl, g u a g e games
Schtitz) (Wittgenstein,
Winch)

admissible Marxist phe dialectical so systems theory ?

nomenology cial theory of societal de
(Marcuse, (Lukacs, velopment
Sartre, Kosik) Adorno) (Parsons,
Luhmann)

n a t u r e as t h e r e a l m of t h e objects of possible e x p e r i e n c e . H e ana

lyzed the necessary subjective c o n d i t i o n s of i n t u i t i o n a n d j u d g m e n t
that a r e t h e a p r i o r i c o n d i t i o n s of t h e possibility of e x p e r i e n c e , t h a t
is, t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of the m a n i f o l d of sensations as p h e n o m e n a in a
totality of lawlike c o n n e c t i o n s . I n S i m m e l we find a classic formula
tion of the a t t e m p t to e x t e n d this a p p r o a c h of a constitutive t h e o r y
of t h e k n o w l e d g e of n a t u r e to a constitutive t h e o r y of society: n o t of
the k n o w l e d g e of society, b u t of society itself.

It is very tempting to treat as an analogous matter [analogous to the ques

tion of the a priori conditions of the knowledge of natureJ. H . ] the ques
tion of the aprioristic conditions under which society is possible. Here, also,
we find individual elements. In a certain sense, they too, like sense percep
tions, stay forever isolated from one another. They, likewise, are synthesized
into the unity of society only by means of a conscious process which corre
lates the individual existence of the single element with that of the other,
13
and which does so only in certain forms and according to certain rules.

However, S i m m e l i m m e d i a t e l y n o t e s t h e key difference. F r o m t h e

perspective of a constitutive theory, n a t u r e a n d society a r e n o t at t h e
20
Lecture I

same level of analysis. " N a t u r e " c a n be d e n n e d as a n object d o m a i n

of k n o w l e d g e only in relation to t h e synthetic activity of t h e knowing
subject, w h o creates unity in t h e m a n i f o l d of intuition. But t h e know- '
1
i n g subject e n c o u n t e r s society as an already c o n s t i t u t e d u n i t y o n e
c o n s t i t u t e d by empirical subjects themselves. T h e q u e s t i o n of how
n a t u r e is c o n s t i t u t e d refers to t h e p r o b l e m of t h e knowledge of n a t u r e ;
t h a t of h o w society is c o n s t i t u t e d refers to t h e p r o b l e m of h o w society
is possible. T h e process of social life occurs o n t h e level of constitu
tive activities a n d not, like the process of n a t u r a l events, at the level
of w h a t is already constituted. I n o t h e r words, t h e processes of con
sciousness w h e r e b y societal subjects constitute society t a k e p l a c e at
t h e s a m e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l level at which t h e k n o w i n g subject consti
tutes n a t u r e as the object of possible e x p e r i e n c e . T h u s the s p h e r e of
society attains a type of objectivity in relation to the k n o w i n g m i n d
t h a t n a t u r e c a n n o t claim in r e l a t i o n to t h e subject involved in know
ing n a t u r e .

[T] here is a decisive difference between the unity of a society and the unity
of nature. It is this: In the Kantian view (which we follow here), the unity of
nature emerges in the observing subject exclusively; it is produced exclu
sively by him in the sense data, and on the basis of sense data, which are in
themselves heterogeneous. By contrast, the unity of society needs no ob
server. It is directiy realized by its own elements because these elements are
themselves conscious and synthesizing units. . . . Societal unification needs
no factors outside its own component elements. Each of them exercises the
function which the psychic energy of the observer exercises in regard to ex
ternal nature: the consciousness of constituting a unity with the others is ac
14
tually all there is to this unity.

S i m m e l goes o n to say t h a t

Owing to these circumstances, the question of how society is possible im

plies a methodology which is wholly different from that for the question of
how nature is possible. The latter question is answered by the forms of cog
nition, whereby the subject synthesizes the given elements into "nature." By
contrast, the former is answered by the conditions which reside a priori in
the elements themselves, whereby they combine, in reality, into the synthesis
15
"society."

T h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n is of c e n t r a l i m p o r t a n c e for t h e starting p o i n t
of all g e n e r a t i v e t h e o r i e s of society, r e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r t h e y follow
 2 1 _ _ _ -
Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

pilthev, Rickert, Husserl, o r Wittgenstein or a r e based directly o n

j ^ t or H e g e l a n d M a r x . F o r it is t h e f o u n d a t i o n of a dualistic philos
i n

ophy of science, which o n p r i n c i p l e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y sets off t h e cul

tural or social sciences a n d h u m a n i t i e s f r o m the n a t u r a l sciences.
Nature is r e g a r d e d as a n object d o m a i n t h a t can b e a c c o u n t e d for i n
terms of t h e constitutive activities of t h e k n o w i n g subject. I n con
trast, t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of society by m e a n s of t h e synthetic activities
of societal subjects p r o d u c e s s o m e t h i n g t h a t is singularly objective in
comparison to n a t u r e . It c o n f r o n t s t h e k n o w i n g subject as a unity
that is already meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d , leaving t h e subject with t h e
possibility only of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g o r r e p r o d u c i n g a constitutive act
t h a t has a l r e a d y b e e n a c c o m p l i s h e d . T h i s dualism h a s t h r e e implica
tions for the t h e o r e d c a l p r o g r a m of t h e social sciences, all of w h i c h
c a n already b e f o u n d in Simmel.
First, a constitutive social t h e o r y goes b e y o n d t h e s p h e r e of c o g n i
tion of n a t u r e , t h a t is, of science. T h e p r e c o n s t i t u t e d w o r l d t h a t so
cial science m u s t r e c o n s t r u c t in o r d e r to b e able to explain societal
processes is t h e s p h e r e of prescientific e x p e r i e n c e a n d of everyday
practices. T h a t is Fry t h e analysis of t h e lifeworld b e c o m e s t h e focus
of Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y .
Second, t r a n s c e n d e n t a l analysis, w h e n a p p l i e d to t h e n o n c o g n i -
tive, practical a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s of a subjectivity t h a t is n o l o n g e r u n
derstood merely as t h e subject of possible k n o w l e d g e , leads to
conceiving of t h e system of social life as a "fact of k n o w l e d g e , " to use
Simmel's e x p r e s s i o n . T h e p r o g r a m of e x a m i n i n g t h e necessary sub
jective c o n d i t i o n s of possible sociation with m e a n s b o r r o w e d from
epistemology is b y n o m e a n s self-evident. F o r

the phenomenon which arises from these processes of sociation and which
receives its norms from their forms is not cognition but consists of practical
processes and actual situations. Nevertheless, what is to be examined (as the
general idea of sociation) in regard to its conditions is something cognitive,
namely, the consciousness of sociating or of being sociated. This conscious
ness is perhaps better called knowledge (Wissen) than cognition (Erkennt-
nis). For here, the subject is not confronting an object of which it gradually
acquires a theoretical picture. . . . It is the processes of interaction which sig
nify to the individual the fact of being sociatednot an abstract fact, to be
sure, but a fact capable of abstract expression. What are the forms that must
underlie this fact? What specific categories are there that human beings
22
Lecture I

must come with, so to speak, so that this consciousness may arise? And what,
therefore, are the forms that this consciousnesssociety as a fact of knowl
edgehas to support? These questions may be called (the subject matter
16
of) the epistemology of society.

T h i s t u r n in t h e a r g u m e n t has a n o t e w o r t h y implication. If t h e sys

tem of social life is c o n s t r u c t e d out of cognitive acts, t h e n it rests on
the facticity of the s a m e validity claims as are p o s i t e d with every f o r m
of k n o w l e d g e . Consciousness, we say, can b e t r u e or false, c o r r e c t or
i n c o r r e c t , r a t i o n a l or i r r a t i o n a l . T h e r e f o r e a society t h a t is m e a n i n g
fully s t r u c t u r e d by synthetic acts of consciousness a n d is c o n s t i t u t e d
as a "fact of k n o w l e d g e " h a s an i m m a n e n t r e l a t i o n to t r u t h . I shall
e l a b o r a t e o n this later. A g a i n it was Husserl w h o first said this a n d de
v e l o p e d a t h e o r y of t r u t h t h a t i n c o r p o r a t e d everyday practice.
Third, S i m m e l h a d already discovered t h e difficulty with which all
constitutive t h e o r i e s of society struggle in vain. Epistemology is con
c e r n e d w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l (or individual)
subject a n d its cognitive object, a n d this r e l a t i o n is in p r i n c i p l e
m o n o l o g i c a l . Society, in contrast, is c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o u g h t h e syn
thetic a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s of a multiplicity of subjects, w h o mutually
r e c o g n i z e o n e a n o t h e r as subjects. But h o w can t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of
this intersubjectivity be c o n c e p t u a l i z e d by m e a n s of a n e p i s t e m o l o g y
t h a t is c o m m i t t e d to a m o n o l o g i c a l a p p r o a c h ? T h e O t h e r is e n c o u n
t e r e d as a c e n t e r of possible constitutive a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s o n t h e
s a m e level as t h e k n o w i n g e g o :

[T]he other m i n d has for me the same reality which I have myself, a n d this
reality is very different from that of a material object. . . . This for-itself
(Fur-sich) of the other does not prevent us from turning it into our represen
tation. In other words, something which can by no means be resolved into
our representing, nevertheless becomes its content, and thus the product
of our representative capacity. This phenomenon is the fundamental
17
psychologico-epistemological paradigm and problem of sociation.

T h i s p r o b l e m was t a k e n u p b y Husserl, w h o dealt with it m o s t subtly

18
i n his Cartesian Meditations.
II
The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of
Society: The Fundamental Role of Claims to
Validity and the Monadological Foundations of
Intersubj ectivity

It is n o a c c i d e n t t h a t t h e m o s t influential constitutive social t h e o r y in

c o n t e m p o r a r y sociology, especially in t h e U n i t e d States, is based o n
t h e work of Husserl. For Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y is b e t t e r suited
than Kant's t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y to e x p a n d i n g t h e constitutive
theory of k n o w l e d g e into a t h e o r y of society. T h e r e are two reasons
for this. First, H u s s e r l differs from K a n t t h r o u g h his r e c o u r s e to t h e
lifeworld as t h e level in which t h e t h e o r y of k n o w l e d g e is g r o u n d e d .
Second, h e uses t h e c o n c e p t of constitution in a descriptive m a n n e r .
I s h o u l d like to discuss these two p o i n t s b e f o r e g o i n g i n t o t h e two
p r o b l e m s t h a t m u s t be solved by any constitutive social theory, in
c l u d i n g those t h a t have overcome t h e limitations of a p h i l o s o p h y of
consciousness: t h e p r o b l e m of society's i m m a n e n t r e l a t i o n to t r u t h ,
a n d t h e p r o b l e m of t h e f o u n d a t i o n of intersubjectivity.

(a) Like Husserl, Kant analyzed t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of a world of pos

sible e x p e r i e n c e . Yet u n l i k e Husserl, h e focused o n objectivity, t h a t
is, o n t h e necessary subjective c o n d i t i o n s of possible k n o w l e d g e of
n a t u r e . For K a n t believed t h a t a c c o u n t i n g for t h e validity of t h e m o s t
exact empirical j u d g m e n t s (that is, t h e t h e o r e t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s of
c o n t e m p o r a r y physics) w o u l d at t h e s a m e t i m e a c c o u n t for t h e tran
s c e n d e n t a l bases of e x p e r i e n c e in g e n e r a l . H u s s e r l challenges t h e
self-evidence of this view i n his f a m o u s treatise, The Crisis of the Euro
1
pean Sciences. H e conceives the object d o m a i n of the n a t u r a l sciences
n o t as t h e i n f r a s t r u c t u r e of t h e objects of p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e i n
24
Lecture II

g e n e r a l , b u t as a derived artificial p r o d u c t . This artifice can b e ade

quately a c c o u n t e d for only if we disclose t h e everyday lifeworld as t h e
f o r g o t t e n f o u n d a t i o n of m e a n i n g . Since Galileo, t h e n a t u r a l sciences
have dealt with a f o r m of " n a t u r e " t h a t has e m e r g e d from a transfor
m a t i o n of prescientific everyday e x p e r i e n c e , o r g a n i z e d as a
lifeworld, r a t h e r t h a n from a synthesis of t h e m a n i f o l d of sensations
given p r i o r to any o r g a n i z e d e x p e r i e n c e . This c o m m o n s e n s e experi
e n c e of daily life is at first relative t o the b o d y and its organs: T h e per
c e p t u a l field is kinesthetically s t r u c t u r e d . It is tailored to t h e
perspective of an ego: T h e e x p e r i e n c e of space a n d time is c e n t e r e d
in a subject. S e c o n d , everyday e x p e r i e n c e is f o r m e d n o t only in ac
c o r d a n c e w i t h cognitive e n d s b u t in c o n n e c t i o n with affective atti
tudes, i n t e n t i o n s , a n d practical i n t e r v e n t i o n s in t h e objective world.
N e e d s a n d e m o t i o n a l attitudes, as well as valuations a n d actions,
f o r m a h o r i z o n of n a t u r a l interests; a n d only in this c o n t e x t c a n ex
p e r i e n c e s c o m e into b e i n g and be c o r r e c t e d . T h i r d , everyday experi
e n c e is n o t a p r i v a t e matter. It is p a r t of an intersubjectively s h a r e d
world in w h i c h I live, speak, a n d act t o g e t h e r w i t h o t h e r subjects.
Intersubjectively c o m m u n a l i z e d e x p e r i e n c e is e x p r e s s e d in symbolic
systems, especially n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e , in which a c c u m u l a t e d knowl
edge is p r e g i v e n to t h e individual subject as c u l t u r a l tradition. At this
level we e n c o u n t e r cultural objects, which are expressions of t h e life
of subjects c a p a b l e of action a n d speech. T h e sciences, too, are s u c h
cultural objects.
H u s s e r l makes us realize t h a t Kant naively took as his starting p o i n t
t h e object d o m a i n of physics a n d failed to see t h a t scientific t h e o r i e s
of this type a r e p r o d u c e d in a c o m m u n i t y of investigators ( P e i r c e ) .
This c o m m u n i t y , in t u r n , m u s t take for g r a n t e d t h e factual validity of
its everyday lifeworld:

Since this is to be a matter of spiritual functions which exercise their accom

plishment in all experiencing and thinking, indeed in each and every preoc
cupation of the human world-life, functions through which the world of
experience, as the constant horizon of existing things, has any meaning and
validity for us, it would certainly be understandable that all objective sci
ences would lack the precise knowledge of what is most fundamental,
namely, the knowledge of what could procure meaning and validity for the
theoretical structures of objective knowledge with any meaning and validity
 25___
The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society

and thus first gives them the dignity of a knowledge which is ultimately
2
grounded.

T h u s we m i s c o n s t r u e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e world of possible experi

ence if we c h o o s e t h e object d o m a i n of scientific k n o w l e d g e as o u r
paradigm a n d fail to see t h a t science is a n c h o r e d in t h e lifeworld a n d
that this lifeworld is t h e basis of t h e m e a n i n g of scientifically
objectified reality. T h e constitutive t h e o r y of empirical k n o w l e d g e
must t h e r e f o r e presuppose a constitutive t h e o r y of t h e lifeworld. T h e
latter, in t u r n , c o m p r i s e s a constitutive t h e o r y of society (as p a r t of a
3
so-called o n t o l o g y of t h e lifeworld ).
(b) But this is n o t t h e only r e a s o n why p h e n o m e n o l o g y is c o n g e
nial to the project of a consdtutive t h e o r y of society. Husserl gives the
concept of c o n s t i t u t i o n itself a descriptive t u r n , so t h a t an i n t e r p r e
tive sociology b a s e d o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g [ Verstehen], s u c h as t h a t devel
o p e d by Alfred Schtitz, c a n consistently i n c o r p o r a t e Husserl's
analyses of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e lifeworld. H e r e again, H u s s e r l dif
fers from Kant. K a n t conceives the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the objects of pos
sible e x p e r i e n c e as t h e genesis of t h e necessary subjective c o n d i t i o n s
of t h e synthesis of a m a n i f o l d . T h u s h e arrives a t a g e n e r a l t h e o r y of
t h e activities a n d u n d e r l y i n g s t r u c t u r e s of t h e k n o w i n g mind. By con
trast, Husserl from t h e outset directs t h e m e d i t a t i n g p h e n o m -
enologist's reflective gaze at t h e way in w h i c h s e n s o r y a n d categorial
objects are "given" to him. U n l i k e Kant, Husserl does n o t w a n t to re
c o n s t r u c t t h e o n e universal m o d e of objectification t h r o u g h w h i c h
t h e e x p e r i e n c e of reality b e c o m e s at all possible. Rather, h e w a n t s to
grasp descriptively t h e varying m o d e s of t h e "self-givenness" of o b
jects. For a n y object w h a t e v e r t h a t r e m a i n s t h e s a m e t h r o u g h o u t o u r
c h a n g i n g m o d e s of consciousness, we c a n "see," as it were, h o w its
m e a n i n g a n d b e i n g are s h a p e d in h o w it is given to us by o u r syn
thetic a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s . T r u e , Husserl, too, assumes a universally
productive subjectivity. But this subjectivity g e n e r a t e s an open hori
z o n of possible objects, w h i c h allows a m a n i f o l d of various types
4
of objectivity t h a t c a n b e g r a s p e d o n l y descriptively. I n this
way, Husserl clears t h e way for a constitutive t h e o r y of society,
which a d o p t s a descriptive a t t i t u d e a n d studies t h e universal struc
tures of t h e lifeworld. A sociology t h a t p r o c e e d s p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y
26
Lecture II

u n d e r s t a n d s t h e social lifeworld from t h e outset as a world consti

t u t e d by synthetic a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s . In the m o s t g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e of
these activities it recognizes t h e typical m e a n i n g s t r u c t u r e s t h a t
intersubjectively c o m m u n a l i z e d subjects m u s t continually p r o d u c e
insofar as they at all o r i e n t themselves to objects of possible e x p e r i
ence in t h e i r everyday p r a c t i c e .
H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y h a s o n e final a d v a n t a g e over Kant's a s a
c o n t r i b u t i o n t o a sociological version of constitutive theory. P h e -
n o m e n o l o g i c a l investigation takes as its f r a m e of r e f e r e n c e n o t a n
a n o n y m o u s consciousness in g e n e r a l , b u t r a t h e r t h e individual tran
s c e n d e n t a l ego of t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l o b s e r v e r (who practices
t h e epoche). H u s s e r l assumes a multiplicity of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l egos
w h o c o n s t i t u t e t h e social lifeworld in r e l a t i o n to o n e a n o t h e r d e s p i t e
t h e cognitive priority of e a c h o n e ' s own subjectivity. By contrast, K a n t
(at least in his t h e o r e t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y ) strictly distinguishes b e t w e e n
a plurality of e m p i r i c a l egos a n d a singular t r a n s c e n d e n t a l conscious
ness in g e n e r a l . T h u s t h e p r o b l e m of t h e possible t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
c o m m u n i t y of subjects w h o first monadically p r o d u c e t h e i r world
5
c a n n o t even arise for h i m .

I n o w w a n t t o e x a m i n e m o r e closely two p r o b l e m s t h a t r e s u l t f r o m
t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n of a constitutive t h e o r y of society.
We shall see t h a t these p r o b l e m s arise for any conceivable g e n e r a t i v e
t h e o r y of society. I w a n t to show that they c a n n o t be solved within the
framework of a t h e o r y of consciousness a n d that they necessitate the
transition to a t h e o r y of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
Every society t h a t we conceive of as a meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d sys
tem of life has a n i m m a n e n t relation to t r u t h . For the reality of
m e a n i n g s t r u c t u r e s is b a s e d on the p e c u l i a r facticity of claims to va
lidity: In g e n e r a l , these claims a r e naively a c c e p t e d t h a t is, they are
p r e s u m e d to be fulfilled. B u t validity claims can, of c o u r s e , be called
i n t o q u e s t i o n . T h e y raise a claim to legitimacy, a n d this legitimacy
can b e p r o b l e m a t i z e d : It can b e c o n f i r m e d o r rejected. W e can s p e a k
of " t r u t h " h e r e o n l y in t h e b r o a d sense of t h e legitimacy of a claim
t h a t c a n be fulfilled o r d i s a p p o i n t e d . T h u s we say, f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t
a n o p i n i o n o r assertion, as well as a h o p e , wish, o r guess, is c o r r e c t o r
justified, t h a t a p r o m i s e o r a n n o u n c e m e n t has b e e n p r o p e r l y m a d e ,
 27.
The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society

that advice has b e e n h o n o r a b l y given, t h a t a m e a s u r e has b e e n p r o p

erly taken, a d e s c r i p t i o n o r an evaluation correctly d o n e . I n everyday
interactions, we rely naively o n an u n s u r v e y a b l e wealth of such
claims t o legitimacy. It is always only individual claims t h a t e m e r g e
from t h i s b a c k g r o u n d a n d t h a t a r e t h e m a t i z e d a n d c h e c k e d in case
of d i s a p p o i n t m e n t .
Husserl c a p t u r e s t h e specific c h a r a c t e r of factually operative
m e a n i n g s t r u c t u r e s with the c o n c e p t of intentionality, which he de
rives p r i m a r i l y f r o m B r e n t a n o . I n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s h a v e t h e
c h a r a c t e r of being t h e consciousness of something. T h e y a r e d i r e c t e d
toward s o m e t h i n g in t h e way t h a t an o p i n i o n , e x p e c t a t i o n , o r wish is
paradigmatically o r i e n t e d toward an object o r state of affairs. Sen
tences f o r m e d with i n t e n t i o n a l expressions, such as "believe," "ex
pect," a n d "wish," always r e q u i r e a direct object o r objective clause of
the f o r m "I hate (insult) x" or "I m e a n t h a t p." This g r a m m a t i c a l
form expresses w h a t Husserl w a n t e d to grasp i m m e d i a t e l y at t h e level
of consciousness with t h e c o n c e p t of intentionality. W h a t distin
guishes i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s from o n e a n o t h e r is t h e m e a n i n g
with w h i c h different acts of consciousness a r e d i r e c t e d toward t h e i r
objects. Different i n t e n t i o n s m a y b e d i r e c t e d at t h e s a m e object, in
which case t h e y h a v e , as H u s s e r l says (in t h e first Logical Investiga
tion) , the s a m e real [reell] c o n t e n t b u t different i n t e n t i o n a l c o n t e n t s .
T h e latter h e also refers t o as t h e i n t e n t i o n a l object ( o r noema, as h e
calls it from Ideas o n w a r d ) . It is to Husserl's c r e d i t t h a t h e e l u c i d a t e d
t h e r e m a r k a b l e i n t e n t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of o u r consciousness a n d d e m
6
o n s t r a t e d t h e i m m a n e n t t r u t h r e l a t i o n of i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s .
We i n t e n d a n object t h a t is n o t p r e s e n t t o u s , b u t w h i c h w e k n o w
c o u l d b e directly given to us. I n t e n t i o n a l i t y r e q u i r e s t h e possibility of
t h e virtual p r e s e n c e of objects t h a t could also b e actually p r e s e n t .
O t h e r w i s e we w o u l d n o t b e a b l e t o take quite different i n t e n t i o n a l at
titudes toward t h e same object. T h e i n t e n t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of o u r con
sciousness r e q u i r e s t h e possibility of a difference b e t w e e n t h e m e r e l y
m e d i a t e d a n d t h e i m m e d i a t e givenness of objects. A t t h e linguistic
level, we c a n illustrate this difference in t e r m s of t h e division of t h e
declarative s e n t e n c e i n t o a subject expression a n d a p r e d i c a t e ex
pression. T h e subject expression, a n o u n o r definite description, re
fers t o a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t t h a t c a n b e d e t e r m i n e d by t h e positive or
28
Lecture II

negative ascription of p r e d i c a t e s . T h i s r e f e r e n c e d o e s n o t r e q u i r e
t h a t t h e object d e n o t e d b e p r e s e n t . R a t h e r , it suffices t h a t t h e object
c a n b e r e p r e s e n t e d a t all as a n identifiable object. It is t o this f e a t u r e
of t h e logic of l a n g u a g e t h a t we owe t h e possibility of context-
i n d e p e n d e n t l a n g u a g e use. I n d e e d , t h e m o s t n o t a b l e a c h i e v e m e n t of
linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n is precisely t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of objects
a n d states of affairs t h a t are absent.
W i t h i n t h e b o u n d s of a t h e o r y of consciousness, however, H u s s e r l
c a n n o t m a k e t h e distinction b e t w e e n c o n t e x t - d e p e n d e n t e x p e r i e n c e
a n d c o n t e x t - t r a n s c e n d e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by m e a n s of referential ex
pressions (which refer to t h e c o n t e x t or s i t u a t i o n ) . Instead, h e inter
p r e t s t h e difference b e t w e e n t h e m e d i a t e d a n d i m m e d i a t e givenness
of objects as a difference b e t w e e n n o n i n t u i t i v e givenness a n d intu
itively fulfilled givenness. T h e m e a n i n g of an i n t e n t i o n a l object t h e n
always r e q u i r e s t h e possibility of t h e intuitively i m m e d i a t e p r e s e n c e
of t h e object. T h e intuitive r i c h n e s s of a n object t h a t is given in evi
d e n c e can h e n c e be u n d e r s t o o d as t h e fulfillment of a c o r r e s p o n d
ing i n t e n t i o n of t h e object. Ideally, t h e stages of fulfillment p o i n t to a
goal in which t h e entire i n t e n t i o n has b e e n fulfilled. T h e full intu
itive p r e s e n c e of t h e object leaves, so to speak, n o trace of unfulfilled
i n t e n t i o n . T h i s c o n c e p t i o n is c o n n e c t e d with a c o n c e p t of t r u t h as
evidence, discussion of w h i c h I shall p o s t p o n e f o r t h e m o m e n t .
H u s s e r l i n t r o d u c e s his t h e o r y of t r u t h w i t h o u t f u r t h e r justification.
H e considers it simply "the p r i n c i p l e of all principles: t h a t . . . every
t h i n g originarily offered to us in ' i n t u i t i o n ' is to b e a c c e p t e d simply
7
as w h a t it is p r e s e n t e d as b e i n g . " T r u t h c a n t h e n b e d e f i n e d with ref
e r e n c e to t h e c o n c e p t of i n t e n t i o n . T r u t h is t h e identifying t h o u g h t ,
a c c o m p a n i e d by an evidential e x p e r i e n c e , of s o m e t h i n g i n t e n d e d , as
c o i n c i d i n g with a c o r r e s p o n d i n g intuitively given object. Conversely,
it follows from this t h a t all i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s are i m m a n e n t l y
a n d necessarily related to t r u t h .

W h a t m a t t e r s for my p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s is t h e following consider

ation. Every i n t e n t i o n is usually c o n n e c t e d w i t h a "positing," w h e r e b y
t h e act of consciousness goes b e y o n d t h e i n t e n d e d object a n d antici
pates its factual givennness. T h e quality of positing consists in antici
p a t i n g t h e intuitive fulfillment of t h e i n t e n t i o n . T h e unfulfilled act
posits t h e i n t e n t i o n a l object as existing. In so d o i n g , it associates with
 29_
The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society

it t h e claim t h a t if t h e object w e r e to c o m e to t h e s t a g e of
self-givenness, it w o u l d a p p e a r j u s t as it is i n t e n d e d , a n d n o t o t h e r
wise. S u c h a c l a i m is e i t h e r legitimate o r illegitimate; its legitimacy
can b e d e m o n s t r a t e d only by t h e intuitive fulfillment of t h e origi
nally "empty" i n t e n t i o n . O f course, positing qualities c a n also be
bracketed or "neutralized," in which case we set aside t h e question of
the legitimacy of t h e claim t h a t a given i n t e n t i o n c a n b e fulfilled pre
cisely as anticipated. I n t e n t i o n s t h a t are not n e u t r a l i z e d in this sense,
however, a r e c o n n e c t e d with a validity claim t h a t c a n b e u n d e r m i n e d
a t a n y t i m e by a failed a t t e m p t to b r i n g t h e i n t e n d e d object to a d e
quate self-givenness.
T h e lifeworld as a w h o l e is a l s o posited. F o r t h e m e a n i n g struc
tures t h a t c o n s t i t u t e t h e lifeworld exist only in t h e manifold of valid
ity claims i n h e r e n t in t h e m . T h e s e claims c o m e t o g e t h e r in the
"general thesis of t h e n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e , " t h a t is, in t h e basic belief of
naive realism t h a t " t h e " world in which I find myself exists a n d has al
8
ways existed as a n actuality t h a t s u r r o u n d s m e . T h e g e n e r a l thesis
e n c o m p a s s e s t h e totality of life in t h e n a t u r a l world.

There we move in a current of ever new experiences, judgments, valuations,

and decisions. In each of these acts, the ego is directed toward objects in its
surrounding world, dealing with them in one way or another. It is of them
that we are conscious in these acts themselves, sometimes simply as actual,
sometimes in modalities of actuality (for example as possible, doubtful,
etc.). None of these acts, and none of the validities contained in them, is iso
lated. In their intentions they necessarily imply an infinite horizon of inac
tive [inaktuelle] validity which simultaneously function with them in flowing
9
mobility.

Interestingly e n o u g h , Husserl extends t h e positing characteristics

t h a t h e derived from a p a r t i c u l a r class of i n t e n t i o n s to all classes of
i n t e n t i o n s . At first, positings are c o n n e c t e d with so-called doxic acts
t h a t are o r i e n t e d to matters of fact. For t h e belief t h a t a n i n t e n d e d
object in fact d o e s o r d o e s n o t exist as i n t e n d e d is associated with
such i n t e n t i o n s as p e r c e p t i o n s , r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , m e m o r i e s , j u d g
m e n t s , a n d so on. Moreover, it w o u l d a p p e a r t h a t only acts of this sort
imply t h e k i n d of m o d a l i t i e s of B e i n g t h a t is, modifications of t h e
absolute certainty of t h e existence of a n object (of Urdoxa)such
t h a t I consider it possible o r p r o b a b l e o r d o u b t f u l t h a t a n i n t e n d e d
30
Lecture II

object will a p p e a r in reality j u s t as it is i n t e n d e d . But if only doxic acts

were capable of t r u t h , t h e n H u s s e r l could n o t s u p p o r t t h e assertion
t h a t positings are c o n n e c t e d with all i n t e n t i o n s . I n d e e d , h e w o u l d
h a v e to a b a n d o n t h e c o n c e p t of i n t e n t i o n itself: For this c o n c e p t al
ways c o n t a i n s the a n t i c i p a t i o n of possible fulfillment t h r o u g h evi
d e n t self-givenness, as well as, in p r i n c i p l e , the possible
d i s a p p o i n t m e n t of such fulfillment; a n d it t h u s always has an i m m a
n e n t relation to t r u t h . This w o u l d also r e n d e r u n t e n a b l e t h e ex
tremely strong thesis t h a t t h e lifeworld itself is b a s e d o n t h e facticity
of a c c e p t e d validity claims t h a t in p r i n c i p l e can n o n e t h e l e s s b e
p r o b l e m a t i z e d . If, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , all i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s
h a v e a n i m m a n e n t r e l a t i o n to t r u t h , t h a t is, if all i n t e n t i o n s a r e
d e f i n e d by t h e possibility of their intuitive fulfillment (or disappoint
m e n t ) , t h e n acts of t h e " s p h e r e of e m o t i o n a n d will," as H u s s e r l calls
t h e m , m u s t also imply positings. T h e r e a r e two a r g u m e n t s for this.
First, all e m o t i o n a l a n d volitional acts, such as fears a n d desires,
a n d decisions a n d e x p r e s s i o n s of will, a r e b u i l t u p o n acts in w h i c h a n
object is i n t e n d e d . I n t e n t i o n a l s t a t e m e n t s such as "I fear (or h o p e or
desire) t h a t t h i s m a n will d e p a r t " refer to a state of affairs t h a t may or
may n o t obtain. (In o u r e x a m p l e s , t h e s a m e state of affairs is r e p r e
s e n t e d in e a c h case by t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t "that this m a n will
d e p a r t . " ) T h e r e f o r e emotive a n d volitional acts imply, as Husserl
says, p o t e n t i a l positings: T h e y a r e potentially thetic. S e c o n d , how
ever, emotive a n d volitional acts also c o n t a i n positings i n themselves,
a n d n o t only w i t h r e g a r d to t h e potentially existing states of affairs t o
which they refer. T h e types of positings for emotive a n d volitional
acts are g r o u n d e d . Husserl assumes specific positings t h a t can b e ex
plicated as value j u d g m e n t s , such as t h a t an i n t e n d e d object is o r is
not actually (or p r o b a b l y o r presumably) pleasing o r repulsive, lovely
or h o r r i b l e , desirable or indifferent, beautiful o r ugly, g o o d o r evil:
"Even in valuing, wishing, willing, s o m e t h i n g is 'posited,' a p a r t f r o m
10
t h e d o x i c positiohality ' i n h e r e n t ' in t h e m . " A n d elsewhere:

On the one hand, there are new characteristics which are analogous to the
modes of belief but possess, at the same time, themselves doxo-logical
positableness; on the other hand, connected with the novel moments there
are also novel "apprehensions," and a new sense becomes constituted. . . . with
it no new determining parts of mere "things" are constituted, but instead
 31___
The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society

values of things, value-qualities, or concrete Objects with values: beauty and

ugliness, goodness and badness; the use-Object, the art work, the machine,
11
the book, the action, the deed, and so forth.

Even nondoxically p e r f o r m e d acts of consciousness, t h e r e f o r e , imply

claims t o validity t h a t c a n b e naively p r e s u p p o s e d o r p r o b l e m a t i z e d ,
accepted or rejected.
T h e universal a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e c o n c e p t of intuitively fulfillable
intention g u a r a n t e e s t h a t all meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d f o r m a t i o n s are
capable of t r u t h , w h e t h e r they have cognitive m e a n i n g o r primarily
e m o t i o n a l a n d volitional m e a n i n g . T h a t is why H u s s e r l can a d o p t
Cartesian l a n g u a g e . H e calls all i n t e n t i o n a l objects cogitata, r e g a r d
less of w h e t h e r they are associated with doxic or n o n d o x i c positing
qualities. T h u s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of everyday lived practices c a n be
conceived a c c o r d i n g to principles of a constitutive t h e o r y of knowl
edge u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g s ego, cogitatio, a n d cogitatum. T h e entire life
process must be r e d u c i b l e to the p e r f o r m a n c e of acts by a p r o d u c t i v e
subjectivity, w h i c h articulates itself in m e a n i n g s t r u c t u r e s of possible
objects of intuitive e x p e r i e n c e .
F r o m t h e fact t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l life universally is o r i e n t e d t o t r u t h ,
Husserl d r e w a n ethical c o n c l u s i o n . H e i n f e r r e d f r o m it t h e r e m a r k
able d e m a n d for a b s o l u t e self-responsibility o n t h e p a r t of sociated
h u m a n beings. T h i s r a d i c a l n o t i o n is d e v e l o p e d i n his m u c h n e
glected essay, " T h e I d e a of Individual a n d C o m m u n i t y Life in Abso
1
l u t e Self-Responsibility":-

Here clearly emerges the universality with which the realm of knowledge en
compasses all types of activities that derive from emotional and volitional
subjectivity. Correlatively, however, the sphere of the valuating emotions and
the will, in their endeavors and activities, extends to the entirety of subjectiv
ity and all its intentional functions. What this means for science, however, is
that all of evaluative and practical reason is reflected and objectified in sci
ence as the objectification of cognitive reason. In other words, all truth, in
cluding every evaluative and practical truth, finds expression and is
determined in the cognitive forms of theoretical truth, where it also takes
13
on the forms of cognitive justification.

Absolute self-responsibility is t h e subjective c o u n t e r p a r t of t h e i n t e n

tional s t r u c t u r e of t h e lifeworld; for t h e positings of t h e lifeworld im
ply an interest in p r o v i n g t h e i r p r e s u m p t i v e legitimacy. O n b o t h t h e
32
Lecture II

p e r s o n a l as well as t h e political level, a life is irresponsible if it con

tents itself with t h e facticity of claims to validity without a t t e m p t i n g to
verify t h e lifeWorld's universal t r u t h claim t h r o u g h t h e equally com
p r e h e n s i v e exercise of p h i l o s o p h i c a l reason. A c c o r d i n g to this idea,
h u m a n p r a c t i c e c o u l d be said to be radically responsible only if the
c o n s t i t u t i n g activities from w h i c h t h e lifeworld is c o n s t r u c t e d were
first r e c o n s t i t u t e d in t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a t t i t u d e , a n d all empty
positings w e r e u n c o v e r e d a n d all unfulfillable i n t e n t i o n s rejected:

We must consider that every form of human action, willing, and feeling can
become the object of sciences in which it becomes the theoretical object,
and that every instance of theoretical knowledge can find immediate nor
mative application, in which it becomes the rule for a possible practice, etc.
Since it is the vocation of philosophy as universal science to be the original
source from which all other sciences draw their ultimate justification, we can
then understand that such a philosophy can be no theoretical fancy to hu
man beings. Rather, a philosophical life must be understood as life itself
14
based on absolute self-responsibility.

For Husserl this c o n t e m p l a t i v e life is n o t only t h e business of t h e in

dividual p h i l o s o p h e r b u t also a political p r o g r a m :

This question, howideally speakinga majority if not the totality of per

sons who are in possible relations of mutual understanding or are already
linked as a community through personal relations would lead a life for
which they could take absolute responsibility, leads to another: is communal
life of this sort conceivable without a community of wills directed at such a
life based on absolute responsibility? Furthermore, is such a life possible if
the idea of it has not first been worked out scientifically, epistemologically,
1
that is, unless we have a normative science about it (ethics)? ''

T h u s far I have s o u g h t to explicate Husserl's o w n train of t h o u g h t .

T h e occasional references t o t h e p h i l o s o p h y of l a n g u a g e w e r e for
p u r p o s e s of clarification only a n d n o t of critique. Now, however, I
s h o u l d like to p o i n t o u t certain difficulties that raise t h e q u e s t i o n of
w h e t h e r a n a d e q u a t e t r e a t m e n t of t h e i m m a n e n t t r u t h r e l a t i o n of a
meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d lifeworld d o e s n o t r u p t u r e t h e framework of
a t h e o r y of consciousness a n d d e m a n d instead to be a p p r o a c h e d
t h r o u g h p h i l o s o p h y of l a n g u a g e . U n l i k e T u g e n d h a t , I shall n o t d e a l
w i t h t h e difficulties i n h e r e n t i n t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l t h e o r y of
m e a n i n g (which originates in Husserl's deriving t h e c o n c e p t of t h e
 33___ . .
The I'henomenological Constitutive Theory of Society

intentional object from t h e reification of t h e p r e d i c a t e s we a t t r i b u t e

to identifiable objects). I n s t e a d I s h o u l d like to call a t t e n t i o n to t h e
difficulties entailed by t h e c o n c e p t of t r u t h as evidence.
We have seen t h a t Husserl defines t r u t h with r e f e r e n c e to t h e intu
itive fulfillment of a n i n t e n t i o n as t h e i m m e d i a t e p r e s e n c e of t h e in
tentional object (for which there is a c o r r e s p o n d i n g e x p e r i e n c e of
evidence). This r e q u i r e s an intuition sui g e n e r i s for all categorial ob
jects, which a p p e a r in every f o r m of j u d g m e n t . T h a t is why Husserl
develops his d o c t r i n e of categorial i n t u i t i o n , with w h i c h h e a t t e m p t s
to r e n d e r plausible t h e idea of a n o n s e n s i b l e i n t u i t i o n a n a l o g o u s to
sensible i n t u i t i o n . T h e force of t h e c o n c e p t u a l strategy t h a t leads
Husserl to d e v e l o p such a c o n c e p t i o n is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e . B u t h e p r o
vides n o c o n v i n c i n g a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e c o n c e p t of "categorial intu
ition" can b e c o n c e i v e d of in any logically consistent m a n n e r at all or
that t h e expression c a n b e used n o n m e t a p h o r i c a l l y . T h e p r o b l e m is
solved as soon as we r e g a r d w h a t Husserl calls categorial objects, such
as syntactic f o r m s o r m a t h e m a t i c a l relations, as symbolic constructs
g e n e r a t e d in a c c o r d a n c e with rules, a n d refrain f r o m i m p u t i n g to
t h e m quasi-objects toward which i n t e n t i o n s can be d i r e c t e d . For
t h e n a claim to validity can n o l o n g e r b e c o n n e c t e d with a n individ
ual category; r a t h e r it applies to w h e t h e r syntactic o r m a t h e m a t i c a l
forms, for instance, a r e g e n e r a t e d in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e rules.
Q u i t e a p a r t from this, it seems t o m e q u e s t i o n a b l e w h e t h e r
Husserl correctly c o n c e i v e d t h e function of sensible intuition t h a t
provides t h e m o d e l for categorial intuition. T h e c o n c e p t of t h e
"self-givenness" of a n object relies o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t sense ex
perience gives us intuitive access to s o m e t h i n g t h a t is i m m e d i a t e l y
a n d evidently given. T h i s a s s u m p t i o n is difficult t o d e f e n d , as s o m e
of Husserl's own analyses i n d i c a t e (see, for e x a m p l e , Erfahrung und
Urteil). Every i n t u i t i o n , n o m a t t e r h o w originary, i n c l u d e s categorial
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s ; every p e r c e p t i o n , n o m a t t e r how pre-predicative,
contains h y p o t h e t i c a l e l e m e n t s t h a t go b e y o n d a n y t h i n g t h a t is actu
ally given. T h e p a r a d i g m a t i c e x p e r i e n c e t h a t may h a v e b e e n in
Husserl's m i n d w h e n h e f o r m u l a t e d his c o n c e p t of t r u t h as e v i d e n c e
c a n scarcely b e f o u n d at t h e level of e x p e r i e n c e s of sensory evidence.
It is m o r e likely t o b e f o u n d a t t h e level o f e x p e r i e n c e s of c o n s t r u c
tion. W h e n we g e n e r a t e symbolic objects a c c o r d i n g t o r u l e s
34
Lecture II

w h e t h e r we a r e c o n s t r u c t i n g a n u m e r i c a l series o r geometrical
figures, p e r f o r m i n g a c o m p o s i t i o n for p i a n o , o r p r o d u c i n g a sen
t e n c e a n i n t e n t i o n is always fulfilled by a n object t h a t is g e n e r a t e d
16
a n d was previously i n t e n d e d as s u c h .
However, this i n t u i t i o n of t h e success of a c o n s t r u c t i o n owes its
ability to g u a r a n t e e certainty precisely to the c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t we
ourselves h a v e p r o d u c e d t h e symbolic object a c c o r d i n g to underly
i n g g e n e r a t i v e rules. C o n s e q u e n t l y we c a n u n d e r s t a n d the object
perfectly, for t h e history of its genesis is t r a n s p a r e n t to us. T h e intu
ition of g e n e r a t i v e activity t h u s is n o t b e confused with t h e i n t u i t i o n
of w h a t is i m m e d i a t e l y given, a c o n c e p t t h a t Husserl i n t r o d u c e d pro-
17
g r a m m a t i c a l l y by a p p e a l i n g to t h e m o d e l of sense e x p e r i e n c e . Even
p e r c e p t i o n s d e p e n d o n a n i n t e r p r e t i v e framework. T h e r e f o r e they
c o n t a i n h y p o t h e t i c a l claims to validity, which can by n o m e a n s b e re
d e e m e d by r e c o u r s e to e l e m e n t a r y p e r c e p t i o n s at s o m e d e e p e r level;
for every sense e x p e r i e n c e c a n b e p r o b l e m a t i z e d . If, however, t h e r e
is n o r e c o u r s e to an u l t i m a t e , u n d e r l y i n g f o u n d a t i o n of intuitive
self-givenness, a n d if, as P e i r c e convincingly d e m o n s t r a t e d l o n g ago,
we m u s t a b a n d o n t h e c o n c e p t of t r u t h as evidence, t h e n t h e claims
to validity implicit in i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s c a n n o t b e r e d e e m e d
intuitively, b u t only discursively. It is n o t i n t u i t i o n s b u t a r g u m e n t s
t h a t c a n lead us to a c k n o w l e d g e o r reject t h e legitimacy of claims to
validity t h a t h a v e b e e n p r o b l e m a t i z e d .
H u s s e r l ' s c o n c e p t of intentionality stands a n d falls with t h e con
cept of t r u t h as evidence. It was d e r i v e d f r o m t h e m o d e l of a solitary,
m o n a d i c subject o r i e n t i n g itself to an object in meaning-giving acts.
T h e r e is m u c h to b e said for r e f o r m u l a t i n g this c o n c e p t in linguistic
t e r m s . W e shall t h e n h a v e to distinguish those i n t e n t i o n s t h a t signify
simply t h a t we u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g of symbolic f o r m s t h a t h a v e
b e e n p r o d u c e d a n d e m p l o y e d in conformity with rules from t h o s e
i n t e n t i o n s t h a t involve a "positing," t h a t is, a validity claim t h a t ex
t e n d s b e y o n d well-formedness o r intelligibility. These i n t e n t i o n s are
paradigmatically c o n n e c t e d with s e n t e n c e s t h a t are u t t e r e d in situa
tions where subjects c a p a b l e of s p e e c h a n d action a t t e m p t to r e a c h
m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I n this version, Husserl's thesis of a t r u t h
claim i m m a n e n t i n a meaningfully structured lifeworld b e c o m e s in
teresting. W e have s e e n t h a t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e t h e o r y of society re-
 35__
The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society

gards the surface s t r u c t u r e of t h e lifeworld as a system of symbolic

forms instead of as a s t r e a m of i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s . But this the
ory, too, m u s t a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t t h e facticity of t h e validity claims im
plicit in these u t t e r a n c e s is constitutive of t h e m o d e of b e i n g of t h e
lifeworld. T h e s e positings are simultaneously based o n e x p e r i e n c e
and tradition a n d a r e culturally habitualized. But t h e y n o l o n g e r ref
er to intuitively identifiable objects; their legitimacy can b e estab
lished only in discourse. W h a t is a n t i c i p a t e d in t h e s e positings, b o t h
doxic a n d o t h e r w i s e , is n o t t h e possibility of t h e intuitive fulfillment
of a n i n t e n t i o n , b u t justifiability: t h a t is, t h e possibility of a c o n s e n
sus, o b t a i n e d w i t h o u t force, a b o u t t h e legitimacy of t h e c l a i m in
question.
This consideration leads m e b a c k once m o r e to Husserl's idea of a
life of absolute self-responsibility. If every positing is associated with
an interest in r e d e e m i n g t h e p o s i t e d claim to validity, t h e n t h e fact
that t h e lifeworld rests o n a b r o a d f o u n d a t i o n of claims t h a t a r e
hardly r e d e e m e d , b u t m e r e l y a c k n o w l e d g e d , in fact calls for e x p l a n a
tion. Until now, o u r story has t r e a t e d t h e u b i q u i t y of naively ac
cepted, u n p r o b l e m a t i c , a n d yet u n p r o v e n a s s u m p t i o n s of validity as a
basic characteristic of social lifeworlds. Husserl obviously c a n n o t
specify a n i n t e r e s t t h a t w o u l d b e powerful e n o u g h to effect a persist
ent a n d sweeping clarification a n d e n l i g h t e n m e n t of all claims. T h a t
is why his a t t e m p t to u n i t e t h e task of p h e n o m e n o l o g y with t h e n e e d
for a p h i l o s o p h i c a l life of absolute self-responsibility retains t h e char
acter of a powerless p o s t u l a t e .
A c o m m u n i c a t i v e t h e o r y of society, too, will p r o c e e d from t h e fact
that a claim to validity i m p l i e d in a symbolic u t t e r a n c e c a n subsist as
l o n g as p e o p l e a r e c o n v i n c e d of t h e discursive justifiability of its im
plied validity, a n d n o longer. But t h e n t h e fact t h a t t h e lifeworld is
based o n a mass of m e r e d e facto claims w h o s e legitimacy has never
b e e n p r o b l e m a t i z e d o r d e m o n s t r a t e d b e c o m e s a p h e n o m e n o n re
q u i r i n g e x p l a n a t i o n . W h a t n e e d s to b e e x p l a i n e d is h o w t h e convic
tion that validity claims a r e discursively r e d e e m a b l e comes i n t o b e i n g
a n d is stabilized w i t h o u t actual c o r r e s p o n d i n g a t t e m p t s a t discursive
justification. For, w h e n e v e r a claim w o u l d n o t h o l d u p to verification,
this naive trust w o u l d reveal itself to b e false consciousness. T h u s we
n e e d a t h e o r y t h a t e x p l a i n s h o w t h e genesis a n d stabilization of false
36
Lecture II

consciousness is possible, a n d in particular why ideology f o r m a t i o n is

necessary. S u c h an e x p l a n a t i o n w o u l d a t the s a m e t i m e be able to an
swer t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e r e is an i n t e r e s t in t h e enlighten
m e n t of false consciousness. W e can already see that if such an
interest in e n l i g h t e n m e n t c o u l d be identified and derived from the
c o n d i t i o n s of r e p r o d u c t i o n of a symbolically s t r u c t u r e d reality, it
c o u l d n o t be satisfied by p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l reflection on the tran
s c e n d e n t a l h i s t o r y of the genesis of the lifeworld. Rather, it w o u l d re
q u i r e a t h e m a t i z a t i o n of validity claims t h a t h a d h i t h e r t o escaped
t e s t i n g f o r n o t m e r e l y c o n t i n g e n t , b u t systematic reasons. S u c h a
t h e m a t i z a t i o n w o u l d have t o have practical c o n s e q u e n c e s .
W i t h this anticipation I have g o t t e n a h e a d of m y a r g u m e n t . I criti
cized the c o n c e p t of t r u t h as evidence a n d s h o w e d that the
difficulties m e n t i o n e d can be avoided by r e p l a c i n g t h e a p p r o a c h of
the p h i l o s o p h y of consciousness with t h a t of t h e p h i l o s o p h y of lan
g u a g e . But I have not shown j u s t why this a p p r o a c h s h o u l d be cho
sen. T h i s I shall d o by e x a m i n i n g t h e s e c o n d p r o b l e m t h a t confronts
every g e n e r a t i v e theory of society in a d d i t i o n to t h e i m m a n e n t truth
relation of a meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d lifeworld. T h e a t t e m p t to pro
vide a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n of intersubjectivity will show
that we are f o r c e d t o a b a n d o n the primacy of intentionality in favor
of the priority of m u t u a l linguistic u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
H u s s e r l takes himself to be c o n f r o n t e d with t h e following p r o b
lem. H o w c a n I, as a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e g o constituting t h e entirety of
my e x p e r i e n c e , constitute a n o t h e r ego a n d n e v e r t h e l e s s e x p e r i e n c e
w h a t is c o n s t i t u t e d in m e as a n o t h e r ego? As H u s s e r l explicitly says,
t h e p h i l o s o p h y of consciousness starts with t h e c o n s t i t u t i n g activities
of t h e m e d i t a t i n g e g o q u a m o n a d . Given t h e a s s u m p t i o n s of t h e phi
l o s o p h y of consciousness, this task is t h u s clearly paradoxical. O n t h e
o n e h a n d , it is I w h o constitutes t h e o t h e r as an e l e m e n t of my world;
b u t as a n other, h e precisely c a n n o t b e given to m e originarily in his
o w n constitutive activities, w h i c h in p r i n c i p l e h e w o u l d h a v e to b e if
t h e o t h e r were c o n s t i t u t e d by m e . It m u s t b e possible to resolve this
p a r a d o x with t h e m e a n s available to p h e n o m e n o l o g y , if only to estab
lish the m e a n i n g of an objective world. For the objectivity of t h e
world m e a n s t h a t the world is p r e s e n t for e v e r y o n e as t h e s a m e world
t h a t I c o n s t i t u t e for myself. As a n objective world, t h e w o r l d t h a t I
 37 ...
The J'henomenological Constitutive Theory of Society

constitute m u s t b e t h e s a m e as t h a t c o n s t i t u t e d by all o t h e r s . O n l y na
ture is given to m e as objective. I constitute it in m o d e s of givenness
that are t h e s a m e for all o t h e r s . In this objective w o r l d , I c a n e n c o u n
ter the initially c o n s t i t u t e d o t h e r s as e m p i r i c a l subjects:

Accordingly the intrinsically first other (the first "non-Ego") is the other Ego.
And the other Ego makes constitutionally possible a new infinite domain of
what is "other": an Objective Nature and a whole Objective world, to which all
18
other Egos and I myself belong.

Husserl sees t h a t t h e m e a n i n g of t h e objectivity of m y world d o e s n o t

d e p e n d only o n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of m a n y o t h e r subjects, all of w h o m
are given t h e i r o w n world. It f u r t h e r r e q u i r e s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of a
c o m m u n i t y of all possible subjects, i n c l u d i n g myself, for w h o m my
world a n d t h e i r worlds are posited identically as o u r world. H e con
tinues in t h e passage j u s t q u o t e d ,

This constitution, arising on the basis of the "pure" others (the other Egos
who as yet have no worldly sense), is essentially such that the others-for-me
do not remain isolated; on the contrary, an Ego-community, which includes
me, becomes constituted . . . as a community of Egos existing with each
other and for each otherultimately a community of monads, which, moreover
. . . constitutes the one identical world. In this world all Egos again present
themselves, but in an Objectivating apperception with the sense "men" or
19
"psychophysical men as worldly Objects."

Husserl m a k e s t h e i m p o r t a n t distinction b e t w e e n a n objective

world a n d a n intersubjective world; this distinction is also i m p o r t a n t
for a c o m m u n i c a t i v e t h e o r y of society. T h e objective w o r l d is o n e in
which all n a t u r a l objects (including o t h e r p e o p l e ) c a n b e e n c o u n
tered as i n n e r w o r l d l y entities, w h e r e a s t h e intersubjective w o r l d is
o n e of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l y sociated subjects, w h o e n c o u n t e r o n e a n
o t h e r at t h e level of t h e c o m m o n constitution of a w o r l d t h a t is i d e n
tical f o r t h e m a n d h e n c e objective. T h i s is t h e social lifeworld, in
w h i c h subjects can r e a c h m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g with o n e a n o t h e r
a b o u t i n n e r w o r l d l y m a t t e r s . "In" their lifeworld, sociated subjects are
always already o p e r a t i n g "at" t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l level of inter
subjectivity. H e n c e they m u s t u n d e r g o a c h a n g e of perspective as
soon as o n e subject is to take a n o t h e r n o l o n g e r as alter ego, b u t as a
c o m p o n e n t of objective n a t u r e , t h a t is, as a n o b s e r v e d body.
38
Lecture II

In t h e fifth Cartesian Meditation Husserl tries to solve t h e p r o b l e m

of t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n of intersubjectivity. H e h a s to
s u p p o s e t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i n g ego has an initial state in which n a t u r e
is given as radically d e n u d e d of all other subjects a n d all inter
subjective relations. This n a t u r e can n o t yet be p o s i t e d as objective
n a t u r e . If we abstract in this way from everything ti*a"t is foreign to the
e g o , we a r e left with a " p r i m o r d i a l " world t h a t only c o n t a i n s w h a t is
i m m e d i a t e l y m y (that is, the m e d i t a t i n g ego's) own a n d t h a t presents
itself to m e in a n o d d l y m u t e d t r a n s c e n d e n c e . Of all t h e bodies of
this " n a t u r e r e d u c e d to t h e e g o ' s p r o p e r s p h e r e , " o n e a l o n e is distin
g u i s h e d as m y body. My living b o d y is t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y b o d y in
which I can d o as I please while constituting my world. I can ascribe
fields of sensation a n d activity a n d c o r r e s p o n d i n g kinesthetic phe
n o m e n a to t h e o r g a n s of my body. Taking this state as his r e f e r e n c e
p o i n t , H u s s e r l c o n s t r u c t s t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l history of inter
subjectivity in two steps.

(a) E x p e r i e n c i n g m y o w n b o d y in a n o r i g i n a r y m a n n e r , I first en
c o u n t e r the o t h e r within my p r i m o r d i a l world as a body. I n an
analogizing a p p r e h e n s i o n , I can perceive this b o d y as o n e similar to
my own living body. I perceive it in analogizing a p p e r c e p t i o n as an
o t h e r living body, t h a t is, I i n t e r p r e t it as a n o t h e r living body. In so
d o i n g , a n d conscious of t h e i n n e r life t h a t is always c o n n e c t e d with
m y body in o r i g i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e , I p e r f o r m a n analogizing transfer:
I a s s u m e t h a t t h e o t h e r living b o d y is also associated in t h e s a m e way
with a n i n n e r life, a l t h o u g h this life is n o t accessible to m e originaliter.
H u s s e r l calls such a p r e s e n t a t i o n , in which s o m e t h i n g n o t given is
m a d e p r e s e n t , appresentation. T h e living body of t h e o t h e r
" a p p r e s e n t s " a life of c o n s c i o u s acts t h a t is at first inaccessible a n d
foreign to m e . T h i s life of t h e conscious acts of t h e other, m e d i a t e d
by his living body, is t h e absolutely first foreign object t h a t comes i n t o
b e i n g in m y p r i m o r d i a l world. T h i s constitutes t h e m e a n i n g of an
o t h e r subject whose b o d y is associated with h e r as a living b o d y j u s t as
m y own living b o d y is associated with m e .
(b) I n t h e s e c o n d step of h i s a r g u m e n t , Husserl tries t o m a k e t h e
case t h a t t h e m e a n i n g of t h e a p p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e o t h e r ' s i n n e r life
u n p r o b l e m a t i c a l l y gives rise to the c o m m u n i t y [Vergemeinschaftung]
 39____ .
The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society

of m o n a d s . H e bases his a r g u m e n t o n t h e fact t h a t the spatial per

spectives of " h e r e " a n d " t h e r e , " w h i c h are c e n t e r e d i n t h e living body,
are mutually i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e a n d , in this way, can b e objectified. I
can i n t e r p r e t t h e o t h e r ' s body o n analogy with m y own, as t h o u g h my
body h e r e were in the place of the o t h e r ' s b o d y t h e r e . Having d o n e
this, a n d inferring from t h e a p p r e s e n t e d i n n e r life of t h e other, I c a n
constitute t h e o t h e r ' s world o n analogy with my own. Husserl n o w
wants to show that, with t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e other, a t r a n s c e n d e n
tal We is also f o r m e d , to w h i c h o n e a n d t h e s a m e n a t u r e , a n d t h u s a n
objective n a t u r e , is given. T o d e m o n s t r a t e this, H u s s e r l a p p e a l s t o
the interchangeability of spatial perspectives. J u s t as I c a n virtually
occupy t h e p l a c e of t h e o t h e r living body a n d e x c h a n g e my H e r e for
its T h e r e , so I can also a d o p t t h e world perspective of t h e o t h e r w h o
is a p p r e s e n t e d in t h a t b o d y a n d relativize t h e e g o c e n t r i c association
of its a n d my world perspectives in favor of o n e t h a t is c o m m o n t o
both of us. T h e o t h e r ' s living b o d y

appresents first of all the other Ego's governing in this body, the body over
there, and mediately his governing in the Nature that appears to him per
ceptuallyidentically the Nature to which the body over there belongs,
identically the Nature that is my primordial Nature. It is the same Nature,
but in the mode of appearance: "as if I were standing over there, where the
Other's body is." . . . In the appresented other ego the synthetic systems are the
same, with all their modes of appearance, accordingly with all the possible
perceptions and the noematic contents of these: except that the actual per
ceptions and the modes of givenness actualized therein, and also in part the
objects actually perceived, are not the same; rather the objects perceived are
precisely those perceivable from there, and as they are perceivable from
20
there.

T h e i n t e r c h a n g e a b i l i t y or reciprocity of perspectives g r o u n d s t h e
identity of m y system of a p p e a r a n c e s with t h a t of t h e bodily
a p p r e s e n t e d other. At t h e s a m e time, t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l W e of
c o m m u n a l i z e d m o n a d s is c o n s t i t u t e d in this identity t h r o u g h
interchangeability.

I have p r e s e n t e d Husserl's a c c o u n t to t h e p o i n t w h e r e I can n o w

discuss t h e t w o m o s t i m p o r t a n t objections to it. B o t h of t h e m indi
cate t h a t Husserl begs t h e q u e s t i o n of intersubjectivity, which h e can
n o t derive o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n s of a p h i l o s o p h y of consciousness.
40
Lecture II

Against ( a ) : Husserl m u s t b e able to give g r o u n d s for why, in my

p r i m o r d i a l world, in which only o n e b o d y is d i s t i n g u i s h e d as my
originarily e x p e r i e n c e d living body, I s h o u l d be able to s e p a r a t e o u t
of t h e totality of all o t h e r b o d i e s a subclass of t h e p o t e n t i a l living
b o d i e s of o t h e r subjects. Husserl justifies t h e possibility of the
a p p e r c e p t i v e transfer of my own bodily e x p e r i e n c e to the o t h e r ' s
b o d y by a p p e a l to a p e r c e p t i b l e similarity b e t w e e n t h e two objects.
B u t w e c o u l d perceive a r e l a t i o n o f similarity b e t w e e n m y living body
a n d a n o t h e r b o d y only after h a v i n g objectified my o w n b o d y as an el
e m e n t of an objective n a t u r e . T h e merely subjectively e x p e r i e n c e d
b o d y is so dissimilar t o t h e perceived body, t h a t it provides n o basis
21
for an analogizing transfer. In fact, even Husserl d o e s n o t rely o n a
r e l a t i o n of similarity. T h e a t t e m p t to i n t e r p r e t a n o t h e r body as a liv
i n g b o d y m u s t also be verifiable in the h a r m o n i o u s succession of con
secutive a p p r e s e n t a t i o n s :

The experienced living body of another continues to prove itself as actually

a living body, solely in its changing but incessantly "harmonious behavior."
Such harmonious behavior (as having a physical side that indicates some
thing psychic appresentatively) must present itself fulnllingly in original ex- j
perience, and do so throughout the continuous change in behavior from
phase to phase. The living body becomes experienced as a pseudo-organ
22
ism, precisely if there is something discordant about its behavior.

W h a t is m e a n t h e r e by " h a r m o n i o u s behavior"? If, as p r e s u p p o s e d ,

only t h e o b s e r v a b l e m o v e m e n t s of o t h e r physical b o d i e s a r e given t o
m e , t h e n w h a t r e s u l t a r e at best regularities in t h e succession of phys
ical states, w h i c h is t r u e of all b o d i e s in my e n v i r o n m e n t . I c a n n o t de
rive from this a criterion for distinguishing p o t e n t i a l living b o d i e s . If,
o n the o t h e r h a n d , I u n d e r s t a n d the b e h a v i o r of the o t h e r ' s living
body as symbolic expression, then t h e c o h e r e n c e of successive ges
tures is d e t e r m i n e d a c c o r d i n g to r u l e s t h a t institute a symbolic sys
t e m : t h a t is, r u l e s that d e t e r m i n e what physical characteristics are to
c o u n t as signs, what m e a n i n g s can be assigned to t h e s e signs, a n d in
which c o n t e x t s of use. A l t h o u g h I a m to u n d e r s t a n d t h e m o v e m e n t s
of a n o t h e r b o d y as gestures by a p p r e h e n d i n g t h e m in an analogizing
m a n n e r , I c a n d o so only if intersubjective k n o w l e d g e of w h a t t h e
signs a r e a n d of t h e lexicon already exists. In n e i t h e r case c a n t h e
m e r e " h a r m o n y " of successive a p p r e s e n t a t i o n s serve as a c r i t e r i o n
 41___ -
The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society

for d e m a r c a t i o n . My i m p r e s s i o n is t h a t Husserl d e l u d e d himself

jhout t h e viability of his first a r g u m e n t b e c a u s e , in t h e c o n c e p t of
;1p p e s e n t a t i o n , h e tacitly assumed w h a t h e w a n t e d to d e d u c e with its
r

aid. In the Cartesian Meditations this c o n c e p t is a d m i t t e d only in t h e

sense of the diadic association of a p e r c e p t i b l e with a n i m p e r c e p t i b l e
object. But Husserl implicitly relies o n a f u r t h e r m e a n i n g suggested
in his earlier works, n a m e l y Ideas a n d Logical Investigations. Ap-
presentation is tacitly conceived as the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a m e a n i n g
by a symbolic expression: in this case, by a c o r p o r e a l o n e . However,
this representative function, which is specific to l a n g u a g e , o u g h t n o t
to be p r e s u p p o s e d i n a t t e m p t i n g t o give a n a c c o u n t of the origins of
an intersubjective r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n m e a n d a n o t h e r subject. F o r it is
this relation t h a t is t o m a k e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g by m e a n s of sym
bols possible in the first place.
Against (b): I n t h e s e c o n d step o f h i s a r g u m e n t , t o o , if I a m n o t
mistaken, H u s s e r l is guilty o f b e g g i n g t h e q u e s t i o n . H e is r i g h t i n his
basic a s s u m p t i o n t h a t an intersubjective world of c o m m u n a l i z e d sub
jects comes into b e i n g t h r o u g h t h e m u t u a l i n t e r t w i n i n g of p e r s p e c
tives. I n this reciprocity, all p a r t i c i p a n t s a p p r e h e n d themselves,
others, a n d n a t u r e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y from t h e i r o w n s t a n d p o i n t a n d
from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of every possible o t h e r subject. I n this way, t h e
subjects constitute a n objective world in c o m m o n . Note, however,
that Husserl develops this c o n s t r u c t i o n only to t h e p o i n t where I, the
meditating p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t , p u t myself in t h e place of t h e
appresented i n n e r life of t h e o t h e r a n d identify its w o r l d with m i n e .
For a c o m m o n world is c o n s t i t u t e d only t h r o u g h a symmetrical rela
tionship t h a t allows t h e o t h e r equally to p u t itself in m y place, t h a t is,
in place of t h e i n n e r life t h a t is a p p r e s e n t e d t o it, a n d identify m y
world with its. H u s s e r l c a n n o t a d e q u a t e l y a c c o u n t for this c o m p l e t e
reciprocity since t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a p p r o a c h b e g i n s with t h e
meditating ego, w h o s e subjectivity m u s t always b e t h e u l t i m a t e pos
sible h o r i z o n of d e m o n s t r a t i o n a n d verification. T h i s leads inevita
bly to an a s y m m e t r y b e t w e e n myself a n d any other. During self-
observation, t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t ' s e g o always r e t a i n s the f u n c t i o n
of an a p r i o r i o r i g i n a r y ego [ Ur-Ich].
T h e d i m e n s i o n s of " H e r e " a n d " T h e r e " are used with an ambiguity
that is of g r e a t c o n s e q u e n c e for t h e strategy of H u s s e r l ' s d e d u c t i o n .
42
L e c t u r e II

At first " H e r e " a n d " T h e r e " d e n o t e spatial perspectives c e n t e r e d

t h e living body. I virtually occupy all possible locations. Therefore
even in my p r i m o r d i a l world, t h a t is, before t h e e n t r a n c e of another
e g o , I can sever spatial p e r s p e c d v e s from their o r i e n t a t i o n to m y liv
ing body a n d objectify t h e m as spatial c o o r d i n a t e s . (This is o n e of the
c o n d i t i o n s of my being able to a p p r e h e n d a n o t h e r body o n analogy
with m y own.) Husserl n o w assumes t h a t t h e free variation of spatial
perspectives also m a k e s possible the i n t e r c h a n g e of world perspec
tives, w h i c h we m u s t u n d e r t a k e in o r d e r to constitute an
intersubjective world. H e d o e s n o t realize t h a t h e is talking a b o u t two
different things. T h e spatial c o o r d i n a t e s within which I relativize the
bodily spatial p e r s p e c d v e s of " H e r e " a n d ' T h e r e " provide a frame
w o r k only for the m o n o l o g i c a l p e r c e p t i o n of moving b o d i e s . But as
i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e world perspectives from which I e n c o u n t e r others
a n d o t h e r s e n c o u n t e r m e within t h e framework of a n intersubjective
world, " H e r e " and " T h e r e " take on a different m e a n i n g . O n l y in a
m e t a p h o r i c a l sense can these be called spatial p e r s p e c d v e s . Unlike
spatial perspectives, they c a n be i n t e r c h a n g e d a n d objectified as per
specdves of a c o m m o n world only o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n of t h e c o m p l e t e
reciprocity of all p a r t i c i p a t i n g subjects. Physical space is r e p l a c e d by
social space. Alfred S c h u t z d i s c e r n e d this weakness:

E v e n if o n e a c c e p t s H u s s e r l ' s t h e o r y o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e O t h e r , ac
c o r d i n g t o w h i c h , by v i r t u e of a p p r e s e n t a t i v e transfer, y o u r [living] b o d y , ap
p e a r i n g i n m y p r i m o r d i a l s p h e r e , l e a d s t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f y o u r full
psychic life a n d f u r t h e r t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of y o u r t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e g o for
m e ; e v e n if, u n l i k e H u s s e r l , o n e a d m i t s t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t m y b o d y a p p e a r
i n g in y o u r p r i m o r d i a l s p h e r e l e a d s i n a n a n a l o g o u s m a n n e r to t h e c o n s t i t u
t i o n of m y full p s y c h i c life a n d m y t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e g o f o r y o u ; if o n e
a s s u m e s all t h i s , still n o t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o m m u n i t y , n o t r a n s c e n d e n t a l W e , is
e v e r e s t a b l i s h e d . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , e a c h t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e g o has n o w consti
t u t e d for himself, as t o its b e i n g a n d s e n s e , h i s w o r l d , a n d in it all o t h e r sub
j e c t s , i n c l u d i n g myself; b u t h e h a s c o n s t i t u t e d t h e m j u s t f o r h i m s e l f a n d n o t
23
f o r all o t h e r t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e g o s as w e l l .

Even o n Husserl's p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o m m u n i t y can

be established only in a n a b s u r d sense: t h a t t h e r e are c o m m u n i t i e s
for m e a n d c o m m u n i t i e s for o t h e r s , w h i c h d o n o t necessarily coin
cide. T h e g e n e r a t i o n of intersubjectively c o m m u n a l i z e d e x p e r i e n c e ,
 4 3 - :

:j^Tphenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society

which is identical for m e a n d all o t h e r s , c a n n o t be m a d e plausible in

this way.
In The Crisis of the European Sciences Husserl speaks unequivocally of
t[ "unique sort of p h i l o s o p h i c a l s o l i t u d e " i n w h i c h t h e p h e n o m -
i e

enologist i m m e r s e s h i m s e l f w h e n h e p e r f o r m s t h e epoche a n d aban

dons the n a t u r a l attitude:

I am the one who performs the epoche, and, even if there are others, and
even if they practice the epoche in direct community with me, [they and] all
other human beings with their entire act-life are included, for me, within my
epoche, in the world-phenomenon, in my epoche, which is exclusively
24
mine/*
This is a f u n d a m e n t a l m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p o s t u l a t e of a p h i l o s o p h y of
consciousness w h o s e starting p o i n t is solitary reflection o n t h e activi
ties of the individual's own subjectivity. It e x c l u d e s in p r i n c i p l e the
possibility that t h e o t h e r s c o n s t i t u t e d by a n d for m e could have ex
actly the same relation t o m e t h a t I have to t h e m as m y i n t e n t i o n a l
objects. Rather, in t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a t t i t u d e , I a m m e t h o d o l o g
ically forced to assert myself as t h e p r i m a r y a n d f o u n d a t i o n a l origi
nal ego against all o t h e r egos t h a t g u a r a n t e e t h e intersubjectivity of
25
my world.
E x p e r i e n c e t h a t is intersubjectively c o m m u n a l i z e d i n t h e strict
sense c a n n o t b e conceived w i t h o u t t h e c o n c e p t of m e a n i n g t h a t is
c o m m u n i c a t e d a n d s h a r e d by different subjects. I d e n t i c a l m e a n i n g s
are n o t f o r m e d in t h e i n t e n t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of a solitary subject t h a t
confronts its world in isolation. For m e a n i n g s to b e identical in any
intelligible sense, t h e y m u s t have t h e same validity for different sub
jects. T o a c c o u n t for t h e identity of s e m a n t i c c o n v e n t i o n s ,
Wittgenstein p r o p o s e d t h e m o d e l of a r u l e t h a t at least two subjects
must b e able to follow. M e a d r e c o m m e n d s t h e m o d e l of a r o l e t h a t
establishes reciprocally i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n s a b o u t b e h a v i o r
for at least two subjects. C o n c e p t s such as " r u l e " o r "role" m u s t b e
defined from t h e o u t s e t in t e r m s of a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n subjects.
They circumvent t h e n o t i o n of a n y t h i n g like a private conscious
ness t h a t only s u b s e q u e n t i y e n t e r s i n t o c o n t a c t with a n o t h e r con
scious b e i n g . Moreover, t h e primitive t e r m s a r e c o n c e i v e d such t h a t
the intersubjective relation a n d t h e use of symbolic expressions o n
44
Lecture II

t h e p a r t of subjects c a p a b l e of s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n originate
simultaneously.
C o m m u n i c a t i v e t h e o r i e s enjoy the a d v a n t a g e of b e i n g able to take
as their starting point t h e intersubjective relation t h a t constitutive
t h e o r i e s a t t e m p t in vain to derive from t h e activity of m o n a d i c con
sciousness. T h e i r task, t h e n , is to give a c o m m u n i c a t i o n - t h e o r e t i c ac
c o u n t of t h e subjective e x p e r i e n c e s , to which each ego has privileged
access. T h e constitution of t h e objects of possible e x p e r i e n c e about
which we c o m m u n i c a t e with o n e a n o t h e r m u s t also be a c c o u n t e d for
in terms of a theory of o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I should
like to discuss this set of p r o b l e m s in terms of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s theory
of l a n g u a g e g a m e s .
 Ill
From a Constitutive Theory to a Communicative
Theory of Society (Sellars and Wittgenstein):
Communicative and Cognitive Uses of Language

I should like to b e g i n by d e v e l o p i n g t h e categorial framework for a

communicative t h e o r y of society. H e r e W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s c o n c e p t of a
language g a m e will serve as a g u i d e . By contrast, Wilfrid Sellars's
quasi-transcendental a c c o u n t o f t h e genesis o f intentionality clearly
illustrates t h e limitations that face the t h e o r y of consciousness after
the linguistic t u r n . His original views occupy a p e c u l i a r i n t e r m e d i a r y
position b e t w e e n a constitutive t h e o r y a n d a c o m m u n i c a t i v e theory.
Sellars distinguishes b e t w e e n acts of consciousness t h a t have a sen
sory or c o n c e p t u a l c o n t e n t ( p e r c e p t i o n s a n d j u d g m e n t s ) , these c o n
tents themselves ( t h e objects or states of affairs i n t e n d e d in
perceptions a n d j u d g m e n t s ) , a n d existing objects (or things-in-them-
selves): or, as h e calls t h e m , " r e p r e s e n t i n g s , " " c o n t e n t s of r e p r e s e n t
ing," a n d "that which exists simpliciter as so existing." T h e s e
distinctions a r e i n t r o d u c e d from t h e perspective of epistemological
realism; thus they d o n o t c o i n c i d e with t h e c o n c e p t s of e i t h e r Kant's
or Husserl's t r a n s c e n d e n t a l logic. Nevertheless, w h a t Sellars calls
"content" a n d " r e p r e s e n t i n g s " c o r r e s p o n d fairly accurately to
Husserl's i n t e n t i o n a l object a n d i n t e n t i o n a l acts, respectively. Sellars
wants to e x p l a i n h o w it is possible t h a t m a n y individual r e p r e s e n t i n g s
can h a v e o n e a n d t h e s a m e c o n t e n t . For only sameness of m e a n i n g
[Bedeutung] can a c c o u n t for t h e intersubjectivity of a t h o u g h t t h a t re
m a i n s t h e same t h o u g h t even if it is t h o u g h t by different p e o p l e o r by
1
t h e s a m e p e r s o n at different times. "What, after all, d o e s it m e a n t o
2
say t h a t c o n t e n t exists ' i n ' r e p r e s e n t i n g ? " T o a n s w e r this q u e s t i o n ,
46
Lecture III

Sellars d o e s n o t simply switch f r o m t h e level of t h e p h i l o s o p h y f 0

consciousness to t h a t of p h i l o s o p h y of l a n g u a g e . Rather, he proposes

to e l u c i d a t e t h e relation of acts of consciousness to their conceptual
c o n t e n t in terms of t h e linguistic model of t h e r e l a t i o n of linguistic ex
pressions to t h e i r s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t . This m e a n s t h a t Husserl's ques
tion of h o w an object is given in t h e s t r e a m of intentional
e x p e r i e n c e s c a n b e r e p l a c e d by t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w a m e a n i n g is ex
3
p r e s s e d symbolically by a linguistic sign. T h e sense in which we talk
of " c o n t e n t s of r e p r e s e n t i n g s " or of "contents existing in repre-
sentings," or of "mental e p i s o d e s representing i n t e n s i o n s " is to b e elu
c i d a t e d with r e f e r e n c e to t h e sense in w h i c h we talk of " m e a n i n g s of
expressions," o r of " m e a n i n g existing in expressions," or of "linguis
tic e p i s o d e s standing for or expressing i n t e n s i o n s . " R e p r e s e n d n g s and
t h e i r c o n t e n t s are to i n t e r p r e t e d on the m o d e l of linguistic expres
sions a n d their m e a n i n g s [Bedeutungen]. I n t e n t i o n a l acts a r e to be
t r e a t e d as t h o u g h t h e r e are n o i n t e n t i o n s [Intentionen] whose
m e a n i n g o r i n t e n s i o n [Sinn], as I posited in t h e first l e c t u r e , c a n n o t
always find symbolic e x p r e s s i o n .
Starting w i t h s e n t e n c e s t h a t c a n b e e i t h e r t r u e or false, Sellars ex
a m i n e s several types of m e a n i n g [ S i n n ] : t h e m e a n i n g of states of af
fairs t h a t c a n b e r e p r e s e n t e d in declarative s e n t e n c e s a n d t h a t d o or
d o n o t o b t a i n ; the m e a n i n g of universal attributes t h a t a p p e a r in the
f o r m of p r e d i c a t e expressions a n d may o r may n o t b e exemplified in
existing objects; a n d t h e m e a n i n g of objects t h a t a r e r e p r e s e n t e d in
4
individual c o n s t a n t s o r d e n o t a t i o n s a n d t h a t m a y or may n o t exist.
T h e relation b e t w e e n a linguistic expression a n d t h e m e a n i n g it sym
bolizes is called a semantic relation. Sellars p r o p o s e s an e l e g a n t way to
g r a s p this s e m a n t i c relation m o r e precisely. Every expression,
w h e t h e r for states of affairs, g e n e r a l attributes o r individuals, can be
p u t in q u o t a t i o n m a r k s in o r d e r to indicate t h a t w h a t is m e a n t is not
t h e c o n c r e t e e x p r e s s i o n in a given l a n g u a g e b u t r a t h e r t h a t this ex
pression s t a n d s for all conceivable expressions t h a t play a r o l e in
c o m p a r a b l e l a n g u a g e s precisely a n a l o g o u s to t h e r o l e played by the
given e x p r e s s i o n in "our" l a n g u a g e . [Sellars i n t r o d u c e s the conven
tion of dot q u o t e s for this p u r p o s e . Trans.] In chess we speak of the
king- in t h e sense t h a t -kings- may m a k e certain moves a n d n o t oth
ers, r e g a r d l e s s of t h e actual physical f o r m t h e -kings- m a y take as
 4____
p ^ j i a Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society

pieces or signs. T h u s in the s e n t e n c e , "the wine is r e d , " I can p u t t h e

predicated adjective red- in d o t q u o t e s to i n d i c a t e t h a t "red" in Eng
lish has the s a m e f u n c t i o n as "rot" in G e r m a n , " r o u g e " in F r e n c h ,
"rosso" in Italian, a n d so o n . T h e s e m a n t i c r e l a t i o n holds n o t b e
tween the English w o r d "red" a n d t h e class of all r e d objects, b u t be
tween it a n d t h e abstract m e a n i n g (sense) -redness,- which c o m e s
only from t h e way in w h i c h I u s e t h e w o r d "red" in English a n d t h e
uses of expressions a n a l o g o u s t o "red" in all o t h e r ( c o m p a r a b l e ) lan
guages. T h u s h e r e t h e q u o t a t i o n m a r k s are a metalingustic device for
highlighting h o w an expression is n o r m a l l y u s e d within a linguistic
system. T h e y direct o u r a t t e n t i o n to t h e u n i f o r m l y identical m e a n i n g
for which t h e r e a r e expressions with a n a n a l o g o u s r o l e i n every c o m
parable l a n g u a g e system. Socrates is wise- is a state of affairs t h a t is
r e n d e r e d in English by t h e s e n t e n c e "Socrates is wise" a n d i n L by x

the expression S ( t h e same holds for p r e d i c a t e s a n d i n d i v i d u a l con

x

stants). T e r m s such as -wise- a n d Socrates- refer to t h e f u n c t i o n t h a t

these words have in English a n d that expression with a n a n a l o g o u s
role have in c o m p a r a b l e languages.
In u n d e r t a k i n g this a b s t r a c d o n , Sellars m u s t tacitly rely o n t h e ba
sic h e r m e n e u t i c e x p e r i e n c e t h a t every s e n t e n c e of a n a t u r a l lan
guage m u s t in p r i n c i p l e b e translatable i n t o every o t h e r l a n g u a g e .
Curiously, however, h e uses t h e c o n c e p t of t h e role or f u n c t i o n an ex
pression has in a l a n g u a g e system w i t h o u t analyzing it further (or
even using it in t h e explicit sense given to these key c o n c e p t s by
Wittgenstein in his analyses of l a n g u a g e g a m e s ) . Sellars treats t h e ab
straction of expressions with t h e same m e a n i n g as a logical o p e r a t i o n
and n o t as a n exercise of h e r m e n e u t i c skill r e q u i r i n g e x p l a n a t i o n in
the p h i l o s o p h y of l a n g u a g e . As I shall show shordy, this has r e p e r c u s
sions for his a t t e m p t to c a r r y t h r o u g h his o w n p r o g r a m , for t h e sake
of which h e p r o p o s e s to c o m p a r e t h e c o n t e n t s of m e n t a l e p i s o d e s t o
the m e a n i n g s of s p e e c h episodes.
Sellars gives Husserl's a t t e m p t to p r o v i d e a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l
f o u n d a t i o n of intersubjectivity a linguistic t u r n . H e w a n t s to show
how an i n t e n t i o n a l i d i o m , in w h i c h we c o m m u n i c a t e a b o u t o u r de
sires, t h o u g h t s , h o p e s , a n d feelings, could h a v e arisen f r o m a lan
g u a g e devoid of i n t e n t i o n a l expressions: in o t h e r words, from a n
empiricist l a n g u a g e . His c o n s t r u c t i o n is g o v e r n e d by t h e basic i d e a
48
Lecture III

t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l expressions were originally hypothetically intro

d u c e d as primitive terms of a theory a c c o r d i n g to which t h e observ
able b e h a v i o r a l r e s p o n s e s of thinking, feeling, o r willing organisms
are to b e conceived as t h e final states of specific processes t h a t begin
with i n t e r n a l episodes or acts of consciousness ( r e p r e s e n t i n g s ) . This
t h e o r y is b a s e d o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t observable episodes at the
level of linguistic articulation have t h e same r e l a t i o n to u n d e r l y i n g
i n t e r n a l episodes (i.e., i n t e n t i o n s ) t h a t linguistic expressions h a v e to
their m e a n i n g s . O n c e t h e theory was discovered, it was so widely cor
r o b o r a t e d t h a t today it is p a r t of t h e r e p e r t o i r e of processes of early
c h i l d h o o d socialization. T h e i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e of the other's
e g o , o n c e a theoretical c o n s t r u c t , h a s since b e c o m e a self-evident,
m u t u a l l y p r e s u p p o s e d reality.
I a m n o t i n t e r e s t e d in e x a m i n i n g w h e t h e r Sellars's c o n s t r u c t i o n is
consistent in its details. I n t h e p r e s e n t context, w h a t is of interest is
only t h e fictitious state of n a t u r e in which, as in H u s s e r l ' s p r i m o r d i a l
world, subjects are e q u i p p e d with a full-fledged conscious life while
b e i n g d e p r i v e d of all intersubjective relationships. T h e y have com
m a n d of a l a n g u a g e t h a t c a n b e used descriptively, a n d that, e x c e p t
for logical constants, allows only t e r m s for observable (spatio-
t e m p o r a l l y localizable) events. T h i s empiricist l a n g u a g e can be used
for cognitive e n d s , such as f o r m i n g h y p o t h e s e s a b o u t n a t u r a l events,
b u t n o t for c o m m u n i c a t i v e e n d s . Sellars has to t a k e this r e d u c t i o n i s t
a p p r o a c h if t h e initial state is to b o t h e x c l u d e i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations
a n d still allow for the existence of l a n g u a g e . This latter c o n d i t i o n is
necessary b e c a u s e t h e t h e o r y of o t h e r m i n d s he postulates is to be
c o n s t r u c t e d o n t h e m o d e l of l a n g u a g e , which m e a n s t h a t it also re
quires k n o w l e d g e of s e m a n t i c relations. I will a r g u e t h a t t h e r e is n o
consistent c o n c e p t i o n of a l a n g u a g e of this sort, severed f r o m its
c o m m u n i c a t i v e use a n d thus c o m p l e t e l y m o n o l o g i c a l .
Sellars's solitary l a n g u a g e users m u s t have m a s t e r y of t h e s a m e
m e a n i n g s for w o r d s a n d s e n t e n c e s w i t h o u t having p e r f o r m e d a sin
gle s p e e c h act in relation to a n o t h e r speaker. To s e p a r a t e o u t such a
5
" n o n - p e r f o r m a t o r y s t r a t u m of linguistic behavior," t h a t is, t h e
"epistemic f u n c t i o n of l a n g u a g e as c o n t r a s t e d with its p e r f o r m a t o r y
r o l e in i n t e r p e r s o n a l relationships," Sellars distinguishes b e t w e e n
"actions" t h a t can b e r e p e a t e d at a n y time willingly a n d consciously,
 p^nTa Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society

that is, intentionally, a n d m e r e "acts" [Reaktionen] t h a t o c c u r

nonintentionally. Sellars's m o n o l o g i c a l l a n g u a g e users may p r o d u c e
only acts, or linguistic events. Since we a r e a t t e m p t i n g t o explain t h e
genesis of i n t e n t i o n a l l a n g u a g e , we d o n o t w a n t falsely to p r e s u p p o s e
its existence in t h e m o n o l o g i c a l state. T h a t is w h y t h e s e l a n g u a g e us
ers may articulate t h e i r i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s , t h o u g h t s , feelings,
and desires only in " l o c u t i o n a r y n o n - a c t i o n s , " t h a t is, in p u r e l y reac
tive linguistic behavior: "these episodes o r 'acts' c a n n o t qualify as ac
6
tions." O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , even such linguistic b e h a v i o r m u s t allow
the expression of identical m e a n i n g s . O t h e r w i s e even a theoretically
imaginative R o b i n s o n C r u s o e w o u l d have n o suitable m o d e l at his
disposal a c c o r d i n g to which h e could c o m e to u n d e r s t a n d t h e rela
tion between t h e o b s e r v a b l e episodes of t h e o t h e r ' s e g o a n d t h e rat
ter's (theoretically p o s t u l a t e d ) i n n e r episodes. T o m e e t this
difficulty, Sellars distinguishes b e t w e e n "rules of p e r f o r m a n c e " a n d
7
"rules of criticism." Rules a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h we o r i e n t o u r actions
establish w h a t we o u g h t to d o . Rules of criticism, in contrast, p r o v i d e
only criteria f o r d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r s o m e t h i n g " o u g h t to b e , " t h a t is,
whether it actually accords with a r u l e or not. P r e s e r v i n g s a m e n e s s of
m e a n i n g o r s e m a n t i c uniformity, a n d t h u s t h e very character of lan
guage in t h e case of m o n o l o g i c a l l a n g u a g e use, r e q u i r e s only rules of
cridcism a n d n o t rules of p e r f o r m a n c e . T h e latter w o u l d illicitly in
t r o d u c e i n t o o u r fictitious state of n a t u r e precisely w h a t m a y n o t yet
appear t h e r e i n t e n t i o n s :

Because the thinking out loud, and the mental acts modeled on them, with
which we have been concerned, are not actions, we have stressed the distinc
tion between rules of performance and rules of criticism. Non-actions, as
well as actions, are subject to rules of criticism, and actions, are subject to
rules of criticisms, and the linguistic non-actions we have in mind are no ex
ceptions. Linguistic rules of criticism play a key role in developing, main
taining, and improving our linguistic character, thus ensuring the existence
of the semantic uniformities, which are the descriptive core of meaningful
8
speech.

T h e force of t h e c o n c e p t u a l strategy t h a t c o m p e l s Sellars to m a k e

these distinctions is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , b u t t h e distinctions themselves
are by n o m e a n s plausible. I t a k e issue with t h e claim t h a t s e m a n t i c
uniformities [Identitdt von Bedeutungen] c a n b e s e c u r e d solely o n t h e
50
L e c t u r e III

basis of m o n o l o g i c a l m a s t e r y of t h e criteria of o n e ' s own j u d g m e n t of

linguistic behavior. Moreover, I dispute the i d e a t h a t it is at all possi
ble to j u d g e w h e t h e r a given b e h a v i o r m e e t s t h e criteria of rule-gov
e r n e d b e h a v i o r if o n e d o e s n o t oneself possess the c o m p e t e n c e to
follow t h e s e rules. Let us recall Wittgenstein's f a m o u s a r g u m e n t ,
which r u l e s o u t t h e possibility t h a t a solitary subject could follow a
r u l e in isolation:

T o think o n e is o b e y i n g a r u l e is n o t t o o b e y a r u l e . H e n c e it is n o t p o s s i b l e to
o b e y a r u l e "privately": o t h e r w i s e t h i n k i n g o n e w a s o b e y i n g a r u l e w o u l d be
9
t h e s a m e t h i n g as o b e y i n g i t .

W i t t g e n s t e i n starts from t h e i d e a t h a t t h e use of t h e w o r d " r u l e " is in

t e r t w i n e d with the use of the w o r d "same." A subject A, if it follows a
r u l e , can d o so only in such a way t h a t it follows t h e same r u l e regard
less of c h a n g i n g c o n t i n g e n t circumstances. It is implicit in t h e mean
i n g of t h e r u l e t h a t w h a t A takes as t h e basis of its o r i e n t a t i o n r e m a i n s
the s a m e . I n that case, however, at least o n e a d d i t i o n a l subject B must
b e able to c h e c k w h e t h e r A actually is following t h e p r e s u m e d r u l e in
t h e given case. A m u s t b e in a position to deviate from t h e r u l e a n d
m a k e systematic e r r o r s . At the same time, B m u s t be able to recog
nize deviations as systematic e r r o r s a n d criticize t h e m . Only if these
two c o n d i t i o n s are satisfied is t h e m e a n i n g e x p r e s s e d in t h e r u l e the
s a m e for b o t h subjectsand, of course, n o t only for t h e s e two partic
u l a r subjects, b u t for all subjects capable of s p e e c h a n d action who
w
could take o n t h e roles of A a n d B.
T h e p o i n t of these reflections is t h a t I myself c a n n o t b e sure of
w h e t h e r I a m following a r u l e unless there is a c o n t e x t in which I can
subject my behavior to another's criticism a n d we can c o m e to a consensus.
T h e o t h e r ' s capacity to criticize p r e s u p p o s e s in t u r n that she has mas
tery of t h e same r u l e - c o m p e t e n c e t h a t I have. F o r w h e r e i n d o e s t h e
intersubjectivity of t h e validity of rules consist? B can p e r f o r m t h e re
q u i r e d c h e c k of A's r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r only if B can d e m o n
s t r a t e to A that, in a given case, A has m a d e a mistake: t h a t is, only if B
can, if necessary, b r i n g a b o u t a m u t u a l a g r e e m e n t a b o u t t h e c o r r e c t
a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e r u l e . F o r e x a m p l e , B c a n take o n A's r o l e a n d show
w h a t A has d o n e w r o n g . I n this case, A takes o n t h e r o l e of t h e critic
w h o c a n n o w justify h e r original b e h a v i o r in t u r n if she c a n d e m o n -
 5d____ .
From a Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society

strate t o B t h a t B h a s m i s a p p l i e d t h e r u l e . W i t h o u t this possibility of

reciprocal critique a n d i n s t r u c t i o n l e a d i n g to a g r e e m e n t , w i t h o u t t h e
possibility of r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t t h e r u l e accord
ing to which b o t h subjects o r i e n t their b e h a v i o r by following it, we
could n o t even speak of "the s a m e " r u l e at all. I n d e e d , w i t h o u t t h e
possibility of intersubjective rule-following, a solitary subject c o u l d
not even h a v e t h e c o n c e p t of a rule.
Wittgenstein uses t h e analysis of t h e c o n c e p t of "obeying a r u l e " to
show that u n d e r s t a n d i n g s a m e n e s s of m e a n i n g c o n c e p t u a l l y p r e s u p
poses t h e ability to e n g a g e in a public p r a c t i c e w i t h at least o n e o t h e r
subject, w h e r e all p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t have t h e c o m p e t e n c e b o t h t o b e
have in r u l e - g o v e r n e d fashion a n d critically t o evaluate such behav
ior. An isolated subject who possesses only o n e of t h e s e c o m p e t e n c i e s
11
cannot m a s t e r s e m a n t i c c o n v e n t i o n s .
T h e m o n o l o g i c a l l a n g u a g e users w h o p o p u l a t e Sellars's state of na
ture are s u p p o s e d to k n o w w h a t it m e a n s to say t h a t a w o r d o r a sen
tence h a s a m e a n i n g . T h e y a r e s u p p o s e d to b e in a p o s i t i o n to find
out by c o m p a r i s o n t h e a n a l o g o u s roles played in different l a n g u a g e s
by expressions with t h e s a m e m e a n i n g a n d t h u s to identify abstract
m e a n i n g s "by c o m p a r i n g t h e j o b s they d o with t h e j o b s d o n e by ex
12
pressions in t h e base l a n g u a g e . " W i t t g e n s t e i n speaks in t h e s a m e
13
sense of t h e role t a k e n o n by w o r d s in l a n g u a g e . But Wittgenstein
analyzes t h e l a n g u a g e systems within w h i c h w o r d s (or sentences) c a n
assume c o m p a r a b l e functions a n d shows t h a t these l a n g u a g e systems
are public in c h a r a c t e r a n d always r e q u i r e t h e i n t e r a c t i o n of at least
two subjects. If Sellars's m o n o l o g i c a l l a n g u a g e users actually c o u l d
identify m e a n i n g s , t h e y w o u l d already b e f u n c t i o n i n g at t h e level of
intersubjec ive c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h a t is t o say, t h e y w o u l d already b e
using t h e very i n t e n t i o n a l i d i o m t h a t was to have b e e n derived from
the fictitious state of n a t u r e . It is t r u e t h a t Sellars avoids Husserl's er
r o r of a n o n l i n g u i s t i c intentionalist t h e o r y of m e a n i n g . B u t h e ac
cepts W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s insight t h a t "it is in l a n g u a g e [and only in
languageJ. H . ] t h a t an e x p e c t a t i o n a n d its fulfillment m a k e con
14
tact" only i n o r d e r to s e p a r a t e l a n g u a g e itself f r o m its i n h e r e n t
form: t h e intersubjectivity of possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Sellars
fails at this p a r a d o x i c a l task of g r o u n d i n g intersubjectivity i n
m o n o l o g i c a l l a n g u a g e j u s t as H u s s e r l d i d in his a n a l o g o u s
52
L e c t u r e III

a t t e m p t a n d for similar reasons. As t h e w o r d " m o n o l o g i c a l " im

plies, t h e m o n o l o g i c a l u s e of l a n g u a g e is conceivable only as a limit
i n g case of c o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e use, a n d n o t as its possible
foundation.
I n contrast, Wittgenstein makes t h e transition from t h e philoso
phy of consciousness to the p h i l o s o p h y of l a n g u a g e w i t h o u t hesita
tion. First, h e treats i n t e n t i o n a l c o n t e n t s i n d e p e n d e n t l y from
i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s ; they a t first have n o t h i n g to d o with acts of
c o n s c i o u s n e s s or i n n e r e p i s o d e s . It is in l a n g u a g e itself t h a t inten
tions m a k e contact with their fulfillment. As an example
W i t t g e n s t e i n uses a m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o b l e m a n d t h e o p e r a t i o n that
13
solves it: " F r o m e x p e c t a t i o n to fulfillment is a step in a calculation."
T h e case o f s e n t e n c e s is a n a l o g o u s . F r o m a n i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e we
derive t h e action t h a t can be r e g a r d e d as fulfilling t h e imperative,
a n d f r o m a declarative s e n t e n c e we can derive t h e fact t h a t m a k e s it
t r u e . I n t e n t i o n a n d fulfillment b e l o n g to t h e g r a m m a r of the
sentence:

I n s o f a r as t h e m e a n i n g of w o r d s b e c o m e s clear i n t h e f u l f i l l m e n t o f a n ex
p e c t a t i o n , i n t h e satisfaction of a wish, in t h e c a r r y i n g o u t o f a n o r d e r , etc., it
a l r e a d y shows itself w h e n w e p u t t h e e x p e c t a t i o n i n t o l a n g u a g e . It is t h e r e
1 6
fore completely d e t e r m i n e d in the g r a m m a r .

T h e m e a n i n g of t h e s e n t e n c e is n o t p n e u m a t i c ; it is n o t e x p l a i n e d by
relating it to i n t e n t i o n s or meaning-giving acts. To t h e contrary, the
m e a n i n g of i n t e n t i o n s can only be specified with r e f e r e n c e to the
17
m e a n i n g of s e n t e n c e s : " T h e m e a n i n g of the s e n t e n c e is n o t a soul."
S o m e t h i n g is a s e n t e n c e only in a l a n g u a g e . T h u s t o u n d e r s t a n d an
i n t e n t i o n is to u n d e r s t a n d t h e r o l e of a s e n t e n c e in a linguistic sys
tem. B u t in w h a t sense c a n we s p e a k h e r e of a system of l a n g u a g e ?
As we know, W i t t g e n s t e i n m a k e s use of a m o d e l : a l a n g u a g e is like
18
a g a m e . H e i n t r o d u c e s the c o n c e p t of a g a m e t h r o u g h e x a m p l e s .
T h e first g r o u p of e x a m p l e s consists in simple calculations t h a t can
b e p e r f o r m e d with the aid of signs a n d usage rules for c o m b i n i n g
signs. T h e p a r a d i g m o n which h e draws a g a i n a n d a g a i n is t h e series
of n a t u r a l n u m b e r s . A f u r t h e r g r o u p of e x a m p l e s consist in chil
d r e n ' s games, which h a v e t h e advantage t h a t they c o o r d i n a t e t h e ac
tivities of several p a r t i c i p a n t s . T h e t h i r d g r o u p of e x a m p l e s consists
 F r o m a C o n s t i t u t i v e t o a C o m m u n i c a t i v e T h e o r y of S o c i e t y

in party games, strategic g a m e s such as chess, c a r d g a m e s , a n d so

forth. Against t h e diffuse b a c k g r o u n d of everyday s p e e c h a n d action,
the c o m p a r i s o n of g r a m m a t i c a l rules w i t h t h e r u l e s of g a m e s high
lights stereotypical, r e c u r r i n g p a t t e r n s : These are w h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n
calls language games. I n o w w a n t to r.how b o t h t h e advantages of this
model for analyzing n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s as well as t h e limitations it im
poses on linguistic analysis.
T h e g a m e m o d e l calls t h e analyst's a t t e n t i o n to habitualized, lin
guistically m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n s . W i t t g e n s t e i n n e g l e c t s t h e truly lin
guistic d i m e n s i o n of rules t h a t g o v e r n h o w strings of words a r e
generated in favor of t h e p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n of rules t h a t govern
how speakers c o m m u n i c a t e with o n e a n o t h e r . C o n s e q u e n t l y t h e
"grammar" of a language g a m e is n o t to b e c o n f u s e d with t h e gram
mar of a l a n g u a g e . T h e f o r m e r e n c o m p a s s e s t h e r u l e s a c c o r d i n g to
which situations of possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g are b r o u g h t
about. T h e s t r u c t u r e of a l a n g u a g e g a m e d e t e r m i n e s how I can use
sentences in u t t e r a n c e s t h a t can b e subject to consensus. H a d
Wittgenstein d e v e l o p e d a t h e o r y of l a n g u a g e g a m e s , it w o u l d have
had to ta te t h e f o r m of a universal p r a g m a t i c s . W i t t g e n s t e i n , how
ever, did not even c o n s i d e r this theoretical p r o g r a m , which I shall
elaborate a n d e n d o r s e as t h e basis for a c o m m u n i c a t i v e t h e o r y of so
ciety. H e never r e g a r d e d t h e g r a m m a t i c a l investigation of l a n g u a g e
games as a theoretical investigation. R a t h e r , h e viewed it as a n a d h o c
p r o c e d u r e t h a t uses indirect messages, t h a t is, theoretically i n a d m i s
sible descriptions, with t h e t h e r a p e u t i c i n t e n t of m a k i n g speakers
aware of h o w t h e i r l a n g u a g e g a m e s function. If we take a l a n g u a g e
g a m e to b e a system of rules a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h u t t e r a n c e s t h a t can
yield a c o n s e n s u s can b e f o r m e d , then, a c c o r d i n g t o Wittgenstein,
the g r a m m a r of a l a n g u a g e g a m e c a n b e exhibited b u t c a n n o t b e ex
19
pressed in the f o r m of a t h e o r e t i c a l a c c o u n t . Before r e t u r n i n g to this
r e n u n c i a t i o n of theory, I should like to n o t e t h r e e ways in which
Wittgenstein m a d e t h e g a m e m o d e l fruitful for t h e analysis of n a t u
ral languages.

(1) W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s p r i m a r y interest in t h e g a m e m o d e l is t h e status

of t h e rules of t h e g a m e a n d t h e c o m p e t e n c e of t h e players w h o
master such r u l e s . T h e rules of t h e g a m e d e t e r m i n e w h a t signs a r e
54
Lecture III

p e r m i t t e d a n d w h a t o p e r a t i o n s m a y b e c a r r i e d o u t w i t h these signs.
W e have to fall back o n t h e m w h e n we d o n ' t k n o w w h a t a p i e c e (such
as a chess p i e c e ) o r a m o v e with a p i e c e is s u p p o s e d to " m e a n . " T h e
use t h e o r y of m e a n i n g , w h i c h m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e m e a n i n g of a word
or s e n t e n c e is t h e role it plays in t h e system of a l a n g u a g e , is derived
f r o m this m o d e l . T h e rules of t h e game, of course, may b e described;
b u t a d e s c r i p t i o n d o e s n o t really c a p t u r e w h a t t h e r u l e s d o . A player
w h o u n d e r s t a n d s t h e rules, that is, one w h o can m a k e moves in t h e
game, n e e d n o t also b e able to describe t h e rules. T h e specific na
ture of a r u l e is e x p r e s s e d in the c o m p e t e n c e of s o m e o n e who mas
ters it r a t h e r t h a n in a d e s c r i p t i o n . T o u n d e r s t a n d a g a m e is to have a
certain k i n d of know-how. U n d e r s t a n d i n g m e a n s m a s t e r i n g a tech
n i q u e . This "mastery" expresses t h e s p o n t a n e i t y with which o n e can
apply a n a c q u i r e d rule i n d e p e n d e n t l y a n d t h u s also t h e creativity of
p r o d u c i n g n e w instances t h a t c o u n t as e x a m p l e s of following the
r u l e . T h i s e x p l a i n s W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s interest in the fact that a s t u d e n t
w h o h a s l e a r n e d a p a r t i c u l a r n u m e r i c a l series by o s t e n s i o n has u n
d e r s t o o d t h e u n d e r l y i n g r u l e w h e n h e "knows h o w to go o n by him
self." T h e "and so o n " with which t h e t e a c h e r e n d s a series of
n u m b e r s t h a t is s u p p o s e d to exemplify a rule stands for t h e abstract
possibility of p e r f o r m i n g infinitely m a n y f u r t h e r o p e r a t i o n s a n d gen
e r a t i n g infinitely m a n y a d d i t i o n a l instances t h a t accord with t h e r u l e .
T h e c o m p e t e n c e t h a t I a c q u i r e i n l e a r n i n g a r u l e of a g a m e o r a
g r a m m a t i c a l r u l e is a generative capacity. W i t t g e n s t e i n never tires of
explaining why t h e cognitive ability of u n d e r s t a n d i n g a rule also re
quires a practical skill, namely, t h a t of acting a c c o r d i n g to t h e r u l e .
T h e m e a n i n g of a r u l e is s o m e t h i n g universal t h a t I c a n exemplify
only t h r o u g h a finite n u m b e r of cases; t h u s I c a n e x p l a i n it to s o m e
o n e else only t h r o u g h ostensive training. T o explain s o m e t h i n g u n i
versal by m e a n s of e x a m p l e s , however, is n o t to get s o m e o n e to
g e n e r a l i z e inductively f r o m a finite n u m b e r of cases. Rather, t h e stu
d e n t h a s grasped t h e universal if a n d only if h e h a s l e a r n e d to see in
t h e t h i n g s s h o w n h i m only e x a m p l e s of s o m e t h i n g t h a t can be seen
in t h e m . Even a single e x a m p l e c a n suffice for this: "So it is t h e r u l e s
20
g o v e r n i n g an e x a m p l e t h a t m a k e it a n e x a m p l e . " T h e objects o r ac
tions t h a t serve as e x a m p l e s a r e never in a n d of themselves e x a m p l e s
of t h e r u l e . O n l y t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a r u l e lets u s r e c o g n i z e t h e u n i -
 f r o m a C o n s t i t u t i v e t o a C o m m u n i c a t i v e T h e o r y of S o c i e t y

versa! in t h e particular. Every a p p l i c a t i o n c o n t a i n s in nuce a creative

m o m e n t . T h e s t u d e n t w h o has l e a r n e d a r u l e has b e c o m e a p o t e n t i a l
teacher. For o w i n g to h e r generative ability, she can herself n o w cre
ate examples: n o t only n e w e x a m p l e s , b u t even fictitious o n e s .
(2) A n o t h e r feature of t h e g a m e m o d e l t h a t interests Wittgenstein
is the c o n s e n s u s t h a t m u s t exist a m o n g t h e players a b o u t w h a t t h e
rules are. T h e c o n n e c t i o n of l a n g u a g e a n d practice t h a t is s u p p o s e d
to be expressed by t h e t e r m "language g a m e " is n o t exhaustively ac
c o u n t e d for by r e f e r r i n g to o p e r a t i o n s t h a t g e n e r a t e strings of sym
bols a c c o r d i n g to a r u l e . W h e n Wittgenstein calls a c o n t e x t of
language a n d activities a "language g a m e , " h e has in m i n d actions of
a different sort, namely, i n t e r a c t i o n s . O r d e r s , for e x a m p l e , a r e lin
guistic u t t e r a n c e s t h a t can b e fulfilled or violated by actions:

S u p p o s e y o u c a m e as a n e x p l o r e r i n t o a n u n k n o w n c o u n t r y w i t h a l a n g u a g e
q u i t e s t r a n g e t o y o u . I n w h a t c i r c u m s t a n c e s w o u l d y o u say t h a t t h e p e o p l e
t h e r e gave o r d e r s , u n d e r s t o o d t h e m , o b e y e d t h e m , r e b e l l e d a g a i n s t t h e m ,
a n d so o n ? T h e c o m m o n b e h a v i o r of m a n k i n d is t h e system of r e f e r e n c e by
2 1
m e a n s of w h i c h w e i n t e r p r e t a n u n k n o w n l a n g u a g e .

The g r a m m a r of a language game governs m e a n i n g structures that

are e m b o d i e d in c o m p l e m e n t a r y fashion in s e n t e n c e s , bodily expres
sions such as grimaces a n d gestures, a n d actions. Insofar as they a r e
elements of a l a n g u a g e g a m e , linguistic u t t e r a n c e s are i n c o r p o r a t e d
22
in i n t e r a c t i o n s . As c o m p o n e n t s of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, linguistic
u t t e r a n c e s also h a v e t h e c h a r a c t e r of actions.
I n p e r f o r m i n g s p e e c h acts such as c o m m a n d s , questions, descrip
tions, or w a r n i n g s , I n o t only m a k e use of c o m p l e m e n t a r y m o d e s of
actions b u t also p a r t i c i p a t e in a " c o m m o n b e h a v i o r [Handlungsweise]
of h u m a n k i n d . " In a c o n t e x t of i n t e r a c t i o n , s p e a k i n g and a c t i n g sub
jects are a p r i o r i l i n k e d by s o m e t h i n g s h a r e d , namely, a c o n s e n s u s
a b o u t h a b i t u a l i z e d r u l e s . A n a n t h r o p o l o g i s t in a c o u n t r y w i t h a n u n
known l a n g u a g e assumes t h a t t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s she observes are
based o n s o m e p a r t i c u l a r r u l e . She derives this r u l e b a s e d o n a
p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h e r own traditions. She can test this hypothesis
only by s t e p p i n g o u t of h e r r o l e as observer, at least virtually, a n d p a r
ticipating herself in t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t she m e r e l y observed at
first. Successful p a r t i c i p a t i o n is t h e only c r i t e r i o n for assessing t h e
56
L e c t u r e III

a d e q u a c y of h e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g . If h e r hypothesis was false, t h e tacit

c o n s e n s u s a c c o m p a n y i n g a c d o n breaks down. T h e e x p e r i e n c e t h a t a
l a n g u a g e g a m e "does n o t f u n c t i o n t h e way I h a d a s s u m e d " is t h e ex
p e r i e n c e of a d i s r u p t e d c o n s e n s u s : "That is not a g r e e m e n t i n opin
23
ions b u t in f o r m of life." Intersubjective validity for or recognition
by a c o m m u n i c a t i n g g r o u p t h u s has a b i n d i n g character. In discuss
i n g t h e r u l e s of games, Wittgenstein m a k e s this clear: "To obey a
r u l e , to m a k e a r e p o r t , to give a n order, t o play a g a m e of chess, are
24
customs (uses, i n s t i t u t i o n s ) . "
(3) Finally, t h e t h i r d aspect of t h e g a m e m o d e l t h a t interests
W i t t g e n s t e i n is the m e a n i n g of constituting a new c o n t e x t . T h e rules
of a g a m e are established arbitrarily. We can modify old r u l e s to the
p o i n t w h e r e we can be said to have invented a n e w g a m e . I n so d o i n g ,
we n e e d n o t have any particular p u r p o s e o r e n d in m i n d . Rather, it is
i n h e r e n t in t h e c o n c e p t of a g a m e that, t h o u g h it may be a b o r i n g or
exciting g a m e , a g a m e of c h a n c e o r of skill, or a g a m e for o n e or
m a n y players, its e n d can consist only in being a g a m e . N e i t h e r gram
matical n o r g a m e r u l e s are technical rules t h a t can be d e t e r m i n e d by
a p p e a l i n g to an e n d t h a t is to b e realized with their aid. Wittgenstein
uses t h e e x a m p l e of c o o k e r y to e x p l a i n this:

W h y d o n ' t I call c o o k e r y r u l e s a r b i t r a r y , a n d w h y a m I t e m p t e d t o call t h e

r u l e s of g r a m m a r a r b i t r a r y ? B e c a u s e I c o n c e i v e t h e c o n c e p t " c o o k e r y " as
d e f i n e d by t h e e n d of c o o k e r y , b u t I d o n o t c o n c e i v e t h e c o n c e p t " l a n g u a g e "
as d e f i n e d b y t h e e n d of l a n g u a g e . You cook b a d l y if y o u a r e g u i d e d i n y o u r
c o o k i n g b y r u l e s o t h e r t h a n t h e r i g h t o n e s ; b u t if y o u follow o t h e r r u l e s t h a n
t h o s e of c h e s s y o u a r e p l a y i n g a n o t h e r g a m e . . . . T h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n
t h e r u l e s o f c o o k e r y a n d t h e g r a m m a r of t h e w o r d "cook" is n o t t h e s a m e as
t h a t b e t w e e n t h e r u l e s of c h e s s a n d t h e e x p r e s s i o n "play c h e s s " or t h a t b e
&
t w e e n t h e r u l e s o f m u l t i p l i c a t i o n a n d t h e g r a m m a r o f t h e w o r d "multiply. "'

Like t h e rules of games, g r a m m a t i c a l rules are constitutive. F o r they

d o n o t serve t o regulate a f o r m of b e h a v i o r t h a t exists i n d e p e n d e n t l y
of t h e m . R a t h e r they c r e a t e a n e w category of m o d e s of behavior.
T h e p u r p o s e to which such generative r u l e s can b e r e l a t e d is consti
t u t e d by these rules themselves. T h u s we c a n n o t r e g a r d l a n g u a g e as
a n institution t h a t serves a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e , such as r e a c h i n g m u
tual u n d e r s t a n d i n g . For t h e c o n c e p t of l a n g u a g e is already c o n t a i n e d
in this c o n c e p t of c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
 57__
from a Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society

Nevertheless, it is precisely t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r of t h e g a m e
that shows the limits of a t t e m p t i n g to u n d e r s t a n d l a n g u a g e o n the
model of a g a m e . W i t t g e n s t e i n himself n o t e s a t o n e p o i n t t h e differ
ence between the arbitrariness of a g a m e u p o n w h i c h we have a g r e e d
and t h e recalcitrance of a l a n g u a g e passed d o w n by tradition, whose
grammar I m u s t obey. A l a n g u a g e is j u s t n o t simply a g a m e ; we have
to take it seriously.

Is meaning then really only the use of the word? Isn't it the way this use
26
meshes with our life? Isn't its use part of our life?

In this passage Wittgenstein expressly distances himself f r o m t h e

idea t h a t t h e use of l a n g u a g e is m e r e l y a g a m e o r a f o r m of propriety.
27
Kor m e to b e a b l e to u n d e r s t a n d it, "it m u s t m e s h with my own life."
What can this m e a n ? W e d o n o t c h o o s e t h e r u l e s of a l a n g u a g e in t h e
same a r b i t r a r y way in which we d o t h e rules of a g a m e . Precisely in
this r e g a r d a strategic g a m e like chess is n o t a n a p p r o p r i a t e m o d e l
for l a n g u a g e . Two constitudve features of l a n g u a g e have n o ana
logue in games of strategy'.

(a) G a m e s of strategy are e x t e r n a l to the playing subjects, w h e r e a s

a language p e r m e a t e s t h e personality s t r u c t u r e s of t h e speakers
themselves. Because g a m e s a r e set u p merely by c o n v e n t i o n , t h e
rules of t h e g a m e a r e e x e m p t f r o m discussion f o r t h e d u r a t i o n of
play. D u r i n g t h e g a m e t h e y c a n n o t a t t h e s a m e t i m e b e w h a t t h e
game is a b o u t . N o r d o t h e playing subjects c h a n g e i n t h e i r abilities
while playing; t h e y b r i n g to t h e g a m e their g e n e r a l i z e d c o m p e t e n c e
to a g r e e u p o n r u l e s of t h e g a m e as such a n d t o act in a c c o r d a n c e
with t h e m . T r u e , t h e i r personality s t r u c t u r e s b e l o n g to t h e ancillary
conditions of t h e g a m e , b u t n o t to t h e variables t h a t c h a n g e t h e i r val
ues d u r i n g its course. T h i s is n o t t h e case for the g r a m m a r of lan
guage games a n d t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e of speakers. B o t h
are implicated in a d e v e l o p m e n t a l process d u r i n g linguistic c o m m u
nication. T h e g r a m m a r of l a n g u a g e g a m e s c h a n g e s in t h e c o u r s e of
cultural transmission, w h i l e s p e a k e r s a r e f o r m e d in t h e c o u r s e of
their socialization; a n d b o t h processes take place in t h e m e d i u m of
l a n g u a g e itself. Precisely b e c a u s e , u n l i k e strategic rules, they a r e n o t
based o n c o n v e n t i o n , g r a m m a t i c a l rules c a n b e c o n t i n u o u s l y m a d e
58
Lecture III

t h e object of m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n . S p e a k i n g subjects, however, if

they want to u n d e r s t a n d a n y t h i n g , are at the s a m e time u n d e r the
c o n s t r a i n t of h a v i n g to draw o n their p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e situa
tion in which they always already find themselves. For their c o m p e
t e n c e as speakers is itself t h e result of linguistically m e d i a t e d
i n t e r a c t i o n s . T h e g a m e m o d e l c a n easily m a k e us forget t h e fact that
t h e t h o r o u g h l y symbolically s t r u c t u r e d personality of speakers is p a r t
of t h e s t r u c t u r e of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . Speakers a n d l a n g u a g e
are i n t e g r a t e d in a different a n d m o r e i n t i m a t e way t h a n are players
a n d their g a m e s . Wittgenstein d o e s n o t take a c c o u n t of this
systematically.
(b) H e takes n o g r e a t e r n o t i c e of a n o t h e r fact: t h e g r a m m a r of
l a n g u a g e c a n n o t c o n s t i t u t e m e a n i n g s i n d e p e n d e n t i y of e x t e r n a l
constraints, as is t h e case in t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l i n t r o d u c t i o n of g a m e
rules. Of c o u r s e , t h e g r a m m a r of a l a n g u a g e g a m e c a n n o t b e refuted
by e m p i r i c a l s t a t e m e n t s . It d o e s n o t d e p e n d o n n a t u r a l laws; rather,
we m i g h t say, it is prior to e x p e r i e n c e . But is t h e g r a m m a r of a lan
guage p r i o r to e x p e r i e n c e in t h e same way as are t h e r u l e s of a strate
gic g a m e ? T h e m e a n i n g a t t r i b u t e d to a m o v e in a g a m e m e a n s
n o t h i n g o u t s i d e t h e c o n t e x t of t h e g a m e . L a n g u a g e , however, refers
to objects in t h e world. W e talk a b o u t s o m e t h i n g that is n o t in lan
guage b u t in t h e world. I n t h e c o n t e x t of a g a m e t h e r e is n o t h i n g we
can d o that is n o t part of t h e g a m e . U n l i k e s e n t e n c e s , g a m e s c a n n o t
r e p r e s e n t a n y t h i n g . T h a t is w h y g r a m m a t i c a l rules are "constitutive"
in a different sense t h a n g a m e r u l e s are: T h e y c o n s t i t u t e t h e possibil
ity of e x p e r i e n c e . A l t h o u g h they are p r i o r to this possible experi
e n c e , they a r e n e v e r t h e l e s s n o t i n d e p e n d e n t of restrictions
associated b o t h with invariant features of o u r biological m a k e - u p a n d
with c o n s t a n t s of o u r n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t :

It is o n l y i n n o r m a l cases t h a t t h e u s e of a w o r d is clearly p r e s c r i b e d ; w e
k n o w , a r e i n n o d o u b t , w h a t t o say i n t h i s o r t h a t case. T h e m o r e a b n o r m a l
t h e c a s e , t h e m o r e d o u b t f u l it b e c o m e s w h a t w e a r e t o say. A n d if t h i n g s w e r e
quite different f r o m what t h e y actually areif t h e r e were f o r instance n o
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n o f p a i n , o f fear, of j o y ; if r u l e b e c a m e e x c e p t i o n
a n d e x c e p t i o n r u l e . . . t h i s w o u l d m a k e o u r n o r m a l l a n g u a g e g a m e s lose
t h e i r p o i n t . T h e p r o c e d u r e of p u t t i n g a l u m p of c h e e s e o n a b a l a n c e a n d
f i x i n g t h e p r i c e b y t h e t u r n o f t h e scale w o u l d lose its p o i n t if it frequently
 59___
From a Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society

happened for such lumps to suddenly grow or shrink for no obvious

28
reason/
This p r o b l e m arises only for r u l e s that, unlike g a m e r u l e s , constitute
not merely a n self-contained c o n t e x t of m e a n i n g b u t r a t h e r t h e
m e a n i n g of objects of possible e x p e r i e n c e . This difference, too, was
n o t systematically a c c o u n t e d for by W i t t g e n s t e i n after h e a b a n d o n e d
the c o n c e p t of a universal l a n g u a g e t h a t r e p r e s e n t s t h e facts a n d has
a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l status.

I would like to discuss briefly t h e two d i m e n s i o n s in w h i c h to de

velop p h i l o s o p h y of l a n g u a g e b e y o n d t h e limits of t h e g a m e m o d e l
of l a n g u a g e .
R e g a r d i n g ( a ) , t h e intersubjecdve r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n speakers: Witt
genstein r e d u c e s sameness of m e a n i n g to the intersubjective recog
nition of rules. But h e does n o t e x a m i n e ^ t h e reciprocal r e l a t i o n
between t h e two subjects w h o a c c e p t a r u l e ] for w h o m a r u l e , s u c h as
a semantic c o n v e n t i o n , is valid. [ T h e fact That each p a r t n e r m u s t be
able to anticipate t h e o t h e r ' s expectation^is by n o m e a n s trivial. G. H .
29
^ M e a d was t h e first t o analyze this f o u n d a t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n .
L T h e intersubjectivity of a r u l e ' s validity and, h e n c e , s a m e n e s s of
m e a n i n g have t h e s a m e basis: t h e fact t h a t r u l e - o r i e n t e d b e h a v i o r
c a n b e mutually criticizecf/what this d e m a n d s , in t u r n , is n o t reci
procity of behavior b u t reciprocity of expectations a b o u t behavior. A
m u s t b e a b l e t o anticipate a n d identify with B's e x p e c t a t i o n j u s t as B
can in relation to A. This m u t u a l reflexivity of e x p e c t a t i o n s is t h e
condition in virtue of which b o t h p a r t n e r s c a n j o i n in t h e same ex
pectation, identify t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t is objectively p o s i t e d with t h e
rule, a n d "share" its symbolic m e a n i n g . W e can call these expecta
tions intentions.
I n t e n t i o n s a r e meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d e x p e c t a t i o n s that a r e ori
e n t e d to identical m e a n i n g s a n d whose c o n t e n t can b e u n d e r s t o o d .
T h e y m a y n o t b e t a k e n as s i m p l e e x p e c t a t i o n s of a subject. I n t e n t i o n s
a r e n o t e x p e c t a t i o n s t h a t c a n b e c o m e reflexive as s o o n as t h e y h a v e
b e e n m a d e t h e object of f u r t h e r e x p e c t a t i o n s , w h e t h e r of t h e s a m e
subject or a n o t h e r . At t h e level of symbolized m e a n i n g , t h e r e c a n
b e n o such "simple" e x p e c t a t i o n s : E x p e c t a t i o n s a r e always consti
tuted by t h e r e c i p r o c a l reflexivity of e x p e c t a t i o n s . T h i s shows t h a t
60
L e c t u r e III

c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h r o u g h m e a n i n g is possible only o n c o n d i t i o n of si
m u l t a n e o u s m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n . C o m m u n i c a t i o n by m e a n s of
shared meanings requires reaching understanding about something
a n d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t t h e intersub
jective validity of what is b e i n g c o m m u n i c a t e d . By m e a n s of symbol
ized m e a n i n g , s o m e t h i n g t h a t is n o w absent is m a d e p r e s e n t
i n a s m u c h as at least two subjects c a p a b l e of s p e e c h a n d action c o m e
to s h a r e this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Yet it d o e s n o t suffice t o r e d u c e identity
of m e a n i n g to t h e reciprocal reflexivity of expectations. For this reci
procity p r e s u p p o s e s in t u r n t h e subjects' mutual recognition. By j o i n i n g
in their e x p e c t a t i o n s , subjects constitute m e a n i n g s t h a t they can
s h a r e . H e r e we m u s t s u p p o s e t h a t they themselves were f o r m e d as
subjects capable of s p e e c h a n d action only in c o n n e c t i o n with acts of
m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n . For it is only their c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e ,
t h a t is, t h e i r capacity t o s p e a k ( a n d to act), t h a t m a k e s t h e m subjects.
F r o m this p o i n t of view, intersubjectivity reveals itself as a p a r a d o x i c a l
relation.
Insofar as t h e y take t h e r o l e of subjects, subjects w h o m u t u a l l y rec
ognize e a c h o t h e r as such m u s t r e g a r d o n e a n o t h e r as identical: E a c h
m u s t s u b s u m e b o t h herself a n d t h e o t h e r u n d e r t h e s a m e category.
At the same time, however, t h e r e l a t i o n of reciprocity in r e c o g n i t i o n
also r e q u i r e s t h e n o n i d e n t i t y of e g o a n d other. I n d e e d , each m u s t
affirm h e r a b s o l u t e difference f r o m t h e other. For to b e a subject in
c l u d e s t h e claim t o individuation. This dialectic of t h e e g o was first
d e v e l o p e d by Fichte a n d H e g e l . Obviously o n e is i n i t i a t e d i n t o t h e
p a r a d o x i c a l r e l a t i o n of intersubjectivity t h r o u g h t h e system of per
sonal p r o n o u n s ; H u m b o l d t , in particular, called a t t e n t i o n to this. As
even H u s s e r l realized, reciprocal reflexivity of e x p e c t a t i o n , in which
identical m e a n i n g s a r e constituted, r e q u i r e s t h a t e a c h subject can
identify a n d h a v e a n e x p e c t a t i o n s i m u l t a n e o u s l y f r o m h e r o w n posi
tion a n d from t h a t of the other. T h i s requires, in t u r n , t h e simulta
n e o u s p e r c e p t i o n of dialogue roles t h a t a r e i n c o m p a t i b l e to t h e
e x t e n t t h a t a s p e a k i n g a n d acting e g o can identify with h e r o t h e r as
with a n o t h e r ego only if the latter is c a p t u r e d as different f r o m her
self, as n o t identical with herself. W h e n e v e r two subjects c o n f r o n t
o n e a n o t h e r a t t h e level of intersubjectivity in o r d e r to speak o r i n t e r
act with o n e a n o t h e r , t h e y m a s t e r this p a r a d o x i c a l relation. T o b e
 61__ _____
From a Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society

able to e n t e r i n t o t h e p a r a d o x i c a l r e l a t i o n of intersubjectivity t h a t
underlies all logically consistent c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , a speaker m u s t
have t h e c o m p e t e n c e to apply p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n s in a c c o r d a n c e with
rules. She must say "I" to herself, a n d address the other, w h o equally
can say "I" to himself, as "you." At t h e s a m e time t h e two d e l i m i t
themselves as "we" from all outsiders (from " h i m " a n d " t h e m " ) , w h o
are merely p o t e n t i a l p a r t i c i p a n t s in conversation.
This intersubjective r e l a t i o n is e l a b o r a t e d in t h e g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m
of t h e e l e m e n t a r y u n i t of s p e e c h : t h e s p e e c h act. P a r a d i g m e x a m p l e s
of speech acts a r e "I p r o m i s e y o u I will c o m e " ; "I advise y o u to stop
that"; "I shall describe to y o u h o w y o u s h o u l d go"; a n d so on. I n every
explicit s p e e c h act of t h e f o r m "Mp," M c o n t a i n s a p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n
in the first p e r s o n as t h e g r a m m a t i c a l subject a n d a p e r s o n a l p r o
n o u n in t h e s e c o n d p e r s o n as t h e object, as well as a p e r f o r m a t i v e
verb as t h e p r e d i c a t e . W e use s e n t e n c e s of this f o r m i n u t t e r a n c e s in
order to both g e n e r a t e a n d r e p r e s e n t a relation of intersubjectivity
based on m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n . S p e e c h acts a r e b a s e d on reciprocal re
lations. T h e roles of a s k i n g a n d answering, affirming a n d d e n y i n g , o r
c o m m a n d i n g a n d obeying a r e in principle interchangeable. This
interchangeability, however, h o l d s only o n c o n d i t i o n of simulta
neously r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t individuals w h o a s s u m e d i a l o g u e roles a r e
in principle i r r e p l a c e a b l e a n d u n i q u e . T h e success of a s p e e c h act
d e p e n d s a m o n g o t h e r things o n speakers e n t e r i n g i n t o a n
intersubjective r e l a t i o n by using p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n s , a n d this rela
tion m a k e s possible reciprocally t h e s i m u l t a n e o u s assertion of t h e
identity a n d n o n i d e n t i t y of e g o a n d other. T h i s p a r t i c u l a r f o r m of
intersubjectivity c o u l d be e l u c i d a t e d f u r t h e r by investigating the
logic of t h e use of p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n s .
R e g a r d i n g ( b ) , t h e r e l a t i o n of speech to s o m e t h i n g in t h e world:
In t h e Tractatus W i t t g e n s t e i n h a d investigated t h e f o r m of a universal
l a n g u a g e t h a t r e p r e s e n t e d facts. All a n d only those s e n t e n c e s o r
p r o p o s i t i o n s [Sdtze] of t h e l a n g u a g e t h a t a r e syntactically c o r r e c t are
empirically m e a n i n g f u l . It is to these a n d only these p r o p o s i t i o n s
t h a t facts c o r r e s p o n d if t h e f o r m e r a r e t r u e . T h u s t h e universal lan
g u a g e was to d e t e r m i n e t h e object d o m a i n of possible empirical a n d
scientific p r o p o s i t i o n s of t h e n a t u r a l sciences a n d could h a v e
claimed a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l status. A p a r t from t h e logical difficulties
62
L e c t u r e III

t h a t s t o o d in t h e way of c a r r y i n g o u t this p r o g r a m , o n e motive above

all c o m p e l l e d Wittgenstein t o a b a n d o n his original p o s i t i o n : t h e dis
covery of the c o m m u n i c a t i v e use of l a n g u a g e . Wittgenstein b e c a m e
a w a r e of t h e p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n of s p e e c h acts, w h e r e b y we pro
d u c e a m a n i f o l d of c o n t e x t s for the possibility of r e a c h i n g
understanding:

T h e r e a r e . . . c o u n t l e s s d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f u s e o f w h a t w e call "symbols,"
" w o r d s , " " s e n t e n c e s " . . . N e w types o f l a n g u a g e , n e w l a n g u a g e g a m e s , as
we m a y say, c o m e i n t o e x i s t e n c e , a n d o t h e r s b e c o m e o b s o l e t e a n d g e t
3 0
forgotten.

Of c o u r s e , W i t t g e n s t e i n was led astray by this insight. T h e discovery

t h a t d e s c r i b i n g a n d e x p l a i n i n g facts is b u t o n e type of s p e e c h act
a m o n g o t h e r s led W i t t g e n s t e i n n o t only t o b r e a k with t h e false m o
n o p o l y of t h e l a n g u a g e g a m e of fact-stating discourse o r with "logos
as t h e m a r k of distinction of l a n g u a g e " (Apel). It also led h i m to suc
c u m b to t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y e r r o r of i g n o r i n g h e n c e f o r t h t h e privi
l e g e d role of cognitive l a n g u a g e use. I n his catalog of l a n g u a g e
g a m e s t h e description of a n object, physical m e a s u r e m e n t , a n d the
verification of h y p o t h e s e s are p u t o n t h e s a m e level as, for e x a m p l e ,
c o m m a n d s , offerings of advice, o r p r o m i s e s . W i t t g e n s t e i n does n o t
r e c o g n i z e t h a t only t h e cognitive u s e of l a n g u a g e o p e n s u p t h e di
m e n s i o n to w h i c h all s p e e c h acts must refer. This can be seen o n c e
again in t h e g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m of t h e e l e m e n t a r y u n i t of s p e e c h .
Every e l e m e n t a r y u t t e r a n c e of t h e f o r m "Mp" c o n t a i n s a d e p e n
d e n t clause p t h a t expresses t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t a b o u t which
m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d a g r e e m e n t is to b e r e a c h e d . T h i s d o u b l e
s t r u c t u r e of t h e s p e e c h act m i r r o r s t h e s t r u c t u r e of s p e e c h in gen
eral. T h e r e is n o m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g unless b o t h i n t e r l o c u t o r s a r e
o p e r a t i n g simultaneously at two levels: (a) t h e level of inter
subjectivity, at which t h e s p e a k e r - h e a r e r s speak with o n e a n o t h e r ;
a n d (b) t h e level of objects o r states of affairs a b o u t w h i c h t h e y c o m
m u n i c a t e with o n e another. In every s p e e c h act, speakers c o m m u n i
cate with o n e a n o t h e r a b o u t objects in t h e world, a b o u t t h i n g s a n d
events, or a b o u t p e r s o n s a n d their u t t e r a n c e s . W i t h o u t t h e p r o p o s i
tional c o n t e n t "that p," which is e x p r e s s e d in cognidve l a n g u a g e use
in t h e f o r m of t h e assertoric p r o p o s i t i o n p, even c o m m u n i c a t i v e use
w o u l d b e impossible, i n d e e d w i t h o u t c o n t e n t . W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s analysis
 63__
From a C o n s t i t u t i v e t o a C o m m u n i c a t i v e T h e o r y of Society

of l a n g u a g e g a m e s focuses only o n t h e m e a n i n g - c o n s t i t u t i n g aspect

of language, namely, its use. It neglects its knowledge-constituting as
pect, t h a t is, its r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l function. T h e holistic analysis of lan
guage games fails t o r e c o g n i z e t h e d u a l s t r u c t u r e of all s p e e c h acts
and h e n c e t h e linguistic c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which reality is m a d e t h e
object of e x p e r i e n c e . It is t r u e t h a t t h e g e n e r a t i o n of contexts of
c o m m u n i c a t i o n c a n n o t b e conceived o n t h e m o d e l of possible expe
rience; n o m o r e so, however, c a n t h e latter b e g r a s p e d a d e q u a t e l y in
t e r m s of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e aspect of l a n g u a g e .
F r o m this p o i n t of view it is advisable t o r e i n t r o d u c e a t t h e level of
linguistic analysis H u s s e r l ' s distinction b e t w e e n i n t e n t i o n a l objects
or "contents" o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d t h e "positings" c o n n e c t e d with
our i n t e n t i o n s o n t h e other. T h e m e a n i n g of a s p e e c h act consists of
i t s p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t / ) (expressed in t h e d e p e n d e n t clause) a n d
t h e sense of t h e m o d e M of m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t is s o u g h t (ex
pressed in the p e r f o r m a t i v e c l a u s e ) . T h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y e l e m e n t de
termines t h e m e a n i n g of t h e validity t h a t we claim f o r an u t t e r a n c e .
( T h e m o d e l o f t h e s e claims t o validity i m p l i e d i n t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n
i n g of a s p e e c h act is t r u t h value/ (or w h a t Husserl called doxic posit
ing) . T h e m e a n i n g of an assertion q u a assertion is t h a t t h e asserted
state of affairs is t h e case. T h e r e are, in a d d i t i o n , o t h e r classes of
claims to validity ( n o n d o x i c positings).] T h u s t h e m e a n i n g of a p r o m
ise q u a p r o m i s e is t h a t t h e s p e a k e r will in fact k e e p a n obligation t o
which she h a s c o m m i t t e d herself. Similarly, it is t h e m e a n i n g of a
c o m m a n d q u a c o m m a n d t h a t t h e s p e a k e r wants to h a v e h e r d e m a n d
fulfilled. T h e s e validity claims t h a t a s p e a k e r raises b y p e r f o r m i n g
speech acts g r o u n d intersubjective relations, t h a t is,[the facticity of
social facts.
I want to distinguish four classes of claims to validity:
5
(1) Intelligibility. ' W i t h every actual u t t e r a n c e t h e speaker associates
t h e claim t h a t it c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d in t h e given situation. T h i s claim
is n o t r e d e e m e d o r v i n d i c a t e d if speaker a n d h e a r e r d o n o t k n o w t h e
s a m e l a n g u a g e . T h e n a h e r m e n e u t i c effort is r e q u i r e d in o r d e r t o
yield s e m a n t i c clarification.
(2) Truth. Assertions a n d e x p l a n a t i o n s imply a claim t o t r u t h . It is
n o t justified if t h e asserted state of affairs d o e s n o t o b t a i n . I call
this u s e of l a n g u a g e cognitive. I n cognitive l a n g u a g e use we initiate
64
Lecture I I I

c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h t h e goal of c o m m u n i c a t i n g s o m e t h i n g a b o u t an
objectified reality.
(3) Sincerity a n d (4) Normative Tightness. All u t t e r a n c e s that are ex
pressive in t h e n a r r o w e r sense (feelings, desires, expressions of will)
imply a claim to sincerity. This claim proves to be false if it turns o u t
t h a t t h e s p e a k e r d i d n o t in fact have t h e i n t e n t i o n s t h a t she ex
pressed. All normatively o r i e n t e d u t t e r a n c e s (such as c o m m a n d s , ad
vice, p r o m i s e s , etc.) imply a claim to n o r m a t i v e Tightness. This claim
is n o t justified if t h e prevailing n o r m s u n d e r l y i n g t h e u t t e r a n c e s can
n o t b e legitimated. I call this use of l a n g u a g e communicative. H e r e we
refer to s o m e t h i n g in the world in o r d e r to p r o d u c e specific interper
sonal relations.

C o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e use p r e s u p p o s e s cognitive use, whereby

we a c q u i r e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s , just as, inversely, cognitive use
p r e s u p p o s e s c o m m u n i c a t i v e use, since assertions can only b e m a d e
by m e a n s of constative s p e e c h acts. A l t h o u g h a c o m m u n i c a t i v e the
ory of society is i m m e d i a t e l y c o n c e r n e d with t h e s e d i m e n t a t i o n s a n d
p r o d u c t s of c o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e use, it must d o justice to t h e
d o u b l e , cognitive-communicative structure of s p e e c h . T h e r e f o r e in
d e v e l o p i n g t h e t h e o r y of s p e e c h acts I shall at least refer to t h e con
stitutive p r o b l e m s t h a t arise in c o n n e c t i o n with cognitive l a n g u a g e
use.
W i t t g e n s t e i n h a d m a r k e d reservations r e g a r d i n g a t t e m p t s to de
velop a theory of l a n g u a g e . T h e systematic reason for his i n t e r p r e t a
tion of linguistic analysis as a merely t h e r a p e u t i c activity lies in his
m a k i n g an absolute of a single use of l a n g u a g e , namely, t h e c o m m u
nicative. Cognitive l a n g u a g e use n o l o n g e r has a n y claim to inde
p e n d e n c e . W i t t g e n s t e i n believed t h a t t h e plurality of l a n g u a g e
g a m e s t h a t h e discovered e n c o m p a s s e d all conceivable ways of using
w o r d s a n d s e n t e n c e s . H e d i d n o t realize t h a t it covers b u t o n e of sev
eral categories of l a n g u a g e u s e .
After i n t r o d u c i n g his l a n g u a g e g a m e m o d e l , Wittgenstein, if I a m
n o t m i s t a k e n , d i d n o t offer any justification for his a b s t e n t i o n from
theory. T o b e sure, h e h a d a m p l e r e a s o n to consider t h e r o a d s to a
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l o r empiricist o r constructivist theory of l a n g u a g e im
passable. Linguistic t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s m , which tries to r e c o n s t r u c t a
 6j_____-- .
Frorn a Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society

"language in g e n e r a l " t h a t constitutes t h e objects of possible experi

ence, ignores n o n c o g n i t i v e l a n g u a g e use. Linguistic empiricism,
which seeks to analyze l a n g u a g e by r e d u c i n g it to o b s e r v a b l e events
or episodes, fails to a c c o u n t for t h e intersubjective s t r u c t u r e of lan
guage (as Sellars's artful c o n s t r u c t i o n d e m o n s t r a t e s ) . A n d linguistic
constructivism a la C a r n a p abstains f r o m t h e outset f r o m analyzing
natural languages. T h e r e r e m a i n s o n e alternative, w h i c h h a s b e e n
developed since W i t t g e n s t e i n i n t h e p r o c e s s of dealing with his
antitheoretical analysis of n a t u r a l languages, namely, t h e project of a
generative t h e o r y of l a n g u a g e . If we take g e n e r a t i v e g r a m m a r as a
model for d e v e l o p i n g a universal p r a g m a t i c s , why s h o u l d we n o t be
able to discover a n d r e c o n s t r u c t t h e rule systems a c c o r d i n g to which
we g e n e r a t e c o n t e x t s of interactions, t h a t is, t h e symbolic reality of
society?
IV
Universal Pragmatics: Reflections on a Theory of
Communicative Competence

Wittgenstein's investigations are t h e result of h i s reflecting o n t h e ac

tivity of analyzing language with t h e r a p e u t i c i n t e n t . H a d h e w a n t e d
instead to d e v e l o p a theory of l a n g u a g e games, it w o u l d h a v e h a d to
take t h e f o r m of universal pragmatics. For W i t t g e n s t e i n is n o t con
cerned with t h e g r a m m a r of s e n t e n c e s t h a t are used in u t t e r a n c e s
but r a t h e r with t h e g r a m m a r of t h e s e u t t e r a n c e s themselves: t h a t is,
with rules for u s i n g s e n t e n c e s in contexts. By t h e s a m e t o k e n , it is n o t
merely a pseudo-linguistic flourish on his p a r t to talk of t h e g r a m
matical structure of l a n g u a g e g a m e s . Wittgenstein uses this n o t i o n to
give expression to the fact that his investigations take place at t h e
level of t h e logical o r c o n c e p t u a l analysis of c o n t e x t s of m e a n i n g a n d
not at t h e level of an empirically o r i e n t e d p r a g m a t i c s . T h e latter con
ceives t h e p h e n o m e n a of l a n g u a g e use within a f r a m e w o r k t h a t is n o t
specific to l a n g u a g e , r e g a r d i n g t h e m , for e x a m p l e , as m o d e s of be
havior c o n t r o l l e d by signs or as self-regulated i n f o r m a t i o n flows. B u t
not even the t h e o r y of action c a n p r o v i d e a n a d e q u a t e c o n c e p t u a l
framework for a theoretical analysis of l a n g u a g e g a m e s . O f c o u r s e ,
one can say t h a t t h e g r a m m a r of l a n g u a g e g a m e s consists in r u l e s for
t h e contextually a p p r o p r i a t e use of symbolic expressions. But t h e
rules in q u e s t i o n a r e constitutive rules, a n d it is by t h e s e very r u l e s
that contexts in w h i c h it is possible to use symbolic expressions a r e
p r o d u c e d . T h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e f o r m of life itself d e p e n d s o n t h e
g r a m m a r of l a n g u a g e games. T h i s p o i n t is o b s c u r e d by t h e
particularistic b e n t of Wittgenstein's later p h i l o s o p h y ; b u t it c o m e s
68
Lecture IV

to t h e fore as s o o n as we i n q u i r e i n t o t h e p r o b l e m of a theory of pos

sible l a n g u a g e games. F o r t h e n we are a i m i n g at r e c o n s t r u c t i n g the
system of rules by m e a n s of which we g e n e r a t e contexts w h e r e we can
r e a c h a m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t objects (and states of affairs).
T h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a t t e m p t to elucidate t h e universal structures
of t h e lifeworld r e t u r n s in t h e f o r m of a n a t t e m p t in t h e philosophy
of l a n g u a g e to discover a n d r e c o n s t r u c t t h e universal structures of
t h e c o m m u n i c a d v e f o r m of life in the universal pragmatics of lan
guage games.
W h e r e a s t h e analysis of t h e lifeworld follows t h e m o d e l of a consti
tutive t h e o r y of k n o w l e d g e , t h e investigation of t h e communicative
f o r m of life (as t h e c o n d i t i o n of all possible l a n g u a g e games) follows
t h e m o d e l of a universalist generative linguistic analysis. T h e theory
of g r a m m a r o r i g i n a t e d by N o a m C h o m s k y p r o v i d e s such a m o d e l
b u t a m o d e l only. T h a t is w h y I s h o u l d like to characterize t h e level at
which a universal pragmatics has to b e d e v e l o p e d by c o m p a r i n g it
with t h e C h o m s k y a n p r o g r a m . This will facilitate my s u b s e q u e n t
t r e a t m e n t of t h e two most i m p o r t a n t theoretical c o m p o n e n t s of a
universal p r a g m a t i c s : o n e d e a l i n g with t h e cognitive use of language,
t h e o t h e r with its c o m m u n i c a t i v e use.
T h e object of t h e t h e o r y of generative g r a m m a r is l a n g u a g e , not
s p e e c h processes (langue as o p p o s e d to parole). T h e linguistic phe
n o m e n a i m m e d i a t e l y accessible to t h e linguist a r e o r d e r e d expres
sions t h a t c a n b e e m p l o y e d in s p e e c h situations. T h e a i m of the
t h e o r y is a n a d e q u a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e system of r u l e s by m e a n s
of which c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r - h e a r e r s p r o d u c e ( a n d u n d e r s t a n d )
strings of s u c h linguistic expressions. Linguistic c o m p e t e n c e is the
capacity t o m a s t e r a system of r u l e s of this sort. It accords with the
g e n e r a l c o m p e t e n c e to follow r u l e s analyzed by W i t t g e n s t e i n in hav
i n g the following two features. First, the speaker h a s the capacity to
g e n e r a t e s p o n t a n e o u s l y w h a t is in p r i n c i p l e a n u n l i m i t e d sum of ex
pressions t h a t are syntactically, semantically, and phonetically accept
able in a given l a n g u a g e . S e c o n d , t h e speaker is capable of j u d g i n g
w h e t h e r ( a n d to w h a t extent) a n expression is well f o r m e d a l o n g
these t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s . W i t h a finite n u m b e r of e l e m e n t s , every
c o m p e t e n t speaker can g e n e r a t e a n d u n d e r s t a n d a n u n l i m i t e d n u m
b e r of strings of symbols, i n c l u d i n g ones t h a t have never b e e n ut-
 69__-
Universal Pragmatics

tered previously. Moreover, t h e s p e a k e r can distinguish ad h o c

between correctly f o r m e d a n d deviant expressions ( a n d o r d e r ex
pressions that a r e syntactically m a l f o r m e d , unclear, o r semantically
or phonetically d i s t o r t e d a c c o r d i n g to t h e d e g r e e to which they a r e
grammatically c o r r e c t ) .
This type of j u d g m e n t m a d e by speakers is indicative of a n a p p a r -
e nd y intuitive or tacit k n o w l e d g e , which t h e t h e o r y of universal
grammar sets o u t to explicate a n d r e c o n s t r u c t . T h e linguist expli
cates t h e know-how t h a t c o m p e t e n t speakers have at t h e i r disposal.
The task of t h e t h e o r y of universal g r a m m a r is t h e r a t i o n a l r e c o n
struction of a system of rules t h a t is n o t yet r e c o g n i z e d or t h e o r e t i
cally specifiable even t h o u g h it is already practically m a s t e r e d and to
that e x t e n t k n o w n . R e c o n s t r u c t i o n should m a k e it possible to derive
a structural d e s c r i p t i o n for every relevant e x p r e s s i o n of a l a n g u a g e
(this applies to syntactic, semantic, a n d p h o n e d c s t r u c t u r e s ) . Since it
is impossible to e n u m e r a t e all relevant expressions of a l a n g u a g e , it is
further necessary t h a t t h e rules of t h e system b e recursively applica
ble f o r m a t i o n rules. A t h e o r y t h a t m e e t s b o t h these d e m a n d s c a n
specify explicitly h o w all t h e possible expressions of a l a n g u a g e c a n
be related to o n e a n o t h e r .
Two goals of this theoretical p r o g r a m m u s t at least b e m e n t i o n e d
in t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t . T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of generative g r a m m a r fol
lows a universalistic r e s e a r c h strategy: T h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s of r u l e
systems for individual l a n g u a g e s a r e to b e effected at increasingly
higher levels of generalization until t h e g r a m m a t i c a l universals u n
derlying all individual l a n g u a g e s are arrived at. In a d d i t i o n , g e n e r a
tive g r a m m a r has two levels, that is, it is a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l g r a m m a r .
Strings of linguistic expressions a r e c o n s i d e r e d surface s t r u c t u r e s
formed from u n d e r l y i n g d e e p s t r u c t u r e s by m e a n s of a set of
transformational rules. Every d e e p s t r u c t u r e c a n t h e n b e c o r r e l a t e d
with a class of surface s t r u c t u r e s t h a t p a r a p h r a s e it. T h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n
has b e e n fairly well c o r r o b o r a t e d empirically. It c a n also b e u s e d to
give a syntactic a c c o u n t of s e m a n t i c ambiguities.
F o r o u r p u r p o s e of delimiting universal p r a g m a t i c s from universal
grammar, it is i m p o r t a n t to explain t h e sense in w h i c h Chomsky, in
i n t r o d u c i n g t h e c o n c e p t of linguistic c o m p e t e n c e , is c o m p e l l e d to
p e r f o r m a n idealization. H e h i m s e l f talks of t h e ideal s p e a k e r - h e a r e r :
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L e c t u r e IV

L i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y is c o n c e r n e d p r i m a r i l y with a n i d e a l s p e a k e r - l i s t e n e r , in
a

c o m p l e t e l y h o m o g e n e o u s s p e e c h c o m m u n i t y , w h o k n o w s h i s l a n g u a g e per
fectly a n d is u n a f f e c t e d b y s u c h g r a m m a t i c a l l y - i r r e l e v a n t c o n d i t i o n s as m e m
o r y l i m i t a t i o n s , d i s t r a c t i o n s , shifts o f a t t e n t i o n a n d i n t e r e s t , a n d e r r o r s
( r a n d o m o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ) i n a p p l y i n g his k n o w l e d g e o f t h e l a n g u a g e in ac
1
tual p e r f o r m a n c e .

It s e e m s to m e t h a t t h e c o n c e p t of t h e ideal s p e a k e r is e n t a i l e d by the
c o n c e p t of t h e n o r m a t i v e validity of g r a m m a t i c a l rules a n d the com
p l e m e n t a r y c o n c e p t of r u l e - c o m p e t e n c e . It is t r u e that grammatical
rules d o n o t a t all c o n t a i n ideal postulates, as g e o m e t r i c a l r u l e s of
m e a s u r e m e n t , for e x a m p l e , d o s u c h as drawing a perfectly straight
line. I n p r i n c i p l e , postulates of p e r f e c t i o n can be fulfilled only ap
p r o x i m a t e l y u n d e r e m p i r i c a l b o u n d a r y c o n d i t i o n s . "Ideal" rule-
c o m p e t e n c e c a n b e claimed for such postulates in a nontrivial sense,
for t h e idealizations a r e p e r f o r m e d by t h e m e a s u r i n g subjects them
selves. I n t h e case of l a n g u a g e , however, it is n o t t h e speaker w h o ide
alizes, b u t t h e l i n g u i s t a n d in a trivial sense. T h e c o n c e p t of a n o r m
already c o n t a i n s latitude for possible deviations from t h e n o r m . The
m e a n i n g of t h e n o r m a t i v e validity of rules implies t h a t the possibility
exists in principle of violating t h e rule. N o n e t h e l e s s , in t h e linguistic
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e rule system of a l a n g u a g e we d i s r e g a r d all the
e m p i r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which g r a m m a t i c a l r u l e s can be realized
e i t h e r perfecdy, inadequately, o r n o t at all. T h e linguist posits the
fictitious case of the c o m p l e t e a n d c o n s t a n t fulfillment of postulates
(that a r e fulfillable in p r i n c i p l e ) . Every logical or c o n c e p t u a l analysis
of rule systems must o p e r a t e on this supposition.
T h e r e is n o t h i n g mysterious a b o u t this idealization. B u t we must
distinguish it f r o m t h e e m p i r i c a l a s s u m p t i o n with which Chomsky
gives it o n t o l o g i c a l i m p o r t . I a m r e f e r r i n g h e r e to the hypothesis that
t h e linguistic rule system (like t h e cognitive a p p a r a t u s in Piaget) de
velops f r o m a g e n e t i c basis t h r o u g h t h e i n t e r a c t i o n of biologically
c o n d i t i o n e d m a t u r a t i o n a l processes a n d stage-specific stimulus in
puts. T h e child does n o t u n d e r g o a l e a r n i n g process to c o n s t r u c t the
g r a m m a r of his m o t h e r t o n g u e m e r e l y by l e a r n i n g from t h e available
linguistic data. Rather, g u i d e d by i n n a t e a priori k n o w l e d g e of t h e ab
stract s t r u c t u r e of n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s in g e n e r a l , he can derive that
g r a m m a r from t h e r u d i m e n t a r y linguistic d a t a in his e n v i r o n m e n t by
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Universal Pragmatics

2
verifying his built-in p r o g r a m of h y p o t h e s e s . C h o m s k y uses this as
sumption of an i n n a t e linguistic capacity to s u p p o r t t h e f u r t h e r as
sumption t h a t all n o r m a l l y socialized m e m b e r s of a s p e e c h
c o m m u n i t y if they have l e a r n e d t o s p e a k at all, have c o m p l e t e mas
tery of t h e system of abstract linguistic rules. In o t h e r words, linguis
tic c o m p e t e n c e c a n n o t b e d i s t r i b u t e d differentially. By m e a n s of
these assumptions t h e ideal s p e a k e r o b t a i n s a curiously empirical sta
tus. A n d it is for this r e a s o n alone t h a t C h o m s k y sees himself moti
vated to explain o b s e r v a b l e linguistic p e r f o r m a n c e in t e r m s of an
innate, linguistic c o m p e t e n c e and e x t e r n a l restrictive empirical con
ditions. For t h e a c t u a l p e r f o r m a n c e of s p e e c h acts is d i s t r i b u t e d over
a r a n g e at b o t h t h e individual a n d g r o u p levels, giving evidence of a
thoroughly n o n h o m o g e n e o u s s p e e c h c o m m u n i t y . A n d if linguistic
c o m p e t e n c e is uniformly distributed, t h e n t h e actual differential dis
tribution m u s t b e t r a c e d to restrictive c o n d i t i o n s . These c o n d i t i o n s
must a c c o u n t for t h e i m p e r f e c t manifestation of u n d e r l y i n g knowl
edge that in itself is perfect. T h u s , if we think of linguistic c o m p e
tence as r e p r e s e n t e d by w h a t we call passive k n o w l e d g e of a l a n g u a g e
( u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) , t h e n we c a n e x p l a i n active linguistic k n o w l e d g e by
psychological variables (such as m e m o r y , a t t e n t i o n , motivational in
hibitions, a n d so o n ) . T h e s e variables selectively d e t e r m i n e how t h e
empirical speaker can use t h e s u p p o s e d l y invariant linguistic r e p e r
toire that t h e ideal s p e a k e r has at h e r disposal. T h i s relation b e t w e e n
linguistic c o m p e t e n c e a n d linguistic p e r f o r m a n c e results f r o m t h e
hypothesis t h a t t h e linguistic a p p a r a t u s is innate, a n d n o t from lin
guistic idealizations.
It is ir this r e a s o n t h a t t h e sociolinguistic objections t h a t have
been raised against Chomsky's position are d i r e c t e d n o t at t h e con
cept of t h e ideal s p e a k e r b u t at t h e m i s t a k e n a s s u m p t i o n t h a t active
language use can be e x p l a i n e d solely o n t h e basis of linguistic com
p e t e n c e a n d e m p i r i c a l p a r a m e t e r s . Sociolinguistic findings s u p p o r t
the view, rather, t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of linguistic c o m p e t e n c e , t o o , is
g o v e r n e d by r u l e systems. T h e strategies of selection f r o m t h e pas
sively available linguistic r e p e r t o i r e are themselves obviously d e p e n d
ent o n rules (or codes) t h a t also a r e linguistic systems of
r u l e s a l t h o u g h they are n o t g r a m m a t i c a l b u t p r a g m a t i c systems.
These linguistic c o d e s (to w h i c h I shall r e t u r n ) d e t e r m i n e t h e
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L e c t u r e IV

contextually a p p r o p r i a t e use of s e n t e n c e s (or n o n v e r b a l expres

sions) in u t t e r a n c e s . T h e y are by n o m e a n s invariant, b u t instead are
d i s t r i b u t e d a c c o r d i n g to sociocultural characteristics. But the con
c e p t u a l analysis of linguistic c o d e s d e p e n d s o n an idealization in the
s a m e trivial sense as does g r a m m a t i c a l analysis. Every individual code
h a s a c o r r e s p o n d i n g r u l e - c o m p e t e n c e , a l t h o u g h t h e latter m u s t al
ways be b a s e d on linguistic c o m p e t e n c e ( n o o n e can k n o w a dialect
o r j a r g o n b e f o r e having l e a r n e d a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e ) .
T h e differential distribution of p r a g m a t i c c o m p e t e n c e s d o e s not
w a r r a n t a b a n d o n i n g idealizations; it simply r e q u i r e s different empir
ical a s s u m p t i o n s with r e g a r d to h o w these c o m p e t e n c e s are acquired.
Like linguistic c o m p e t e n c e in t h e n a r r o w e r s e n s e (which f r o m now
o n I shall call g r a m m a t i c a l c o m p e t e n c e ) , p r a g m a t i c c o m p e t e n c e s
find t h e i r expression i n implicit knowledge: i n s p e a k e r s ' j u d g m e n t s
a b o u t t h e acceptability of linguistic expressions. W u n d e r l i c h distin
guishes b e t w e e n grammaticality a n d acceptability as follows:

T h e f o r m e r is a p r o p e r t y of s t r i n g s of s y m b o l s t h a t a r e p r o d u c e d as sen
t e n c e s b y a g r a m m a r ; t h e l a t t e r is a p r o p e r t y of s t r i n g s o f s y m b o l s t h a t o c c u r
i n c o n t e x t s a n d , w h e n u t t e r e d , c a n b e e v a l u a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y by d i f f e r e n t speak
ers. B o t h p r o p e r t i e s can be t h e o r e t i c a l l y e x p l i c a t e d : t h e f o r m e r i n t h e g r a m
3
m a t i c a l a n d t h e l a t t e r i n t h e p r a g m a t i c p a r t of o n e ' s a c c o u n t of l a n g u a g e .

I have b r o u g h t u p t h e s e p o i n t s in o r d e r t o d e f i n e m o r e precisely
the p r o j e c t of a universal p r a g m a t i c s . Universal p r a g m a t i c s s t a n d s be
tween linguistics o n o n e h a n d a n d empirical pragmatics o n the
other. Linguistics limits itself to linguistic expressions a n d disregards
c o n t e x t s of their possible use. T h e t h e o r y of linguistic c o d e s o n the
o t h e r h a n d , which is c o n c e r n e d with t h e differential m o d e s of lan
g u a g e use, p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t t h e c o n t e x t s in w h i c h m u t u a l u n d e r
s t a n d i n g is possible h a v e already b e e n p r o d u c e d . J u s t w h a t is the
status of t h e s e contexts, in which s e n t e n c e s ( a n d n o n v e r b a l expres
sions) c a n b e u t t e r e d , r e m a i n s u n e x p l a i n e d . Linguistics d o e s n o t
have to c o n s i d e r them, a n d within the theory of linguistic c o d e s they
c o u n t as b o u n d a r y c o n d i t i o n s . Yet t h e c o m p o n e n t s t h a t r e c u r in
every possible s p e e c h situation u n d e r s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n s a r e n o t
extralinguistic e l e m e n t s . T h e general structures of possible s p e e c h
e n t e r i n t o t h e very c o n c e p t of a linguistic c o d e . T h e y u n d e r l i e the
 73_
Universal Pragmatics

differential d e t e r m i n a t i o n s of individual codes. Obviously in perform

ing speech acts we also performatively produce the conditions that make possi
ble the utterance of sentences in the first place.
G e n e r a t i n g c o n t e x t s of possible s p e e c h certainly m e a n s s o m e t h i n g
different t h a n g e n e r a t i n g grammatically o r d e r e d strings of symbols.
For s p e e c h acts, w h i c h we m a y r e g a r d as t h e e l e m e n t a r y u n i t s of
speech, have simultaneously a linguistic a n d a n institutional m e a n
ing: linguistic insofar as they are parts of s p e e c h , and institutional in
sofar as they m a k e possible t h e c o n t e x t u a l i z a t i o n of linguistic
expressions. By u t t e r i n g "I p r o m i s e y o u I will c o m e t o m o r r o w , " I a m
not only expressing a p r o m i s e , I a m makings p r o m i s e . T h i s u t t e r a n c e
is the p r o m i s e t h a t it also r e p r e s e n t s . By m e a n s of s u c h s p e e c h acts
we g e n e r a t e g e n e r a l conditions for c o n t e x t u a l i z i n g s e n t e n c e s . At t h e
same time, however, these s t r u c t u r e s a r e also r e p r e s e n t e d in s p e e c h
itselfand precisely as t h e linguistic expressions t h a t we call prag
matic universah. A t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e m u s t ex
plain w h a t speakers or h e a r e r s a c c o m p l i s h by m e a n s of p r a g m a t i c
universals w h e n they use s e n t e n c e s (or n o n v e r b a l expressions) in
utterances.
T h e key p h e n o m e n o n t h a t a universal p r a g m a t i c s m u s t e x p l a i n is
the p e c u l i a r reflexivity of n a t u r a l languages. It is t h e basis for t h e ca
pacity of t h e c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r to p a r a p h r a s e any expressions of a
language in t h a t l a n g u a g e itself. A n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e h a s n o m e t a l a n
guage t h a t is not d e p e n d e n t in t u r n o n an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s in t h a t (or
a n o t h e r ) n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e . Schwayder describes this p h e n o m e n o n
in t e r m s of self-explication:

What is at once most essential to and perplexing about language is that it

speaks for itself. In seeing me do whatever it is I m a y b e doing, e.g., shooting
at the top of the target, you may not know what I am doing. But if you hear
me say something you will there and then come to know what it is I mean to
say. My choice of words is calculated to tell you what I mean to do with those
words. They speak for themselves.... In asking a question, I do not also state
that I mean to ask a question; nor when I make a statement, I do not also
state that I mean to make that statement. . . . My act is not one of saying what
I intend to do; but rather my act . . . must show what I mean to do. This, I
think, is part of what underlies Wittgenstein's remark that the assertion
4
shows its sense, and says that things are so.
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Lecture IV

5
T h e p e r f o r m a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s investigated by A u s t i n are paradig
matic for this self-explicating capacity of l a n g u a g e . T h e g r a m m a r of
t h e s e s p e e c h acts reflects a p e c u l i a r d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e , which is the
f o u n d a t i o n of t h e reflexivity of n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s .
6
I have already p o i n t e d o u t t h a t a s p e e c h act is c o m p o s e d of a
p e r f o r m a t i v e clause a n d a d e p e n d e n t clause with p r o p o s i t i o n a l con
7
t e n t . T h e m a i n clause is u s e d in an u t t e r a n c e in o r d e r to establish an
intersubjective relation b e t w e e n speakers a n d h e a r e r s . T h e .depend
e n t clause is u s e d in a n u t t e r a n c e in o r d e r to c o m m u n i c a t e a b o u t ob
j e c t s (or states of affairs). T h e e l e m e n t a r y c o n n e c t i o n of the
p e r f o r m a t i v e clause a n d t h e clause w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t illus
trates t h e d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e of o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t i o n :
C o m m u n i c a t i o n a b o u t objects (or states of affairs) takes place only
on c o n d i t i o n of s i m u l t a n e o u s m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n a b o u t the m e a n
ing of the use of the d e p e n d e n t clause. A situation w h e r e it is possi
ble to r e a c h a m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e q u i r e s that at least two
s p e a k e r - h e a r e r s simultaneously establish c o m m u n i c a t i o n at both lev
els: at the level of intersubjectivity, w h e r e the subjects talk with o n e
a n o t h e r , a n d a t t h e level of t h e objects (or states of affairs) about
w h i c h they c o m m u n i c a t e . Universal pragmatics aims at t h e recon
s t r u c t i o n ofi t h e r u l e systeirpthat a c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r m u s t k n o w if
she is to be able to fulfill this p o s t u l a t e of t h e simultaneity of c o m m u
n i c a t i o n a n d m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I s h o u l d like to reserve the t e r m
communicative competence for this qualification.*
T o d e l i n e a t e m o r e sharply t h e c o n c e p t of c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e
t e n c e , I w o u l d like to p r o p o s e a didactically plausible series of steps
of abstraction. T h e abstractions b e g i n with c o n c r e t e u t e r a n c e s . I call
a n u t t e r a n c e " c o n c r e t e " if it is m a d e within a c o m p l e t e l y d e t e r m i n
i n g context. T h e first step is sociolinguistic abstraction. It p r e s c i n d s
f r o m all t h o s e b o u n d a r y c o n d i t i o n s of linguistic r u l e systems that
vary c o n t i n g e n l y a n d are specific only to individual speaker-hearers,
a n d r e t a i n s " u t t e r a n c e s in g e n e r a l i z e d social contexts." T h e s e c o n d
step is universal-pragmatic abstraction. It p r e s c i n d s from all spatio-
t e m p o r a l l y a n d socially c i r c u m s c r i b e d contexts a n d r e t a i n s only "situ
ated u t t e r a n c e s in g e n e r a l . " In this way we arrive at t h e e l e m e n t a r y
units of s p e e c h . T h e t h i r d abstraction is linguistic abstraction, which
Universal P r a g m a t i c s

prescinds from t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of s p e e c h acts a n d retains only "lin

guistic expressions" o r s e n t e n c e s . In this way we arrive at t h e e l e m e n
tary units of l a n g u a g e . T h e f o u r t h step is logical abstraction, w h i c h
disregards all performatively relevant linguistic expressions a n d re
tains "assertoric p r o p o s i t i o n s . " I n this way we arrive at the e l e m e n
tary units for r e n d e r i n g states of affairs.
U t t e r a n c e s in g e n e r a l i z e d social c o n t e x t s a r e t h e object of
sociolinguistics: It takes t h e f o r m of a t h e o r y of p r a g m a t i c c o m p e
tences. Its task is r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e linguistic c o d e s a c c o r d i n g t o
which c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r s e m p l o y u t t e r a n c e s in a contextually ap
propriate m a n n e r a c c o r d i n g to sociocultural s t a n d a r d s . Situated ut
terances in g e n e r a l that are n o t specific to a given c o n t e x t a r e t h e
object of universal p r a g m a t i c s : It takes t h e f o r m of a t h e o r y of com
municative c o m p e t e n c e . Its task is r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e r u l e system
according to w h i c h c o m p e t e n t speakers t r a n s p o s e linguistic expres
sions i n t o u t t e r a n c e s . Linguistic expressions (or strings of symbols)
are t h e object of linguistics: It takes t h e f o r m of a t h e o r y of syntactic
c o m p e t e n c e . Its task is r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e r u l e system a c c o r d i n g t o
which c o m p e t e n t speakers f o r m a n d t r a n s f o r m s e n t e n c e s . Finally,
assertoric p r o p o s i t i o n s [Aussagen] are t h e object of logic. Logic has
the task of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e r u l e system a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h we
form p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d t r a n s f o r m t h e m while p r e s e r v i n g t h e i r
truth-value. Logic p r e s c i n d s from t h e e m b e d d e d n e s s of assertoric
sentences in speech acts. T o this e x t e n t it deals w i t h b o t h less a n d
m o r e t h a n linguistics. T h e s e distinctions give rise to t h e following
correlations:

Object d o m a i n Competence Theory

u t t e r a n c e s in social pragmatic sociolinguistics

contexts
non-context-specific communicative universal p r a g m a t i c s
utterances
linguistic expres grammatical linguistics
sions (sentences)
propositions logical formal logic
76
Lecture TV

9
This overview is i n t e n d e d only to delimit universal pragmatics.
L e t u s t u r n o n c e again t o t h e d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e of s p e e c h acts. Only
in constative s p e e c h acts d o s e n t e n c e s with p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t
take t h e f o r m of assertoric s e n t e n c e s or p r o p o s i t i o n s . I n o t h e r types
of s p e e c h acts, such as questions, c o m m a n d s , w a r n i n g s , disclosures,
a n d so o n , t h e d e p e n d e n t clauses d o n o t a p p e a r in t h e f o r m of
assertoric s e n t e n c e s . T h e y d o n o t r e n d e r any p r o p o s i t i o n s , yet they
h a v e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t n o n e t h e l e s s . N o m i n a l i z e d expressions of
t h e f o r m "that p" can be t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o p r o p o s i t i o n s at any time.
T h i s e x p l a i n s h o w t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t can r e m a i n t h e same
even if t h e m o d e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n is c h a n g e d , as w h e n questions
are t r a n s f o r m e d into o r d e r s , o r d e r s into confessions, o r confessions
1
i n t o s t a t e m e n t s . ' I n this c o n n e c t i o n we can take u p o n c e again the
distinction b e t w e e n cognitive a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e use and
m a k e it m o r e precise. I call the use of constative s p e e c h acts, in
w h i c h p r o p o s i t i o n s m u s t always figure, cognitive, b e c a u s e the
performatively established i n t e r p e r s o n a l relation b e t w e e n speaker
a n d h e a r e r serves t h e p u r p o s e of r e a c h i n g a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t
objects (or states of affairs). By contrast, I call c o m m u n i c a t i v e t h e use
of l a n g u a g e w h e r e r e a c h i n g a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t objects ( a n d
state of affairs) occurs for t h e p u r p o s e of establishing an interper
sonal r e l a t i o n s h i p . T h e level of c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t is t h e e n d in
o n e case is m a d e i n t o a m e a n s in t h e other. In cognitive l a n g u a g e use
p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s a r e t h e topic; they are w h a t t h e c o m m u n i c a
t i o n is about. But c o m m u n i c a t i v e use m e n t i o n s p r o p o s i t i o n a l con
t e n t s only in o r d e r to establish performatively a n intersubjective
relation b e t w e e n speaker-hearers. W h a t gives rise to t h e reflexivity of
n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s is that e a c h use of l a n g u a g e implicitly refers to the
11
other.

We a r e n o w ready to i n t r o d u c e t h e p r a g m a t i c universals (a) a n d

then to analyze t h e constitutive r o l e t h a t they play in b o t h t h e cogni
tive (b) a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e (c) u s e of l a n g u a g e .

(a) First, following W u n d e r l i c h , I shall list t h e classes of words

( a n d their g r a m m a t i c a l forms) t h a t r e f e r to g e n e r a l structures of t h e
s p e e c h situation.
77___
Universal P r a g m a t i c s

1. Personal p r o n o u n s (owning to their d o u b l e p e r f o r m a t i v e a n d ref

erential function I shall n o t simply s u b s u m e t h e m u n d e r singular
terms);
2. Words a n d p h r a s e s t h a t are u s e d for t h e initiation of s p e e c h a n d
for address ( g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m : vocative, h o n o r a t i v e ) ;
3. Deictic expressions (of space a n d t i m e ) ; d e m o n s t r a t i v e s a n d arti
cles; n u m e r a l s , quantifiers ( g r a m m a t i c a l forms: tense, g r a m m a t i c a l
modes);
4. Performative verbs (grammatical forms: interrogative,
imperative);
5. N o n p e r f o r m a t i v e i n t e n t i o n a l verbs a n d m o d a l adverbs.

I call these classes of linguistic expressions pragmatic universals be

cause they can b e c o r r e l a t e d with universal s t r u c t u r e s of t h e s p e e c h
situation. Classes 1 a n d 2 i n d i c a t e t h e s p e a k e r - h e a r e r s a n d t h e p o t e n
tial participants in conversation. Class 3 i n d i c a t e s t h e s p a t i o t e m p o r a l
and factual e l e m e n t s of t h e s p e e c h situation. Class 4 indicates t h e re
lation t h e speaker to h e r u t t e r a n c e , a n d t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n
speakers a n d h e a r e r s . Class 5, finally, i n d i c a t e s t h e i n t e n t i o n s a n d ex
p e r i e n c e s of t h e speaker.
I d o n o t c o n s i d e r it a d e q u a t e to r e g a r d t h e p r a g m a t i c universals as
c o m p o n e n t s of a m e t a l a n g u a g e in which we can reach an u n d e r
standing a b o u t t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e s p e e c h situation. T h i s view cre
ates t h e misleading impression t h a t t h e universal s t r u c t u r e s of t h e
speech situation are given as empirical b o u n d a r y c o n d i t i o n s i n d e
p e n d e n t of s p e e c h . I n fact, however, we c a n e m p l o y s e n t e n c e s in ut
terances only if we ourselves, by m e a n s of p r a g m a t i c universals,
p r o d u c e t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which c o m m u n i c a t i o n is possible,
thereby p r o d u c i n g t h e s p e e c h situation. W i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e to these
universals we c a n n o t even define t h e r e c u r r i n g c o m p o n e n t s of situa
tions of possible s p e e c h , namely, t h e u t t e r a n c e s themselves, t h e in
t e r p e r s o n a l relations g e n e r a t e d b e t w e e n s p e a k e r - h e a r e r s a l o n g with
u t t e r a n c e s , a n d t h e objects a b o u t which s p e a k e r - h e a r e r s c o m m u n i
12
cate with o n e a n o t h e r . T h i s does n o t affect t h e fact t h a t p r a g m a t i c
universals, at t h e s a m e time as we use t h e m to p r o d u c e the s p e e c h sit
uation, also serve to represent it.
78
Universal Pragmatics

I n cognitive l a n g u a g e u s e we e m p l o y p r a g m a t i c universals in such

a w a y as to c o n s t i t u t e describable object d o m a i n s . This role of consti
t u t i n g e x p e r i e n c e is to be e x p l a i n e d by a t h e o r y of r e f e r e n c e . In
c o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e u s e we e m p l o y p r a g m a t i c universals in such
a way as to establish intersubjective relations performatively. This
role is to b e e x p l a i n e d by a t h e o r y of s p e e c h acts. I n b o t h cases we
c o m e u p o n systems of rules that, u n l i k e g r a m m a t i c a l rules, d o not
merely r e p r e s e n t intralinguistic relations. Rather, t h e universal-
p r a g m a t i c rule system reveals t h e restrictions t h a t the e x t e r n a l reality
of n a t u r e a n d society, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t h e i n t e r n a l reality of the
cognitive a n d motivational m a k e - u p of t h e h u m a n o r g a n i s m , o n the
other, place o n l a n g u a g e . I n t h e p r a g m a t i c universals we see t h e in
terface of l a n g u a g e and reality. T h e describable reality of n a t u r e and
society is f o r m e d in t h e interplay of l a n g u a g e , c o g n i t i o n , a n d action,
which is g o v e r n e d by universal-pragmatic rules. At t h e same time we
ourselves p r o d u c e t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o n t e x t of t h e intersubjec
tively e x p e r i e n c e d lifeworld t h r o u g h s p e e c h acts t h a t a r e g o v e r n e d
by universal-pragmatical r u l e s .

(b) I shall c o n f i n e myself to b u t a few brief r e m a r k s o n t h e prag

matics of cognitive language use. We m a k e two suppositions with r e g a r d
to p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t we express in constative s p e e c h acts. W e suppose
t h e existence of t h e object a b o u t which we m a k e a statement; a n d we
p r e s u p p o s e t h e t r u t h of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n itself, t h a t is, of w h a t we as
sert a b o u t t h e object. Existence a n d t r u t h r e p r e s e n t t h e c o n d i t i o n s
t h a t m u s t b e fulfilled if t h e s t a t e m e n t is to r e p r e s e n t a fact. T h e first
s u p p o s i t i o n is justified if b o t h speakers a n d hearers are able to iden
tify unequivocally t h e object d e n o t e d by t h e subject expression of a
p r o p o s i t i o n . T h e s e c o n d is justified if b o t h speakers a n d h e a r e r s can
verify w h e t h e r w h a t is p r e d i c a t e d of t h e object in t h e p r o p o s i t i o n as
s e r t e d is in fact t r u e of it. T h e referential expression, b e it a singular
t e r m o r a definite d e s c r i p t i o n , c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as a specification
of h o w a n object can b e identified. T o g e t h e r with t h e p r e d i c a t e ex
pression, it constitutes a p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t is s u p p o s e d to c o r r e s p o n d
to a n existing s t a t e of affairs. N o w I would like to m a i n t a i n t h a t t h e
p r a g m a t i c r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d reality p r o d u c e d in
t h e cognitive u s e of l a n g u a g e d e p e n d o n an a p r i o r i c o n s t i t u t i o n of
t h e object of possible e x p e r i e n c e . T h e p r a g m a t i c s of cognitive lan-
Universal Pragmatics

guage use shows t h a t a n y given object d o m a i n is s t r u c t u r e d by partic

ular i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e , c o g n i t i o n , a n d action.
O u r e x p e r i e n c e as t r a n s m i t t e d by o u r sense o r g a n s is e i t h e r
sensory o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e , in w h i c h case it b u i l d s o n sensory experi
ence. Sensory e x p e r i e n c e leads to t h e p e r c e p t i o n of things, events,
or states t h a t we ascribe to things (we see t h a t s o m e t h i n g is in a cer
tain state). T h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e based o n sensory experi
ence leads via p e r c e p t i o n s to t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p e r s o n s ,
utterances, or states t h a t we ascribe to p e r s o n s (we "see," i.e., u n d e r
stand, t h a t s o m e o n e is in a certain state). E x p e r i e n c e s can h a v e infor
mational c o n t e n t only b e c a u s e and to t h e e x t e n t t h a t they are
surprisingthat is, to t h e e x t e n t t h a t they d i s a p p o i n t a n d modify sta
bilized e x p e c t a t i o n s a b o u t objects. This b a c k g r o u n d , which acts as a
foil a n d against which e x p e r i e n c e s s t a n d out, consists in beliefs (or
p r e j u d g m e n t s ) a b o u t objects t h a t we have already e x p e r i e n c e d . I n
cognitive l a n g u a g e use we p u t o u r beliefs in t h e f o r m of p r o p o s i
tions. T h e s e in t u r n a p p e a r in a descriptive i d i o m t h a t , a c c o r d i n g to
its g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m , is e i t h e r a thing-event l a n g u a g e o r a n inten
tional l a n g u a g e (which a d m i t s expressions for p e r s o n s a n d t h e i r ut
terances in a d d i t i o n t o expressions for things and events). If we
analyze t h e g r a m m a r of t h e s e l a n g u a g e s , we c o m e u p o n categories
that a p r i o r i s t r u c t u r e t h e object d o m a i n of possible e x p e r i e n c e . To
form beliefs a b o u t objects or states of affairs t h a t c a n be disap
p o i n t e d by e x p e r i e n c e , we m u s t first p r e s u p p o s e objects of possible
e x p e r i e n c e in g e n e r a l , namely, universal s t r u c t u r e s of a n object d o
main. We i m p u t e to o u r sensory e x p e r i e n c e s a n object d o m a i n of
moving b o d i e s , a n d to o u r c o m m u n i c a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s an object d o
main of subjects w h o express themselves t h r o u g h s p e e c h a n d action.
T h e two d o m a i n s a r e of c o u r s e c o o r d i n a t e d with o n e a n o t h e r . O b j e c t
d o m a i n s r e p r e s e n t systems of primitive t e r m s t h a t e n a b l e us simulta
neously b o t h to o r g a n i z e e x p e r i e n c e s and to f o r m u l a t e beliefs.

I n t h e case of o r g a n i z i n g e x p e r i e n c e s of objects we conceive t h e

primitive t e r m s as cognitive schemata; in f o r m u l a t i n g beliefs a b o u t
objects of e x p e r i e n c e we can r e p r e s e n t t h e m as logico-semantic cate
gories. Evidently t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n these two levels (of experi
ence o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d l a n g u a g e o n the other) is created by
action: specifically, by e i t h e r i n s t r u m e n t a l o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e action.
80
Lecture IV

T h i s c a n b e s e e n ifwe e x a m i n e t h e use of referential expressions. We

d e n o t e objects by m e a n s of n a m e s or definite descriptions. To do
this, we h a v e to o r i e n t ourselves by characteristic features. T h a t is
why we can always r e p l a c e a n a m e with a definite d e s c r i p t i o n . If it is
to f u n c t i o n pragmatically, t h e definite d e s c r i p t i o n m u s t c o n t a i n an
identifying d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e object. It generally d e p e n d s o n the
c o n t e x t which feature is sufficiently characteristic for speakers a n d
h e a r e r s to b e able to pick o u t f r o m all possible objects precisely that
object which is b e i n g discussed. T h e less we can rely o n contexts of
p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , however, the m o r e deictic expressions m u s t bear
t h e b u r d e n of d e n o t a t i o n . H e r e we m a k e use of specifying expres
sions (definite articles: t h e ; demonstratives: this, t h a t ) , quantifying
expressions ( n u m e r a l s ; indefinite quantifiers such as s o m e , many,
all), as well as spatial and t e m p o r a l adverbs. At t h e linguistic level
t h e s e e x p r e s s i o n s r e p r e s e n t cognitive s c h e m a t a , namely, substance,
quantity, space, a n d time. T h e s e expressions, however, f o r m a func
t i o n i n g d e n o t a t i v e system only after they have b e e n i n t e r p r e t e d
w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of a descriptive l a n g u a g e (a thing-event lan
guage o r a n i n t e n t i o n a l l a n g u a g e ) . T h e identifiable object is catego
rized in t h e first case as a m o v i n g b o d y (or an a g g r e g a t e of things,
states, o r events) a n d in t h e s e c o n d as a p e r s o n (or as a s t r u c t u r e d
w e b of p e r s o n s , states, o r u t t e r a n c e s ) . These categories, in t e r m s of
w h i c h we perceive a n d u n d e r s t a n d t h e identified object, r e f e r to al
ternative p a t t e r n s of action.
T h i n g s a n d events m o v e in physically m e a s u r a b l e t i m e . T h e f o r m
of t h e objectivity [Gegenstdndlichkeit] of m o v i n g b o d i e s c o m p r i s e s , be
sides E u c l i d e a n space, a n abstract c o n d n u u m of t e m p o r a l points as
t h e d i m e n s i o n of time m e a s u r e m e n t . T h e objects of s e n s o r y experi
ence m u s t b e identifiable as points in space-time. P e r s o n s a n d utter
ances m o v e w i t h i n t e m p o r a l h o r i z o n s with b i o g r a p h i c a l a n d
historical r e f e r e n c e . T h e f o r m of t h e objectivity of p e r s o n s w h o ex
press themselves comprises, besides social space ( t h e intersubjective
r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n subjects c o m m u n i c a t i n g in o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e ) , t h e
perspectives of past a n d future, which are c e n t e r e d in the p r e s e n t
a n d s t r u c t u r e action. T h e "objects" of c o m m u n i c a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e
m u s t b e identifiable in t h e i r identity as a p e r s o n or g r o u p . T h i s d o u
ble s c h e m a t i z a t i o n of time is c o n n e c t e d with t h e fact that, o n t h e o n e
 81___
Universal Pragmatics

hand, we have e x p e r i e n c e s of objects t h a t w e c a n m a n i p u l a t e within

the functional s p h e r e of i n s t r u m e n t a l action, while o n t h e o t h e r
hand, we have e x p e r i e n c e s of ourselves a n d of o n e a n o t h e r w h e n we
e n c o u n t e r o n e a n o t h e r at t h e level of intersubjectivity as i n t e r l o c u
tors. In doubtful cases we m u s t c o m b i n e deictic expressions w i t h par
ticular actions in o r d e r to s u c c e e d in identifying an object. T h e s a m e
p r o n o u n s a n d adverbs, such as "this" a n d "that," " h e r e " a n d " t h e r e , "
"now" a n d "then," a n d " o n e " a n d "many," r e q u i r e different actions
d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r they a r e a p p l i e d to t h i n g s o r p e r s o n s . To
identify "this t h i n g h e r e " in case of d o u b t , I m u s t fall b a c k o n t h e
m e a s u r e m e n t of a s p a t i o t e m p o r a l l o c a t i o n a n d (at least) o n e de
scriptive o b s e r v a t i o n p r e d i c a t e . T o identify "this p e r s o n h e r e " I have
to address her a n d involve her in i n t e r a c t i o n s of some p a r t i c u l a r
kind. A n identity is ascribed to things by those w h o d e a l with t h e m .
Persons f o r m their own identity in c o n t e x t s of action. T h e y m u s t b e
able t o say w h o they a r e (unless, they a r e "beside themselves," in
which case it b e c o m e s q u e s t i o n a b l e in w h a t sense they are still
persons). T h a t is why in identifying p e r s o n s we also rely o n t h e d u a l
performative-demonstrative role of t h e first-person personal
pronoun.
A similar c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e , c o g n i t i o n , a n d action is
manifest in p r e d i c a t i o n . If I w a n t to establish w h e t h e r a p r e d i c a t e ap
plies to an object or not, I have t o verify w h e t h e r t h e object in fact
exemplifies the universal attribute expressed by the p r e d i c a t e . If t h e
proposition is f o r m u l a t e d in an i d i o m t h a t c o n t a i n s only o b s e r v a t i o n
predicates, t h e n I h a v e to rely o n observation. If it is f o r m u l a t e d in
a n i n t e n t i o n a l idiom, I use i n t e r r o g a t i o n as t h e most a p p r o p r i a t e
m e t h o d of verification. In t u r n , these m e t h o d s refer to a p a r t i c u l a r
practice: to t h e "language g a m e " of physical m e a s u r e m e n t in t h e first
case a n d the creation of intersubjective relations in t h e s e c o n d . O n e
f u r t h e r c a t e g o r y c o m e s i n t o play in t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f p r e d i c a t e s to
objects of (sensory or c o m m u n i c a t i v e ) e x p e r i e n c e : causality. Causal
ity is t h e f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t a c c o r d i n g to which we subject t h e ob
jects of e x p e r i e n c e to t h e idea of a lawlike c o n n e c t i o n : It m u s t be
possible to c o m p r e h e n d every event, every u t t e r a n c e , a n d every state
of affairs as t h e effect of a cause. T h e supposition of a lawlike c o n n e c
tion a m o n g things a n d events, as Peirce has s h o w n , o n l y m a k e s sense
82
Lecture IV

within t h e f u n c t i o n a l s p h e r e of i n s t r u m e n t a l action. T h e corre

s p o n d i n g s u p p o s i t i o n of motives for actions a n d of action orienta
tions m a k e s sense only with r e f e r e n c e to p u r e c o m m u n i c a t i v e action.
Dispositional p r e d i c a t e s ( s u c h as "soluble" o r "friendly") are para
d i g m e x a m p l e s of t h e causal generalizations t h a t are i m p l i c a t e d in
t h e descriptive idiom a n d t h a t e m e r g e w h e n we verify p r e d i c a t i o n s .
T h e c o r r e c t u s e of t h e denotative system seems to d e p e n d o n inte
g r a t i n g l a n g u a g e with cognitive s c h e m a t a o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d types
of action o n t h e other.
(c) The pragmatics of communicative language use. I s h o u l d like to
elucidate this by providing a classification of s p e e c h acts. T h e logic of
t h e use of p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n s , which I c a n n o t go into at this point,
a n d s p e e c h act t h e o r y a r e t h e two p a r t s of universal p r a g m a t i c s t h a t
are i m m e d i a t e l y r e l e v a n t to g r o u n d i n g sociology in p h i l o s o p h y of
l a n g u a g e . U n t i l now, n e i t h e r linguists n o r analytic p h i l o s o p h e r s have
s u c c e e d e d in setting u p a systematic a c c o u n t of s p e e c h acts. How
ever, insofar as we may i n c l u d e a m o n g p r a g m a t i c universals certain
aspects of s p e e c h acts, the lexical multiplicity of s p e e c h acts t h a t are
realized idiolectically by individual speakers m u s t be r e d u c i b l e to a
universally valid classification. Searle has identified t h e following
aspects of s p e e c h acts in g e n e r a l : t h e p r e p a r a t o r y r u l e , which deter
m i n e s t h e c o n d i t i o n s of a p p l i c a t i o n of a s p e e c h act; t h e proposi
tional c o n t e n t r u l e , which d e t e r m i n e s w h a t linguistic expressions are
a c c e p t a b l e in the s p e e c h act's d e p e n d e n t clauses with p r o p o s i t i o n a l
content; t h e sincerity r u l e , which d e t e r m i n e s t h e c o n d i t i o n s of seri
ousness f o r t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of t h e s p e e c h act; a n d finally t h e essen
tial r u l e , w h i c h d e t e r m i n e s t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g of t h e s p e e c h
13
a c t . 1 shall limit myself to this last aspect a n d distinguish f o u r classes
of s p e e c h acts.
T h e first class of s p e e c h acts, w h i c h I shall call communicatives,
serves to express t h e various aspects of t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g of
s p e e c h as such. It explicates t h e m e a n i n g of u t t e r a n c e s q u a utter
a n c e s . F o r every s p e e c h p r e s u p p o s e s a factual p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g
a b o u t w h a t it m e a n s to c o m m u n i c a t e in l a n g u a g e , to u n d e r s t a n d a n d
to m i s u n d e r s t a n d u t t e r a n c e s , to b r i n g a b o u t c o n s e n s u s o r to w o r k
o u t a dissensus; t h a t is, a b o u t h o w to use l a n g u a g e . E x a m p l e s are: to
say, to express oneself, to speak, to talk, to q u e s t i o n , to answer, to re-
 83
(J niversal P r a g m a t i c s

ply, to retort, to a g r e e , to c o n t r a d i c t , to object, to admit, to m e n t i o n ,

to render, to q u o t e , a n d so on.
T h e s e c o n d class of s p e e c h acts, w h i c h I shall call constatives, serves
to express t h e m e a n i n g of t h e cognitive use of s e n t e n c e s . It expli
cates t h e m e a n i n g of p r o p o s i t i o n s q u a p r o p o s i t i o n s . "To assert," t h e
prototypical v e r b of t h e assertoric m o d e , c o m b i n e s two e l e m e n t s t h a t
a p p e a r separately in t h e two subclasses of those s p e e c h acts. O n t h e
o n e h a n d , "to assert" b e l o n g s to t h e set of e x a m p l e s including: to de
scribe, to report, to i n f o r m , to n a r r a t e , to illustrate, to note, to show,
to explain, to p r e d i c t , on so o n . T h e s e e x a m p l e s r e p r e s e n t t h e
assertoric use of p r o p o s i t i o n s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , "to assert" b e l o n g s
to t h e g r o u p of e x a m p l e s i n c l u d i n g : t o affirm, to aver, t o c o n t e n d to
deny, to contest, to d o u b t . T h e s e e x a m p l e s illustrate the specific
pragmatic m e a n i n g of t h e t r u t h c l a i m of p r o p o s i t i o n s .
T h e t h i r d class of s p e e c h acts, w h i c h I shall call representatives
(expressives), serves to express t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g of t h e
speaker's self-representation to an a u d i e n c e . It explicates t h e m e a n
ing of t h e s p e a k e r ' s b r i n g i n g to expression his i n t e n t i o n s , attitudes,
a n d e x p e r i e n c e s . T h e d e p e n d e n t clauses with p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s
are i n t e n t i o n a l clauses w i t h verbs such as to know, to t h i n k , to be
lieve, to h o p e , to fear, to love, to h a t e , to like, to wish, to w a n t , t o de
cide, a n d so on. Some e x a m p l e s are: to reveal, to disclose, to betray,
to confess, to express, to h i d e , to conceal, to p r e t e n d , to o b s c u r e , to
keep secret, to suppress, to deny (these s p e e c h acts a p p e a r only in
negative f o r m as in: "I will not hide f r o m you t h a t . . . " ) .
T h e f o u r t h class of s p e e c h acts, which I shall call regulatives, serves
to express t h e n o r m a t i v e m e a n i n g of t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations t h a t
a r e established. It explicates t h e m e a n i n g of t h e stance t h a t
speaker-hearers take in relation to n o r m s of action. E x a m p l e s are: to
order, to d e m a n d , to r e q u e s t , to r e q u i r e , to r e m i n d , to forbid, to al
low, to suggest, to refuse, to o p p o s e , to c o m m i t oneself, to p r o m i s e ,
t o a g r e e u p o n , to answer for, to c o n f i r m , to e n d o r s e , to v o u c h for, to
r e n o u n c e , to apologize, to forgive, to p r o p o s e , to d e c l i n e , to r e c o m
m e n d , t o accept, to advise, to w a r n , to e n c o u r a g e , a n d so o n .
T h e r e is a f u r t h e r class of s p e e c h acts, which is crucial for t h e p e r
f o r m a n c e of institutionally r e g u l a t e d actions, b u t w h i c h d o e s n o t
b e l o n g t o p r a g m a t i c universals p e r s e a l t h o u g h it was w h a t
84
Lecture IV

p r o m p t e d Austin to study t h e n a t u r e of s p e e c h acts in t h e first place.

E x a m p l e s are: to greet, to c o n g r a t u l a t e , to thank, to felicitate, to con
dole, to bet, t o marry, to b e c o m e e n g a g e d , to baptize, to transgress,
to curse, to a n n o u n c e , to publicize, to proclaim, to appoint, to con
1 1
d e m n , to acquit, to testify, to vote for, a n d so on. ' T h e s e s p e e c h acts
already p r e s u p p o s e institutions, w h e r e a s the dialogue-constitutive
universals themselves p r o d u c e g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s of s p e e c h situa
tions. Also, m a n y institutional s p e e c h acts d o n o t r e q u i r e a d e p e n d
e n t clause w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t ("I t h a n k y o u "I a p p o i n t you,"
"I curse y o u " ) .
S p e e c h acts serve to m a k e t h r e e f u n d a m e n t a l distinctions t h a t we
m u s t m a s t e r if we w a n t to b e able to c o m m u n i c a t e at all. I n philoso
p h y t h e s e distinctions have a l o n g tradition: reality a n d a p p e a r a n c e
[Sein und Schein], essence a n d a c c i d e n t [Wesen undErscheinung], and
is a n d o u g h t [Sein und Sollen] T h e use of constatives makes possible
t h e distinction of a public world of intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d con
ceptions f r o m a private world of m e r e beliefs or o p i n i o n s (reality and
a p p e a r a n c e ) . T h e use of representatives makes possible a s e c o n d dis
tinction: b e t w e e n t h e i n d i v i d u a t e d being [ Wesen], to whose recogni
tion subjects capable of s p e e c h a n d action reciprocally lay claim, and
t h e linguistic u t t e r a n c e s , expressions, a n d actions in which t h e sub
j e c t a p p e a r s (essence and a c c i d e n t ) . T h e use of regulatives makes
possible t h e distinction between empirical regularities, w h i c h c a n be
o b s e r v e d , a n d prevailing n o r m s , which can b e i n t e n t i o n a l l y obeyed
or violated (is a n d o u g h t ) . Finally, those t h r e e distinctions, t a k e n to
gether, m a k e possible the c e n t r a l distinction b e t w e e n a " t r u e " (real)
a n d "false" ( a p p a r e n t ) consensus. T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n in t u r n e n t e r s into
t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g of s p e e c h as such, which we express by
m e a n s of t h e first class of s p e e c h acts, t h e communicatives. F o r the
m e a n i n g of s p e e c h as such is obviously that at least two speaker-hear
ers r e a c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t s o m e t h i n g . A n d they s u p p o s e that
insofar as they r e a c h a m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , it leads to a valid con
sensus.
T h e c o r r e l a t i o n of classes of s p e e c h acts with distinctions so funda
m e n t a l t h a t t h e y c a n n o t be f u r t h e r analyzed is m e a n t to lay the
g r o u n d w o r k for a n a t t e m p t at d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e systematic basis of
o u r classification.
 Truth and Society: The Discursive Redemption
of Factual Claims to Validity

Having provided a p r e l i m i n a r y clarification of the cognitive a n d

c o m m u n i c a d v e uses of l a n g u a g e , I s h o u l d like to e x a m i n e t h e claims
t o validity t h a t are c o n t a i n e d in s p e e c h acts. T h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e the
ory of society whose d e v e l o p m e n t I a m a d v o c a t i n g conceives of t h e
life process of society as a generative process m e d i a t e d by s p e e c h
acts. T h e social reality t h a t e m e r g e s from this rests o n t h e facticity of
the claims to validity implicit i n symbolic objects such as s e n t e n c e s ,
actions, gestures, traditions, institutions, worldviews, a n d so o n . This
n i m b l e facticity of m e a n i n g t h a t lays claim to validity conceals as
m u c h as it expresses t h e ultimately physical force of strategic
influences a n d t h e m a t e r i a l force of functional constraints; they can
gain p e r m a n e n c y only t h r o u g h t h e m e d i u m of a c k n o w l e d g e d inter
pretations. In t h e t h i r d l e c t u r e I d i s t i n g u i s h e d f o u r classes of claims
to validity: intelligibility, t r u t h , n o r m a t i v e Tightness, a n d sincerity.
These converge in t h e single claim to rationality. I a m i n t r o d u c i n g
these concepts at t h e level of universal p r a g m a t i c s a n d linking t h e m
to t h e strong assertion t h a t t h e idealizations c o n t a i n e d i n ' t h e possi
bility of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n itself by n o m e a n s express m e r e l y
a p a r t i c u l a r historical f o r m of reason.! Rather,! t h e idea of r e a s o n ,
w h i c h isfdifferentiated in t h e various claims to validity^is necessarily
built into the way in which t h e species of talking animals r e p r o d u c e s
itself. Insofar as we p e r f o r m a n y s p e e c h acts at all, we a r e subject t o
t h e i n h e r e n t imperative of "reason," to use an honorific for t h e
power t h a t I s h o u l d like to derive from t h e s t r u c t u r e of possible
 Lecture V

s p e e c h . T h i s is the sense in which I take it to b e m e a n i n g f u l to talk of

t h e social life p r o c e s s as h a v i n g an i m m a n e n t relation to t r u t h .
T h e p a r a d i g m of all claims to validity is propositional truth. Even
t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use of l a n g u a g e m u s t p r e s u p p o s e cognitive lan
g u a g e use with its t r u t h claims, since s t a n d a r d s p e e c h acts always con
tain p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s . W e call s t a t e m e n t s [Aussagen] " t r u e " or
"false" with r e g a r d to t h e existence of t h e states of affairs t h a t are rep
r e s e n t e d i n assertoric s e n t e n c e s . If a s t a t e m e n t r e p r e s e n t s an actual
state of affairs o r a fact, we call it true. Assertions are justified or
unjustified. By asserting s o m e t h i n g , I a m claiming t h a t t h e proposi
tion [Aussage] t h a t I a m asserting is t r u e . T r u t h is n o t a p r o p e r t y of
assertions. Rather, I use constative s p e e c h acts such as assertions to
raise the validity claim " t r u e " or "false" for a p r o p o s i t i o n . T h u s the
metalinguistic s t a t e m e n t , " T h e assertion ' t h a t p' is justified," which
m e a n s t h e s a m e as 'p'is t r u e , " is n o t r e l a t e d to t h e simple s t a t e m e n t
"that p" or "p" as a p r e m i s e to a c o n c l u s i o n . T h e metalinguistic state
1
m e n t simply makes explicit an implicitly raised validity claim. It spe
cifies w h a t we tacitly m e a n w h e n we m a k e assertions or, by so doing,
state p r o p o s i t i o n s . T h e m e a n i n g of t r u t h , therefore, can b e ex
p l a i n e d only with r e f e r e n c e to the pragmatics of a specific class of
s p e e c h acts. W h a t we m e a n by the t r u t h or falsity of p r o p o s i t i o n s can
be shown only by e x a m i n i n g the p e r f o r m a n c e of constative s p e e c h
acts.
T h u s universal p r a g m a t i c s is w h e r e we can give a n a c c o u n t of the
m e a n i n g of t r u t h . T h i s s h e d s light o n t h e i n a d e q u a c y of the correspon
dence theory of truth, b o t h in its s e m a n t i c f o r m (associated with Tarski
and C a r n a p ) a n d its traditional ontological f o r m o r i g i n a t i n g with
Aristotle.
T h e explicit f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e s e m a n t i c definition o f t r u t h is

(1) s is t r u e if a n d only if "p" is t r u e

w h e r e 5 is a n assertoric s e n t e n c e t h a t m e a n s p? T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n
clearly shows t h a t t h e semantic c o n c e p t i o n of t r u t h begs t h e ques
3
tion of t h e c o n c e p t of p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h . Tarski c a n replace (1)
with

(2) s is t r u e iff/)
87__
Truth and Society

only b e c a u s e h e assumes t h e equivalence

= s
(3) P "P" i t r u e .

T h e equivalence sign, however, h i d e s t h e very p r o b l e m t h a t is at is

sue. F o r by "p" I m e a n a t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n [Aussage] only if I e m b e d
the assertoric s e n t e n c e 5 in a s p e e c h act t h a t takes t h e f o r m of a n as
sertion. W e c a n n o t c o n t e n t ourselves with t h e equivalence in (3) if
we w a n t to give a n a c c o u n t of t h e validity implicit in assertions.
Rather we m u s t explicate t h e claim to validity t h a t we raise in
4
constative s p e e c h acts.
T h e classic a t t e m p t to c i r c u m v e n t this p r o b l e m is t h e ontological
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d
facts as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n [Abbildung] ( t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e t h e o r y of
t r u t h ) . T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n obviously fails to c a p t u r e t h e m e a n i n g of
truth, since images or copies can b e m o r e o r less like t h e original
they are s u p p o s e d to r e p r e s e n t , w h e r e a s a t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n c a n n o t
be m o r e or less like reality: T r u t h is n o t a relative property. (This has
b e e n p o i n t e d o u t by Austin as well as Sellars.) T h e real difficulty of
ontological t h e o r i e s of t r u t h , however, is t h a t t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e
b e t w e e n p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d facts (or reality as t h e totality of all facts)
can in t u r n b e r e p r e s e n t e d o n l y in p r o p o s i t i o n s . As Peirce d e m o n
strated, we can a c c o r d t h e t e r m "reality" n o m e a n i n g o t h e r t h a n w h a t
5
we m e a n by the t r u t h of p r o p o s i t i o n s . W e c a n i n t r o d u c e t h e c o n c e p t
of "reality" o n l y with r e f e r e n c e t o " t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n s " : Reality is t h e
totality of all states of affairs a b o u t which t r u e s t a t e m e n t s a r e possi
ble. O n t o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s of t r u t h try in vain to g o b e y o n d t h e s e m a n
tic realm. But only in this r e a l m c a n t h e validity claim of s p e e c h acts
be explicated.
T h e m e a n i n g o f t r u t h d o e s n o t consist i n t h e m e t h o d o f ascertain
ing t r u t h ; nevertheless, t h e m e a n i n g of a validity claim also c a n n o t
be d e t e r m i n e d w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e t o t h e possibility of r e d e e m i n g , limit
ing, o r rejecting it. T h a t is why t h e evidential theory of truth, t h e
Husserlian version of which we have e x a m i n e d m o r e closely, defines
t r u t h with r e f e r e n c e t o t h e intuitive fulfillment of a n i n t e n t i o n . T h e
m e a n i n g of t r u t h , a c c o r d i n g to Husserl, refers t o t h e evidence of t h e
intuition of w h a t is i m m e d i a t e l y given. I shall n o t r e h e a r s e t h e argu
m e n t s t h a t have b e e n a d v a n c e d by p h i l o s o p h e r s from Peirce to
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Lecture V

P o p p e r a n d A d o r n o against this sort of Ursprungsphilosophie. I n

Husserl, t h e impossibility of t h e evidential t h e o r y of t r u t h e m e r g e s in

t h e a t t e m p t to p r o v e that t h e r e is a n o n s e n s o r y (or categorial) intu
ition for universal p r o p o s i t i o n s , in which universals a r e s u p p o s e d to
b e self-evident. But even singular p r o p o s i t i o n s (so-called p e r c e p t u a l
j u d g m e n t s ) c o n t a i n at least o n e universal expression (namely, o n e of
t h e p r e d i c a t e s of disposition, m e a s u r e m e n t , relation, or sensation al
lowed in o b s e r v a t i o n l a n g u a g e s ) . T h e s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t of such a
g e n e r a l t e r m c a n n o t be e x h a u s t e d by a finite n u m b e r of particular
o b s e r v a t i o n s . As Wittgenstein showed with t h e e x a m p l e of introduc
i n g semantic c o n v e n t i o n s , t h e m e a n i n g s of words a n d s e n t e n c e s con
n o t e a n e l e m e n t of universality t h a t t r a n s c e n d s all possible particular
exemplifications. T h a t is why t h e claim tp validity implicit in an asser
tion c a n n o t be r e d e e m e d by empirical evidence. Nevertheless, the
validity of empirically m e a n i n g f u l assertions obviously rests) o n expe
rience^,'In a c e r t a i n sense, t h e validity claim is f o u n d e d in experi
e n c e s . W e c a n show w h a t this m e a n s by c o n s i d e r i n g t h e dissonant
c h a r a c t e r of " e x p e r i e n c e s , " w h i c h b o t h G a d a m e r a n d P o p p e r have
6
emphasized.
Especially Peirce a n d t h e pragmatists w h o followed h i m have
p l a c e d epistemological w e i g h t on the fact t h a t we l e a r n only from
h a v i n g o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s d i s a p p o i n t e d . We s p e a k of e x p e r i e n c e s in an
e m p h a t i c sense o n l y if t h e y modify o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d c o m p e l us
to r e o r i e n t ourselves. W e d o n o t n o t i c e w h e n o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s are
c o n f i r m e d . C o r r o b o r a t i n g e x p e r i e n c e s are the f o u n d a t i o n on which
t h e everyday p r a c t i c e of o u r lifeworld rests; they p r o v i d e us with cer
tainty. B u t certainties are always subjective; they can b e u p s e t at any
time by d i s s o n a n t e x p e r i e n c e s . F r o m t h e perspective of the believing
subject, certainty is the c o r r e l a t e of t h e actual validity of a belief. To
t h a t e x t e n t e x p e r i e n c e t h a t is, continually c o r r o b o r a t i n g experi
e n c e g r o u n d s t h e t r u t h claims raised in constative s p e e c h acts.
" G r o u n d i n g " m e a n s stabilizing claims q u a claims: As l o n g as "experi
e n c e d o e s n o t t e a c h us o t h e r w i s e , " we have in fact n o plausible cause
to d o u b t a t r u t h claim, even t h o u g h we k n o w t h a t d o u b t s , w h e n they
arise, c a n n o t b e resolved by e x p e r i e n c e s , b u t only by a r g u m e n t s . Of
course, e x p e r i e n c e c a n be a p p e a l e d to in t h e c o u r s e of a n a r g u m e n t .
But t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a p p e a l to e x p e r i e n c e , as in e x p e r i m e n t s , it-
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Truth and Society

self d e p e n d s o n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s whose validity c a n be d e m o n s t r a t e d

only in discourse. E x p e r i e n c e s support t h e t r u t h claims of assertions;
we m a i n t a i n this claim as l o n g as t h e r e a r e n o d i s s o n a n t e x p e r i e n c e s .
But these t r u t h claims c a n b e redeemed only t r o u g h a r g u m e n t . A claim
g r o u n d e d [jundiert] in e x p e r i e n c e enjoys provisional backing; as
soon as it b e c o m e s p r o b l e m a t i c , we can see t h a t a claim g r o u n d e d in
experiences is n o t yet by any m e a n s a justified [ begriindet] claim.
T h e validity claim of constative speech acts, t h a t is, t h e t r u t h t h a t
we claim p r o p o s i t i o n s to have by asserting t h e m , d e p e n d s o n two
conditions. First, it m u s t b e g r o u n d e d in e x p e r i e n c e ; t h a t is, t h e
statement may n o t conflict with d i s s o n a n t e x p e r i e n c e . S e c o n d , it
must b e discursively r e d e e m a b l e ; t h a t is, t h e s t a t e m e n t m u s t b e able
to h o l d u p against all c o u n t e r a r g u m e n t s a n d c o m m a n d t h e assent of
all p o t e n t i a l p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a discourse. T h e first c o n d i t i o n m u s t be
satisfied t o m a k e credible t h a t t h e s e c o n d c o n d i t i o n could b e satisfied
as r e q u i r e d . T h e m e a n i n g of t r u t h implicit in t h e p r a g m a t i c s of asser
tions can b e explicated if we specify w h a t is m e a n t by the "discursive
r e d e m p t i o n " of claims to validity. T h i s is t h e task of the/'consensus the
ory of truth. A c c o r d i n g to this theory, I can a t t r i b u t e a p r e d i c a t e t o an
object if a n d only if e v e r y o n e else w h o c o u l d e n t e r into discourse
with m e w o u l d also a t t r i b u t e t h e s a m e p r e d i c a t e t o t h e same object.
To distinguish t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n s f r o m false o n e s , I take r e c o u r s e t o
the j u d g m e n t of o t h e r s t h a t is, of all o t h e r s with w h o m I c o u l d ever
e n t e r i n t o discourse (including counterfactually all discursive part
ners w h o m I could e n c o u n t e r if my life history w e r e coextensive with
the history of h u m a n k i n d ) . T h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n of p r o p o s i t i o n s is
the p o t e n t i a l assent of all o t h e r s . E v e r y o n e else should b e able to
convince h i m - o r herself t h a t I a m justifi ed in p r e d i c a t i n g t h e attrib
ute p of object x a n d s h o u l d t h e n be able to a g r e e with m e . T h e uni
versal-pragmatic m e a n i n g of t r u t h , therefore, is d e t e r m i n e d in t e r m s
of t h e d e m a n d of r e a c h i n g a r a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s . i T h e c o n c e p t of t h e
discursive r e d e m p t i o n of validity claims leads to t h e c o n c e p t of ratio
n a l consensus. Before discussing t h e aporias t h a t arise from this, I
would like to e x a m i n e t h e types of validity claims o t h e r t h a n t r u t h
claims t h a t occur in o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e g a m e s .

A f u n c t i o n i n g l a n g u a g e g a m e , in w h i c h s p e e c h acts a r e c o o r d i
n a t e d a n d e x c h a n g e d , is a c c o m p a n i e d by a " b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s . "
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Lecture V

This c o n s e n s u s rests o n t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of at least f o u r claims to va

lidity t h a t c o m p e t e n t speakers m u s t raise reciprocally for each of
t h e i r s p e e c h acts: t h e intelligibility of the u t t e r a n c e , t h e truth of its
p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t , t h e normative Tightness of its performative
c o m p o n e n t , a n d t h e sincerity of t h e i n t e n t i o n expressed by the
speaker. T h e c o u r s e of a c o m m u n i c a t i o n r u n s smoothly (on t h e basis
of a socially l e a r n e d [eingespielt] consensus) if s p e a k i n g and acting
subjects

(a) r e n d e r intelligible t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g of t h e intersubjective

relation (which c a n b e e x p r e s s e d in t h e f o r m of a performative
clause) as well as t h e m e a n i n g of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t of
their utterances;
(b) r e c o g n i z e t h e t r u t h of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n stated with t h e s p e e c h act
(or the existential p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of the p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t men
tioned therein);
(c) a c k n o w l e d g e t h e n o r m a t i v e Tightness of t h e n o r m t h a t the given
s p e e c h act m a y be r e g a r d e d as fulfilling; a n d
(d) d o n o t cast d o u b t o n t h e sincerity of t h e subjects involved.

Particular validity claims are t h e m a t i z e d only if t h e f u n c t i o n i n g of

a l a n g u a g e g a m e is d i s t u r b e d a n d the w o r k i n g b a c k g r o u n d consen
sus is u n d e r m i n e d . This t h e n gives rise to typical q u e s t i o n s a n d an
swers, w h i c h are a n o r m a l p a r t of c o m m u n i c a t i v e practice. If the
intelligibility of an u t t e r a n c e b e c o m e s p r o b l e m a t i c , we ask such ques
tions as, "What d o you m e a n by that?" "How a m I to u n d e r s t a n d
that?" "What d o e s that m e a n ? " W e call t h e answers to such questions
interpretations. If t h e t r u t h of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t of a n utter
ance b e c o m e s p r o b l e m a t i c , we ask such questions as "Are things as
y o u say?" "Why are they t h a t way a n d n o t s o m e o t h e r way?" We reply
to such questions with assertions a n d explanations. If t h e n o r m a t i v e
Tightness of a s p e e c h act or its n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t b e c o m e s p r o b l e m
atic, we ask s u c h q u e s t i o n s as, "Why did you d o that?" "Why d i d n ' t
y o u b e h a v e differently?" To these q u e s t i o n s w e r e s p o n d with justifica
tions. Finally, if in the c o n t e x t of an i n t e r a c t i o n we call i n t o d o u b t an
o t h e r ' s sincerity, we ask q u e s t i o n s such as, "Is he deceiving m e ? " or
"Is she deceiving herself a b o u t herself?" T h e s e questions, however,
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T r u t h a n d Society

are a d d r e s s e d n o t to t h e u n t r u s t w o r t h y p e r s o n himself, b u t r a t h e r to
third parties. A s p e a k e r s u s p e c t e d of b e i n g i n s i n c e r e can at best b e
cross-examined in c o u r t o r may p e r h a p s " b r o u g h t t o his senses" i n
analysis.
These four claims to validity a r e f u n d a m e n t a l in t h a t they c a n n o t
be r e d u c e d to a c o m m o n d e n o m i n a t o r . T h e m e a n i n g of intelligibil
ity, n o r m a t i v e Tightness, a n d sincerity c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d to t h e
m e a n i n g of t r u t h . W e u n d e r s t a n d w h a t t r u t h is w h e n we grasp t h e
m e a n i n g of t h e claims to validity c o n t a i n e d in constative s p e e c h acts:
T h e pragmatics of assertion is t h e key to t h e c o n c e p t of t r u t h ,
whereas t h e a p p e a l of models such as t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e theory,
which are l o c a t e d in a different s p h e r e , namely, t h a t of iconic r e p r e
sentation, is misleading. T r u t h is n o t a r e l a t i o n of r e s e m b l a n c e . T h e
same h o l d s for t h e o t h e r classes of validity claims. T h e intelligibility
of a n u t t e r a n c e is n o t a t r u t h relation. Intelligibility is a validity claim
that signifies t h a t I h a v e mastery of a specific r u l e - c o m p e t e n c e ,
namely, that I k n o w a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e . An u t t e r a n c e is intelligible if
it is grammatically a n d pragmatically well f o r m e d , so that e v e r y o n e
who h a s m a s t e r e d t h e a p p r o p r i a t e r u l e systems is able to g e n e r a t e
the same u t t e r a n c e . T h u s w h a t we call "analytic t r u t h " c o u l d b e u n
derstood as a special case of intelligibility, namely, t h e intelligibility
of s e n t e n c e s in f o r m a l l a n g u a g e s . But intelligibility h a s n o t h i n g to d o
with "truth." T r u t h is a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n s e n t e n c e s a n d t h e reality
a b o u t which we m a k e s t a t e m e n t s . By contrast, intelligibility is an in
ternal relation b e t w e e n symbolic expressions a n d the relevant system
of rules, a c c o r d i n g to which we can p r o d u c e these expressions.
Sincerity is n o m o r e a t r u t h relation t h a n is intelligibility. Sincerity
is a validity claim c o n n e c t e d with s p e e c h acts b e l o n g i n g to t h e class
of representatives. It signifies t h a t I sincerely m e a n t h e i n t e n t i o n s
that I express exacdy as I have e x p r e s s e d t h e m . A s p e a k e r is sincere if
she deceives n e i t h e r herself n o r o t h e r s . J u s t as " t r u t h " refers to t h e
sense in which I can p u t forth a p r o p o s i t i o n , "sincerity" refers to t h e
sense in which I disclose o r manifest in front of o t h e r s a subjective
e x p e r i e n c e to which I have privileged access. As s o o n as we conceive
of sincerity as a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e expression of a n e x p e r i e n c e
a n d a n i n n e r state q u a entity, we have already m i s u n d e r s t o o d it on
analogy with t r u t h . I n acts of self-representation, I assert n o t h i n g
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Lecture V

a b o u t i n n e r episodesI m a k e n o assertions at all; r a t h e r I express

s o m e t h i n g subjective. T h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , which
u n d e r l i e s disclosure theories of truth, is n o less serious. In these theories
(of which H e i d e g g e r ' s is a g o o d e x a m p l e ) t r u t h is conceived o n the
m o d e l of sincerity as manifestation o r u n c o n c e a l m e n t . This concep
t i o n d o e s n o t d o justice to t h e fact t h a t t h e cognitive use of l a n g u a g e
7
refers to reality.
C o m p a r e d to intelligibility a n d sincerity, t h e claim to n o r m a t i v e
Tightness has received g r e a t e r a t t e n t i o n in p h i l o s o p h i c a l discus
sionsalbeit usually u n d e r t h e title of m o r a l t r u t h . Rightness is a va
lidity claim c o n n e c t e d with t h e class of regulatives. It signifies t h a t it
is r i g h t to r e c o g n i z e a prevailing n o r m a n d t h a t this n o r m " o u g h t " to
have validity. This n o r m a t i v e validity has n o t h i n g to d o with t h e valid
ity of t r u t h . T h i s is i n d i c a t e d by t h e fact t h a t n o r m a t i v e sentences
c a n n o t b e d e r i v e d from descriptive s e n t e n c e s . T h e oft-repeated ob
j e c t i o n s to t h e naturalistic fallacy in ethics apply to the difference be
tween r i g h t n e s s a n d t r u t h . As soon as we conceive of r i g h t n e s s as a
r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a c o m m e n d a t i o n o r a d m o n i t i o n a n d a n i n n e r en
tity such as a desire or aversion, we have already m i s u n d e r s t o o d it on
analogy with t r u t h . In acts of motivated choice I no m o r e make asser
tions a b o u t i n n e r episodes t h a n I d o in acts of self-representation.
R a t h e r I d o s o m e t h i n g right or wrong. N e v e r t h e l e s s j t o infer from
this t h a t t h e r e can b e n o t r u t h in practical matters w o u l d equally be
t o m i s c o n s t r u e t h e m e a n i n g of N o r m a t i v e validity} By expressing that
o n e n o r m o u g h t to b e p r e f e r r e d to a n o t h e r , I w a n t precisely to ex
c l u d e t h e e l e m e n t of arbitrariness: N o r m a t i v e rightness coincides
w i t h t r u t h in t h a t b o t h claims c a n b e r e d e e m e d o n l y discursively
t h r o u g h a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d t h e a t t a i n m e n t of r a t i o n a l consensus.
C o n s e n s u s , however, d o e s n o t m e a n t h e s a m e t h i n g in t h e two cases.
T h e c r i t e r i o n o f t h e t r u t h of p r o p o s i t i o n s is t h e possibility of univer
sal assent [Zustimmung] to a n o p i n i o n , w h e r e a s ^ h e c r i t e r i o n of t h e
r i g h t n e s s of a c o m m e n d a t i o n o r a d m o n i t i o n is t h e possibility of uni
81
versal a g r e e m e n t [ Ubereinstimmung] in a n o p i n i o n .

N o t all of t h e claims to validity t h a t we have e l u c i d a t e d by way of

universal pragmatics with r e f e r e n c e to t h e four classes of s p e e c h acts
imply t h a t they can b e r e d e e m e d discursively. T h e c o n s e n s u s t h e o r y
of t r u t h , w h i c h has to rely o n t h e c o n c e p t of a discursively a t t a i n e d
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T r u t h a n d Society

consensus, is r e l e v a n t only for claims to t r u t h a n d to Tightness.

Claims t o sincerity can b e r e d e e m e d only t h r o u g h actions. N e i t h e r
i n t e r r o g a t i o n s n o r analytic conversations b e t w e e n d o c t o r a n d pa
tient m a y be c o n s i d e r e d to b e discourses. T h e case of claims to intel
ligibility is different. If t h e b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s is u p s e t to t h e
p o i n t t h a t ad h o c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are n o l o n g e r a d e q u a t e , it is advis
able t o r e s o r t to h e r m e n e u t i c d i s c o u r s e in which different i n t e r p r e
tations can b e tested a n d t h e o n e t h a t is t a k e n to b e correct c a n b e
justified. H e r e t o o the difference is u n m i s t a k a b l e . Claims t o t r u t h
a n d t o n o r m a t i v e Tightness f u n c t i o n in everyday practice as claims
that are a c c e p t e d in light of t h e possibility t h a t they could b e discur
sively r e d e e m e d if necessary. Intelligibility, by contrast, is a claim t h a t
is in fact r e d e e m e d as l o n g as t h e course of c o m m u n i c a t i o n p r o c e e d s
u n d i s t u r b e d ; it is n o t m e r e l y a n a c c e p t e d p r e m i s e ; c o m m u n i c a t i o n
that is u n i n t e l l i g i b l e breaks d o w n .
T h e c o n s e n s u s theory of t r u t h , to which I n o w r e t u r n h a v i n g dis
tinguished t h e different types of validity claims, picks u p o n t h e fact
that r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g [Verstdndigung] is a n o r m a t i v e
concept. W i t t g e n s t e i n r e m a r k s that the c o n c e p t of r e a c h i n g u n d e r
s t a n d i n g is c o n t a i n e d in t h e c o n c e p t of l a n g u a g e . H e n c e t h e claim
that t h e p u r p o s e of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n is t o r e a c h m u t u a l u n
d e r s t a n d i n g is analytic. Every act of r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g
is c o n f i r m e d by a r a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s ; o t h e r w i s e it is n o t a "real" act of
r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , as we say. C o m p e t e n t speakers k n o w t h a t
any d e facto c o n s e n s u s a t t a i n e d c a n b e illusory; b u t t h e i r basis for t h e
concept of an illusory (or simply forced) c o n s e n s u s is t h e c o n c e p t of
a r a t i o n a l consensus. Thev k n o w t h a t an illusory c o n s e n s u s must b e
r e p l a c e d with a n actual o n e if c o m m u n i c a t i o n is t o lead t o m u t u a l
u n d e r s t a n d i n g . As soon as we start c o m m u n i c a t i n g , we implicidy de
clare o u r desire to reach an u n d e r s t a n d i n g with o n e a n o t h e r a b o u t
s o m e t h i n g . If c o n s e n s u s e v e n a b o u t a difference of o p i n i o n c a n
n o l o n g e r be r e a s o n a b l y expected, c o m m u n i c a t i o n breaks d o w n . Yet,
if r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is n o t a descriptive c o n c e p t , w h a t is t h e
criterion for a r a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s , as o p p o s e d t o a c o n t i n g e n t l y estab
lished c o n s e n s u s t h a t is n o t "sound"? A r a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s , as we
have said, is a t t a i n e d t h r o u g h discourse. What d o we m e a n by
discourse?
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Discourses a r e events with t h e g o a l of justifying cognitive utter

ances. Cognitive e l e m e n t s such as i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , assertions, expla
n a t i o n s , and justifications are n o r m a l c o m p o n e n t s of everyday lived
p r a c t i c e . T h e y fill i n f o r m a t i o n gaps. However, as s o o n as their claims
to validity are explicitly called i n t o question, t h e p r o c u r i n g of further
i n f o r m a t i o n is n o l o n g e r simply a p r o b l e m of d i s s e m i n a t i o n b u t a
p r o b l e m of epistemic gain. I n t h e case of f u n d a m e n t a l prob-
lematizations, equalizing i n f o r m a t i o n deficits is of n o h e l p . Rather,
we ask for c o n v i n c i n g reasons, a n d in discourse, we try to reach a
s h a r e d conviction [ Uberzeugung].
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , assertions, e x p l a n a t i o n s , a n d justifications, whose
claim to validity was initially naively a c c e p t e d a n d t h e n prob
l e m a t i z e d , are t r a n s f o r m e d t h r o u g h discursively a t t a i n e d justifica
tions. Casuistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a r e i n t e g r a t e d i n t o interpretive
contexts^ singular assertions are c o n n e c t e d with t h e o r e t i c a l state
m e n t s , e x p l a n a t i o n s are justified with r e f e r e n c e to n a t u r a l laws or
n o r m s , a n d singular justifications of actions are d e r i v e d from t h e
g e n e r a l justifications of t h e n o r m s u n d e r l y i n g t h e actions. W e en
g a g e in hermeneutic discourse w h e n c o n t e s t i n g t h e validity of h o w to in
t e r p r e t e x p r e s s i o n s within a given linguistic system. W e e n g a g e in
theoretico-emprical discourse w h e n verifying the validity of empirically
m e a n i n g f u l assertions a n d of e x p l a n a t i o n s . We e n g a g e in practical dis
course when a c c o u n t i n g for t h e validity of c o m m e n d a t i o n s (or a d m o
n i t i o n s ) , which refer to t h e a c c e p t a n c e (or rejection) of certain
s t a n d a r d s . If what is a t issue is d e t e r m i n i n g which linguistic system to
select in o r d e r to be able to describe a preliminarily identified p h e
n o m e n o n adequately, to c a p t u r e a n existing p r o b l e m exactly a n d
r e n d e r it m a n a g e a b l e , or even to pick out a k n o w l e d g e - g u i d i n g inter
est, t h e n we have a special case of a practical discourse at t h e
metalevel.
Substantive a r g u m e n t s h a v e t h e p o w e r rationally to motivate the
r e c o g n i t i o n of a validity claim, t h o u g h they c a n n o t force this recogni
tion simply by way of d e d u c t i o n (or by a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a p p e a l to
9
e x p e r i e n c e ) . T h a t is, they c a n n o t d o so analytically (or empirically) .
T h e logic of discourse c a n give a n a c c o u n t of w h a t "rational motiva
t i o n " m e a n s only by c o n t r a s t i n g it with "logical necessity." T h i s expla
n a t i o n will have to appeal in a circular fashion t o t h e characteristic
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T r u t h a n d Society

unforced force of t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t b e t t e r b e c a u s e it is m o r e
convincing. B u t is it t h e n possible to define t h e m e a n i n g of
truthwhich differs f r o m m e r e certainty precisely in its claim to b e
absoluteby r e f e r e n c e to t h e wobbly f o u n d a t i o n of t h e e n d e a v o r t o
reach c o n s e n s u s discursively? H o w a r e we t o distinguish a r a t i o n a l
from a merely c o n t i n g e n t l y established consensus?
Let us r e t u r n t o t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e truth of propositions. Constative
speech acts allow us to claim that p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e t r u e . They e n a b l e
us to draw t h e f u n d a m e n t a l distinction b e t w e e n reality a n d a p p e a r
ance. A c c o r d i n g to the c o n s e n s u s t h e o r y of t r u t h , the c o n d i t i o n for
r e d e e m i n g t h e t r u t h of p r o p o s i t i o n s is t h e p o t e n t i a l assent of all
o t h e r p e r s o n s . Now, as a m a t t e r of fact, t h e r e a r e always only a few
persons against whose assent I can c h e c k my assertion's claim to va
lidity. T h e actual assent t h a t I can possibly o b t a i n f r o m a few o t h e r s is
m o r e likely to b e e n d o r s e d by f u r t h e r j u d g e s , t h e less we a n d o t h e r s
see a n y r e a s o n to d o u b t their c o m p e t e n c e to j u d g e . T h e r e f o r e we
shall restrict t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n t h a t has b e e n i n t r o d u c e d
counterfactually as follows: I m a y assert p if every o t h e r competent
j u d g e w o u l d a g r e e with m e in this assertion. B u t w h a t can c o m p e
tence in j u d g m e n t m e a n in this context?
Kamlah a n d L o r e n z e n have p r o p o s e d t h a t c o m p e t e n t j u d g e s m u s t
be c a p a b l e of p e r f o r m i n g a p p r o p r i a t e verification p r o c e d u r e s . T h e y
m u s t h a v e e x p e r t k n o w l e d g e . But h o w can we d e t e r m i n e w h a t sort of
verification p r o c e d u r e is to c o u n t as a p p r o p r i a t e in a given case a n d
who m a y claim to b e a n expert? T h e s e q u e s t i o n s , t o o , m u s t b e sub
ject to discourse t h e o u t c o m e of which in t u r n d e p e n d s o n a c o n s e n
sus a m o n g t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s . Expertise is n o d o u b t a c o n d i t i o n t h a t
must b e satisfied by a c o m p e t e n t j u d g e . But we c a n n o t specify any in
d e p e n d e n t criteria for w h a t counts as "expertise"; d e c i d i n g o n t h e
choice of these criteria itself d e p e n d s o n t h e o u t c o m e of a discourse.
T h a t is why, if t h e assent of a j u d g e is to b e t h e test of m y o w n j u d g
m e n t , I s h o u l d n o t like to m a k e his c o m p e t e n c e d e p e n d o n his ex
pertise, b u t simply o n w h e t h e r h e is "rational." W e c a n n o t escape this
d i l e m m a even if we a s s u m e t h a t verification p r o c e d u r e s a p p r o p r i a t e
for compelling c o n s e n s u s a b o u t t h e validity of empirically m e a n i n g
ful assertions c o u l d b e derived from t h e universal-pragmatic features
of descriptive l a n g u a g e o r even if we could t e r m "rational" all
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Lecture V

j u d g e s who, for e x a m p l e , a r e capable of m e t h o d i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n a n d

inquiry. For h o w could we ascertain this c o m p e t e n c e with any cer
tainty? It is by n o m e a n s sufficient for s o m e o n e to act as t h o u g h she is
m a k i n g a n o b s e r v a t i o n o r e n g a g i n g in inquirv. W e also e x p e c t h e r to
b e , for lack of a better word, in possession of h e r s e n s e s t h a t is, to
b e a c c o u n t a b l e for h e r actions. S h e m u s t live in t h e public world of a
s p e e c h c o m m u n i t y a n d m u s t n o t b e an "idiot," t h a t is, i n c a p a b l e of
distinguishing b e t w e e n reality a n d a p p e a r a n c e . To be sure, we can
tell w h e t h e r s o m e o n e is i n d e e d rational only if we speak with h e r a n d
c a n c o u n t o n h e r in c o n t e x t s of i n t e r a c t i o n .
I n cases of d o u b t , w h e t h e r a consensus is t r u e o r false m u s t b e de
c i d e d t h r o u g h discourse. B u t t h e o u t c o m e of discourse d e p e n d s in
t u r n o n t h e a t t a i n m e n t of a s o u n d consensus. T h e c o n s e n s u s t h e o r y
of t r u t h makes us aware t h a t it is n o t possible to d e c i d e o n t h e truth
of p r o p o s i t i o n s w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e to the c o m p e t e n c e of possible
j u d g e s . T h i s in t u r n c a n n o t b e d e t e r m i n e d w i t h o u t evaluating the
sincerity of t h e i r u t t e r a n c e s a n d t h e rightness of their actions. T h e
i d e a of t r u e c o n s e n s u s r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s in discourse be
able to d i s t i n g u i s h reliably b e t w e e n reality a n d a p p e a r a n c e , essence
a n d a c c i d e n t , a n d is a n d o u g h t ; for o n l y t h e n c a n t h e y b e c o m p e t e n t
to j u d g e t h e t r u t h of p r o p o s i t i o n s , t h e veracity of u t t e r a n c e s , a n d the
legitimacy of actions. Yet in n o n e of these t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s can we
specify a c r i t e r i o n t h a t w o u l d allow for a n i n d e p e n d e n t assessment of
t h e c o m p e t e n c e of possible j u d g e s o r p a r t i c i p a n t s in deliberation.
R a t h e r , it seems as t h o u g h t h e c o m p e t e n c e to j u d g e itself m u s t be
j u d g e d o n t h e basis of t h e very same k i n d of c o n s e n s u s for whose
0
evaluation criteria a r e to b e found'-,! ,This circle c o u l d b e b r o k e n only
by a n o n t o l o g i c a l t h e o r y of truth, b u t n o n e of t h e s e copy or corre
s p o n d e n c e theories has yet held u p u n d e r scrutiny.
W e r e this t h e case, however, it would be h a r d to u n d e r s t a n d why
we n o n e t h e l e s s a s s u m e in every conversation t h a t we c a n r e a c h a mu
tual u n d e r s t a n d i n g . In fact we are always c o n f i d e n t t h a t we know how
to tell a r a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s from a n illusory o n e . O t h e r w i s e we could
n o t tacitly p r e s u p p o s e t h e sense of s p e e c h t h a t is always already ac
c e p t e d at t h e m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e level a n d w i t h o u t which o r d i n a r y
l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t i o n w o u l d b e m e a n i n g l e s s n a m e l y , its ratio
n a l character. This p h e n o m e n o n r e q u i r e s e x p l a n a t i o n .
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Truth and Society

I would a r g u e t h a t what explains it is t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s in argu

m e n t a t i o n m u t u a l l y presuppose s o m e t h i n g like a n ideal s p e e c h situa
tion. T h e defining feature of t h e ideal s p e e c h situation is t h a t a n y
consensus attainable u n d e r its c o n d i t i o n s can c o u n t p e r se as a ratio
nal consensus. My thesis is t h a t only t h e anticipation [ Vorgriff] of an
ideal speech situation w a r r a n t s a t t a c h i n g to a n y c o n s e n s u s t h a t is in fact
attained t h e claim t h a t it is a r a t i o n a l consensus. A t t h e s a m e time,
this anticipation is a critical s t a n d a r d t h a t can also b e u s e d to call i n t o
question a n y factually a t t a i n e d consensus a n d to e x a m i n e w h e t h e r it
is a sufficient i n d i c a t o r of real m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e c o n s e n s u s
theory of t r u t h is, it seems to m e , s u p e r i o r to all o t h e r t h e o r i e s of
truth. But even it c a n b r e a k o u t of t h e circular m o v e m e n t of argu
m e n t only if we a s s u m e t h a t i n everv discourse we a r e m u t u a l l y re
quired to p r e s u p p o s e a n ideal s p e e c h situation. Obviously this o r a
similar a n t i c i p a t i o n is necessary in o r d e r to avoid m a k i n g t h e discur
sive r e d e m p t i o n of a validity claim d e p e n d o n a c o n t i n g e n t l y at
tained c o n s e n s u s . T h e q u e s t i o n r e m a i n s of w h e t h e r it is possible t o
design [entwerfen] a n ideal s p e e c h situation. If, first of all, all s p e e c h
requires t h a t a t least two subjects r e a c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t
s o m e t h i n g or, if necessary, discursively arrive at m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d
ing a b o u t d i s p u t e d validity claims; if, s e c o n d , m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g
means b r i n g i n g a b o u t a r a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s ; a n d if, t h i r d , a t r u e con
sensus can b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m false o n e only by r e f e r e n c e to a n
ideal s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n t h a t is, t h r o u g h r e c o u r s e t o a n a g r e e m e n t
that is conceived counterfactually as t h o u g h it h a d c o m e a b o u t
u n d e r ideal c o n d i t i o n s t h e n this idealization m u s t involve an antici
pation t h a t we must m a k e every time we w a n t to e n g a g e in a r g u m e n
tation a n d t h a t we a r e also able to m a k e by m e a n s of t h e tools t h a t
every speaker h a s at h e r disposal by v i r t u e of h e r c o m m u n i c a t i v e
competence.

H o w is it possible t o d e s i g n a n ideal s p e e c h situation by m e a n s of

the s p e e c h acts t h a t every c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r k n o w s h o w to p e r
form? I n t e r m s of distinguishing b e t w e e n a t r u e a n d a false c o n s e n
sus, we call a s p e e c h situation ideal if c o m m u n i c a t i o n is i m p e d e d
n e i t h e r by e x t e r n a l c o n t i n g e n t forces nor, m o r e importantiy, by c o n
straints arising from t h e s t r u c t u r e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n itself. T h e ideal
speech situation e x c l u d e s systematic distortion of c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
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Lecture V

O n l y t h e n is t h e sole prevailing force t h e characteristic unforced

force of t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t , which allows assertions to b e methodi
cally verified in a n e x p e r t m a n n e r a n d decisions a b o u t practical is
sues to be rationally motivated.
O n l y if t h e r e is a symmetrical distribution of t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s for
all possible p a r t i c i p a n t s to c h o o s e a n d p e r f o r m s p e e c h acts does the
s t r u c t u r e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n itself p r o d u c e no constraints. N o t only
are d i a l o g u e roles t h e n universally i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e , b u t t h e r e is in
effect also a n equality of o p p o r t u n i t i e s to take on t h e s e roles, t h a t is,
to p e r f o r m s p e e c h acts. F r o m this general a s s u m p t i o n of symmetry
we can derive special r u l e s for each of t h e f o u r classes of s p e e c h acts
t h a t we have i n t r o d u c e d . If all participants in dialogue have t h e same
o p p o r t u n i t y to employ c o m m u n i c a t i v e s , t h a t is, to initiate c o m m u n i
c a t i o n a n d c o n t i n u e it t h r o u g h s p e a k i n g a n d r e s p o n d i n g or asking
q u e s t i o n s a n d giving answers, t h e n equally distributing opportunities
for e m p l o y i n g constatives (as well as t h e subset of regulatives relevant
for c o m m e n d i n g a n d a d m o n i s h i n g ) t h a t is, equally distributing the
o p p o r t u n i t i e s to p u t forth i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , assertions, explanations,
a n d justifications a n d t o establish or refute t h e i r claims to valid
itycan be a way of c r e a t i n g a basis o n which n o p r e j u d i c e or unex
a m i n e d belief will r e m a i n e x e m p t from t h e m a t i z a t i o n a n d critique in
t h e l o n g r u n . T h e s e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s are w h a t ideally g o v e r n the
s p e e c h acts t h a t we e m p l o y in discourses. However, they do n o t fully
specify the c o n d i t i o n s of an ideal s p e e c h situation t h a t e n s u r e s not
only u n r e s t r i c t e d , b u t also n o n h e g e m o n i c discussion solely in virtue
of its situational characteristicsthat is, its s t r u c t u r e . For the pre
vious definitions d o n o t by themselves g u a r a n t e e t h a t interlocutors
n o t merely i m a g i n e themselves to b e e n g a g e d in a discourse while
they a r e in fact t r a p p e d i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n subject to c o e r c i o n . We
m u s t a s s u m e in a d d i t i o n that speakers deceive n e i t h e r themselves
n o r others a b o u t t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s . Interestingly e n o u g h , therefore,
t h e ideal s p e e c h situation r e q u i r e s d e t e r m i n a t i o n s t h a t refer directly
to how c o n t e x t s of i n t e r a c t i o n a r e organized, and only indirectly to
discourses. T h e freeing of discourse from coercive s t r u c t u r e s of ac
tion a n d i n t e r a c t i o n , w h i c h is r e q u i r e d for the ideal s p e e c h situation,
is a p p a r e n t l y conceivable o n l y u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of p u r e c o m m u n i c a
tive action. T h e r e f o r e , t h e two o t h e r special a s s u m p t i o n s refer to
r u l e s g o v e r n i n g s p e e c h acts t h a t we use in i n t e r a c d o n s .
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T h e ideal s p e e c h situation a d m i t s o n l y speakers w h o as actors have

the same o p p o r t u n i t i e s to use representatives. For only a h a r m o n i o u s
reciprocity as to t h e scope of u t t e r a n c e s , w h i c h a r e always individual,
and t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y oscillation b e t w e e n p r o x i m i t y a n d distance
ensure t h a t subjects are t r a n s p a r e n t to themselves a n d o t h e r s in w h a t
they actually d o a n d believe a n d , if necessary, c a n translate t h e i r n o n
verbal expressions i n t o linguistic u t t e r a n c e s . T o this reciprocity of
u n i m p a i r e d self-representation t h e r e c o r r e s p o n d s a c o m p l e m e n t a r y
reciprocity of e x p e c t a t i o n s a b o u t behavior, w h i c h r u l e s o u t privileges
in the sense of n o r m s of action t h a t are only unilaterally b i n d i n g . In
turn, this s y m m e t r y of e n t i t l e m e n t s a n d obligations is g u a r a n t e e d if
interlocutors have equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s to employ regulatives, t h a t is,
if the o p p o r t u n i t i e s to c o m m a n d a n d resist, to allow a n d forbid, t o
make a n d extract p r o m i s e s , a n d to answer for o n e ' s actions a n d d e
m a n d that o t h e r s d o so, a r e equally distributed. T o g e t h e r with t h e
equal o p p o r t u n i t y to use c o m m u n i c a t i v e s , this ensures the possibility
of withdrawing at any time f r o m c o n t e x t s of i n t e r a c t i o n a n d e n t e r i n g
into discourses t h a t t h e m a t i z e claims to validity.
T h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l c o n d i t i o n s of t h e ideal s p e e c h situation can
also b e conceived of as necessary c o n d i t i o n s of an e m a n c i p a t e d f o r m
of life. F o r t o d e t e r m i n e t h e symmetrical d i s t r i b u t i o n of o p p o r t u n i
ties to c h o o s e a n d p e r f o r m s p e e c h acts in terms of (a) p r o p o s i t i o n s
q u a p r o p o s i t i o n s , (b) t h e s p e a k e r ' s r e l a t i o n to his u t t e r a n c e s , a n d
(c) c o m p l i a n c e w i t h n o r m s is to recast in linguistic t e r m s w h a t we
have traditionally s o u g h t to c a p t u r e in t h e ideas of t r u t h , f r e e d o m ,
and justice. T h e s e t e r m s m u t u a l l y i n t e r p r e t o n e a n o t h e r . T a k e n to
gether, they define a f o r m of life t h a t follows t h e m a x i m t h a t all p u b
licly relevant issues a r e to b e d e a l t with by e n t e r i n g into d i s c o u r s e
a n d t h a t in d o i n g so, we m u s t p r e s u p p o s e t h a t if we w e r e to e n g a g e i n
c o m m u n i c a t i o n with this i n t e n t i o n a n d persist l o n g e n o u g h , we
would necessarily arrive at a c o n s e n s u s t h a t would c o u n t as a r a t i o n a l
11
consensus.
T h e idealization o f t h e s p e e c h situation is i n t e r l o c k e d i n a c h a r a c
teristic way with an idealization of t h e action situation. T h e c o n c e p t
of " p u r e c o m m u n i c a t i v e action," which I have i n t r o d u c e d w i t h o u t
justifying it, requires e x p l a n a t i o n .
U p t o n o w we have d i s t i n g u i s h e d b e t w e e n two f o r m s of c o m m u n i
cation (or " s p e e c h " ) : communicative action (interaction) a n d discourse.
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Lecture V

I n c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, t h e validity of u t t e r a n c e s is naively presup

p o s e d in o r d e r to e x c h a n g e i n f o r m a t i o n ( e x p e r i e n c e s related to ac
t i o n ) . I n discourse, validity claims that have b e e n problematized
b e c o m e explicit topics of discussion, b u t n o i n f o r m a t i o n is ex
c h a n g e d . I n discourses we a t t e m p t to reestablish or r e p l a c e an agree
m e n t t h a t h a d existed in c o m m u n i c a t i v e action a n d b e c a m e
p r o b l e m a t i z e d . T h i s is t h e sense in which I spoke of r e a c h i n g a mu
tual u n d e r s t a n d i n g discursively. T h e goal of a r g u m e n t a t i o n is to
w o r k t h r o u g h a situation t h a t arises t h r o u g h t h e p e r s i s t e n t prob-
lematization of validity claims that are naively p r e s u p p o s e d in com
m u n i c a t i v e action. T h i s reflexive f o r m of c o m m u n i c a t i o n leads to a
discursively p r o d u c e d , justified a g r e e m e n t (which of c o u r s e can set
tle o n c e again i n t o a traditionally pregiven, secondarily habitual
12
agreement).
C o m m u n i c a t i v e action takes p l a c e in h a b i t u a l i z e d a n d normatively
m a i n t a i n e d l a n g u a g e g a m e s . T h e y c o m p r i s e expressions [Aus-
serungen] f r o m all t h r e e categories (sentences, expressions [Expres-
sionen], a c t i o n s ) , which are n o t only f o r m e d a c c o r d i n g to rules, but
are also c o n n e c t e d with o n e a n o t h e r a c c o r d i n g to c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y
a n d s u b s t i t u t i o n rules. Discourse, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , r e q u i r e s sus
pending constraints on action. This is m e a n t to b r a c k e t all motives save
t h a t of a c o o p e r a t i v e s e a r c h for t r u t h , a n d to s e p a r a t e q u e s t i o n s of
t h e validity of k n o w l e d g e f r o m q u e s t i o n s of its origins. S e c o n d , dis
c o u r s e r e q u i r e s suspending claims to validity. This is to m a k e us reserve
o u r j u d g m e n t r e g a r d i n g the existence of t h e objects of c o m m u n i c a
tive action ( t h a t is, t h i n g s a n d events, p e o p l e a n d their expressions)
a n d to r e m a i n skeptical with r e g a r d t o states of affairs a n d n o r m s . In
d i s c o u r s e , to use H u s s e r l i a n t e r m s , we b r a c k e t t h e g e n e r a l thesis of
the n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e . T h u s facts t u r n i n t o states of affairs t h a t mav or
may n o t o b t a i n , while n o r m s b e c o m e suggestions t h a t may or m a y not
b e right.
In c o n c l u s i o n , I w a n t to e l u c i d a t e t h e m e a n i n g of n o r m a t i v e valid
ity, w h i c h is a f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e t h e o r y of
society. T h e naive validity of n o r m s of action c o n t a i n s a very
far-reaching claim. T h i s claim is t h e source of t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l
p o w e r that allows prevailing n o r m s to sustain without violence their
i m m u n i t y against c o n t i n u a l violations. Let m e take as my starting
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T r u t h a n d Society

point a p h e n o m e n o n of w h i c h every subject c a p a b l e of a c t i o n has a n

intuitive awareness. If we e n c o u n t e r a n o t h e r as a subject a n d n o t as
an o p p o n e n t , let a l o n e as a n object t h a t we c a n m a n i p u l a t e , we (inev
itably) take h e r to be a c c o u n t a b l e for h e r actions. W e can only inter
act with h e r or, as I h a v e p u t it, e n c o u n t e r h e r a t the level of
intersubjectivity, if we p r e s u p p o s e t h a t u n d e r a p p r o p r i a t e question
ing she c o u l d a c c o u n t for h e r actions. Insofar as we want to relate t o
her as to a subject, we must p r o c e e d on t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e o t h e r
could tell us why in a given situation she b e h a v e d as she d i d a n d n o t
otherwise. T h u s we p e r f o r m a n idealization, a n d o n e t h a t affects us
as well, since we see t h e o t h e r subject with t h e eyes with w h i c h w e
look at ourselves. W e s u p p o s e t h a t t h e o t h e r , w e r e we to ask her, c a n
give us reasons for h e r actions j u s t as we believe t h a t we c a n a c c o u n t
lor o u r own actions if asked by a n o t h e r subject. T h i s intuitive knowl
edge, which in t h e c o u r s e of action conceals from itself the status of
a s u p p o s i t i o n (or a n t i c i p a t i o n ) , can b e b r o k e n d o w n into two
counter factual e x p e c t a t i o n s : (a) W e e x p e c t t h a t actors intentionally
obey the n o r m s t h a t they follow. T h u s we are i n c a p a b l e of i m p u t i n g
13
unconscious motives to t h e o t h e r in t h e c o u r s e of an i n t e r a c t i o n . As
soon as we m a k e such a n i m p u t a t i o n we leave t h e level of inter
subjectivity a n d treat t h e o t h e r as a n object about w h i c h we can c o m
m u n i c a t e with t h i r d p a r t i e s b u t with w h o m c o m m u n i c a t i o n has
b r o k e n down. I n a d d i t i o n , this expectation of intentionality i n c l u d e s t h e
a s s u m p t i o n t h a t all n o n v e r b a l expressions c a n if necessary b e t r a n s
f o r m e d i n t o linguistic u t t e r a n c e s , (b) W e e x p e c t t h a t a c t i n g subjects
obey only t h o s e n o r m s t h a t they t a k e to b e justified. T h u s we a r e in
c a p a b l e in t h e c o u r s e of i n t e r a c t i o n t o e x p e c t t h e o t h e r t o o b e y a
n o r m t h a t she w o u l d n o t also r e c o g n i z e as legitimate (if she is obey
ing it i n t e n t i o n a l l y ) . Even if a subject is obviously only bowing to an
empirically i m p o s e d constraint, we i m p u t e to h e r g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s
a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h she w o u l d justify this behavior, t o o . This expecta
tion of legitimacy also i n c l u d e s t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e only n o r m s (or
general principles) t h a t are c o n s i d e r e d justified in t h e eyes of acting
subjects a r e t h o s e t h a t they are c o n v i n c e d w o u l d h o l d u p if necessary
u n d e r u n r e s t r i c t e d a n d u n c o e r c i v e discussion.

T h e s e two c o u n t e r f a c t u a l e x p e c t a t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e idealiza
tion of reciprocally i m p u t e d accountability, which is inevitable for
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Lecture V

actors, refer to a m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t is in p r i n c i p l e attainable

in practical discourses. T h e m e a n i n g of the claim to validity of n o r m s
of action consists t h e r e f o r e in t h e promise t h a t t h e n o r m - g o v e r n e d
b e h a v i o r of subjects, which is i n fact habitual, c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as
t h e r e s p o n s i b l e action of a c c o u n t a b l e subjects. W e p r e s u p p o s e that
subjects c a n say w h a t n o r m they a r e obeying and why they a c c e p t this
n o r m as justified. I n so d o i n g , we also s u p p o s e that subjects to whom
we c a n discursively d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t they d o n o t m e e t t h e two above
c o n d i t i o n s would a b a n d o n t h e n o r m in q u e s t i o n a n d c h a n g e their
behavior. W e k n o w t h a t institutionalized actions as a r u l e d o n o t cor
r e s p o n d to this model ofpure communicative action, a l t h o u g h we cannot
h e l p b u t always act counterfactually as t h o u g h this m o d e l were real
ized. O n this inevitable fiction rests t h e h u m a n i t y of social inter
c o u r s e a m o n g p e o p l e w h o are still h u m a n , t h a t is, w h o have not
yet b e c o m e completely a l i e n a t e d from themselves in t h e i r self-
objecti fixations.
T h e status o f t h e u n a v o i d a b l e anticipation of a n ideal s p e e c h situa
t i o n (in discourse) a n d of a m o d e l of p u r e c o m m u n i c a t i v e action (in
i n t e r a c t i o n ) , however, r e m a i n s unclear. I w a n t to c o n c l u d e by cau
t i o n i n g against two obvious m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s . T h e c o n d i t i o n s un
der which a r g u m e n t s actually o c c u r are clearly n o t the s a m e as those
of t h e ideal s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n a t least n o t often or usually. Neverthe
less, it is p a r t of t h e s t r u c t u r e of possible s p e e c h t h a t in p e r f o r m i n g
s p e e c h acts ( a n d actions) we act counterfactually as t h o u g h t h e ideal
s p e e c h situation (or t h e m o d e l of p u r e c o m m u n i c a t i v e action) were
n o t m e r e l y fictitious b u t realprecisely this is what we call a presup
position. T h u s the n o r m a t i v e f o u n d a t i o n of linguistic c o m m u n i c a
tion is b o t h a n t i c i p a t e d a n d yet, as an a n t i c i p a t e d basis, operative.
T h e f o r m a l a n t i c i p a t i o n of idealized conversation ( p e r h a p s as a form
of life to b e realized in t h e future?) g u a r a n t e e s t h e "ultimate" u n d e r
lying c o u n t e r f a c t u a l m u t u a l a g r e e m e n t , which d o e s n o t first have to
be c r e a t e d , b u t which m u s t c o n n e c t p o t e n t i a l s p e a k e r - h e a r e r s a pri
ori. Moreover, r e a c h i n g a m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e g a r d i n g this
a g r e e m e n t m u s t n o t be r e q u i r e d if c o m m u n i c a t i o n is to be at all pos
sible. T h u s t h e c o n c e p t of t h e ideal s p e e c h situation is n o t m e r e l y a
regulative p r i n c i p l e in t h e K a n t i a n sense. For with o u r first act of lin
guistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n we m u s t in fact always already be m a k i n g this
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Truth and Society

presupposition. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e c o n c e p t of t h e ideal s p e e c h
situation is n o t a n existing c o n c e p t [existierender Begriff] in t h e H e
gelian sense. F o r t h e r e is n o historical society t h a t c o r r e s p o n d s to t h e
form of life t h a t we a n t i c i p a t e in t h e c o n c e p t of t h e i d e a l s p e e c h situ
ation. T h e ideal situation could best b e c o m p a r e d with a transcen
dental illusion [Schein] w e r e it n o t at t h e s a m e t i m e a constitutive
condition of possible s p e e c h i n s t e a d of a n i m p e r m i s s i b l e p r o j e c t i o n
(as in t h e n o n e m p i r i c a l e m p l o y m e n t of t h e categories of t h e u n d e r
standing) . For every possible c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t h e a n t i c i p a t i o n of t h e
ideal speech situation h a s t h e significance of a constitutive illusion
that is at t h e s a m e t i m e t h e prefiguration [Vorschein] of a f o r m of
14
life. Of c o u r s e , we c a n n o t k n o w a p r i o r i w h e t h e r t h a t p r e f i g u r a t i o n
is a m e r e delusion ( s u b r e p t i o n ) n o m a t t e r h o w u n a v o i d a b l e t h e
presuppositions t h a t give rise to itor w h e t h e r t h e empirical c o n d i
tions of an even a p p r o x i m a t e realization of this s u p p o s e d f o r m of life
can be b r o u g h t a b o u t in p r a c t i c e . From this p o i n t of view the funda
mental n o r m s of possible s p e e c h t h a t a r e built i n t o universal
pragmatics c o n t a i n a practical hypothesis. T h i s hypothesis, which
must first b e d e v e l o p e d a n d justified in a theory of c o m m u n i c a t i v e
c o m p e t e n c e , is the p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e for a critical t h e o r y of society.
Intentions, Conventions, and Linguistic
Interactions (1976)
1
1 Semantic Conventions and Social Conventions

T h e notions of i n t e n t i o n a l a n d n o r m - r e g u l a t e d a c t i o n e x t e n d t h e
concept of r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r in two opposite directions. I n
contrast, t h e n o t i o n of interpretively m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n c o m p r i s e s
b o t h c o n c e p t s of a c t i o n a n d sees t h e i r d e v e l o p m e n t as c o m p l e m e n
tary. I n this essay, I shall discuss two c o n c e p t u a l levels t h a t t r a n s c e n d
rule-governed b e h a v i o r as well as two c o n c e p t s t h a t are differenti
ated accordingly. In d o i n g so, I will show how to systematically incor
p o r a t e c o n c r e t e action, which I h a v e elsewhere d e l i n e a t e d from
r u l e - g o v e r n e d behavior.
O n e m i g h t object t h a t t h e f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t s of i n t e n t i o n a n d
c o n v e n t i o n , let alone t h e c o n c e p t of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , are already im
plicit in t h e c o n c e p t of rule-following. After all, Wittgenstein intro
d u c e d t h e c o n c e p t of a r u l e in o r d e r to conceive of t h e expression of
i n t e n t i o n s as a way of following c o n v e n t i o n s . W e d o not use i n t e n
tional expressions such as "to m e a n " a n d "to u n d e r s t a n d , " "to w a n t "
a n d "to desire," "to h o p e " a n d "to fear" in o r d e r t o r e p o r t private
states or i n t e r n a l events, n o r d o we use t h e m to express o u r subjectiv
ity, to manifest our i n n e r life. Rather, in using t h e s e expressions, we
rely on intersubjective s e m a n t i c c o n v e n t i o n s , w h i c h give o t h e r partic
ipants in interaction t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to test w h e t h e r we a r e k e e p i n g
t o t h e rules of a n established l a n g u a g e g a m e in a given situation or
not. Wittgenstein basically wants to r e d u c e i n t e n t i o n s to an u n d e r
standing of rules, to k n o w i n g h o w to use rules. H e elucidates this u n
d e r s t a n d i n g of rules paradigmatically with t h e h e l p of simple
a r i t h m e t i c c o n s t r u c t i o n s o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of s i n g u l a r p r e d i c a t e s .
.Scan b e h a v e intentionally insofar as she knows f o r m a t i o n r u l e s o r se
mantic conventions.
T h i s yields a semantically a b r i d g e d c o n c e p t of t h e intentionality of
actions. T h e very p o i n t of t h e semantic c o n c e p t of t h e intentionality
of actions derives from t h e fact t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n implicitly e q u a t e s
s e m a n t i c c o n v e n t i o n s with social c o n v e n t i o n s . H e e x p l a i n s t h e m e a n
ing of a r u l e of a r i t h m e t i c o r of p r e d i c a t i o n n o t with r e f e r e n c e to ab
stract rule systems a c c o r d i n g to which we p e r f o r m calculations or
linguistic o p e r a t i o n s , b u t with r e s p e c t to typical c o n t e x t s of use for
such o p e r a t i o n s . H e d o e s n ' t really distinguish b e t w e e n a l a n g u a g e
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I n t e n t i o n s , Conventions, a n d Linguistic Interactions

a n d t h e g r a m m a r of l a n g u a g e g a m e s . M. R o c h e d e v e l o p s t h e thesis
t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n s c a n only t r e a t i n t e n t i o n s , r u l e s , a n d conven
tions as m u t u a l l y e x p l a n a t o r y p r i m i t i v e t e r m s b e c a u s e t h e y t r e a t se
m a n t i c c o n v e n t i o n s a n d social c o n v e n t i o n s as i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e :

C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , t h e s c h o o l o f c o n c e p t u a l analysis h a s s e e n n o t e n s i o n b e
t w e e n i n t e n t i o n a n d c o n v e n t i o n ; a c c o r d i n g t o its view, t h e l a t t e r c o n t a i n s
t h e f o r m e r a n d vice versa. H a m p s h i r e s h a r e s this c o n c e p t i o n w h e n h e
writes: "Each c o n v e n t i o n o r r u l e t h a t I a c c e p t is a n i n t e n t i o n t h a t I i n d i c a t e " ;
a n d " W h e r e t h e r e is l a n g u a g e u s e , t h e r e m u s t b e t h e i n t e n t i o n t o follow a
c o n v e n t i o n o r r u l e . " I n c o n t r a s t , h o w e v e r , t h e r e is t h e possibility t h a t i n t e n
t i o n a l a c t i o n c a n , i n a c e r t a i n s e n s e , b e t h e o p p o s i t e o f c o n v e n t i o n a l action.
W e h a v e d e a l t w i t h this possibility i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e i d e a t h a t society
" c a u s e s " a c t i o n s b y e n f o r c i n g c o n v e n t i o n s . A t issue h e r e is t h e possibility
that, by explaining o u r o w n actions o r those of others i n terms of conven
tions, w e o f t e n t e n d t o a b d i c a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e m a n d s o m e t i m e s e v e n
c o n d e m n t h e m , w h i l e w e t e n d t o take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a n d s o m e t i m e s a p p r o v e
of a c t i o n s b y i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e m i n t e r m s of fulfilled i n t e n t i o n s . . . . A t m i n i
m u m t h i s i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e r e is a c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n t h e c o n c e p t s o f i n t e n t i o n
a n d c o n v e n t i o n i n s o f a r as t h e o n e r e f e r s t o w h a t w e w a n t t o d o a n d t h e
1
o t h e r t o w h a t we d o n o t w a n t t o d o .

A c c o r d i n g t o R o c h e , this c o n f u s i o n arises b e c a u s e p h i l o s o p h e r s of
l a n g u a g e a r e too q u i c k to identify l a n g u a g e with society. C o n c e p t u a l
analysis

n o r m a l l y r i g h t l y a s s u m e s t h a t t h e analysis of c o n c e p t s r e q u i r e s a n analysis of
" l a n g u a g e g a m e s " a n d o f social " f o r m s of life" ( W i t t g e n s t e i n ) o r t h a t t h e
analysis o f s p e e c h acts r e q u i r e s a n analysis of social acts ( A u s t i n ) . H o w e v e r , it
m i s t a k e n l y i n f e r s f r o m this t h a t c o n v e n t i o n s g o v e r n i n g c o m m u n i c a t i o n a r e
p a r a d i g m s o f t h e social c o n v e n t i o n s t h a t s u r r o u n d t h e m a n d t h a t l a n g u a g e
u s e is r e l a t e d t o c o n v e n t i o n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n t h e s a m e w a y as a social
2
a c t i o n is t o social c o n v e n t i o n s .

I r e f e r t o this a r g u m e n t h e r e b e c a u s e it shows t h a t t h e t h e o r y o f ac
tion e x c e e d s t h e capacity of t h e c o n c e p t of rule-following. O n e c a n
m a k e a c o n v i n c i n g a r g u m e n t t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n did n o t h a v e in m i n d
a t h e o r y of action, b u t of m e a n i n g . B u t p h i l o s o p h e r s of l a n g u a g e , es
pecially t h o s e w h o , like W i n c h a n d H a m p s h i r e , h a v e m a d e t h e use
t h e o r y of m e a n i n g t h e basis for a t h e o r y of a c t i o n , fail to see t h a t t h e
c o n c e p t of a r u l e , w h i c h has b e e n d e r i v e d f r o m a n d a n a l y z e d in
t e r m s of e x a m p l e s of g r a m m a t i c a l a n d m a t h e m a t i c a l r u l e s , m a y well
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apply t o o p e r a t i o n s t h a t are p e r f o r m e d along with c o n c r e t e actions,

b u t is too i m p o v e r i s h e d f o r c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g t h e actions themselves.
W i n c h unhesitatingly t r a n s p o s e s t h e c o n c e p t o f rule-following from
t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a n u m e r i c a l series a n d p r e d i c a t i o n to t h e
fulfillment of an i n t e n t i o n to act a n d t h e following of social conven
tions. H e d o e s n o t distinguish between g r a m m a t i c a l o r m a t h e m a t i c a l
rules t h a t d e t e r m i n e t h e m e a n i n g of an intelligible expression a n d
rules t h a t g o v e r n h o w c o n c r e t e actions are p r o d u c e d .
F u r t h e r m o r e , n o t all rules of a c t i o n a r e c o n v e n t i o n s in t h e sense
of validthat is, intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d n o r m s . T h e rules of
i n s t r u m e n t a l action are n o t c o n v e n t i o n a l in this sense, n o r do rules
of strategic a c t i o n p e r se enjoy validity in t h e sense of intersubjective
r e c o g n i t i o n of a n o r m a t i v e claim to validity. In a d d i t i o n , b o t h of
these types of r u l e s r e q u i r e an a t t i t u d e o r i e n t e d to success, n o t to
r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e m o n o l o g i c a l application of
technologies a n d strategies r a t h e r suggests an analysis t h a t p r o c e e d s
from t h e perspective of t h e individual acting subject; t h a t is, it starts
with t h e subject's i n t e n t i o n s . N o r m s , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , are o b e y e d
with an a t t i t u d e t h a t c o n f o r m s to expectations; h e n c e t h e y suggest
a n analysis t h a t p r o c e e d s from r u l e s f o r action a n d derives t h e inten
tions of actors from t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of n o r m s i n t o motives f o r ac
tion. T h e m e d i u m of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n c a n be e x a m i n e d
from either of these analytical perspectives; it is n o t as if, as R o c h e ' s
r e m a r k s w o u l d suggest, l a n g u a g e always r e p r e s e n t s a m e d i u m for t h e
free expression of o n e ' s own i n t e n t i o n s a n d society r e p r e s e n t s a
sphere of externally i m p o s e d n o r m s . A s p e e c h act c a n b o t h signify
that o n e is obeying a n o r m a n d b e used in pursuit of a private inter
est. However, t h e primitive n o t i o n s of i n t e n t i o n a l action a n d of
n o r m - g o v e r n e d a c t i o n d o lead to different, a n d one-sided, c o n c e p t u
alizations of linguistically m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e a d v a n t a g e of
these a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c a p p r o a c h e s over a t h e o r y that m o d e l s behav
ioral rules on s e m a n t i c c o n v e n t i o n s is t h a t they i n t r o d u c e c o n c e p t s
of action t h a t r e n d e r a c t i o n s n o t only intelligible b u t also explicable
e i t h e r by r e f e r e n c e to t h e i n t e n t i o n s of t h e a g e n t or by r e f e r e n c e t o
the validity of a n o r m . T h e o p e r a t i o n a l rules t h a t d e t e r m i n e t h e
m e a n i n g of symbols s t r u c t u r e actions, b u t they c a n n o t b e c o m e m o
tives for acting. T h e y have t h e c h a r a c t e r of s e m a n t i c c o n v e n t i o n s , b u t
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n o t of social c o n v e n t i o n s t h a t give rise to motives in t h e f o r m of obli

gations. W e follow such r u l e s ( m o r e or less) intentionally, b u t t h e in
t e n t i o n s [Intentionen] with which we f o r m g r a m m a t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s
or m a t h e m a t i c a l expressions c a n n o t have t h e motivating force of be
liefs a n d p u r p o s e s [Absichten], desires a n d inclinations, feelings a n d
moods.

2 Intentional Action

It is well k n o w n t h a t B r e n t a n o took u p t h e c o n c e p t of intentionality in

c o n n e c t i o n with discussions of late Scholasticism, in o r d e r to distin
guish psychic o r m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a from observable physical ap
p e a r a n c e s . T h o u g h t s a n d e x p e r i e n c e s are i n t e n t i o n a l in the sense
t h a t t h e y a r e d i r e c t e d in s o m e p a r t i c u l a r way toward objects a n d con
tents. T h e sense in q u e s t i o n is t h a t in w h i c h we direct ourselves to
w a r d s o m e t h i n g we see o r m e a n to pick out, n o t t h e sense in which
we p o i n t a stick at a physical object in o r d e r to p u s h it o u t of t h e way.
T h e i n t e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n of t h o u g h t s and e x p e r i e n c e s to t h e i r object
is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e fact that w h a t they are about is in a way con
t a i n e d in t h e m i t i n h e r e s in t h e m . Husserl r e n d e r e d t h e c o n c e p t of
i n t e n t i o n m o r e precise by defining these i n h e r e n t objects as
n o e m a t i c c o n t e n t s . T h a t is, he defined t h e m as s o m e t h i n g c o n c e p
tual t h a t can b e e x p r e s s e d in linguistic m e a n i n g s . T h i s t u r n e d o u t to
be significant for the s u b s e q u e n t linguistic t u r n of t h e c o n c e p t of
intentionality.
In a n a r r o w e r , teleological sense, i n t e n t i o n [Intention] is u n d e r
stood as t h e i n t e n t [Absicht] of a subject w h o w a n t s to p u r s u e a goal
or realize a n end: S is d i r e c t e d toward or intends a state of affairs she
w a n t s to b r i n g a b o u t . H e r a c t i o n t h e n consists in o r g a n i z i n g t h e
m e a n s a p p r o p r i a t e to b r i n g i n g a b o u t t h e i n t e n d e d state of affairs. I n
this teleological schema for action, we call i n t e n t i o n t h e a c t o r ' s in
tent o r will o r p u r p o s e of realizing a n end. A m o n g an a g e n t ' s i n t e n
tions in a b r o a d e r sense a r e also h e r h o p e s , fears, a n d e x p e c t a t i o n s ,
h e r desires a n d dispositions, e v e n h e r e m o t i o n s : love a n d h a t e , a n g e r
a n d s h a m e , disgust, l o n g i n g , a n d so on. W h a t t h e s e i n t e n t i o n s have
in c o m m o n is t h a t they refer to objects o r states of affairsalthough
they d o so in different ways. T h a t which they are a b o u t in each case
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can b e r e p r e s e n t e d as s o m e t h i n g t h a t is e n c o u n t e r e d or takes place

in t h e world. I n t e n t i o n s are a b o u t s o m e t h i n g in t h e world. We may
want, i n t e n d , strive for, fear, h o p e , l o n g for, or be disgusted with t h e
same p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t , say, t h a t S m a n a g e s to arrive o n time for
the o p e n i n g of t h e n e w b u i l d i n g . T h e i n t e n t i o n s e m b o d i e d in lin
guistic or n o n l i n g u i s t i c expressions c o r r e s p o n d t o p r o p o s i t i o n a l atti
tudes. In a certain sense, p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s must thus already b e
available. Before we c a n w a n t o r l o n g for o r b e disgusted with some
thing, we m u s t have cognitively a p p r o p r i a t e d this " s o m e t h i n g " in
some other way. Expressing i n t e n t i o n s w h e r e b y we assume a p r o p o s i
tional attitude p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t we can refer t o a n objectified w o r l d
of t h i n g s a n d states of affairs. This cognitive r e l a t i o n t o s o m e t h i n g in
t h e world m a k e s available to us t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s t h a t o u r
i n t e n t i o n s , desires, a n d feelings can b e a b o u t w h e n we express o u r
subjectivity.
H e n c e t h e r e is a family r e s e m b l a n c e b e t w e e n the i n t e n t i o n s
w h e r e b y speakers a n d actors express their subjectivity a n d cognitive
acts of perceiving and t h i n k i n g . H a m p s h i r e finds a similarity be
tween i n t e n t i o n s a n d beliefs: "To express an i n t e n t i o n , or to i m p u t e
an i n t e n t i o n to d o s o m e t h i n g is in m a n y ways like e x p r e s s i n g o r im
p u t i n g a belief. . . . Any h u m a n m i n d is t h e locus of u n q u e s t i o n e d
a n d silently f o r m e d i n t e n t i o n s a n d of u n q u e s t i o n e d a n d silentiy
f o r m e d beliefs." Yet this similarity m u s t n o t l e a d to mistaking o n e
t h i n g for a n o t h e r . I n Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l investigations,
p e r c e p t i o n s a n d j u d g m e n t s a r e p a r a d i g m a t i c for i n t e n t i o n a l acts in
g e n e r a l . In t h e linguistic analyses of C a r n a p , C h i s h o l m , Sellars,
Hintikka, a n d o t h e r s , expressions of k n o w l e d g e a n d belief p r o v i d e
m o d e l s for u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n t e n t i o n a l expressions. T h u s C h i s h o l m ' s
n o w classic investigation o f i n t e n t i o n a l l a n g u a g e u s e begins with a n
analysis of belief-sentences.
T h e r e is, however, a n i m p o r t a n t difference b e t w e e n a referential
relation to a n object a b o u t w h i c h S wants to m a k e a s t a t e m e n t
(intentionalityi) a n d t h e expressive r e l a t i o n to a p r o p o s i t i o n a l con
t e n t w h e r e b y 5 assumes an a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s o m e t h i n g (intention
ality,) . Intentionality_ is d e t e r m i n e d by t h e fact t h a t S places herself
in a cognitive r e l a t i o n to t h e objectified world a n d in d o i n g so ori
ents herself toward t h e validity claim to t r u t h . I n contrast, w h a t is
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characteristic of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y is t h a t 5 takes a stance toward a prop

2

ositional c o n t e n t in such a way t h a t she expresses h e r subjectivity in

d o i n g so. She p u t s herself in a n o n c o g n i t i v e relation to a merely pre
s u p p o s e d w o r l d w i t h o u t o r i e n t i n g herself t o any claim to t r u t h . As
s u m i n g a n a t t i t u d e t o w a r d a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t to express oneself
does of c o u r s e p r e s u p p o s e t h a t S could f o r m u l a t e a p r o p o s i t i o n
a b o u t this s o m e t h i n g in t h e world a n d t h a t she c a n r e f e r to t h e con
t e n t of this p r o p o s i t i o n w i t h o u t o r i e n t i n g herself to its t r u t h claim.
E x a m i n i n g belief-sentences is admittedly revealing for neutralizing
t h e t r u t h claim of a p r o p o s i t i o n p a n d for s e p a r a t i n g t h e proposi
tional c o n t e n t "that p" from t h e assertoric force of a given statement.
If s e n t e n c e s such as

(1) (I h e r e b y assert:) 11 is g o i n g to rain.

(T) I k n o w (see, believe) t h a t it is g o i n g to rain.

are u t t e r e d by t h e s a m e s p e a k e r in t h e s a m e situation, we can treat

t h e m as equivalent. However,

(1') I k n o w t h a t it is going t o rain.

and

(1") H e k n o w s t h a t it is g o i n g to rain.

are n o t equivalent. Insofar as t h e cognitive act of k n o w i n g o r perceiv

i n g e x p r e s s e d in the first p e r s o n can b e seen as e q u i v a l e n t to a corre
s p o n d i n g constative speech act, it reveals t h e o r i e n t a t i o n to a claim
to t r u t h t h a t t h e speaker raises r e g a r d i n g a p r o p o s i t i o n . T h e
intentionality! of h e r a t t i t u d e to s o m e t h i n g in t h e world, which is ori
e n t e d to t r u t h , as such b e c o m e s a n e l e m e n t of a f u r t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n
as soon as t h e i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e in t h e first p e r s o n is t r a n s f o r m e d
i n t o a c o r r e s p o n d i n g s e n t e n c e in t h e third p e r s o n . I n s e n t e n c e (1"),
t h e c o n t e n t of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n expressed in (1') b e c o m e s n e u t r a l
with r e s p e c t to any t r u t h claim. I n (1") the s p e a k e r only raises a t r u t h
claim r e g a r d i n g t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t 5 claims t o k n o w t h a t it will
r a i n , b u t n o t (as in [1']) r e g a r d i n g t h e p r o p o s i t i o n that it will rain. In
(1") t h e u t t e r a n c e m a d e in (1) "It is g o i n g to r a i n " is t r a n s f o r m e d
i n t o t h e n o m i n a l i z e d p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t " t h a t it is g o i n g to rain."
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W e can r e a d off f r o m t h i r d - p e r s o n belief-sentences h o w S refers to

p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s , t h a t is, h o w she fulfills a necessary c o n d i t i o n
for placing h e r subjectivity in relation to p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s .
Only this r e l a t i o n can b e t e r m e d i n t e n t i o n a l in a n a r r o w e r sense.
A n d this i n t e n t i o n a l i t y c a n b e read off from t h e a t t i t u d e with which
2

S expresses herself, t h a t is, h e r i n t e n t i o n s , desires, inclinations, feel

ings, a n d so o n by r e f e r r i n g to p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s . I n o t h e r
words, she i n t e r p r e t s h e r subjectivity in a s s u m i n g a p r o p o s i t i o n a l atti
t u d e toward c o n t e n t s . T h u s , S's i m m e d i a t e o r i e n t a t i o n is n o l o n g e r
toward claims to t r u t h b u t r a t h e r toward sincerity: "intentions are
s o m e t h i n g that may be c o n c e a l e d o r disguised."
After this p r e l i m i n a r y a c c o u n t o f t h e c o n c e p t o f intentionality, I
would like to address t h e teleological s c h e m a for a c d o n . W e call
goal-directed b e h a v i o r i n t e n t i o n a l if a n actor wants to b r i n g a b o u t a
certain state of affairs in t h e world by m e a n s of it. In a b r o a d e r sense,
however, we c a n i n c l u d e a m o n g t h e i n t e n t i o n s of a n a g e n t n o t only
goals, b u t also desires a n d e m o t i o n s . In d e s c r i b i n g b e h a v i o r as inten
tional, we refer to t h e i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s of t h e agent. An inten
t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e is t h e subjective t a k i n g of a stance toward a
p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t "that p," which is e x p r e s s e d in words o r ac
tions. By ascribing an i n t e n t i o n to a n agent, we p r e s u p p o s e that:

(i) p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s are available to t h e a g e n t , i.e., t h a t h e

h a s a d e t e r m i n a t e cognitive r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a reality t h a t , f o r h i m ,
is objectively given;

(ii) t h e a g e n t takes a stance toward t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s

whereby h e places his subjectivity in a p a r t i c u l a r n o n c o g n i t i v e rela
tion t o reality.

By d e s c r i b i n g a b e h a v i o r as an i n t e n t i o n a l action, we take t h e per

spective of t h e actor himself; b u t this a g e n t ' s p o i n t of view signifies a
two-tiered i n t e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n to s o m e t h i n g in t h e world, namely,
the relation to t h e cognitive r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of reality t h a t is valid for
the agent a n d to t h e subjective a t t i t u d e t h a t t h e a g e n t takes t o w a r d
this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of reality.
T h e two-tiered n a t u r e of t h e i n t e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n to s o m e t h i n g in
the world is implicit in t h e l a n g u a g e we use to describe a b e h a v i o r as
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an i n t e n t i o n a l action. It h a s n o ontological significance. B r e n t a n o

w a n t e d to use t h e c o n c e p t of intentionality to d e l i m i t t h e ontological
d o m a i n s of t h e psychological a n d t h e physical. Yet t h e choice of ac
t i o n - t h e o r e t i c c o n c e p t s implies t h e d e l i m i t a t i o n of object d o m a i n s at
t h e level of m e t h o d o l o g y .
T h e linguistic t u r n in discussions of intentionality is characterized
by t h e idea t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s m u s t a d m i t of symbolic ex
pression. T h i s m e a n s that S c a n n o t , strictly speaking, act i n t e n t i o n
ally u n l e s s she is able to express h e r i n t e n t i o n in t h e right
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . She m u s t have a m a s t e r y of an i n t e n t i o n a l i d i o m
in w h i c h she c o u l d describe h e r situation from h e r e n g a g e d
perspective.
This thesis arises from t h e logic of e x p l a n a t i o n o n which we rely at
least implicitly in d e s c r i b i n g b e h a v i o r as i n t e n t i o n a l action. W e ex
plain an i n t e n t i o n a l action by citing the i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e of
the a g e n t as a motive, as a p u r p o s e or i n t e n t i o n , a t e n d e n c y or dispo
sition to r e a c t to s o m e t h i n g in a certain way, a feeling or affective per
c e p t i o n of s o m e t h i n g , a m o o d , a sensory stimulation, a n d so o n .
T h e s e i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s ( i n t e n t i o n s , n e e d s , feelings) c a n n o t
b e identified i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e i r p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s . T h i s
m e a n s t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s d o n o t c o r r e s p o n d to t h e logical
type of events t h a t c a n b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e action
they cause. T h i s relation b e t w e e n an i n t e n t i o n a n d t h e action ex
p r e s s i n g it is n o t c o n t i n g e n t a n d is p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h the a g e n t ' s in
t e r p r e t a t i o n of his situation. In u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e a g e n t ' s i n t e n t i o n
as t h e motive or cause of a c o r r e s p o n d i n g action, we treat his inter
p r e t a t i o n of his s i t u a t i o n as constitutive of t h e b e h a v i o r u n d e r an in
t e n t i o n a l description. We t h e r e b y p r e s u p p o s e t h a t t h e a g e n t himself
h a s at his disposal a n i n t e n t i o n a l i d i o m in which h e c a n describe his
situation a n d f o r m u l a t e his i n t e n t i o n s explicitly (given t h e r i g h t cir
c u m s t a n c e s ) . Insofar as we a r e following t h e e x p l a n a t o r y logic f o r in
t e n t i o n a l action, we p r e s u p p o s e t h a t t h e a g e n t h a s a m a s t e r y of a n
i n t e n t i o n a l i d i o m . I shall r e t u r n to this c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n
intentionality a n d language.
First, however, I w o u l d like to address t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r a n d
in w h a t sense i n t e n t i o n s m a y b e s e e n as causes of actions. Late
W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n s such as Peters, M e l d e n , a n d W i n c h have derived a
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Intentions, Conventions, a n d Linguistic Interactions

k i n d of d u a l i s m f r o m t h e fact t h a t actions a n d t h e i n t e n t i o n s they ex

press are necessarily, t h a t is, internally related. A c c o r d i n g to this du
alism, causal e x p l a n a t i o n is i n a d e q u a t e to a c c o u n t for i n t e n t i o n a l
actions. C h a r l e s Taylor h a s p r e s e n t e d a f u n d a m e n t a l critique of this
thesis. H e starts from a teleological m o d e l of a c d o n :

End: S wants to b r i n g a b o u t state of affairs A;

Means: S knows t h a t A will n o t o c c u r in t h e given situation unless

a c t i o n p is p e r f o r m e d ;

C h o i c e of Means: Situation x is t h e case; h e n c e 5 u n d e r t a k e s

action p.

F o r e x a m p l e , S wants to b e c o m e t h e n e x t h e a d of g o v e r n m e n t . S h e
knows t h a t a traditional ministerial portfolio is a g o o d p o s i t i o n f r o m
which t o c o m p e t e against o t h e r c a n d i d a t e s . T h e r e f o r e , s h e seeks to
obtain such a portfolio d u r i n g t h e n e x t c a b i n e t shuffle. A practical
syllogism of this sort c a n b e a r e a s o n for S's choice of action p as a n
i n s t r u m e n t a l m e a n s . Of c o u r s e this reason can t a k e o n the r o l e of a
cause only o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t S takes it to b e a motive for action.
5 m u s t have t h e goal or i n t e n t i o n o r willingness to b r i n g a b o u t A. If 5
has set herself a certain goal, t h e n t h e i n t e n t i o n to attain this goal
can causally explain a c o r r e s p o n d i n g action. F o r t h e r e f e r e n c e to an
intention indicates why S acts t h u s a n d n o t o t h e r w i s e . T h e act of set
ting a goal plays t h e s a m e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l role for i n t e n t i o n a l action
as a physical cause plays f o r a c o r r e s p o n d i n g event. T h u s o n e m i g h t
try to m a k e S d o a certain action by g e t t i n g h e r to h a v e a c o r r e s p o n d
ing i n t e n t i o n . T h i s can b e d o n e by m e a n s of a r g u m e n t , p e r s u a s i o n ,
or by c h a n g i n g t h e situation. Moreover, k n o w i n g an i n t e n t i o n c a n b e
u s e d t o p r e d i c t future actions j u s t as k n o w i n g t h e physical c a u s e c a n
be u s e d t o p r e d i c t future events.
T h e teleological m o d e l allows e n d s to be viewed as causes of a c d o n
if we m a y p r e s u p p o s e t h a t S acts with t h e goal of b r i n g i n g a b o u t t h e
state of affairs in question. Setting this goal is a n i n t e n t i o n w h e r e b y 5
assumes an a t t i t u d e toward a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t in such a w a y t h a t
t h e state of affairs e x p r e s s e d by t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t is rec
o g n i z e d as a possible state of t h e world t h a t can o b t a i n u n d e r spe
cific c o n d i t i o n s a n d t h a t c a n b e b r o u g h t a b o u t by effecting these
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Intentions, Conventions, a n d Linguistic Interactions

c o n d i t i o n s . P h e n o m e n a such as i n t e n d i n g , desiring, o r willing to d o

s o m e t h i n g , however, are themselves in n e e d of e x p l a n a t i o n . T h e te
leological a c c o u n t in terms of e n d s t h a t p r e s u p p o s e s c o r r e s p o n d i n g
i n t e n t i o n s is b u t t h e first step in a n e x p l a n a t i o n of motivation. Taylor
analyzes two f u r t h e r steps: an a c c o u n t in terms of desires a n d disposi
tions a n d a n e x p l a n a t i o n in t e r m s of e m o t i o n s , t h a t is, of feelings
3
and moods.
An e x p l a n a t i o n o f S's i n t e n t i o n t o b e c o m e h e a d o f g o v e r n m e n t
m i g h t b e s o u g h t in t h e g e n e r a l disposition to seek r e c o g n i t i o n , o r in
t h e c o n c r e t e desire finally t o o u t d o a friend w h o h a s always b e e n
a h e a d of S, t h a t is, in a m b i t i o n or envy. O n e m i g h t e x p l a i n t h e fact
t h a t 5 m a d e h e r decision at a time w h e n n o o n e e x p e c t e d h e r to d o
so in terms of strong e m o t i o n a l motives: t h e a n g e r at a h u m i l i a t i o n 5
suffered at t h e h a n d s of a rival, a p e c u l i a r e u p h o r i c m o o d S has b e e n
in ever since s h e successfully u n d e r w e n t surgery, a n d so o n . In any
case, we fall b a c k on n e e d s a n d wants, t h a t is, on motives t h a t lie
d e e p e r t h a n i n t e n t i o n s or decisions. N e e d s are Janus-faced: T h e y are
differentiated o n o n e h a n d into dispositions a n d desires (the voli
tional perspective) a n d i n t o feelings a n d m o o d s o n t h e o t h e r (the
p e r c e p t u a l p e r s p e c t i v e ) . Dispositions a n d desires a r e o r i e n t e d to
w a r d situations of w a n t satisfaction; feelings a n d m o o d s perceive
objecs in t h e light of our wants. O u r Bedurfnisnatur is the b a c k g r o u n d
of a partiality t h a t steers subjects to take a stance t o w a r d reality, to
w a r d t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s t h a t are cognitively available to
t h e m . T h i s partiality guides b o t h h o w we actively i n f l u e n c e a n d h o w
we affectively perceive situations t h a t are t h e m a t i z e d as c o m p o n e n t s
of our lifeworld r a t h e r than as a n objectified S o m e t h i n g in the world.
Desires a n d w a n t s dispose o n e to choose goals of action; feelings a n d
m o o d s evaluate situations a n d o p e n u p perspectives o n possible
goals of action. Desires a n d wants p r e s u p p o s e t h e evaluation of desir
able o r u n d e s i r a b l e states of affairs, w h e r e a s e m o t i o n s a n d m o o d s
have a dispositional e l e m e n t .

T h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n dispositions a n d e m o t i o n s b e c o m e s
clearer if we conceive of b o t h as interpretations of underlying wants and
needs. N e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s involve b o t h feelings a n d desires. F o r de
sires are i n t e r p r e t e d indirectly, o n t h e o n e h a n d by m e a n s of action
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p r e f e r e n c e s o r ends, a n d o n t h e o t h e r h a n d by m e a n s of affectively
l o a d e d categories a n d situations, t h a t is, by m e a n s of values. E n d s a n d
values are m u t u a l l y i n t e r p r e t i n g . To specify what expressions such as
"beautiful," "terrible," "happy," or " h o r r i b l e " m e a n in a given con
text, we can refer to individual objects o r situations t h a t a r e plausible
as possible goals of action. T o r e n d e r plausible t h e choice of particu
lar ends, we can in t u r n a p p e a l to a c c e p t e d values. T h i s m u t u a l inter
p r e t a t i o n of e n d s against t h e b a c k g r o u n d of values a n d of values by
m e a n s of ends can b e informative b e c a u s e e n d s t e n d to c h a r a c t e r i z e
particular states of affairs w h e r e a s c u l t u r a l values t e n d to express
s o m e t h i n g universal. Moreover, t h e descriptive c o m p o n e n t is m o r e
p r o n o u n c e d in ends, a n d t h e evaluative m o r e in values. I shall r e t u r n
below to this d u a l descriptive-evaluative c o n t e n t of expressions inter
p r e t i n g n e e d s a n d wants.
But first I w a n t to show h o w t h e c o n c e p t of i n t e n t i o n a l action char
acterizes motives as "final" causes. W i t h i n this f r a m e w o r k it is n o t
possible t o treat motives (i.e., feelings a n d desires) themselves o r t h e
needs they i n t e r p r e t as p h e n o m e n a r e q u i r i n g e x p l a n a d o n . T h e ex
p l a n a t i o n of i n t e n t i o n a l action m a y b e r e d u c i b l e via ends a n d inten
tions to desires a n d dispositions a n d , ultimately, to feelings a n d
m o o d s . Yet t h e c h a i n of e x p l a n a t i o n e n d s with motives, h o w e v e r
"deeply" r o o t e d they may be. As long as we a r e describing b e h a v i o r as
i n t e n t i o n a l action, motives a r e basic. As s o o n as we u n d e r s t a n d the
n e e d s of individuals in t u r n as t h e result of a p r o c e s s of i n t e r p r e t a
tion, we d i s r u p t the m o n o l o g i c a l m o d e l of a c t i o n of a subject ex
pressing i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s . It is n a t u r a l to s u p p o s e t h a t n e e d
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s d e p e n d o n cultural values a n d o n n o r m s t h a t e m
b o d y such values. However, we c a n n o t r e d u c e an a g e n t ' s i n t e n t i o n s
t o t h e social reality of n o r m s a n d values by way of t h e process of m o
tive f o r m a t i o n w i t h o u t a b a n d o n i n g t h e c o n c e p t of i n t e n t i o n a l ac
tion. T h u s e x p r e s s i o n s of monologically m i n d e d subjects acting
intentionally are r e p l a c e d with i n t e r a c t i o n g o v e r n e d by i n t e r s u b
jectively r e c o g n i z e d n o r m s a n d v a l u e s a m o n g subjects acting so as
to c o n f o r m to e x p e c t a t i o n s . T h i s p r e s u p p o s e s a causal c o n n e c t i o n
b e t w e e n cultural traditions a n d n e e d s , a n d b e t w e e n institutionalized
values a n d dispositions. T h i s empirical c o n n e c t i o n , however, fails t o
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Intentions, Conventions, and Linguistic Interactions

c a p t u r e t h e i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n between reasons a n d motives, which

is t h e only admissible c o n n e c t i o n in t h e c o n t e x t of i n t e n t i o n a l action
m o r e narrowly c o n s t r u e d .

3 Fulfilling N o r m s

T h e specific c o n c e p t of n o r m - g o v e r n e d o r value-oriented action de

v e l o p e d by Parsons, which has b e c o m e de r i g u e u r i n sociology,
c o u n t s o n a s p h e r e of linguistic intersubjectivity t h a t is i n d e p e n d e n t
f r o m t h e subjectivity of an e x p e r i e n c i n g subject. Not only matters of
t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e , b u t also values a n d n o r m s a r e "shared" in this
s p h e r e . T h i s s h a r i n g or "having in c o m m o n " is m a d e possible
t h r o u g h c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t h a t is, t h r o u g h m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g that
is r e a c h e d on t h e basis of validity claims that are r e c o g n i z e d by sub
j e c t s c a p a b l e of s p e e c h a n d action. T h e c o n c e p t of i n t e n t i o n a l action
already p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t cognitive acts m a k e r e f e r e n c e to t r u t h ; a n d
t h e teleological m o d e l of action counts o n t h e r e being a n acting sub
j e c t that can be motivated by reasons or practical syllogisms. Yet
within t h e f r a m e w o r k of t h e c o n c e p t of intentionality, t r u t h is n o t
u n d e r s t o o d as a validity claim t h a t g r o u n d s intersubjectivity. T h e
claim to t r u t h c a n b e r e i n t e r p r e t e d monologically so as to fit i n t o t h e
c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k of t h e subjective m i n d . T h e c o n c e p t of
v a l u e - o r i e n t e d action, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n t r o d u c e s a s e c o n d valid
ity claim. It p r e s u p p o s e s t h e n o r m a t i v e validity of values a n d r u l e s of
action. A n d this validity claim c a n n o t be i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h o u t refer
e n c e to intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n a m o n o l o g i c a l r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
in this i n s t a n c e is all b u t impossible.
As I c a n n o t yet at this p o i n t u n d e r t a k e t h e task of a systematic ex
plication of the m e a n i n g of validity claims, I shall p r o c e e d byway of a
critique of t h e basic p r i n c i p l e s u n d e r l y i n g empiricist ethics. Ethics
deals with t h e s a m e q u e s t i o n s f r o m t h e n o r m a t i v e perspective of j u s
tifying actions as t h e t h e o r y of action does f r o m t h e perspective of
e x p l a i n i n g t h e m . T h e question, "Why s h o u l d S i n situation x perfor
in a c t i o n a r a t h e r t h a n any of a ,
x 2 . . . o r a?" calls for giving (at
least) o n e r e a s o n . Similarly, it is possible to answer t h e q u e s t i o n "Why
d i d Sin situation xperform action a (rather t h a n a?, 03, . . . o r a,,)?"
x

with a n e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t cites a r e a s o n as motive. Ethics deals with a

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specific class of actions, namely, t h o s e whose choice c a n be evaluated

as morally good o r c o r r e c t . T h e explication of r e a s o n s for morally
relevant actions m u s t t h e r e f o r e t a k e a c c o u n t of t h e sense of ought im
plicit in this way of asking t h e q u e s t i o n . Every ethics is faced with t h e
task of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e n o n d e s c r i p t i v e c o n t e n t of o u r n o t i o n s of
values a n d n o r m s . A n empiricist ethics, which is c o m m i t t e d to t h e te
leological m o d e l of a c t i o n a n d h e n c e to a subjectivist r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
of i n t e n t i o n a l action, faces t h e special difficulty of r e d u c i n g valua
tions, which by its own lights are far from m e r e l y subjective, to w h a t
a r e u l t i m a t e l y private n e e d s . E m p i r i c i s m bases t h e justification of
morally relevant actions o n t h e wants a n d n e e d s of a n actor w h o is
herself t h e final j u d g e of w h a t h e r wants a n d n e e d s a r e :

By a n e m p i r i c i s t p o s i t i o n I m e a n t h e i d e a t h a t t h e u l t i m a t e g r o u n d s o f o n e ' s
factual beliefs a b o u t t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d a r e p r o p o s i t i o n s a b o u t w h a t o n e di
rectly p e r c e i v e s . T h e p a r a l l e l s b e t w e e n s u c h a p o s i t i o n a n d t h e a c c o u n t s of
r e a s o n s - f o r - a c t i n g are: first, t h e i d e a t h a t i n a n y c h a i n of r e a s o n s t h e r e m u s t
'ays b e a p o i n t at w h i c h o n e h a s t o s t o p , i.e., t h e r e a r e always u l t i m a t e r e a
s o n s ; s e c o n d , t h e i d e a t h a t t h e s e u l t i m a t e r e a s o n s m u s t all s h a r e s o m e c o m
m o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c (s); t h i r d , t h e i d e a t h a t t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s p o s s e s s e d b y
the ultimate reasons must be such that they c a n n o t be questioned further,
a n d t h e r e f o r e n o f u r t h e r r e a s o n s a r e n e e d e d , i.e., t h e u l t i m a t e r e a s o n s m u s t
be such that they can constitute "foundations"; a n d fourth, t h e idea that
s u c h r e a s o n s a r e p r o v i d e d by first-person p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t a t e m e n t s , s i n c e
4
these c a n n o t be questioned further a n d c a n n o t b e d o u b t e d .

R i c h a r d N o r m a n shows t h a t n e i t h e r t h e emotivist r e c o u r s e to
b r u t e attitudes, wants, o r feelings n o r t h e decisionist r e c o u r s e to ulti
m a t e decisions suffices for justifying a morally r e l e v a n t action. O n l y
such reasons a r e a c c e p t a b l e as m a k e clear w h y t h e a g e n t in a given
situation has precisely this feeling or t h a t disposition, o r why she has
t h e i n t e n t i o n to a c c o m p l i s h precisely this goal. T h e m e r e assertion
t h a t S in a given s i t u a t i o n has certain i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s lacks
a n y practical justificatory force so l o n g is it is n o t plausible t h a t p e o
ple o t h e r t h a n S in such situations also have e x p e r i e n c e s of this sort
t h a t motivate t h e i r a c t i o n s in this way. A w a n t is o n l y a n intelligible m o
tive if it is i n t e r p r e t e d so t h a t it m a k e s sense to o t h e r s :

T o w a n t simply a s a u c e r o f m u d is i r r a t i o n a l , b e c a u s e s o m e f u r t h e r r e a s o n is
n e e d e d f o r w a n t i n g it. T o w a n t a s a u c e r of m u d b e c a u s e o n e w a n t s t o e n j o y
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I n t e n t i o n s , C o n v e n t i o n s , a n d Linguistic Interactions

its r i c h river-smell is r a t i o n a l . N o f u r t h e r r e a s o n is n e e d e d f o r w a n t i n g to en
j o y t h e r i c h river-smell, f o r t o c h a r a c t e r i z e w h a t is w a n t e d as "to enjoy t h e
r i c h river-smell" is itself to g i v e a n a c c e p t a b l e r e a s o n f o r w a n t i n g it, a n d
5
t h e r e f o r e t h i s w a n t is r a t i o n a l .

T h e r e f e r e n c e t o t h e "rich river-smell" i n t e r p r e t s a s o m e w h a t pecu

liar want. If t h e d e s i r e for a h a n d f u l of m u d does n o t m a k e sense un
d e r this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d c o n t i n u e s to s e e m like s o m e t h i n g private,
i n s c r u t a b l e , a n d idiosyncratic, t h e n we will take the actions or fanta
sies motivated by this desire to be a b n o r m a l and may p e r h a p s look
for p a t h o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n s . Against t h e b a c k g r o u n d of this exam
ple, t h e specific a c h i e v e m e n t of evaluative expressions by which we
i n t e r p r e t n e e d s a n d wants stands out. I n c h a r a c t e r i z i n g a n object or a
situation as rich, p u n g e n t , stimulating, terrific, uplifting, successful,
happy, d a n g e r o u s , f o r b i d d i n g , terrifying, revolting, a n d so o n , we are
trying to m a k e sense of a c e r t a i n a t t i t u d e to this object or situation by
a p p e a l i n g to universal s t a n d a r d s of evaluation. To the e x t e n t that
these s t a n d a r d s of evaluation, or values, for short, are r e c o g n i z e d by
o t h e r s , and to the e x t e n t t h a t t h e n e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are s h a r e d by
o t h e r s , we can justify the c o r r e s p o n d i n g desires or feelings, and the
actions they motivate, with s u c h n e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . Evaluative ex
pressions have justificatory p o w e r if and to the e x t e n t t h a t they can
c h a r a c t e r i z e a w a n t such that o t h e r s r e c o g n i z e their own wants u n d e r
this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . A w a n t will b e a c c e p t a b l e as a r e a s o n for an ac
tion insofar as t h e cultural values to which we a p p e a l in i n t e r p r e t i n g
the want are recognized.
N o r m a n gives t h e following e x a m p l e :

A p r o p o s e d r o a d s c h e m e m i g h t b e very m u c h to a particular individual's

o w n d i s a d v a n t a g e , i n v o l v i n g t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e w h o l e o f h i s f r o n t gar
d e n , t h u s d e p r i v i n g h i m of d i e o p p o r t u n i t y t o e n g a g e i n his favorite h o b b y
of g a r d e n i n g , d e s t r o y i n g his b e a u t i f u l rose b e d s , r u i n i n g t h e w h o l e a p p e a r
a n c e of the f r o n t of the h o u s e , a n d b r i n g i n g the n o i s e a n d the f u m e s of t h e
traffic r i g h t u p t o his f r o n t d o o r s t e p . B u t if asked f o r his a s s e s s m e n t of t h e
m e r i t s of t h e s c h e m e , h e m i g h t n e v e r t h e l e s s say t h a t h e t h o u g h t it was t h e
b e s t p o s s i b l e o n e i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , since it w o u l d e n a b l e p e o p l e t o
travel m o r e easily a n d i n g r e a t e r c o m f o r t , c u t d o w n t h e n u m b e r o f acci
d e n t s , a n d c a u s e t h e least o v e r a l l i n c o n v e n i e c e . . . . T h i s , h o w e v e r , is n o t
w h a t I h a v e b e e n r e f e r r i n g t o i n e m p h a s i z i n g t h e n e c e s s a r y p u b l i c i t y of s t a n
d a r d s . I n m y s e n s e , t h e m a n is e m p l o y i n g p u b l i c s t a n d a r d s j u s t as m u c h
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Intentions, Conventions, a n d Linguistic Interactions

w h e n h e a d o p t s t h e f o r m e r o f t h e two p o i n t s of view. T h i s c a n b e s e e n f r o m
t h e k i n d of v o c a b u l a r y h e m i g h t u s e . I n s o f a r as h e r e f e r s t o t h e n o t i o n o f
" p e a c e a n d q u i e t , " d i s t u r b a n c e c a u s e d b y n o i s e , t h e c h o k i n g s t e n c h o f traffic
f u m e s , the e n j o y m e n t of a hobby, t h e b e a u t y of flowers, e t c . , h e is i n v o k i n g
publicly s h a r e d c o n c e p t s a n d p u b l i c s t a n d a r d s of e v a l u a t i o n . It is b e c a u s e h e
d o e s so t h a t w e c a n d e s c r i b e a s " r a t i o n a l , " h i s p o t e n t i a l o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e
6
r o a d s c h e m e f r o m t h e p o i n t of view of his private w a n t s a n d interests.

T h e e x a m p l e is m e a n t to s u p p o r t t h e thesis t h a t motives for a c t i o n

can take o n t h e r o l e of moral-practical reasons only insofar as t h e y
r e p r e s e n t publicly interpreted wants r a t h e r t h a n any private features of
t h e acting subject. W h a t a p a r t i c u l a r individual w a n t s or desires or
feels is logically d e p e n d e n t o n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e u n d e r l y i n g
w a n t t h a t prevails in t h e given linguistic c o m m u n i t y .
N o r m a n fails to distinguish clearly t h e intelligibility of a n
evaluative expression a n d t h e normative b i n d i n g n a t u r e of a c o r r e
s p o n d i n g s t a n d a r d of value. By assessing t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h e
projected d e s t r u c t i o n of his front lawn by m e a n s of evaluative expres
sions for, for e x a m p l e , t h e b e a u t y of t h e r o s e b e d s , t h e p l e a s u r e of
working in t h e g a r d e n , t h e g r a n d facade of t h e h o u s e , t h e u n b e a r
able noise and s t e n c h of the traffic, the r e s i d e n t provides a persua
sive r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of his interests t h a t w o u l d b e violated by
i m p l e m e n t i n g t h e c o m m u n a l traffic p l a n . H e c h o o s e s i n t e r p r e t a
tions u n d e r which others c a n r e c o g n i z e t h e i r own w a n t s and n e e d s if
they put themselves in his situation. His n e e d i n t e r p r e t a d o n s m a k e
intelligible why s o m e o n e in this situation w o u l d o p p o s e such a p l a n .
B u t a plausible w a n t o r n e e d falls s h o r t of justifying a n action t h a t is
motivated by it, such as a c o m p l a i n t t o t h e city g o v e r n m e n t . T h e per
son w h o is affected may b e able to r e p r e s e n t his p e r s o n a l interests in
a n intelligible a n d plausible fashion, as o u r e x a m p l e shows, a n d yet
h e m a y p l a c e t h e m o r e g e n e r a l interests of t h e n e i g h b o r h o o d o r of
all t h e drivers first. H e m a y refrain f r o m trying to o p p o s e t h e city
plan by legal means, for e x a m p l e . T h e evaluative expressions t h a t oc
c u r in n e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s r e n d e r a n i n t e n t i o n , a desire, o r a feeling
intelligible b e c a u s e t h e y r e l a t e t h e s e motives to t h e cultural values
t h a t are s h a r e d in a linguistic c o m m u n i t y . Yet a plausible motive d o e s
n o t yet a m o u n t t o a justification for a n a p p r o p r i a t e l y motivated ac
tion. An action c a n only b e justified with r e f e r e n c e to n o r m s t h a t lay
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Intentions, Conventions, a n d Linguistic Interactions

d o w n t h a t certain values ought to receive p r i m a r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n in

certain circumstances.
A strictly n o r m a t i v e validity t h a t c a n be b i n d i n g for motives for ac
tion a c c r u e s to values only if they are e m b o d i e d in n o r m s . A n d t h e
e m b o d i m e n t of values in n o r m s signifies t h a t in situations in which
this r e g u l a t i o n is valid, everyone is justified in o r i e n t i n g herself t o w a r d
certain values a n d to base h e r actions on t h e wants a n d n e e d s inter
p r e t e d in these values. T o say t h a t a n o r m is valid is to say t h a t it
claims to e x p r e s s a universalizable interest a n d to d e s e r v e t h e con
sent of all those affected. C u l t u r a l values p e r se c a n n o t raise this k i n d
of a claim to validity. However, they a r e candidates for being e m b o d
ied i n n o r m s , t h a t is, for b e c o m i n g universally b i n d i n g in c e r t a i n cir
c u m s t a n c e s . I n t h e light of cultural values, t h e wants of o n e
individual a r e also intelligible to o t h e r individuals w h o s t a n d in t h e
same cultural tradition. But wants a n d n e e d s t h a t a r e i n t e r p r e t e d as
plausible are t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o legitimate motives for action only by
m a k i n g the c o r r e s p o n d i n g values normatively b i n d i n g in certain cir
c u m s t a n c e s a n d for certain g r o u p s .
T h e basic moral-practical p r e d i c a t e s s u c h as "correct" or "just" o r
" g o o d " refer t o this sense of o u g h t implicit in a n intersubjectively
b i n d i n g n o r m of action. T h e "validity" of a n o r m m e a n s the un
forced r e c o g n i t i o n of its validity claim. This claim in t u r n consists in
t h e claim t h a t all those affected have g o o d r e a s o n to c o n s e n t to the
n o r m b e c a u s e it expresses t h e i r c o m m o n interest. T h e m o s t g e n e r a l
n o r m s t h a t express t h e c o m m o n interest of all h u m a n b e i n g s are
called "moral." T h u s t h e i d e a of t h e moral-practical justification of
an action in t h e end refers t o t h e i d e a of a universal a g r e e m e n t t h a t
is m o t i v a t e d by r e a s o n s a n d r e a s o n s a l o n e :

T o e n g a g e i n t h e d e f e n s e of a l i n e of a c t i o n . . . is t o i m p l y t h a t t h e m e m b e r s
of o n e ' s a u d i e n c e h a v e c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w h i c h m a k e t h e i r o p i n i o n s
w o r t h t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t . I t is, in p a r t i c u l a r , t o a s s u m e t h a t t h e y c a n u n d e r
stand o n e ' s p r e s e n t a t i o n , a n d are able to r e s p o n d w i t h intelligible criticism.
B u t t h i s i n t u r n m e a n s t h a t o n e c o n c e d e s a p o t e n t i a l (at v e r y least) of p r a c t i
cal r e a s o n i n g o n t h e i r p a r t s . T o see, i n t h e light of this, w h y " t h e d i c e of r e a
s o n a r e l o a d e d i n favor of t h e g e n e r a l i n t e r e s t , " we c a n r e f l e c t t h a t it w o u l d
b e a b s u r d (i.e., p o i n t l e s s ) t o r a i s e q u e s t i o n s a n d m a k e d e f e n s e s of o n e ' s acts
t o o t h e r p e o p l e , if o n e w e r e n o t p r e p a r e d to a c k n o w l e d g e s i m i l a r w e i g h t t o
s i m i l a r c l a i m s o n t h e i r p a r t s . . . . T h e r e is n o p o i n t i n b e i n g p r e p a r e d t o ar-
IP
It'

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Intentions, Conventions, a n d Linguistic Interactions

g u e if o n e d o e s n ' t e n v i s a g e a n y p o s s i b l e t e r m s of s e t t l e m e n t ; a n d o n e c a n
n o t h o p e f o r s e t t l e m e n t if o n e ' s " a r g u m e n t s " a r e g o i n g t o b e a r b i t r a r i l y
l o a d e d i n favor of oneself. . . . T o a r g u e f o r m o r a l i t y a t all is t o claim t h e as
s e n t of all r a t i o n a l b e i n g s . B u t t h e o n l y p r i n c i p l e m u t u a l l y a c c e p t a b l e t o all
r a t i o n a l b e i n g s is o n e w h i c h r e g a r d s all of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s as e q u a l l y w o r t h sat
isfying (less, t h e r e f o r e , t h o s e w h i c h a r e i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h o t h e r s ) . E v e r y o n e
7
c a n a g r e e t o this b e c a u s e e v e r y o n e ' s i n t e r e s t s a r e r e s p e c t e d .

T h e s e reflections serve as a bridge to t h e c o n c e p t of norm-gov

e r n e d action. This can b e d o n e by a step-by-step revision. First, t h e
Bedurfnisnatur, in w h i c h the i n t e n t i o n s of a subject w h o takes a stance
a r e rooted, is divested of its subjective c h a r a c t e r . Wants always a p p e a r
u n d e r s o m e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t p r e s u p p o s e s (a) a linguistic c o m m u
nity, (b) a l a n g u a g e c o n t a i n i n g evaluative expressions, a n d (c) a n
intersubjectively s h a r e d t r a d i t i o n of cultural values. Next, values c a n
be shown t o r e p r e s e n t s o m e t h i n g like candidates for e m b o d y i n g
n o r m s . Values b e c o m e normatively b i n d i n g if a consensus arises
a m o n g m e m b e r s o f a g r o u p a b o u t certain situation-specific value-ori
e n t a t i o n s . C o r r e s p o n d i n g t o this m o d e l of action, t h e r e is a n explan
a t o r y strategy t h a t admits t h e r e a s o n s f o r a n action as a n agent's
motives o n l y insofar as t h e y a r e c o n n e c t e d with cultural values
t h r o u g h t h e n e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a n d with intersubjectively recog
nized n o r m s t h r o u g h t h e cultural values. I n s t e a d of private wants
a n d n e e d s , p u b l i c n o r m s take o n t h e role of t h e e x p l a n a n s . T h e val
ues by which t h e agents o r i e n t themselves a r e institutionalized i n
these n o r m s . Valid n o r m s h a v e t h e p o w e r t o motivate actions be
cause t h e values they e m b o d y a n d h e n c e a b o u t which c o n s e n s u s
can b e reachedrepresent t h e standards according to which t h e
n e e d s a n d wants a r e i n t e r p r e t e d a n d d e v e l o p e d i n t o dispositions by
m e a n s of linguistically m e d i a t e d l e a r n i n g processes. T h i s is t h e basic
o u t l i n e of t h e m o d e l t h a t P a r s o n s c o n s t r u c t e d b a s e d o n t h e c o n c e p t
of a n o r m a n d of c o n f o r m i t y with n o r m s .

J u s t as w e c o n n e c t t h e o r i e s t o a claim t o t r u t h , so w e c o n n e c t
n o r m s t o a claim t o Tightness. W h e r e a s t h e o r e t i c a l t r u t h p r e s u p p o s e s
a c o m m u n i c a t i v e society of r e s e a r c h e r s , n o r m a t i v e Tightness i m m e d i
ately p r e s u p p o s e s t h e s o u n d i n g b o a r d of a social lifeworld. N o r m s in
tervene regulatively i n t h e c o m m u n a l life of subjects capable of
s p e e c h a n d action. N o r m a t i v e validity m e a n s t h a t t h e rules of action
are intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d by t h e m e m b e r s of a social g r o u p .
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Intentions, Conventions, a n d Linguistic Interactions

G. H. Mead h a s analyzed n o r m s in t e r m s of e x p e c t a t i o n s others

have a b o u t o u r behavior. H e calls a behavioral e x p e c t a t i o n generalized
if every m e m b e r of a social g r o u p expects all others to b e h a v e in a
certain way in a given situation. 5 acts i n conformity with a n o r m or 5
fulfills a valid n o r m by acting in this way if h e o r i e n t s his action ac
c o r d i n g to t h e situation-specific e x p e c t a t i o n s to w h i c h t h e m e m b e r s
of his social g r o u p a r e entitled:

[ I ] n o r d e r t h a t o n e s h o u l d b e h a v e "as a m e m b e r of t h e c o m m u n i t y " t h e fol

l o w i n g f o r m a l c o n d i t i o n s m u s t h o l d . First, o n e m u s t h a v e p r a c t i c a l knowl
e d g e o f t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h h e is t o b e h a v e , a n d so b e able t o k n o w
w h e t h e r o r n o t h e is c o n f o r m i n g . Second, it is i m p l i e d a n d k n o w n by t h e
a g e n t t h a t all o t h e r m e m b e r s o f t h e c o m m u n i t y s h o u l d h a v e a s i m i l a r p r a c t i
cal k n o w l e d g e a b o u t t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h t h e y a r e t o b e h a v e . Third, t h e
a g e n t k n o w s t h a t o t h e r m e m b e r s o f t h e c o m m u n i t y will, as d o e s h e , believe
t h a t all o t h e r s w h o m t h e y t a k e to b e m e m b e r s of t h e c o m m u n i t y will have
c o m p a r a b l e k n o w l e d g e . In s h o r t , w e have a c o m m u n i t y i n w h i c h e a c h m e m
b e r is p r e s u m e d t o k n o w h o w h e is t o b e h a v e a n d t o believe t h a t all o t h e r s
8
have knowledge comparable to his own.

T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n , by u s i n g t h e t e r m "should," r e m o v e s t h e ambi
guity i n h e r e n t i n M e a d ' s o w n f o r m u l a t i o n s of the t e r m "behavioral
e x p e c t a t i o n . " If we u n d e r s t a n d "behavioral e x p e c t a t i o n " i n t h e
p u r e l y cognitive sense of S p r e d i c t i n g t h e b e h a v i o r of Si, t h e n t h e
2

m e r e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n across m e m b e r s of a g r o u p c a n n o t give rise to a

n o r m . A b e h a v i o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n g e n e r a l i z e d i n this sense would im
ply, for e x a m p l e , that Si knows that S expects in a given situation
2

t h a t Si will b e h a v e i n a certain way. A n d since some o t h e r m e m b e r S n

knows t h a t Si k n o w s this, S t o o will e x p e c t t h a t Si will m e e t S 's ex

n 2

p e c t a t i o n . B u t t h e n the "generalized behavioral e x p e c t a t i o n " would

be j u s t a n o t h e r t e r m for " a c c e p t e d t h e o r y of t h e everyday" (in t h e
sense e x p l i c a t e d by J a r v i e ) . Yet t h e c o n c e p t of a b e h a v i o r a l expecta
tion c o n t a i n s n o t only t h e sense of a p r e d i c t i o n , b u t also t h e n o r m a
tive sense t h a t m e m b e r s of a social g r o u p a r e m u t u a l l y entitled to
e x p e c t c e r t a i n types of b e h a v i o r from o n e a n o t h e r .
O n e m i g h t say t h a t t h e o r i e s , too, if t r u e a n d applicable to certain
situations, e n t i t l e o n e to c e r t a i n e x p e c t a t i o n s . However, b e i n g enti
tled to a c o n d i t i o n a l p r e d i c t i o n rests o n the t r u t h of e m p i r i c a l state
m e n t s , w h e r e a s t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t Swill a b i d e by a n o r m is justified
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Intentions, Conventions, and Linguistic Interactions

only if S b e l o n g s to a social g r o u p w h e r e this n o r m (as expression of

a g e n e r a l interest) is r e c o g n i z e d . T h e kind of justification varies ac
c o r d i n g to t h e type of validity claim that can be raised for a g e n e r a l
ized b e h a v i o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n . W h e n they b e c o m e a c o m p o n e n t of
n o r m s , values lose their particularity in a similar way as d o beliefs
w h e n they a t t a i n t h e status of t h e o r e t i c a l s t a t e m e n t s . However, t h e
universality of n o r m s is based o n t h e generalizability of t h e interests
they express. It is this r e l a t i o n to t h e Bedurfnisnatur t h a t e m e r g e s i n
t h e o u g h t of a n o r m , b u t is missing in t h e t r u t h o r objective validity
of a theory. A t h e o r y justifies t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t a c e r t a i n e v e n t will
o c c u r if c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s o b t a i n ; a n o r m justifies t h e e x p e c t a t i o n
t h a t S will b e h a v e in a c e r t a i n way in certain situations if we c a n as
s u m e she recognizes this n o r m a n d orients h e r a c t i o n a c c o r d i n g to
the values e m b o d i e d i n it.

4 L Qguage

T h e sociological a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e two m o d e l s of i n t e n t i o n a l a n d
n o r m - g o v e r n e d action u n p r o b l e m a t i c a l l y p r e s u p p o s e s l a n g u a g e as
t h e m e d i u m of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , w h i c h c o n n e c t s subjects w h o act. If
the rules are conceived of as semantic c o n v e n t i o n s , t h e n t h e use of
linguistic symbols c a n b e e l u c i d a t e d by m e a n s of t h e c o n c e p t of
rule-following t h a t I h a v e i n t r o d u c e d . However, this r u l e - m o d e l of
l a n g u a g e use is p e r c e i v e d from o p p o s i t e perspectives, d e p e n d i n g o n
w h e t h e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n in c o m m u n i c a t i o n is r e p r e s e n t e d as a n i n t e n
tional a c t i o n o r as t h e fulfillment o f a n o r m . I n t h e f o r m e r case, lan
g u a g e is conceived as t h e m e d i u m in which t h e actor expresses h e r
beliefs a n d a t t i t u d e s a n d t h r o u g h w h i c h s h e t r a n s m i t s t h e i n f o r m a
tional c o n t e n t of h e r i n t e n t i o n s by using linguistic m e a n s to m a k e
a n o t h e r a c t o r r e c o g n i z e w h a t s h e m e a n s o r i n t e n d s . L a n g u a g e is es
sentially r e p r e s e n t e d as a medium for transmitting intentional experi
9
ences. In t h e latter case, l a n g u a g e is u n d e r s t o o d as a m e d i u m
w h e r e i n a consensus o n g e n e r a l situation i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s is s e c u r e d
a m o n g m e m b e r s of a social g r o u p in t h e l i g h t of c o m m o n c u l t u r a l
values a n d n o r m s . Sharing a c o m m o n symbolic system m e a n s be
longing to a n intersubjectively b i n d i n g f o r m of life. H e r e , l a n g u a g e
is r e p r e s e n t e d essentially as a medium of participation in the same
126
Intentions, Conventions, a n d Linguistic Interactions

culture. T h e c o m m o n a l i t y h e r e is secured n o t only t h r o u g h using the

s a m e l a n g u a g e , b u t also and f o r e m o s t t h r o u g h r e c o g n i z i n g the same
values.
I n t h e f o r m e r case, subjects acting intentionally s u b s e q u e n t l y e n t e r
into a c o m m u n i c a t i v e r e l a t i o n with o n e another. A l o n g with t h e nor
mative c o n t e n t of t h e processes of r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w h a t is
lost o n this m o d e l of l a n g u a g e is t h e n o t i o n of a reality c o n s t i t u t e d by
t h e intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n of reciprocally raised universal claims
to validity. I n t h e latter, t h e subjectivity of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s is sub
m e r g e d i n the n o r m a t i v e c o n s e n s u s a b o u t the c u l t u r e that is objec
tively given in the linguistic world view. This m o d e l of l a n g u a g e
leaves n o r o o m for any i n t e r p r e t i v e c o m p e t e n c e o n t h e p a r t of the
individual vis-a-vis t h e values a n d n o r m s of her lifeworld. This is the
p o i n t w h e r e o u r critique b e g a n .
T h e n o r m a t i v e m o d e l of a c t i o n conceives of l a n g u a g e as a m e d i u m
w h e r e i n c o n s e n s u s a b o u t values b e c o m e s h a b i t u a l a n d is r e p r o
d u c e d . C o n v e n t i o n a l role theory, which I discuss elsewhere, is based
o n this a s s u m p t i o n . H e r e I only w a n t to m e n t i o n t h a t t h e critique of
r o l e - t h e o r y h a s p a i d p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n to t h e constitutive achieve
m e n t s of t h e actor. W e m u s t n o t p r o c e e d f r o m t h e a s s u m p t i o n that
the motives for action simply c o r r e s p o n d to t h e values that a r e insti
tutionalized in roles. Nor may we a s s u m e that the p a r t i c i p a n t ' s situa
tion i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a n d t h e i r o r i e n t a t i o n s to action are g u i d e d
exclusively by n o r m s a n d fully c o n g r u e n t with roles so as to b e sub
s u m e d by t h e m . Rather, the m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a t t a i n e d in any
p a r t i c u l a r s e q u e n c e of i n t e r a c t i o n is t h e result of a p r o c e s s of reach
i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e p a r t i c i p a t i n g subjects u n d e r t a k e this process
within a c o n t e x t t h e y d o n o t fully c o n t r o l . N o n e t h e l e s s , it is a n en
d e a v o r in which they are e n g a g e d together m virtue of their interactive
c o m p e t e n c i e s . T h e p a r t i c i p a n t s c o o r d i n a t e their m u t u a l expecta
tions by o r i e n t i n g themselves by institutionalized values. B u t social
roles a r e idealizations t h a t serve as g u i d e l i n e s f o r c o n s t r u c t i n g
s h a r e d situation definitions. T h e process of role-taking is a con
t e x t - d e p e n d e n t , r e c i p r o c a l i n t e r p r e t i v e process a i m e d a t r e a c h i n g
m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . It develops a n d revises a n existing t r a d i t i o n
of values a n d n o r m s by m e a n s of applying a n d e x t e n d i n g t h e m as
m u c h as it is itself d e t e r m i n e d by t h a t tradition.
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Intentions, Conventions, and Linguistic Interactions

Interpretation is t h e f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t of a m o d e l of communica
tive action. T h e goal of such a m o d e l is to c o m p e n s a t e for t h e respec
tive weaknesses of t h e m o d e l s of i n t e n t i o n a l a n d n o r m - g o v e r n e d
action a n d t o take p r o p e r a c c o u n t of t h e constitutive significance of
linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t of i n t e r p r e t a
tion shows that the m o d e l of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action e m p h a s i z e s t h e
constitutive activities of participants in i n t e r a c t i o n , b u t does n o t re
vert t o a subjectivist position. I n t e n t i o n a l a g e n t s d o n o t e n t e r i n t o
c o m m u n i c a t i v e relations with o n e a n o t h e r after t h e fact, so to speak,
in o r d e r to fabricate a n intersubjective world. Rather, c o m m u n i c a t i v e
action p r e s u p p o s e s the n o r m a t i v e reality of a society j u s t as m u c h as
a n objectifiable reality a n d t h e subjectivity of t h e a g e n t herself. F o r
every i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e f e r s to a c o n t e x t in w h i c h t h e s e t h r e e ele
m e n t s are i n t e r w o v e n : n o r m s a n d values, objects a n d states of affairs,
and intentional experiences.
O f c o u r s e t h e c o n c e p t of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n easily l e a d s t o t h e miscon
c e p t i o n t h a t t h e activity of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e a g e n t is in t h e first in
stance t h a t of a cognizing subject w h o first i n t e r p r e t s a situation a n d
t h e n goes a b o u t d i s s e m i n a t i n g t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n socially. T h i s mis
u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n b e a v o i d e d by (a) tying t h e c o n c e p t of c o m m u n i
cative action to t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i n g subjects a s s u m e a n
attitude o r i e n t e d toward r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g r a t h e r t h a n toward
r e a c h i n g success, a n d (b) tying m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g to a c o n s e n s u s
n o t only a b o u t t r u t h claims, b u t also a b o u t sincerity- a n d Tightness
claims. For t h e n t h e p r o c e s s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t h a t m u t u a l l y refer t o
o n e a n o t h e r will b e subject n o t only to t h e p a r a m e t e r s of a g i v e n p a r
ticular context, b u t to the e x a c t i n g p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t a c o n s e n s u s
c a n b e a t t a i n e d o n l y by way of the shared recognition of universal validity
claims. A n d since Tightness a n d sincerity b e l o n g t o these validity
claims as m u c h as p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h d o e s , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n (which, in
c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, is conceived of as a process of m u t u a l u n d e r
s t a n d i n g ) m e a n s t h e s e a r c h for a m u t u a l a g r e e m e n t a b o u t a situation
definition. T h i s definition refers to w h a t is c o m m o n l y r e c o g n i z e d as
t h e society's n o r m a t i v e reality, w h a t is m u t u a l l y r e c o g n i z e d as t h e
manifested subjecdvity of a participant, as well as to a c c e p t e d beliefs
a b o u t an objectified reality.
1
Reflections on Communicative Pathology (1974)
My point of d e p a r t u r e is t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of in
teractive c o m p e t e n c e regulates t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n [Aufbau] of i n t e r n a l
behavioral c o n t r o l s . However, t h e systematic differences b e t w e e n
moral j u d g m e n t a n d t h e actual b e h a v i o r in situations of conflict res
olution show t h a t t h e two lines of d e v e l o p m e n t d o n o t c o i n c i d e . Lin
guistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n is relevant f o r motivational d e v e l o p m e n t in
two respects. O n t h e o n e h a n d , c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n is t h e m e d i u m
of socialization t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e influences of familial environ
ments are filtered a n d t r a n s m i t t e d to t h e personality system. O n t h e
o t h e r h a n d , l a n g u a g e offers a w a y of o r g a n i z i n g w a n t s a n d n e e d s t h a t
are subject to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; o u r n e e d - b a s e d n a t u r e [Bediirfnisnatur]
is communicatively s t r u c t u r e d . T h e difference b e t w e e n levels of
moral j u d g m e n t a n d levels of moral action can b e e x p l a i n e d by dis
t u r b a n c e s of t h e socialization process. T h e s e " d i s t u r b a n c e s " can be
analyzed o n two levels: t h e level of p a t h o g e n e t i c p a t t e r n s of t h e lin
guistic e n v i r o n m e n t t h a t are relevant to socialization, a n d t h e level of
t h e s t r u c t u r e s of n e e d s a n d of behavioral controls t h a t d e v e l o p u n
d e r c o n d i t i o n s of systematically distorted c o m m u n i c a t i o n . F r e u d in
troduces t h e e g o f u n c t i o n of u n c o n s c i o u s r e p r e s s i o n as a m e c h a n i s m
of linguistic p a t h o g e n e s i s . T h e repression of conflicts t h a t are n o t
consciously resolved, t h a t is, n o t o n a basis of c o n s e n s u a l action,
leaves traces t h a t t a k e t h e f o r m of c o m m u n i c a t i v e d i s t u r b a n c e s .
Intrapsychic d i s t u r b a n c e s of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n parts of
the personality system a r e a n a l o g o u s t o d i s t u r b a n c e s in family c o m
m u n i c a t i o n . O f c o u r s e t h e analysis of such deviations p r e s u p p o s e s
knowledge [Kenntnis] of t h e k i n d of c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t can be
characterized as " n o r m a l . " But w h e n can a c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e c o n
sidered u n d i s t u r b e d , n o t systematically d i s t o r t e d , o r "normal"?

(1) First, we have to explain t h e sense in w h i c h we m e a n to talk

a b o u t the n o r m a l c y c o n d i t i o n s of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . Obvi
ously, t h e statistical notion of n o r m a l c y is u n s u i t a b l e . A n o r m a l distri
bution of c o m m u n i c a t i v e features tells u s n o t h i n g a b o u t the
n o r m a l c y c o n d i t i o n s of socially effective i n t e r a c t i o n s , unless we have
already classified t h e p o p u l a t i o n s b e i n g e x a m i n e d b a s e d o n clinical
criteria; b u t t h a t w o u l d b e to evaluate t h e m based o n criteria of n o r
malcy. O t h e r w i s e we c o u l d n o t r u l e o u t an " a b n o r m a l " s c e n a r i o ,
132 _
Reflections on Communicative Pathology

w h e t h e r t h e deviating individuals o r linguistic u n i t s it comprised

were greater o r fewer in n u m b e r t h a n average. T h e clinical notion of
n o r m a l c y stems from t h e field of somatic illnesses. H e r e , t h e healthy
or n o r m a t i v e state [Sollzustand] of t h e organism, f r o m which the
state of illness deviates, is r e a s o n a b l y well k n o w n . T h a t is, we either
k n o w it t h r o u g h empirical analysis or by m e a n s of intuitively inter
p r e t e d e m p i r i c a l indicators. T r a n s f e r r i n g this n o t i o n of n o r m a l c y to
the r e a l m of psychic or c o m m u n i c a t i v e d i s t u r b a n c e s is difficult be
cause t h e c u r r e n d y available t h e o r i e s have not b e e n able to deter
m i n e unequivocally the n o r m s [Sollwerte] of psychic organization.
A n y p r o p o s a l s t h a t appeal to intuitive evidence are suspect of deriv
i n g from c u l t u r a l traditions t h a t are n o t m a d e explicit. Nowadays,
t h e r e f o r e , t h e culturalistic notion of n o r m a l c y characterizes a widely
a c c e p t e d fallback position. A c c o r d i n g to this n o t i o n , we have to
confine ourselves to a descriptive a c c o u n t of what a given culture
c o n s i d e r s t o b e " n o r m a l " for a given d o m a i n of life. T h u s t h e key to
the culturally relative c o n c e p t s of n o r m a l c y is not the n o r m a l distri
b u t i o n of o b s e r v e d aspects of behavior, b u t t h e definitions of nor
malcy that a r e to be a s c e r t a i n e d in any given case.
However, e t h n o p s y c h i a t r y h a s raised strong reservations r e g a r d i n g
this relativism t h a t is widely a c c e p t e d in cultural anthropology.
1
G. D e v e r e u x suggests s o m e distinctions t h a t clearly show t h e limits
of t h e a r g u m e n t for cultural relativism. H e j u x t a p o s e s individual pa
t h o l o g i e s with d i s t u r b a n c e s t h a t have b e e n culturally standardized,
a n d shows t h a t even these d i s t u r b a n c e s , w h i c h have b e e n n o r m a l
ized, as it w e r e , deviate from what is n o r m a l in t h e clinical sense. Cul
2
tural n o r m a l i z a t i o n refers to all t h r e e e l e m e n t s of t h e "disturbance":

(i) t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e d i s t u r b i n g or s h o c k i n g events t h a t are

e x p e r i e n c e d as stress o r t r a u m a a n d trigger an intrapsychic conflict
(in Sparta, a m o t h e r ' s m o u r n i n g a son w h o has died in battle is an
"ethnic d i s t u r b a n c e , " b e c a u s e its cause is a culturally r e c o g n i z e d and
c o n v e n t i o n a l i z e d t r a u m a , w h e r e a s in Athens, t h e s a m e act of m o u r n
ing r e m a i n s a t t h e level of a n individual e m o t i o n a l r e a c t i o n ) ;
(ii) strategies of r e p r e s s i o n w h e r e b y t h e intrapsychic conflict can be
k e p t o u t of c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d m a d e b e a r a b l e (i.e., n o t t h e r a p e u t i
cally "resolved"). Every c u l t u r e , even in cases of e x t r e m e d i s t u r b a n c e
|33
Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology

(as D e v e r e u x ' s e l a b o r a t e e x a m p l e of t h e s h a m a n d e m o n s t r a t e s ) , of
fers a system of p r e f e r e n c e s for m e a n s of r e p r e s s i o n t h a t allow for a
superficial n o r m a l i z a t i o n (i.e., a conventionally r e c o g n i z e d restruc
turing) of t h e i n n e r conflict;
(iii) finally, t h e s y m p t o m s in which t h e u n c o n s c i o u s l y r e p r e s s e d
conflict m a y b e m a n i f e s t e d . ( U n d e r this h e a d i n g D e v e r e u x e x a m i n e s
social roles t h a t institutionalize culturally recognized deviant behav
ior: t h a t of t h e s h a m a n , t h e p e r s o n r u n a m o k , t h e " m a d d o g , " t h e
M o h a v e transvestite, t h e stoic saint, etc. Even w h e r e such roles h a v e
n o t b e e n differentiated, t h e r e a r e cultural definitions f o r "how t o b e
have w h e n o n e is crazy.")

Individual d i s t u r b a n c e s o c c u r t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e n o r m a l i z i n g
activity of a c u l t u r e fails i n such a way t h a t t h e p e r s o n affected h a s t o
improvise f o r herself h o w to i n t e r p r e t t r a u m a t i c events a n d which
m e a n s of r e p r e s s i o n a n d types of s y m p t o m s to c h o o s e . P e r h a p s a
comparative c o n c e p t f o r m a t i o n is p r e f e r a b l e t o t h e d i c h o t o m o u s
c o n c e p t f o r m a t i o n t h a t j u x t a p o s e s e t h n i c a n d individual distur
bances a n d leads to t h e p o s t u l a t i o n of a n "ethnic u n c o n s c i o u s . " But
even if D e v e r e u x ' s thesis is w e a k e n e d in this sense a n d d i s t u r b a n c e s
a r e classified a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r d e g r e e of cultural stereotyping, t h e
analysis of limit cases is of critical i m p o r t a n c e for t h e culturalistic n o
tion of normalcy.
T h e cross-cultural c o m p a r i s o n of e t h n o p s y c h i a t r i c p h e n o m e n a
shows t h a t t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l r e s t r u c t u r i n g of f o r m s of r e p r e s s i o n a n d
of symptoms n o r m a l i z e s t h e u n d e r l y i n g a n o m a l y of a s e r i o u s psychic
conflict o r illness in t h e sense of socially accepted roles. However, it
does so in such a way t h a t t h e a n o m a l y r e m a i n s p e r c e p t i b l e as such.
T h e s h a m a n is psychologically ill in t h e clinical sense e v e n t h o u g h h e
plays a socially r e c o g n i z e d role:

T h e primitive who, after suffering from psychological disturbances, u n d e r

goes a s h a m a n i c t r e a t m e n t that "cures" h i m a n d m a k e s h i m a s h a m a n , i n re
ality o n l y e x p e r i e n c e s a c o n v e n t i o n a l r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f h i s conflicts a n d
s y m p t o m s w i t h o u t t h e r e b y g a i n i n g a n y real insight i n t o t h e n a t u r e o f h i s
conflicts. . . . T h e s e c u r e s t a k e p l a c e as if t h e t r e a t m e n t c o n s i s t e d m e r e l y i n
r e p l a c i n g conflicts a n d c u l t u r a l r e p r e s s i o n b y c o n v e n t i o n a l c u l t u r a l conflicts
a n d ritualized symptoms, without ever p r o d u c i n g t h e insight which alone
3
can lead to a real c u r e .
134
Reflections o n Communicative Pathology

D e v e r e u x tells of two Native A m e r i c a n I n d i a n s s e n t e n c e d to d e a t h ,

w h o h a d b e e n d e e m e d "of s o u n d m i n d in t h e legal s e n s e " by the
p r i s o n psychiatrist b e c a u s e t h e y t o o k their h a l l u c i n a t i o n s from the
cultural m a t e r i a l of the beliefs of t h e i r tribe. Only a,closer examina
tion s h o w e d t h a t they n o l o n g e r objectively lived these cultural con
4
tents, b u t u s e d t h e m for h a l l u c i n a t o r y p u r p o s e s . T h e psychiatrist
h a d confused t h e h a l l u c i n a t i o n s of his p a t i e n t s with t h e beliefs of the
tribe of which they were m e m b e r s . Similarly, the difference between
delirium a n d faith c a n also b e r e n d e r e d culturally i n c o n s p i c u o u s if
t h e p e r s o n affected "clothes" his clinical b e h a v i o r in a social role, say
t h a t of t h e s h a m a n , and n o r m a l i z e s it. H e n c e the psychiatrist assess
i n g psychic d i s t u r b a n c e s a c c o r d i n g to a c u l t u r a l n o t i o n of n o r m a l c y
is

i n c a p a b l e of h e l p i n g a n I n d i a n w h o is i n r e m i s s i o n after a first p s y c h o t i c at
t a c k or u r g e a n d d e f i n e s h i m s e l f as a s h a m a n . A c c o r d i n g t o "relativistic"
n o r m s that govern the limited diagnostic technique I am talking about, one
w o u l d c l a i m t h a t this I n d i a n s h a m a n h a s n o n e e d of p s y c h i a t r i c t r e a t m e n t ,
since h e c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d " c u l t u r a l l y n o r m a l . " H o w e v e r , I h a v e s h o w n t h a t
t h e s h a m a n is e i t h e r a s e v e r e n e u r o t i c o r a p s y c h o t i c in r e m i s s i o n a n d h e n c e
is i n u r g e n t n e e d of p s y c h i a t r i c aid. I n fact, s u c h a n i n d i v i d u a l is i n r e m i s s i o n
only w i t h r e s p e c t t o a single socially d e t e r m i n e d m i l i e u : h i s o w n t r i b e . H e is
m o r e or less well a d a p t e d t o this, a n d only t h i s , m i l i e u . He is not capable of
adapting, and especially not capable of re-adapting. A n o r m a l I n d i a n , i n c o n t r a s t ,
w h o is n o t a s h a m a n , c a n b e well a d a p t e d t o h i s c u l t u r e a n d still r e t a i n his
ability t o c o p e w i t h a v a r i e t y of s i t u a t i o n s . I n m y o p i n i o n , t h e t o u c h s t o n e of
m e n t a l h e a l t h is n o t a d a p t e d n e s s as s u c h , b u t a s u b j e c t ' s a b i l i t y to d e v e l o p
further t h r o u g h successive new a d a p t a t i o n s w i t h o u t losing t h e sense o f his
5
own temporal continuity.

D e v e r e u x p u r s u e s t h e n o r m a l i z i n g activities of c u l t u r e s o m e w h a t
f u r t h e r t h a n p r o p o n e n t s of cultural relativism do. H e shows t h a t dis
t u r b a n c e s a n d deviations themselves are subject to t h e definitions of
normalcy, albeit only i n such a way t h a t the difference b e t w e e n n o r
m a l a n d d e v i a n t b e h a v i o r is simply leveled o u t r a t h e r t h a n m a d e
unrecognizable.
T h e distinction drawn h e r e r e q u i r e s a culturally invariant n o t i o n
of normalcy. It m u s t b e c o r r o b o r a t e d by clinical e x p e r i e n c e , b u t ex
plicated i n d e p e n d e n t l y . I n t h e last passage q u o t e d above, Devereux
cites as t h e d e t e r m i n i n g criterion t h e ability to r e s t r u c t u r e o n e ' s own
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Reflections on Communicative Pathology

identity in a c c o r d a n c e with o n e ' s situation. Elsewhere, h e thinks t h a t

all psychological d i s t u r b a n c e s result in d e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a n d d e i n d i -
6
v i d u a t i o n . Yet "individuation" is a c o n c e p t l a d e n w i t h p r e s u p p o s i
tions, a n d t h e c o n c e p t of a level of differentiation is useful only if we
c a n give a n a d e q u a t e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e system
precisely by m e a n s of t h e d y n a m i c of progressive individuation.
T h e cultural c o n c e p t of n o r m a l c y t u r n s o u t t o b e u n t e n a b l e . Yet a
culturally invariant c o n c e p t of n o r m a l c y t h a t refers n e i t h e r to fea
tures of physical h e a l t h n o r to statistical averages has a n o r m a t i v e
c o n t e n t . How can this c o n t e n t be justified within a n empirical-
descriptive science?
P i a g e t u s e d t h e c o n c e p t of d e v e l o p m e n t a l logic, w h i c h p e r m i t s t h e
i n t r o d u c t i o n of n o r m a t i v e n o t i o n s for p u r p o s e s of e m p i r i c a l analysis.
T h e c o n c e p t has so far b e e n c o r r o b o r a t e d only in t h e d o m a i n of cog
nitive development. H e r e , the n o r m a t i v e a s s u m p t i o n [Wertprdmisse] is
n o t suspect, f o r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of objectifying t h o u g h t is m e a s u r e d
by t h e level of unequivocally d e c i d a b l e p r o b l e m s , t h a t is, of p r o b l e m s
t h a t have true solutions. P r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h is a validity claim p r e s u p
posed by a n y a r g u m e n t a t i o n . Normative Tightness of a c t i o n a n d evalua
tion is a validity claim t h a t is u n d e r d i s p u t e , b u t c a n still be m a d e
plausible. R e s e a r c h i n t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a l logic of m o r a l j u d g m e n t
d e p e n d s o n this n o r m a t i v e a s s u m p t i o n . Its o n t o g e n e s i s is also m e a
s u r e d a c c o r d i n g to levels of p r o b l e m solving. But in this case we can
n o t rely o n e l e m e n t a r y knowledge of logic, m a t h e m a t i c s , a n d physics
for validating t h e c o r r e c t solutions. W e h a v e to v e n t u r e o n t o t h e u n
stable g r o u n d of p h i l o s o p h i c a l ethics in o r d e r to justify t h e thesis
t h a t e a c h h i g h e r level of m o r a l consciousness allows f o r a n increas
ingly a d e q u a t e c o n s e n s u a l solution of increasingly c o m p l e x conflicts
of action. E x p a n d i n g t h e c o n c e p t of t h e capacity for m o r a l j u d g m e n t
i n t o t h e c o n c e p t of interactive c o m p e t e n c e o n c e a g a i n transforms
t h e n o r m a t i v e a s s u m p t i o n . For t h e ability t o p a r t i c i p a t e in interac
tion a n d to m a i n t a i n t h e c o n s e n s u a l basis of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action
even t h r o u g h conflicts includes t h e c o m p e t e n c e to act in a c c o r d a n c e
with m o r a l j u d g m e n t s , b u t , b e y o n d this, also p r e s u p p o s e s t h e validity
basis of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n in its full spectrum. Interactive com
p e t e n c e is m e a s u r e d n o t a c c o r d i n g to t h e ability to solve p r o b l e m s of
k n o w l e d g e a n d m o r a l insight at t h e a p p r o p r i a t e level, b u t a c c o r d i n g
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Reflections o n Communicative Pathology

to t h e ability to m a i n t a i n processes of r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d
ing even in conflict situations r a t h e r t h a n b r e a k i n g off c o m m u n i c a
tion o r merely s e e m i n g to m a i n t a i n it.
T h e psychoanalytic c o n c e p t of u n c o n s c i o u s repressioii s h e d s light,
as we shall see, o n t h e t e c h n i q u e of a p p a r e n d y c a r r y i n g o n processes
of r e a c h i n g c o n s e n s u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Unconsciously r e p r e s s e d
conflicts a r i s e e i t h e r intrapsychically as a n i n t e r r u p t i o n of c o m m u
n i c a t i o n within t h e self, o r as a n i n c o n s p i c u o u s b a r r i e r b e t w e e n indi
viduals within t h e f a m i l y u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s t h a t e x c l u d e processes
of m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d h e n c e h e a l i n g (conflict resolution)
t h r o u g h insight. T h e c o n c e p t of n o r m a l c y for e g o s t r e n g t h devel
o p e d by psychoanalysis in this c o n n e c t i o n is m e a s u r e d by t h e de
p e n d e n c e o n strategies of u n c o n s c i o u s r e p r e s s i o n . T h e ego's
s t r e n g t h increases to t h e same e x t e n t t h a t t h e e g o is able t o d o with
o u t s u c h strategies a n d to process its conflicts consciously. T h e n o r
mative a s s u m p t i o n h e r e lies in t h e c o n c e p t of consciousness a n d in t h e
r e l a t i o n to t h e insight i n t o a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l l y caused psychological
conflict. In a c c o r d a n c e w i t h my c o m m u n i c a t i o n - t h e o r e t i c r e a d i n g of
7
t h e basic psychoanalytic assumptions,' I relate these topologically
conceived c o n d i t i o n s of conscious conflict processing t o c o n d i t i o n s
of n o r m a l linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n : Conscious conflict processing
m e a n s conflict p r o c e s s i n g u n d e r conditions of u n d i s t o r t e d
communication.
T h u s we r e t u r n to w h e r e we b e g a n o u r reflections, h a v i n g f o u n d
t h a t we c a n n o t avail ourselves of t h e available statistical, clinical, o r
cultural notions of n o r m a l c y t h a t a r e at o u r disposal. R a t h e r we have
to m a k e explicit t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t i n h e r e n t in the n o t i o n of lin
guistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n itself. T h e expression " u n d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i
c a t i o n " does n o t a d d a n y t h i n g to m u t u a l linguistic u n d e r s t a n d i n g
[Verstdndigung], f o r " m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g " signifies t h e telos i n h e r
e n t in linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I w o u l d like to establish t h e condi
tions of n o r m a l c y of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n by way of a
c o n c e p t u a l analysis of t h e m e a n i n g of "mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g " be
cause I assume t h a t every s p e e c h act h a s a n u n a v o i d a b l e , as it were,
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l y necessitating basis of validity. I w a n t to d e v e l o p t h e
thesis t h a t every c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t o r h a s t o c o m m i t to fulfilling uni
versal claims to validity. Insofar as she participates in c o m m u n i c a t i o n
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Reflections on Communicative Pathology

(i.e., a process of r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) a t all, she c a n n o t avoid

raising t h e following claims:

(i) to express herself intelligibly,

(ii) to m a k e something u n d e r s t o o d ,
(iii) t o m a k e AerseZ/understood in d o i n g so, a n d
(iv) to r e a c h a m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g with another.

O f c o u r s e if c o m p l e t e a g r e e m e n t [Einverstdndnis], which encom

passes all f o u r c o m p o n e n t s , w e r e t h e n o r m a l state of linguistic c o m
m u n i c a t i o n , t h e n it w o u l d n o t b e n e c e s s a r y to analyze t h e process of
r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g u n d e r t h e d y n a m i c aspect of bring
ing about a g r e e m e n t . W h a t is typical i n s t e a d are situations t h a t lie in
t h e gray a r e a s o m e w h e r e b e t w e e n a lack of u n d e r s t a n d i n g
[Unverstdndnis] a n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g [Missverstdndnis], intended
a n d i n v o l u n t a r y insincerity, veiled a n d o p e n d i s a g r e e m e n t on t h e
o n e h a n d , a n d a n always already existing p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g
[Vorverstdndigtsein] a n d m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n t h e other. I n this
gray area, a g r e e m e n t m u s t be actively b r o u g h t about. M u t u a l u n d e r
s t a n d i n g is a process t h a t seeks to o v e r c o m e a lack of u n d e r s t a n d i n g
a n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , insincerity toward oneself a n d others, a n d
d i s a g r e e m e n t . A n d it does so o n t h e c o m m o n basis of validity claims
t h a t aim at r e c i p r o c a l r e c o g n i t i o n .
I w o u l d n o w like t o c o n s i d e r t h e o n t o g e n e s i s of t h e validity basis
(2) i n o r d e r to t h e n d e m o n s t r a t e t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m p o r t of t h e
claims t h a t g r o u n d validity a n d t h a t p r e c e d e every possible instance
of c o m m u n i c a t i o n ( 3 ) . Starting from this validity basis a n d t h e g e n
eral s t r u c t u r e s of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n , I shall t h e n discuss for
mal c o n d i t i o n s of systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n (4).
Finally, I shall discuss a few e x a m p l e s of such c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
8
(2) H a v i n g s t u d i e d prelinguistic child d e v e l o p m e n t , R. Spitz at
t r i b u t e s p a r t i c u l a r i m p o r t a n c e to l e a r n i n g processes i n the t h i r d
m o n t h of life w h e r e b y p r i m a r y narcissism is overcome a n d t h e stage
of t h e first "object a n t i c i p a t i o n " sets in. F r o m t h e perspective of
t h e c o n s t i t u e n t s of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t h e following t h r e e
m o m e n t s seem significant: (a) T h e child learns to distinguish
s o u n d s t h a t it p r o d u c e s itself f r o m e x t e r n a l acoustic stimuli
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Reflections on Communicative Pathology

( b a b b l i n g m o n o l o g u e s ) a n d it b e g i n s to react with u n d e r s t a n d i n g
[Verstdndnis] to t h e p h y s i o g n o m i c s c h e m a of t h e m o t h e r ' s face (smil
ing with eye c o n t a c t ) . (b) T h e child l e a r n s to act in a goal-directed
fashion b a s e d o n s c h e m a t a of sensory-motor action. Along with these
b e g i n n i n g s of initiatives to act, we can observe (c) a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n
f r o m r e a c t i o n s t o stimuli to p r o t o - f o r m s of i n t e n t i o n a l action g u i d e d
by p e r c e p t i o n . F r o m t h e very b e g i n n i n g , t h e actions serve t h e dou
ble task of c o n t r o l l i n g t h e e n v i r o n m e n t a n d of f e n d i n g off danger. In
d o i n g this they r e g u l a t e drives a n d affects. T h i s t h i r d aspect sheds
light o n t h e b e g i n n i n g s of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e s t r u c t u r i n g of i n n e r
n a t u r e . T h e first two aspects r e f e r to t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of c o m m u n i
cative r e l a t i o n s a n d t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g capabilities of active a n d pas
sive p a r t i c i p a n t s in i n t e r a c t i o n .
I n t h e s e c o n d half of t h e first year of life, t h e love object " m o t h e r "
is c o n s t i t u t e d for t h e child as an identifiable entity. First, t h e child
l e a r n s to i n t e g r a t e i n t o a single i m a g e two object anticipations: t h e
"good," permissive m o t h e r a n d t h e "bad," restrictive o r a b s e n t o n e .
This synthesis m a r k s equally a cognitive d e v e l o p m e n t (the begin
n i n g s of object p e r m a n e n c e ) and a n increasing r e g u l a t i o n of affects
a n d drives ( b e g i n n i n g s of the t o l e r a n c e for a m b i v a l e n c e ) . T h e
eighth-month anxiety t h a t then follows ( a n d which Spitz analyzes in de
tail) signals t h a t t h e child l e a r n s to distinguish b e t w e e n t h e t r u s t e d
a n d loved object of t h e m o t h e r a n d strangers. T h e child n o longer
reacts only with u n d e r s t a n d i n g to t h e p h y s i o g n o m i c s c h e m a (be it
t h a t of t h e m o t h e r , a mask, o r a s t r a n g e r ) . R a t h e r h e n o w r e s p o n d s to
t h e gestures of a n individual r e f e r e n c e p e r s o n . T h i s alters t h e level of
r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n p a r t n e r s in c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e child identifies
with t h e m o t h e r by imitating h e r gestures. T h i s is an i m p o r t a n t pre
c o n d i t i o n for t h e e x c h a n g e , m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h gestures, w h e r e b y the
child l e a r n s to r e g u l a t e his own activity in relation to that of the
m o t h e r (i.e., giving a n d taking, b e i n g active and passive). For this
self-regulation of the initiative to act, shaking o n e ' s h e a d in denial
plays a significant r o l e .
First t h e child l e a r n s t h e g e s t u r e of s h a k i n g his h e a d by identifying
with t h e m o t h e r w h o refuses h i m s o m e t h i n g by s h a k i n g h e r h e a d .
Later, t h e child uses t h e n e g a t i n g shaking of t h e h e a d in situations
w h e r e h e rejects a d e m a n d o r offer himself. A n d after l a n g u a g e devel-
 139
Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e P a t h o l o g y

o p m e n t has b e g u n with t h e first h o l o p h r a s t i c (one-word) s e n t e n c e s ,

from a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e fifteenth m o n t h , t h e c h i l d uses t h e w o r d
" n o " instead of t h e n e g a t i n g gesture. T h i s step is t h e b e g i n n i n g of
linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n in a specificc

W i t h t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f t h e g e s t u r e of n e g a t i o n , a c t i o n is r e p l a c e d b y w o r d ,
a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n a c r o s s d i s t a n c e is i n t r o d u c e d . T h i s m a y b e t h e m o s t i m
p o r t a n t t u r n i n g p o i n t i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e i n d i v i d u a l a n d t h e s p e c i e s .
T h i s is t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e h u m a n i z a t i o n o f t h e s p e c i e s , o f t h e zoon
9
politikon, of society.

Spitz, I think righdy, attributes a crucial i m p o r t a n c e to t h e g e s t u r e

of d e n i a l o n t h e p a r t of t h e prelinguistic child a n d to t h e nay-saying
o f t h e child w h o h a s o n l y j u s t b e g u n to speak in t h e transition from
symbolically mediated to g e n u i n e l y linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . Yet t h e
insistence with which h e d o e s so does n o t fit well w i t h t h e analytic
c o n c e p t i o n of this p h e n o m e n o n . Spitz speaks of t h e c o n c e p t u a l
c h a r a c t e r of n e g a t i o n . H e believes t h a t n e g a t i o n m a k e s possible t h e
capacity to j u d g e [Urteilsfahigkeit]. B u t the first " n o " is n e i t h e r t h e n e
gation [Verneinung] of p r e d i c a t e s ("this ball is n o t r e d " ) , n o r t h e n e
gation [Negation] of states of affairs ("it is n o t t r u e t h a t this ball is
r e d " ) . O t h e r w i s e t h e c h i l d would already b e able to distinguish dif
f e r e n t types of s p e e c h acts or i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations. T h e first " n o " is
r a t h e r constitutive for p r o d u c i n g symbolically m e d i a t e d i n t e r p e r
sonal r e l a d o n s t o u t court. It m a k e s possible t h a t early m o d e of t h e
first linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n which is, in a way, d e t e r m i n e d by
imperatives.
I n prelinguistic i n t e r a c t i o n s with a r e f e r e n c e p e r s o n , the child ex
p e r i e n c e s satisfactions as well as f r u s t r a d o n s , b u t t h e frustrations of
drives are in t h e first i n s t a n c e externally i m p o s e d events; they are n o t
yet perceived as prohibitions. O n l y after t h e child h a s l e a r n e d ,
t h r o u g h a process of identification, to u n d e r s t a n d t h e refusals t h e
m o t h e r imposes o n h i m as i n t e n t i o n a l actions a n d has himself
l e a r n e d to say n o , d o e s h e m e e t t h e p r e c o n d i t i o n for p a r t i c i p a t i n g in
a c o m m u n i c a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p for w h i c h t h e o p t i o n of o b e y i n g o r ac
c e p t i n g a n d refusing is constitutive. A r e q u e s t is n o t a r e q u e s t , an of
fer n o t an offer, as l o n g as t h e a d d r e s s e e lacks t h e conscious ability to
say n o , t h a t is, t h e ability, in p r i n c i p l e , to d e c i d e n o t to abide by t h e
r e q u e s t or to a c c e p t t h e offer. T h e first " n o " n e g a t e s a n e x p e c t a t i o n
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Reflections o n Communicative Pathology

of behavior. T o say n o m e a n s rejection. Spitz describes t h e psycho-

d y n a m i c s of this first nay-saying t h a t is constitutive f o r t h e interper
sonal r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n speakers as follows:

T h e n e g a t i n g g e s t u r e o f s h a k i n g o n e ' s h e a d a n d t h e w o r d " n o " u t t e r e d by

t h e O b j e c t a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d [einverkibt] i n t o t h e e g o of t h e i n f a n t as m e m
o r y t r a c e s . T h e n e g a t i v e affect is s e p a r a t e d f r o m this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h i s
s e p a r a t i o n t r i g g e r s a f r u s t r a t i o n t h a t is t h e n l i n k e d t h r o u g h a s s o c i a t i o n with
t h e m e m o r y t r a c e i n t h e e g o . If t h e c h i l d i d e n t i f i e s w i t h t h e O b j e c t , t h i s
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h t h e a t t a c k e r is f o l l o w e d b y a n a t t a c k o n t h e o u t s i d e w o r l d ,
a c c o r d i n g to A n n a F r e u d . F o r t h e fifteen-month-old child, this c o n c e p t
t a k e s t h e f o r m o f " n o " (first t h e g e s t u r e , t h e n t h e w o r d ) . T h e c h i l d h a s
a d o p t e d t h i s f o r m o f t h e c o n c e p t f r o m its love o b j e c t . B a s e d o n n u m e r o u s
e x p e r i e n c e s o f d i s p l e a s u r e , t h e " n o " c a r r i e s a n e g a t i v e v a l e n c e . A s a result,
" n o " is s u i t a b l e f o r e x p r e s s i n g a g g r e s s i o n , a n d this is w h y " n o " is u s e d i n t h e
defense m e c h a n i s m of identifying with t h e attacker a n d t u r n e d against t h e
O b j e c t . A s s o o n as this level is r e a c h e d , t h e p h a s e o f d e f i a n c e ( t h e
1 0
w e l l - k n o w n " t e r r i b l e twos") c a n b e g i n .

Saying " n o " is n o t significant i n l a n g u a g e d e v e l o p m e n t simply be

cause t h e child p e r f o r m s h e r first s p e e c h act with t h e first i n t e n t i o n a l
"no." R a t h e r , saying " n o " is a c e n t r a l i n d i c a t o r of l a n g u a g e develop
m e n t b e c a u s e t h e child is only able t o p e r f o r m a s p e e c h act, t h a t is,
to e n t e r i n t o a linguistically m e d i a t e d i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n , o n c e
she u n d e r s t a n d s o r d e r s , p r o h i b i t i o n s , o r offers as r e q u e s t s t h a t c a n
b e d e n i e d , t h a t is, as b e h a v i o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n s t h a t c a n b e n e g a t e d .
O n this first level of linguistic communication, concepts, which have de
v e l o p e d prelinguistically a n d have h i t h e r t o s t r u c t u r e d t h e interactive
realm, can be r e s t r u c t u r e d :

(i) T h e r e is a differentiation b e t w e e n primitive linguistic expres

sions a n d n o n l i n g u i s t i c gestures a n d actions. Communicative symbols
express b e h a v i o r a l expectations a n d t h u s r e m a i n r o o t e d in a c o n t e x t
of action, w h e r e a s n o n l i n g u i s t i c actions a r e c o n n e c t e d t o linguisti
cally p r o d u c e d interpersonal relations as t h e fulfillment o r nonfulfill
m e n t of b e h a v i o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n s .
(ii) T h e semantic content c o m m u n i c a t e d b y m e a n s o f symbols a n d ac
tions r e p r e s e n t s a s y n d r o m e in which certain m e a n i n g s of t h e i m p e r
ative m o d e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n (requests, offers) are fused with
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Reflections o n Communicative Pathology

p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s (in r e f e r e n c e to objects in t h e world) a n d

certain i n t e n t i o n s of t h e speaker (sympathy, antipathy, p l e a s u r e ,
p a i n , etc.).
(iii) T h e c o n c e p t s of t h e actor a n d of agency are d e t e r m i n e d by t h e
complementary relation b e t w e e n t h e b e h a v i o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t t h e al
ter expresses by m e a n s of a c o m m u n i c a t i v e symbol a n d t h e action
w h e r e b y t h e ego fulfills or t h w a r t s this e x p e c t a t i o n . I n t e r l o c u t o r s act
from reciprocal perspectivesunder c o n d i t i o n s of a d o u b l e contin
gency: For b o t h , it is possible in p r i n c i p l e to frustrate t h e expecta
tions of the other.
(iv) A l t h o u g h t h e i m p e r a t i v e m o d e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n does n o t yet
a d m i t of a n y alternative uses of l a n g u a g e , it does establish a n i m m e
d i a t e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n communication a n d the regulation of behavior.
By p e r f o r m i n g a s p e e c h act, o n e individual i n f l u e n c e s t h e motives of
t h e other. Since linguistically p r o d u c e d i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations p r e
suppose in p r i n c i p l e t h e possibility of rejection, motives for action m u s t
b e c o n s t r a i n e d to c o m p e n s a t e f o r this new d e g r e e of f r e e d o m .
(v) I n a s m u c h as i n t e r a c t i o n s are e m b e d d e d i n p o w e r relations, b e
havioral e x p e c t a t i o n s c a n b e s a n c t i o n e d o n t h e basis of symbolically
g e n e r a l i z e d p l e a s u r e / p a i n . T h a t is, they c a n b e e n f o r c e d by m e a n s of
t h e p r o s p e c t of rewards a n d t h e t h r e a t of p u n i s h m e n t . T h r o u g h this
m e c h a n i s m , drives a n d affects a r e t r a n s f o r m e d into motives for ac
tion. T h e prelinguistic predispositions of o n e ' s i n n e r n a t u r e a r e
d r a w n into a n intersubjectively s h a r e d universe t h r o u g h c o m m u
nicative action, a n d this is h o w culturally i n t e r p r e t e d n e e d s a r e
created.

T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e second level of communication c a n b e e x a m

ined f r o m t h e perspective of t h e differentiation of l a n g u a g e as a pe
culiar d o m a i n of reality. T h e linguistic u t t e r a n c e is differentiated
f r o m (a) o t h e r semantically contentful, b u t n o n v e r b a l expressions
(gestures); (b) t h e c o n t e x t of action in which it is e m b e d d e d ; (c)
n o r m a t i v e social reality ( n o r m s of action a n d values); (d) t h e subjec
tivity of t h e speakers; a n d (e) t h e c o m m u n i t y of those p a r t i c i p a t i n g
in c o m m u n i c a t i o n . All these r e l a t i o n s manifest themselves in (f) t h e
i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h ; they d e t e r m i n e t h e validity basis of
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linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t of t h e following
r o u g h d e v e l o p m e n t a l sketch is a level of i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t p r e s u p
poses p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y differentiated s p e e c h .

(a) A g r a m m a t i c a l s p e e c h act is distinct from n o n v e r b a l acts a n d

gestures, t h a t is, bodily expressions, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d from sym
bolic b u t n o t propositionally differentiated forms of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
such as music, d a n c e , p a i n t i n g , a n d so on, o n t h e other.
S p e e c h acts a n d n o n v e r b a l expressions c a n b e functional equiva
lents of o n e a n o t h e r . Hailing a cab nonverbally can be r e p l a c e d with
a verbalized call. Silently taking s o m e o n e ' s a r m can, in the a p p r o p r i
ate c o n t e x t , mean t h e s a m e as t h e assurance "I'll h e l p you." I n still
o t h e r cases, t h e r e is a c o m p l e m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n catego
ries of expressions. A verbal p r o m i s e can b e k e p t by n o n v e r b a l ac
tions. T h e s e actions t h e n have the meaning that the s p e a k e r "has k e p t
his w o r d . " Linguistic a n d n o n l i n g u i s t i c expressions c a n express t h e
s a m e s p e a k e r i n t e n t i o n , a n d t h e s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t of b o t h types of
expression c a n by analyzed from t h e dual perspective of t h e interper
sonal r e l a t i o n a n d t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l content. T h e r e r e m a i n s , to be
sure, t h e difference t h a t s p e e c h acts b e c o m e reflexive, t h a t is, they
can be t u r n e d into t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t or c o n t e n t of o t h e r s p e e c h
acts.
T h e linguistic a n d n o n l i n g u i s t i c m e a n s w h e r e b y c o m m u n i c a t i v e
acts are p e r f o r m e d s t a n d on the s a m e level of o r g a n i z a t i o n , so to
speak. T h i s is n o t the case for s p e e c h acts and gestures. For bodily ex
pressions a r e n o t r e l a t e d to the psychological p r o c e s s they express
conventionally i n t h e way t h a t s e n t e n d a l symbols are to t h e i r seman
tic c o n t e n t . T h e y a r e often t h e sign (index) as well as t h e icon of w h a t
they m e a n . B u h l e r has s o u g h t to c a p t u r e this difference b e t w e e n t h e
gestural a n d linguistic functions of m e a n i n g with t h e c o n c e p t s of ex
pressive versus r e p r e s e n t a t i v e function; Bateson with the distinction,
b o r r o w e d f r o m c o m p u t e r science, between a n a l o g a n d digital trans
mission; a n d Arieti with t h e j u x t a p o s i t i o n of p r o t o - l a n g u a g e a n d n o r
m a l l a n g u a g e , a j u x t a p o s i t i o n g e a r e d toward p s y c h o p a t h o l o g i c a l
p h e n o m e n a . W h a t defines these c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s is t h e view t h a t
p r o p o s i t i o n s c o n t a i n g e n e r a l predicates. T h e s e m u s t b e c o n n e c t e d
to individual objects t h r o u g h acts of identification, w h e r e a s t h e
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Reflections on Communicative Pathology

m e a n i n g of a gesture is explicated by its own c o n c r e t e visual charac

ter a n d is from t h e outset r o o t e d in t h e c o n t e x t in which it is ex
p r e s s e d so t h a t an explicit r e f e r e n c e is unnecessary.
T h e bodily expression is u n e n c u m b e r e d by p r o b l e m s of r e f e r e n c e
a n d by decisions a b o u t t h e context-specific a p p l i c a t i o n a n d
concretization of general t e r m s b e c a u s e it lacks a propositionally artic
ulated structure.
(b) A f u r t h e r aspect of this d e v e l o p m e n t is t h e t r a n s i t i o n from
c o n t e x t - d e p e n d e n t l a n g u a g e use in symbolically m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c
tions to context-independent language use in propositionally differenti
ated speech. As l o n g as the d o m i n a n t m o d e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n is
uniformly s t r u c t u r e d by imperatives and d o e s n o t allow for differen
t i a t e d l a n g u a g e use, speech acts r e m a i n r o o t e d in t h e c o n t e x t of ac
tion i n a s m u c h as t h e situation in which a n u t t e r a n c e is m a d e
coincides w i t h t h e situation to which its c o n t e n t refers. But as soon as
p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t can b e k e p t i n v a r i a n t with r e s p e c t to different
illocutionary acts a n d c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y c h a n g i n g i n t e r p e r s o n a l rela
tions, s e n t e n c e m e a n i n g h a s to b e r e c o n n e c t e d to t h e s p e e c h situa
tion by m e a n s of expressions t h a t refer to t h e situation a n d b e l o n g to
t h e system of r e f e r e n c e t h a t has n o w e m e r g e d . T h e flip side of free
i n g p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t f r o m t h e imperative w e b of i n t e r a c t i o n s , of
which t h e u t t e r a n c e itself is a p a r t , is t h e a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d p r o b l e m
of r e f e r e n c e a n d a p p l i c a d o n . N a m e s o r definite d e s c r i p t i o n s have t o
b e c h o s e n by t h e s p e a k e r in such a way t h a t a h e a r e r in a given situa
tion could reliably identify t h e object to which t h e e x p r e s s i o n refers,
t h a t is, t h a t she c o u l d pick it o u t f r o m a n u m b e r of possible objects of
reference.
T h e d e v e l o p m e n t s discussed u n d e r (a) a n d (b) create a n e w level
of linguistic differentiation. Insofar as a s p e a k e r r e m a i n s b e l o w this
level, his u t t e r a n c e s t a k e o n idiosyncratic features. B o t h inconsistencies
b e t w e e n verbalized s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t a n d c o n t e n t e x p r e s s e d in n o n
verbal actions or gestures, as well as t h e a r b i t r a r y a p p l i c a t i o n of p u b
lic l a n g u a g e with o p a q u e r e f e r e n c e s betray a d e f o r m e d l a n g u a g e use
t h a t is shot t h r o u g h with private meanings.
(c), (d) A f u r t h e r t e n d e n c y toward the i n c r e a s i n g a u t o n o m y of
l a n g u a g e e m e r g e s in the s e p a r a t i o n of s p e e c h from the n o r m a t i v e
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Reflections o n Communicative Pathology

b a c k g r o u n d of s p e e c h acts. Elsewhere, I h a v e s h o w n t h a t t h e sys

tematic c o n n e c t i o n of p a r t i c i p a n t a n d o b s e r v e r perspective is con
stitutive for roles, t h a t is, for reciprocal n o r m a t i v e behavioral
e x p e c t a t i o n s . T h i s splits t h e d o m a i n of the reality of symbolically m e
diated i n t e r a c t i o n s in two: N o r m s of action a n d values f o r m t h e rela
tively invariant b a c k g r o u n d against which interpretive events take
p l a c e in s e q u e n c e s of s p e e c h acts, n o n v e r b a l actions, a n d gestures.
T h i s differentiation b e t w e e n s p e e c h a n d n o r m a t i v e social reality cor
r e s p o n d s to t h e differentiation b e t w e e n s p e e c h a n d a s p e a k e r ' s sub
jectivity. T h e double-sided differentiation of s p e e c h from t h e
institutional reality of n o r m s of action a n d values as well as from the
symbolically o r g a n i z e d e g o of a g e n t s w h o take their place within sys
tems of roles leads to a g r e a t e r complexity in processes of r e a c h i n g
u n d e r s t a n d i n g . At t h e level of symbolically m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n ,
r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g within t h e m o d e of i m p e r a t i v e c o m m u n i c a
tion m e a n s b o t h g e t t i n g t h e o t h e r to u n d e r s t a n d a b e h a v i o r a l expec
tation a n d to fulfill it. " R e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g " [Verstdndigung]
today still h a s t h e a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d d u a l c o n n o t a t i o n of u n d e r s t a n d
i n g [Verstehen] a n d agreeing [Ubereinstimmen]. As soon as s p e e c h is
d e t a c h e d f r o m its n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d a n d f r o m t h e identity of
the speaker, t h e s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g [ Verstdndnis] of the m e a n i n g
[Sinn] of a n expression in itself n o l o n g e r g u a r a n t e e s a g r e e m e n t
a b o u t its r i g h t n e s s a n d acceptability. In such a case, dissensus regard
i n g t h e r i g h t n e s s of an u t t e r a n c e t h a t is intelligible in terms of its se
m a n t i c c o n t e n t may c o n c e r n t h e fact t h a t t h e u t t e r a n c e (i) fails to
m e e t a c o m m o n l y r e c o g n i z e d n o r m or (ii) a c c o r d s with a d i s p u t e d
n o r m . T h e dissensus, however, m a y also r e f e r to t h e self-representa
tion of t h e speaker, t h a t is, to t h e fact (iii) t h a t an u t t e r a n c e d o e s n o t
fit with a r e c o g n i z e d identity o r a n ego-ideal o r (iv) t h a t it accords
w i t h a n identity t h a t is itself c o n t e s t e d .

(e) S p e e c h b e c o m e s a u t o n o m o u s relative to o t h e r f o r m s of ex
pression, relative to t h e c o n t e x t of action, relative to n o r m a t i v e social
reality a n d t h e speaker's subjectivity. T h e result is t h a t s p e e c h be
comes subject t o an external organization t h a t resolves t h e steering
p r o b l e m s t h a t c r o p u p . Socially, f o r e x a m p l e , t h e r e a r e q u e s t i o n s as
to w h o m a y p a r t i c i p a t e (actively o r passively) in which s p e e c h situa
tions, h o w formally or diffusely relationships get defined, a n d so o n .
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Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology

T e m p o r a l l y t h e r e are issues r e g a r d i n g w h o may start or stop discus

sion, w h o may c o n t r i b u t e s o m e t h i n g to t h e conversation, h o w often,
a n d in w h a t order. I n terms of c o n t e n t , t h e r e are issues r e g a r d i n g t h e
o r d e r of topics a n d c o n t r i b u t i o n s , h o w precisely topics are d e f i n e d
a n d h o w extensively they g e t treated, h o w b r o a d t h e s p e c t r u m of
c o n t r i b u t i o n s s h o u l d b e , a n d so o n . Of c o u r s e t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t
t h a t d e t e r m i n e s t h e p a t t e r n s of i n t e r a c t i o n is also r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e
e x t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h . But in a d d i t i o n , s p e e c h is subject to
its o w n o r g a n i z i n g imperatives. Moreover, it serves as t h e a r e n a
w h e r e speakers h a v e to reconcile different i n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t e x t s a n d
c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r differential p l a n s of action a n d t h e i r n e e d s . T h u s
e a c h p a r t i c i p a n t can try t o i n f l u e n c e t h e e x t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of
s p e e c h with t h e aim of altering t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t t o h e r advan
tage. T h e a u t o n o m y of s p e e c h o p e n s u p t h e possibility of e m p l o y i n g
t h e means of communicative action strategically w i t h o u t ostensibly violat
i n g t h e c o m m i t m e n t to consensus. Some e x a m p l e s of this a r e de
bates over t h e o r d e r of business in associations a n d p a r l i a m e n t s ,
c o n v e r s a t i o n s in i n f o r m a l g r o u p s , a n d especially h a b i t u a l s p e e c h
strategies in t h e family t h a t serve t h e u n d e c l a r e d p u r s u i t of u n a p
proved interests u n d e r t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of c o n s e n s u a l action ( a n d
c o n s e n s u a l conflict r e s o l u t i o n ) . E g o c e n t r i c perspectives m a y b e built
i n t o t h e asymmetries of h o w speech is o r g a n i z e d in m o r e or less obvi
o u s ways.

(f) T h e differentiation of s p e e c h t h a t I have e l a b o r a t e d u n d e r

(a) t h r o u g h (e) is m i r r o r e d by t h e internal organization of speech. T h e
e x t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h normatively d e t e r m i n e s (i.e.,
t h r o u g h r e g u l a t i o n s o f a n institutional n a t u r e ) h o w t h e g e n e r a l
s t e e r i n g p r o b l e m s of a linguistic system of c o m m u n i c a t i o n a r e re
solved. T h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h consists i n t h e universal
p r a g m a t i c r e g u l a t i o n of s e q u e n c e s of s p e e c h acts, a n d this r e g u l a t i o n
does n o t r e q u i r e any b a c k i n g by social n o r m s o w i n g to its t r a n s c e n -
dentally necessitating n a t u r e .
As the i n d e p e n d e n t s p h e r e of g r a m m a t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s t h a t a r e
f o r m e d in a c c o r d a n c e to (or violation of) certain rules d e s c r i b e d u n
d e r (a) b e c o m e s a u t o n o m o u s , t h e n e e d arises for evaluating an ut
terance as an e l e m e n t of a l a n g u a g e . An u t t e r a n c e is unintelligible if it
d o e s n o t b e l o n g to t h e set of well-formed expressions t h a t can b e
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p r o d u c e d by m e a n s of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e system of g r a m m a t i c a l rules.
T h e differentiation of p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s d e s c r i b e d u n d e r (b)
gives rise to t h e n e e d t o j u d g e w h e t h e r a p r o p o s i t i o n is true or false,
a n d w h e t h e r an object of w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is asserted can b e
i d e n t i f i e d or n o t , t h a t is, w h e t h e r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n c o u l d b e t r u e o r
w h e t h e r it is meaningless. T h e s e p a r a t i o n b e t w e e n s p e e c h a n d a n o r
mative b a c k g r o u n d i n d i c a t e d in (c) gives rise to t h e n e e d to j u d g e a
given u t t e r a n c e with r e s p e c t to w h e t h e r it m e e t s socially b i n d i n g val
ues or a prevailing n o r m and is in that sense right or w h e t h e r it vio
lates established structures of e x p e c t a t i o n . Similarly, the split
between s p e e c h a n d a s p e a k e r ' s subjectivity cited u n d e r (d) raises
t h e n e e d to j u d g e t h e s p e a k e r ' s expressed i n t e n t i o n with r e g a r d t o
w h e t h e r t h e s p e a k e r expresses it sincerely or insincerely.
In p e r f o r m i n g s p e e c h acts, we are r e q u i r e d to m e e t universal de
m a n d s t h a t g r o u n d t h e validity of o u r claims. T h e s e d e m a n d s reflect
t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n t h e s p e e c h acts a n d t h e i r p r o p e r linguistic
m e d i u m , t h e n o r m a t i v e social reality, a n d t h e i n n e r subjecdve n a t u r e
of t h e speakers. As soon as this validity basis of s p e e c h is established,
different m o d e s of l a n g u a g e u s e c a n b e differentiated d e p e n d i n g o n
w h i c h validity c l a i m is thematically h i g h l i g h t e d : T h e r e a r e cognitive,
interactive, a n d expressive uses of l a n g u a g e . T h e o c c u r r e n c e of these
different m o d e s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n is a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n for
p e r f o r m a t i v e n e g a t i o n , t h a t is, for e x t e n d i n g the n e g a t i o n of sen
tences to s p e e c h acts. At t h e first level of c o m m u n i c a t i o n only t h e be
havioral e x p e c t a t i o n of a n o t h e r can b e n e g a t e d ; at t h e s e c o n d level,
t h e s p e a k e r is able to d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n a r e j e c d o n of w h a t is p r o
p o s e d in t h e s p e e c h act (I d o n ' t accept y o u r p r o m i s e ) , a n e g a t e d
s p e e c h act (I a m n o t p r o m i s i n g you t h a t I will c o m e ) , a n d a n e g a t e d
p r o p o s i t i o n (I p r o m i s e t h a t I will n o t c o m e ) .

(3) In discussing t h e " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " place value of t h e validity

basis, o n e m i g h t t h i n k t h a t it is impossible to diverge from t h e uni
versal d e m a n d s t h a t g r o u n d validity, t h a t t h e i n t e r n a l organization of
s p e e c h is inviolable. If t h a t were t h e case, we would n o t even n e e d to
explicate t h e n o r m a t i v e f o u n d a t i o n of s p e e c h since t h e n o r m a l con
d i t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n f r o m w h i c h a s p e a k e r c o u l d n o t diverge
w o u l d b e of n o i n t e r e s t for analyzing distorted p a t t e r n s of c o m m u n i
cation. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , n o r m a l c y c o n d i t i o n s for t h e e x t e r n a l or-
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ganization of speech seem to b e given in a different sense t h a n t h e

c o n d i t i o n s f o r its i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e p r o b l e m s r e g a r d i n g
t e m p o r a l , spatial, a n d substantive dispositions leave c o n s i d e r a b l e lee
way for s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n , which can be utilized differently d e p e n d i n g
o n t h e functional c o n t e x t in w h i c h c o m m u n i c a t i o n takes place. T h e
key t o t h e p a t h o g e n e s i s of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n , in my view, lies
in a certain overburdening of the external organization of speech. T h i s bur
d e n must be shifted onto the internal organization of speech a n d results in
systematic distortion. I use the t e r m "distortion" to stress the insight
t h a t the i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h expresses u n i v e r s a l a n d u n
avoidable p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e t r a n
s c e n d e n t a l necessity implied by this f e a t u r e of ineluctability o r of a
lack of alternatives d o e s n o t imply inviolability. Rather, it m e a n s t h a t
t h e violation of t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h gives rise to
p a t h o l o g i c a l m u t a t i o n s of t h e p a t t e r n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I n o t h e r
words, t h e p a t h o g e n e s i s c a n b e t r a c e d b a c k to p r o b l e m s t h a t e x e r t
p r e s s u r e o n t h e e x t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of speech. W h e n this p r e s s u r e
is shifted f r o m t h e e x t e r n a l to the i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h , it
has a distorting effect. I s h o u l d n o w like to analyze this distortion,
w h i c h sets in at the validity basis of speech.
T h e d i s t u r b a n c e of systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n lies at
a d e e p e r level than the d i s t u r b a n c e of a n o m a l o u s b e h a v i o r that ex
presses itself in d i v e r g e n c e f r o m a socially b i n d i n g n o r m . D i s t o r t e d
c o m m u n i c a t i o n does n o t violate a n y n o r m s of a c t i o n t h a t enjoy so
cial validity f o r c o n t i n g e n t reasons; t h e y violate universal p r e s u p p o s i
tions of c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t in n o way c h a n g e from o n e n o r m a t i v e
c o n t e x t to a n o t h e r . Of course even a flawed c o m m u n i c a t i o n is a c o m
m u n i c a t i o n , w h i c h in m a n y cases m a y still b e r e g a r d e d as n o r m a l
s p e e c h " n o r m a l " in t h e cultural sense of n o r m a l c y t h a t covers
everything within t h e b o u n d s of w h a t is socially a c c e p t e d .
T h e following a r e universal presuppositions of communicative action:

(i) t h a t the p a r t i c i p a n t s m u t u a l l y c o n s i d e r each o t h e r to b e account

able. T h a t is, they m u s t p r e s u m e o n e a n o t h e r to have overcome child
ish e g o c e n t r i s m a n d to b e able to distinguish between t h e
intersubjectivity of l a n g u a g e , t h e objectivity of e x t e r n a l n a t u r e , t h e
subjectivity of i n n e r n a t u r e , a n d t h e normativity of society; a n d
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(ii) t h a t t h e y m u t u a l l y c o n s i d e r o n e a n o t h e r ready and willing to reach

mutual understanding. T h e y must mutually s u p p o s e o n e a n o t h e r to be
disposed e i t h e r t o act o n t h e basis of or to b r i n g a b o u t a c o n s e n s u s
r e g a r d i n g t h e f o u r validity claims i n h e r e n t in s p e e c h (the intelligibil
ity of a n u t t e r a n c e , t h e t r u t h of t h e asserted o r m e n t i o n e d proposi
tional c o n t e n t , t h e rightness of t h e u t t e r a n c e w i t h r e f e r e n c e to a n
accepted n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d , a n d t h e sincerity of t h e s p e a k e r re
g a r d i n g t h e i n t e n t i o n s she is e x p r e s s i n g ) . I n o t h e r words, they m u s t
a t t r i b u t e to each o t h e r dispositions to reach agreement. T h i s g e n e r a l
c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of a m u t u a l l y a t t r i b u t e d willingness
to r e a c h m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g d o e s n o t h o l d for strategic, b u t only
for c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. T h u s a speaker S w h o is willing t o r e a c h
m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g will

(a) select a linguistic expression so t h a t t h e h e a r e r / / u n d e r s t a n d s it

as S i n t e n d s H to u n d e r s t a n d it;
(b) f o r m u l a t e t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t so t h a t it r e p r e s e n t s a n ex
p e r i e n c e o r a fact ( a n d so that Hcan share S's k n o w l e d g e ) ;
(c) express h e r i n t e n t i o n so t h a t t h e linguistic expression r e p r e s e n t s
w h a t S m e a n s ( a n d so t h a t Hmay t r u s t S);
(d) e x e c u t e t h e s p e e c h act so t h a t it m e e t s a c c e p t e d n o r m s o r c o r r e
s p o n d s to a c c e p t e d self-images ( a n d so t h a t H c a n a g r e e w i t h S o n
this).

T h e validity of t h e sentence u s e d d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r it is well formed

in a c c o r d a n c e with g r a m m a t i c a l rules. T h e validity of t h e proposition
(or t h e existential p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t ) de
p e n d s o n w h e t h e r it (or they) correspond(s) to reality. T h e validity of
t h e intention e x p r e s s e d d e p e n d s on w h e t h e r it coincides with what the
s p e a k e r m e a n s . A n d , finally, t h e validity of t h e s p e e c h act d e p e n d s o n
w h e t h e r it fulfills a c k n o w l e d g e d b a c k g r o u n d n o r m s .
If t h e intelligibility of a c o m m u n i c a t i o n breaks down, t h e c o m m u n i
cative d i s t u r b a n c e c a n b e t h e m a t i z e d at t h e level of h e r m e n e u t i c dis
c o u r s e , in c o n n e c t i o n with t h e relevant linguistic system. I n cognitive
l a n g u a g e u s e , we take on an obligation to g r o u n d o u r claim
[Begrundungsverpflichtung] t h a t is i n h e r e n t in t h e s p e e c h act. Con
stative s p e e c h acts c o n t a i n t h e offer to t a k e r e c o u r s e , if necessary, t o
t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l s o u r c e f r o m w h i c h t h e speaker draws the certainty
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t h a t his s t a t e m e n t is t r u e . If this i m m e d i a t e g r o u n d i n g [Begriindung]

fails to satisfy an ad h o c d o u b t , t h e p r o b l e m a t i z e d t r u t h claim can be
c o m e t h e object of a t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . I n interactive l a n g u a g e
use, we take o n a n obligation to justify o u r claim [Rechtfer-
tigungsverpflichtung] i n h e r e n t in the s p e e c h act. Regulative s p e e c h
acts c o n t a i n only t h e offer of a s p e a k e r to refer, if necessary, to t h e
n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t t h a t gives t h e speaker t h e conviction t h a t h e r utter
ance is right. O n c e again, if t h e i m m e d i a t e justification [Rechtfer-
tigung] fails to r e m o v e a n a d h o c d o u b t , we may m o v e to the level of
discourse, in this case of practical discourse. With this m o v e , how
ever, t h e object of t h e discursive test b e c o m e s n o t t h e claim to n o r
mative validity t h a t is c o n n e c t e d t o t h e s p e e c h act; b u t t h e validity
claim of the underlying norm. Lastly, even in expressive l a n g u a g e use,
t h e speaker u n d e r t a k e s a w a r r a n t i n h e r e n t in t h e s p e e c h act, namely,
t h e obligation to p r o v e trustworthy [Bewahrungsverpflichtung] by
d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h r o u g h t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of his actions t h a t h e has
expressed t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t actually motivates him. I n case t h e im
m e d i a t e assurance t h a t expresses w h a t is evident to t h e speaker himself
fails to dissipate a n ad h o c d o u b t , t h e sincerity of t h e u t t e r a n c e c a n
only b e tested against t h e consistency of t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of action.
N o w w h a t does a violation of t h e universal p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of c o m
munication mean?
A n u t t e r a n c e m u s t b e sufficiently well f o r m e d so t h a t it c a n b e u n
d e r s t o o d . Otherwise it does n o t serve t h e p u r p o s e of r e a c h i n g m u
t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . It is n o t possible to w a n t to c o m m u n i c a t e and to
express oneself unintelligibly o r misleadingly: h e r e i n lies t h e necessi
t a t i n g m o m e n t t h a t is r e m i n i s c e n t of a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l necessity. In
telligibility is a claim t h a t can b e satisfied to a d e g r e e : An u t t e r a n c e
may b e m o r e o r less intelligible, b u t it m u s t b e intelligible uberhaupt
(i.e., sufficiently so) if it is to fulfill its c o m m u n i c a t i v e p u r p o s e . It is
possible to set different s t a n d a r d s of intelligibility for u t t e r a n c e s de
p e n d i n g o n t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r functional contexts. F o r e x a m p l e , t h e
s t a n d a r d s of precision a n d d e m a n d s f o r e x p l i c a t i o n in science a r e
different from t h o s e of everyday c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I w o u l d like to
c o m p a r e several violations of t h e claim to intelligibility in o r d e r to
identify t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which s o m e t h i n g like a systematic dis
tortion of c o m m u n i c a t i o n occurs.
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(a) A s p e a k e r wishes t o e x p r e s s h i m s e l f in a foreign l a n g u a g e of

which h e has limited mastery, b u t t h e a t t e m p t fails. His u t t e r a n c e s re
m a i n unintelligible. Yet the s p e a k e r w o u l d be perfectly able to ex
press w h a t h e m e a n s intelligibly in his m o t h e r t o n g u e . I d o n o t call
this a case of systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n , b u t of incom
p e t e n c e . T h e s p e a k e r is i n c o m p e t e n t t o express w h a t h e m e a n s
w i t h i n t h e c o n v e n t i o n s of a f o r e i g n l a n g u a g e .
(b) A scientist fails to express herself sufficiently clearly. She abides
n e i t h e r by t h e d e m a n d s for explication n o r by t h e t e r m i n o l o g y of a
discourse, which is regulated by an academic discipline. H e r col
leagues c o m p l a i n t h a t she is unintelligible. T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t
her factual assertions are n o t intelligible, b u t only t h a t they violate
t h e n o r m s of a level of intelligibility to be e x p e c t e d in t h e c o n t e x t of
a specialized p u b l i c s p h e r e . I n this case, c o m m u n i c a t i o n is n o t dis
t o r t e d either.
(c) I n an e m b a r r a s s i n g situation, o n e of t h e p e o p l e involved tries to
express himself so as to m a i n t a i n a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g that defuses
t h e situation. T h i s m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g may have b e e n i n t e n d e d o r it
m a y h a v e arisen by accident. O r a s p e a k e r tries to express herself u n
intelligibly i n a c o m m u n i c a t i v e situation t h a t has d e r a i l e d a n d in
which any of t h e possible r e a c t i o n s w o u l d be equally e m b a r r a s s i n g .
She c h o o s e s a m i l d f o r m of b r e a k i n g off c o m m u n i c a t i o n o r of obfus-
cation i n o r d e r to avoid t h e o t h e r w i s e u n a v o i d a b l e conflict. N e i t h e r
is so m u c h a case of systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n as a n in
stance of strategic action r e p l a c i n g c o n s e n s u a l action. I n t e n d e d mis
u n d e r s t a n d i n g s a n d i n t e n d e d lack of u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e p a r t of a
strategy in t h e course of which t h e s p e a k e r silently s u s p e n d s essential
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n (sincerity, r i g h t n e s s ) .
(d) A s p e a k e r expresses himself (in his m o t h e r t o n g u e ) unintelligi
bly or confusedly w i t h o u t n o t i c i n g o r i n t e n d i n g it. T h e a n o m a l y of
his m a n n e r of expression m a y b e c a u s e d by illogical o r p a r a d o x i c a l
l a n g u a g e use. T h a t is, verbal a n d n o n v e r b a l messages m a y c o n t r a d i c t
e a c h other. A b i z a r r e f o r m of expression, however, m a y also result
from a n idiosyncratic use of s e m a n t i c s o r f r o m violations of syntax. If
i n t e r j e c d o n s of private l a n g u a g e violate t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r e s u p
position of intelligibility, a n d t h u s t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of
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s p e e c h , even t h o u g h t h e s p e a k e r does n o t intentionally a b a n d o n t h e

f o u n d a t i o n of c o n s e n s u a l action, t h e n we h a v e w h a t I w a n t to call sys
tematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n .

S o m e t h i n g similar applies to two o t h e r validity claims: sincerity

a n d n o r m a t i v e Tightness. Unless an i n t e n t i o n is expressed sincerely,
t h e speaker's i n t e n t i o n c a n n o t serve t h e p u r p o s e of r e a c h i n g m u t u a l
u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Again, t r a n s c e n d e n t a l necessitation is evident in t h e
fact t h a t o n e c a n n o t w a n t b o t h to m a k e oneself u n d e r s t o o d a n d to
express o n e ' s i n t e n t i o n insincerely. In cognitive l a n g u a g e u s e (I as
sert t h a t p) t h e implicit i n t e n t i o n of t h e speaker (that t h e speaker
knows s o m e t h i n g ) is n o t t h e m a t i z e d . Similarly, in interactive lan
g u a g e use (I o r d e r y o u t h a t p), t h e s p e a k e r ' s e m b e d d e d i n t e n t i o n a l
e x p e r i e n c e s (that she gives t h e o r d e r fearfully, threateningly,
cold-bloodedly, embarrassedly, etc.) are e x p r e s s e d only incidentally.
O n l y in expressive l a n g u a g e use (I suspect that p; I h o p e that p; I do
n o t deny that I miss you, that I h a t e you, love you, etc.) d o i n t e n
tional e x p e r i e n c e s lose t h e i r s e c o n d a r y c h a r a c t e r . A l t h o u g h t h e r e is
t h e possibility t h a t t h e speaker expresses h e r i n t e n t i o n sincerely o r
insincerely, t h e c l a i m to sincerity m a y also b e r e d e e m e d by degree.
How m u c h a s p e a k e r conceals b e h i n d his explicit sincere u t t e r a n c e s
d e p e n d s o n t h e context. I n different f u n c t i o n a l c o n t e x t s , this cir
c u m s t a n c e is g r o u n d s for s t a n d a r d i z i n g t h e s c o p e of sincere utter
ances. E x a m p l e s a r e u t t e r a n c e s u n d e r o a t h d u r i n g trials o r m a r r i a g e
c e r e m o n i e s , w h i c h institutionalize a uni- o r bilateral claim to "the
whole t r u t h , " t h u s e x c l u d i n g strategic w i t h h o l d i n g of i n f o r m a t i o n .
C o n s i d e r t h e following e x a m p l e s :

(a) A witness is u n d e r suspicion of having given false testimony. H e

r e p e a t s his t e s t i m o n y u n d e r o a t h . L a t e r it t u r n s o u t t h a t h e h a s pur
posely s u p p r e s s e d a relevant fact without h a v i n g c o m m i t t e d a n out
right lie. H e r e t h e witness is violating a n o r m t h a t is i m p o r t a n t to the
f u n c t i o n i n g of c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s ; namely, telling t h e t r u t h to its full
e x t e n t . H e is acting strategically in a d o m a i n of action for which a
valid n o r m p r e s c r i b e s acting o n t h e basis of c o n s e n s u s .
(b) O n e p a r t n e r in a c o u p l e p r e t e n d s t o have feelings t h a t t h e o t h e r
expects. Let's a s s u m e we a r e talking a b o u t a w o m a n w h o d o e s n o t
w a n t t o e n d a n g e r t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t of t h e m a r r i a g e a n d t h e
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family. F o r t h e sake of this strategic goal, she k e e p s u p t h e a p p e a r

a n c e of r e c i p r o c a t i n g the affection of h e r h u s b a n d w h o m she has
l o n g d e t e s t e d . T h i s gives rise to two levels of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . At t h e
level of manifest behavior, t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of
c o n s e n s u a l a c t i o n a r e m e t . At the level of l a t e n t behavior, o n e of the
p a r t i c i p a n t s is acting strategically a n d intentionally violates t h e p r e
s u p p o s i t i o n of sincerity. T h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h is b e i n g
unilaterally a n d intentionally violated.
(c) W e m a y modify this e x a m p l e . T h e wife deceives n o t only h e r hus
b a n d r e g a r d i n g h e r t r u e feelings, b u t also herself. (We n e e d n o t con
sider t h e structurally a n a l o g o u s case in which b o t h p a r t n e r s relate to
e a c h o t h e r as well as to themselves insincerely, since it differs from
t h e simple case o n l y in d e g r e e of complexity.) Again, c o m m u n i c a
tion is split a n d transpires at t h e manifest level such t h a t t h e condi
tions of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action are m e t , while at the l a t e n t level, o n e
of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s is acting strategically by s u s p e n d i n g t h e sincerity
claim. But n o w t h e s p e a k e r violates a c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n
u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y a n d in such a way t h a t t h e violation of t h e organiza
tion of s p e e c h goes u n n o t i c e d by bothparties. In cases (b) a n d (c) t h e
c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n participants is systematically distorted, b u t
only in t h e latter case can t h e d i s t u r b a n c e b e t r a c e d back to a d i s r u p
tion of c o m m u n i c a t i o n within t h e psyche of o n e of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s .

S u s p e n d i n g t h e claim to n o r m a t i v e rightness has similar conse

q u e n c e s . A n u t t e r a n c e has to fit i n t o t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t ; o t h e r
wise it is n o t r e c o g n i z e d a n d fails to serve t h e p u r p o s e of r e a c h i n g
m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . A t r a n s c e n d e n t a l necessitation asserts itself
in t h e fact t h a t o n e m a y n o t at t h e same t i m e w a n t m u t u a l u n d e r
s t a n d i n g a n d m a k e u t t e r a n c e s t h a t violate r e c o g n i z e d n o r m s a n d val
ues. H e r e I w a n t to leave it o p e n w h e t h e r the n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d
is equally b i n d i n g for all p a r t i c i p a n t s or w h e t h e r it m e d i a t e s by
m e a n s of a n o r m a t i v e self-image a n d d e t e r m i n e s h o w a particular per
son o u g h t to act i n a given situation. I w a n t to distinguish b e t w e e n
t h e degree of formalization w h e r e b y a b e h a v i o r is s t a n d a r d i z e d a n d
t h e degree of fulfillment of an existing n o r m by a p a r t i c u l a r behavior.
I n o u r c o n t e x t , only this deviation from n o r m s , which can-
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n o t be f u r t h e r s t a n d a r d i z e d , is of interest. C o n s i d e r t h e following
examples.

(a) A speaker b e h a v e s t o o informally by i g n o r i n g social distance a n d

trying to create an intimacy t h a t is i n a p p r o p r i a t e in t h e situation a t
h a n d . This k i n d of n o r m violation h a s n o t h i n g to d o with d i s t o r t e d
communication.
(b) A s p e a k e r may b e h a v e awkwardly a n d m a y not feel u p to h a n
dling a particularly f o r m a l situation, such as a r e c e p t i o n , a test, etc.
O r s h e behaves i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y b e c a u s e she d o e s n o t k n o w what t h e
n o r m a d v e c o n t e x t is. This is a case of b e h a v i o r t h a t deviates from t h e
n o r m s o w i n g to i n c o m p e t e n c e . Again, it has n o t h i n g to d o with dis
torted communication.
(c) B o t h of these are q u i t e different f r o m inflexible b e h a v i o r t h a t
stereotypically r e c u r s , b u t is n o t necessarily e x p e r i e n c e d by t h e a c t o r
as a b n o r m a l . This c a t e g o r y i n c l u d e s n e u r o t i c b e h a v i o r p a t t e r n s
u t t e r a n c e s t h a t are forcibly s t a n d a r d i z e d a n d are felt to b e p e c u l i a r
a n d o u t of place by o t h e r s . Again, a split of c o m m u n i c a t i o n can b e
o b s e r v e d : T h i s time, only t h e s p e a k e r takes t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r e
suppositions to b e met, while o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s r e g a r d t h e c o m m u
n i c a t i o n as flawed. T h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of speech is d a m a g e d
at t h e level of manifestation; only for t h e s p e a k e r does t h e s e m b l a n c e
of a s m o o t h flow of c o m m u n i c a t i o n persist.
(d) If p a r t i c i p a n t s d i s a g r e e a b o u t t h e n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d , if t h e
o t h e r considers c e r t a i n n o r m s of a c t i o n to b e r i g h t t h a t t h e e g o re
j e c t s , o r if t h e o t h e r d o e s n o t a c c e p t t h e e g o ' s i m a g e of herself, t h e n
we c a n n o l o n g e r talk a b o u t deviating behavior; instead, we n o w have
a conflict. T h i s c a n give rise to distortion effects for t h e i n t e r n a l or
ganization of s p e e c h if t h e conflict is r e p r e s s e d a n d disguised a n d
c o n t i n u e s to s m o l d e r u n d e r t h e cover of a p p a r e n t l y c o n s e n s u a l ac
tion. Here, too, t h e r e is a split of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , w h i c h we shall ex
a m i n e in detail.

I h a v e n o t discussed violations of t h e claim to t r u t h . T h e social

s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n of w h a t c o u n t s as vindicating this claim c a n a p p l y
only to the w a r r a n t to g r o u n d t h e claim, which is i m m a n e n t in t h e
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s p e e c h act. I d o n o t take o n t h e s a m e w a r r a n t for an assertion I m a k e

in t h e c o u r s e of small talk as I d o for a s t a t e m e n t I m a k e i n t h e course
of a scientific discussion. Curiously, t h e r e is n o violation of t r u t h t h a t
is s y m p t o m a t i c of systematically distorted c o m m u n i c a t i o n .

(a) O n e can b e m i s t a k e n , a n d o n e maybe mistaken. An u n i n t e n t i o n

ally false s t a t e m e n t d o e s not fall into t h e class of actions for which we
are a c c o u n t a b l e . T h e care with which a speaker makes g o o d o n t h e
w a r r a n t h e takes o n with a constative s p e e c h act can be s a n c t i o n e d
m u c h like lying, b u t e r r o r c a n n o t . I n d e e d discovering mistakes is a
c o n d i t i o n for l e a r n i n g . Mistakes d o n o t affect t h e i n t e r n a l organiza
tion of s p e e c h .
(b) T h i n g s a r e s o m e w h a t different in t h e case of "wanton asser
tions. " If by t h a t we m e a n u t t e r a n c e s in which t h e speaker carelessly
or intentionally n e g l e c t s the m i n i m a l obligations of a constative
s p e e c h act, we are n o t d e a l i n g with assertions or at least n o t with cor-
recdy f o r m e d a c c e p t a b l e s p e e c h acts. In certain contexts, we m a y be
d e a l i n g with assertions with w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r tries t o m a k e t h i n g s
easy for himself by n o t t a k i n g t h e b u r d e n of p r o o f seriously, etc. H e r e
t h e s p e a k e r is violating social n o r m s , n o t communicative
presuppositions.
(c) Lies, too, d o n o t d a m a g e t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h as
l o n g as they o c c u r as o p e n l y d e c l a r e d and permissible c o m p o n e n t s
of strategic action. O n l y if t h e y a r e u s e d to disguise a conflict c a n
t h e y d i s t o r t c o m m u n i c a t i o n . B u t in t h a t case it is n o t t h e p r e s u p p o s i
tion of t r u t h b u t t h a t of sincerity t h a t is violated: t h e speaker is n o t
expressing h e r i n t e n t i o n sincerely; s h e knows t h a t h e r s t a t e m e n t is
false, b u t h i d e s it f r o m o t h e r s .

T h e c o m p a r i s o n of these e x a m p l e s shows t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n c a n
b e systematically d i s t o r t e d only if t h e i n t e r n a l organization of speech
is d i s r u p t e d . This h a p p e n s if t h e validity basis of linguistic c o m m u n i
cation is c u r t a i l e d surreptitiously; t h a t is, w i t h o u t l e a d i n g to a b r e a k in
c o m m u n i c a t i o n or to the transition to o p e n l y declared a n d permissi
ble strategic action. T h e validity basis of s p e e c h is c u r t a i l e d surrepti
tiously if at least o n e of the t h r e e universal validity claims to
intelligibility (of t h e e x p r e s s i o n ) , sincerity (of t h e i n t e n t i o n ex-
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p r e s s e d by the s p e a k e r ) , a n d n o r m a t i v e Tightness (of t h e expression

relative to a n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d ) is violated a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n
n o n e t h e l e s s c o n t i n u e s o n t h e p r e s u m p t i o n of communicative (not
strategic) action o r i e n t e d toward r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
T h i s is only possible by splitting c o m m u n i c a t i o n , by d o u b l i n g it u p
i n t o a public a n d a private process. W e c a n e x a m i n e h o w this h a p
p e n s by f u r t h e r l o o k i n g at defense m e c h a n i s m s . Since systematically
d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o n t i n u e s t h e t h r e a d of action o r i e n t e d to
r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , this d i s t u r b a n c e m a y b e culturally n o r m a l
ized u n d e r c e r t a i n conditions. T h e c o n f o u n d i n g t h i n g a b o u t "sys
tematic d i s t o r t i o n " is t h a t t h e same validity claims t h a t a r e b e i n g
violated ( a n d violation of w h i c h has p a t h o l o g i c a l effects) at t h e s a m e
t i m e serve to k e e p u p t h e a p p e a r a n c e of c o n s e n s u a l action. T h e vio
lation of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of cognition has t h e effect
of a loss of m e a n i n g , as c a n b e seen in t h e e x a m p l e of category mis
takes. T h e violation of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of commu
nication also leads to a loss of m e a n i n g , if the s p e a k e r falls below t h e
level of differentiation of t h e s e c o n d level of c o m m u n i c a t i o n (as is
t h e case with s c h i z o p h r e n i c linguistic d i s t u r b a n c e s ) . But these a r e
e x t r e m e cases. Usually c o m m u n i c a t i v e p a t h o l o g i e s r e s u l t n o t in a
loss of m e a n i n g , b u t in distortion. T h i s is b e c a u s e c o m m u n i c a t i v e
processes c o n t i n u e as l o n g as t h e violation of s o m e of their transcen
d e n t a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s is n o t manifest, t h a t is, as l o n g as it is n o t rec
ognized a n d a d m i t t e d by t h e participants.

(4) Systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s express a p o t e n t i a l

for conflict t h a t c a n n o t b e c o m p l e t e l y s u p p r e s s e d b u t is n o t sup
p o s e d to b e c o m e manifest. O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e s t r u c t u r e of c o m
m u n i c a t i o n is d e f o r m e d u n d e r t h e p r e s s u r e of conflicts t h a t a r e n o t
c a r r i e d o u t b e c a u s e t h e validity basis of s p e e c h is d a m a g e d . O n t h e
o t h e r h a n d , a n d simultaneously, this d e f o r m e d s t r u c t u r e stabilizes a
c o n t e x t of action that, a l t h o u g h c h a r g e d with t h e p o t e n t i a l for
conflict, constrains a n d to some extent immobilizes t h a t p o t e n t i a l .
T h u s we a r e d e a l i n g w i t h conflicts t h a t c a n b e n e i t h e r o p e n l y c a r r i e d
o u t n o r resolved consensually, b u t t h a t s m o l d e r o n w i t h t h e effect of
distorting c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
Conflicts of identity t h a t arise from t h e u n c o n s c i o u s r e p r e s s i o n of
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t h r e a t s to g r o u p o r e g o identity fit this d e s c r i p t i o n . A n identity c a n

b e secured only by m e a n s of i n t e r p e r s o n a l relationships; it stands
a n d falls with t h e " r e c o g n i t i o n " it findsbe it at t h e cross-cultural or
i n t e r n a t i o n a l level o r at t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l level a m o n g friends a n d
family, a n d so o n . If a n identity is t h r e a t e n e d by t h e w i t h h o l d i n g of
r e c o g n i t i o n , it is often d e f e n d e d i n a p a r a d o x i c a l m a n n e r . O n t h e
o n e h a n d , every d e f e n s e is a strategic action; it can b e o p t i m i z e d only
u n d e r t h e m a x i m s of p u r p o s i v e action. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e goal
of t h e defense c a n n o t be a t t a i n e d strategically, t h a t is, by w i n n i n g a
fight o r a g a m e by defeating o n e ' s o p p o n e n t r e c o g n i t i o n ultimately
c a n n o t be w o n by force. Only d i s i n g e n u o u s or a p p a r e n t r e c o g n i t i o n
c a n be t h u s g a i n e d ; this is e i t h e r t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o real r e c o g n i t i o n
o r it b e c o m e s frail. T h a t is, it b e c o m e s clear t h a t t h e f o r c e d signs o f
r e c o g n i t i o n w e r e n o t seriously m e a n t as r e c o g n i t i o n .
I n w h a t follows I w a n t to set aside p r o b l e m s of collective identity
a n d c o n s i d e r d e f e n s e strategies for p e r s o n a l identities. L a i n g ' s ob
servations a r e helpful h e r e :

A person's "own" identity cannot be perfectly abstracted from his iden-

tity-for-others. His identity-for-himself; the identity that others ascribe to
him; the identities that he attributes to them; the identity or identities he
thinks they attribute to him; what he thinks they think he thinks they
think. . . . "Identity" is that whereby one feels that one is the same in this
place, this time as at that time and at that place, past or future. It is that by
which one is identified. I have the impression that most people tend to
come to feel that they are the same continuotis being from womb to tomb.
And that this "identity," the more it is phantasy, is the more intensely
11
defended.

T h e p a r a d o x t h a t I m e n t i o n e d can b e c o r r o b o r a t e d by t h e strategies
u s e d to d e f e n d o n e ' s e g o identity. T h e d e f e n d e r , w h o c a n stabilize
his t h r e a t e n e d identity only by s u c c e e d i n g in h a v i n g it r e c o n f i r m e d ,
o n t h e o n e h a n d m u s t s t a n d his g r o u n d in a conflict, b u t o n t h e
o t h e r h a n d m u s t suppress this conflict in o r d e r n o t t o destroy t h e
c o n s e n s u a l f o u n d a t i o n of the m u t u a l l y d e s i r e d r e c o g n i t i o n a n d in
o r d e r n o t to risk t h e b r e a k d o w n of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p .
At this p o i n t , I w a n t to illustrate t h e dynamics of such identity
conflicts with a n e x a m p l e t h a t L a i n g a n d his colleagues c o n s t r u e as
follows.
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Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology

[ T h e vicious c i r c l e ] s t a r t s t o w h i r l s o m e t h i n g like this:

Peter: Paul:
1. I ' m u p s e t . 1. P e t e r is u p s e t .
2. P a u l is a c t i n g v e r y calm and 2. I'll t r y t o h e l p h i m by r e m a i n i n g
dispassionate. calm a n d just listening.
3. If P a u l c a r e d a b o u t m e a n d 3. H e ' s g e t t i n g e v e n m o r e u p s e t . I
w a n t e d to h e l p h e w o u l d g e t m o r e m u s t be even m o r e calm,
involved a n d show s o m e e m o t i o n
also.
4. P a u l k n o w s t h a t t h i s u p s e t s m e . 4. H e ' s accusing me of hurting
him.
5. If P a u l k n o w s t h a t t h i s b e h a v i o u r 5. I ' m really t r y i n g to h e l p ,
upsets me, t h e n he m u s t be intend
ing to h u r t m e .
6. H e m u s t b e c r u e l a n d sadistic. 6. H e m u s t b e p r o j e c t i n g .
M a y b e h e g e t s p l e a s u r e o u t o f it, e t c .

A t t r i b u t i o n s o f t h i s k i n d , b a s e d o n a virtually i n e x t r i c a b l e m i x o f m i s
m a t c h e d e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d p h a n t a s y a n d p e r c e p t i o n , a r e t h e v e r y stuff of
i n t e r h u m a n reality. O n e h a s , f o r i n s t a n c e , t o e n t e r i n t o t h i s r e a l m i n o r d e r
to u n d e r s t a n d h o w o n e p e r s o n ' s attributions a b o u t o t h e r s m a y b e g i n to be
particularly disturbing a n d disjunctive to these others, a n d c o m e to b e re
p e a t e d l y i n v a l i d a t e d by t h e m , so t h a t h e m a y b e g i n t o b e s u b j e c t t o t h e
1 2
global attribution of b e i n g m a d .

T h e first p r e c o n d i t i o n for this k i n d o f spiraling i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l re

lationships is a mistrust o n t h e p a r t of at least o n e party, which can b e
t r a c e d b a c k to insecurity r e g a r d i n g o n e ' s own identity. I'm n o t talk
ing a b o u t s o m e a r b i t r a r y affect, b u t a b o u t a type of mistrust that c a n
b e conceived in t e r m s of t h e t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i o n : a mistrust of
t h e s o u n d n e s s of t h e c o n s e n s u a l f o u n d a t i o n of t h e i n t e r a c t i o n , t h a t
is, t h e w o r r y t h a t t h e o t h e r m i g h t leave t h e f o u n d a t i o n of a c t i o n ori
e n t e d to m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d m i g h t "veer o f f m o r e o r less
surreptitiously i n t o strategic behavior. T h e second p r e c o n d i t i o n of t h e
c o m m u n i c a t i v e spiral is a l a t e n t lack of a g r e e m e n t i n t h e assessment
of (at least o n e of) t h e two self-images t h a t r e g u l a t e t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s '
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of self. I n o u r e x a m p l e t h e violations of t h e claims to
sincerity a n d to Tightness a r e r e l e v a n t for t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e
disturbance.
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T h e first " m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g " a p p e a r s in t h e s e c o n d s e q u e n c e : Pe

t e r d o e s n o t u n d e r s t a n d t h a t P a u l w a n t s to h e l p him, b e c a u s e P e t e r
expects P a u l to b e h a v e differendy toward h i m if h e w a n t e d to h e l p .
T h e s e c o n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g e m e r g e s in t h e t h i r d s e q u e n c e : Paul
d o e s n o t u n d e r s t a n d t h a t P e t e r m i s u n d e r s t a n d s h i m b e c a u s e h e ex
p e c t s P e t e r to i n t e r p r e t his b e h a v i o r as helpful. I n t h e f o u r t h se
q u e n c e , t h e c o n s e n s u a l f o u n d a t i o n of t h e i n t e r a c t i o n breaks d o w n
w i t h o u t e i t h e r of the p a r t i c i p a n t s clearly giving n o t i c e that he is
a b a n d o n i n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e action: P e t e r believes that Paul inten
tionally wants to h u r t him, while P a u l this t i m e knows w h a t P e t e r
m e a n s . I n t h e fifth a n d sixth s e q u e n c e s , b o t h p a r t i e s r e a c h t h e con
clusion t h a t t h e o t h e r is violating sincerity claims: P e t e r t h i n k s t h a t
P a u l is enjoying h u r t i n g him, b u t d o e s n o t a d m i t it; P a u l t h i n k s t h a t
P e t e r is falsely t r a n s f e r r i n g t h e hostile feelings h e h a s toward P a u l
o n t o Paul. T h u s P e t e r attributes to P a u l an i n t e n t i o n a l violation of
t h e claim to sincerity, a n d Paul a t t r i b u t e s t o P e t e r a n u n i n t e n t i o n a l
o n e . O n t h e c o n d i t i o n a n d this is t h e third p r e c o n d i t i o n t h a t nei
t h e r of t h e two p a r t n e r s is in a pqsition to go o n acting with an orien
t a t i o n t o r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g at a m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e
level, the c o m m u n i c a t i v e spiral c o n t i n u e s .
Let's a s s u m e t h a t , i n a c e r t a i n context, o u r p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e ,
namely, P e t e r ' s b e i n g upset, r e p r e s e n t s P e t e r ' s a t t e m p t to assert his
identity. T h e n t h e systematically g e n e r a t e d a n d r e i n f o r c e d m i s u n d e r
s t a n d i n g h a s t h e p a r a d o x i c a l result of m a k i n g P e t e r ' s i d e n d t y still
less s e c u r e . F o r P e t e r fails t o h a v e his identity, which is r e p r e s e n t e d in
his u p s e t r e s p o n s e , r e c o g n i z e d . T h e r e c o g n i t i o n would have to con
sist in a n a g r e e m e n t [Einverstdndnis] t h a t w o u l d have given P e t e r the
feeling t h a t Paul h a d understood h i m . U n d e r s t a n d i n g [ Verstehen], b e i n g
u n d e r s t o o d , a n d feeling to have b e e n u n d e r s t o o d a r e functions of a
process of r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , which in this case w o u l d have to
c o m e a b o u t n o t only by m e a n s of (a) t h e intelligibility of t h e expres
sion (of P e t e r ' s b e i n g upset) a n d (b) t h e t r u t h of a p r o p o s i t i o n
(equivalent to a n o n v e r b a l e x p r e s s i o n ) , b u t also by m e a n s of (c) t h e
r i g h t n e s s of P a u l ' s r e s p o n s e (calm listening) w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o a n o r
mative c o n t e x t ( P e t e r ' s a n d Paul's self-images) a n d by m e a n s of
(d) t h e sincerity of t h e i n t e n t i o n s P e t e r a n d P a u l express. I n the in
teractive s e q u e n c e s of o u r e x a m p l e , t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s (c) a n d (d)
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a r e n o t m e t , b u t c o m m u n i c a t i o n is n o n e t h e l e s s n e i t h e r b r o k e n off in
a manifest c h a n g e of a t t i t u d e to strategic a c t i o n n o r c o n t i n u e d at t h e
m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e level of a clarificatory discourse. F o r this reason,
this s e q u e n c e of u t t e r a n c e s is a n e x a m p l e of systematically p r o d u c e d
misunderstandings.
Systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t results f r o m p r o b
lems of s e c u r i n g e g o identity occurs n o t exclusively b u t particularly
frequently within family relations. T h e family is a privileged site of
identity m a n a g e m e n t , n o t only for c h i l d r e n w h o are only just estab
lishing their identity, b u t also for adult family m e m b e r s . I n a d d i t i o n ,
this milieu obliges family m e m b e r s to action t h a t is t h o r o u g h l y ori
e n t e d t o m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; i n societies of o u r sort, i n a n y case,
strategic action is i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e with t h e c o m m i t m e n t s t o con
sensus t h a t h o l d within t h e family. T h e family r e g u l a t e s i n f o r m a l
relationships a n d i n t i m a t e face-to-face i n t e r a c t i o n s within t h e frame
w o r k of a diffuse s t r u c t u r e of roles. Recent l i t e r a t u r e o n e g o psychol
ogy p r o c e e d s f r o m t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t i n t e r p e r s o n a l relationships
of this sort always h a v e a dual character: "Object relations" serve b o t h
t h e f o r m a t i o n a n d c o n f i r m a t i o n of a p r o j e c t i o n of o n e ' s identity a n d
t h e satisfaction of drives. I n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s within t h e family
a r e c h a n n e l s of a n affective as well as a cognitive e x c h a n g e , which are
d e t e r m i n e d simultaneously by t h e p s y c h o d y n a m i c s of satisfying
drives a n d of s e c u r i n g o n e ' s identity. T h e s e aspects c a n be s e p a r a t e d
only analytically. T h e diffuse r o l e s t r u c t u r e of t h e n u c l e a r family
m e e t s t h e d u a l c h a r a c t e r of t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l relationships t h a t are
p e r m i t t e d within it halfway. W i t h r e s p e c t to t h e personality systems of
its m e m b e r s , t h e family does n o t h a v e particularly s t r o n g functional
specifications. It allows f o r a b r o a d s p e c t r u m of n e e d s to b e m e t .
T h e r e are n o particularly rigid s t a n d a r d s for h o w r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e
tween family m e m b e r s a r e defined; t h e leeway for individual self-
p r e s e n t a t i o n is relatively wide since any given aspect of a r e l a t i o n s h i p
c a n b e t h e m a t i z e d at any time. If, of course, individual family m e m
b e r s use a role s t r u c t u r e t h a t is subject to conflict s i m u l t a n e o u s l y for
satisfying their drives a n d for s e c u r i n g t h e i r identities, special regula
tory capacities are called for in o r d e r to resolve e m e r g i n g systemic
p r o b l e m s adequately, t h a t is, w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e to strategies of r e p r e s
sion t h a t h a v e oppressive side effects.
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T w o systemic p r o b l e m s arise from t h e perspective of t h e functions

t h a t t h e family system is to fulfill for individual m e m b e r s : o p t i m a l
n e e d satisfaction a n d securing identity. A t h i r d systemic p r o b l e m
arises f r o m t h e complementary^ p o i n t of view of w h a t t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s
between m e m b e r s are to achieve for t h e family system: s e c u r i n g au
t o n o m y within the self-regulation of the family's e x c h a n g e with its
s u r r o u n d i n g s (its " e n v i r o n m e n t s " ) . Moreover, we may a s s u m e t h a t
t h e f o u r t h systemic p r o b l e m , which establishes t h e family's func
tional r e l a t i o n to t h e system of t h e w h o l e of society, namely, t h e so
cialization of t h e c h i l d r e n , c a n b e resolved to t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e
o t h e r t h r e e systemic p r o b l e m s c a n b e satisfactorily dealt with. H e n c e
I shall confine myself i n w h a t follows t o t h e s e t h r e e .
First, I w a n t t o c o r r e l a t e t h e systemic p r o b l e m s with t h e d i m e n
sions in w h i c h t h e i r solutions c a n b e analyzed. It will t h e n b e c o m e
clear w h i c h of t h e s e d i m e n s i o n s is relevant to t h e e x t e r n a l organiza
tion of s p e e c h a n d h o w t h e p r e s s u r e of unsolved p r o b l e m s (by m e a n s
of an u n c o n s c i o u s r e p r e s s i o n of conflicts) has a d i s t o r t i n g effect
w h e n it is shifted o n t o t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h .
T h e systemic p r o b l e m of n e e d satisfaction of individual family
m e m b e r s can be e x a m i n e d in t h e d i m e n s i o n of a mutual giving and
taking. Processes in this d i m e n s i o n can in t u r n b e e x a m i n e d from
t h r e e p o i n t s of view: (a) w h a t t h e ratio of drive satisfaction to desire
frustration is f o r a n individual a n d h o w t h e b a l a n c e of gratification is
d i s t r i b u t e d a m o n g family m e m b e r s ; (b) w h a t t h e p r o p o r t i o n of t h e i r
s h a r e of i m m e d i a t e gratifications is relative to delayed gratifications;
a n d (c) h o w t h e stimulating variation o f stimuli a n d t h e stabilizing
c o n t i n u i t y of stimuli b a l a n c e out. H. Stierlin has shown t h a t t h e s e
13
t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s v a r y i n d e p e n d e n t l y of o n e a n o t h e r . T h e p r o b l e m
of securing one's identity can b e b r o k e n d o w n i n t o t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s :
(a) t h e r e g u l a t i o n of t h e p r o x i m i t y a n d distance t h a t is to b e m a i n
t a i n e d d u r i n g i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n participants; (b) t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n
a m o n g g r o u p m e m b e r s of o p p o r t u n i t i e s to actively take t h e initiative
or simply to e x p e r i e n c e t h e activities of o t h e r s passively; a n d (c) t h e
d e g r e e of c o n v e r g e n c e a n d difference b e t w e e n n o r m a t i v e o r i e n t a
tions, especially b e t w e e n intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d self-images.
T h e p r o b l e m of t h e independence of the family system from its environ-
I;
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Reflections o n Communicative Pathology

m e n t , finally, is a q u e s t i o n of b o u n d a r i e s : t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h t h e
family closes itself off o r o p e n s u p , h o w m u c h it constitutes a u n i t
with r e g a r d to family issues a n d m y t h s , o r t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h its in
t e r n a l c o m m u n i c a t i v e n e t w o r k s are tied to extrafamilial forces.
Empirical studies have s h o w n t h a t a family's ability t o solve t h e
above p r o b l e m s s t a n d s in a n inverse relation to its i n t e r n a l p o t e n t i a l
for conflict. T h e latter in t u r n is a f u n c t i o n of t h e distribution of power.
T h e m o r e u n e q u a l l y p o w e r is d i s t r i b u t e d a m o n g t h e (adult) m e m
b e r s of a family, t h e h i g h e r t h e probability of a n asymmetrical distri
b u t i o n of t h e c h a n c e s each individual h a s of a t t a i n i n g a satisfactory
14
b a l a n c e of gratifications. T h e r e s u l t i n g conflicts, however, often
c a n n o t b e carried o u t strategically within t h e confines of t h e family
b e c a u s e they are i m m e d i a t e l y i n t e r t w i n e d with t h e identity m a n a g e
m e n t of the p a r t i c i p a n t s . A family whose p o w e r constellations d o n o t
p e r m i t a solution of t h e p r o b l e m of b a l a n c i n g n e e d satisfaction
a m o n g its m e m b e r s c o n s t r a i n s t h e leeway f o r successfully m a n a g i n g
identities. F e r r e i r a has c o m p a r e d t h e problem-solving b e h a v i o r of
clinically u n u s u a l family g r o u p s of t h r e e a n d f o u r m e m b e r s with cor
r e s p o n d i n g b e h a v i o r of c o n t r o l g r o u p s . As e x p e c t e d , t h e s y m p t o m
atic families d e m o n s t r a t e d a g r e a t e r p o t e n t i a l for conflict (i.e., less
s p o n t a n e o u s a g r e e m e n t of a t t i t u d e s m e a s u r e d p r i o r t o family discus
sions) . T h e y n e e d e d m o r e t i m e to r e a c h decisions in family discus
sions, a n d t h e satisfaction of drives, m e a s u r e d by t h e m u t u a l
sensitivity toward t h e wishes of o t h e r family m e m b e r s , was lower t h a n
15
in t h e c o n t r o l families.
Since t h e 1960s, various theoretical a p p r o a c h e s have p r o d u c e d
e m p i r i c a l studies of conflict-ridden families. T h e r e s u l t s c a n n o t eas
16
ily b e r e d u c e d to a c o m m o n d e n o m i n a t o r . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e y war
r a n t several tentative c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t t h e causes of systematically
d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n . D i s t u r b a n c e s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n in t h e
sense of r e c u r r i n g , structurally p r o d u c e d unclarities a n d m i s u n d e r
s t a n d i n g s o c c u r m o r e o f t e n in families t h a t h a r b o r a "clinical p o
tential" in t h e b r o a d sensefamilies, in o t h e r w o r d s , t h a t have
characteristics t h a t c o u n t as "symptoms" a c c o r d i n g to t h e usual
vague p r e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e t e r m . S y m p t o m a t i c families of this sort
a r e c h a r a c t e r i z e d by an asymmetrical distribution of power, with
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Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology'

d o m i n a n c e r e l a t i o n s a n d coalition f o r m a t i o n s , as well as by c o r r e
s p o n d i n g tensions, d i s c r e p a n t expectations, r e c i p r o c a l d e p r e c a t i o n ,
a n d so o n . T h e conflicts at issue h e r e t e n d to b e s m o l d e r i n g , partially
c o n c e a l e d o n e s that c a n n o t be publicly played out b e c a u s e the
p s y c h o d y n a m i c p r e c o n d i t i o n s d o n o t exist for r e a c h i n g a n u n d e r
s t a n d i n g m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a n d dealing with these conflicts dis
cursively. C o m m u n i c a t i v e styles that m e d i a t e distance a n d clear the
g r o u n d for discourse, such as j o k i n g , irony, a n d f o r m s of trivializing
a n d n e u t r a l i z i n g , are t h e r e f o r e also e n c o u n t e r e d less often in these
families. T h e p o t e n t i a l f o r conflict affects t h e e x t e r n a l organization
of s p e e c h so as to m a k e likely e x t r e m e manifestations in t h e
a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d d i m e n s i o n s . C o n c e p t s such as pseudo-mutuality,
schism, skew, s e p a r a t e d n e s s , a n d c o n n e c t e d n e s s t h a t have b e e n de
v e l o p e d by r e s e a r c h in s c h i z o p h r e n i a are n o t sufficiently precise for
o u r d i m e n s i o n s . T h e y have b e e n selected as c o u n t e r - c o n c e p t s to t h e
symmetries of a b a l a n c e d role systems (role-reciprocity, c o m p l e
m e n t a r i t y of e x p e c t a t i o n , m u t u a l i t y of u n d e r s t a n d i n g , etc.) a n d
h e n c e they cut across t h e aspects I w a n t to distinguish in what
follows.

Proximity/Distance
T h e well-known studies of Lidz a n d W y n n e ' s r e s e a r c h t e a m s confirm
t h a t t h e distances b e t w e e n individual family m e m b e r s in pathologi
cal families c a n n o t be r e g u l a t e d appropriately. T h e basic roles of t h e
family ( g e n d e r / g e n e r a t i o n ) either are t o o s e p a r a t e d from o n e an
o t h e r or r e m a i n t o o diffuse, so t h a t the b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e n genera
tions a n d g e n d e r s r e m a i n overly rigid or insufficiendy differentiated.
This p a t t e r n c a n p e r m e a t e all interactions. T h u s social distances can
n o t b e i m p l e m e n t e d as flexible e i t h e r b e c a u s e t h e disintegration of
the g r o u p w o u l d l e a d to s p l i n t e r i n g a n d alienation or b e c a u s e a co
e r c e d a n d frantic o v e r i n t e g r a t i o n w o u l d lead to a solidarity t h a t is
m a i n t a i n e d by force. T h e c o n c e p t of a p p a r e n t l y m a i n t a i n e d reci
17
procity (pseudo-mutuality) b e l o n g s in this c o n t e x t .

Equality /Difference
Hess a n d H a n d e l have s h o w n how i m p o r t a n t it is for the family sys
tem to allow a n a p p r o p r i a t e leeway for the self-presentation of indi-
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Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology

vidual m e m b e r s . I n p a t h o l o g i c a l families t h e m u t u a l l y c o r r o b o r a t e d
c o n g r u e n c e of self-images (i.e., of t h e r e p r e s e n t e d a n d r e c o g n i z e d
identities of m e m b e r s ) is e i t h e r so h i g h t h a t o v e r p o w e r i n g family ste
r e o t y p e s i m p e d e t h e f o r m a t i o n of individuals or so low t h a t t h e col
lective u n i t is t h r e a t e n e d by t h e lack of n o r m a t i v e a g r e e m e n t . W h a t
is decisive h e r e is n e i t h e r t h e d e g r e e of stereotyping n o r t h e d e g r e e
of d i s c r e p a n c y as such, b u t r a t h e r t h e inability to synthesize aspects
of s a m e n e s s a n d difference. T h u s t h e n e e d arises t o mask t h e con
18
trast b e t w e e n t o l e r a t e d self-images a n d actual b e h a v i o r .

Activity /Passivity
T h e u n e q u a l distribution of p o w e r m e a n s t h a t t h e sphere of action
of a p a r t n e r in i n t e r a c t i o n is n o t merely d e l i m i t e d by t h e s p h e r e of
a c t i o n of a n o t h e r family m e m b e r , b u t is d e t e r m i n e d a n d c o n t r o l l e d
by t h e initiatives of t h a t family m e m b e r . I n s y m p t o m a t i c families, we
can often o b s e r v e p a t t e r n s of i n t e r a c t i o n b e c o m i n g solidified. T h e s e
i n g r a i n e d p a t t e r n s c a n b e t r a c e d t o t h e d e p e n d e n c e of o n e s p o u s e
o n a n o t h e r a n d to t h e f o r m a t i o n of coalitions b e t w e e n a t least o n e
19
p a r e n t a n d o n e or several c h i l d r e n . U. O e v e r m a n n h a s d e v e l o p e d
t h e c o n c e p t of affective solidarity b e t w e e n p a r e n t s , w h i c h is applica
ble in this c o n t e x t a n d is d a m a g e d in t h e families t h a t were studied.
O n c e again, it is n o t t h e u n e q u a l distribution of activities a m o n g
family m e m b e r s as s u c h t h a t is t h e p r o b l e m , b u t r a t h e r t h e m o r e o r
less surreptitiously h a b i t u a l i z e d d o m i n a n c e relations t h a t p r o h i b i t
s h o w i n g a n y c o n s i d e r a t i o n for t h e desires of m a r g i n a l i z e d family
m e m b e r s . T h i s is a p r e c o n d i t i o n of t h e various strategies of exploita
tion i n t e r n a l to t h e family to which we shall r e t u r n .

Demarcation of the family system

A large n u m b e r of o b s e r v a t i o n s s u p p o r t t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t symp
t o m a t i c families d o not d e v e l o p a sufficient capacity for self-regula
tion in o r d e r to regulate their e x c h a n g e with their e n v i r o n m e n t
a u t o n o m o u s l y . Severely dysfunctional families a r e o n t h e o n e h a n d
m o r e isolated, t h e y have less well-organized c o n t a c t s t o t h e i r sur
r o u n d i n g s t h a n n o r m a l families; b u t o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , they are less
p r o t e c t e d from e x t e r n a l influences, typically o n t h e p a r t of t h e par
e n t s ' two e x t e n d e d families. A c k e r m a n a n d B e h r e n s have d e v e l o p e d
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Reflections on Communicative Pathology

t h e following typology based o n clinical observations. T h e y distin

guish, a m o n g o t h e r things, b e t w e e n t h e externally isolated family,
t h e family t h a t is externally i n t e g r a t e d b u t n o t internally unified, a n d
20
finally, t h e d i s i n t e g r a t e d a n d regressive family. I n this context, we
can apply t h e c o n c e p t of t h e " r u b b e r f e n c e " t h a t was d e v e l o p e d by
t h e W y n n e g r o u p . T h e idea is t h a t of a diffuse d e m a r c a t i o n of t h e
pathological family, which allows n e i t h e r for a clear inside-outside
differentiation nor, in particular, for a distinction b e t w e e n partic
ularistic a n d m o r e strongly universalistic relationships. T h i s has t h e
result t h a t family m e m b e r s actually isolate themselves from their
environment.
S y m p t o m a t i c families frequently s h o w e x t r e m e r e a d i n g s in the
four m e n t i o n e d d i m e n s i o n s . This m e a n s t h a t t h e interactive a n d role
s t r u c t u r e s t h a t d e t e r m i n e t h e e x t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h are
too rigid to p r o d u c e t h e flexible r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n p r o x i m i t y a n d dis
t a n c e , b e t w e e n equality a n d difference, b e t w e e n action initiatives
a n d b e h a v i o r a l r e s p o n s e s , b e t w e e n inside a n d o u t s i d e , w h i c h , ac
c o r d i n g to all e m p i r i c a l i n d i c a t o r s a r e r e q u i r e d for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t
[Entwurf] a n d m a i n t e n a n c e of t h e e g o identity of family m e m b e r s
a n d of t h e collective identity of t h e g r o u p . T h e m a n a g e m e n t of t h e
identities of individual m e m b e r s is curtailed i n these families. T h i s
causes c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n to b e o v e r b u r d e n e d w i t h t h e k i n d s of
conflicts t h a t p l a y themselves o u t i n a systematic d i s t o r t i o n of c o m
m u n i c a t i o n . The pressure of identity conflicts is shifted onto the internal or
ganization of speech where it is stabilized but remains unresolved. T h i s
explains t h e f r e q u e n t o c c u r r e n c e of c o m m u n i c a t i v e d i s t u r b a n c e s in
s y m p t o m a t i c families.
T h e s e d i s t u r b a n c e s a r e r e v e a l e d in a thinly veiled strategic use of
the m e a n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n in situations w h e r e the c o n s e n s u a l ba
sis of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action m u s t n o n e t h e l e s s n o t be a b a n d o n e d . I
a m t r a c i n g systematically p r o d u c e d unclarities a n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d
ings to t h e paradoxical a c h i e v e m e n t of trying to m a i n t a i n an en
d a n g e r e d b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s , w h i c h rests o n t h e r e c i p r o c a l
r e c o g n i t i o n of validity claims raised i n speech acts, precisely by tacitly
violating o n e o r several of these universal claims.
(5) I n conclusion, I w o u l d like to cite s o m e e x a m p l e s of systemati
cally d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I a m using t h e results of r e s e a r c h by
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L u c K a u f m a n n as well as by U. O e v e r m a n n a n d Y. Schtitze.
21
K a u f m a n n analyzes t h e first fifteen m i n u t e s of interviews b e t w e e n a
hospitalized p a t i e n t , t h e p a t i e n t ' s family, a n d two physicians. T h e r e
a r e seven cases of n e u r o s e s a n d d e p r e s s i o n , seven b o r d e r l i n e cases,
a n d seven cases of s c h i z o p h r e n i a . T h e study follows a c o d e p l a n
based o n criteria from W y n n e a n d Singer o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d from
t h e Bateson g r o u p o n t h e other. O e v e r m a n n a n d Schtitze use t a p e d
protocols from five visits e a c h with two families; in b o t h cases, t h e
p a r e n t s h a v e s o u g h t c o u n s e l i n g because of p r o b l e m s w i t h t h e i r chil
d r e n w h o h a d j u s t started school. T h e scenes o n w h i c h t h e analysis is
based h a v e been selected partly at r a n d o m , partly based o n t h e i r rel
evance for t h e s u s p e c t e d family conflict. T h e m a t e r i a l is r e c o n
s t r u c t e d at t h e t h r e e levels of s p e e c h acts ( p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t ,
s p e a k e r i n t e n t i o n , a n d m e a n i n g of i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s ) with a
view to h o w t h e u n d e r l y i n g family conflict is at t h e s a m e time ex
p r e s s e d a n d c o n c e a l e d in t h e linguistic m e d i u m . I d o n ' t want to p r e
sent t h e d e t a i l e d results of t h e two studies, b u t will r a t h e r d r a w o n
t h e m in o r d e r t o illustrate m y a c c o u n t of linguistic d i s t u r b a n c e s .
Recall t h a t m y basic hypothesis is t h a t families i n w h i c h skewed
p o w e r constellations, u n e q u a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d o p p o r t u n i t i e s of n e e d
satisfaction, a n d conflicts t h r e a t e n cohesiveness t e n d t o w a r d a
dedifferentiation o r c o n s o l i d a t i o n of interactive a n d role s t r u c t u r e s .
T h i s signifies a n inflexible e x t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h , w h i c h
limits t h e possibilities of individual family m e m b e r s t o d e v e l o p a n d
to m a i n t a i n t h e i r e g o identities w i t h o u t mistrust. However, unless t h e
c o n s e n s u a l basis of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action is manifestly upset (which
w o u l d m a k e identity conflicts i n s o l u b l e ) , identity conflicts c a n be
c o n t a i n e d only by diverting t h e p r e s s u r e caused by t h e p r o b l e m from
t h e e x t e r n a l t o t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h . T h e distorting
effect of flawed c o m m u n i c a t i o n is e x p l a i n e d by t h e fact t h a t t h e fam
ily c o n s e n s u s appears to be m a i n t a i n e d . T h i s pseudo-consensus is at
t a i n e d at the e x p e n s e of r e d e e m i n g the universal validity claims of
intelligibility, sincerity, and n o r m a t i v e Tightness on w h i c h the recog
n i t i o n of t h e b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s of a successful l a n g u a g e g a m e
d e p e n d s . W h a t m u s t n o t b e c o m e manifest is t h e systematic d i s t o r t i o n
of t h e validity claims. C o m m u n i c a t i v e d i s t u r b a n c e s a r e all t h e m o r e
c o n s p i c u o u s , t h e m o r e difficult it is t o h i d e t h e violation of validity
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claims. I w a n t to distinguish a c c o r d i n g l y t h e following levels at which

a p s e u d o - c o n s e n s u s can be p r o d u c e d :

(a) At t h e first level, t h e r e a r e strategies to shield t h e c o n s e n s u s so

t h a t t h e validity basiswhich, if e x a m i n e d , w o u l d n o t b e subject to
c o n s e n s u s c a n n o t even b e sufficiently precisely identified. This can
be achieved by using h a r m l e s s t e c h n i q u e s such as b r e a k i n g off o n e ' s
o w n u t t e r a n c e s o r i n t e r r u p t i n g s o m e o n e else. A somewhat m o r e ob
vious strategy is to i g n o r e t h e u t t e r a n c e s of a n o t h e r or to force a
c h a n g e of topic. K a u f m a n n distinguishes t h e following variants of
n o t r e s p o n d i n g , where (ii)-(v) f u n c t i o n as substitutes for a real
answer:
(i) simple refusal to answer, i.e., silence;
(ii) a n s w e r i n g to someone other than the person asking the
question;
(iii) c o m m e n t i n g , in t h e t h i r d p e r s o n , o n t h e p e r s o n e x p e c t i n g an
answer;
(iv) c u r a t o r i a l answer: C answers instead of to a question o r re
m a r k by A;
(v) answer or i n t e r v e n t i o n t h e c o n t e n t of w h i c h h a s n o t h i n g to d o
22
with w h a t h a s b e e n said.
T h e " t a n g e n d a l r e s p o n s e , " w h i c h is a n evasive response strategy t h a t
i m p e r c e p t i b l y shifts t h e topic by p i c k i n g u p o n p e r i p h e r a l e l e m e n t s
of t h e m e a n i n g of w h a t has b e e n said (Ruesch) also b e l o n g s in this
last category. Most c o n s p i c u o u s a r e strategies of obfuscation: diffuse
chatter, s p i n n i n g tales, s e q u e n c e s t h a t K a u f m a n n has e n c o d e d as
"idle c o m m u n i c a t i o n " [Leerlaujkommunikation] ( p p . 84ff.) a n d t h a t Y.
Schiitze discusses u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g of r e d u n d a n c y strategies. O n e
r e p e a t s a n d e l a b o r a t e s t h e details t o such a n e x t e n t t h a t o n e ' s inter
l o c u t o r loses t h e t h r e a d of t h e conversation a n d n o l o n g e r k n o w s
w h a t it is a b o u t . This gives rise to functional i m p r e c i s i o n s a n d
unclarities t h a t d o n o t result f r o m a violation of any specific validity
claim, b u t r a t h e r c o u n t e r a c t all attempts to e x a m i n e t h e status of the
a g r e e m e n t m o r e closely a n d to p u r s u e any suspicion of p s e u d o -
consensus. Typical of this is t h e " t a n d e m p h e n o m e n o n " t h a t
Kaufmann observed,
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Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology

so n a m e d after t h e two-seat bicycles w h e r e y o u also c a n ' t tell w h o is really

"working." T h e m a n e u v e r causes insecurity with r e g a r d to role distribution,
a n d i n d i v i d u a l initiative, a u t h o r i t y a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . T h u s w e c a n n o t tell
f r o m t h e b e h a v i o r o f two p e o p l e , f o r e x a m p l e , w h e t h e r A r e a l l y s h a r e s a n d
actively s u p p o r t s B's o p i n i o n o r w h e t h e r A is o n l y passively " c o a s t i n g " i n t h e
2 3
same direction.

(b) At t h e s e c o n d level, t h e r e a r e strategies for b r i n g i n g a b o u t a

pseudo-consensus. Kaufmann has studied these pseudo-
c o n f i r m a t i o n s following W y n n e .

A d i f f e r e n c e o f o p i n i o n is f o r m u l a t e d i n t h e a n s w e r o r o t h e r r e s p o n s e as a n
a g r e e m e n t or, conversely, a g r e e m e n t is r e c i p r o c a t e d w i t h d i v e r g e n c e . W e
d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t d e g r e e s a n d v a r i a n t s of p s e u d o - c o n f i r m a t i o n :
A n s w e r s t h a t , b e c a u s e o f a h e s i t a t i o n , a p a r t i c u l a r c h o i c e of w o r d s , o r t o n e o f
v o i c e leave a d o u b t w h e t h e r t h e s p e a k e r a c c e p t s t h e m e s s a g e o f t h e o t h e r as
valid o r w h e t h e r h e h a s a l r e a d y d i s q u a l i f i e d i t (easy, f r e q u e n t disqualificat
ion) . "Correction" of t h e s e n d e r ' s message by a d d i n g w o r d s o r s o u n d s that
q u e s t i o n t h e v a l u e a n d significance o f t h e s e n d e r ' s c o m m u n i c a t i o n o r sim
p l y a n n u l w h a t h a s b e e n said. "False r e c i p r o c a t i o n , " a c o m m o n p h e n o m e
n o n w h e r e t h e r e s p o n s e is r e c i p r o c a t e d i n a d i f f e r e n t " c u r r e n c y " o r "coin";
the respondent does n o t encounter the interlocutor's message at the same
(logical) level o r d o e s n o t r e s p o n d t o it w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e s a m e c o n t e x t .
T h e false r e c i p r o c a t i o n p r a c t i c a l l y always r e p r e s e n t s a d i s t u r b a n c e o f "inter
p e r s o n a l logic" a n d c a n o v e r l a p w i t h t h e p h e n o m e n o n o f p a r a d o x i c a l c o m
m u n i c a t i o n . P s e u d o - c o n f i r m a t i o n s , finally, leave o u t ("forget") s o m e c r u c i a l
b i t o f w h a t t h e o t h e r h a s c o m m u n i c a t e d a n d o p e r a t e as t h o u g h t h e r e m a i n
der were t h e whole. Moreover, t h e above-mentioned tangentialization m a y
2 4
f u n c t i o n as a p s e u d o - c o n f i r m a t i o n .

T h e e x a m p l e s t h a t K a u f m a n n analyzes in w h a t follows show t h a t t h e

p s e u d o - c o n f i r m a t i o n disqualifies t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y s p e e c h a c t a t
t h e level of its claims to intelligibility, sincerity, o r Tightness. At t h e
s a m e t i m e , it suggestively i m p l i e s t h a t other validity claims, w h i c h t h e
s p e a k e r h a s n o t r a i s e d at all, a r e r e c o g n i z e d in t h e s p e e c h act. T h e
m o r e o r less o b v i o u s m a n e u v e r t h u s consists i n p r o d u c i n g a c o n s e n
sus a b o u t s p e a k e r i n t e n t i o n s a n d a b o u t a n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t t h a t
c o n c e a l s t h e dissensus a b o u t w h a t h a s actually b e e n said.

(c) A t t h e t h i r d level, t h e r e a r e i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s t h a t b e t r a y t h e u n -
a v o w e d v i o l a t i o n s of t h e validity claims t h a t u n d e r l i e t h e c o n s e n s u s .
All i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i m p e d e t h e intelligibility of u t t e r a n c e s ; yet u n d e r
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Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology

certain c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e y c a n b e traced back to t h e fact t h a t t h e

s p e a k e r deceives herself o r o t h e r s a b o u t h e r i n t e n t i o n s o r p r e s u p
poses t h e intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n of w h a t is in fact a d i s p u t e d
n o r m a t i v e context. I would like to d i s r e g a r d e x t r e m e linguistic er
r o r s s u c h as b i z a r r e or idiosyncratic s e n t e n c e c o n s t r u c t i o n s , obvi
ously i n c o r r e c t p r o n u n c i a t i o n , concretistic c o n c e p t f o r m a t i o n ,
c a t e g o r y mistakes, secret messages in t e l e g r a m style, o n o m a t o p o e i c
associations, n o n s t a n d a r d plays o n w o r d s , m a n n e r i s m s , etc., which
indicate t h a t a s p e a k e r is o p e r a t i n g below t h e level of differentiation
of n o r m a l s p e e c h . I n t h e p r e s e n t context, w h a t is of i n t e r e s t are
t h e less obvious divergences t h a t a r e p r o d u c e d specifically by vio
lating logical, s e m a n t i c , a n d p r a g m a t i c rules a n d t h a t t h r e a t e n
t h e p s e u d o - c o n s e n s u s from t h e outset t h r o u g h an a l i e n a t i n g
unintelligibility.
C o n v e r s a t i o n a l s e q u e n c e s t h a t do n o t h a n g t o g e t h e r logically are
usually the result of self-contradictions,

n a m e l y i n t h e f o r m o f p a r t s of o r a d d i t i o n s t o c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t d i m i n i s h ,
d e v a l u e , o r r e n d e r q u e s t i o n a b l e t h e w h o l e of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n ; "forget
t i n g " w h a t h a s o r h a s b e e n said i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e s a m e c o m m u n i c a t i o n by
t h e s a m e p e r s o n o r of w h a t h a s n o t b e e n said, b u t is obviously b e i n g p r e s u p
p o s e d ; all t h o s e i n d i v i d u a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t h a t , t o t h e e a r of t h e e x a m i n e r ,
25
c o n t a i n a p a r t i a l r e t r a c t i o n of w h a t h a s b e e n s a i d .

Logical i n c o h e r e n c e may be t h e manifestation of a p e c u l i a r strategy

t h a t Y Schiitze describes as follows:

O n e a s s o c i a t e s a l o o s e c h a i n of a r g u m e n t s t h a t c a n n o t b e r e n d e r e d logically
c o n s i s t e n t , t h a t is, o n e uses a n a r g u m e n t , w i t h d r a w s its a s s e r t o r i c f o r c e i n
t h e n e x t s t e p of t h e a r g u m e n t , a n d u s e s it i n a n o t h e r c o n t e x t s u c h t h a t it
26
n o w h a s a n e w m e a n i n g , w h i c h is t h e o p p o s i t e of h o w it w a s u s e d initially.

T h e i n c o h e r e n c e d o e s not arise f r o m a logical i n c o m p e t e n c e , mis

t a k e n i n f e r e n c e s o r definitions, b u t r a t h e r from t h e r e a d i n e s s subse
q u e n t l y to disqualify validity claims t h a t o n e initially d e f e n d e d . T h i s
also applies to t h e self-contradictory strategy of c o n d i t i o n a l self-
denial: "Concessions are m a d e to t h e p o i n t of self-denial. If t h e o t h e r
t h e n believes t o have w o n , o n e m a k e s an about-face a n d withdraws o r
27
relativizes o n e ' s c o n c e s s i o n s . "
T h e s i m u l t a n e o u s expression of two contrary e x p e c t a t i o n s is p a r -
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ticularly confusing. T h i s p a r a d o x i c a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n has b e e n stud

ied by t h e Palo-Alto t e a m as t h e "double-bind." Bateson a n d his
colleagues of course d i d n o t sufficiently differentiate b e t w e e n i n t e n
tional p a r a d o x e s t h a t are u s e d for conveying a message indirectly
a n d are p a r t of n o r m a l linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d the involun
tary p a r a d o x e s t h a t stabilize a p s e u d o - c o n s e n s u s d e s p i t e a barely re-
pressible conflict in cases w h e r e t h e addressee is e m o t i o n a l l y
d e p e n d e n t o n t h e s p e a k e r a n d is u n a b l e to verbalize t h e c o n t r a d i c
tion, t h a t is, to identify it as s u c h a n d t h u s to resolve it (for h i m s e l f ) .
Also at the level of logic, t h e r e are p h e n o m e n a of u n c l e a r r e f e r e n c e
so t h a t n o u n e q u i v o c a l a t t r i b u t i o n of t h e e x p r e s s e d i n t e n s i o n s t o par
ticular participants e m e r g e s f r o m t h e course of t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n . Vi
olations of s e m a n t i c and p r a g m a t i c rules, for e x a m p l e , using w o r d s
w i t h idiosyncratic m e a n i n g s or in a way t h a t is n o t context-specific,
d i s r e g a r d i n g p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , a n d so on, all b e l o n g t o t h e r e a l m of
private l a n g u a g e u t t e r a n c e s . L o r e n z e r has a c c o u n t e d for t h e s e c o m
p o n e n t s of private l a n g u a g e by m e a n s of t h e m e c h a n i s m of splitting
t h e m e a n i n g s of t r a u m a t i c scenarios f r o m p u b l i c l a n g u a g e use, t h a t
28
is, by m e a n s of t h e process of d e s y m b o l i z a t i o n . T h i s c o n c e p t fits o u r
m o d e l , for t h e private m e a n i n g s , o n this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , express t h e
u n l i c e n s e d s p e a k e r i n t e n t i o n so t h a t they c a n n o t e n d a n g e r t h e exist
i n g superficial c o n s e n s u s owing to their unintelligibility.

T h i s survey of typical p a t t e r n s of systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u

n i c a t i o n was to give a p r e l i m i n a r y illustration of t h e suggested con
c e p t of a c o m m u n i c a t i v e d i s t u r b a n c e at t h e level of t h e validity basis
of s p e e c h . I h a v e tried to e x p l a i n t h e o v e r b u r d e n i n g of t h e i n t e r n a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n of speech in t e r m s of t h e p r e s s u r e e x e r t e d by p r o b l e m s
t h a t stem f r o m conflicts of identity a n d t h a t initially overtax t h e ex
t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h . Yet m e r e l y saying t h a t t h e p r e s s u r e ex
e r t e d by these p r o b l e m s is "shifted" or "diverted" to t h e i n t e r n a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h w h e r e it is " a b s o r b e d " d o e s n o t e x p l a i n
m u c h . We can only u n d e r s t a n d this process if we follow its intra
psychic traces a n d clarify h o w u n c o n s c i o u s d e f e n s e m e c h a n i s m s
a g a i n s t conflicts w o r k a n d i n t e r v e n e in c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. How
ever, conflicts of identity, on t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t h e d i s t o r t e d c o m
m u n i c a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s within w h i c h such conflicts smolder, o n t h e
170
Reflections on Communicative Pathology

other, a r e p a r t of a circular process. T h e conflicts, as it were, cause

the systematic distortion, yet c a n b e t r a c e d b a c k to deficiencies of
e g o o r g a n i z a t i o n (in t h e p a r e n t s ' g e n e r a t i o n ) , w h i c h in t u r n were
p r o d u c e d in d e v i a n t formative processes, t h a t is, in families with
d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s . Simplistic a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t
diffusion a n d transmission a r e i n a d e q u a t e for fully grasping the
i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l transmission of c o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d identity distur
b a n c e s . T h i s r e q u i r e s clarification in at least t h r e e d o m a i n s of hy
p o t h e s e s : I have i n m i n d the d e v e l o p m e n t a l p r o b l e m s that are
specific to the levels of a b i p h a s i c formative process; a classification
in t e r m s of d e v e l o p m e n t a l logic of t h e pathologies t h a t a r e c a u s e d by
(or are corollaries of) unfavorable c o n d i t i o n s of socialization; a n d ,
lasdy, a n etiology t h a t a c c o u n t s for t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n c o m m u
nicative d i s t u r b a n c e s within t h e family a n d c h i l d h o o d p a t h o l o g i e s .
Notes

Translator's Introduction

l.Jvirgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols., trans. Thomas McCar
thy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984/1987). Hereafter cited as TCA.

2. For the sake of convenience, I shall refer to t h e m henceforth as the Gauss Lec
tures. They follow closely u p o n the publication of the English translation of Knowl
edge and Human Interest, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), a n d
m o r e or less coincide with the 1970 G e r m a n publication of On the Logic of the Social
Sciences, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen a n d Jerry A. Stark (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1988).

3. T h e fourth lecture clearly served as basis for the essay "What Is Universal
Pragmatics?" trans. Thomas McCarthy, in Communication and the Evolution of Society
(Boston: Beacon, 1979), pp. 1-68.

4. See J o h n Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press:

1969), 57ff., as well as Jtirgen H a b e r m a s , "Toward a Critique of a T h e o r y of Mean
ing," in Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. William H o h e n g a r t e n (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1 9 9 2 ) , p p . 70-72, a n d "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" pp. 6 0 - 6 1 .

5. Habermas, "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" 13. See also his "Reconstruction a n d

Interpretation in the Social Sciences," in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Ac
tion, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), pp. 21-42.

6. This dialogical dimension is lacking in Saul Kripke's discussion of the rule-follow

ing problem, even though the connection of the private language a r g u m e n t with the
rule-following problem is strikingly similar. See Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and
Private Language (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).

7. Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,

1994).
172
Notes

8. See T C A : l , p p . 295-328.
9. See Cristina Lafont, The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), chs. 5-6.

10. See Jiirgen Habermas, "Rorty's Pragmadc Turn," in On the Pragmatics of Communi
cation, ed. Maeve Cooke (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 343-382. For his
account of discourse ethics, see Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans.
Christian L e n h a r d t a n d Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1990), a n d Justification and Application, trans. Ciarin Cronin (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1994). Habermas's critique of empiricist ethics in the essay "On Intentions,
Conventions, a n d Linguistic Interactions" offers insight into the roots of his funda
mentally intersubjectivist approach to ethics. See pp. 118-125 in this volume.

11. Cf. "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" pp. 35 a n d 54.

12. Jiirgen Habermas, Zur Logic der Sozialwissenschaften (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982),
p. 10, a n d T C A l : xli.

13. For further changes, see TCA. Subsequent modifications to the theory have often
been the result of Habermas's response to his critics. See his replies in J. B. T h o m p
son and D. Held, eds., Habermas: Critical Debates (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982),
Richard Bernstein, ed., Habermas andModernity (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985),
and Axel H o n n e t h a n d H a n s Joas, eds., Communicative Action (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1992).

14. See Jiirgen H a b e r m a s , "Toward a Critique of a Theory of Meaning," in

Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. William M. H o h e n g a r t e n (Cambridge, Mass: MIT
Press, 1992).

15. See "Some Further Clarifications of the Concept of Communicative Rationality,"

in On the Pragmatics of Communication. Here Habermas distinguishes communicative
use of language from epistemic and teleological use.

16. A dialogue between the two has already been initiated. See Jiirgen Habermas,
"Von Kant zu Hegel: Zu Robert Brandoms Sprachpragmatik," in Wahrheit und
Rechtfertigung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1999), pp. 138-185. An English translation is
forthcoming in The European Journal of Philosophy.

Lecture I

1. [Although h e assigns primacy to linguistic meaning, Habermas conceives of Sinn

quite broadly. H e does not distinguish in these lectures between "sense" (Sinn) a n d
"reference" (Bedeutung) in the tradition of Frege, for example, as his point of depar
ture is not that tradition but social action theory, where "meaning" is the usual term.
Trans.]

2. Cf. J o h n Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p p .

19ff.

3. Cf. D. S. Shwayder's conceptual analyses in his The Stratification of Behavior (Lon

don: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965).
173
Notes

4. Cf. A. V. Cicourel, Method and Measurement in Sociology (New York: F r e e Press, 1964).
5. H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Crossroad, 1989).

6. N. Malcolm, "Intentional Activity Cannot be Explained by Contingent Causal

Laws," in L. I. Krimerman, ed., The Nature and Scope of Social Science (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), 334-350; Th. Mishel, Psychologische Erklarungen
(Frankfurt: 1981).

7. Cf. N . Chomsky's critique of Skinner in J. A. Fodor a n d J. J. Katz, eds., The Structure

of Language (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 547-578.

8. Cf. Krimerman, Nature and Scope of Social Science, Part 7, p p . 585ff, especially the ar
ticles by Watkins, Goldstein, and Mandelbaum.

9. Ibid, p. 604.

10. Ibid., p. 605.

11. Peter L. Berger a n d T h o m a s Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden

City,N.Y.:Doubleday, 1966).

12. G. Simmel, Soziologie (Leipzig: Duncker & Humbolt, 1908; 3rd ed, 1923). [A par
tial translation appears as "How Is Society Possible?" in On Individuality and Social
Forms, ed. Donald Levine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 6-22. Where
appropriate, references to the English are included in square brackets. Trans.]

13. I b i d , p. 22 [p. 6, translation modified].

14. I b i d , p. 22 [p. 7 ] .

15. I b i d , p. 23 [p. 8 ] .

16. Ibid., p. 24.

17. Ibid., p. 23.

18. In comparison with Rickert's a n d Dilthey's proposals for a t h e o r y of the cultural

or h u m a n sciences, Simmel's brief c o m m e n t s are merely programmatic. O n the
other hand, this program derives immediately form Kant and, unlike the theories of
Rickert and Dilthey, does not aim to provide a foundation for the h u m a n sciences
that developed in the n i n e t e e n t h century. Instead, it is geared toward a constitutive
social theory in the strict sense. The only one who pursued a similar goal and actually
went through with an epistemological foundation of the social sciences is Max Adler
in Das Rdtsel der Gesellschaft (Vienna: Saturn, 1936). More recently, H e l m u t Schelsky
has renewed the call for a "transcendental theory of society"; see his Ortsbestimmung
der deutschen Soziologie (Dtisseldorf: E. Diederich, 1959), 93ff. His empirical work,
however, belongs m o r e to an anthropological theory of society. T h u s the subjectivist
approaches in c o n t e m p o r a r y sociology all derive directly (Schiitz, Berger,
Luckmann, Nathanson) or indirectly (Garfi.nkel, Cicourel, Sacks) from Husserl
rather than from Kant. Rickert's philosophy of value of course has found its way into
m o r e recent sociology via Max Weber and Parsons. However, t h e constitutive prob
lem already receded into the b a c k g r o u n d in Weber, a n d in Parsons it was superceded
by the basic tenets of a moderately empiricist philosophy of science.
174
Notes

Lecture II

1. E d m u n d Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,

trans. D. Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 28ff., p p . 103ff.
Hereafter cited as Crisis.

2. Crisis, 32, p. 119.

3. Crisis, 51, p. 173.

4. Husserl reproaches Kant for the "lack of a n intuitive exhibiting m e t h o d " (Crisis,
30, p. 114).

5. Simmel apparently fails to see the i n h e r e n t difficulty of the architectonic of the

Kantian opus. Max Adler, in contrast, undertakes the following revision. H e intro
duces the social a priori a n d raises this relationship of the singular ego to the commu
nity of many egos to the level of the transcendental determination of the individual
consciousness: "Transcendental epistemology not only teaches that every object nec
essarily belongs to a subject, but m u c h more: to be a n object is f or the t h i n g to belong
to indeterminately m a n y subjects. This plurality must not be u n d e r s t o o d empirically,
but transcendentally, that is, already as characteristic of the individual consciousness
itself'." Adler, DasRdlsel der Gesellschaft (Vienna: Saturn, 1936), p. 111.

6.1 n connection with what follows, see Ernst Tugendhat's excellent study o n the con
cept of t r u t h in Husserl a n d Heidegger:,Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 1967), part 1.

7. E d m u n d Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological

Philosophy, book 1, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 24, p. 44.

8. Ideas, 30, pp. 56ff.

9. Crisis, 40, p . 149.

10. Ideas, 117, p . 279.

11. Ideas, 116, p . 277.

12. E d m u n d Husserl, "Meditation iiber die I d e e eines individuellen u n d

Gemeinschaftelebens in absoluter Selbstverantwortung" a n d "Besinnung als
Aktivitat," both in Husserliana, ed. (The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 193-211.

13. Ibid., p . 194.

14. Ibid., p. 197.

15. Ibid., p. 199.

16. Vico's epistemic interpretation of t h e phrase factum et verum convertuntur, which

he develops based on the model of geometry, is based o n this insight.
175
Notes

17. For a critique of immediacy as a concept of epistemological justification, see T. W.

A d o r n o , Zur Metakritik derErkenntnistheorie (Stuttgart: Kolhammer, 1956).

18. E d m u n d Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Martinus

Nijhoff, 1960), 49, p. 107.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., 55, p. 123.

21. Schtitz refers t o corresponding works by Scheler, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. "The
Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl," in Collected Papers, v o l 3, ed.
I. Schtitz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 51-84.

22. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 52, p. 114. [Translation modified. Trans.]

23. Schtitz, "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl," p. 76.

24. Crisis, p. 184.

25. "As primal ego, I constitute my horizon of transcendental others as cosubjects

within the transcendental intersubjectivity which constitutes the world," ibid.

Lecture III

1. To begin with, I shall eschew the question of how it is possible that the same prop
ositional content can pick out many different things: "If we admit one content 'in'
many representings, why n o t admit o n e attribute 'in' m a n y things: platonism for
things as well as platonism for thoughts?" (W. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics [Lon
don: Routledge a n d Kegan Paul, 1968], p. 62). Elsewhere, Sellars talks about content
as inherent in [Innewohnen] acts of consciousness (in-esse of attributes in
representings) a n d of content residing within things themselves (in-esse of attributes
in things) (p. 92).

2. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, p. 62.

3. I a m disregarding t h e fact that Sellars from t h e outset interprets acts of conscious

ness objectivistically, that is, as mental episodes: "If anything which occurs or takes
place is to count as an episode, then, whenever an object changes from having one
disposition to having a n o t h e r the c h a n g e is an episode" (ibid, p. 72). Sellars's
physicalism manifests itself in that he conceives of acts of consciousness or
representings as events in the world like objectified natural events.

4. I b i d , p. 64: [Sellars proceeds by identifying contents first with intensions a n d then

with (Fregean) senses. This distinction does not figure in Habermas's account here.
Trans.]

5. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, p. 156.

6. Ibid.

7. I b i d , p. 76.
176
Notes

8. Ibid., p. 157.

9. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), 202,

p . 81.

10. [For a similar interpretation of Wittgenstein, see Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on

Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). Trans.]

11. Cf. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), pp. 2 4 - 4 4 ; also H. J. Giegel, Die Logic der seelischen
Ereignisse (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969), pp. 99-108, 112, 134.

12. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics,^. 128.

13. E.g., Philosophical Investigations, 182, p- 73.

14. Philosophical Investigations, 445, p . 131.

15. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, trans. A. Kenny (Berkeley: University

of California Press, 1974), p a r t i , 111, p. 160.

16. Ibid., P a r t i , 4 5 , p . 88.

17. Ibid., P a r t i , 84, p . 131. [Translation modified. Trans.]

18. "No one will deny that studying the nature of the rules of games must b e useful
for the study of grammatical rules, since it is beyond doubt that there is some sort of
similarity between t h e m . T h e right thing is to let the instinct that there is a kinship
lead one to look at the rules of games without any preconceived j u d g e m e n t or preju
dice about the analogy between games and grammar" (ibid., 134, p. 187).

19. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), vol. 2, 54,
p p . 84ff.

20. Philosophical Grammar, part II, 9, p . 272.

21. Philosophical Investigations, 206, p . 82.

22. Cf. Jiirgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. J. Shapiro (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1971), ch. 7, pp. 140-160.

23. Philosophical Investigations, 241, p. 88.

24. Ibid., 199, p . 80.

25. Philosophical Grammar, part I, 133, p . 184.

26. I b i d . , p a r t l , 29, p. 65 [italicsJ.H.].

27. Ibid., p. 66 [original italics].

28. Philosophical Investigations, 142, p. 56.

29. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self, Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).
177
Notes

30. Philosophical Investigations, 23, p. 11.

3 1 . [Other Habermas translators, following McCarthy, have r e n d e r e d Verstdndlichkeit
as "comprehensibility." However, "intelligibility" is the m o r e usual in contexts of phi
losophy of language. Trans.]

Lecture IV

1. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of a Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, MA: T h e MIT Press,

1965), pp. 3ff.

2. Cf. E H. Lenneberg, Biological Foundations of Language (New York: Wiley, 1967).

3. Dieter Wunderlich, Tempus und Zeitreferenz imDeutschen (Munich: Hueber, 1970).

4. D. S. Shwayder, The Stratification of Behavior (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,

1965), p. 288.

5. T h a t is, t h e illocutionary acts analyzed by Searle following Austin a n d Strawson;

see Speech Acts (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

6. By introducing the singular speech act as the elementary unit of speech, we al

ready perform an abstraction: We prescind from the fact that speech acts usually oc
cur in pairs, as questions a n d answers, assertions a n d denials, etc.

7. Even if the performative c o m p o n e n t s are n o t explicitly verbalized, they are always

implicit in the linguistic process. Thus they must be present in the deep structure of
every linguistic utterance.

8. Dell Hymes uses the expression instead for the mastery of linguistic codes; for this
I have suggested the term pragmatic competence.

9. In the most recent linguistic debates, consideration of universal pragmatic rela

tions has led to a revision of the semantic theory initially proposed by Katz, Fodor,
Postal, and others. In the newer conception of generative semantics, drawing o n the
work of McCawley, Fillmore, a n d especially Lakoff, the categorical separation of syn
tactic deep structure and semantic interpretation for meaning-preserving transfor
mations has b e e n d r o p p e d and replaced with the assumption of a semantic deep
structure with pre- a n d postlexical transformations. Accordingly, the process of sen
tence formation begins with a semantic entity whose general characterization also in
volves aspects of universal pragmatics. Ross and McCawley have suggested
interpreting every highest 5 as a performative utterance, that is, as the d o m i n a n t
clause of a speech act. Lakoff a n d others incorporate, in addition to the performative
mode (question, order, assertion, etc.), references to possible speech situations, as
well as focus, presupposition, a n d co-reference into the description of deep struc
ture. Fillmore's suggestion of representing deep structure as a role structure that
would show how elements such as agentives, instrumentals, datives, factitives,
locatives, objectives, e t c , contribute to sentence m e a n i n g approximates a cognitivist
approach to semantics. I cannot predict the course of this discussion within linguis
tics. Nevertheless, there are indications that in describing semantic deep structure,
linguistics will come across a linguistically basic system of reference that might be un
derstood as a representation of the rule system of universal pragmatics.
178
Notes

10. Cf. Searle, Speech Acts, p p . 29ff.

11. We may call the use of language that exploits this reflexivity for purposes of para
phrasing hermeneutic. Relative to the cognitive a n d communicative uses of language, it
occurs at a metalevel, but it is nonetheless an element of everyday communication
since it merely expresses the reflexivity inherent in natural language. I do not wish to
elaborate on this here.

12. Empiricist pragmatics in t h e sense of a behaviorist semiotics (Charles Morris), of

course, characteristically introduces t h e universal structures of speech without refer
ence to pragmatic universals from the perspective of the observer. Cf. K. O- Apel,
"Szientismus oder transcendental Hermeneutik? Zur Frage nach d e m Subject der
Zeicheninterpretations in der Semiotik des Pragmatismus," in R. Bubner et al. (eds.),
Hermeneutik und Dialektik (Tubingen: Mohr, 1970), vol. 1, pp. 105-144; also Arno
Mviller, Probleme der behavioristischen Semiotik (doctoral dissertation, University of
Frankfurt, 1970).

13. Searle, Speech Acts, pp. 57ff.

14. Austin groups these speech acts with "behabitives" and "exercisives" (see Searle,
Speech Acts, pp. 150-162).

Lecture V

1. Cf. Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, and Reality (New York: Humanities Press,
1963), pp. lOOff.

2. [The G e r m a n here reads: "wobei 's' einen assertorischen Satz mit der Bedeutung
'p' bezeichnet." In keeping with Frege's distinction between sense (Sinn) and refer
ence (Bedeutung), H a b e r m a s can be u n d e r s t o o d as saying that s has p as its reference.
This interpretation fits well with the subsequent discussion of correspondence theo
ries of truth. T h e formulation is particularly interesting in light of Davidson's appro
priation of Tarski's semantic conception of truth. Davidson explicitly uses
Convention T to replace ' means that.' (See Donald Davidson, "Truth a n d Meaning,"
in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).)
Trans.]

3. Cf. E. Tugendhat, in Philosophische Rundschau, vol. 8, no. 2 / 3 , p p . 131-159.

4. T u g e n d h a t (ibid., p. 138) rightly maintains that "if t h e meaning of ' t r u e ' is ex

hausted by the fact that we can replace 'p is t r u e ' by 'p,' t h e n any inquiry into the
truth of j u d g m e n t s is pointless."

5. Cf. K. O . Apel's introduction to C. S. Peirce, Schriflen I (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,

1968).

6. Cf. H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Crossroad, 1989),
a n d Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Basic Books, 1959).

7. [For a r e c e n t discussion of world disclosure, see Thesis 11, vol. 37 (1994), espe
cially the articles by Kompridis, Lafont, Seel, a n d B o h m a n n . Trans.]
179
Notes

8. This difference may be connected with the fact t h a t empirical beliefs must be
g r o u n d e d in experience\whereas the acceptance or rejection of n o r m s n e e d n o t have',
1
an immediate experiential connection to external reality. T h e claim of a norm to be"
right may be based o n the reflexive experience of the participating subjects of them
selves. This experience indicates whether o n e "really wants" to accept the n o r m and
1
whether the interpretation of needs and desires that it expresses "really" picks o u t
what can be understood as "one's own" n e e d s and desires.

9. S. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964),

pp. 146ff.

10. This goal cannot be attained because we cannot go behind a discourse; that is, we
c a n n o t engage in "metadiscourse." In a metadiscourse, we act as ifand this has
b e e n our attitude until nowwe could ascertain that the participants in this dis
course satisfy the conditions that allow them to participate in discourse. Yet strictly
speaking, discourse and metadiscourse are at the same level. All discourses are
intersubjective events. T h e appearance of the arbitrary iteration of the self-reflection
of isolated subjects does not so m u c h as get off the ground; see A. Kulenkampff,
Antinomie undDialektik (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1970). Even the self-reflection whereby in
terlocutors ascertain that they have indeed stepped out of contexts of communicative
action and have suspended the forces of the reality of making risky decisionseven
this is an intersubjective event; cf. my Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. J. Shapiro
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), ch. 10). We cannot engage in discourse without presup
posing that the conditions for entering into discourse have already been met. After
having made this presupposition, however, discourse about whether we were right to
do so is meaningless. At the level of discourse, there can be no separation of dis
course and the external point of view of observing discourse.

11. I have sought to characterize the ideal speech situation not in terms of the fea
tures of the personality of ideal speakers, but in terms of the structural features of a
context of possible speech, specifically the symmetric distribution of opportunities to
take o n dialogue roles a n d to perform speech acts. This construction is meant to
demonstrate that we are i n d e e d capable of anticipating an ideal speech situation,
which a competent speaker must be able to do if she wants to participate in discourse,
by means of the four m e n t i o n e d classes of speech actsand only those four. Hence
my suggestion for giving a systematic account of speech acts can b e justified in retro
spect from the point of view that speech acts can only function as pragmatic univer
salsthat is, as means of producing universal structures of possible speechif they
can simultaneously serve f or designing an ideal speech situation.

12. Even a discursively justified validity claim regains t h e status of b e i n g "naively"

presupposed as soon as the result of the discourse reenters contexts of action.

13. This also holds in the special case of therapeutic discourse, which both interlocu
tors enter with the intention of raising unconscious motives to the level of
consciousness.

14. I have since retracted this formulation. See J. H a b e r m a s , "A Reply to my Critics,"
in J. B. T h o m p s o n and D. Held, e d s , Habermas: Critical Debates (Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press, 1982), pp. 261ff.
180
Notes

Intentions, Conventions, and Linguistic Interactions

1. M. Roche, "Die philosophische Schule der Sprachanalyse," in R. Wiggershaus, ed.,

SprachanalyseundSoziologie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1975), p . 187.

2. Ibid., pp. 188ff.

3. Charles Taylor, "Explaining Action," Inquiry, 13, 1970, 54-89.

4. R. N o r m a n , Reasons for Actions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971), p. 24.

5. Ibid., pp. 63-64.

6. Ibid., p. 72.

7. From J. Narveson, Morality and Utility (Baltimore: J o h n s Hopkins University Press,

1967), quoted in N o r m a n , Reasons for Actions, p. 48.

8. D. S. Shwayder, The Stratification of Behavior (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,

1965), pp. 254ff.

9. See my critique of intentionalist semantics in J. Habermas, "Intentionalistische

Semantik," in Vorstudien und Ergdnzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984). [More recently, Habermas has made this criticism in
"Comments on J o h n Searle: Meaning, Communication, a n d Representation," in John
Searle and His Critics, ed. Ernest Lepore a n d Robert Van Gulick (Oxford: Blackwell,
1991), p p . 17-29, and in Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. Bill H o h e n g a r t e n (Cam
bridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992). Trans.]

Reflections o n Communicative Pathology

1. G. Devereux, Normal und Anormal (Frankfurt, 1974).

2. Ibid., pp. 28ff.

3. Ibid., p p . 44, 46.

4. Ibid., p p . 122ff.

5. Ibid., p p . 119ff.

6. Ibid., p . 86.

7. J. Habermas, KnowledgeandHuman Interests, trans. J. Shapiro (Boston, MA: Beacon

Press 1971), ch. 10, and "The H e r m e n e u t i c Claim to Universality," in Contemporary
Hermeneutics, ed. Josef Bleicher (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), p p .
181-211.

8. R . A . Spitz, Vom Sduglingzum Kleinkind (Stuttgart, 1967).

9. Ibid., p. 204.
 181
Notes

10. Ibid., pp. 201ff.

11. R D . Laing, Self and Others (New York: Pantheon, 1969), p. 70.

12. R. D. Laing, H. Phillipson, a n d A. R. Lee, Interpersonal Perception (New York:

Springer, 1966), p p . 21-22.

13. H. Stierlin, Das Tun des Einen ist das Tun des Anderen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,
1971).

14. W. D. Winter and A. J. Ferreira, eds., Research in Family Interaction (Palo Alto: Sci
ence and Behavior Books, 1969).

15. See the literature review in t h e introduction to L. Kaufmann, Familie,

Kommunikation, Psychose (Bern: 1972).

16. G. Handel, e d . The Psychosocial Interior of the Family (Chicago: Aldine, 1967).

17. E. G. Mishler a n d N. E. Waxier, Interaction inFamilies (New York: Wiley, 1968).

18. R. D. Hess a n d G. Handel, "The Family as a Psychosocial Organization," in Han

del, The Psychosocial Interior of the Family, pp. lOff.

19. M. T. Siegert, Strukturbedingungen von Familienkonflikten (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,

1977).

20. N. W. Ackerman a n d M. L. Behrens, "A Study of Family Diagnosis," American Jour

nal of Orthopsychiatry (1956): 66ff.

21. Kaufmann, Familie, Kommunikation, Psychose, p p . 73ff.

22. I b i d , p . 106.

23. I b i d , p p . 105ff.

24. I b i d , p . 92.

25. I b i d , p . 8 1 .

26. Y Schiitze, Innerfamiliale Kommunikation und kindlichePsyche (Berlin, 1977).

27. Ibid.

28. A. Lorenzer, Sprachzerstirung und Rekonstruktion (Frankfurt: S u h r k a m p , 1970).

r
Index

Absolute self-responsibility, for Husserl, Assertion (s), 90, 94

31-32, 35 and Brandom vs. H a b e r m a s , xxiv
Abstraction pragmatics of, 89, 91
linguistic, 74-75 Atomistic approach i n social sciences,
logical, 75 13-14
sociolinguistic, 74 Attributions, 157
universal-pragmatic, 74 Austin, J. L., xxii, 74, 83-84, 87,
Accountability, xv, 101, 147 108
Ackerman, N. W , 163-164
Action. See also Communicative action; Bediirfnisnatur (need-based n a t u r e ) ,
Strategic action 123, 125, 131
vs. act (Sellars), 48-49 Behavior, vs. action, 4-6
vs. behavior, 4 - 6 Behavioral expectation, generalized
intentional, xviii, 11, 110-118, 125 (see (Mead), 124
also Intention) Behaviorism, x, 8-9, 10
normative model of, 126 Behrens, M. L , 163-164
presuppositions of, xxiii Beliefs, and intentions, 111
purposive-rational, 11-12 Berger, Peter L , 16
and rules, 5-6, 13, 108-109 Brandom, Robert, xiv, xxiv
social, ix Brentano, Franz, xvii, 27,110, 114
teleological means-end model of, xix, Buhler, Karl, 142
113-114, 115-116, 118
theory of, ix, xvii, 108 Carnap, Rudolf, 65, 86, 111
Action-theoretic approaches, 109 Cartesian Meditations, The (Husserl), xi,
Activity, in family relationships, 22, 38, 41
163 Categorial intuition, 33, 88
Actor, 141 Causality, 81
Adler, Max, 19, l74n.5 and intention, 114-115
A d o r n o , Theodor, 19, 87-88 Child development, communication de
Agency, x, 141 velopment in, 137-140
Analytic truth, 91 Chisholm, Roderick, 111
Arieti, Silvano, 142 Chomsky, Noam, 68, 69-71
Aristotle, 86 Cicourel, A. V., 11
184
Index
Claims to validity. See Validity claims
Cognitive orientations, vs. noncognitive,
xviii
Cognitive use of language, 63-64, 76
a n d communicative use, xiii, xxiii
and disclosure theories of truth, 92
obligation in, 148
pragmatics of, 78-82
and Wittgenstein, 62
Commonsense experience, 24
Communication
a n d consensus, 93
empirical vagaries of, xx
a n d ideal speech situation, 97-98
simultaneous metacommunication as
condition of, xiii, 59-60, 74
systematically distorted, viii, xx, 137,
147-149 (see also Systematically dis
torted communication)
a n d validity claims, xx, xxiii (see also Va
lidity claims)
Communication theory of society. See
Communicative theory of society
Communicative action, xvii-xviii, 11,
12-13, 99-100
and autonomy of speech, 145
a n d interpretation, 127
and lifeworld, xvi
and mutual understanding, ix
pure, 99-100, 102
a n d socialization, xx, 131
a n d strategic action, xviii, 12-13
a n d supposition of motives, 82
a n d systematic distortion, xxi (see also
Systematically distorted
communication)
and theory of rationality, xxii-xxiii
universal (formal) presuppositions of,
xx, 147-149
violations of, 149-155
and validity claims, xiv-xv
Communicative competence, xi, 57, 60,
73, 74, 75
Communicative language use. See Com
municative use of language
Communicative paradigm, x-xi
Communicative pathologies, 155. See also
Systematically distorted
communication
Communicative rationality or reason, vii,
ix, xi
and The Theory of Communicative Action,
viii
Communicative speech acts, xiv, 82-83,
84, 99
Communicative spiral, 157-159
Communicative symbols, 140
Communicative theory(ies) of society,
3, 18, 85
categorial framework for, 45
a n d communicative language use, 64
a n d intersubjective relation, 44
a n d lifeworld, 34-35
a n d normative validity, 100
a n d objective vs. intersubjective world,
37
a n d universal pragmatics, 53
Communicative use of language, 64, 76
a n d cognitive use, xiii, xxiii
pragmatics of, 82-84
a n d Wittgenstein, xiii
Community
behaving as member of, 124
Husserl o n , 32
transcendental, 26, 42-43, 174n.5
Competence
communicative, xi, 57, 60, 73, 74, 75
interactive, xx, 131, 135-136
and rules, 54
C o m p e t e n t judges, 95-96
Conditional self-denial, 168
Conflicts, identity. See Identity conflicts
Conscious conflict processing, as undis
torted communication, 136
Consciousness, philosophy or theory of.
See Philosophy or theory of
consciousness
Consensus
a n d communication, 93
rational, xv, xvii, 93, 95, 96, 99
on truth vs. on rightness, 92
Consensus theory of truth, xvii, 89,
92-93
a n d competent judges, 95-96
a n d ideal speech situation, 97-99
Constative speech acts, xiv, 76, 78, 83,
84
a n d mistakes, 154
obligation in, 148-149
a n d t r u t h , 86, 88, 95
validity claim of, 89, 91
Constitution, a n d Husserl, 2 3 , 25
Constitutive rules, 56
Constitutive theory of knowledge, 25
a n d analysis of lifeworld, 68
a n d Husserl, 31
 185
Index
Constitutive theory(ies) of society,
18-22, 173n.l8
and Husserl, 25-26
a n d intersubjective relation, 44
and lifeworld, 25
a n d phenomenology, 25
two p r o b l e m s for, 23, 26
Contemplative life, Husserl on, 32
Context-independent language use, 143
Conventionalism, vs. essentialism, 8-10
Conventional role theory, 126
Conventions
and m u t u a l understanding, xix
and rule-following, 107
semantic, 88, 107-110
social, 107-110
Correspondence theory of truth, 86, 91
Crisis of the European Sciences, The
(Husserl), 23, 43
Critical theory
a n d formal pragmatics, xv
a n d universal pragmatics, 103
Culturalistic notion of normalcy,
132-135
Cultural tradition, 24
Cultural values, a n d norms, 122
Davidson, Donald, xiii
Defense mechanisms, 155, 169
Definite descriptions, 80, 143
Denial, in child development (Spitz),
138-140
Desires, 116-117
Desymbolization, 169
Devereux, G, 132-135
Deviant behavior, 12
Deviant processes of socialization, xix
Dialectical social theory, 16, 19
Dialectic of the ego, 60
Difference, in family relationships,
162-163
Discourse (s), xv, 94
vs. communicative action, 99-100
a n d ideal speech situation, 98
a n d metadiscourse, I 7 9 n . l 0
rational consensus through, 93
a n d validity claims, xxi
Discourse ethics, xvii
universalizability of, xix
Dispositions, 116
Dissensus, on Tightness of utterance,
144
Distance between family members, in
pathological families, 162
Double bind, 168-169
Doxic acts, and Husserl, 29-30
Doxic positings, 63
Dual structure of speech, xiii, 63, 76
D u m m e t t , Michael, xxiii
Ego, dialectic of, 60
Emancipated form of life, 99
Emotional a n d volitional acts, a n d
Husserl, 30-31
Empirical pragmatics, 72
Empiricist ethics, 118-119
Epistemology, a n d society, 22
Equality, in family relationships,
162-163
Essentialism, vs. conventionalism, 8-10
Ethics
discourse, xvii, xix
empiricist, 118-119
and Husserl o n absolute responsibility,
32
Evaluative expression, vs. normative
standard of value, 121
Examples, Wittgenstein on, 54-55
Expectations
in double bind, 168-169
generalized (Mead), 124
of intentionality, 101
intentions as, 59
and learning, 88
of legitimacy, 101
Experience
commonsense, 24
truth claims g r o u n d e d in, 88-89
Explanations, 90, 94
Expressive language use, warrant in,
149
Expressive speech acts, xiv
False consciousness, 35-36
False reciprocation, 167
Families
a n d intrapsychic disturbances of com
munication, 131
systematically distorted communica
tion in, xxi-xxii, 159-165, 170
Feelings, 116
Ferreira, A . J , 161
F i c h t e , J o h a n n Gottlieb, 60
Formalization, degree of, 152
 186
Index

Formal pragmatics. See Universal a n d intersubjectivity, 60

pragmatics
Freud, Anna, 140
Freud, Sigmund, 131
Fulfillment, degree of, 152
Gadamer, H. G., 88
Galileo, 24
Games, language. See Language games
Games of strategy, 57
Gauss Lectures, Princeton (1971), viii,
ix, xxiii
Generative grammar, 68-72
Generative process of society, models of,
16-18
Generative semantics, l 7 7 n . 9
Generative theories of society, 11, 15-18
constitutive theories, 18-22, 23, 25-26,
44, 173n.l8
Generative theory of language, 65
Grammar, generative, 68-72
Grammatical competence, 75
Grammatical rules, 56, 57-58
Habermas, Jiirgen, vii
and Brandom, xxiv
and Husserl, xi-xii
and linguistic turn, vii, xxii
and Sellars, xi, xii, xxiv
and theory of language, ix
and Wittgenstein, xi, xii-xiii
Hampshire, Stuart, 108, 111
Handel, G., 162-163
H a r m o n i o u s behavior, a n d Husserl,
40-41
Hegel, G. W. F., 16, 60
Heidegger, Martin, 92
H e r m e n e u t i c discourse or language, 94,
178n.ll
Hermeneutics, 7-8
Hess, R. D., 162-163
Hintikka, Jaakko, 111
Holistic approach in social sciences,
13-14
Humboldt, Wilhelm, 60
Husserl, E d m u n d , xi-xii, 16, 19
on absolute self-responsibility 31-32,
35
on categorial intuition, 33
a n d constitutive social theory, 23
on "contents" vs. "positings," 63
on intentionality, 2 7 - 3 1 , 32-34, 110,
111
a n d Kant, 23, 24, 25-26
and lifeworld, 16, 21, 23, 24
social, 26, 37
a n d nonlinguistic intentionalist theory
of meaning, 51
and other egos, 36
a n d phenomenological foundation of
intersubjectivity, 47
a n d Sellars, 45, 46
a n d subjectivist approaches, 173n.l8
o n transcendental history of
intersubjectivity, 3 8 - 4 3
a n d truth, 22, 28-31, 33, 87-88
"Idea of Individual a n d Community
Life in Absolute Self-Responsibility,
T h e " (Husserl), 31
Idealized model of communication,
sorts of failure of, xxi
Ideal speaker-listener (Chomsky),
69-70, 71
Ideal speech situation, xv-xvi, xx,
97-99, 102-103, 1 7 9 n . l l
vs. empirical circumstances, xxii
Ideas . . . (Husserl), 27, 41
Identity, 156
personal, 156
Identity conflicts, 155-159
a n d family relation, 159-165, 170
and pseudo-consensus, xxii, 165-169
a n d systematic distortions, 169-170
Instrumental action, rules of, 109
Intelligibility
and truth, 91
as validity claim, xiv, 63, 90, 91, 93
violation of, 148, 149-151
I n t e n t i o n ( s ) , 5 9 , 110-111
and beliefs, 111
as cause, 114-115
a n d rule-following, 107
Wittgenstein on, 52
Intentional action, xviii, 11, 110-118
and cognitive acts, 118
and language, 125
a n d norm-governed action, 109
Intentional behavior, 5
Intentional expressions, Sellars on,
47-48
Intentionality, xviii, 27-31, 32-34, 36
a n d B r e n t a n o , 27, 110, 114
cognitive vs. noncognitive relation in,
111-112
187
Index
expectation of, 101
and first- vs. third-person, 112-113
and Husserl, 27-31, 32-34, 110, 111
and language, 114
Sellars's account of, 45
"Intentions, Conventions, and Linguistic
Interactions" (Habermas), xvii
Interactive competence, xx, 131
a n d moral j u d g m e n t , 131, 135-136
Interactive language use, obligation in,
149
Interpersonal relationships
within family, 159
spiraling in, 157-159
Interpretation (s), 90, 9 4 , 1 2 7
a n d intersubjectivity, xi
and rule-following, 107
Intersubjectively communalized experi
ence, 24
Intersubjective world, vs. objective world,
37
Intersubjectivity, x-xi
and assertibilist semantics, xxiii
and communicative vs. constitutive the
ories, 44
a n d Habermas on Wittgenstein, xiii
Husserl and Sellars on, xi-xii
and intentional expressions, 107
a n d monological language, 51-52
as paradoxical relation, 60-61
phenomenological foundation of, 36,
38, 47
problem of foundation of, 23
of society, 22
a n d speech acts, 61
and subjectivity, xx
of thought, 45
transcendental history of, 38-43
and universalizability of interests,
xix
of validity of rules, 50, 59
Intrapsychic disturbances of communica
tion, family disturbances analogous
to, 131
Intuition, and Husserl, 28, 33, 88
J u d g e s , competent, 9596
Justification(s), 90, 94. See also Validity
claims
a n d consensus theory of truth, xvii
moral-practical, 119-123
a n d motive, xix
a n d theory of meaning, xiiixiv
Kamlah, Wilhelm, 95
Kant, Immanuel, 16, 18-19
a n d Husserl, 23, 24, 25-26
and Sellars, 45
Kaufmann, Luc, 165, 166-167
Laing, R. D , 156
Language, 125-127
autonomy of, 143-144
generative theory of, 65
g r a m m a r of, 67
and intentionality, 114
knowledge of rules of, 8-10
a n d m e a n i n g , xxiii
monological, 48-50, 51
reflexivity of, 73-74
Language development, Spitz on,
138-140
Language games, xii, 52-63, 64,
I76n.l8
and analysis of concepts (Roche), 108
background consensus in, 89-90
communicative action in, 100
and communicative theory, 44, 53
a n d dual structure of speech acts, 63
and generative theory of society, 17,
18, 19
g r a m m a r of, 67, 107-108
a n d role or function of expression,
47
Wittgenstein and theory of, 53, 67
Language use
cognitive, xiii, xxiii, 63-64, 76
and disclosure theories of t r u t h , 92
obligation in, 148
pragmatics of, 78-82
and Wittgenstein, 62
communicative, xiii, xxiii, 64, 76
pragmatics of, 82-84
and Wittgenstein, xiii
context-independent, 143
Legitimacy, expectation of, 101
Levy-Strauss, Claude, 19
Lidz, T h e o d o r e , 162
Lies, 154
Lifeworld, xvi
and communicative theory of society,
34-35
constitutive theory of, 25
of Husserl, 16, 21, 23, 24
p h e n o m e n o l o g y a n d philosophy of
language on, 68
as posited, 29, 30
188
Index

Lifeworld (continued) social theory(ies) of, xxiii, xxiv

and science, 24-25 use theory(ies) of, xii, xxiii, 54
social, 26, 37 Measurement, 7, 10-11
Linguistic abstraction, 74-75 M e l d e n , A . L , 114-115
Linguistic codes, 71-73 Mental health, Devereux on, 134
Linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n , ix, xviii, 4, Metacommunication, xiii, 59-60, 74
109 Metadiscourse, 179n.l0
a n d absence, 28 Moods, 116
in child's development, 137-140 Moral j u d g m e n t
levels of a n d interactive competence, 131,
first, 140-141 135-136
second, 141-146 normative assumption of, 135
and model of communicative action, Moral justification, 119-123
127 Mutual understanding. See Understand
and motivational development, 131 ing, mutual
mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g as purpose of,
93 Naturalistic fallacy in ethics, 92
normalcy conditions of, 131-137 Nature
normative foundation of, 102 a n d natural sciences, 24
Linguistic c o m p e t e n c e , 69-70, 71 a n d other Ego, 37
Linguistic empiricism, 65 vs. society, 19-21
Linguistics, 75 Need-based nature (Bedurfnisnatur),
Linguistic transcendentalism, 64-65 123,125,131
Linguistic t u r n of twentieth-century phi Need interpretations, xviii
losophy, vii Needs, 116
for Habermas, xii, xxii Negation
a n d Sellars, xii, 47 in child development (Spitz),
a n d theory of consciousness, 45 138-140
Logic, 75 a n d speech acts, 146
Logical abstraction, 75 Neo-Kantianism, 19
Logical Investigations (Husserl), 27, 41 Neurotic behavior patterns, 153
Lorenzen, Paul, 95 Nomological statements, 9
Lorenzer, A., 169 Nonverbal expressions, and speech
Luckmann, Thomas, 16 acts, 142
L u h m a n n , Niklas, 14, 19 Normalcy of linguistic communication,
Lukacs, G., 19 xx, 131-137
and conscious conflict, 136
Making It Explicit (Brandom), xxiv Norman, Richard, 119-121
Marcuse, Herbert, 19 Normative model of action, 126
Marx, Karl, 16 Normative rightness, 123
Marxist phenomenology, 19 and truth, 92
Mead, G. H., xix, 17, 18, 19, 43, 59, as validity claim, xiv, 64, 90, 91, 92, 93,
124 179n.8
Meaning, 3-4, l 7 2 n . l violation of, 152-153
a n d action vs. behavior, 4-6 Normative social reality, a n d speech,
communication as sharing of, 60 144, 146
and conventionalism vs. essentialism, Normative validity, 100-103, 122, 123
8-10 of rules, 6
a n d intersubjectivity, x-xi, 43 a n d value-oriented action, 118
normativity of, xi Norm-governed action, xviii, 123
a n d observation vs. understanding, and language, 125
6-8 Norms
and Sellars, 46 a n d accountability, 101
189
Index
a n d action, 5-6, 7, 8
a n d communicative action, 12
a n d deviations, 70
fulfilling of, 118-125
M e a d on, 124
a n d rules of action, 109
validity of, 122-123
a n d values, 125
Objective world
vs. intersubjective world, 37
a n d paradox of others, 36-37
Objectivist approach to theory forma
tion, x-xi, xii, 10-11
Object relations, 159
Observation, vs. understanding, 6-8
Oevermann, U , 163, 165
Ontological theories of truth, 86, 87
Other(s)
and constitutive theories of society, 22
Husserl o n , 36-37, 39-40, 42
a n d personal identity; 156
Parsons, Talcott, 13, 14, 19, 118, 123
Passivity, in family relationships, 163
Peirce, C. S., 24, 34, 81-82, 87, 88
Perception, and cognitive language,
xvi-xvii
Performative clause, 90
Performative utterances, 74
Performative verbs, 77
Peters, R. S, 114-115
Phenomenological attitude, 43
Phenomenological foundation of
intersubjectivity, 36, 38, 47
Phenomenology, 19
a n d constitutive theory o f society, 25
a n d intersubjectivity, xi-xii
Philosophical life, Husserl on, 32
Philosophy of language
and game model of language, 59
a n d philosophy of consciousness, 32,
36
a n d Wittgenstein, 52
Philosophy or theory of consciousness
Husserl on, 36
a n d linguistic turn, 45
philosophy of language as replacement
for, 32, 36
solitary reflection in, 43
a n d Wittgenstein, 52
Philosophy in twentieth century, "lin
guistic turn" of. See Linguistic
turn of twentieth-century
philosophy t
Piaget.Jean, 70, 135
Popper, Karl, 14, 87-88
Positing(s), 28-30, 34-35, 63
Power relations, and family distortions,
xxii, 161-162
Practical discourse, 9 4
Pragmatic competences, 75
Pragmatics. See also Universal
pragmatics
of assertions, 89, 91
of cognitive language use, 78-82
of communicative language use,
82-84
empirical, 72
resurgence of interest in, xxix
Pragmatic theory of meaning, and
speech act theory, ix
Pragmatic universals, 73, 76-78
Predication, 81-82
Presuppositions of action, xxiii
Private language utterances, 169
Pronouns, 6 1 , 77, 81
Propositions, truth of, 95
Proximity of family members, in patho
logical families, 162
Pseudo-confirmation, 167
Pseudo-consensus, xxii,
165-169
Public standards, 120-121
Pure communicative action, 99-100,
102
Purposive-rational action, 11-12
Rational choice theories, 15
Rational consensus, xv, xvii, 93, 9 5 , 9 6 ,
99
Rationality. See also Reason
a n d assertibilist semantics, xxiii
claim to, 85
communicative, ix, xi
of judges, 95-96
and theory of communicative action,
xxii-xxiii
Rational motivation, 94-95
Reality, 87
Reason, 8 5 - 8 6 . See also Rationality
communicative, vii, ix
a n d Habermas on communication,
vii
a n d linguistic turn, vii
"postmetaphysical," vii
 190
Index
Reasons, a n d speech acts, xiv. See also Va
lidity claims
Reference
and cognitive language, xvi-xvii
and context-independence, 143
Referential expressions, 80
"Reflection on Communicative Pathol
ogies" (Habermas), xix
Regulative speech acts, xiv, 83, 84, 99,
149
Representative (expressive) speech acts,
83, 84, 99
Responsibility, a n d behavior, 5
Rickert, Heinrich, 19, 173n.l8
Rightness, 92. See also Normative
rightness
Roche, M., 108, 109
Role theory, conventional, 126
Rule-competence, 7 0 , 7 2
Rule-following, xii, xviii, 107
Rule-model of language use, 125
Rules, 50-51
and action, 5-6, 13, 108-109
grammatical, 56, 5 7 - 5 8
of performance vs. criticism (Sellars),
49
Wittgenstein on, xii, 43, 50, 5 1 , 56, 68,
107-108
a n d Wittgenstein on language games,
53-55, 56
Rule systems, subjectless, 16
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 19
Schutz, Alfred, xi, 16, 19, 25, 42
Schiitze, Y, 165, 166, 168
Schwayder, D. S., 73
Science, and lifeworld, 24-25
Searle, J o h n , 82
Self-responsibility, for Husserl, 31-32, 35
Sellars, Wilfrid, xi, xii, xxiv, 45-49,
5 1 - 5 2 , 6 5 , 87, 111, I75n.3
Semantic content, 140-141
Semantic conventions, 107-110
as Wittgenstein example, 88
Semantic definition of truth, 86
Semantic relation, Sellars o n , 46-47
Semantics
assertibilist, xxiii
Brandom on, xxiv
formal, xxiii
intentionalist, xxiii
Simmel, Georg, 18, 19-20, 21-22,
173n.l8
Sincerity
and speech vs. speaker's subjectivity,
146
a n d truth, 91-92
as validity claim, xiv, 64, 90, 91, 93
violation of, 151-152, 154
Social action, and Habermas, ix
Social change, on atomistic approach,
14
Social conventions, 107-110
Social cybernetic models, 15
Socialization
and communicative action, xx, 131
deviant processes of, xix
disturbances of, 131
Social lifeworld, 2 6 , 3 7
Social reality, constitution of, 16
Social science (s). See also T h e o r y forma
tion in social sciences
dominant paradigms in, x
a n d meaning, 3-4
theoretical approaches in, 3
Social systems theory. See Systems
theory
Social theory
Habermas's linguistic approach to, ix,
x
of meaning, xxiii
Society
epistemology as i n a d e q u a t e to, 22
vs. n a t u r e , 19-21
truth in immanent relation to, 22, 23,
26-27, 32
Sociolinguistic abstraction, 74
Sociolinguistics, 75
Spann, O., 19
Speech. See aho Ideal speech situation
autonomy of, 144-145
dual structure of, xiii, 63, 76
external a n d internal organization of,
144-145, 147, 154, 169
a n d normative social reality, 144, 146
Speech acts, 55, 61, 73-74, 76
classification of, xiv, 82-84
communicatives, xiv, 82-83, 84, 99
constatives, xiv, 78, 83, 84 (see aho
Constative speech acts)
regulatives, xiv, 83, 84, 99, 149
representatives (expressives), xiv, 83,
84, 99
a n d intentions vs. norms, 109
a n d nonverbal expressions, 142
normative background of, 143-144
191
Index
a n d reason, 85-86
and t r u t h , 86
validity claims for, xiv, 90, 136, 146 (see
also Validity claims)
and Wittgenstein, 62
Speech act theory, ix-x, xiii-xiv, xxiii
and pragmatic universals, 78
and validity claims, xiv
Spitz, R, 137-140
Stierlin, H , 160
Strategic action, 12-13
and communicative action, xviii,
12-13
vs. consensual action, 150
Strategic games, 57
Structuralism, 16-17, 19
Subjectivist approaches i n contemporary
sociology, 173n.l8
Subjectivist approaches t o theory forma
tion, x-xi, 10, 15
Subjectivist theoretical program, 10
Subjectivity, a n d intersubjectivity, xx
Symbolic interactionism, 19
Systematically distorted communication,
viii,xx, 137, 147-149
and conflicts of identity, xxi, 155-159
as circular process, 169-170
in families, xxi-xxii, 159-165,
170
a n d pseudo-consensus, 165-169
examples of, 164-165
as third option, xxii
violations of validity claims, 149-155
Systems theory(ies), 14, 16-17, 18, 19
Tandem p h e n o m e n o n , 166-167
Tangential response, 166
Tarski, Alfred, 86
Taylor, Charles, 115
Teleological m o d e l of action, xix,
113-114, 115-116
and acting subject, 118
Theoretico-empirical discourse, 94
Theories, and expectations, 124-125
T h e o r y of action, ix, xvii
and rule-following, 108
Theory of Communicative Action, The
(Habermas), viii, xiv, xvi
T h e o r y of consciousness. See Philosophy
or theory of consciousness
T h e o r y formation in social sciences
atomistic vs. holistic a p p r o a c h in,
13-14
classification of approaches t o , 14
a n d generative theories of society,
15-22
objectivist vs. subjectivist approaches
to, 10-11, 15
and strategic vs. communicative ac
tion, 11-13
T h e o r y of knowledge, constitutive. See
Constitutive theory of
knowledge
Theory of language, and Wittgenstein,
64
T h e o r y of meaning, xiii-xiv
T h e o r y of rationality, xxii
Tractatus . . . (Wittgenstein), 61
Transcendental community, 26, 42-43,
174n.5
Transcendental history of
intersubjectivity, 38-43
T r u t h , xvi, xxiii, 86
analytic, 91
consensus theory of, xvii, 89, 92-93,
95-99
correspondence theory of, 86, 91
disclosure theories of, 92
as evidence (evidential theory of), 33,
34, 36, 87-88
Husserl on, 22, 28-31, 33, 87-88
a n d intelligibility, 91
a n d normative Tightness, 92
of propositions, 95
and sincerity, 91-92
society's i m m a n e n t relation t o , 22, 23,
26-27, 32
universal-pragmatic meaning of,
89
as validity claim, xiv, 6 3 - 6 4 , 90, 91,
93
violation of, 153-154
Tugendhat, Ernst, 32
Unconscious motives, a n d accountabil
ity, 101
Unconscious repression, 136
Understanding
a n d acceptability conditions, xxiii
of games, 54, 55-56
mutual, 93, 97, 101-102
and consensus, 127
a n d conventions, xix
a n d dual structure of speech,
xiii
and formal pragmatics, ix
192 _
Index
Understanding (continued)
and normalcy of linguistic communi
cation, 136-137
as presupposition of communicative
action, 148
and role-taking, 126
as telos of language, ix
a n d normative social reality, 144
vs. observation, 6-8
and spiral of interpersonal relation
ships, 157, 158
Universalizability of discourse ethics,
principle of, xix
Universal-pragmatic abstraction, 74
Universal-pragmatic m e a n i n g of truth,
89
Universal (formal) pragmatics, viii, ix,
72. See aho Pragmatics
and cognitive use of language, 68
a n d communicative competence, xi, 74,
75
and communicative theory of society,
53
a n d communicative use of language,
68
and critical theory, xv, 103
generative grammar as model for,
65
and generative semantics, 177n.9
of language games, 68
a n d lifeworld, xvi
a n d reflexivity of natural languages,
73-74
and social theory of meaning, xxiii
Uses of language. See Language use
Use theory of meaning, xii, xxiii, 54
Utterance
abstractions from, 74-75
and speech act theory, ix
as unintelligible, 145-146
Validity claims, xiv, xxiii
bases of, 136-137
ontogenesis of, 137-146
transcendental i m p o r t of, 146-155
B r a n d o m on, xxiv
challenging of, xiv, xx
classes of, xiv, 63-64, 90-91
intelligibility, xiv, 63, 90, 9 1 , 93, 148,
149-151
normative rightness, xiv, 64, 90, 9 1 , 92,
93, 152-153, I79n.8
sincerity, xiv, 64, 90, 91, 93, 151-152,
154
truth, xiv, 63-64, 90, 91, 93,
153-154
a n d consensus theory of truth, xvii
discursive r e d e m p t i o n of, xvii, xxi, 89,
92-93, 97
a n d experiences, 88
facticityof, 22, 85
a n d false consciousness, 35-36
and mutual agreement, 136-137
of n o r m , 122 (see aho Normative
validity)
a n d positing, 34
a n d social life, 22
a n d society's relation to truth, 26
suspension of in discourse, 100
violation of, 149-155
Values, 117, 123
a n d common culture, 126
cultural, 122
and norms, 125
Volitional acts
a n d Husserl, 30-31
Vorstudien und Ergdnzungen zur theorie des
kommunikativen Handelns
(Habermas), viii
Wants, 123
intelligible, 119-120
publicly interpreted, 121
W a t k i n s J . W. N., 14
Weber, Max, 13
Winch, Peter, 19, 108-109, 114-115
Wittgenstein, xi, xiixiii, 67
and analysis of concepts, 108
and comparable functions in lan
guage, 51
o n intention and language, 52
o n language-games, 17, 18, 19, 44, 47,
52-63, 64, 67, 176n.l8
o n reaching understanding, 93
o n rules, xii, 43, 50, 51, 56, 68,
107-108
a n d semantic conventions, 88
semantic a n d social conventions
equated by, 107
on sense of assertion, 73
a n d theory of action vs. of meaning,
108
a n d theory of language, 64
Wunderlich, Dieter, 72, 76
Wynne, Lyman, 162, 164, 165