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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,


vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and
ANTONIO ROSALES,respondents.

Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.

Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the question raised
is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her
mother-in-law.

It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident
of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2)
children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased
her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein
petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00).

On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix
of the said estate.

In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972
declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective
share of the estate

Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4;


Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.

This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.

These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she
is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial court
denied her plea. Hence this petition.

In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First is a widow
(surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second are the Orders of the trial court
which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in question final as against the said
widow?

Our answer to the first question is in the negative.

Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right,
and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either
by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of
representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:

Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are
dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.

Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the
portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions.

Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their
descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a
legitimate child.

There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate
heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from
her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the
Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with
meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The
conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the
deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving
spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.

Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of the
Civil Code which provides that:

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1
and 2; neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall
inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.

The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving
spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.

Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.
We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:

We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597
(not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L.
Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or
compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. ...
(Emphasis supplied).

By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support
petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated
therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate
estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the
petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the
inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.

The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the
Civil Code, viz

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the
person represented. The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law because of
his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented)
who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have
succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood
with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an
inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may,
said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox
Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his
deceased father, Carterio Rosales.

On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass upon
the second question posed by the petitioner.

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an intestate
heir of his or her parent-in-law.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs
against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 III Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines
461, 1979 ed.

2 Articles 978 to 1014.

3 Art. 887 (3), Civil Code.

4 71 SCRA 262, 265 L-42257, June 14, 1976.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-66574 February 21, 1990


ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed
SANTERO, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.

Pedro S. Sarino for respondent Felisa Pamuti Jardin.

RESOLUTION

PARAS, J.:

The decision of the Second Division of this Court in the case of Anselma Diaz, et al. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 6574, promulgated June 17, 1987 declaring Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to
be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, and its
Resolution of February 24, 1988 denying the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 2, 1987, are
being challenged in this Second Motion for Reconsideration dated July 5, 1988. After the parties had
filed their respective pleadings, the Court, in a resolution dated October 27, 1988, resolved to grant
the request of the petitioners for oral argument before the court en banc, and the case was set for
hearing on November 17, 1988 to resolve the question: Does the term "relatives" in Article 992 of the
New Civil Code which reads:

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children or
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child.

include the legitimate parents of the father or mother of the illegitimate children? Invited to discuss
as amici curiaeduring the hearing were the following: Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, former Justice
Minister Ricardo C. Puno, Dr. Arturo Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and Professor
Ruben Balane.

The facts of the case, as synthesized in the assailed decision, are as follows:

It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de


Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children
of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon
Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died
during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual
Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only
legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;
5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in
1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother
Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with
Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
(pp. 1-2, Decision; pp. 190-191, Rollo)
Briefly stated, the real issue in the instant case is this who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of
Pablo Santero)?

The present controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
In connection therewith, We are tasked with determining anew whether petitioners as illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of
representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.

Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil Code of
Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines) constitute a
substantial and not merely a formal change, which grants illegitimate children certain successional
rights. We do not dispute the fact that the New Civil Code has given illegitimate children
successional rights, which rights were never before enjoyed by them under the Old Civil Code. They
were during that time merely entitled to support. In fact, they are now considered as compulsory
primary heirs under Article 887 of the new Civil Code (No. 5 in the order of intestate succession).
Again, We do not deny that fact. These are only some of the many rights granted by the new Code
to illegitimate children. But that is all. A careful evaluation of the New Civil Code provisions,
especially Articles 902, 982, 989, and 990, claimed by petitioners to have conferred illegitimate
children the right to represent their parents in the inheritance of their legitimate grandparents, would
in point of fact reveal that such right to this time does not exist.

Let Us take a closer look at the above-cited provisions.

Art.902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are
transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.

Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right
of representation and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the
portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions. (933)

Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive descendants of
another illegitimate child who is dead, the former shall succeed in their own right and
the latter by right of representation. (940a)

Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles
to illegitimate children shall be transmitted upon their death to their descendants,
who shall inherit by right of representation from their deceased grandparent. (941a)
Emphasis supplied).

Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights
are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate
children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In
whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are
themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of
a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant
of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides
that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a
conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate
parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992.
Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother. It may not be amiss to state that Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.

"The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children ... are transmitted upon their
death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed
by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother."' (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice
Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12)

"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product
of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth,
by avoiding further ground of resentment." (7 Manresa 110 cited in Grey v. Fable 40 OG (First S) No.
3, p. 196).

According to petitioners, the commentaries of Manresa as above- quoted are based on Articles 939
to 944 of the old Civil Code and are therefore inapplicable to the New Civil Code and to the case at
bar. Petitioners further argue that the consistent doctrine adopted by this Court in the cases
of Llorente vs. Rodriguez, et al., 10 Phil., 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322, and Oyao vs.
Oyao, 94 Phil. 204, cited by former Justice Minister Justice Puno, Justice Caguioa, and Prof. Balane,
which identically held that an illegitimate child has no right to succeed ab intestato the legitimate
father or mother of his natural parent (also a legitimate child himself is already abrogated by the
amendments made by the Now Civil Code and thus cannot be made to apply to the instant case.

Once more, We decline to agree with petitioner. We are fully aware of certain substantial changes in
our law of succcession, but there is no change whatsoever with respect to the provision of Article
992 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, by the said substantial change, Article 992, which was a
reproduction f Article 943 of the Civil Code of Spain, should have been suppressed or at least
modified to clarify the matters which are now the subject of the present controversy. While the New
Civil Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate children, those articles, however, in
conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from being exercised where the
person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the determining factor is the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person to be represented is an
illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him;
however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot represent
him because the law provides that only his legitimate descendants may exercise the right of
representation by reason of the barrier imposed Article 992. In this wise, the commentaries of
Manresa on the matter in issue, even though based on the old Civil Code, are still very much
applicable to the New Civil Code because the amendment, although substantial, did not consist of
giving illegitimate children the right to represent their natural parents (legitimate) in the intestate
succession of their grandparents (legitimate). It is with the same line of reasoning that the three
aforecited cases may be said to be still applicable to the instant case.
Equally important are the reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also find
support from other civilists. We quote:

In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within
the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an
illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this
principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but
with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows
the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue
of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the
grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference
being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall
have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases
the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or
contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 992 and 998. The first solution
would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children.
(Reflections on the Reform of hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, First Quartet 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41). (p. 7,
Decision; p. 196, Rollo)

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is
broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. (Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing
p. 2862 Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. 11, Third Revision, Eight Edition) The record reveals that from
the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to
be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus
curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:

The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In
accordance therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be
understood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general
one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda.That the law does not make a
distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera
debemus. Esrinche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y
Jurisprudencia defines parientes as "los que estan relacionados por los vinculos de
la sangre, ya sea por proceder unos de otros, como los descendientes y
ascendientes, ya sea por proceder de una misma raiz o tronco, como los colaterales.
(cited in Scaevola, op. cit., p. 457). (p. 377, Rollo)

According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense
than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further states
that when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the
word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only
collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that
it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense which as already discussed earlier, is not so in
the case at bar.

To recapitulate, We quote this:

The lines of this distinction between legitimates and illegitimates. which goes back
very far in legal history, have been softened but not erased by present law. Our
legislation has not gone so far as to place legitimate and illegitimate children on
exactly the same footing. Even the Family Code of 1987 (EO 209) has not abolished
the gradation between legitimate and illegitimate children (although it has done away
with the sub-classification of illegitimates into natural and 'spurious'). It would thus be
correct to say that illegitimate children have only those rights which are expressly or
clearly granted to them by law (vide Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1973
ed., vol. III, p. 291). (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by Prof. Ruben Balane, p. 12).

In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at least amended to
clarify the term "relatives" there is no other alternative but to apply the law literally. Thus, We hereby
reiterate the decision of June 17, 1987 and declare Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the second Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED, and the assailed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Cortes, Grio-Aquino,


Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

The ponente, Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras, is a noted teacher of Civil Law subjects and a well-
known author of many Commentaries on the Civil Code. The amicus curiae former Justice Jose
B.L. Reyes, former Justice Ricardo C. Puno, former Senator Arturo Tolentino, former Justice
Eduardo Caguioa, and Professor Ruben Balane together with the ponente read like a veritable
Who's Who in Civil Law in the Philippines.

It is, therefore, with trepidation that I venture to cast a discordant vote on the issue before the Court.
But it is perhaps because I am not as deeply steeped in the civil law tradition and in the usually tidy
and methodical neatness characterizing its ancient precepts that I discern a change effected by our
own version of the Civil Code. The orthodox rules which earlier inflexibly separated the legitimate
from the illegitimate families have been relaxed a little. The oppobrium cast on illegitimate children
and the disadvantages they suffer in law are no longer as overwhelming as before. The wall is no
longer as rigid as it used to be. The efforts of the Code Commission and the Congress to make our
civil law conform "With the customs, traditions, and idiosyncrasies of the Filipino people and with
modern trends in legislation and the progressive principles of law" have resulted in deviations from
the strict and narrow path followed by Manresa and other early glossators. I, therefore, do not feel
bound to follow the ancient interpretations in the presence of absurd and unjust results brought
about by amendments in the new Civil Code.

We have here a case of grandchildren who cannot inherit from their direct ascendant, their own
grandmother, simply because their father (who was a legitimate son) failed to marry their mother.
There are no other direct heirs. Hence, the properties of their grandmother goes to a collateral
relative her niece. If the niece is no longer alive, an even more distant group of grandnieces and
grandnephews will inherit as against the grandmother's own direct flesh and blood.

As pointed out by the petitioners, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court disregards the
order of intestate succession in Arts. 978 to 1014 of the Civil Code and the right of representation in
Art. 970 of descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate as provided by Arts. 902, 993, and 995.

I agree that a clear and precise amendment is needed if collateral relatives such as illegitimate
children and legitimate uncles, aunts, or cousins or illegitimate siblings and their legitimate half-
brothers or half-sisters are to inherit from one another. But I must stress that the barrier is between
the legitimate and illegitimate families. I see no reason why we should include a grandmother or
grandfather among those where a firm wall of separation should be maintained. She cannot be a
separate "family" from her own grandchildren.

The ancient wall was breached by our Code Commission and Congress in Art. 902 of the Code
which provides:

The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted
upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. (843a)

The illegitimate children of an illegitimate child have the right to represent him in the circumstances
given in preceding articles. Before the Code was amended, that right was reserved to the illegitimate
child's legitimate off-spring.

I find it absurd why the petitioners could have represented their father Pablo if their grandparents
Simona and Pascual had not been legally married. Senator Tolentino, while supporting the majority
view of this Court states:

xxx xxx xxx

In the present article, the Code Commission took a step forward by giving an
illegitimate child the right of representation, which he did not have under the old
Code. But in retaining without change provisions of the old Code in Article 992, it
created an absurdity and committed an injustice, because while the illegitimate
descendant of an illegitimate child can represent, the illegitimate descendant of a
legitimate child cannot. The principle that the illegitimate child should succeed by
operation of law only to persons with the same status of illegitimacy has thus been
preserved. And this is unfair to the illegitimate descendants of legitimate
children. Dura lex, sed lex. (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, 1987 ed., p. 330.)

The adoption of a harsh and absurd interpretation, pending an amendment of the law, does not
impress me as correct. Precisely, the word "relatives" in Art. 992 calls for reinterpretation because
the Code has been amended. The meaning of relatives must follow the changes in various
provisions upon which the word's effectivity is dependent.

My dissent from the majority opinion is also premised on a firm belief that law is based on
considerations of justice. The law should be interpreted to accord with what appears right and just.
Unless the opposite is proved, I will always presume that a grandmother loves her grandchildren
legitimate or illegitimate more than the second cousins of said grandchildren or the parents of
said cousins. The grandmother may be angry at the indiscretions of her son but why should the law
include the innocent grandchildren as objects of that anger. "Relatives" can only refer to collateral
relatives, to members of a separate group of kins but not to one's own grandparents.

I, therefore, vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

The ponente, Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras, is a noted teacher of Civil Law subjects and a well-
known author of many Commentaries on the Civil Code. The amicus curiae former Justice Jose
B.L. Reyes, former Justice Ricardo C. Puno, former Senator Arturo Tolentino, former Justice
Eduardo Caguioa, and Professor Ruben Balane together with the ponente read like a veritable
Who's Who in Civil Law in the Philippines.

It is, therefore, with trepidation that I venture to cast a discordant vote on the issue before the Court.
But it is perhaps because I am not as deeply steeped in the civil law tradition and in the usually tidy
and methodical neatness characterizing its ancient precepts that I discern a change effected by our
own version of the Civil Code. The orthodox rules which earlier inflexibly separated the legitimate
from the illegitimate families have been relaxed a little. The oppobrium cast on illegitimate children
and the disadvantages they suffer in law are no longer as overwhelming as before. The wall is no
longer as rigid as it used to be. The efforts of the Code Commission and the Congress to make our
civil law conform "With the customs, traditions, and idiosyncrasies of the Filipino people and with
modern trends in legislation and the progressive principles of law" have resulted in deviations from
the strict and narrow path followed by Manresa and other early glossators. I, therefore, do not feel
bound to follow the ancient interpretations in the presence of absurd and unjust results brought
about by amendments in the new Civil Code.

We have here a case of grandchildren who cannot inherit from their direct ascendant, their own
grandmother, simply because their father (who was a legitimate son) failed to marry their mother.
There are no other direct heirs. Hence, the properties of their grandmother goes to a collateral
relative her niece. If the niece is no longer alive, an even more distant group of grandnieces and
grandnephews will inherit as against the grandmother's own direct flesh and blood.
As pointed out by the petitioners, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court disregards the
order of intestate succession in Arts. 978 to 1014 of the Civil Code and the right of representation in
Art. 970 of descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate as provided by Arts. 902, 993, and 995.

I agree that a clear and precise amendment is needed if collateral relatives such as illegitimate
children and legitimate uncles, aunts, or cousins or illegitimate siblings and their legitimate half-
brothers or half-sisters are to inherit from one another. But I must stress that the barrier is between
the legitimate and illegitimate families. I see no reason why we should include a grandmother or
grandfather among those where a firm wall of separation should be maintained. She cannot be a
separate "family" from her own grandchildren.

The ancient wall was breached by our Code Commission and Congress in Art. 902 of the Code
which provides:

The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted
upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. (843a)

The illegitimate children of an illegitimate child have the right to represent him in the circumstances
given in preceding articles. Before the Code was amended, that right was reserved to the illegitimate
child's legitimate off-spring.

I find it absurd why the petitioners could have represented their father Pablo if their grandparents
Simona and Pascual had not been legally married. Senator Tolentino, while supporting the majority
view of this Court states:

xxx xxx xxx

In the present article, the Code Commission took a step forward by giving an
illegitimate child the right of representation, which he did not have under the old
Code. But in retaining without change provisions of the old Code in Article 992, it
created an absurdity and committed an injustice, because while the illegitimate
descendant of an illegitimate child can represent, the illegitimate descendant of a
legitimate child cannot. The principle that the illegitimate child should succeed by
operation of law only to persons with the same status of illegitimacy has thus been
preserved. And this is unfair to the illegitimate descendants of legitimate
children. Dura lex, sed lex. (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, 1987 ed., p. 330.)

The adoption of a harsh and absurd interpretation, pending an amendment of the law, does not
impress me as correct. Precisely, the word "relatives" in Art. 992 calls for reinterpretation because
the Code has been amended. The meaning of relatives must follow the changes in various
provisions upon which the word's effectivity is dependent.

My dissent from the majority opinion is also premised on a firm belief that law is based on
considerations of justice. The law should be interpreted to accord with what appears right and just.
Unless the opposite is proved, I will always presume that a grandmother loves her grandchildren
legitimate or illegitimate more than the second cousins of said grandchildren or the parents of
said cousins. The grandmother may be angry at the indiscretions of her son but why should the law
include the innocent grandchildren as objects of that anger. "Relatives" can only refer to collateral
relatives, to members of a separate group of kins but not to one's own grandparents.
I, therefore, vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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