1. PROVINCE OF NORTH COTOBATO VS.

GRP PEACE PANEL

GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008

FACTS: When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the MILF was
suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF
member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia
through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the
MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the
GRP. The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian
government, the parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption
of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its military actions. Formal peace
talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the
following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With
regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed that the same be
discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting. A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya,
Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect
of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the
Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement
2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many incidence of
violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003. Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat
Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace
negotiator of the MILF. Murads position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal. In 2005,
several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the
draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. Before the Court is
what is perhaps the most contentious consensus ever embodied in an instrument the MOA-AD which is
assailed principally by the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and
183962. Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain and the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. On July 23, 2008, the Province of North
Cotabato[and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose
and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the
slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public
consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. This initial
petition was followed by several other petitions by other parties. The Court ordered the consolidation of the
petitions.
ISSUE: Whether there is a violation of the peoples right to information on matters of public concern (1987
Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
(1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991?
HELD: YES. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta, the Court has recognized the statutory
right to examine and inspect public records, a right which was eventually accorded constitutional status. The right
of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has been
recognized as a self-executory constitutional right. In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,the Court
ruled that access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of
public concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of social and
political significance. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of
free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nations
problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general
interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has
been aptly observed: Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and
its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases. In the same way that free
discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general
interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues
confronting the nation, so that they may be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the government in a
responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas
among a well-informed San Beda College of Law Based on ATTY. ADONIS V. GABRIEL lectures 26 Alliance for
Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired
by the people. The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern That the subject of the information sought in the present
cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is
indeed of public concern. In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered
in the Register of Deeds, the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service eligibility
of a public employee, the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the
recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth,[120] and the identity of party-list nominees, among others, are
matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as
it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.
Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial character of
agreements, the Court has categorically ruled that the right to information contemplates inclusion of negotiations
leading to the consummation of the transaction. Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the
exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is
consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects. Requiring a
consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to
the government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on
matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a
requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a
constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest. Intended as a splendid symmetry to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy
of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution. The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in
above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in
the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section
28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure
establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the
peoples right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy.
These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all
times accountable to the people. Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission so disclose.

2. BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a JUNK VFA MOVEMENT v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO
ZAMORA
G.R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000

FACTS:
The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951, To further
strengthen their defense and security relationship. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external
armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.

On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines.

On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on
January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by
Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.

On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA.
On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially
transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines,the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA,
for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners as legislators, non-governmental organizations, citizens and
taxpayers assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in
ratifying the agreement.

Petitioner contends, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in
the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: a) it must be a treaty,b) it must be duly
concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if
so required by congress, and c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such
treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.

ISSUES AND RULING:

Issue 1: Do the Petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the
constitutionality of the VFA?

NO. Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing. A party bringing a suit challenging the Constitutionality of a
law must show not only that the law is invalid, but that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.
Petitioners have failed to show that they are in any danger of direct injury as a result of the VFA.

As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
powers. A taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove
that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will
sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that
he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised
by taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners that public funds are being
misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA.

Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.) do not possess the requisite locus standi to sue. In the
absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong, they
cannot sue. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is also stripped of standing in these cases. The IBP lacks the
legal capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its
National President to commence the present action.

Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of the issues raised, the
Court may brush aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions.

Issue 2: Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution?

Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as the VFA involves the presence of foreign military troops in
the Philippines.

The Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international
agreements.

Section 21, Article VII reads: [n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in
by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:[a]fter the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that
purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of
at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the treaty valid and binding to the
Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on treaties. All treaties, regardless of subject matter,
coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of
foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is
only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the
agreement binding on the Philippines. Sec 25 further requires that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may
be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the
other contracting state.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of US troops visiting the Philippines. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the US and
RP government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, import and export of
equipment, materials and supplies. Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties
involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent, however,
the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to determining the number of votes
required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate.

It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason that
there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. The Constitution makes no
distinction between transient and permanent. We find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign
troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. When no distinction is made by law;
the Court should not distinguish. We do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not
controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. The
proscription covers foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to
the entry of troops and facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects, such that
three different situations are contemplated a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign
bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of
Section 25, Article XVIII.

Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIII's requisites satisfied to make the VFA effective?

YES

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following
conditions are sufficiently met:
(a) it must be under a treaty;
(b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of
the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and
(c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by
the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the Constitution, as there were at least 16 Senators
that concurred.

As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party
accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the US to submit the VFA to the US Senate for
concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the
principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be
understood in the sense they have in common use.
The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Hubbard, has stated that the US has fully
committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the US accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty,
and binds itself further to comply with its treaty obligations, there is indeed compliance with the mandate of the
Constitution.

Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the President of the VFA, and the concurrence of the Senate, should
be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression of our nation's consent to be bound by said treaty, with the
concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder. Ratification is generally
held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state, through which the formal acceptance of the
treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. In our
jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The
role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.

With the ratification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under principles of
international law (pacta sunt servanda), to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2,
Article II declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations.

3. Plaridel M. Abaya vs. Hon. Secretary Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr.

G. R. No. 167919
February 14, 2007

FACTS:
On May 7, 2004 Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
issued a Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012. It was approved by DPWH Acting Secretary Florante Soriquez. This
resolution recommended the award to China Road & Bridge Corporation of the contract for the implementation of
civil works for Contract Package No. I (CP I), which consists of the improvement/rehabilitation of the San Andres-
Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road, with the lengt of 79.818 kilometers, in the island province of Catanduanes.
This Loan Agreement No. PH-204 was executed by and between the JBIC and the Philippine Government pursuant
to the exchange of Notes executed by and between Mr. Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of Japan to the Philippines, and then Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon, in behalf of their respective
governments.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Loan Agreement No. PH-204 between the JBIC and the Philippine Government is a kind of a
treaty.

HELD:
The Loan Agreement No. PH-204 taken in conjunction with the Exchange of Notes dated December 27, 1999
between the Japanese Government and the Philippine Government is an executive agreement.
An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with the private law contract.
The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one
signed by the representative of the other.
treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols, declarations, memoranda of understanding, modus
vivendi and exchange of notes all are refer to international instruments binding at international law.
Although these instruments differ from each other by title, they all have common features and international law
has applied basically the same rules to all these instruments. These rules are the result of long practice among the
States, which have accepted them as binding norms in their mutual relations. Therefore, they are regarded as
international customary law.
That case was dismissed by the SCORP last Feb. 14 2007.
What the petitioners wanted was that Foreign funded projects also undergo the procurement process.
The dismissal of the case somehow gave justification for the delay of the implementing rules for foreign funded
projects (IRR-B) of the procurement law
If we recall the decision of the Abaya vs Ebdane was used by the DOJ when the
DOTC Secretary was asking for an opinion from the former, during the ZTE controversy.
as ruled by the Supreme Court in Abaya v. Ebdane, an
exchange of notes is considered a form of an executive agreement, which
becomes binding through executive action without need of a vote by the
Senate and that (like treaties and conventions, it is an international
instrument binding at international law,
The second issue involves an examination of the coverage of
Republic Act No. 9184, otherwise known as the Government
Procurement Reform Act. Section 4 of the said Act provides that it shall
apply to:
the Procurement of infrastructure Projects, Goods and
Consulting Services, regardless of source of funds, whether local
or foreign, by all branches and instrumentalities of government, its
departments, offices and agencies, including government-owned
and/or -controlled corporations and local government units,
subject to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 138. Any
treaty or international or executive agreement affecting the
subject matter of this Act to which the Philippine government is a
signatory shall be observed.

4. Sec. of Justice v. Lantion

Facts:

On January 13, 1977 P.D. 1069 was issued prescribing the Procedure of the Extradition of Persons who have
committed Crimes in a Foreign Country. The Decree is founded on The Doctrine of Incorporation under the
Constitution Art II, Sec 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

On November 13, 1994 Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon signed in Manila the Extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the Philippines and the Government of U.S.A. It was ratified by the Senate.

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of U. S. a request for
the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States who are charged in the U.S. with the violation of the
following: conspiracy, attempt to evade tax, false statement or entry, election contributions in the name of
another.
Pending evaluation of the extradition documents, Mark Jimenez, through a counsel, on July 1, 1999, requested
copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government as well as all documents and papers submitted
therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall received copies of the
requested papers.

Mark Jimenez insisted the constitutional rights particularly the following:

1. the right to be furnished the request and supporting papers;

2. the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to present
evidence is support of the opposition;

The Depart of Justice Denied the request.

On Aug 6, 1999 Mark Jimenez filed with the R.T.C against the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Foreign Affairs and
the Director of the NBI for Mandamus (to compel them to furnish to Mark Jimenez the extradition documents.),
Certiorari (to set aside the Sec. of Justice letter dated July 13, 1999), Prohibition (to restrain the Sec of Justice from
considering the extradition request).

On August 10, 1999 the Judge ordered:

The Secretary of Justice et al ordered to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts
complained of.

Thus this petition, arguing that Honorable Lantion (Presiding Judge of RTC Manila)acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or abuse discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the TRO:

1. by ordering the Secretary of Justice to refrain from committing the acts complained of (i.e to desist from
refusing Mark Jimenez access to the official extradition request and documents.)

2. Secretary of Justice was unqualifiedly prevented from performing legal duties under the extradition treaty and
the Philippine Extradition Law.

Issue:

Would Mark Jimenez entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute
a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty?

Held:

Petition Dismissed.

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence.

Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further
legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which
there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute
of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.

In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal
courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances.

The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy
of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as
applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not
superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect a
treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of
the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in
conflict with the constitution

5. INCHONG VS. HERNANDEZ

101 PHIL. 1155

FACTS: Petitioner filed a suit to invalidate the Retail Trade Nationalization Law, on the premise that it violated
several treaties which under the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a generally accepted principle of international law,
should be observed by the Court in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Retail Trade Nationalization Law is unconstitutional for it is in conflict with treaties
which are generally accepted principles of international law.
HELD: The Supreme Court said it saw no conflict. The reason given by the Court was that the Retail Trade National
Law was passed in the exercise of the police power which cannot be bargained away through the medium of a
treaty or a contract. The law in question was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national
economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from such
dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru
which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future. Resuming what we have set
forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national
economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from such
dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the state, through
which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate
the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien
and citizen in the exercise of occupation regulated, nor the due process of the law clause; because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably
protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be
plainly evident - as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary - and that in any case such
matter falls within the prerogative of the legislature, with whose power and discretion the judicial department of
the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers
from no duplicity and has not misled the legislature of the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot
be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on
the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional
agreement.
6. Kuroda v. Jalandoni
83 SCRA 171

Facts
Shinegori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the
Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged before the Philippine Military Commission for war crimes.
As he was the commanding general during such period of war, he was tried for failure to discharge his duties and
permitting the brutal atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against noncombatant civilians and
prisoners of the Japanese forces, in violation of of the laws and customs of war.
Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid court because the law that created it,
Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He further contends that using as basis the Hague Conventions Rules
and Regulations covering Land Warfare for the war crime committed cannot stand ground as the Philippines was
not a signatory of such rules in such convention. Furthermore, he alleges that the United States is not a party of
interest in the case and that the two US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.

Issue
1.Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional
2.Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case

Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War Crimes Office and prescribing
rules on the trial of accused war criminals, is constitutional as it is aligned with Sec 3,Article 2 of the Constitution
which states that The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. The generally accepted principles of
international law includes those formed during the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and other
international jurisprudence established by United Nations. These include the principle that all persons, military or
civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of
crimes and offenses in violation of laws and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In the doctrine of
incorporation, the Philippines abides by these principles and therefore has a right to try persons that commit such
crimes and most especially when it is committed againsts its citizens. It abides with it even if it was not a signatory
to these conventions by the mere incorporation of such principles in the constitution.
The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have been equally, if not more greatly,
aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is charged for. By virtue of Executive Order No. 68, the Military
Commission is a special military tribunal and that the rules as to parties and representation are not governed by
the rules of court but by the very provisions of this special law.

7. Tomoyuki Yamashita v. Wilhelm Styer

G.R. No. L-129 December 19, 1945

Facts:

Tomoyuki Yamashita was an erstwhile commanding general of the 14th army group of the Japanese Imperial Army
in the Philippines. He was charged before an American Military Commission with the most monstrous crimes ever
committed against the American and Filipino peoples.

Filed before the Court were petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer,
Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific.

It was alleged that General Yamashita, after his surrender, became a prisoner of war of the US but was later
removed from such status and placed in confinement as an accused charged for war crimes before an American
Military Commission constituted by respondent Lieutenant General Styer.

Petitioner wanted to be reinstated to his former status as prisoner of war, and that the Military Commission be
prohibited from further trying him.

Issues:

(1) That the Military Commission was not duly constituted, and, therefore, it is without jurisdiction;

(2) That the Philippines cannot be considered as an occupied territory, and the Military Commission cannot
exercise jurisdiction therein;

(3) That Spain, the "protecting power" of Japan, has not been given notice of the implementing trial against
petitioner, contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1892, and therefore, the Military
Commission has no jurisdiction to try the petitioner;

(4) That there is against the petitioner no charge of an offense against the laws of war; and

(5) That the rules of procedure and evidence under which the Military Commission purports to be acting denied
the petitioner a fair trial.

Held:

The Court deemed that petition for habeas corpus is untenable.

The relative difference as to the degree of confinement in such cases is a matter of military measure, disciplinary in
character, beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts.

Neither may the petition for prohibition prosper against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer. The military Commission is not
made party respondent in this case, and although it may be acting, as alleged, without jurisdiction, no order may
be issued in these case proceedings requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.

Constitutionality of the Military Commission

The Commission has been validly constituted by Lieutenant General Styer duly issued by General Douglas
MacArthur, Commander in Chief, United States Army Force Pacific, in accordance in authority vested in him and
with radio communication from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Under paragraph 356 of the Rules of the Land Welfare a Military Commission for the trial and punishment of the
war criminals must be designated by the belligerent. And the belligerent's representative in the present case is
none other than the Commander in Chief of the United States Army in the Pacific.

The Military Commission thus duly constituted has jurisdiction both over the person of the petitioner and over the
offenses with which he is charged. It has jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by reason of his having fallen
into the hands of the United States Army Forces. Under paragraph 347 of the Rules of the Land Warfare, "the
commanders ordering the commission of such acts, or under whose authority they are committed by their troops,
may be punished by the belligerent into whose hands they may fall."

As to the jurisdiction of the Military Commission over war crimes, the Supreme Court of the United States said:

From the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of
the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status rights and duties and of enemy nations as
well as of enemy individuals. By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so
far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against
the law of war in appropriate cases. Congress, in addition to making rules for the government of our Armed Forces,
has thus exercised its authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations by sanctioning, within
constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons and offenses which, according to
the rules and precepts of the law of nations, and more particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such tribunals.
(Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.)

Philippine jurisdiction to the case

Petitioner is charged before the Military Commission sitting at Manila with having permitted members of his
command "to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against the people of the United States and of its
allies and dependencies, particularly the Philippines," crimes and atrocities which in the bills of particulars, are
described as massacre and extermination of thousand and thousands of unarmed noncombatant civilians by cruel
and brutal means, including bayoneting of children and raping of young girls, as well as devastation and
destruction of public, or private, and religious property for no other motive than pillage and hatred. These are
offenses against the laws of the war as described in paragraph 347 of the Rules of Land Warfare.

It is maintained, however, that, according to the Regulations Governing the Trial of War Criminals in the Pacific.
"the Military Commission . . . shall have jurisdiction over all of Japan and other areas occupied by the armed forces
commanded by the Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific" (emphasis supplied), and the
Philippines is not an occupied territory. The American Forces have occupied the Philippines for the purpose of
liberating the Filipino people from the shackles of Japanese tyranny, and the creation of a Military Commission for
the trial and punishment of Japanese war criminals is an incident of such war of liberation.

Third Issue Spain as protecting power of Japan

It is maintained that Spain, the "protecting power" of Japan, has not been given notice before trial was begun
against petitioner, contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929. But there is nothing in
that Convention showing that notice is a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of Military Commissions appointed by
victorious belligerent. Upon the other hand, the unconditional surrender of Japan and her acceptance of the terms
of the Potsdam Ultimatum are a clear waiver of such a notice. It may be stated, furthermore, that Spain has
severed her diplomatic relation of Japan because of atrocities committed by the Japanese troops against Spaniards
in the Philippines. Apparently, therefore, Spain has ceased to be the protecting power of Japan.

Dismissal of the petition

And, lastly, it is alleged that the rules of procedure and evidence being followed by the Military Commission in the
admission of allegedly immaterial or hearsay evidence, cannot divest the commission of its jurisdiction and cannot
be reviewed in a petition for the habeas corpus. (25 Am. Jur., 218; Collins vs. McDonald, 258 U. S. 416; 66 Law. ed.,
692; 42 Sup. Ct., 326).

For all foregoing, petition is hereby dismissed without costs.

8. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd, (Belgium v. Spain)

Citation. I.C.J. 1970 I.C.J. 3.

Brief Fact Summary. Belgium (P) claimed Spain (D) should be held accountable for the injury to a Canadian
corporation operating in Spain.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state assumes an obligation concerning the treatment of foreign investments based on
general international law, once the state admits foreign investments or foreign nationals into its territory.
Facts. On behalf of Belgian nationals (P) who had invested in a Canadian corporation, Belgium (P) sued Spain (D) on
the premise that Spain (D) was responsible for acts in violation of international law that had caused injury to the
Canadian corporation and its Belgian shareholders (P).
Issue. Does a state assumes an obligation concerning the treatment of foreign investments based on general
international law, once the state admits foreign investments or foreign nationals into its territory?
Held. Yes. A state assumes an obligation concerning the treatment of foreign investments based on general
international law, once the state admits foreign investments or foreign nationals into its territory. It is highly
imperative to draw a distinction between those obligations of a state toward the international community as a
whole and those arising from the field of diplomatic protection. It is only the party to whom an international
obligation is due can bring a claim if a breach of an obligation that is the subject of diplomatic protection occurs.
Discussion. The basic right of all human persons was mentioned by the Court to be protected against slavery and
racial discrimination as deriving from basic general international law. Such rights may derive from international
instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character. Such obligations are obligations erga omnes, that is, all
states have a legal interest in their protection.

9. THE PAQUETE HABANA, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)

Facts:
These are two appeals from decrees of the district court of the United States for the southern district of Florida
condemning two fishing vessels and their cargoes as prize of war.

Each vessel was a fishing smack, running in and out of Havana, and regularly engaged in fishing on the coast of
Cuba. It sailed under the Spanish flag and was owned by a Spanish subject of Cuban birth, living in the city of
Havana. It was commanded by a subject of Spain, also residing in Havana. Her master and crew had no interest in
the vessel, but were entitled to share her catch.

Her cargo consisted of fresh fish, caught by her crew from the sea, put on board as they were caught, and kept and
sold alive. Until stopped by the blockading squadron she had no knowledge of the existence of the war or of any
blockade. She had no arms or ammunition on board, and made on attempt to run the blockade after she knew of
its existence, nor any resistance at the time of the capture.

The Paquete Habana (1st vessel) was a sloop and had a crew of three Cubans, including the master, who had a
fishing license from the Spanish government, and no other commission or license. She left Havana and was
captured by the United States gunboat Castine.

The Lola (2nd vessel) was a schooner and had a crew of six Cubans, including the master, and no commission or
license. She was stopped by the United States steamship Cincinnati, and was warned not to go into Havana, but
was told that she would be allowed to land at Bahia Honda. She then set for Bahia Honda, but on the next
morning, when near that port, was captured by the United States steamship Dolphin.
Both the fishing vessels were brought by their captors into Key West. A libel for the condemnation of each vessel
and her cargo as prize of war was filed. Each vessel was sold by auction (the Paquete Habana for the sum of $490
and the Lola for the sum of $800). There was no other evidence in the record of the value of either vessel or of her
cargo.

Issue:

Whether or not the fishing smacks were subject to capture during the war with Spain.

Held:

No. By an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of
international law, coast fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation of catching and bringing in fresh fish, have been
recognized as exempt, with their cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of war. (The case then discussed
instances throughout history where fishing vessels were captured.)

It will be convenient to refer to some leading French treatises on international law as determined by the general
consent of civilized nations.

'Enemy ships,' say Pistoye and Duverdy, in their Treatise on Maritime Prizes, published in 1855, 'are good prize.
Not all, however; for it results from the unanimous accord of the maritime powers that an exception should be
made in favor of coast fishermen. Such fishermen are respected by the enemy so long as they devote themselves
exclusively to fishing.'
De Cussy, in his work on the Phases and Leading Cases of the Maritime Law of Nations, affirms in the clearest
language the exemption from capture of fishing boats, saying, that 'in time of war the freedom of fishing is
respected by belligerents; fishing boats are considered as neutral; in law, as in principle, they are not subject either
to capture or to confiscation.

Ortolan, in the fourth edition of his Regles Internationales et Diplomatie de la Mer, after stating the general rule
that the vessels and cargoes of subjects of the enemy are lawful prize, says: 'Nevertheless, custom admits an
exception in favor of boats engaged in the coast fishery; these boats, as well as their crews, are free from capture
and exempt from all hostilities. The coast-fishing industry is, in truth, wholly pacific, and of much less importance
in regard to the national wealth that it may produce than maritime commerce or the great fisheries. Peaceful and
wholly inoffensive, those who carry it on, may be called the harvesters of the territorial seas, since they confine
themselves to gathering in the products thereof; they are for the most part poor families who seek in this calling
hardly more than the means of gaining their livelihood.' Again, after observing that there are very few solemn
public treaties which make mention of the immunity of fishing boats in time of war, he says: 'From another point
of view the custom which sanctions this immunity is not so general that it can be considered as making an absolute
international rule; but it has been so often put in practice, and, besides, it accords so well with the rule in use in
wars on land, in regard to peasants and husbandmen, to whom coast fishermen may be likened, that it will
doubtless continue to be followed in maritime wars to come. (A lot of opinions of other writers were also included
which will not be mentioned in this digest)

This review of the precedents and authorities on the subject appears to us abundantly to demonstrate that at the
present day, by the general consent of the civilized nations of the world, and independently of any express treaty
or other public act, it is an established rule of international law, founded on considerations of humanity to a poor
and industrious order of men, and of the mutual convenience of belligerent states, that coast fishing vessels, with
their implements and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed and honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of
catching and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as prize of war.

The exemption, of course, does not apply to coast fishermen or their vessels if employed for a warlike purpose, or
in such a way as to give aid or information to the enemy; nor when military or naval operations create a necessity
to which all private interests must give way.
Nor has the exemption been extended to ships or vessels employed on the high sea in taking whales or seals or
cod or other fish which are not brought fresh to market, but are salted or otherwise cured and made a regular
article of commerce.

This rule of international law is one which prize courts administering the law of nations are bound to take judicial
notice of, and to give effect to, in the absence of any treaty or other public act of their own government in relation
to the matter.

By the practice of all civilized nations, vessels employed only for the purposes of discovery or science are
considered as exempt from the contingencies of war, and therefore not subject to capture. It has been usual for
the government sending out such an expedition to give notice to other powers; but it is not essential.

To this subject in more than one aspect are singularly applicable the words uttered by Mr. Justice Strong, speaking
for this court: 'Undoubtedly no single nation can change the law of the sea. The law is of universal obligation and
no statute of one or two nations can create obligations for the world. Like all the laws of nations, it rests upon the
common consent of civilized communities. It is of force, not because it was prescribed by any superior power, but
because it has been generally accepted as a rule of conduct. Whatever may have been its origin, whether in the
usages of navigation, or in the ordinances of maritime states, or in both, it has become the law of the sea only by
the concurrent sanction of those nations who may be said to constitute the commercial world. Many of the usages
which prevail, and which have the force of law, doubtless originated in the positive prescriptions of some single
state, which were at first of limited effect, but which, when generally accepted, became of universal obligation.'

In the case, each vessel was of a moderate size, such as is not unusual in coast fishing smacks, and was regularly
engaged in fishing on the coast of Cuba. The crew of each were few in number, had no interest in the vessel, and
received, in return for their toil and enterprise, two thirds of her catch, the other third going to her owner by way
of compensation for her use. Each vessel went out from Havana to her fishing ground, and was captured when
returning along the coast of Cuba. The cargo of each consisted of fresh fish, caught by her crew from the sea, and
kept alive on board. Although one of the vessels extended her fishing trip, we cannot doubt that each was engaged
in the coast fishery, and not in a commercial adventure, within the rule of international law.

The case was adjudged that the capture was unlawful and without probable cause ordered that the proceeds of
the sale of the vessel, together with the proceeds of any sale of her cargo, be restored to the claimant, with
damages and costs.

10. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States)
Citation. I.C.J. 1984 I.C.J. 39

Brief Fact Summary. Nicaragua (P) brought a suit against the United States (D) on the ground that the United
States (D) was responsible for illegal military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. The jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice to entertain the case as well as the admissibility of Nicaraguas (P) application to
the I.C.J. was challenged by the United States (D).

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Nicaragua (P) brought a suit against the United States (D) on the ground that the United
States (D) was responsible for illegal military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. The jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice to entertain the case as well as the admissibility of Nicaraguas (P) application to
the I.C.J. was challenged by the United States (D).
Facts. The United States (D) challenged the jurisdiction of the I.C.J when it was held responsible for illegal military
and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (P) in the suit the plaintiff brought against the defendant in
1984. Though a declaration accepting the mandatory jurisdiction of the Court was deposited by the United States
(D) in a 1946, it tried to justify the declaration in a 1984 notification by referring to the 1946 declaration and
stating in part that the declaration shall not apply to disputes with any Central American State.
Apart from maintaining the ground that the I.C.J lacked jurisdiction, the States (D) also argued that Nicaragua (P)
failed to deposit a similar declaration to the Court. On the other hand, Nicaragua (P) based its argument on its
reliance on the 1946 declaration made by the United states (D) due to the fact that it was a state accepting the
same obligation as the United States (D) when it filed charges in the I.C.J. against the United States (D).
Also, the plaintiff intent to submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. was pointed out by the valid
declaration it made in 1929 with the I.C.Js predecessor, which was the Permanent Court of International Justice,
even though Nicaragua had failed to deposit it with that court. The admissibility of Nicaraguas (P) application to
the I.C.J. was also challenged by the United States (D).
Issue. (1) Is the jurisdiction to entertain a dispute between two states, if they both accept the Courts jurisdiction,
within the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice?
(2) Where no grounds exist to exclude the application of a state, is the application of such a state to the
International Court of Justice admissible?