SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995

MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

The adverse decision in this case promulgated by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233 on
November 24, 1993, as well as its resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof, are challenged by petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga in this appeal by certiorari through a petition
which raises issues centering mainly on said petitioner's right to be admitted to bail.

On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as a co-conspirator in
the crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case No. 86-39 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan
de Oro City for the killing of members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which
petitioner was the mayor at the time. The original information, filed on October 6, 1986 with the Regional
Trial Court of Gingoog City,1 had initially indicted for multiple murder eight accused suspect, namely, Felipe
Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And Richard Doe as
the alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son,
Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was apprehended, tried and eventually
convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison. The others have remained at large up to the present. 2

In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated in the crime. In an amended
information dated October 6, 1988, he was charged as a co-accused therein. As herein petitioner was his
former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the former's services as counsel in said case.
Ironically, in the course of the preliminary investigation therein, said accused, in a signed affidavit dated
March 30, 1989 but which he later retracted on June 20, 1990, implicated petitioner as the supposed
mastermind behind the massacre of the Bucag family.3

Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case per his resolution of
July 7, 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor, designated a replacement,
State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both the preliminary investigation and prosecution
of Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution of the new prosecutor dated September 6, 1989,
petitioner was finally charged as a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a second amended information
dated October 6, 1992. Petitioner assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to this Court in
G.R. No. 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III,
Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In an en banc decision promulgated on
April 19, 1991, the Court sustained the filing of the second amended information against him. 4
 Under this backdrop, the trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest warrant for
petitioner's apprehension but, before it could be served on him, petitioner through counsel, filed on
October 28, 1992 a motion for admission to bail with the trial court which set the same for hearing on
November 5, 1992. Petitioner duly furnished copies of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon,
the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On November
5, 1992, the trial court proceeded to hear the application for bail. Four of petitioner's counsel appeared in
court but only Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecution's Office appeared for
the prosecution.5

As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due to "acute
costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of their client
to the local chapter president of the integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of said
hearing of his bail application, he considered being in the custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo, on the
other hand, informed the trial court that in accordance with the directive of the chief of their office,
Regional State prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the
application for bail and that they were submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail judge. 6

Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was waiving any further
presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated November 5, 1992, the trial court
admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. The following day, November 6, 1992,
petitioner, apparently still weak but well enough to travel by then, managed to personally appear before
the clerk of court of the trial court and posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned
and in the trial that ensued, he also personally appeared and attended all the scheduled court hearings of
the case.7

The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed twenty (20) days later on November 26, 1992 by
Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the petition for admission to bail on the day after the
hearing, was denied by the trial court in its omnibus order dated March 29, 1993. On October 1, 1993, or more
than six (6) months later, Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals through a
special civil action for certiorari. Thus were the resolution and the order of the trial court granting bail to petitioner
annulled on November 24, 1993, in the decision now under review, on the ground that they were tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.8

Respondent court observed in its decision that at the time of petitioner's application for bail, he was not
yet "in the custody of the law," apparently because he filed his motion for admission to bail before he was
actually arrested or had voluntarily surrendered. It further noted that apart from the circumstance that
petitioner was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua, the evidence of guilt was strong as
borne out by the fact that no bail was recommended by the prosecution, for which reasons it held that the
grant of bail was doubly improvident. Lastly, the prosecution, according to respondent court, was not
afforded an opportunity to oppose petitioner's application for bail contrary to the requirements of due
process. Hence, this appeal.

Petitioner argues that, in accordance with the ruling of this Court in Santiago vs. Vasquez etc., et al.,9 his
filing of the aforesaid application for bail with the trial court effectively conferred on the latter jurisdiction
over his person. In short, for all intents and purposes, he was in the custody of the law. In petitioner's
words, the "invocation by the accused of the court's jurisdiction by filing a pleading in court is sufficient to
vest the court with jurisdiction over the person of the accused and bring him within the custody of the
law."

Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on record negates the existence of such strong evidence
as would bar his provisional release on bail. Furthermore, the prosecution, by reason of the waiver by
Prosecutor Abejo of any further presentation of evidence to oppose the application for bail and whose
representation in court in behalf of the prosecution bound the latter, cannot legally assert any claim to a
denial of procedural due process. Finally, petitioner points out that the special civil action
for certiorari was filed in respondent court after an unjustifiable length of time.

On the undisputed facts , the legal principles applicable and the equities involved in this case, the Court
finds for petitioner.

1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing before any court as
required under the conditions specified in said Rule. Its main purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from
the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. 10 As bail is
intended to obtain or secure one's provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him
has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. 11 As this
Court has put it in a case "it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free." 12

The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice
whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the
jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements
therefor.13 Thus, in Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al.,14 where the petitioner who had been charged with
kidnapping with murder went into hiding without surrendering himself, and shortly thereafter filed a
motion asking the court to fix the amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial, the Supreme Court
categorically pronounced that said petitioner was not eligible for admission to bail.

As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have either been arrested, detained, or other wise
deprived of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the protective mantle extended by the right to
bail. The person seeking his provisional release under the auspices of bail need not even wait for a formal
complaint or information to be filed against him as it is available to "all persons" 15 where the offense is
bailable. The rule is, of course, subject to the condition or limitation that the applicant is in the custody of
the law.16

On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either by
virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by warrantless arrest under Section
5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he
has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper
authorities.17 in this light, the ruling, vis-a-vis the facts in Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et al.,18 should be
explained.

In said case, the petitioner who was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel what purported to be an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for
Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond." Said petitioner was at the time confined in a hospital recuperating from
serious physical injuries which she sustained in a major vehicular mishap. Consequently, she expressly
sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the
Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings." On the basis of said ex-
parte motion and the peculiar circumstances obtaining in that incident, the Sandiganbayan authorized
petitioner to post a cash bail bond for her provisional liberty without need of her personal appearance in
view of her physical incapacity and as a matter of humane consideration.

When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold departure order against her, she question the jurisdiction of
that court over her person in a recourse before this Court, on the ground that "she neither been arrested
nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she
never personally appeared before said court" In rejecting her arguments, the Court held that she was
clearly estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for by her own representations in the
 urgent ex parte motion for bail she had earlier recognized such jurisdiction. Furthermore, by actually
posting a cash bail was accepted by the court, she had effectively submitted to its jurisdiction over her
person. Nonetheless, on the matter of bail, the Court took pains to reiterate that the same cannot be
posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or
voluntary surrender.

In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his motion for admission to
bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the
factual ambience therefore, be considered as being constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the
likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail application with the trail court, for
purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the
custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as
prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission
to the custody of the person making the arrest. 19 The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called
"house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being "confined to quarters" or restricted to the military
camp area.

It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it known to the
prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could not personally appear as he was
then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could
not then obtain medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court,
notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to
have the arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to
place petitioner in the physical custody of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under
medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him
under guard.

The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law. Apparently, both
the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never attempted to have him physically
restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person,
firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his
actual whereabouts; and, more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court.
Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, petitioner never
made any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts
from the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission application for bail, and
until the day of the hearing thereof.

At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his actual confinement at the hospital on account of an acute
ailment, which facts were not at all contested as they were easily verifiable. And, as a manifestation of his
good faith and of his actual recognition of the authority of trial court, petitioner's counsel readily informed
the court that they were surrendering custody of petitioner to the president of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Misamis Oriental Chapter. 20 In other words, the motion for admission to bail was filed not for
the purpose or in the manner of the former practice which the law proscribes for the being derogatory of
the authority and jurisdiction of the courts, as what had happened in Feliciano. There was here no intent
or strategy employed to obtain bail in absentia and thereby be able to avoid arrest should the application
therefore be denied.

2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all indictees shall be allowed
bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong.
In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before
conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived considering its personal nature 21 and
which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the law, springs from the presumption of
innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at the outset since after trial
he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt. 22

Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal offense, an accused is
entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present exceptions thereto being the instances where the
accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment23 and
the evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, the court
having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a hearing conducted to
specifically determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the
other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court under the
exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion
of the court,24 is required with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of the
prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the
applicant.25 Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required
quantum.26

Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the prosecution must be give an opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to introduce before the court may resolve the
application, since it is equally entitled as the accused to due process. 27 If the prosecution is denied this opportunity,
there would be a denial of procedural due process, as a consequence of which the court's order in respect of the
motion or petition is void.28 At the hearing, the petitioner can rightfully cross-examine the witnesses presented by
the prosecution and introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. 29 When, eventually, the court issues an order either
granting or refusing bail, the same should contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, followed by its
conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. 30 The court, though, cannot rely on mere affidavits
or recitals of their contents, if timely objected to, for these represent only hearsay evidence, and thus are
insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence that the law requires. 31

In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be a violation of procedural due process when the court
below allowed Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecutor's Office to appear in behalf of
the prosecution, instead of State Prosecutor Henrick P. Gingoyon who is claimed to be the sole government
prosecutor expressly authorized to handle the case and who received his copy of the motion only on the day after
the hearing had been conducted. Accordingly, the prosecution now insists that Prosecutor Abejo had no authority
at all to waive the presentation of any further evidence in opposition to the application for bail and to submit the
matter to the sound discretion of the trial court. In addition, they argue that the prosecution was not afforded
"reasonable time" to oppose that application for bail.

We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor acted as the collaborating
counsel, with State Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal Case No. 86-39 on the basis of an authority from then
Chief State Prosecutor Fernando de Leon which was sent through radio message on July 10, 1992 and duly received
by the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor on the same date. This authorization, which was to be continuing
until and unless it was expressly withdrawn, was later confirmed and then withdrawn only on July 12, 1993 by then
Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon. This was done after one Rebecca Bucag-tan questioned the authority of
Regional State Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado and State Prosecutor II Erlindo Abejo to enter their appearance as
collaborating government prosecutors in said criminal case. 32 It was in fact by virtue of this arrangement that the
same Prosecutor Zozobrado and Prosecutor Perseverando Arana entered their appearance as collaborating
prosecutor in the previous hearing in said case. 33 Hence, on the strength of said authority and of its receipt of the
notice of the hearing for bail, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, through Prosecutor Abejo, could validly
represent the prosecution in the hearing held on November 5, 1992.

Secondly, although it is now claimed that Prosecutor Abejo was allegedly not familiar with the case, he
nonetheless was explicitly instructed about the position of the Regional State Prosecutor's Office on the
matter. Prosecutor Zozobrado, whose office received its copy of the motion on the very day when it was
sent, that is, October 28, 1992, duly instructed Prosecutor Abejo to manifest to the court that the
prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they were submitting
the matter to its sound discretion. Obviously, what this meant was that the prosecution, at that particular
posture of the case, was waiving the presentation of any countervailing evidence. When the court a
quo sought to ascertain whether or not that was the real import of the submission by Prosecutor Abejo,
the latter readily answered in the affirmative.

The following exchanges bear this out:

PROSECUTOR ERLINDO ABEJO:

I was informed to appear in this case just now Your Honor.

COURT:

Where is your Chief of Office? Your office received a copy of the motion as early
as October 28. There is an element of urgency here.

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

I am not aware of that, Your Honor, I was only informed just now. The one
assigned here is State Prosecutor Perseverando Arena, Jr. who unfortunately is
in the hospital attending to his sick son. I do not know about this but before I
came I received an instruction from our Chief to relay to this court the stand of
the office regarding the motion to admit bail. That office is neither supporting
nor opposing it and we are submitting to the sound discretion of the Honorable
Court.

COURT:

Place that manifestation on record. For the record, Fiscal Abejo, would you like
to formally enter your appearance in this matter?

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

Yes, Your Honor. For the government, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office
represented by State Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo.

COURT:

By that manifestation do you want the Court to understand that in effect, at

least, the prosecution is dispensing with the presentation of evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused is strong, the denial . . .

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

I am amenable to that manifestation, Your Honor.

COURT:
 Final inquiry. Is the Prosecution willing to submit the incident covered by this
particular motion for resolution by this court?

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

Without presenting any further evidence?

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

Yes, Your Honor.34

It is further evident from the foregoing that the prosecution, on the instructions of Regional State
prosecutor Zozobrado, had no intention at all to oppose the motion for bail and this should be so
notwithstanding the statement that they were "neither supporting nor opposing" the motion. What is of
significance is the manifestation that the prosecution was "submitting (the motion) to the sound discretion
of the Honorable Court." By that, it could not be any clearer. The prosecution was dispensing with the
introduction of evidence en contra and this it did at the proper forum and stage of the proceedings, that
is, during the mandatory hearing for bail and after the trial court had fully satisfied itself that such was the
position of the prosecution.

3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons,35 it was stressed that where the trial court has reasons to
believe that the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing the application for bail is not justified, as when he is
evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction of duty, the court, in the interest of Justice, must
inquire from the prosecutor concerned as the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it is
strong. And, in the very recent administrative matter Re: First Indorsement Dated July 21, 1992 of
Hon. Fernando de Leon,Chief State Prosecutor, Department of Justice; Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of
Dagupan City vs. Judge Deodoro Sison, 36 the Court, citing Tucay vs. Domagas, etc., 37 held that where the
prosecutor interposes no objection to the motion of the accused, the trial court should nevertheless set
the application for hearing and from there diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter is
really not contesting the bail application.

No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be attributed to the trial court
here as regards its order granting bail to petitioner. A review of the transcript of the stenographic notes
pertinent to its resolution of November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order of March 29, 1993 abundantly
reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. As summarized in its aforementioned order, the lower
court exhausted all means to convince itself of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of the
prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the evidence of both the
prosecution and the defense, and only after sifting through them did the court conclude that petitioner
could be provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and up to the
present, petitioner has ever committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.

As to the contention that the prosecutor was not given the opportunity to present its evidence within a
reasonable period of time, we hold otherwise. The records indicate that the Regional State Prosecutor's
Office duly received its copy of the application for bail on the very same day that the it was filed with the
trial court on October 28, 1992. Counted from said date up to the day of the hearing on November 5,
1992, the prosecution had more than one (1) week to muster such evidence as it would have wanted to
adduce in that hearing in opposition to the motion. Certainly, under the circumstances, that period was
 more than reasonable. The fact that Prosecutor Gingoyon received his copy of the application only on
November 6, 1992 is beside the point for, as already established, the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor was authorized to appear for the People.

4. What finally militates against the cause of the prosecutor is the indubitably unreasonable period of time
that elapsed before it questioned before the respondent court the resolution and the omnibus order of
the trial court through a special civil action for certiorari. The Solicitor General submits that the delay of
more than six (6) months, or one hundred eighty-four (184) days to be exact, was reasonable due to the
attendant difficulties which characterized the prosecution of the criminal case against petitioner. But then,
the certiorariproceeding was initiated before the respondent court long after trial on the merits of the
case had ensued in the court below with the active participation of prosecution lawyers, including
Prosecutor Gingoyon. At any rate, the definitive rule now in that the special civil action
for certiorari should not be instituted beyond a period of the three months, 38 the same to be reckoned by
taking into account the duration of time that had expired from the commission of the acts complained to
annul the same.39

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233, promulgated on November
24, 1993, annulling the resolution dated November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order dated March 29, 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, as well as said respondent court's resolution of April 26, 1994 denying
the motion for reconsideration of said judgment, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The aforesaid resolution
and omnibus order of the Regional Trail Court granting bail to petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga are hereby
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 148468. January 28, 2003]

ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL LEANDRO
MENDOZA, respondents.

[G.R. No. 148769. January 28, 2003]

EDWARD S. SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondents.

[G.R. No. 149116. January 28, 2003]

EDWARD S. SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing the resolutions of
the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion to
quash, and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is
one of the accused together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose Jinggoy P. Estrada and several others.
 The records show that petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit foundation established in February 2000 ostensibly for the
purpose of providing educational opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and
students, and support to research and advance studies of young Muslim educators and scientists.
Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its behalf a donation in the
amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson through the
latters assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte. Petitioner received the donation and turned over the said amount to the
Foundations treasurer who later deposited it in the Foundations account with the Equitable PCI Bank.
In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson publicly accused then President Joseph E. Estrada and his
cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities, including its operation on the illegal numbers game known
as jueteng. This triggered the filing with the Office of the Ombudsman of several criminal complaints against Joseph
Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner, together with other persons. Among such complaints were: Volunteers
Against Crime and Corruption, versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case
No. 0-00-1754; Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc., versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al.,
docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1755; and Leonardo De Vera, Romeo T. Capulong and Dennis B. Funa, versus
Joseph Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, Raul De Guzman, Danilo Reyes and Mila Reforma, docketed as
OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1757.
Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit dated February 21, 2001. The other respondents likewise
filed their respective counter-affidavits. The Office of the Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation of the
complaints and on April 4, 2001, issued a joint resolution recommending, inter alia, that Joseph Estrada, petitioner
and several others be charged with the criminal offense of plunder.
On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several Informations against former President
Estrada, who earlier had resigned from his post as President of the Republic of the Philippines. One of these
Informations, docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, charged Joseph Estrada with plunder. On April 18, 2001, the
Ombudsman filed an amended Information in said case charging Estrada and several co-accused, including
petitioner, with said crime. No bail was recommended for the provisional release of all the accused, including
petitioner. The case was raffled to a special division which was subsequently created by the Supreme Court. The
amended Information reads:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES
AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR
BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR
MEANS, described as follows:

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM
ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ATONG ANG, Jose
Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
 (b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for
HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit public fund in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED
MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000.00]) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur
under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia
Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE, 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and
the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE
CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDERED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A
TOTAL OR MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE
AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[189,700,000.00] MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE;
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, the
amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
[P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE AT THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

On April 5, 2001, petitioner obtained a copy of the Ombudsmans Joint Resolution finding probable cause
against him for plunder. The next day, April 6, 2001, he filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation.[2] Petitioner likewise filed on said date, this time with the Sandiganbayan,
an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (a) To Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Further Proceedings; (b)
To Conduct a Determination of Probable Cause; (c) For Leave to File Accuseds Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation; and (d) To Direct the Ombudsman to Conduct a Reinvestigation of the Charges against accused
Edward Serapio.[3]
On April 10, 2001, the Ombudsman issued an order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration and/or
reinvestigation on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amended Information charging petitioner with
plunder had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. [4]
In a parallel development, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on April 25, 2001 in Criminal Case No.
26558 finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants of arrest for the accused, including
petitioner. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order on the same date for the arrest of petitioner. [5] When
apprised of said order, petitioner voluntarily surrendered at 9:45 p.m. on the same day to Philippine National Police
Chief Gen. Leandro Mendoza. Petitioner has since been detained at Camp Crame for said charge.
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including petitioner, in Criminal Case No. 26558 on
June 27, 2001. In the meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for
Bail which was set for hearing on May 4, 2001. [6] For his part, petitioners co-accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed on
April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right.
 During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for the
resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than the June 27, 2001 schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan
denied the motion of the prosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and should be
heard before petitioners arraignment on June 27, 2001 and even before the other accused in Criminal Case No.
26558 filed their respective petitions for bail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception of
evidence on petitioners petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001.
On May 17, 2001, four days before the hearing on petitioners petition for bail, the Ombudsman filed an
urgent motion for early arraignment of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner and a motion for joint bail
hearings of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner. The following day, petitioner filed a manifestation
questioning the propriety of including Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in the hearing on his (petitioners)
petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on May 18, 2001 resetting the hearings on petitioners petition for bail
to June 18 to 28, 2001 to enable the court to resolve the prosecutions pending motions as well as petitioners
motion that his petition for bail be heard as early as possible, which motion the prosecution opposed.
On May 31, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus
Motion. The court ruled that the issues posed by petitioner had already been resolved in its April 25, 2001
Resolution finding probable cause to hold petitioner and his co-accused for trial. [7] Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said May 31, 2001 Resolution.
On June 1, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner as well as all
the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 during the hearings on the petitions for bail under pain of waiver of
cross-examination. The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to proceed with the trial of the case in the
manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case, directed the
other accused to participate in the said bail hearing considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Court, whatever evidence is adduced during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the
trial.[8]
However, instead of proceeding with the bail hearing set by it on June 18, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued an
Order on June 15, 2001 canceling the said bail hearing due to pending incidents yet to be resolved and reset anew
the hearing to June 26, 2001.[9]
On the eve of said hearing, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution. The bail hearing on June 26, 2001 did not again proceed because
on said date petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the amended Information on the grounds
that as against him, the amended Information does not allege a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
constitutive of plunder; as against him, the amended Information does not allege a pattern of criminal acts
indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy; the money alleged in paragraph (a) of the amended
Information to have been illegally received or collected does not constitute ill-gotten wealth as defined in Section
1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080; and the amended Information charges him of bribery and illegal gambling. [10] By way
of riposte, the prosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing until petitioner agreed to withdraw his motion to
quash. The prosecution contended that petitioners motion to quash the amended Information was antithetical to
his petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of accused and the hearing on the petition for bail of petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 26558 for July 10, 2001 to enable it to resolve the pending incidents and the motion to quash of
petitioner. However, even before the Sandiganbayan could resolve the pending motions of petitioner and the
prosecution, petitioner filed with this Court on June 29, 2001 a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Certiorari, docketed
as G.R. No. 148468, praying that the Court declare void the questioned orders, resolutions and actions of the
Sandiganbayan on his claim that he was thereby effectively denied of his right to due process. Petitioner likewise
prayed for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus; that the People be declared to have waived their right to
present evidence in opposition to his petition for bail; and, premised on the failure of the People to adduce strong
evidence of petitioners guilt of plunder, that he be granted provisional liberty on bail after due proceedings. [11]
 Meanwhile, on June 28, 2001, Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion praying that said
court resolve his motion to fix his bail.
On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion to quash the amended
Information. Petitioner, through counsel, received on said date a copy of said resolution. [12] The motion to fix bail
filed by Jose Jinggoy Estrada was also resolved by the Sandiganbayan.
On July 10, 2001, just before his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 26558, petitioner manifested to the
Sandiganbayan that he was going to file a motion for reconsideration of the July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his
motion to quash and for the deferment of his arraignment. The Sandiganbayan, however, declared that there was
no provision in the Rules of Court or in the Sandiganbayans rules granting the right to petitioner to file a motion for
the reconsideration of an interlocutory order issued by it and ordered petitioner to orally argue his motion for
reconsideration. When petitioner refused, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with his arraignment. Petitioner refused
to plead, impelling the court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.
On July 20, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148769, alleging
that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his motion to quash, notwithstanding the
fact that material inculpatory allegations of the amended Information against him do not constitute the crime of
plunder; and that he is charged, under the said amended Information, for more than one offense. Jose Jinggoy
Estrada likewise filed petition for certiorari with the Court docketed as G.R. No. 148965 for the nullification of a
resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to fix bail.
On August 9, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court another Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
149116, assailing the Sandiganbayans Resolution dated 31 May 2001 which denied his April 6, 2001 Urgent
Omnibus Motion and its June 25, 2001 Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2001
Resolution.

Re: G.R. No. 148769

Petitioner avers that:

THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN DENYING PETITIONER
SERAPIOS MOTION TO QUASH NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
I
THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION AS AGAINST PETITIONER SERAPIO DO NOT
CONSTITUTE THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.
A. The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio, does not allege a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder.
B. The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio, does not allege a pattern of criminal acts
indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
C. The money described in paragraph (a) of the Amended Information and alleged to have been illegally
received or collected does not constitute ill-gotten wealth as defined in Section 1(d), Republic Act No.
7080, as amended.
II
THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE.[13]
 Petitioner asserts that, on the face of the amended Information, he is charged with plunder only in paragraph
(a) which reads:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS,
FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY
FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE
ATONG ANG, Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING; [14]
Petitioner asserts that there is no allegation in paragraph (a) of the amended Information of a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts constituting plunder as described in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 as amended. Neither
does the amended Information allege a pattern of criminal acts. He avers that his single act of toleration or
protection of illegal gambling impelled by a single criminal resolution does not constitute the requisite combination
or series of acts for plunder. He further claims that the consideration consisting of gifts, percentages or kickbacks in
furtherance of said resolution turned over to and received by former President Joseph E. Estrada on several
occasions does not cure the defect in the amended information. Petitioner insists that on the face of the amended
Information he is charged only with bribery or illegal gambling and not of plunder.
Petitioner argues that the P540 million which forms part of the P4,097,804,173.17 amassed by former
President Joseph E. Estrada in confabulation with his co-accused is not ill-gotten wealth as defined in Section 1(d)
of R.A. 7080.
We do not agree with petitioner. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.

When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information.[15]
The acts or omissions complained or must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to know the proper
judgment. The Information must allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definition and
elements of the specific crimes. The purpose of the requirement of alleging all the elements of the crime in the
Information is to inform an accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare for his defense.[16] Another purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense. [17] The use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts
constituting the offense charged is sufficient.[18]
In this case, the amended Information specifically alleges that all the accused, including petitioner, connived
and conspired with former President Joseph E. Estrada to commit plunder through any or a combination or a series
of overt or criminal acts or similar schemes or means.And in paragraph (a) of the amended Information, petitioner
and his co-accused are charged with receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances money in the
aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00. In Jose Jinggoy Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), et al.,[19] we held
that the word series is synonymous with the clause on several instances; it refers to a repetition of the same
predicate act in any of the items in Section 1(d) of the law. We further held that the word combination
contemplates the commission of at least any two different predicate acts in any of the said items. We ruled that
plainly, subparagraph (a) of the amended information charges accused therein, including petitioner, with plunder
committed by a series of the same predicate act under Section 1(d)(2) of the law and that:
x x x Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in
consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those who
conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense
described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080. x x x.[20]

It is not necessary to allege in the amended Information a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy because as Section 3 of R.A. 7080 specifically provides, the same is
evidentiary and the general rule is that matters of evidence need not be alleged in the Information. [21]
The Court also ruled in Jose Jinggoy Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan [22] that the aggregate amount
of P4,097,804,173.17 inclusive of the P545 million alleged in paragraph (a) of the amended information is ill-gotten
wealth as contemplated in Section 1, paragraph 1(d) of Republic Act 7080, as amended, and that all the accused in
paragraph (a) to (d) of the amended information conspired and confederated with former President Estrada to
enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17.
Under the amended Information, all the accused, including petitioner, are charged of having conspired and
confabulated together in committing plunder. When two or more persons conspire to commit a crime, each is
responsible for all the acts of others. In contemplation of law, the act of the conspirator is the act of each of them.
[23]
Conspirators are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak one voice, they wield one arm and the law says
that the acts, words and declarations of each, while in the pursuit of the common design, are the acts, words and
declarations of all.[24]
Petitioner asserts that he is charged under the amended Information of bribery and illegal gambling and
others. The Sandiganbayan, for its part, held that petitioner is not charged with the predicate acts of bribery and
illegal gambling but is charged only with one crime that of plunder:

THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE INFORMATION

CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE

According to the accused Estradas and Edward Serapio the information charges more than one offense, namely,
bribery (Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code), malversation of public funds or property (Article 217, Revised Penal
Code) and violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act (RA No. 3019) and Section 7(d) of RA 6713.

This contention is patently unmeritorious. The acts alleged in the information are not charged as separate offenses
but as predicate acts of the crime of plunder.

It should be stressed that the Anti-Plunder law specifically Section 1(d) thereof does not make any express
reference to any specific provision of laws, other than R.A. No. 7080, as amended, which coincidentally may
penalize as a separate crime any of the overt or criminal acts enumerated therein. The said acts which form part of
the combination or series of act are described in their generic sense. Thus, aside from malversation of public funds,
the law also uses the generic terms misappropriation, conversion or misuse of said fund. The fact that the acts
involved may likewise be penalized under other laws is incidental.The said acts are mentioned only as predicate
acts of the crime of plunder and the allegations relative thereto are not to be taken or to be understood as
allegations charging separate criminal offenses punished under the Revised Penal Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. [25]

This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan. It is clear on the face of the amended Information that petitioner
and his co-accused are charged only with one crime of plunder and not with the predicate acts or crimes of
plunder. It bears stressing that the predicate acts merely constitute acts of plunder and are not crimes separate and
independent of the crime of plunder. Resultantly then, the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 149116

Petitioner assails the May 31, 2001 Joint Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his April 4, 2001 Urgent
Omnibus Motion contending that:

GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION

THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN SUMMARILY DENYING
PETITIONER SERAPIOS URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (RE:
RESOLUTION DATED 31 MAY 2001), NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE OMBUDSMAN HAD TOTALLY
DISREGARDED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND COMMITTED GRAVE AND MANIFEST ERRORS OF LAW
SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF PETITIONER SERAPIO, AND THERE IS NO
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT AN INDICTMENT FOR PLUNDER AS AGAINST PETITIONER SERAPIO. [26]
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his omnibus motion
to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant for his arrest as well as the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 26558;
to conduct a determination of probable cause; and to direct the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the
charges him. Petitioner asseverates that the Ombudsman had totally disregarded exculpatory evidence and
committed grave abuse of discretion in charging him with plunder. He further argues that there exists no probable
cause to support an indictment for plunder as against him. [27]
Petitioner points out that the joint resolution of the Ombudsman does not even mention him in relation to
the collection and receipt of jueteng money which started in 1998 [28] and that the Ombudsman inexplicably arrived
at the conclusion that the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation was a money laundering front organization put up by
Joseph Estrada, assisted by petitioner, even though the latter presented evidence that said Foundation is a bona
fide and legitimate private foundation.[29] More importantly, he claims, said joint resolution does not indicate that
he knew that the P200 million he received for the Foundation came from jueteng.[30]
Petitioner insists that he cannot be charged with plunder since: (1) the P200 million he received does not
constitute ill-gotten wealth as defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080; [31] (2) there is no evidence linking him to the
collection and receipt of jueteng money;[32] (3) there was no showing that petitioner participated in a pattern of
criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, or that his act of receiving the P200 million constitutes an overt criminal act of plunder. [33]
Petitioner argues further that his motion for reinvestigation is premised on the absolute lack of evidence to
support a finding of probable cause for plunder as against him, [34] and hence he should be spared from the
inconvenience, burden and expense of a public trial. [35]
Petitioner also avers that the discretion of government prosecutors is not beyond judicial scrutiny. He asserts
that while this Court does not ordinarily look into the existence of probable cause to charge a person for an offense
in a given case, it may do so in exceptional circumstances, which are present in this case: (1) to afford adequate
protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression; (3) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; and (4) where the charges are
manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance. [36] Petitioner claims that he raised proper grounds for a
reinvestigation by asserting that in issuing the questioned joint resolution, the Ombudsman disregarded evidence
exculpating petitioner from the charge of plunder and committed errors of law or irregularities which have been
prejudicial to his interest.[37] He also states that during the joint preliminary investigations for the various charges
against Joseph Estrada and his associates, of which the plunder charge was only one of the eight charges against
Estrada et al., he was not furnished with copies of the other complaints nor given the opportunity to refute the
evidence presented in relation to the other seven cases, even though the evidence presented therein were also
used against him, although he was only charged in the plunder case. [38]
 The People maintain that the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners
omnibus motion. They assert that since the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge petitioner with the crime
of plunder, the Sandiganbayan is bound to assume jurisdiction over the case and to proceed to try the same. They
further argue that a finding of probable cause is merely preliminary and prefatory of the eventual determination of
guilt or innocence of the accused, and that petitioner still has the chance to interpose his defenses in a full blown
trial where his guilt or innocence may finally be determined. [39]
The People also point out that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners omnibus motion asking for, among others, a reinvestigation by the Ombudsman, because his motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans joint resolution did not raise the grounds of either newly discovered evidence,
or errors of law or irregularities, which under Republic Act No. 6770 are the only grounds upon which a motion for
reconsideration may be filed.[40]
The People likewise insist that there exists probable cause to charge petitioner with plunder as a co-
conspirator of Joseph Estrada.[41]
This Court does not agree with petitioner.
Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsmans discretion in the conduct of
preliminary investigations. Thus, in Raro vs. Sandiganbayan[42], the Court ruled:

x x x. In the performance of his task to determine probable cause, the Ombudsmans discretion is paramount. Thus,
in Camanag vs. Guerrero, this Court said:

x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted a policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and leaves to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for filing of information
against the supposed offender.

In Cruz, Jr. vs. People,[43] the Court ruled thus:

Furthermore, the Ombudsmans findings are essentially factual in nature. Accordingly, in assailing said findings on
the contention that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is liable for
estafa through falsification of public documents, petitioner is clearly raising questions of fact here. His arguments
are anchored on the propriety or error in the Ombudsmans appreciation of facts. Petitioner cannot be unaware
that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari
where neither question of fact nor even of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion. Insofar as the third issue is concerned, we find that no grave abuse of discretion has
been committed by respondents which would warrant the granting of the writ of certiorari.

Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish that the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman for that matter
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing their resolution and joint resolution, respectively. Petitioner failed to
discharge his burden. Indeed, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan and
the Ombudsman in finding probable cause against petitioner for plunder. Neither did the Sandiganbayan abuse its
discretion in denying petitioners motion for reinvestigation of the charges against him in the
amendedInformation. In its Resolution of April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the finding of the
Ombudsman that probable cause exists against petitioner and his co-accused for the crime of plunder, thus:

In the light of the foregoing and considering the allegations of the Amended Information dated 18 April 2001
charging the accused with the offense of PLUNDER and examining carefully the evidence submitted in support
thereof consisting of the affidavits and sworn statements and testimonies of prosecution witnesses and several
other pieces of documentary evidence, as well as the respective counter-affidavits of accused former President
Joseph Estrada dated March 20, 2001, Jose Jinggoy Pimentel Estrada dated February 20, 2001, Yolanda T. Ricaforte
dated January 21, 2001 and Edward S. Serapio dated February 21, 2001, the Court finds and so holds that probable
cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify issuance of warrants of arrest of accused former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro,
John Doe. a.k.a.Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a Delia Rajas. [44]

Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31, 2001 of petitioners omnibus motion, the Sandiganbayan noted that a
preliminary investigation was fully conducted in accordance with Rule II, Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of
the Ombudsman, pursuant to Sections 18, 23 and 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989); and
that all the basic complaints and evidence in support thereof were served upon all the accused. [45] It was in light of
such findings that the Sandiganbayan held that there was no basis for the allegation that accused therein (including
petitioner) were deprived of the right to seek a reconsideration of the Ombudsmans Resolution dated April 4, 2001
finding probable cause to charge them with plunder after the conduct of preliminary investigation in connection
therewith. In addition, the Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsmans resolution, but failed to show in his motion that there were newly discovered evidence, or that the
preliminary investigation was tainted by errors of law or irregularities, which are the only grounds for which a
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans resolution may be granted.[46]
It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right
conferred by statute.[47] The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the Information
or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or
constitute a ground for quashing the Information.[48] If the lack of a preliminary investigation does not render the
Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, with more reason can it be said that the
denial of a motion for reinvestigation cannot invalidate the Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the
case. Neither can it be said that petitioner had been deprived of due process. He was afforded the opportunity to
refute the charges against him during the preliminary investigation.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial.[49] As the Court held in Webb vs. De Leon, [a] finding of probable cause needs only to rest
on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the
suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
[50]

Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other officer authorized to conduct
preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to said officers finding and determination of probable cause,
since the determination of the existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor. [51] The Court agrees
with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner failed to establish that the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman was tainted with irregularity or that its findings stated in the joint resolution dated April 4, 2001 are
not supported by the facts, and that a reinvestigation was necessary.
Certiorari will not lie to invalidate the Sandiganbayans resolution denying petitioners motion for
reinvestigation since there is nothing to substantiate petitioners claim that it gravely abused its discretion in ruling
that there was no need to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. [52]
The ruling in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals [53] that an accused shall not be deemed to have waived his right to
ask for a preliminary investigation after he had been arraigned over his objection and despite his insistence on the
conduct of said investigation prior to trial on the merits does not apply in the instant case because petitioner
merely prayed for a reinvestigation on the ground of a newly-discovered evidence. Irrefragably, a preliminary
investigation had been conducted by the Ombudsman prior to the filing of the amended Information, and that
petitioner had participated therein by filing his counter-affidavit. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan had already
denied his motion for reinvestigation as well as his motion for reconsideration thereon prior to his arraignment.
[54]
In sum then, the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 148468

As synthesized by the Court from the petition and the pleadings of the parties, the issues for resolution
are: (1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may be
conducted; (2) Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended Information during the pendency of his
petition for bail; (3) Whether a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and those of the other accused in
Criminal Case No. 26558 is mandatory; (4) Whether the People waived their right to adduce evidence in opposition
to the petition for bail of petitioner and failed to adduce strong evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crime
charged; and (5) Whether petitioner was deprived of his right to due process in Criminal Case No. 26558 and
should thus be released from detention via a writ of habeas corpus.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it deferred the hearing of his petition for bail to July 10, 2001,
arraigned him on said date and entered a plea of not guilty for him when he refused to be arraigned. He insists that
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, does not require that he be arraigned first prior to the conduct of
bail hearings since the latter can stand alone and must, of necessity, be heard immediately. [55] Petitioner maintains
that his arraignment before the bail hearings are set is not necessary since he would not plead guilty to the offense
charged, as is evident in his earlier statements insisting on his innocence during the Senate investigation of
the jueteng scandal and the preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman. [56] Neither would the prosecution be
prejudiced even if it would present all its evidence before his arraignment because, under the Revised Penal Code,
a voluntary confession of guilt is mitigating only if made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution,
[57]
and petitioner admitted that he cannot repudiate the evidence or proceedings taken during the bail hearings
because Rule 114, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that evidence present during bail
hearings are automatically reproduced during the trial. [58] Petitioner likewise assures the prosecution that he is
willing to be arraigned prior to the posting of a bail bond should he be granted bail. [59]
The People insist that arraignment is necessary before bail hearings may be commenced, because it is only
upon arraignment that the issues are joined. The People stress that it is only when an accused pleads not guilty
may he file a petition for bail and if he pleads guilty to the charge, there would be no more need for him to file said
petition. Moreover, since it is during arraignment that the accused is first informed of the precise charge against
him, he must be arraigned prior to the bail hearings to prevent him from later assailing the validity of the bail
hearings on the ground that he was not properly informed of the charge against him, especially considering that,
under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence presented during such proceedings are
considered automatically reproduced at the trial. [60] Likewise, the arraignment of accused prior to bail hearings
diminishes the possibility of an accuseds flight from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because trial in
absentia may be had only if an accused escapes after he has been arraigned. [61] The People also contend that the
conduct of bail hearings prior to arraignment would extend to an accused the undeserved privilege of being
appraised of the prosecutions evidence before he pleads guilty for purposes of penalty reduction. [62]
Although petitioner had already been arraigned on July 10, 2001 and a plea of not guilty had been entered by
the Sandiganbayan on his behalf, thereby rendering the issue as to whether an arraignment is necessary before the
conduct of bail hearings in petitioners case moot, the Court takes this opportunity to discuss the controlling
precepts thereon pursuant to its symbolic function of educating the bench and bar. [63]
The contention of petitioner is well-taken. The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct
of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by
virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.[64] An accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition
for bail.
In Lavides vs. Court of Appeals, [65] this Court ruled on the issue of whether an accused must first be arraigned
before he may be granted bail. Lavides involved an accused charged with violation of Section 5(b) Republic Act No.
7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), an offense punishable
by reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. The accused therein assailed, inter alia, the trial
courts imposition of the condition that he should first be arraigned before he is allowed to post bail. We held
therein that in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may
be precluded from filing a motion to quash.[66]
However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a petition for bail
should at all times precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his
arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or
information is filed against him.[67] The Courts pronouncement in Lavides should be understood in light of the fact
that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash the informations filed against
him.Hence, we explained therein that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to
place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on
bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing
of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine
his constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or Information sufficient to charge him
with a crime and his right to bail.[68]
It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his
application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to
arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also implies that an application for bail in a case involving an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if the court finds in
such case that the accused is entitled to bail because the evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted
provisional liberty even prior to arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be authorized under the
circumstances. In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail.
With respect to the second issue of whether petitioner may file a motion to quash during the pendency of his
petition for bail, petitioner maintains that a motion to quash and a petition for bail are not inconsistent, and may
proceed independently of each other. While he agrees with the prosecution that a motion to quash may in some
instances result in the termination of the criminal proceedings and in the release of the accused therein, thus
rendering the petition for bail moot and academic, he opines that such is not always the case; hence, an accused in
detention cannot be forced to speculate on the outcome of a motion to quash and decide whether or not to file a
petition for bail or to withdraw one that has been filed. [69] He also insists that the grant of a motion to quash does
not automatically result in the discharge of an accused from detention nor render moot an application for bail
under Rule 117, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court.[70]
The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application of an accused for bail and his filing of
a motion to quash. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him
or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions set forth under the
Rules of Court.[71] Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until his
conviction while at the same time securing his appearance at the trial. [72] As stated earlier, a person may apply for
bail from the moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. [73]
On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a
criminal complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which
are apparent in the face of the Information. [74] An accused may file a motion to quash the Information, as a general
rule, before arraignment.[75]
These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each other. Certainly, the right of an
accused right to seek provisional liberty when charged with an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, or when charged with an offense punishable by such penalties but after due
hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not to be strong, does not preclude his right to assail the validity of the
Information charging him with such offense. It must be conceded, however, that if a motion to quash a criminal
complaint or Information on the ground that the same does not charge any offense is granted and the case is
dismissed and the accused is ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and
academic.
 We now resolve the issue of whether or not it is mandatory that the hearings on the petitions for bail of
petitioner and accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada in Criminal Case No. 26558 and the trial of the said case as against
former President Joseph E. Estrada be heard jointly.
Petitioner argues that the conduct of joint bail hearings would negate his right to have his petition for bail
resolved in a summary proceeding since said hearings might be converted into a full blown trial on the merits by
the prosecution.[76]
For their part, the People claim that joint bail hearings will save the court from having to hear the same
witnesses and the parties from presenting the same evidence where it would allow separate bail hearings for the
accused who are charged as co-conspirators in the crime of plunder. [77]
In issuing its June 1, 2001 Order directing all accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 to participate in the bail
hearings, the Sandiganbayan explained that the directive was made was in the interest of the speedy disposition of
the case. It stated:

x x x The obvious fact is, if the rest of the accused other than the accused Serapio were to be excused from
participating in the hearing on the motion for bail of accused Serapio, under the pretext that the same does not
concern them and that they will participate in any hearing where evidence is presented by the prosecution only if
and when they will already have filed their petitions for bail, or should they decide not to file any, that they will
participate only during the trial proper itself, then everybody will be faced with the daunting prospects of having to
go through the process of introducing the same witness and pieces of evidence two times, three times or four
times, as many times as there are petitions for bail filed. Obviously, such procedure is not conducive to the speedy
termination of a case. Neither can such procedure be characterized as an orderly proceeding. [78]

There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the
Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more petitions for bail filed by different accused or that a petition
for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case against the other accused. The matter of
whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions for bail filed by two different accused or to
conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against another accused is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown, the Court
will not interfere with the exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
It may be underscored that in the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into account not
only the convenience of the State, including the prosecution, but also that of the accused and the witnesses of
both the prosecution and the accused and the right of accused to a speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan must also
consider the complexities of the cases and of the factual and legal issues involving petitioner and the other
accused. After all, if this Court may echo the observation of the United States Supreme Court, the State has a stake,
with every citizen, in his being afforded our historic individual protections, including those surrounding criminal
prosecutions. About them, this Court dares not become careless or complacent when that fashion has become
rampant over the earth.[79]
It must be borne in mind that in Ocampo vs. Bernabe,[80] this Court held that in a petition for bail hearing, the
court is to conduct only a summary hearing, meaning such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering
the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine
the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. The court does not try the merits or enter into any inquiry as to the
weight that ought to be given to the evidence against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial
or on what further evidence may be offered therein. It may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of
witnesses, and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not
essential to the purpose of the hearing.
A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by two accused will of course avoid duplication of time and
effort of both the prosecution and the courts and minimizes the prejudice to the accused, especially so if both
movants for bail are charged of having conspired in the commission of the same crime and the prosecution
adduces essentially the same evident against them. However, in the cases at bar, the joinder of the hearings of the
petition for bail of petitioner with the trial of the case against former President Joseph E. Estrada is an entirely
different matter. For, with the participation of the former president in the hearing of petitioners petition for bail,
the proceeding assumes a completely different dimension. The proceedings will no longer be summary. As against
former President Joseph E. Estrada, the proceedings will be a full-blown trial which is antithetical to the nature of a
bail hearing. Moreover, following our ruling in Jose Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, supra where we stated that Jose
Jinggoy Estrada can only be charged with conspiracy to commit the acts alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the
amended Information since it is not clear from the latter if the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) thereof
conspired with each other to assist Joseph Estrada to amass ill-gotten wealth, we hold that petitioner can only be
charged with having conspired with the other co-accused named in sub-paragraph (a) by receiving or collecting,
directly or indirectly, on several instances, money x x x from illegal gambling, x x x in consideration of toleration or
protection of illegal gambling. [81] Thus, with respect to petitioner, all that the prosecution needs to adduce to prove
that the evidence against him for the charge of plunder is strong are those related to the alleged receipt or
collection of money from illegal gambling as described in sub-paragraph (a) of the amended Information. With the
joinder of the hearing of petitioners petition for bail and the trial of the former President, the latter will have the
right to cross-examine intensively and extensively the witnesses for the prosecution in opposition to the petition
for bail of petitioner. If petitioner will adduce evidence in support of his petition after the prosecution shall have
concluded its evidence, the former President may insist on cross-examining petitioner and his witnesses. The
joinder of the hearing of petitioners bail petition with the trial of former President Joseph E. Estrada will be
prejudicial to petitioner as it will unduly delay the determination of the issue of the right of petitioner to obtain
provisional liberty and seek relief from this Court if his petition is denied by the respondent court. The
indispensability of the speedy resolution of an application for bail was succinctly explained by Cooley in his
treatise Constitutional Limitations, thus:

For, if there were any mode short of confinement which would with reasonable certainty insure the attendance of
the accused to answer the accusation, it would not be justifiable to inflict upon him that indignity, when the effect
is to subject him in a greater or lesser degree, to the punishment of a guilty person, while as yet it is not
determined that he has not committed any crime. [82]

While the Sandiganbayan, as the court trying Criminal Case No. 26558, is empowered to proceed with the trial
of the case in the manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case,
[83]
the Court finds that it gravely abused its discretion in ordering that the petition for bail of petitioner and the trial
of former President Joseph E. Estrada be held jointly. It bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan itself acknowledged
in its May 4, 2001 Order the pre-eminent position and superiority of the rights of [petitioner] to have the matter of
his provisional liberty resolved without unnecessary delay, [84] only to make a volte face and declare that after all the
hearing of petition for bail of petitioner and Jose Jinggoy Estrada and the trial as against former President Joseph E.
Estrada should be held simultaneously. In ordering that petitioners petition for bail to be heard jointly with the trial
of the case against his co-accused former President Joseph E. Estrada, the Sandiganbayan in effect allowed further
and unnecessary delay in the resolution thereof to the prejudice of petitioner. In fine then, the Sandiganbayan
committed a grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a simultaneous hearing of petitioners petition for bail with the
trial of the case against former President Joseph E. Estrada on its merits.
With respect to petitioners allegations that the prosecution tried to delay the bail hearings by filing dilatory
motions, the People aver that it is petitioner and his co-accused who caused the delay in the trial of Criminal Case
No. 26558 by their filing of numerous manifestations and pleadings with the Sandiganbayan. [85] They assert that
they filed the motion for joint bail hearing and motion for earlier arraignment around the original schedule for the
bail hearings which was on May 21-25, 2001.[86]
They argue further that bail is not a matter of right in capital offenses. [87] In support thereof, they cite Article
III, Sec 13 of the Constitution, which states that

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.[88]

The People also cited Rule 114, Secs. 7 and 4 of the Revised Rules of Court which provide:

Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonement, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

Sec. 4. Bail, a matter of right, exception.All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with
sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule x x x (b) and before conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. [89]

Irrefragably, a person charged with a capital offense is not absolutely denied the opportunity to obtain
provisional liberty on bail pending the judgment of his case. However, as to such person, bail is not a matter of right
but is discretionary upon the court.[90] Had the rule been otherwise, the Rules would not have provided for an
application for bail by a person charged with a capital offense under Rule 114, Section 8 which states:

Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in
custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may
recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable
to testify.[91]

Under the foregoing provision, there must be a showing that the evidence of guilt against a person charged
with a capital offense is not strong for the court to grant him bail. Thus, upon an application for bail by the person
charged with a capital offense, a hearing thereon must be conducted, where the prosecution must be accorded an
opportunity to discharge its burden of proving that the evidence of guilt against an accused is strong. [92] The
prosecution shall be accorded the opportunity to present all the evidence it may deems necessary for this purpose.
[93]
When it is satisfactorily demonstrated that the evidence of guilt is strong, it is the courts duty to deny the
application for bail. However, when the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a matter of right. [94]
In this case, petitioner is not entitled to bail as a matter of right at this stage of the proceedings. Petitioners
claim that the prosecution had refused to present evidence to prove his guilt for purposes of his bail application
and that the Sandiganbayan has refused to grant a hearing thereon is not borne by the records. The prosecution
did not waive, expressly or even impliedly, its right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of
petitioner. It must be noted that the Sandiganbayan had already scheduled the hearing dates for petitioners
application for bail but the same were reset due to pending incidents raised in several motions filed by the parties,
which incidents had to be resolved by the court prior to the bail hearings. The bail hearing was eventually
scheduled by the Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but the hearing did not push through due to the filing of this
petition on June 29, 2001.
The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioners application for bail is therefore not imputable solely to the
Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution. Petitioner is also partly to blame therefor, as is evident from the following list
of motions filed by him and by the prosecution:
Motions filed by petitioner:
Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 6, 2001, for (1) leave to file motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation and to direct ombudsman to conduct reinvestigation; (2) conduct a
determination of probable cause as would suggest the issuance of house arrest; (3) hold in abeyance
the issuance of warrant of arrest and other proceedings pending determination of probable cause;
 Motion for Early Resolution, dated May 24, 2001;

Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance Implementation or Service of Warrant of Arrest for Immediate
Grant of bail or For Release on Recognizance, dated April 25, 2001;

Urgent Motion to allow Accused Serapio to Vote at Obando, Bulacan, dated May 11, 2001;

Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 22, 2001, praying for Resolution of May 18, 2001 be
set aside and bail hearings be set at the earliest possible time;

Urgent Motion for Immediate Release on Bail or Recognizance, dated May 27, 2001;

Motion for Reconsideration of denial of Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated June 13, 2001, praying that
he be allowed to file a Motion for Reinvestigation; and

Motion to Quash, dated June 26, 2001.[95]

Motions filed by the prosecution:

Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 8, 2001; [96]

Motion for Joint Bail Hearings of Accused Joseph Estrada, Jose Jinggoy Estrada and Edward Serapio,
dated May 8, 2001;[97]

Opposition to the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion to Adjust Earlier
Arraignment, dated May 25, 2001;[98] and

Omnibus Motion for Examination, Testimony and Transcription in Filipino, dated June 19, 2001. [99]

The other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 also contributed to the aforesaid delay by their filing of the
following motions:

Motion to Quash or Suspend, dated April 24, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080 and praying that the Amended Information be quashed;

Very Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 30, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, praying that he be (1)
excluded from the Amended Information for lack of probable cause; (2) released from custody; or in
the alternative, (3) be allowed to post bail;

Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Place on House Arrest, dated April 25, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada, praying that they be placed on house arrest during the pendency of the case;

Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;

Supplemental Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada;

Omnibus Motion, dated May 7, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada, praying by reinvestigation of the case
by the Ombudsman or the outright dismissal of the case;
 Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension, dated May 2, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, requesting for five
(5) within which to respond to the Opposition to Motion to Quash in view of the holidays and
election-related distractions;

Opposition to Urgent Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 10, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada;

Omnibus Manifestation on voting and custodial arrangement, dated May 11, 2001, filed by Joseph
and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be placed on house arrest;

Manifestation regarding house arrest, dated May 6, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;

Summation regarding house arrest, dated May 23, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;

Urgent Manifestation & Motion, dated May 6, 2001 filed by Jinggoy Estrada;

Manifestation, dated May 28, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be allowed
to be confined in Tanay;

Motion to charge as Accused Luis Chavit Singson, filed by Joseph Estrada;

Omnibus Motion, dated June 11, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, seeking reconsideration
of denial of requests for house arrest, for detention in Tanay or Camp Crame; motion for inhibition of
Justice Badoy;

Urgent Motion to Allow Accused to Clear His Desk as Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated June
28, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;

Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 9, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that the
resolution compelling them to be present at petitioner Serapios hearing for bail be reconsidered;

Motion to Quash, dated June 7, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada;

Still Another Manifestation, dated June 14, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada stating that
Bishop Teodoro Bacani favors their house arrest;

Manifestation, dated June 15, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, waiving their right to be
present at the June 18 and 21, 2001 bail hearings and reserving their right to trial with assessors;

Omnibus Motion for Instructions: 30-Day House Arrest; Production, Inspection and Copying of
Documents; and Possible Trial with Assessors, dated June 19, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada;

Urgent Motion for Additional Time to Wind Up Affairs, dated June 20, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;

Manifestation, dated June 22, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, asking for free dates for parties,
claiming that denial of bail is cruel and inhuman, reiterating request for gag order of prosecution
witnesses, availing of production, inspection and copying of documents, requesting for status of alias
case; and
 Compliance, dated June 25, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, requesting for permission to attend some
municipal affairs in San Juan, Metro Manila.[100]

Furthermore, the Court has previously ruled that even in cases where the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence in opposition to an application for bail by an accused charged with a capital offense, the trial court is still
under duty to conduct a hearing on said application. [101] The rationale for such requirement was explained
in Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz (supra), citing Basco vs. Rapatalo:[102]

When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a
matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be
exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the
weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the
court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to
the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. [103]

Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until the Sandiganbayan conducts a hearing of his
application for bail and resolve the same in his favor. Even then, there must first be a finding that the evidence
against petitioner is not strong before he may be granted bail.
Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for petitioner, he contends that he
is entitled to the issuance of said writ because the State, through the prosecutions refusal to present evidence and
by the Sandiganbayans refusal to grant a bail hearing, has failed to discharge its burden of proving that as against
him, evidence of guilt for the capital offense of plunder is strong. Petitioner contends that the prosecution
launched a seemingly endless barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves to prevent the conduct of bail
hearings.Specifically, the prosecution moved for petitioners arraignment before the commencement of bail
hearings and insisted on joint bail hearings for petitioner, Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada despite the fact that it
was only petitioner who asked for a bail hearing; manifested that it would present its evidence as if it is the
presentation of the evidence in chief, meaning that the bail hearings would be concluded only after the prosecution
presented its entire case upon the accused; and argued that petitioners motion to quash and his petition for bail
are inconsistent, and therefore, petitioner should choose to pursue only one of these two remedies. [104] He further
claims that the Sandiganbayan, through its questioned orders and resolutions postponing the bail hearings
effectively denied him of his right to bail and to due process of law. [105]
Petitioner also maintains that the issuance by the Sandiganbayan of new orders canceling the bail hearings
which it had earlier set did not render moot and academic the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,
since said orders have resulted in a continuing deprivation of petitioners right to bail. [106] He argues further that the
fact that he was arrested and is detained pursuant to valid process does not by itself negate the efficacy of the
remedy of habeas corpus. In support of his contention, petitioner cites Moncupa vs. Enrile,[107] where the Court held
that habeas corpus extends to instances where the detention, while valid from its inception, has later become
arbitrary.[108]
However, the People insist that habeas corpus is not proper because petitioner was arrested pursuant to the
amended information which was earlier filed in court, [109] the warrant of arrest issuant pursuant thereto was valid,
and petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the authorities. [110]
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so. [111] In exceptional
circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant
to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action due to its ability to cut through barriers
of form and procedural mazes.[112] Thus, in previous cases, we issued the writ where the deprivation of liberty, while
initially valid under the law, had later become invalid, [113] and even though the persons praying for its issuance were
not completely deprived of their liberty. [114]
 The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner. The general rule
that habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issue the same [115] applies, because petitioner is
under detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the filing by
the Ombudsman of the amended information for plunder against petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner had in
fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest
had been issued.
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile[116] that habeas corpus will lie where the deprivation of liberty which was
initially valid has become arbitrary in view of subsequent developments finds no application in the present case
because the hearing on petitioners application for bail has yet to commence. As stated earlier, the delay in the
hearing of petitioners petition for bail cannot be pinned solely on the Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution for that
matter. Petitioner himself is partly to be blamed. Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate
remedy for asserting ones right to bail. [117] It cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter
of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail,
[118]
or has not even exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application for bail with the court
where the criminal case is pending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified but would also preempt the
Sandiganbayans resolution of the pending application for bail of petitioner. The recourse of petitioner is to
forthwith proceed with the hearing on his application for bail.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, the petitions are DISMISSED. The resolutions of respondent
Sandiganbayan subject of said petitions are AFFIRMED; and
2. In G.R. No. 148468, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan,
Annex L of the petition, ordering a joint hearing of petitioners petition for bail and the trial of Criminal Case No.
26558 as against former President Joseph E. Estrada is SET ASIDE; the arraignment of petitioner on July 10, 2001 is
also SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT. MANUEL ISON, COL.
LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO,
LTC. ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE
LA PERA, MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO LIM, CAPT.
ELMER AMON, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI INVESTIGATING PANEL COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S.
MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ. FELIX V. BALDONADO and MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and
GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14 COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA,
COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN, respondents.

No. 95020 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY
FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO LIGOT
PA., respondents.

No. 96948 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO PN, CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN,
LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA,
LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA,
MAJ. CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO
PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY
FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF
GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14, respondents.

No. 97454 August 2, 1991

AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,
PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT. COL. ALBERTO OLARIO, Commanding Officer of
the PNP/INP Detention Center/Jail, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, CAPTAIN REYNALDO S.
RAFAEL, 1 LT SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT. ATANACIO T. MACALAN JR PMM
2LT ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS CALLEJA PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT JOSELITO CABREROS PMM
2LT MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC, respondents.

Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito Sanchez, Tiburcio Fusillero, Ericson Aurelio,
Levino Valencia, Danilo Arnon Vergel Nacino, Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio and Joey Sarroza, Manuel Q. Malvar
for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim. Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson. Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo
Oliveros. Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison. Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro. Alfredo Lazaro
for Romelino Gojo.
Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador. Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando. Pablito
V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio. Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson. M.M. Lazaro & Associates for
respondents Ligot and Ison . Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.
Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena. Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro. Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes&
Manalastas for petitioners in G.R. No. 93177.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and related issues
arising from the same incident.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d'
etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.

The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer
and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).

In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are questioning the conduct of
the Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate the charges against them and the creation of the
General Court Martial GCM convened to try them.

In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14, seek certiorari against its ruling
denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.

In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are assailed
on certiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its
ruling denying bail to the private respondents.

In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a
petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents. Jurisdictional objections are likewise
raised as in G.R. No. 95020.

Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel had been constituted pursuant
to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI
Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the petitioners, to wit:

You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating Officers on 12
Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City, then and there to submit your counter-
affidavit and the affidavits of your witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial investigation of the charge/charges
against you for violence of AWs _______________. DO NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.

Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a
waiver of your right to submit controverting evidence.

On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements of
witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.

At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI
Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing This was done through a Motion for
Summary Dismissal dated February 21, 1990.

In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days from
notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.

On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the PTI Panel
gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. This was done on March 14,1990.

The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71,
which provides:
 Art. 71. Charges Action upon. Charges and specifications must be signed by a person subject to military
law, and under the oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters set
forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief.

No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial
investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include inquiries as to the truth of the
matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what disposition of the case should be made in the
interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation full opportunity shall be given to the accused to
cross-examine witnesses against him if they are available and to present anything he may desire in his
own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available witnesses
requested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be accompanied
by a statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)

They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no prosecution
witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion for summary dismissal was denied, the
motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to date and they have not been able to submit their counter-
affidavits.

At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they were exercising their right
to raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com.
Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been discontinued
under P.D. No. 39.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14.
He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer
for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. After considering the petition and the answer thereto
filed by the president and members of GCM No.14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting
provisional liberty to Ligot.

On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and to declare in
contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said order. He later also complained that
Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him "pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this
Court.

After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of intervenors Ltc
Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of additional intervenors Ltc Romelino
Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.

On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:

(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all persons with the
defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings. Accordingly,
the assailed orders of General Court- Martial No. 14 denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the
mistaken assumption that bail does not apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the
ground that there is no precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and void. Respondent General
Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the
petitioner, intervenors and which may as well include other persons facing charges before General Court-
Martial No. 14.
 Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No. 14, this Court
reiterates its orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as well as intervenors
Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.

On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a petition for habeas
corpuson the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was raffled to respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after
hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the
trial court ordered their release.

II

The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.

It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities to present their side
at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of
their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits.
On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in
writing. This they did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in effect denied when the PTI Panel resolved to
recommend that the charges be referred to the General Court Martial for trial.

The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the investigation was resolved
against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits. They had been expressly warned In the
subpoena sent them that "failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall
be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. As
their motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without
waiting for the petitioners to submit their defense.

Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. 1wphi1 If it is not availed of, it
is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.

There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is now settled
that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court- martial of jurisdiction." We
so held in Arula v. Espino,1 thus:

xxx xxx xxx

But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of
jurisdiction.

The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory, and in no way
affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986 (1949), the
Court said:

We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70 (The Philippine counter-
part is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408) can properly be construed as an indispensable
pre-requisite to the exercise of the Army General court martial jurisdiction.. The Article does
serve important functions in the administration of court-martial procedures and does provide
safeguards to an accused. Its language is clearly such that a defendant could object to trial in the
absence of the required investigation. In that event the court-martial could itself postpone trial
pending the investigation. And the military reviewing authorities could consider the same
 contention, reversing a court- martial conviction where failure to comply with Article 70 has
substantially injured an accused. But we are not persuaded that Congress intended to make
otherwise valid court-martial judgments wholly void because pre-trial investigations fall short of
the standards prescribed by Article 70. That Congress has not required analogous pre-trial
procedure for Navy court-martial is an indication that the investigatory plan was not intended to
be exalted to the jurisdictional level.

xxx xxx xxx

Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of the Army did hold
that where there had been no pre-trial investigation, court-martial proceedings were void ab
initio. But this holding has been expressly repudiated in later holdings of the Judge Advocate
General. This later interpretation has been that the pre-trial requirements of Article 70 are
directory, not mandatory, and in no way effect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War
Department's interpretation was pointedly called to the attention of Congress in 1947 after which
Congress amended Article 70 but left unchanged the language here under consideration.
compensable pre-requisite to the exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction

A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation under article of war 71
would of course be altogether irregular but the court-martial might nevertheless have jurisdiction.
Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in criminal procedure in the civil courts to the effect
that absence of preliminary investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the
regularity of the proceedings.

As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that issue was resolved more than two
years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa,2 where we declared:

The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911. The
amended charge sheets, charging petitioners and their co-respondents with mutiny and conduct
unbecoming an officer, were signed by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he had
investigated the matter through an evaluation of the pertinent records, including the reports of
respondent AFP Board of Officers, and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies on record. The
charge sheets were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance with and in the manner provided
under Art. 71 of the Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, is only of
suppletory application, the fact that the charge sheets were not certified in the manner provided under
said decrees, i.e., that the officer administering the oath has personally examined the affiant and that he is
satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood its affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets.
Thereafter, a "pretrial investigation" was conducted by respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to
P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their counter-
affidavit. However, instead of doing so, they filed an untitled pleading seeking the dismissal of the charges
against them. That petitioners were not able to confront the witnesses against them was their own doing,
for they never even asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses so that they may be made to
answer clarificatory questions in accordance with P. D, No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.

The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with Article 8 of the Articles of
War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the body, was not signed by Gen. Renato de Villa
as Chief of Staff.

Article of War No. 8 reads:

 Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when empowered by the President, the commanding
officer of a major command or task force, the commanding officer of a division, the commanding officer of
a military area, the superintendent of the Military Academy, the commanding officer of a separate brigade
or body of troops may appoint general courts-martial; but when any such commander is the accuser or
the prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the court shall be appointed by superior competent
authority. ...

While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt that he authorized it
because the order itself said it was issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it has not been shown to be
spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General, the Summary Disposition Form showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief
of Staff, AFP, actually constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its president and members. It is significant that
General De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the said order, as he would certainly have
done if his authority had been improperly invoked. On the contrary, as the principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177,
he sustained General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the other respondents by the Solicitor
General.

Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally provided for under Article 18 of
Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948, to wit:

Art. 18. Challenges. Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged by the accused or
the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall determine the relevancy and validity
thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to more than one member at a time. Challenges by the trial
judge advocate shall ordinarily be presented and decided before those by the accused are offered. Each
side shall be entitled to the peremptory challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be
challenged except for cause.

The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro,3 thus:

In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of Commonwealth Act
No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a handful of Philippine Scout officers and
graduates of the United States military and naval academies who were on duty with the Philippine Army,
there was a complete dearth of officers learned in military law, its aside from the fact that the officer corps
of the developing army was numerically made equate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of
the national defense program. Because of these considerations it was then felt that peremptory challenges
should not in the meanwhile be permitted and that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be
allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on September 14,
1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no mention or reference to any peremptory challenge by
either the trial judge advocate of a court- martial or by the accused. After December 17,1958, when the
Manual for Courts-Martial of the Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's Service
of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive program of training and education in military
law, encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines. This program was pursued until the outbreak
of World War 11 in the Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in
1945, the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very large number, and a
great many of the officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It was in these environmental
circumstances that Article of War 18 was amended on June 12,1948 to entitle "each side" to one
peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law member of court shall not be challenged except
for cause.

On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be
referred to them.
On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure,
and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge, thus:

No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained to insure impartiality
and good faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by a majority of the members
excluding the challenged member. A tie vote does not disqualify the challenged member. A successfully
challenged member shall be immediately replaced.

On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security Code, which was a
compilation and codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies intended "to meet the continuing threats
to the existence, security and stability of the State." The modified rule on challenges under P.D. No. 39 was
embodied in this decree.

On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state of martial
law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and declared the dissolution of the
military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final determination of the cases pending therein.

P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders mentioned therein. With
the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the
existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante
ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is
its soul.

Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in L P.D. No. 39 became
ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045, As a
result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the
right to peremptory challenge.

We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory challenge remains
withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted
on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer operative, having been
cast out under the new dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges
of the previous regime.

The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is curious that the present
government should invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify its action against the accused officers.

The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited by a respondent in a
court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. It is hoped that the accused
officers in the cases at bar will not be so motivated. At any rate, the wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of
present circumstances, is a matter addressed to the law-makers and not to this Court. The judiciary can only
interpret and apply the laws without regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a problem only
the political departments can resolve.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition for certiorari and mandamus
and the petition for habeas corpus filed by the private respondents with the Regional Trial Courts of Quezon City. It
is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of
War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial
proceedings.
The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the Court of Appeals is vested with "exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions." Rather irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the
case of Yang v. Court of Appeals4 where this Court held that "appeals from the Professional Regulation Commission
are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals.

It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary appeals and not to the
remedies employed by the accused officers before the respondent courts.

In Martelino, we observed as follows:

It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the proceedings of
courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to consideration. The single inquiry,
the test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true that in the exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-
martial may commit such an abuse of discretion what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave
abuse of discretion" as to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point at issue in
this action suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and prohibition ... .

The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions
for habeas corpusand quo warranto.5 In the absence of a law providing that the decisions, orders and ruling of a
court-martial or the Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can exercise similar jurisdiction.

We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been
recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights.
This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in
the military where the right to bail does not exist.

The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:

The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the
constitutional coverage on the right to bail.

Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of
democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their
duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent
elements carry out their activities outside of and against the existing political system.

xxx xxx xxx

National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release on bail of
respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the
streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25,1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional"
bail. The sheer number alone is already discomforting. But, the truly disquieting thought is that they could
freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted
authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own
concept of government and justice.

The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not
acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply
where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they
are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated
against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.

On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been charged after more than
one year from their arrest, our finding is that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due
process and the right to a speedy trial.

The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991, and was referred to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard on February 26, 1991, by the
respondent court, where the petitioners submitted the charge memorandum and specifications against the private
respondents dated January 30, 1991. On February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was
created and initial investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991, the private
respondents received the copies of the charges, charge sheets and specifications and were required to submit their
counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay of more than one year in the investigation
and preparation of the charges against the private respondents. However, this was explained by the Solicitor
General thus:

... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it pre-charge investigation only after one
(1) year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. All
of them, as well as other witnesses, had to be interviewed or investigated, and these inevitably took
months to finish. The pre-charge investigation was rendered doubly difficult by the fact that those involved
were dispersed and scattered throughout the Philippines. In some cases, command units, such as the
Scout Rangers, have already been disbanded. After the charges were completed, the same still had to pass
review and approval by the AFP Chief of Staff.

While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following admonition:

This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the point that if the participation of
petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders of Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili
cannot be established and no charges can be filed against him or the existence of a prima facie case
warranting trial before a military commission is wanting, it behooves respondent then Major General
Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to release petitioner. Respondents must also be reminded that even if a
military officer is arrested pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War, indefinite confinement is not
sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof mandates that immediate steps must be taken to try the person accused
or to dissmiss the charge and release him. Any officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay in
investigating or carrying the case to a final conclusion may even be punished as a court martial may
direct.6

It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on February 26, 1991, the
government filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for reconsideration, the latter was ultimately
denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48- hour period for appeal under Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules of
Court did not run until after notice of such denial was received by the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to
the private respondents' contention, therefore, the decision had not yet become final and executory when the
special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was filed with this Court on March 12, 1991.

III

Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following observations of the Court in
Arula:
 The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion (AW 71). A
petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the
respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to
nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an
abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.

As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave abuse of discretion or
without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts complained
of by the petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to
peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private
respondents should not have been ordered released.

ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is
GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge
under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and the
orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I dissent insofar as he would deny bail
to accused military personnel.

The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before conviction, with the only exception of
"those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong." 1 The Charter also
states that "[T]he right to bail shall not be impaired even if the writ of habeas corpus is suspended." 2 To deny the
military officers here concerned of the right to bail is to circumscribe the inclusive meaning of "all persons" the
coverage of the right.

I believe that military officers fall within "persons".

The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the
Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail [t]he sheer number
alone is already discomforting . . . [b]ut, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous
activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable
Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice." 3 But
would a scenario of 1,000 murderers or drug pushers roaming the streets of the metropolis justify a denial of the
right to bail? Would not that dark picture painted by the Solicitor General be reproduced by 1,000 "equally
dangerous" elements of society?

We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the petitioners should not be granted the
same right.
The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an argument to deny bail. I submit,
however, that tradition is no argument. First, the Constitution does not say it. Second, we are a government of
laws, not tradition.

If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a reexamination is in order.

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148,
MAKATI CITY; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN DOLORFINO,
AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO OBEA, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly
demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.

Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring
a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. 1 A series of negotiations quelled the
teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening.

In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident," petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was
charged, along with his comrades, with coup detat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784, "People v. Capt. Milo
D. Maestrecampo, et al."

Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, 2 threw his hat in the political arena and won a
seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. 3

Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148,
an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests" 4 (Omnibus
Motion). Among his requests were:

(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate (whether at the Senate
or elsewhere) particularly when the Senate is in session, and to attend the regular and plenary sessions of
the Senate, committee hearings, committee meetings, consultations, investigations and hearings in aid of
legislation, caucuses, staff meetings, etc., which are normally held at the Senate of the Philippines located
at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City (usually from Mondays to Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.);
 (b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks
Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a personal desktop computer and the appropriate
communications equipment (i.e., a telephone line and internet access) in order that he may be able to
work there when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in
session. The costs of setting up the said working area and the related equipment and utility costs can be
charged against the budget/allocation of the Office of the accused from the Senate;

(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at his place of detention at the
Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, at reasonable times of the day
particularly during working days for purposes of meetings, briefings, consultations and/or coordination, so
that the latter may be able to assists (sic) him in the performance and discharge of his duties as a Senator
of the Republic;

(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the press or the
media regarding the important issues affecting the country and the public while at the Senate or
elsewhere in the performance of his duties as Senator to help shape public policy and in the light of the
important role of the Senate in maintaining the system of checks and balance between the three (3) co-
equal branches of Government;

(e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his custodians, to be allowed to
receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and other members of the media who may wish to interview
him and/or to get his comments, reactions and/or opinion at his place of confinement at the Marine Brig,
Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, particularly when there are no sessions, meetings or
hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in session; and

(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of the Senate and related
activities scheduled in the morning (9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July 2007 at the Senate of the Philippines
located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City.5

By Order of July 25, 2007, 6 the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to three. 7 The
trial court just the same denied the motion by Order of September 18, 2007. 8

Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court, and
for prohibition and mandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning the Senate staff, resource persons and guests
from meeting with him or transacting business with him in his capacity as Senator; and (ii) direct respondents to
allow him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and guests and permit him to attend all sessions and official
functions of the Senate. Petitioner preliminarily prayed for the maintenance of the status quo ante of having been
able hitherto to convene his staff, resource persons and guests 9 at the Marine Brig.

Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of Staff, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon
(Esperon); Philippine Navys Flag Officer-in-Command, Vice Admiral Rogelio Calunsag; Philippine Marines
Commandant, Major Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino; and Marine Barracks Manila Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo
Obea (Obea).

Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has, since November 30, 2007, been in the
custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Custodial Center following the foiled take-over of the Manila
Peninsula Hotel10 the day before or on November 29, 2007.

Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action as against the above-named military
officers-respondents. The issues raised in relation to them had ceased to present a justiciable controversy, so that a
determination thereof would be without practical value and use. Meanwhile, against those not made parties to the
case, petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from this Court. 11 Petitioner did not, by way of substitution, implead the
police officers currently exercising custodial responsibility over him; and he did not satisfactorily show that they
have adopted or continued the assailed actions of the former custodians. 12

Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously raised in his Motion for Reconsideration
filed with the trial court:

I.

THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT
CASE BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A.

UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE WAS ALREADY CONVICTED AT THE
TIME HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN THE INSTANT CASE, ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN
CONVICTED AND, THEREFORE, STILL ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;

B.

THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS CHARGED WITH TWO (2) COUNTS OF STATUTORY
RAPE AND SIX (6) COUNTS OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.
HEREIN ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE OF "COUP DETAT", A CHARGE
WHICH IS COMMONLY REGARDED AS A POLITICAL OFFENSE;

C.

THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE ATTEMPTED TO FLEE PRIOR TO BEING ARRESTED. THE
ACCUSED/ PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED TO THE AUTHORITIES AND AGREED TO TAKE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS AT OAKWOOD;

II.

GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE MARINE BRIGS COMMANDING
OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO ATTEND THE SENATE SESSIONS;

III.

ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR SOVEREIGN CAPACITY,
ELECTED HIM TO THE POSITION OF SENATOR OF THE REPUBLIC PROVIDES THE PROPER LEGAL
JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO WORK AND SERVE HIS MANDATE AS A SENATOR;

- AND -

IV.

MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW LIBERAL TREATMENT OF DETENTION

PRISONERS WHO ARE HELD WITHOUT BAIL AS IN THE CASE OF FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH "ERAP"
ESTRADA AND FORMER ARMM GOV. NUR MISUARI.13
The petition is bereft of merit.

In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that former
Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a
motion similar to petitioners Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts
that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.

Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of
statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup detat which is regarded as a
"political offense."

Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate grievances
against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.

In sum, petitioners first ground posits that there is a world of difference between his case and that of Jalosjos
respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the motion, and other circumstances which
demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos.14

A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress
is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement.15

It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of
justice. No less than the Constitution provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.16 (Underscoring supplied)

The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, 17 or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal action.18

That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup detat cases, both being punishable by reclusion
perpetua,19 is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is
clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioners application for bail and for release on recognizance was
denied.20 The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application
for bail21 or imported from a trial courts judgment of conviction, 22 justifies the detention of an accused as a valid
curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such
cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying
rationale of public self-defense23 applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-
appellants like Jalosjos.

As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay,24 it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-
trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their
constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of
the public.

The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:25

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the
custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for
the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him,
unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all
prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession
nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention . This is
a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.26 (Underscoring supplied)

These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the extent that confinement restrains the
power of locomotion or actual physical movement. It bears noting that in Jalosjos, which was decided en banc one
month after Maceda, the Court recognized that the accused could somehow accomplish legislative results. 27

The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full
enjoyment of civil and political rights.

Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the presumption of innocence during
the period material to the resolution of their respective motions. The Court in Jalosjos did not mention that the
presumption of innocence no longer operates in favor of the accused pending the review on appeal of the
judgment of conviction. The rule stands that until a promulgation of final conviction is made, the constitutional
mandate ofpresumption of innocence prevails.28

In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither denied nor disputed his agreeing to a
consensus with the prosecution that media access to him should cease after his proclamation by the Commission
on Elections.29

Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk since he
voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to
travel outside his place of detention.

Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well when on November 29, 2007
petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue
certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident," 30 proves that petitioners
argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for
foreboding became real.

Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable
amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of bail. 31 In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is
controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail
shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion. 32

Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo33 to buttress his plea for leeway because unlike petitioner, the
therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who was charged with multiple murder and multiple
frustrated murder,34 was able to rebut the strong evidence for the prosecution. Notatu dignum is this Courts
pronouncement therein that "if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof
being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury." 35 At the
time Montano was indicted, when only capital offenses were non-bailable where evidence of guilt is strong, 36 the
Court noted the obvious reason that "one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong
temptation to flee."37Petitioners petition for bail having earlier been denied, he cannot rely on Montano to
reiterate his requests which are akin to bailing him out.

Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial courts findings, Esperon did not overrule Obeas
recommendation to allow him to attend Senate sessions. Petitioner cites the Comment 38 of Obea that he
interposed no objection to such request but recommended that he be transported by the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms
with adequate Senate security. And petitioner faults the trial court for deeming that Esperon, despite professing
non-obstruction to the performance of petitioners duties, flatly rejected all his requests, when what Esperon only
disallowed was the setting up of a political office inside a military installation owing to AFPs apolitical nature. 39

The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a valid objective that may justify the
imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial detention. 40 The officer with custodial responsibility over a
detainee may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety and prevent the
escape of the detainee.41 Nevertheless, while the comments of the detention officers provide guidance on security
concerns, they are not binding on the trial court in the same manner that pleadings are not impositions upon a
court.

Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his mandate, after the
people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is
tantamount to removing him from office, depriving the people of proper representation, denying the peoples will,
repudiating the peoples choice, and overruling the mandate of the people.

Petitioners contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that "a public official can not be removed
for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor." 42

The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term"
to speak of. In a plethora of cases, 43 the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to
criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioners
electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only
such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison." 44

In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument, 45 it is opportune to wipe out the lingering
misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints
articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the
overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained
to govern all under the rule of law.

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The
accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law .46 (Underscoring
supplied)

Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who have also been
charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who
were allowed to attend "social functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the more serious request
to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.

In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention prisoners, petitioner expressly
admits that he intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form of being placed under Senate custody
or house arrest,47 yet he at the same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest to others.

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the
authorities or upon court orders.48 That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the
trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in
February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office 49 on June
29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete
turn-around,50 petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and
blanket authorizations.

Petitioners position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests alone, petitioners case fails to
compare with the species of allowable leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds:

x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days
or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position.
Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also
would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. 51

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. RTJ- 03-1767. March 28, 2003]

ROSALIA DOCENA-CASPE, complainant, vs. JUDGE ARNULFO O. BUGTAS, Regional Trial Court, Branch II,
Borongan, Eastern Samar, respondent.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The refusal or failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence or to interpose objection to a petition for bail will
not dispense with the conduct of a bail hearing. [1] Neither may reliance to a previous order granting bail justify the
absence of a hearing in a subsequent petition for bail, [2]more so where said order relied upon was issued without
hearing and while the accused was at large. [3]
The instant administrative case for gross ignorance of the law and incompetence against respondent judge
stemmed from a murder case filed against accused Celso Docil and Juan Docil for the death of Lucio Docena. In her
sworn complaint, complainant alleged that on September 3, 1993, Judge Gorgonio T. Alvarez of the Municipal Trial
Court of Taft, Eastern Samar, conducted a preliminary investigation on the said murder case, and thereafter issued
the corresponding warrants of arrest. No bail was recommended for the two (2) accused who were at large since
the commission of the offense on August 29, 1993.
Complainant further stated that the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch II, then presided by Judge Paterno T. Alvarez. The latter allegedly granted a
P60,000.00 bailbond each to both accused without conducting a hearing, and while the two were at
large. Meanwhile, accused Celso Docil was apprehended on June 4, 2000.
Subsequently, Provincial Prosecutor Vicente Catudio filed before the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern
Samar, Branch II, now presided by respondent Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, a motion praying that an alias warrant of
arrest be issued for the other accused, Juan Docil; and that both accused be denied bail. Said motion was granted
by the respondent Judge. Thereafter, accused Celso Docil filed a motion for reconsideration praying that he be
allowed to post bail on the grounds that (1) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right because he is charged with
murder allegedly committed at the time when the imposition of the death penalty was suspended by the
Constitution; and that (2) both the investigating Judge and the First Assistant Prosecutor recommended P60,000.00
bail for his temporary liberty.
On August 11, 2000, the respondent Judge denied said motion. [4] He explained that notwithstanding the
suspension of the imposition of the death penalty at the time the accused committed the offense, bail for the
crime of murder remains to be a matter of discretion. He cited Section 13, Article III, of the Constitution which
explicitly provides that (a)ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance
as may be provided by law. The respondent Judge added that contrary to the accuseds claim, there is nothing in the
records which show that bail was recommended for his temporary liberty.
Accused Celso Docil filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating his previous contentions. Then, he filed a
manifestation pointing out that on page 49 of the records is an order granting him and his co-accused the
recommended bail of P60,000.00. The court gave the prosecution five (5) days within which to file a comment to
the accuseds motion for reconsideration but the former failed to do so.
On January 15, 2001, the respondent Judge issued a Resolution granting the said motion for reconsideration
on the basis of a previous order granting bail to the accused. [5] He ratiocinated that on page 49 of the records, there
indeed appears a final and executory order dated July 22, 1994 issued by his predecessor, Judge Paterno T. Alvarez
granting bail of P60,000.00 to the accused, hence, the inevitable recourse is to grant bail to accused Celso Docil.
On August 16, 2001, the complainant filed the instant administrative case against the respondent Judge for
granting bail to accused Celso Docil without conducting a bail hearing.
In his Comment,[6] the respondent insisted that he committed no gross ignorance of the law or
incompetence. He contended that the prosecution is estopped from objecting to the grant of bail to accused Celso
Docil because it questioned the said order issued by his predecessor Judge only on February 4, 2000, or after six (6)
years from the issuance thereof on July 22, 1994. He added that despite the five-day period given to the
prosecution, it failed to file a comment to the motion for reconsideration of the accused, warranting the
presumption that it has no objection to the accuseds petition for bail.
On the basis of its evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the instant case be re-
docketed as a regular administrative matter and that respondent Judge be fined in an amount equivalent to one (1)
month salary, with a warning that the commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely.[7]
In a Resolution dated February 6, 2002, the Court required the parties to manifest whether they are
submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. [8] On April 24, 2002, the respondent Judge
manifested his conformity to the said Resolution. [9] The complainants manifestation, on the other hand, was
dispensed with by the Court.
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or
otherwise, relative to the grant of bail especially in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion. [10]Under the present rules, a hearing is required
in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. [11] It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail
in cases where bail is a matter of discretion hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence on the guilt of the
accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion
which remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a
hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. [12]
In Santos v. Ofilada,[13] it was held that the failure to raise or the absence of an objection on the part of the
prosecution in an application for bail does not dispense with the requirement of a bail hearing. Thus

Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to interpose an objection to the granting of bail to the accused will not
justify such grant without hearing. This Court has uniformly ruled that even if the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence or fails to interpose any objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a
hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or
lack of it, against the accused. Where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to
grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the States
evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of the bail. Irrespective of respondent judges opinion that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demand that a hearing be
conducted before bail may be fixed for the temporary release of the accused, if bail is at all justified.

Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the accused, the
respondent judge therein should nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently ascertain
from the prosecution whether the latter was not in fact contesting the bail application. In addition, a hearing was
also necessary for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in the then Section 6, Rule 114 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure for the fixing of the amount of the bail. Only after respondent judge had satisfied
himself that these requirements have been met could he then proceed to rule on whether or not to grant bail.

Clearly therefore, the respondent Judge cannot seek refuge on the alleged belated objection of the
prosecution to the order dated July 22, 1994 issued by his predecessor, Judge Paterno T. Alvarez; nor on the
prosecutions failure to file a comment to the accuseds motion for reconsideration of the August 11, 2000 order
denying the application for bail.
It is certainly erroneous for the respondent to rely on the order of Judge Paterno T. Alvarez. As a responsible
judge, he should have looked into the real and hard facts of the case before him and ascertained personally
whether the evidence of guilt is strong. [14] To make things worse, respondent Judge relied on the said July 22, 1994
order despite the fact that the same appears to have been issued by his predecessor Judge also without a hearing
and while the accused was at large. In addition to the requirement of a mandatory bail hearing, respondent judge
should have known the basic rule that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the
law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for bail
for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.[15]
In Basco v. Rapatalo,[16] the Court laid down the following rules which outlined the duties of a judge in case an
application for bail is filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation;
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court
to exercise its discretion;
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution;
 (4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the courts order granting or
refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. [17] A summary is defined as a
comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or statement. Based on the summary of evidence, the
judge formulates his own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the
accused.[18]
In the instant case, it appears that when the respondent judge initially granted the prosecutions motion
praying that the accused be denied bail, no hearing was conducted. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or
weakness of evidence of the accuseds guilt, he should have conducted a hearing and thereafter made a summary
of the evidence for the prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be
downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its
absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail. [19]
The indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail has always been ardently and indefatigably
stressed by the Court. The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled
authoritative doctrines. He should strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be
the personification of justice and the Rule of Law. [20]
In Dericto v. Bautista,[21] the Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on the respondent Judge for granting bail
without conducting a bail hearing. We explained therein that although the Rules of Court authorize the
investigating judge to determine the amount of bail, such authority does not include the outright granting of bail
without a preliminary hearing on the matter, more so in cases where the crime charged is punishable with
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. And while it may be true that the determination of whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, this discretion lies not in the determination of
whether or not a hearing should be held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the prosecutions
evidence of guilt against the accused.
In Goodman v. De La Victoria,[22] the erring Judge was found guilty of serious misconduct in office and ordered
to pay a fine of P5,000.00 for failing to conduct a bail hearing in the manner required by law. It was held that the
brief inquiry conducted by the said Judge before granting bail did not constitute the hearing mandated by law, for
such proceeding did not elicit evidence from the prosecution to guide respondent in the proper determination of
the petition.
In Marzan-Gelacio v. Flores,[23] the Court sustained the recommendation of the OCA to impose the penalty of
fine in the amount of P10,000.00 on the erring judge for granting bail without hearing to the accused in a rape
case.
In Cabatingan, Sr. v. Arcueno,[24] the Court imposed the penalty of fine of 15,000.00 on the investigating Judge
for denying bail on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In said case, the accused was arrested in the municipality
presided by the respondent judge. The Court ruled that the latter had the authority to grant bail and to order the
release of the accused, even if the records of the case had been transmitted for review to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor. The Court further noted therein that the respondent Judge was previously found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00, when without a hearing, he granted bail to an
accused charged with a capital offense.
In the following cases, the Court imposed a P20,000.00 fine on the Judges found to be grossly ignorant of the
rules and procedures in granting or denying bail, to wit:

(1) Manonggiring v. Ibrahim,[25] where the respondent Judge, in violation of Rule 114, Section 17(b), of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, granted bail to the accused in a criminal case which was then pending with another
branch involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death;
(2) Panganiban v. Cupin-Tesorero,[26] where the erring Municipal Trial Court Judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation granted bail to the accused (a) without jurisdiction and in violation of Rule 114, Section 17a, of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the corresponding Information against the accused being pending with the
Regional Trial Court; (b) without notice to the prosecutor of the request to approve the bail bond in violation of
Rule 114, Section 18; and (c) without conducting a bail hearing;

(3) Tabao v. Barataman,[27] and Comia v. Antona,[28] where the Judges concerned entertained an application for bail
even though the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

(4) Layola v. Gabo, Jr.,[29] where a Regional Trial Court Judge granted bail in a murder case without the requisite bail
hearing.

The record shows that this is not the first administrative case of the respondent Judge. In a decision
promulgated on April 17, 2001, in RTJ-01-1627, he was found guilty of gross inefficiency for failure to resolve a civil
case within the three-month reglementary period and consequently ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00. For this
second infraction, respondent Judge deserves a heavier penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas is ordered to pay a FINE in the
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 135045. December 15, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. IRENEO GAKO, JR. (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
7th Judicial Region, Branch 5, Cebu City) and VICENTE GO, respondents.

DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Before us is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court of the Resolution [1] of public respondent
Court of Appeals (Former Third Special Division) dated August 12, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47142, entitled PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES versus HON. IRENEO GAKO, JR. ET. AL., dismissing the petition of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), herein petitioner.
This instant petition stems from a murder case filed against private respondent Vicente Go (Go) and two co-
accused Sonny Herodias (Herodias) and Leopoldo dela Pea (de la Pea). The victim, Rafael Galan, Sr. (Galan, Sr.), was
shot dead on June 25, 1991.
Judge Priscila S. Agana (Judge Agana) originally presided over the criminal case subject of this petition. The
prosecution sought to inhibit said judge for her alleged collusion with the accused when she repeatedly sustained
the objections of the defense every time the prosecution attempted to establish the conspiracy to kill the
victim. Judge Agana denied the motion to inhibit and dismissed the case with prejudice on the ground that the
rights of the accused to a speedy trial were violated. The prosecution challenged the dismissal in the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32954. In its Decision dated April 18, 1994, the Court of Appeals set aside the
order of dismissal, granted the inhibition of the judge, and ordered the re-raffle of the case. The decision of the
Court of Appeals gained finality when this Court dismissed the appeal of private respondent Go and co-accused
Herodias in a Minute Resolution dated June 26, 1995. The criminal case was thus set for retrial. A series of delays
beset the case when the judges to whom the case was raffled inhibited themselves. The case was finally presided
over by public respondent Judge Ireneo Gako, Jr (Judge Gako, Jr.).
With the foregoing events as backdrop, the pertinent facts that led to the filing of this instant petition are as
follows:
On July 3, 1991, de la Pea executed an Extra-judicial Confession implicating therein Herodias and Go in the
conspiracy to kill and murder the victim.
On July 9, 1991, an Information was filed against the three accused namely, de la Pea, Herodias and Go,
charging them with the murder of Galan, Sr. and the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-22474. Judge
Godardo Jacinto,[2] then the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, issued a Warrant of Arrest
against the accused.
On July 22, 1991 an Urgent Motion to Confine private respondent Go in a hospital was filed.
On August 2, 1991, the hearing on said motion was conducted with the prosecution reserving its right to
cross-examine Dr. Gonzales.
On August 6, 1991 an Order was issued to confine private respondent Go in a hospital without the
prosecution having cross-examined Dr. Gonzales on his medical report.
On July 15, 1992, a hearing was conducted where de la Pea was presented as a witness for the
prosecution. Presiding Judge Agana sustained the objections of the defense counsels each time that the
prosecution attempted to establish the conspiracy to kill the victim. The prosecution filed a motion to inhibit Judge
Agana, which motion was denied.
On November 20, 1992, the Information against Go and Herodias was dismissed with prejudice on the ground
that their right to a speedy trial had been violated, leaving de la Pea to face trial.
The prosecution then challenged the Order of Dismissal with Prejudice before the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
SP No. 32954. In its Decision dated April 18, 1994, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the Order of
Dismissal, ordered the inhibition of Judge Agana, and ordered the raffle of the case to another branch. With the
dismissal of the appeal of private respondent Go and co-accused Herodias by this Court in a Minute Resolution
dated June 26, 1995, the criminal case was set anew for trial.
The case was re-raffled to RTC-17 and on October 28, 1996, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was issued against
private respondent Go and co-accused Herodias.
On February 2, 1997, Dr. Matig-a, the physician of Go, filed a Clinical Summary on the illness of Go and on
February 13, 1997 Go filed a Petition for Bail.
On March 7, 1997 and March 10, 1997, the prosecution presented de la Pea who was acquitted in 1993. De la
Pea testified on matters which he was not allowed by then presiding Judge Agana to testify on.
On March 21, 1997, a Manifestation on the Confinement of private respondent Vicente Go was filed urging his
arrest because he was out of the intensive care unit.
The motion of the prosecution to transfer the criminal case to a Special Heinous Crimes Court was denied by
then presiding Judge Jesus de la Pea (Judge de la Pea). The case was finally assigned to Branch 5 with public
respondent Judge Gako, Jr. as presiding judge.
On September 16 and 17, 1997, the hearing was resumed, now presided by public respondent Judge Gako, Jr.
 On September 26, 1997, an Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest was filed praying for the
arrest of private respondent Go first before his Clinical Summary Report could be heard.
On November 10, 1997, public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order granting the Petition for Bail of
private respondent Go.
On November 11, 1997, the prosecution filed a Vehement Motion to Inhibit public respondent Judge Gako, Jr.
due to his alleged delay in resolving the incidents in connection with the arrest of private respondent Go.
On November 12, 1992, the prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the Order of the court dated
November 10, 1997, the order which granted bail to private respondent Go.
On November 14, 1997, a Supplemental Motion to Inhibit public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. was filed by the
counsel of the offended party because Judge Gako, Jr. allegedly pre-judged the evidence of the prosecution without
carefully evaluating why it is short of the requirement to sustain a verdict of life imprisonment.
On November 15, 1997, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration was filed from the Order dated
November 10, 1997 because the transcripts were allegedly not read.
On December 1, 1997, a Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum to produce the records of Dr.
Matig-a was filed to determine if the medical findings on private respondent Go were not exaggerated to prevent
his arrest.
On December 11, 1997, public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order in which he denied the
prosecutions Manifestation dated March 21, 1997 on the confinement of private respondent Go, and the Urgent
Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest dated September 26, 1997 against private respondent Go.
On January 20, 1998, public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order denying the: (1) Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated November 10, 1997; (2) Motion to Inhibit; and (3) Supplemental Motion to
Inhibit the Presiding Judge. The prosecution received this order on February 10, 1998.
On March 20, 1998, private complainant Guadalupe Galan (Galan), the widow of the victim, filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 471460 before public respondent
Court of Appeals. The petition sought to annul or set aside the orders of public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. and then
acting Presiding Judge de la Pea, to wit:

a) Order dated May 23, 1997, which set aside the earlier order of the court that granted the re-raffle of this
case to a heinous crime court upon the defenses motion for reconsideration.

b) Order dated November 10, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court hereby grants bail to accused Vicente Go which is fixed
at P50,000.00, after taking into consideration, and this fact has not been disputed, that said accused is presently
confined in the hospital and is suffering from the following ailments:

a) Ischemic Heart Disease, S/P Coronary Angiogram, Single Vessel Disease, LAD, Chronic Stable
Angina;

b) Essential Hypertension;

c) NIDDM

d) Hypercholesterolemia; and

e) Respiratory Tract Infection

 And, as per clerical summary report of Dr. Generoso Matiga, dated February 4, 1997, the confinement of
accused Go in prison will cause his disease to terminate fatally.

xxx

c) Order dated December 11, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Manifestation dated March 3, 1997 and the Motion to Enforce the Alias
Warrant of Arrest are hereby denied for want of merit. Besides the accused was already released on bail and the
issue on the enforcement of the Alias Warrants of Arrest is already moot and academic.

d) Order dated January 20, 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Omnibus Motions for Reconsideration on the order of the court granting
Bail to accused Vicente Go with Supplemental pleading, xxx and thirdly, to disqualify the herein Presiding Judge, are
hereby denied for lack of merit. xxx[3]

The petition was signed by the counsel of private complainant, Atty. Antonio Guerrero with the conformity of
Vidal Gella, Prosecutor I of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City.
On March 26, 1998, public respondent Court of Appeals (Special Third Division) issued a Resolution dismissing
the said petition on these grounds: (1) that the petition was not filed by the Solicitor General in behalf of the
People of the Philippines; and (2) that the certification on non-forum shopping was signed by counsel for petitioner
Galan, not by petitioner herself.[4]
On April 14, 1998, private complainant Galan, through counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said
Resolution indicating that petitioner OSG was going to adopt her petition. On the same date, petitioner OSG
manifested before public respondent Court of Appeals that it was joining private complainant Galan in her petition
and was adopting her petition as its own.
On June 18, 1998, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution that denied said motion for reconsideration of
private complainant Galan on the ground that the certification on non-forum shopping was not signed by therein
petitioner Galan. The Court of Appeals also reasoned that the fact that the OSG joined petitioner Galan in her
petition did not cure the above deficiency. [5] Petitioner OSG received copy of the resolution on June 29, 1998.
On August 3, 1998 petitioner OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the
Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47142.
On August 12, 1998, said petition of petitioner OSG was dismissed by public respondent Court of Appeals, the
pertinent portions of the resolution read:

The Court notes that said petition is practically a reproduction of the petition earlier filed by complainant
Guadalupe Galan, which was dismissed on March 26, 1998. The dismissal was reaffirmed by the Court in its
resolution dated June 18, 1998, copy of which was received by the OSG on June 29, 1998.

Instead of seeking, on time, the amendment of the first petition or a review of the resolution dismissing it, the OSG
has come to this Court through the instant petition which not only raises the same matters ventilated in the same
petition but also was filed beyond the 60-day period prescribed in Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition dated July 17, 1998, is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[6]
 In seeking the allowance of this instant petition, petitioner OSG relies upon the following grounds:
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE SPECIAL CIVIL
ACTION OF (sic) CERTIORARI FILED BY PETITIONER DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. 47142.
II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SAID SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION WAS
FILED BEYOND THE SIXTY-DAY PERIOD PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 4, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.
III.PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TOUCHING ON THE MERITS OF THE SAID
PETITION.[7]
Public respondent Court of Appeals correctly ruled that there was sufficient ground to dismiss the petition
filed by private complainant Galan since it was her counsel who signed the certificate on non-forum shopping and
not private complainant herself. The petition clearly failed to comply with the requirement imposed by Section 1,
Rule 65[8], in relation to Section 3, Rule 46 [9] of the 1997 Rules of Court. We also agree with the Court of Appeals,
that the mere fact that petitioner OSG manifested that it was adopting the petition of therein petitioner Galan did
not cure the defective petition considering that the certificate on non-forum shopping was still not signed by
petitioner Galan but by her counsel. The manifestation of petitioner OSG also did not contain a certification on
non-forum shopping. By the time that petitioner OSG filed its petition for certiorari in behalf of the People of the
Philippines on August 3, 1998, the dismissal of the petition of private complainant Galan had already been
reaffirmed and the 60-day period for petitioner OSG to file its petition had already lapsed.
In dismissing the petition of petitioner OSG, public respondent Court of Appeals pointed out that private
complainant Galan had no legal standing to file the petition before it because only the Solicitor General can
represent the People before this Court (Court of Appeals) and the Supreme Court. [10] On this point, we differ.
In the recent case of Narciso vs. Romana-Cruz [11], we reiterated the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
[12]
Calo that:

While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or the State in criminal proceeding pending in this Court
and the Court of Appeals (Republic vs. Partisala, 118 SCRA 320 [1982]), the ends of substantial justice would be
better served, and the issues in this action could be determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner, by
entertaining the petition at bar. As an offended party in a criminal case, private petitioner has sufficient personality
and a valid grievance against Judge Adaos order granting bail to the alleged murderers of his (private petitioners)
father.

In Paredes vs. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 (1969), this Court ruled that the offended parties in criminal cases have
sufficient interest and personality as person(s) aggrieved to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari
under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of Court
in order to promote their object, thus:

Furthermore, as offended parties in the pending criminal case before petitioner judge, it cannot be gainsaid that
respondents have sufficient interest and personality as person(s) aggrieved by petitioner judges ruling on his non-
disqualification to file the special civil action under sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65. Recently in line with the underlying
spirit of a liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their object, as against the literal
application of Rule 110, section 2, we held, overruling the implication of an earlier case, that a widow possesses the
right as an offended party to file a criminal complaint for the murder of her deceased husband. (Id., p. 699)[13]

Hence, private complainant Galan had sufficient interest and personality as the aggrieved party [14] in a criminal case
to file the special civil action for certiorari before public respondent Court of Appeals. The proper ground therefore
for dismissing her petition is the fact that it was her counsel who signed the certificate on non-forum shopping and
not herself as petitioner.
 Petitioner OSG submits that assuming that the petition for certiorari it filed with public respondent Court of
Appeals was filed out of time, nonetheless the following issues raised in said petition warranted resolution:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 10, 1997 GRANTING BAIL IS PROPER WITHOUT
EXPRESSING THE COURTS FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT OF THE ACCUSED IS NOT STRONG.
II. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT VICENTE GO IS CONSIDERED UNDER LEGAL CUSTODY AS OF
NOVEMBER 20, 1992 UNTIL THE PRESENT BECAUSE OF HIS HOSPITAL CONFINEMENT BY ORDER OF
THE COURT DATED AUGUST 6, 1991.
III. WHETHER OR NOT IT IS NECESSARY THAT CRIMINAL CASE NO. CBU-22474 SHOULD BE TRIED BY THE
SPECIAL HEINOUS CRIMES COURT NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE MURDER WAS COMMITTED IN
1991 BEFORE THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW CREATING THESE SPECIAL COURTS.
This instant petition also seeks to set aside the following orders: (1) Order dated May 23, 1997 which set aside
the earlier order of the trial court that granted the re-raffle of this case to a heinous crime court upon the motion
for reconsideration of the defense; (2) Order dated November 10, 1997 that granted the bail of accused Go in the
amount of P 50,000.00; (3) Order dated December 11, 1997 denying the Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrants of
arrest; and (4) Order dated January 20, 1998 denying the Omnibus Motions for Reconsideration of the order of the
court granting bail to accused Go and ruling against the disqualification of respondent Judge Gako, Jr.
While the petition of private complainant Galan was indeed defective in form and the petition of petitioner
OSG was demonstrably filed beyond the 60-day period, we however resolve to grant this petition in part in view of
the primordial interest of substantial justice.
The just cited issues in the petition before public respondent Court of Appeals presented extenuating
circumstances that should have compelled the latter to pass upon the merits of said petition. In a number of cases,
[15]
we have set aside the strict application of procedural technicalities in the higher interest of justice. As we shall
show hereunder, the issues raised by petitioner OSG deserve disposition to avoid a miscarriage of justice and to
end the streaks of delay which have saddled the criminal case subject of this petition.
First, the assailed Order dated November 10, 1997 granting bail is legally infirm for failing to conform with the
requirement that in cases when the granting of bail is not a matter of right, a hearing for that purpose must first be
conducted. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides the instances when bail is a matter of right or
discretionary, to wit:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reiterates that:

No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

Based on the foregoing, bail is not a matter of right with respect to persons charged with a crime the penalty
for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, when the evidence of guilt is strong. Private
respondent Go, accused in the criminal case, was charged with murder in 1991, before the passage of RA 7659, the
law that re-imposed the death penalty. Murder then was a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, accused
Gos right to bail is merely discretionary.
We have consistently held that when bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it, against
the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. [16] A
summary hearing is defined as such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as
is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for
the purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to
the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the
outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may
be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to
substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary examination and cross examination. [17]
It is inconceivable how Judge Gako, Jr. could have appreciated the strength or weakness of the evidence of
guilt of the accused when he did not even bother to hear the prosecution. The reliance of Judge Gako, Jr. on the
voluminous records of the case simply does not suffice. As judge, he was mandated to conduct a hearing on the
petition for bail of the accused since he knew that the crime charged is one that carries a penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and in that hearing, the prosecution is entitled to present its evidence. It is worth stressing that the
prosecution is equally entitled to due process.[18]
Another compelling reason why a hearing of a petition for bail is necessary is to determine the amount of bail
based on the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. [19] Without the required hearing, the
bail granted to accused Go in the amount of P 50,000.00 is undoubtedly arbitrary and without basis.
Second, the order granting bail issued by Judge Gako, Jr. merely made a conclusion without a summary of the
evidence, a substantive and formal defect that voids the grant of bail. Well settled is the rule that after the hearing,
whether the bail is granted or denied, the presiding judge is mandated to prepare a summary of the evidence for
the prosecution. A summary is defined as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or
statement.[20] Based on the summary of evidence, the judge formulates his own conclusion on whether such
evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The importance of a summary cannot be
downplayed, it is considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its
absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail. [21]
Thus, we laid down the duties of a judge in case an application for bail is filed, viz:

(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing for bail or require him to submit his recommendation;

(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
discretion;

(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution; (Italics supplied)

(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond. Otherwise,
petition should be denied.[22]

In dispensing with the required hearing for bail, Judge Gako, Jr. pointed out in the assailed order that the
accused was confined in the hospital, was suffering from a number of ailments and that the eventual confinement
of accused Go in prison will allegedly cause his disease to terminate fatally. [23] The irregularity in the grant of bail
however is not attenuated since respondent judges findings were based on the summary clinical report of Dr.
Matiga dated February 4, 1997 while the order granting bail was issued on November 10, 1997. It could not
therefore be reasonably assumed that the actual state of health of accused Go could still be accurately reflected by
the said medical report when nine months had already passed from the time that said medical report was
prepared. It was therefore clear error for Judge Gako, Jr. to depend solely on the dated medical report in granting
bail when the defense failed to present a more recent one that would convincingly raise strong grounds to
apprehend that the imprisonment of the accused would endanger his life.
 Petitioner OSG advances the theory that the accused, private respondent Go, is not entitled to bail because
he was allegedly not under the custody of the law at the time that he applied for bail. Petitioner OSG anchors this
theory on the following arguments: that the August 6, 1991order commanding the confinement of accused Go in
the hospital was void because the prosecution was not able to cross-examine the doctor who prepared the medical
report pertaining to the accused illnesses; that when the Information in this case was ordered dismissed with
prejudice on November 20, 1992 by then presiding Judge Agana, accused Go was bodily released from his
confinement; that at that point, the trial court had lost its jurisdiction over the person of the accused; that before
the dismissal with prejudice was voided by the Court of Appeals, accused traveled extensively abroad; that when
the case was re-raffled and finally presided by Judge Gako, Jr. accused continued to be confined in the hospital on
the strength of the allegedly void order of confinement dated August 6, 1991; that Judge Gako, Jr. refused to
enforce the alias warrant of arrest on the ground that the order of confinement was still in effect; and that accused
Go voluntarily admitted himself to the hospital, hence was not yet deprived of his liberty at the time that he
applied for bail.
We must first correct the perception that the trial court was ousted of its jurisdiction over the person of
accused Go after Judge Agana erroneously dismissed the case and upon the refusal of Judge Gako, Jr. to enforce the
alias warrant of arrest during the re-trial of the case.Applicable to this issue is the basic principle that the
jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent
happenings or events although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
instance; and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case. [24]
Prior to the dismissal of the case by Judge Agana, the court had already acquired its jurisdiction over accused
Go when he was duly arraigned on December 11, 1991. [25] The fact that this Court affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals that voided the order dismissing the criminal case with prejudice is a clear declaration that the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the criminal case and over the person of the accused continued to subsist. With
the nullification of the dismissal of the case, it then became explicit that the court should have tried the case to its
end. The case was ordered remanded and re-raffled because the inhibition of then presiding Judge Agana was
granted, in no way was the jurisdiction of the trial court over the case and over the person of the accused ever
placed in doubt.
We now discuss the theory of petitioner OSG that the right of accused Go to bail did not accrue because he
was not under the custody of the law or deprived of his liberty. Petitioner OSG rests this claim on the allegations
that accused Go voluntarily admitted himself to the hospital during the re-trial of the case and that Judge Gako, Jr.
refused to enforce the alias warrant of arrest as evidenced by the questioned Order dated December 11, 1997.
By the very definition of bail in Section 1, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court [26], the person applying for bail must
be in the custody of the law. A person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either by
virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or even without a warrant under Section 5,
Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities. [27]
We do not agree with petitioner OSG that accused Go was not in custody of the law at the time that he
applied for bail. In the same assailed order, Judge Gako, Jr. explained his refusal to enforce the alias warrant of
arrest in this manner:

Secondly, the movant wanted this court to order the arrest of the accused in view of the Alias Warrant of Arrest
issued by Acting Judge Andres Garalza, Jr. on October 28, 1996. For the information of the movant, there is another
Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Jose Burgos on May 27, 1996 after he denied the Investigation Report
submitted by the Office of the Cebu City Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal of the case against Vicente
Go.

The court believes honestly that these two (2) Alias Warrants of Arrest were improvidently issued because at that
time the Warrant of Arrest issued by then Judge Godardo Jacinto on July 9, 1991 was still valid and subsisting. In
fact it was this latter Warrant of Arrest that handed to this court jurisdiction over the person of the accused Go.
The Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Burgos has no legal basis not only because the Warrant of Arrest issued
by Judge Jacinto is still valid and subsisting but also for the fact that it was issued as an aftermath of the courts
denial of the Reinvestigation Report of the Office of the Cebu City Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal of
Gos case. Under Section 6, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the Regional Trial Court
may issue a warrant of arrest after a preliminary investigation, not after reinvestigation when one was already was
(sic) issued.

Likewise, the Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Garalza, which came about five months (5) later, had no legal
basis, firstly, because there was already an Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Burgos on May 27, 1996,
secondly, the Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Jacinto on July 9, 1991 is still valid and subsisting. But what appears
more funny is the Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Garalza against accused Go who was at that time lawfully
confined in the hospital pursuant to an Order of the court, dated August 6, 1991. When Judge Garalza issued said
alias (sic) Warrant of Arrest, there was no showing that accused Go had escaped, or refused to obey a lawful Order
of the court.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Manifestation, dated March 21, 1997, and the Motion to Enforce the
Alias Warrant of Arrest are hereby denied for want of merit. Besides, the accused was already released on bail and
the issue on the enforcement of the Alias Warrants of Arrest is already moot and academic. [28]

As pointed out by Judge Gako, Jr., accused Go had already been arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest
issued by Judge Jacinto on July 9, 1991 which gave the trial court jurisdiction over the accused. As mentioned
earlier, accused Go was duly arraigned before the case was erroneously dismissed. From the time that accused Go
was arrested, he was already deprived of his liberty and was in the custody of the law. At the re-trial of the case,
accused Gos confinement in the hospital was by virtue of a court order dated August 6, 1991; the restraint on the
freedom of accused Go is evident. There was therefore no more need to enforce the alias warrant of arrest since
accused Go was still under the custody of the law, and there being no evidence that accused Go had escaped or
refused to obey a lawful order of the court. At this point, the setting aside of the questioned order dated December
11, 1997 that denied the enforcement of the alias warrant of arrest against accused Go has become moot and
academic with the provisional freedom of accused Go after his bail was erroneously granted by Judge Gako, Jr.
We however find merit in the argument of petitioner OSG that the order dated August 6, 1991 authorizing the
confinement of accused Go in the hospital was, in the words of petitioner OSG, a continuing one and built-in
license for the accused to automatically confine himself as many times as he likes. It may be true that said order
subsisted for it was never quashed, but at the re-trial of the case, the prosecution through its motion to enforce the
alias warrant of arrest dated September 26, 1997 had already put in issue the health of the accused. Yet, Judge
Gako, Jr. in an Order dated December 11, 1997 justified the confinement of accused Go in the hospital on the basis
of the August 6, 1991 order of confinement.
The prosecution vigorously objected to the confinement of accused Go in the hospital, questioning the
alleged ill health of the accused. Judge Gako, Jr. was called upon to rule on this matter and instead of ascertaining
the true state of health of said accused, Judge Gako, Jr. instead inexplicably relied on a court order authorizing the
confinement of accused Go in the hospital, an order that was issued six years ago. The proper course of action in
this case should have been to recall the order of confinement and to order the detention of accused Go until the
defense could prove through competent evidence that the imprisonment of said accused would imperil his
health. The order to arrest accused Go in such case would be the consequence of the recall of the order of
confinement, not for the purpose of placing him under the custody of the law since to repeat, he already was
under the custody of the law.
As discussed earlier, accused Go is currently already out on bail, [29] the granting of which is void for want of a
hearing and summary of evidence. In cases when the grant of bail is void, this Court will not hesitate to set aside
the order granting bail and order that the accused be recommitted to jail pending his application for bail, [30] as this
Court now holds in the case at bar.
 As to the issue of whether or not public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. should be inhibited on the ground of
partiality, the relevant provision to consider is Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, it provides:

SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges.No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or
child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the
rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all
parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the records.

A judge, may in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons
other than those mentioned above.

The ground of partiality is not one of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of the just quoted provision
that would per se disqualify a judge from sitting in a case. Jurisprudence is clear that partiality is a recognized
ground for the voluntary inhibition of the judge under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. [31] In this case,
Judge Gako, Jr. has already ruled in the assailed Order dated January 20, 1998 that he will not inhibit himself.
To overturn the ruling of Judge Gako, Jr. and rule for his disqualification, there must be clear and convincing
evidence to prove the charge of partiality. Material to this issue are the following parameters we have set in
disqualifying a judge: mere suspicion that a judge was partial to a party is not enough; that there should be
adequate evidence to prove the charge; that there must be showing that the judge had an interest, personal or
otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar; and that to be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown
to have stemmed from an extra-judicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than
what the judge learned from his participation in the case. [32]
Petitioner OSG accuses Judge Gako, Jr. of partiality supposedly shown by the grant of bail without a hearing
and the alleged suppression of the hearing on the Clinical Summary Report of the accused. Again, to successfully
disqualify a judge on the ground of bias or partiality, there must be concrete proof that a judge has a personal
interest in the case and his bias is shown to have stemmed from an extra-judicial source. This precept springs from
the presumption that a judge shall decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts. [33] Thus, we
have held that an erroneous ruling on the grant of bail alone does not constitute evidence of bias. [34] Likewise,
respondent judges reliance on the order of confinement even if erroneous is not sufficient to point to a conclusion
that he was manifestly partial to the defense. To allow the disqualification of a judge on the mere allegation of
partiality with nothing more would open the floodgates to forum shopping. [35]
Corollary to the foregoing, we do not find well taken the recommendation of petitioner OSG that the criminal
case be raffled to a Special Heinous Crimes Court. Even petitioner OSG concededly recognizes that Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 51-96 dated May 3, 1996 creating the Special Heinous Crimes Court provides that: All
cases covered by this order where trial has already been commenced shall continue to be heard by the branches to
which these were originally assigned. Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 104-96 dated October 21, 1996
which amended Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 51-96, also contains a similar provision, to wit: Where
trial has already begun, the same shall continue to be heard by the respective branches to which they have been
originally assigned. For purposes hereof, a criminal case is considered begun when the accused or any of them has
already been arraigned; in a civil case, it is when pre-trial has already been conducted and a pre-trial order issued.
We thus see no cogent reason to set aside the order dated May 23, 1997 that denied the transfer of Criminal
Case No. CBU-22474 to a Special Heinous Crimes Court when the trial of the case has already begun and when the
crime for which the accused is being charged with occurred prior to the creation of the Special Heinous Crimes
Court. Furthermore, there are no extraordinary circumstances that would compel this Court to exercise its power
under the Constitution to order a change of venue or place of trial.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed resolution of public respondent Court of Appeals dated
August 12, 1998 is SET ASIDE. The order dated November 10, 1997 of the trial court in Criminal Case No. CBU-
22474 is SET ASIDE for being void in so far as it grants bail to the accused and the accused is ordered recommitted
to jail pending the hearing on the bail application. The order dated May 23, 1997 denying the re-raffle of Criminal
Case No. CBU-22474 to a Special Heinous Crimes Court and the resolution dated January 20, 1997 ruling against
the inhibition of presiding Judge Ireneo Gako, Jr. are hereby AFFIRMED. The court a quo is ordered to proceed with
dispatch in the disposition of this case.
SO ORDERED.

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, G.R. No. 189122

Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA, J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
- v e r s u s - NACHURA,
PERALTA and
MENDOZA, JJ.

THE COURT OF APPEALS

and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Promulgated:
March 17, 2010

x---------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to guarantee his appearance
before any court as may be required,[1] is the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to
be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the dubious interval, often years long, between
arrest and final adjudication? [2] Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in
pretrial liberty and societys interest in assuring the accuseds presence at trial.[3]

Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin serving time immediately
unless, on application, he is admitted to bail. [4] An accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate
court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his
liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed. [5] Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however,
the accuseds interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently
prepare his case and avoidance of potential hardships of prison. [6] On the other hand, society has a compelling
interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a
crime serious enough to warrant prison time. [7] Other recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending
appeal include the prevention of the accuseds flight from court custody, the protection of the community from
potential danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment. [8] Under what circumstances an accused may obtain
bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of society and those of the accused. [9]
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to those convicted
by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the
exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of
bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong
reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court. [10]
THE FACTS

Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of six years and one day of prision mayoras minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.[11]

He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. [12] Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission
to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or
possibility of flight on his part.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. [13] It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail
pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons. Citing well-established jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an
ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. It found that petitioner

failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during
trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. x x x Notably, the physical
condition of [petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while confined in
prison, though he clearly preferred to be attended by his personal physician. [14]

For purposes of determining whether petitioners application for bail could be allowed pending appeal, the
Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioners conviction. It made a preliminary evaluation of petitioners
case and made a prima faciedetermination that there was no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence
of petitioners guilt.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. [15]

Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering that none of
the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was
present. Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more
than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be
granted to an appellant pending appeal.

THE ISSUE

The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant
sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of
the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?

Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
 discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the
filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate
court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved
by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent
of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution,
with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the

crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution
of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for bail by an appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a
penalty of more than six years imprisonment should automatically be granted.

Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules.

BASIC PROCEDURAL CONCERNS

FORBID GRANT OF PETITION

Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the denial by the
Court of Appeals of his urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal. While the said remedy may be
resorted to challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is proper only where the interlocutory order was
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[16]

Other than the sweeping averment that [t]he Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners application for bail pending appeal despite the fact that none of the conditions to justify the
denial thereof under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present, much less proven by the prosecution, [17] however, petitioner
actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies
on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances
enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, petitioner asserts
that the Court of Appeals committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal by denying his application for bail on
the ground that the evidence that he committed a capital offense was strong.
We disagree.

It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary. Two,
the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as this where the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the
rules with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioners urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal.

Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners application for bail pending appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an error in judgment but
it is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. [18] Ordinary
abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. [19] It must be so patent and gross as to
amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of
caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.[20]

Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending appeal, the Court of Appeals
exercised its judgment capriciously and whimsically. No capriciousness or arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion
was ever imputed to the appellate court. Nor could any such implication or imputation be inferred. As observed
earlier, the Court of Appeals exercised grave caution in the exercise of its discretion. The denial of petitioners
application for bail pending appeal was not unreasonable but was the result of a thorough assessment of
petitioners claim of ill health. By making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for the purpose of
granting bail, the court also determined whether the appeal was frivolous or not, or whether it raised a substantial
question. The appellate court did not exercise its discretion in a careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings of
this Court.

At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeals erroneous application and interpretation of Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court. However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in
proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact.[21] In this connection, Lee v. People[22] is apropos:

Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or
exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its questioned acts
would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.

In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to
correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the courts findings and conclusions. An interlocutory
order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court
generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the
practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only
delay the administration of justice but will also unduly burden the courts. [23] (emphasis supplied)

WORDING OF THIRD PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 5,

RULE 114 CONTRADICTS PETITIONERS
INTERPRETATION
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant
applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in
the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission of the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or
violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation,
parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of
committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The
second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.

The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the commentary of retired Supreme
Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law:

Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be
summarized in the following rules:

xxxxxxxxx

e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment

exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances
stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of
discretion (Sec. 5);

f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment

exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or
any other similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec.
5); x x x[24](emphasis supplied)

Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of the same
thinking:

Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand,
upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.

Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then
bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.[25] (emphasis supplied)

In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the
discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-
negating[26] circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate
courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself,
constitute abuse of discretion.

On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to
carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other
option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal,
grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the
perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine
whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish
whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application
for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within the
first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances,
other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and
justice;[27]on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.

On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the appellate courts stringent
discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the
presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence
of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the
said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize
the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.

Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations that are governed by
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes
the import of the said provision and trivializes the established policy governing the grant of bail pending appeal.

In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that it interprets the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment
exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to limited
discretion, that is, one restricted to the determination of whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances
exists. The implication of this position is that, if any such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied.
Otherwise, bail will be granted pending appeal.

Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose authority is
limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 exists. This unduly constricts its discretion into merely filling out the checklist of circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the
appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. In short, petitioners interpretation severely curbs the discretion of
the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular factual issue whether any of the five bail-negating
circumstances is present.

However, judicial discretion has been defined as choice. [28] Choice occurs where, between two alternatives
or among a possibly infinite number (of options), there is more than one possible outcome, with the selection of
the outcome left to the decision maker. [29] On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action
is the end of discretion.[30] Thus, by severely clipping the appellate courts discretion and relegating that tribunal to a
mere fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the
trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioners theory effectively renders nugatory the
provision that upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.

The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this case) to rule on applications for bail
pending appeal must necessarily involve the exercise of judgment on the part of the court. The court must be
allowed reasonable latitude to express its own view of the case, its appreciation of the facts and its understanding
of the applicable law on the matter. [31] In view of the grave caution required of it, the court should consider
whether or not, under all circumstances, the accused will be present to abide by his punishment if his conviction is
affirmed.[32] It should also give due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the record of the particular case,
such as the record, character and reputation of the applicant, [33] among other things. More importantly, the
discretion to determine allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal necessarily includes, at the very least, an
initial determination that the appeal is not frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact which must be
determined by the appellate court.[34] In other words, a threshold requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that
the appeal is not pro forma and merely intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable issue. [35] This must be so;
otherwise, the appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for the purpose of
taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more significantly, this comports with the very
strong presumption on appeal that the lower courts exercise of discretionary power was sound, [36] specially since
the rules on criminal procedure require that no judgment shall be reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals
except for substantial error.[37]

Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bail-negating circumstances to those expressly mentioned,
petitioner applies the expressio unius est exclusioalterius[38] rule in statutory construction. However, the very
language of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea that the enumeration of the five
situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The provision categorically refers to the following or other similar
circumstances. Hence, under the rules, similarly relevant situations other than those listed in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 may be considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending appeal.

Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or senseless
consequences. An absurd situation will result from adopting petitioners interpretation that, where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted if none of the listed bail-
negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed is more than
six years of imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years.
While denial or revocation of bail in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years imprisonment must be
made only if any of the five bail-negating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty
imposed does not exceed six years imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.

Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail pending appeal be more accessible
to those convicted of serious offenses, compared to those convicted of less serious crimes?

PETITIONERS THEORY DEVIATES FROM HISTORY

AND EVOLUTION OF RULE ON BAIL PENDING APPEAL

Petitioners interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history and evolution of the provisions on bail
pending appeal.

The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of
Criminal Procedure:

Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First Instance. After
judgment by a municipal judge and before conviction by the Court of First Instance, the
defendant shall be admitted to bail as of right.

Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance. After
conviction by the Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon application, be bailed at the
discretion of the court.

Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this rule, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
 Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. No person in custody for the commission of a capital
offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.

The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal
Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before final
conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or
an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application
for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this Rules, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death. (emphasis supplied)

The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated January 20,
1992 as follows:

The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in Section 3
of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:

Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall

before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those
charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of
its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of
right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the
evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.

Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending
cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies concerning
the effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:

1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law existing at the time
of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by a penalty lower
than reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the
offense charged or of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, he may
be allowed to remain free on his original bail pending the resolution of his appeal, unless the
proper court directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, as amended;

2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the
law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable
by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser
offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set forth in the
preceding paragraph shall be applied;

3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law
at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable
by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense
 charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in confinement pending
resolution of his appeal.

As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now pending
appeal before his Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty, the following rules are
laid down:

1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten (10) days
from notice to the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court of the fact of
surrender, after which, the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by this Court;

2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau of Prisons
thru the Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain under confinement pending
resolution of his appeal;

3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten (10)
days, his bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by this Court. The appeal
taken by the accused shall also be dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of
Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his bail. (emphasis supplied)

Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994 which
brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:

SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. All persons in custody shall: (a) before or after
conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a
matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law of
this Rule. (3a)

SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on
application, may admit the accused to bail.

The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty
under the same bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more
than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be
cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has

committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, under
conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
 (e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may
commit another crime.

The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and
with notice to the adverse party. (n)

SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in these Rules,
is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, maybe punished with death. (4)

SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to
bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (emphasis supplied)

The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114 were thereafter amended by
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now.
The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive approach to bail
pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be
allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.

The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a non-capital offense by the
Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court) discretionary. The 1988 amendments made
applications for bail pending appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail before final conviction in trial courts
for non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusion perpetua was a matter of right, meaning, admission
to bail was a matter of right at any stage of the action where the charge was not for a capital offense or was not
punished by reclusion perpetua.[39]

The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail pending appeal (of a
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment) discretionary. Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more stringent rules on the matter
of post-conviction grant of bail.

A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying which court has
authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal under certain conditions and in particular situations. More
importantly, it reiterated the tough on bail pending appeal configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In
particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a
matter of right before final conviction. [40] Under the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed,
pursuant to the tough on bail pending appeal policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial
or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the
trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.

Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail pending appeal? What is more in
conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view of bail pending appeal? Is it a rule which favors the automatic
grant of bail in the absence of any of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a
rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due consideration of all relevant circumstances, even if none of the
circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?

The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal parallels the
approach adopted in the United States where our original constitutional and procedural provisions on bail
emanated.[41] While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail
pending appeal is no different from that in other democratic societies.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending appeal is
anchored on the principle that judicial discretion particularly with respect to extending bail should be exercised not
with laxity but with caution and only for strong reasons. [42] In fact, it has even been pointed out that grave caution
that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and
exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5. [43]

Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:

The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should
be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore,
where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit
to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may
be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show
error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability
of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to
attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction. [44] (emphasis supplied)

As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon, the Court declared in Yap
v. Court of Appeals[45] (promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were already effective), that denial of bail
pending appeal is a matter of wise discretion.

A FINAL WORD

Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis
supplied)

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the
constitutional right to bail ends.[46] From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of
being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering
that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by
a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the
rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial
courts initial determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail
despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail
pending appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition,
at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee
regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites
frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits, the appeal of petitioner Jose
Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with dispatch.

Costs against petitioner.

 SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE, G.R. No. 182677

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,

NACHURA,*
BERSAMIN,
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. ABAD,** and
GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
August 3, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) assails via the present petition for review filed on May 30, 2008 the August 30,
2007 Decision[1] and the April 18, 2008 Resolution [2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97761 that affirmed
the trial courts Orders of January 24, 31, February 7, 8, all in 2007, and denied the motion for reconsideration,
respectively.

Petitioner was, by Information[3] of January 16, 2007, charged with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas
on January 12, 2007 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Branch 150 to which the case was raffled,
presided by Judge Elmo Alameda, forthwith issued a commitment order [4] against petitioner who was placed under
police custody while confined at the Makati Medical Center.[5]

After petitioner posted a P40,000 cash bond which the trial court approved, [6] he was released from detention, and
his arraignment was set on January 24, 2007.

The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent
Omnibus Motion[7] praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-
examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.

The RTC thereafter issued the (1) Order of January 24, 2007 [8] deferring petitioners arraignment and
allowing the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense and submit a
recommendation within 30 days from its inception, inter alia; and (2) Order of January 31, 2007 [9] denying
reconsideration of the first order. Petitioner assailed these orders via certiorari and prohibition before the Court of
Appeals.
 Meantime, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion before the trial court to defer
acting on the public prosecutors recommendation on the proper offense until after the appellate court resolves his
application for injunctive reliefs, or alternatively, to grant him time to comment on the prosecutors
recommendation and thereafter set a hearing for the judicial determination of probable cause. [10] Petitioner also
separately moved for the inhibition of Judge Alameda with prayer to defer action on the admission of the Amended
Information.[11]

The trial court nonetheless issued the other assailed orders, viz: (1) Order of February 7, 2007[12] that
admitted the Amended Information[13] for murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and (2) Order
of February 8, 2007[14] which set the arraignment on February 13, 2007. Petitioner questioned these two orders
via supplemental petition before the appellate court.

The appellate court dismissed petitioners petition, hence, his present petition, arguing that:

PRIVATE RESPONDENT DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO CAUSE THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE
CRIMINAL CASE BELOW WHEN THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION HAD ALREADY BEEN FILED WITH
THE LOWER COURT. HENCE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN FINDING
THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING SUCH
REINVESTIGATION DESPITE HAVING NO BASIS IN THE RULES OF COURT[;]

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ADMITTING STATE

PROSECUTOR VELASCOS AMENDED INFORMATION, ISSUING A WARRANT OF ARREST, AND
SETTING THE CASE BELOW FOR ARRAIGNMENT, CONSIDERING THAT THE VALIDITY AND LEGALITY
OF HIS ORDERS DATED 24 AND 31 JANUARY 2007, WHICH LED TO THE QUESTIONABLE
REINVESTIGATION AND ILLEGAL AMENDED INFORMATION[,] ARE YET TO BE RESOLVED BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT (sic); [AND]

CONSIDERING THAT PROSECUTOR VELASCOS FINDINGS IN HIS RESOLUTION DATED 2 FEBRUARY

2007 ARE BLATANTLY BASED ON MERE SPECULATIONS AND CONJECTURES, WITHOUT ANY
SUBSTANTIAL OR MATERIAL NEW EVIDENCE BEING ADDUCED DURING THE REINVESTIGATION,
RESPONDENT JUDGE SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST ALLOWED PETITIONERS MOTION FOR A HEARING
FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE.[15] (emphasis in the original omitted)

Records show that the arraignment scheduled on March 21, 2007 pushed through during which petitioner refused
to plead, drawing the trial court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.

Prior thereto or on February 23, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti
Cautela[16] which the trial court, after hearings thereon, granted by Order of May 21, 2007,[17] it finding that the
evidence of guilt for the crime of murder is not strong. It accordingly allowed petitioner to post bail in the amount
of P300,000 for his provisional liberty.

The trial court, absent any writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court, went on to try petitioner under
the Amended Information. By Decision of January 14, 2009, the trial court found petitioner guilty of homicide,
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years
and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. From the Decision, petitioner filed an appeal to the appellate court,
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, during the pendency of which he filed an urgent application for admission to bail
pending appeal. The appellate court denied petitioners application which this Court, in G.R. No. 189122, affirmed by
Decision of March 17, 2010.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) later argued that the present petition had been rendered moot
since the presentation of evidence, wherein petitioner actively participated, had been concluded. [18]
 Waiver on the part of the accused must be distinguished from mootness of the petition, for in the
present case, petitioner did not, by his active participation in the trial, waive his stated objections.

Section 26, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation. An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging
the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the
regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him,
provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early
as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case.

By applying for bail, petitioner did not waive his right to challenge the regularity of the reinvestigation of
the charge against him, the validity of the admission of the Amended Information, and the legality of his arrest
under the Amended Information, as he vigorously raised them prior to his arraignment. During
the arraignment on March 21, 2007, petitioner refused to enter his plea since the issues he raised were still pending
resolution by the appellate court, thus prompting the trial court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.

The principle that the accused is precluded after arraignment from questioning the illegal arrest or the lack
of or irregular preliminary investigation applies only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial,
without previously invoking his objections thereto.[19] There must be clear and convincing proof that petitioner had
an actual intention to relinquish his right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of
intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to
voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. [20]

From the given circumstances, the Court cannot reasonably infer a valid waiver on the part of
petitioner to preclude him from obtaining a definite resolution of the objections he so timely invoked. Other than
its allegation of active participation, the OSG offered no clear and convincing proof that petitioners participation in
the trial was unconditional with the intent to voluntarily and unequivocally abandon his petition. In fact, on January
26, 2010, petitioner still moved for the early resolution of the present petition. [21]

Whatever delay arising from petitioners availment of remedies against the trial courts Orders cannot be
imputed to petitioner to operate as a valid waiver on his part. Neither can the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction be deemed as a voluntary relinquishment of petitioners principal prayer. The non-issuance of such
injunctive relief only means that the appellate court did not preliminarily find any exception [22] to the long-standing
doctrine that injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution. [23]Consequently, the trial of the case took its
course.

The petition is now moot, however, in view of the trial courts rendition of judgment.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. [24]

The judgment convicting petitioner of homicide under the Amended Information for murder operates as a
supervening event that mooted the present petition. Assuming that there is ground[25] to annul the finding of
probable cause for murder, there is no practical use or value in abrogating the concluded proceedings and retrying
the case under the original Information for homicide just to arrive, more likely or even definitely, at the same
conviction of homicide. Mootness would have also set in had petitioner been convicted of murder, for proof
beyond reasonable doubt, which is much higher than probable cause, would have been established in that
instance.
 Instead, however, of denying the petition outright on the ground of mootness, the Court proceeds to
resolve the legal issues in order to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public. [26] In the
present case, there is compelling reason to clarify the remedies available before and after the filing of an
information in cases subject of inquest.

After going over into the substance of the petition and the assailed issuances, the Court finds no reversible
error on the part of the appellate court in finding no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the four trial court
Orders.

In his first assignment of error, petitioner posits that the prosecution has no right under the Rules to seek
from the trial court an investigation or reevaluation of the case except through a petition for review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ). In cases when an accused is arrested without a warrant, petitioner contends that the
remedy of preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused.

The contention lacks merit.

Section 6,[27] Rule 112 of the Rules of Court reads:

When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a
preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need
of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In
the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended
party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended
party or arresting officer or person.

Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the
waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days
from its inception.

After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the
accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule.
(underscoring supplied)

A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where
the penalty prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and one day without regard to fine. [28] As an
exception, the rules provide that there is no need for a preliminary investigation in cases of a lawful arrest without
a warrant[29] involving such type of offense, so long as an inquest, where available, has been conducted. [30]

Inquest is defined as an informal and summary investigation conducted by a public prosecutor in criminal
cases involving persons arrested and detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest issued by the court for the
purpose of determining whether said persons should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in
court.[31]

It is imperative to first take a closer look at the predicament of both the arrested person and the private
complainant during the brief period of inquest, to grasp the respective remedies available to them before and after
the filing of a complaint or information in court.

BEFORE THE FILING OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IN COURT, the private complainant may proceed in
coordinating with the arresting officer and the inquest officer during the latters conduct of inquest. Meanwhile, the
arrested person has the option to avail of a 15-day preliminary investigation, provided he duly signs a waiver of any
objection against delay in his delivery to the proper judicial authorities under Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. For obvious reasons, this remedy is not available to the private complainant since he cannot waive what he
does not have. The benefit of the provisions of Article 125, which requires the filing of a complaint or information
with the proper judicial authorities within the applicable period, [32] belongs to the arrested person.

The accelerated process of inquest, owing to its summary nature and the attendant risk of running against
Article 125, ends with either the prompt filing of an information in court or the immediate release of the arrested
person.[33] Notably, the rules on inquest do not provide for a motion for reconsideration. [34]

Contrary to petitioners position that private complainant should have appealed to the DOJ Secretary, such
remedy is not immediately available in cases subject of inquest.

Noteworthy is the proviso that the appeal to the DOJ Secretary is by petition by a proper party under such
rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe. [35] The rule referred to is the 2000 National Prosecution Service
Rule on Appeal,[36] Section 1 of which provides that the Rule shall apply to appeals from resolutions x x x in cases
subject of preliminary investigation/ reinvestigation. In cases subject of inquest, therefore, the private party should
first avail of a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation, if any, before elevating the matter to the DOJ Secretary.

In case the inquest proceedings yield no probable cause, the private complainant may pursue the case
through the regular course of a preliminary investigation.

ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT, the rules yet provide the accused with another
opportunity to ask for a preliminary investigation within five days from the time he learns of its filing. The Rules of
Court and the New Rules on Inquest are silent, however, on whether the private complainant could invoke, as
respondent heirs of the victim did in the present case, a similar right to ask for a reinvestigation.

The Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation, subject to and in light of the
ensuing disquisition.

All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor.[37] The private complainant in a criminal case is merely a witness and not a party to
the case and cannot, by himself, ask for the reinvestigation of the case after the information had been filed in
court, the proper party for that being the public prosecutor who has the control of the prosecution of the case.
[38]
Thus, in cases where the private complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the criminal action, [39] and is
granted the authority to prosecute,[40] the private complainant, by counsel and with the conformity of the public
prosecutor, can file a motion for reinvestigation.

In fact, the DOJ instructs that before the arraignment of the accused, trial prosecutors must examine the
Information vis--vis the resolution of the investigating prosecutor in order to make the necessary corrections or
revisions and to ensure that the information is sufficient in form and substance.[41]

x x x Since no evidence has been presented at that stage, the error would appear or be
discoverable from a review of the records of the preliminary investigation. Of course, that fact may
be perceived by the trial judge himself but, again, realistically it will be the prosecutor who can
initially determine the same. That is why such error need not be manifest or evident, nor is it
required that such nuances as offenses includible in the offense charged be taken into account. It
necessarily follows, therefore, that the prosecutor can and should institute remedial measures[.]
[42]
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of the government whose principal
power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to
execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide
range of discretion the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of
factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.[43]

The prosecutions discretion is not boundless or infinite, however. [44] The standing principle is that once an
information is filed in court, any remedial measure such as a reinvestigation must be addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. Interestingly, petitioner supports this view.[45] Indeed, the Court ruled in one case that:

The rule is now well settled that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the
accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. Although the prosecutor retains the direction
and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even when the case is already in court, he cannot
impose his opinion upon the tribunal. For while it is true that the prosecutor has the quasi-judicial
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court, once the case had
already been brought therein any disposition the prosecutor may deem proper thereafter

should be addressed to the court for its consideration and approval. The only qualification is that
the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the
People to due process of law.

xxxx

In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by the public
prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court must be secured. If after such re-investigation
the prosecution finds a cogent basis to withdraw the information or otherwise cause the dismissal
of the case, such proposed course of action may be taken but shall likewise be addressed to the
sound discretion of the court.[46] (underscoring supplied)

While Abugotal v. Judge Tiro[47] held that to ferret out the truth, a trial is to be preferred to a
reinvestigation, the Court therein recognized that a trial court may, where the interest of justice so requires, grant a
motion for reinvestigation of a criminal case pending before it.

Once the trial court grants the prosecutions motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have
deferred to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having brought the case back to the
drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped with discretion wide and far reaching regarding the disposition
thereof,[48] subject to the trial courts approval of the resulting proposed course of action.

Since a reinvestigation may entail a modification of the criminal information as what happened in the
present case, the Courts holding is bolstered by the rule on amendment of an information under Section 14, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court:

A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at

any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense
charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court
 shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
especially the offended party.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a
new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 11, Rule 119, provided the
accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail
for their appearance at the trial. (emphasis supplied)

In fine, before the accused enters a plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may
be made without leave of court.[49] After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave
of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is
proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.[50]

It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are curable by amendment prior to entry of
plea. An information which is void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for quashal. [51] An amendment
which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is likewise impermissible. [52]

Considering the general rule that an information may be amended even in substance and even without
leave of court at any time before entry of plea, does it mean that the conduct of a reinvestigation at that stage is a
mere superfluity?

It is not.

Any remedial measure springing from the reinvestigation be it a complete disposition or an intermediate
modification[53] of the charge is eventually addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which must make an
independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. Since the trial court would ultimately make the
determination on the proposed course of action, it is for the prosecution to consider whether a reinvestigation is
necessary to adduce and review the evidence for purposes of buttressing the appropriate motion to be filed in
court.

More importantly, reinvestigation is required in cases involving a substantial amendment of the information. Due
process of law demands that no substantial amendment of an information may be admitted without conducting
another or a new preliminary investigation.In Matalam v. The 2nd Division of the Sandiganbayan, [54] the Court ruled
that a substantial amendment in an information entitles an accused to another preliminary investigation, unless the
amended information contains a charge related to or is included in the original Information.

The question to be resolved is whether the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered
a substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a
preliminary investigation.

The Court answers in the affirmative.

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following
have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the
range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment
which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one;
(3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause
surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment
 which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment that
merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new
and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already
contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime
charged.

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under
the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made,
and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information
in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the
nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or
deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of
form and not of substance.[55](emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Matalam adds that the mere fact that the two charges are related does not necessarily or automatically
deprive the accused of his right to another preliminary investigation. Notatu dignum is the fact that both the
original Information and the amended Information in Matalam were similarly charging the accused with violation
of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

In one case,[56] it was squarely held that the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is
one of substance with very serious consequences. [57] The amendment involved in the present case consists of
additional averments of the circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and cruelty, which qualify the
offense charged from homicide to murder. It being a new and material element of the offense, petitioner should be
given the chance to adduce evidence on the matter. Not being merely clarificatory, the amendment essentially
varies the prosecutions original theory of the case and certainly affects not just the form but the weight of defense
to be mustered by petitioner.

The Court distinguishes the factual milieus in Buhat v. CA[58] and Pacoy v. Cajigal,[59] wherein the amendment of the
caption of the Information from homicide to murder was not considered substantial because there was no real
change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged as alleged in the body of the Information, as the
allegations of qualifying circumstances were already clearly embedded in the original Information. Buhat pointed
out that the original Information for homicide already alleged the use of superior strength, while Pacoy states that
the averments in the amended Information for murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original
Information for homicide. None of these peculiar circumstances obtains in the present case.

Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required, the fact that what was conducted in the
present case was a reinvestigation does not invalidate the substantial amendment of the Information. There is no
substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the
same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial.[60] What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of
murder[61] after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion.

Petitioner did not, however, make much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the proposed
amended charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe the proceedings and declined to
actively participate, even with extreme caution, in the reinvestigation. Mercado v. Court of Appeals states that the
rules do not even require, as a condition sine qua non to the validity of a preliminary investigation, the presence of
the respondent as long as efforts to reach him were made and an opportunity to controvert the complainants
evidence was accorded him.[62]

In his second assignment of error, petitioner basically assails the hurried issuance of the last two assailed
RTC Orders despite the pendency before the appellate court of the petition for certiorari challenging the first two
trial court Orders allowing a reinvestigation.
 The Rules categorically state that the petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a
temporary retraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued. [63] The appellate court, by Resolution
of February 15, 2007,[64] denied petitioners application for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction. Supplementary efforts to seek injunctive reliefs proved futile. [65] The appellate court thus did not err in
finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it proceeded with the case and eventually
arraigned the accused on March 21, 2007, there being no injunction order from the appellate court. Moreover,
petitioner opted to forego appealing to the DOJ Secretary, a post-inquest remedy that was available after the
reinvestigation and which could have suspended the arraignment. [66]

Regarding petitioners protestations of haste, suffice to state that the pace in resolving incidents of the
case is not per se an indication of bias. In Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice,[67] the Court held:

Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly
attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For ones prompt dispatch may be anothers
undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant
consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.

The presumption of regularity includes the public officers official actuations in all phases of
work. Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present
contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This,
petitioners failed to discharge.The swift completion of the Investigating Panels initial task cannot
be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular performance of not
just one but five state prosecutors.[68]

There is no ground for petitioners protestations against the DOJ Secretarys sudden designation of Senior State
Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco as Acting City Prosecutor of Makati City for the present case [69] and the latters
conformity to the motion for reinvestigation.

In granting the reinvestigation, Judge Alameda cannot choose the public prosecutor who will conduct the
reinvestigation or preliminary investigation. [70] There is a hierarchy of officials in the prosecutory arm of the
executive branch headed by the Secretary of Justice [71] who is vested with the prerogative to appoint a special
prosecutor or designate an acting prosecutor to handle a particular case, which broad power of control has been
recognized by jurisprudence.[72]

As for the trial courts ignoring the DOJ Secretarys uncontested statements to the media which aired his
opinion that if the assailant merely intended to maim and not to kill the victim, one bullet would have sufficed the
DOJ Secretary reportedly uttered that the filing of the case of homicide against ano against Leviste lintek naman
eh I told you to watch over that case there should be a report about the ballistics, about the paraffin, etc., then
thats not a complete investigation, thats why you should use that as a ground no abuse of discretion, much less a
grave one, can be imputed to it.

The statements of the DOJ Secretary do not evince a determination to file the Information even in the
absence of probable cause.[73] On the contrary, the remarks merely underscored the importance of securing basic
investigative reports to support a finding of probable cause. The original Resolution even recognized that probable
cause for the crime of murder cannot be determined based on the evidence obtained [u]nless and until a more
thorough investigation is conducted and eyewitness/es [is/]are presented in evidence[.][74]

The trial court concluded that the wound sustained by the victim at the back of his head, the absence of paraffin
test and ballistic examination, and the handling of physical evidence, [75] as rationalized by the prosecution in its
motion, are sufficient circumstances that require further inquiry.
 That the evidence of guilt was not strong as subsequently assessed in the bail hearings does not affect the
prior determination of probable cause because, as the appellate court correctly stated, the standard of strong
evidence of guilt which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused is markedly higher than the standard of judicial
probable cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal case. [76]

In his third assignment of error, petitioner faults the trial court for not conducting, at the very least, a
hearing for judicial determination of probable cause, considering the lack of substantial or material new evidence
adduced during the reinvestigation.

Petitioners argument is specious.

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly
pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and
to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for
trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case
must be filed in court. Whether that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether
he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court
itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.[77]

The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted,
there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge
finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. [78] Paragraph (a), Section 5,[79] Rule
112 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed by the RTC.

To move the court to conduct a judicial determination of probable cause is a mere superfluity, for with or
without such motion, the judge is duty-bound to personally evaluate the resolution of the public prosecutor and
the supporting evidence. In fact, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court
is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. [80]

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted
by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may
already make a personal determination of the existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not
satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutors report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.[81] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest of the accused before any warrant may be issued. [82] Petitioner thus cannot, as a matter of right, insist on a
hearing for judicial determination of probable cause. Certainly, petitioner cannot determine beforehand how
cursory or exhaustive the [judge's] examination of the records should be [since t]he extent of the judges
examination depends on the exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances of the case require. [83] In one
case, the Court emphatically stated:
The periods provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are mandatory, and as such, the
judge must determine the presence or absence of probable cause within such periods. The
Sandiganbayans determination of probable cause is made ex parte and is summary in nature, not
adversarial.The Judge should not be stymied and distracted from his determination of probable
cause by needless motions for determination of probable cause filed by the accused.
[84]
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 Petitioner proceeds to discuss at length evidentiary matters, arguing that no circumstances exist that
would qualify the crime from homicide to murder.

The allegation of lack of substantial or material new evidence deserves no credence, because new pieces
of evidence are not prerequisites for a valid conduct of reinvestigation. It is not material that no new matter
or evidence was presented during the reinvestigation of the case. It should

be stressed that reinvestigation, as the word itself implies, is merely a repeat investigation of the case. New matters
or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the prosecutor to review and
re-evaluate its findings and the evidence already submitted. [85]

Moreover, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in, and be subject of, a
petition for review on certiorari since this Court is not a trier of facts. The Court cannot thus review the evidence
adduced by the parties on the issue of the absence or presence of probable cause, as there exists no exceptional
circumstances to warrant a factual review.[86]

In a petition for certiorari, like that filed by petitioner before the appellate court, the jurisdiction of the
court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve
questions and issues beyond its competence, such as an error of judgment. [87] The courts duty in the pertinent case
is confined to determining whether the executive and judicial determination of probable cause was done without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Although it is possible that error may be committed in
the discharge of lawful functions, this does not render the act amenable to correction and annulment by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.[88]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97761 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

PANFILO D. BONGCAC, G.R. Nos. 156687-88

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
FORTUNATO LIM, and Promulgated:
TORIBIO BON,
Respondents. May 21, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Facts

The Mayor of Tagbilaran City, Jose V. Torralba, designated his secretary, petitioner Panfilo D. Bongcac (petitioner), as
the Mayors representative to the City Market Committee, Consultant and Coordinator on market matters, and
adviser to the Acting Market Administrator. In January 1991, respondents Engr. Fortunato Lim (Lim) and Toribio Bon
(Bon) applied for stalls or tiendas in the Cogon Public Market in Tagbilaran City and were referred to petitioner.
Petitioner showed them the Minutes of the City Market Committee meeting held on 9 January 1991 which included
their names as among the awardees of the market stalls. Petitioner informed Lim and Bon that the city government
could not afford to construct a new market and if they were interested, they should give him more money for the
construction of the stalls or tiendas they were applying for. Accordingly, Lim issued and delivered to petitioner a BPI
check, pay to cash, in the amount of P62,000. Bon issued and delivered to petitioner two Metrobank checks, pay to
cash, in the amounts of P30,000 and P10,000. Petitioner issued handwritten receipts to Lim and Bon. Petitioner
assured Lim that his stalls would be finished on or before 30 June 1991 and promised Bon that his stall would be
finished before the fiesta in Tagbilaran City. The checks were subsequently encashed.

Thereafter, Lim and Bon read in the 30 June 1991 issue of a local newspaper that petitioner was sacked as market
body consultant and was terminated as secretary to the Mayor. They looked for him and demanded that he either
make an accounting of the money he received or deliver the stalls or tiendas already constructed.

Petitioner failed to do so. Thus, he was charged with two counts of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315,
1(b) of the Revised Penal Code before the Sandiganbayan. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 18005
and 18006.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued and the cases were tried jointly.
On 28 March 2001, the Fourth Division [1] of the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of
Estafa, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 18005, the accused, PANFILO D. BONGCAC, is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ESTAFA (of the amount of P54,000.00) defined
under subdivision 1, paragraph (b), and penalized under the 1 st paragraph, both of Article 315,
Revised Rules of Court, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of from Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
Eleven (11) Years of prision mayor, as maximum, to indemnify Engr. Fortunato Lim in the amount
of P54,000.00 plus P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and

In Criminal Case No. 18006, the same accused, PANFILO D. BONGCAC, is likewise found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the same crime of ESTAFA (of the amount of P35,000.00) defined and
penalized under the aforestated law, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of Two (2) Years, Three (3) Months and Five (5) Days of prision correccional, as minimum,
to Nine (9) Years of prision mayor, as maximum, to indemnify Toribio Bon in the amount
of P35,000.00; and to pay the costs.[2]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 28 March 2001 Decision of the Sandiganbayan. The motion was
denied in the Resolution dated 3 September 2001.[3]

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari [4] with this Court, which was docketed as G.R. Nos.
149711-12. The petition sought the reversal of the 28 March 2001 Decision of the Sandiganbayan.

On 20 February 2002, this Court, in G.R. Nos. 149711-12, issued a Resolution denying the petition for: (a) failure of
the petition to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan committed any reversible error in the challenged decision
and resolution; and (b) failure of the petition to show extraordinary circumstance justifying a departure from the
established doctrine that findings of facts of the Sandiganbayan are well-nigh conclusive on this Court and will not
be reviewed or disturbed on appeal.[5] No motion for reconsideration was filed. Consequently, the Resolution of 20
February 2002 became final and executory on 2 April 2002. [6]

On 4 December 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a notice to petitioner and counsel directing them to be present on
8 January 2003 for the execution of judgment in the criminal cases. [7]

On 26 December 2002, petitioner filed in G.R. Nos. 149711-12 a Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief with
this Court. The petition sought to reverse and set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan and to declare that
petitioner is acquitted of the offense charged.[8]

Meanwhile, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan, in Criminal Case Nos. 18005 and 18006, a Manifestation and
Very Urgent Motion to Suspend Further Proceedings praying that the execution of judgment be held in abeyance
to await the action of this Court on the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief he filed in G.R. Nos. 149711-
12.[9]

On 10 January 2003, the Fourth Division [10] of the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Criminal Case Nos. 18005
and 18006 denying, for lack of merit, petitioners Manifestation and Very Urgent Motion to Suspend Further
Proceedings. It further directed the issuance of a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner to serve the sentence
imposed upon him. The cash bond posted by petitioner for his temporary liberty was ordered cancelled. Petitioner
was given five days to voluntarily surrender.[11]

On 3 March 2003, this Court issued a Resolution in G.R. Nos. 149711-12 denying, for lack of merit, the Very Urgent
Petition for Extraordinary Relief.
Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order praying that the Resolution dated 10 January 2003 issued by the
Sandiganbayan be set aside and that the bench warrant of arrest and the order cancelling the bail bond pending
resolution of the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief be recalled. Petitioner likewise sought to suspend the
final execution of the 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan Decision until after the resolution of the Very Urgent Petition
for Extraordinary Relief.

Respondents People of the Philippines (People) and Lim filed their respective Comments to the petition.
Respondent Bon did not file his comment and the Court resolved to dispense with the filing of the comment as the
notices sent to him were returned with the notation RTS party abroad, USA. [12]

The People, in its Comment, asserted that this Court had no more jurisdiction to entertain the Very Urgent Petition
for Extraordinary Relief because the Courts Resolution of 20 February 2002 in G.R. Nos. 149711-12 had already
become final and executory. Petitioners bail bond was deemed automatically cancelled upon execution of the
judgment of conviction.

In his Comment, respondent Lim alleged that the instant petition should be dismissed outright. He argued that the
present petition was filed beyond the reglementary period of 60 days and that the Very Urgent Petition for
Extraordinary Relief was not sanctioned by the Rules of Civil Procedure and was barred by res judicata. He further
argued that the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief and the present petition are obviously dilatory tactics
to delay the execution of judgment in the criminal cases.

Issue

The resolution of the present petition hinges on the sole issue of whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying petitioners motion to hold in abeyance the
execution of judgment.

The Courts Ruling

We dismiss the petition.

Petitioner appealed the 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan Decision via a petition for review on certiorari before this
Court. The appeal was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149711-12. This Court, however, denied that petition in the
Resolution of 20 February 2002. The Resolution of 20 February 2002 became final and executory on 2 April 2002
after petitioner failed to file a timely motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan
Decision likewise became final and executory. Petitioner could no longer seek a reversal of the judgment of
conviction rendered by the Sandiganbayan, as what petitioner did when he filed the Very Urgent Petition for
Extraordinary Relief.

In the present petition, petitioner prayed that the execution of the 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan Decision be
suspended until after final resolution of petitioners Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief. The Very Urgent
Petition for Extraordinary Relief filed in G.R. Nos. 149711-12 sought to reverse and set aside the decision of the
Sandiganbayan and to declare that petitioner is acquitted of the offense charged. While technically, the Very Urgent
Petition for Extraodinary Relief filed in G.R. Nos. 149711-12 is not sanctioned by the rules, nonetheless, that
petition was likewise denied in the Courts Resolution of 3 March 2003. It is clear, therefore, that the Very Urgent
Petition for Extraordinary Relief and the instant petition are merely dilatory tactics employed by petitioner in his
efforts to delay the execution of the judgment in the criminal cases for estafa which had long become final and
executory.
Petitioner cannot perpetually file any petition or pleading to forestall the execution of a final judgment. Execution
of a final judgment is the fruit and end of the suit. While a litigants right to initiate an action in court is fully
respected, once his case has been adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final judgment, he should not be
permitted to initiate similar suits in the hope of securing a favorable ruling. The 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan
Decision has attained finality. Such definitive judgment is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or
reversal. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Except
for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, or
where the judgment is void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has become final and
executory. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment. In Lim v. Jabalde,[13] this Court further explained
the necessity of adhering to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments, thus:

Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere and it is essential to an effective and
efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not,
through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against
any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.

Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. For just as a
losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is
the life of the law.[14] To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party is to frustrate all the efforts,
time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of justice that we should write finis to this litigation.
Consequently, we find no grave abuse of discretion when the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion to hold in
abeyance the execution of judgment.
On the cancellation of petitioners cash bailbond as ordered in the Resolution of 10 January 2003 of the
Sandiganbayan, the cancellation of the bailbond was due to the execution of the final judgment of conviction.
Section 22 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides:

SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail. - Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the
prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the
case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.

In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail. (emphasis
supplied).

From this provision, it is clear that the cancellation of bail is automatic upon execution of the judgment of
conviction. The Sandiganbayan did not err in cancelling petitioners cash bailbond after the judgment of conviction
became final and executory and its executionbecame ministerial.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution dated 10 January 2003 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case Nos. 18005 and 18006. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5379. May 9, 2003, 403 SCRA 123]

WALTER T. YOUNG, complainant, vs. CEASAR G. BATUEGAS, MIGUELITO NAZARENO V. LLANTINO and
FRANKLIN Q. SUSA, respondents.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On December 29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young filed a Verified Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment against Attys.
Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin Q. Susa for allegedly committing deliberate
falsehood in court and violating the lawyers oath.[1]
Complainant is the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 00-187627 for Murder, entitled People of the
Philippines versus Crisanto Arana, Jr., pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27. On December
13, 2000, respondents Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for accused, filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail,
alleging that the accused has voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority. As such, he is now under detention.
[2]
Upon personal verification with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana allegedly
surrendered, complainant learned that he surrendered only on December 14, 2000, as shown by the Certificate of
Detention executed by Atty. Rogelio M. Mamauag, Chief of the Security Management Division of the NBI.
Respondent Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila, Branch 27, calendared the motion on December
15, 2000 despite the foregoing irregularity and other formal defects, namely, the lack of notice of hearing to the
private complainant, violation of the three-day notice rule, and the failure to attach the Certificate of Detention
which was referred to in the Motion as Annex 1.
Respondents filed their respective comments, declaring that on December 13, 2000, upon learning that a
warrant of arrest was issued against their client, they filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail with the trial
court. Then they immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and brought him to the NBI to voluntarily
surrender. However, due to heavy traffic, they arrived at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the certificate of
detention indicated that the accused surrendered on December 14, 2000. They argued that there was neither
unethical conduct nor falsehood in the subject pleading as their client has voluntarily surrendered and was
detained at the NBI. As regards the lack of notice of hearing, they contend that complainant, as private prosecutor,
was not entitled to any notice. Nevertheless, they furnished the State and City prosecutors copies of the motion
with notice of hearing thereof. Moreover, the hearing of a motion on shorter notice is allowed under Rule 15, Sec.
4(2) of the Rules of Court.[3]
For his part, respondent Susa argues in his comment that he was no longer in court when his co-respondents
filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail. Ms. Teofila A. Pea, Clerk III, received the said Motion and noticed that
it was set for hearing on December 15, 2000 and the Certificate of Detention was not attached. However, the
presiding judge instructed her to receive the Motion subject to the presentation of the Certificate of Detention
before the hearing. Thus, the inclusion of the Motion in the courts calendar on December 15, 2000 was authorized
by the presiding judge and, thus, was done by respondent Susa in faithful performance of his ministerial duty.
In a Resolution dated August 13, 2001, [4] the instant case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report and recommendation or decision.
On December 7, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner, Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, submitted her report and
recommendation as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Ceasar G. Batuegas and
Atty. Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino be suspended from the practice of their profession as a lawyer/member of the
Bar for a period of six (6) months from receipt hereof. The complaint against Atty. Franklin Q. Susa, upon the other
hand, is hereby recommended dismissed for lack of merit. [5]

The foregoing Report and Recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline in Resolution No. XV-2002-400, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex
A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and in view of respondents commission of deliberate falsehood, Atty. Batuegas and Atty. Llantino are hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. The complaint against Atty. Susa is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.[6]

We agree with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondents Batuegas
and Llantino are guilty of deliberate falsehood.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. [7] He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood
nor consent to the doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. [8] He should bear in mind that
as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case
and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. [9] The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to
expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. [10] While a lawyer has the solemn
duty to defend his clients rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his clients cause, his
conduct must never be at the expense of truth. [11]
The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy
to continue as an officer of the court.[12]
Evidently, respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected from them as members of
the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court if it found that it had no jurisdiction over
the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to
a person in authority and was under detention. Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court
and thereby contribute to injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a
contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated their oath when they resorted to deception.
Respondents contend that their allegation of the accuseds detention was merely a statement of an ultimate
fact which still had to be proved by evidence at the hearing of the Motion. That they were able to show that their
client was already under the custody of the NBI at the hearing held on December 15, 2000 does not exonerate
them. The fact remains that the allegation that the accused was in the custody of the NBI on December 13, 2000
was false.
In Comia vs. Antona, we held:

It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the police authorities on the same date tentatively
scheduled for the hearing of the application for bail. To our mind, such supervening event is of no bearing and
immaterial; it does not absolve respondent judge from administrative liability considering that he should not have
accorded recognition to the application for bail filed on behalf of persons who, at that point, were devoid of
personality to ask such specific affirmative relief from the court. [13]

In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to
be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he must be asked for his recommendation. [14]
 In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of hearing of the motion for bail two days prior to
the scheduled date. Although a motion may be heard on short notice, respondents failed to show any good cause
to justify the non-observance of the three-day notice rule.Verily, as lawyers, they are obliged to observe the rules of
procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. [15]
Finally, we are in accord with the Investigating Commissioner that respondent clerk of court should not be
made administratively liable for including the Motion in the calendar of the trial court, considering that it was
authorized by the presiding judge. However, he is reminded that his administrative functions, although not
involving the discretion or judgment of a judge, are vital to the prompt and sound administration of justice. [16] Thus,
he should not hesitate to inform the judge if he should find any act or conduct on the part of lawyers which are
contrary to the established rules of procedure.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino
are found guilty of committing deliberate falsehood. Accordingly, they are SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Miguelito
Nazareno V. Llantino in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007521 SCRA 470

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by
respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated
December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April
10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition
alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.

The facts are:

On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an
"Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.

On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
"accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201
of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law
of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted,
he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional
arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private
respondent.

On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That
same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.

On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning
the validity of the Order of Arrest.

On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.

On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.

On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity
of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.

Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC
of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to
Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a
petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.

After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that
there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."

On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was
then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.

On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for
bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to
post bail, thus:

In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is
granted subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will
appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to
orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking,
the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

 3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold
departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to
the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court
to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the
condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by
respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.

Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or
statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.

In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged
deprivation of ones liberty.

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this
Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.

In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch
42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio
V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition
proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:

x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well
as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J.,
later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available
only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus finds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional
provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It
cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this Court cannot ignore
the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international
law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to
human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human
rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under
our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the
sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of
international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only
to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo
trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as
violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg
principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the
former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international
law.

On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and
importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of
every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now
recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director
of Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, 3the principles
set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among
the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II,
Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the
right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their
release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person
under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the
right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human
rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order.

First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily
limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and
quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history.
Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This
Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been
 allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings,
taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human
rights.

The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the
necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee
had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed
the most serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the
machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation
proceedings.

In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals
against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order
of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in
sustaining the detainees right to bail.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is
no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.
Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the
right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.

Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to
enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed
against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government."

Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender
of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state
to surrender him to the demanding state. 8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a
criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though
such punishment may follow extradition. 10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations
between different nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. 12 Nor
is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape
of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the
purpose of trial or punishment.14

But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of
liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is
also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law)
which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the
interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the
"provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from
provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received
subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the
demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of
extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.

Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for
over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of
detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of
liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.

The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the
latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused.
As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting
to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the
arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on
the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. 15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus
bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these
obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not
necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees
rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution,
but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an
extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither
be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in
civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases
cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing
our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in
extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher
than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is
not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the
cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with
dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
[A.M. MTJ No. 04-1526. February 02, 2004, 421 SCRA 500]

JOCELYN V. GRAGEDA, complainant, vs. JUDGE NIETO T. TRESVALLES,* Municipal Trial

Court, Virac, Catanduanes, respondent.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The instant administrative case arose when Jocelyn V. Grageda filed an Affidavit-Complaint[1] dated January 18,
2000 charging Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles, Municipal Trial Court, Virac, Catanduanes, with gross ignorance of the law
and abuse of authority relative to Criminal Case No. 5307 entitled People v. Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. for murder.
The facts that led to the filing of the complaint as summarized by Executive Judge Romulo P. Atencia, are as
follows:

The complainant in this administrative case was the wife of Gil Grageda who died at about 8:30 in the evening
of November 24, 2000 in Constantino, Virac, Catanduanes due to multiple stab wounds. On December 1, 2000, a
complaint charging Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. y Pitajen for the murder of Gil Grageda was filed for preliminary
investigation with the Municipal Trial Court, 5 th Judicial Region, Virac, Catanduanes, presided by respondent Judge
Nieto T. Tresvalles, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 5307.

After Criminal Case No. 5307 was filed in his court for preliminary investigation, Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles conducted
a preliminary examination on December 5, 2000. On the same day, December 5, 2000, he issued an Order which
textually reads, as follows:

After conducting the preliminary investigation, the Court believes that a prima facie case exists that the crime
charged has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Let therefore a warrant of arrest issue
for his arrest. The bail bond of P30,000.00 is hereby fixed for his provisional liberty on the ground that the evidence
of guilt of the accused is not strong.

SO ORDERED.

The corresponding warrant for the arrest of Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. was issued on the same day, stating that the bail
for the accuseds temporary liberty was in the amount of P30,000.00.

The accused surrendered on December 11, 2000. The respondent Judge immediately issued an order committing
the person of the accused Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. y Pitajen to the Municipal Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management
and Penology, Virac, Catanduanes. Also on the same day, the accused, through counsel, filed a motion to strike out
the testimony of witness Perlita Tablizo (wife of the accused) and to grant accused bail.

The following day, December 12, 2000, the respondent Judge issued an Order releasing accused Bernardo
P. Tablizo, Jr. from the custody of law after the latter posted a personal bail bond in the amount of P30,000.00.

In an Order dated February 28, 2001, the respondent transmitted the records of the case to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, which contained a denial of the accuseds motion to strike out the testimony
of Perlita Tablizo.

First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Antonio C.A. Ayo, Jr. of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor thereafter
conducted preliminary investigation (I.S. No. 00-30), ultimately recommending the filing of an information for
murder against Bernardo P. Tablizo, Jr. with the aggravating circumstances of use of motor vehicle, treachery and
evident premeditation. No bail was recommended for the temporary liberty of the accused.

Thereafter, an information charging Bernardo P. Tablizo, Jr. for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, which is now awaiting decision.[2]

The respondent was, thereafter, charged with gross ignorance of the law, conduct unbecoming of a member
of the Bench, failure to conduct himself in a manner that would justify his continued stay in the judiciary, and
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. [3] According to the complainant, the respondent judge granted bail to the
accused in Criminal Case No. 5307 without the requisite bail hearing, despite the fact that there was an eyewitness
to the murder who made a positive identification of the accused. The complainant also alleged that the amount
of P30,000.00 printed on the Warrant of Arrest issued by the respondent judge appeared to be snowpaked, an
indication that another entry was previously made, possibly a no bail recommendation. Furthermore, no counter-
affidavit or answer was filed by the accused during the preliminary investigation conducted by the respondent
judge, and it took the police authorities seven days to arrest the accused after the issuance of the warrant of
arrest. Thus:

16. I hereby execute this Affidavit to respond to the call in (sic) to encouraging the public to report erring judges to
the Supreme Court and not to the media, as I am also very much concerned, not only of being a victim of injustice,
but also of being prejudicial to [the] governments interest as a consequence of incompetence, gross ignorance,
misconduct of the Presiding Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles of the Municipal Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes in the
granting of bail to the accused, even when the evidence of his guilt was strong and without an Application for Bail,
considering that a Complaint for Murder was filed, and without an Order, to which the judge is to make as
Summary of Evidence filed by the complainant and her witnesses to immediately cut short his membership in the
Bench, be terminated and dismissed from the judicial service with forfeiture of all his benefits and leave credits
with prejudice to his re-employment in any public office.[4]

In his Comment, the respondent admitted that no bail hearing was conducted in Criminal Case No. 5307, but
reasoned that the evidence of the guilt of the accused was not strong. According to the respondent, the matter of
granting bail is an exercise of judgment, and that the accused should not be denied his constitutional right to bail.

It is true that a hearing is necessary before an accused should be released on bail in cases where the granting of
bail is discretionary on the part of the judge. However, it is also equally true that in the exercise of his sound
discretion and opinion, he is not also precluded in seeing to it that the evidence of the prosecution is adduced in
support for the denial of bail to the accused to guide the court on what to do on the matter. But the public
prosecutor failed during the hearing.[5]

The respondent also explained that a judge issuing a warrant of arrest is not an arresting officer. Thus, if it
took seven days for the accused to be arrested after the issuance of the warrant, it was no longer his concern.
In its Report[6] dated June 19, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator opined that Sections 7 and 8 of Rule
114 of the Rules of Court make it mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing before an accused charged with a
capital offense is granted bail, and that failure to do so amounts to gross ignorance of the law. It was recommended
that the complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that the respondent judge be fined in the
amount of P10,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more severely.
In a Resolution dated July 28, 2003, the Court referred the matter to Executive
Judge Romulo P. Atencia. Thereafter, the Executive Judge submitted his Report and Recommendation
dated November 6, 2003.
According to the Executive Judge, the actual implementation of a warrant of arrest is the responsibility of
other functionaries of the government. In fact, the respondent issued the warrant of arrest on December 5, 2000,
only four days after the case was filed in his sala on December 1, 2000. Thus, the respondent cannot be blamed in
any wise if the accused was not arrested or held in custody prior to December 11, 2000.
According to the Executive Judge, the charge that no bail was really granted for the provisional liberty of the
accused in the sum of P30,000 and that the said amount was merely superimposed on the warrant of arrest is not
supported by the records. Since the respondent issued an Order on December 5, 2000 fixing the bail at P30,000,
the contention that no such order granting bail was issued is, likewise, devoid of merit. Thus, the Executive Judge
concluded, even assuming that there was such a superimposition on the warrant of arrest, the same was merely
made to conform to the said Order.
Anent the charge that the accused was not required to file a comment on the complaint, the Executive Judge
found that no fault could be attributed to the respondent on this regard, as it is the prerogative of the accused to
submit any pleading in his defense. However, the respondent judge failed to make any findings of facts and the law
supporting his action as mandated by Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
The Executive Judge also stated that at the time the respondent judge granted bail to the accused
on December 5, 2000, no application for bail had as yet been filed by the accused. Furthermore, no hearing was
held to determine whether the evidence of the prosecution on the guilt of the accused was strong or not.
[7]
According to the Executive Judge, a hearing is required to afford the judge a basis for determining the existence
of the facts set forth under Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in granting or rejecting a plea of bail. Thus, the
grant of bail without due hearing deprives the prosecution of procedural due process, a right to which it is equally
entitled to as the defense. Thus:

The respondent Judge seeks to justify his grant of bail by claiming that the testimonies of the witnesses will not
warrant the charge of murder. This claim, however, is belied by his own Order granting bail when he stated that the
Court believes that a prima facie case exists that the crime charged has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof. The offense for which he found the accused to be probably guilty of is Murder, since it was
the crime charged The warrant of arrest issued by the respondent Judge designated the offense as Murder. [8]

The Executive Judge agreed with the finding of the Court Administrator that the respondent is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.
We agree that the respondent judge is administratively liable for granting bail to an accused charged with
murder without conducting the requisite bail hearing.
The importance of a hearing in applications for bail should once more be emphasized. Section 8, Rule 114
provides as follows:

Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. - At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in
custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may
recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, or otherwise, unable to testify.

The importance of the Rule lies on the fact that on the result of the bail hearing depends the right of an
accused to provisional liberty vis--vis the duty of the State to protect the people against dangerous elements. The
resolution of the issue affects important norms in our society: liberty on one hand, and order on the other. To
minimize, if not eliminate, error and arbitrariness in a judges decision, the Rules require the judge to hear the
parties and then make an intelligent assessment of their evidence. [9]
The respondents argument that a hearing is only necessary if there is an application for admission to bail is
erroneous. As found by the Executive Judge:
[T]he fact that the accused has not even filed yet any application for bail at the time bail was fixed on December 5,
2000 aggravates matters. To state the obvious, there was no occasion for the respondent Judge to exercise any
discretion on the matter of bail at that point in time as the accused was not asking to be released on temporary
liberty. The respondent Judge should have followed the straight and trodden path, well-traveled by members of the
bench, that bail should not be allowed in cases of murder. It might also be worth mentioning, in passing, that the
right to bail may be waived considering its personal nature. It arises from the time one is placed in the custody of
the law. The fact that the respondent Judge already granted bail when the accused has not been arrested yet
compounds the aggravation.[10]

Admission to bail presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal
principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature
of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in
determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly,
legally, and within the confines of due process, that is, after the evaluation of the evidence submitted by the
prosecution.[11] In this case, the respondent judge motu proprio granted bail to the accused. The prosecution was
not even afforded an opportunity to present its evidence, in accordance with the Rules.
We likewise agree with the finding of the Executive Judge that the respondents claim of good faith will not
exonerate him from administrative liability.

The respondent Judge also argues in his Position Paper submitted to the undersigned Executive Judge that there is
absolutely no evidence to show that he was motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in granting bail.
As such, he argues that his act which was done in his official capacity is not subject to disciplinary
action. Unfortunately for the respondent Judge, it is already settled that when a judge grants bail to a person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment without
conducting the required [bail] hearing, he is considered guilty of ignorance or incompetence the gravity of which
cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or excusable negligence. [12]

In the recent case of Rosalia Docena-Caspe v. Judge Arnulfo O. Bagtas,[13] the Court stressed the indispensable
nature of a hearing in petitions for bail, citing a plethora of cases, [14] where judges were found to be grossly
ignorant of the rules and procedures and were fined P20,000.00 therefor.
Moreover, the respondent judge failed to adhere to the mandate of Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
which provides:

Sec. 5. Resolution of investigating judge and its review. Within ten (10) days after the preliminary investigation, the
investigating judge shall transmit the resolution of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor, or to the
Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, for appropriate action. The resolution shall state the findings of facts and the law supporting his action,
together with the record of the case which shall include: (a) the warrant, if the arrest is by virtue of a warrant; (b)
the affidavits, counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence of the parties; (c) the undertaking or bail of the
accused and the order for his release; (d) the transcripts of the proceedings during the preliminary investigation;
and (e) the order of cancellation of his bail bond, if the resolution is for the dismissal of the complaint.

No such report on the findings of fact and law was made by the respondent. As found by the Executive Judge,
the December 5, 2000 Order of the respondent finding probable cause that the crime of murder was committed
was made only for the purpose of issuing of a warrant of arrest against the accused, thus:

It is apparent that the aforementioned finding was made only for purposes of issuance of a warrant of arrest, as at
that time, the accused was still at large. Strictly speaking, this was not yet a finding of any prima facie case upon
which an Information charging the proper offense should be filed in court. The respondent Judge was yet to issue a
subpoena to the accused attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents as
required under Sec. 3 (a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The accused has not yet submitted any counter-affidavit
or has waived the submission thereof. In other words, preliminary investigation was not yet
terminated. Subsequently, however, the respondent Judge never issued any other resolution on the result of the
preliminary investigation he conducted up to the time he transmitted the records to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor. The respondent Judge did not make any findings of facts and the law supporting his action as mandated
by Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, his original, premature finding of probable guilt made
on December 5, 2000 was already his verdict on the preliminary investigation yet to be conducted. This cavalier
disregard of procedural rules leaves much to be desired. [15]

A judge owes it to himself and his office to know by heart basic legal principles and to harness his legal know-
how correctly and justly anything less than that is constitutive of the serious charge of gross ignorance of the law,
perhaps, grave misconduct.[16] In Celestina B. Corpuz vs. Judge Orlando F. Siapno,[17] we had the occasion to state,
thus:

When a judge displays an utter unfamiliarity with the law and the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in
the courts. A judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep
abreast of laws and the prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of
injustice.[18]

While the Executive Judge agreed that the respondent should be held administratively liable, it was
recommended that he be merely reprimanded, as a balancing of the equities involved should tilt the scales in favor
of the respondent for his loyalty, diligence and reliability. Thus:

There are six (6) first level courts in the Province of Catanduanes. Of these, five (5) do not have incumbent
judges. As the only judge in the first level courts, respondent Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles has, for many years, been
Acting Judge of all the other vacant courts which are scattered throughout the island province, accessible only
through dirt mountain roads. This necessarily entailed great sacrifices on the part of the respondent Judge, not to
mention that the extra remuneration given to Judges for sitting in vacant salas is a mere pittance. Inasmuch as this
administrative matter concerns the official acts of the respondent, equity demands that the bad be weighed
together with the good.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the undersigned is inclined to adopt the recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator that the respondent Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles be FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more severely.However, considering that the said
respondent is in the twilight of his career with the Judiciary, as his compulsory retirement is scheduled in January of
the coming year which is barely two (2) months away, and considering further that the respondent Judge did the
yeomans job of single-handedly operating the judicial machinery in the Province of Catanduanes for many years as
the only first level court Judge in the entire province, it is the respectful recommendation of the undersigned that
respondent Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles be instead only REPRIMANDED. [19]

The records show that the respondent judge compulsorily retired on January 22, 2004, having served thirty-
four years in the judiciary. Under the circumstances, the Court finds that a fine of P10,000.00 is just and
reasonable.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and is FINED
in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. RTJ-00-1522. January 20, 2000, 322 SCRA 559]

ROMULO SJ TOLENTINO, State Prosecutor, complainant, vs. JUDGE POLICARPIO S. CAMANO, JR., Regional Trial
Court, Branch 58, Tigaon, Camarines Sur, respondent. Misj uris

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint filed by State Prosecutor and Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur Romulo SJ Tolentino
against Judge Policarpio S. Camano, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Tigaon, Camarines Sur, for gross
ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, grave abuse of authority, violation of Canons 1, 2 and 3 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics, and incompetence in connection with the granting of bail to the accused in Criminal Case
No. T-1468.

The facts are as follows:

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur filed an information against Roderick Odiaman for
allegedly engaging in sexual intercourse with a child in violation of 5(b) of the Child Abuse Act (R.A. No. 7610). The
case was filed in the RTC at Tigaon, Camarines Sur and was later assigned to respondent judge of that court. The
defense moved to quash the information on the ground that no preliminary investigation had been conducted
before the case was filed, whereupon respondent judge on November 15, 1995 ordered complainant state
prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation. Pending the holding of a preliminary investigation, the accused
filed a petition for bail which respondent judge scheduled for hearing on January 9, 1996. However, both
complainant state prosecutor and private complainant in the criminal case failed to appear before the court despite
due notice. The hearing was reset to January 16, 1996, but, on the said date, complainant state prosecutor again
failed to appear despite due notice to him. Just the same, the hearing was postponed to January 24, 1996. The
notice of hearing was personally served on complainant state prosecutor, but on the scheduled date, he again
failed to appear. Instead, the assistant provincial prosecutor entered a special appearance in the case and moved
for another postponement of the hearing. Respondent judge denied the motion, and, on January 30, 1996, granted
the petition for bail which he fixed at P50,000.00. Respondent judge stated in pertinent parts in his order:

In resolving the Motion to Quash, the court in its Order dated November 13, 1995 denied said
Motion finding merit however, on the question of lack of preliminary investigation and as a
consequence remanded the case to the prosecutor for preliminary investigation. Jj lex

Pending preliminary investigation, the accused filed the instant Petition for Bail which were set
for hearings on January 9, 16, and 24, 1996, during which settings the prosecution failed to
appear and to adduce evidence to oppose the Petition.

From the foregoing antecedent facts, it can be discerned that the accused is not yet charged in
court for violation of Art. III, Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610, his case being under preliminary
investigation, [but he] is behind bars.

The issue to be resolved by the court is whether or not a Petition for Bail can be entertained by
this court at this stage of the proceedings and under the attendant circumstances.

The court applying Sec. 17(c) of Rule 114 as Amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 and
adhering to applicable doctrine, resolves the issue in the affirmative.

Sec. 17(c) Rule 114 provides, thus:

 "Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with
any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held."

EXPLANATIONS: (Taken from the Book, entitled "Remedial Law" by O. Herrera,

vol. 4, 1994 ed.)

In the case of Go vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, Feb. 11, 1992, the court ruled, thus:

"Where the accused was charged for murder without the benefit of a
preliminary investigation and trial had already began over his objections, the
accused remains entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right pending the
preliminary investigation."

"The filing of the Petition for Bail does not constitute a waiver of accused[s]
right to preliminary investigation."

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Bail is hereby granted and the bail for the
provisional liberty of the accused is hereby fixed at P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED. New miso

However, on motion of complainant state prosecutor, respondent judge set aside his order and set the petition for
bail on March 4, 1996, "if only to afford the prosecution another chance to present evidence to show that the
evidence of guilt is strong."

Complainant state prosecutor again failed to appear although he filed a manifestation questioning the hearing set
on the ground that it was premature to consider the question of bail as there was a pending "reinvestigation" of
the case before the provincial prosecutors office. On May 9, 1996, respondent judge issued an order granting bail
to the accused in the increased amount of P100,000.00. His order stated:

Any person in custody who is not yet charge[d] in court may apply for bail with any [court] in the
province, city, or municipality where [he] is held. (Remedial Law by O. Herrera, Vol. 4, 1994
edition).

In the case at bench, it can be said that the accused is not yet charge[d] in court for Violation of
Art. 3, Sec. 5(B) of Republic Act 7610, this case being under preliminary investigation and/or
reinvestigation.

The court takes into consideration the health of the accused who is sick with diabetes and lung
ailment needing medical attention.

Since the case is still under preliminary investigation and/or reinvestigation, it is needless for the
court to make a conclusion of facts or assessment of the prosecutions evidence whether it is
strong or not in order not to preempt the outcome of the reinvestigation. Although from a
perusal of the Complaint and affidavit executed by Cecille Buenafe and the witnesses, the court
could not find any allegations that said Cecille Buenafe is a minor who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion of any adult, syndicate or group indulge[s] in sexual
intercourse for a fee to be deemed a child exploited in prostitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Bail is GRANTED for the temporary liberty of
the accused and the same is hereby fixed at P100,000.00.
 SO ORDERED.

Complainant state prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration and a notice of appeal, both of which were denied
by respondent judge. In his order, dated May 30, 1996, respondent judge ruled: Acct mis

Invoking denial of due process as a ground, the prosecution moves for the reconsideration of the
May 9, 1996 Order of this court granting bail to the accused. The inaccuracy of the allegations so
advanced in support of the Motion is readily emphasized by no less than the sequence of the
dates of hearing with explicit order to adduce evidence to oppose the Petition for Bail as recited
in detail in the questioned Order, thus, evincing the evident effort of the court towards
observance of due process for both the defense and the prosecution.

It is basic in law that actual hearing is not an indispensable requisite of due process, but mere
opportunity to be heard would suffice. Thus:

"There is no denial of due process where a party is given an opportunity to be

heard and to present his case. (Development Bank of the Philippines vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, 218 SCRA 183)."

"It is not the denial of the right to be heard but the deprivation of the
opportunity to be heard which constitutes a violation of the due process clause.
(Imperial Textile Mills Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 217 SCRA
237)."

Corollarily, the prosecution cannot feign ignorance of the physical condition of the accused
considering his medical records, all certified copies, furnished to this court by Mr. Norberto P.
Villamor, Administrative Officer IV of the Bicol Medical Center, Naga City at the instance of Atty.
Romulo SJ. Tolentino, Prosecutor on Case which medical records now form part of the record of
this case. It cannot be gainsaid that the production of his medical records was the necessary
consequence of Atty. Tolentinos previous insistence for the hospital to produce the same. The X-
ray result confirms that the accused is suffering from tuberculosis, right upper lobe. Briefly stated,
the records of the case strongly rebuff the contention of the prosecution in the Motion for
Reconsideration.

Interlocutory orders are not appeallable in this jurisdiction. The Order granting bail subject of the
instant Motion falls within the ambit of Interlocutory Order.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED and the Notice of Appeal
incorporated therein is likewise DENIED, both for LACK of MERIT.

SO ORDERED. Mis act

On May 31, 1996, respondent judge approved the property bond filed by the accused and ordered his immediate
release. Hence, the instant complaint.

Complainant claims that the prosecution was not given an opportunity to adduce evidence to show that the guilt of
the accused was strong, and that the bail, which was fixed at P100,000.00, was 50% less than the recommended
amount in the Bail Bond Guide of 1996. Complainant also claims that respondent judge acted on the petition for
bail notwithstanding a pending "reinvestigation" of the case.
In its resolution of November 18, 1996, the Court required respondent judge to comment on the complaint. In
addition, it ordered that a copy of the complaint furnished the Department of Justice for possible disciplinary
action against complainant state prosecutor for deliberately delaying the administration of justice.

In his comment, dated January 24, 1997, respondent judge alleges:

3. This incident could have not reached this far, if State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino
cooperated and obeyed the series of Orders issued by this court requiring him to appear and
adduce evidence of strong guilt, during the bail hearing.

The petition for bail was filed on December 26, 1995. Said petition was set for hearing by the
court on January 9, 1996 where the prosecution and the offended party, Cecile Buenafe, were
personally served with subpoenas. The prosecutor and the offended party failed to appear in this
scheduled bail hearing. The court in its Order on January 9, 1996, reset the bail hearing to
January 16, 1996 and ordered the prosecution to adduce evidence of strong guilt. The bail
hearing was again reset to January 24, 1996, and State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino was again
ordered to adduce evidence of strong guilt, a copy of the Order was personally served upon him.
On [the] January 24, 1996 bail hearing, State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino again failed to
appear and adduce evidence of strong guilt and instead requested Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Victor de la Cruz to appear in his behalf and to ask for a postponement of the bail hearing. The
bail hearing was again reset to March 4, 1996, by the court and subpoenas were served [on] the
State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino and the offended party Cecile Buenafe and their witnesses.
[At the] March 4, 1996 bail hearing, the prosecution again failed to appear and adduce evidence
of strong guilt.

From the foregoing chronology of events of the bail hearing, it is crystal clear that the
prosecution was afforded reasonable notice and all the opportunities to adduce evidence of
strong guilt in adherence to requirements of procedural due process. S djad

....

5. The Order of this court granting and fixing the bail for the accused in the amount of P50,000.00
contained in its Order [of] January 30, 1996 was reconsidered thru his application and at the
same time the court set the bail application for hearing and ordering State Prosecutor Romulo SJ.
Tolentino to appear and adduce evidence which he likewise failed to comply. After all these series
of failures to appear and adduce evidence, the court granted the petition for bail fixing the same
in the amount of P100,000.00. State Prosecutor Tolentino contends that the P100,000.00 bail is
only 50% of the recommendable amount. Your Respondent, in fixing the amount of P100,000.00
relied on Administrative Circular No. 12-94, Sec. 9 as basis, and because of the consistent failure
to appear and adduce evidence of the prosecutor and make known his recommendation as to the
fixing of the bail. For his repeated failure to appear and adduce evidence despite the repeated
orders of this court, the Respondent should not be faulted nor punished administratively.

6. A petition for bail can be entertained by the court while the preliminary investigation or re-
investigation is going [on] for as long as the accused is under detention. In fact, it is advantageous
for the prosecution because with one stone it is shooting two birds. It will abbreviate the
proceedings in the trial on the merits that would eventually result [in] the early disposition of the
case.
 7. Your Respondent is still human, although a judge. It being so, he is not exempted from the
danger of falling into the path holes [sic] of legal error or errors just like his peers. That is why in
several decisions of the Supreme Court, it was ruled, thus:

"In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts
are erroneous." (Alvarado vs. Laquindanum, 245 SCRA 501)

"A judge may not be administratively charged for mere errors of judgment in
the absence of a showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose on his
part." (Heirs of the Late Nasser D. Yasin vs. Felix, 250 SCRA 545) Sppedsc

"If respondent judge committed any error at all it was a legal error rectifiable by
appeal not by administrative sanction." (State Prosecutor vs. Muro, 251 SCRA
111)

"A judge cannot be held administratively liable for an erroneous ruling on first
impression, and malice cannot be inferred from his having rendered a decision
rectifying an earlier impression without proof beyond doubt of a conscious and
deliberate intent on his part to commit an injustice by such acts." (Castaos vs.
Escao, Jr., 251 SCRA 174)

"As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption,

the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action
even though such acts are erroneous." (Chin vs. Gustillo, 247 SCRA 175).

8. Your Respondent acted in this case honestly and in good faith, and his actuations not tainted
with graft and corruption.

Subsequently, respondent judge filed an application for optional retirement, which the Court approved on
November 17, 1998. The amount of P50,000.00 was withheld from his retirement benefits pending resolution of
the complaint in this case and another complaint against him in OCA-I.P.I.-96-250-RTJ.

The Office of the Court Administrator, to which the complaint in this case was referred, finds respondent judge
guilty of gross ignorance of law and grave abuse of authority in granting bail without hearing, and recommends
that he be fined and sternly warned. Its report states in pertinent parts:

In the first place, respondent Judge should not have acted on the petition for bail as there is still a
pending reinvestigation of the cases at the Regional State Prosecutors Office. Secondly, in
granting bail to the accused respondent violated the fundamental law of procedural due process.
In doing so he acted with grave abuse of authority and in wanton disregard of established rules
and jurisprudence. In Petition for admission to bail the Judge is under legal obligation to receive
evidence from the prosecution with the view of determining whether the evidence of guilt is so
strong as to warrant the denial of bail. For this purpose therefore a hearing must be conducted to
give opportunity for the prosecution to present evidence that the guilt of the accused is so strong
before resolution of the motion (Sec. 5, Rule 114, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure). C alrsc

....
While it may be argued that the granting of bail is an exercise of judicial discretion, the Court has
delineated a clear guideline on the exercise thereof to thwart any abuse, in the case of Borinaga
vs. Tamin, thus:

"x x x (w)hile the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong is a

matter of judicial discretion, this discretion by the nature of things may rightly
be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at such hearing.
Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody [for a capital
offense be resolved] in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial,
the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable
time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court may
resolve the motion for bail. If the prosecution should be denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the
order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground x x x x
(E)ven where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the
application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such
questions as would ascertain the strength of the states evidence or judge the
adequacy of the amount of bail x x x x." (Cited in Mamolo, Sr. vs. Narisma, 252
SCRA 613).

Respondent Judge tried to absolve himself with the established dictum that a judge cannot be
held administratively liable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders and that no one is
infallible in his judgment.

Respondent Judge must not hide behind that fundamental rule for what he has violated is the
basic principle of procedural due process. While the Court does not require perfection and
infallibility, it reasonably expects a faithful and intelligent discharge of duty by those who are
selected to fill the position of administrators of justice (Lardizabal v. Reyes, A.M. No. MTJ-94-897,
5 December 1994, 238 SCRA 640). While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on
account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet it is highly imperative that they
should be conversant with basic legal principles (Libarios vs. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48). A judge is
called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural
rules. He is required to continuously study the law and jurisprudence. For it is in the Judges
industry in keeping abreast with the recent law and court rulings that the faith of the people in
the administration of justice will be restored since the litigants will be confidently and invariably
assured that the occupants of the bench are in full grasp of legal principles.

As to the amount of bail which is allegedly 50% less of the recommendable amount, it is noted
that the information filed is for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 7610. Under Justice Department
Circular No. 4, RE: The 1996 Bailbond Guide, which became effective [on] 1 February 1996 and
the law enforceable at the time the Petition for Bail was filed by the defense, the penalty for
violation of Section 5 of R.A. 7610 (Law on Child Abuse), is reclusion temporal medium to
reclusion perpetua and the amount of bail to be posted by the accused is P40,000.00. Hence, the
amount of P100,000.00 fixed by the respondent Judge is even excessive. Sccal r

....

WHEREFORE, for his failure to afford procedural due process to the prosecution in the grant of
bail to the accused in Criminal Case No. T-1462, [it is hereby recommended that] respondent
Judge Policarpio S. Camano, Jr. [be] found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
authority, and be FINED P20,000.00 payable within thirty days from notice with a STERN
WARNING that a commission of the same act or offense will be dealt with more severely.
We find the complaint in this case to be without any basis.

First. Art. III, 13 of the Constitution provides that, before conviction, all persons shall be allowed bail, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua (or higher) when the evidence of guilt is strong. On the
other hand, Rule 114, 4 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure, provides that "all persons in custody shall,
before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right." Thus, when the charge against an accused is for an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, there must be a hearing with the participation of
the prosecution and the defense, in order to determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong,
and ultimately to determine whether he should be granted bail. The burden of proof is on the prosecution to show
that the evidence meets the required quantum. For this purpose, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to
present within a reasonable time all evidence that it may want to adduce before the court. The State has a right to
due process as much as the accused. And even if the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the
motion for bail, the court must nevertheless endeavor to ascertain the strength of the States evidence in order to
determine whether bail should be granted. [1]

In this case, however, it was not necessary to hold a hearing so that the prosecution could show that evidence of
the guilt of the accused was strong, because a preliminary investigation had been ordered by the court. At that
point, bail was still a matter of right. Thus, in Go v. Court of Appeals,[2] it was held that an accused, who was charged
in court with murder without the benefit of a preliminary investigation, was entitled to be released on bail as a
matter of right pending the preliminary investigation, reserving to the prosecutor, after the preliminary
investigation, the right to ask the trial court for the cancellation of the bail should he believe the evidence of guilt
of the accused to be strong. It would then be up to the trial court to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of
bail after considering the evidence on record. Indeed, if the propriety of charging the accused was yet to be
resolved in the preliminary investigation, it cannot be claimed that the evidence of guilt of the accused was strong
so as to justify the denial of bail to him. Calrsp ped

Be that as it may, respondent judge set the hearing on the bail petition at least four times: on January 9, 1996,
January 16, 1996, January 24, 1996, and March 4, 1996, in order to allow complainant prosecutor present his
evidence, because the accused was charged with having "sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse." Under 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the penalty for such an
offense is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. But complainant failed to present his
evidence. It thus appears that it was the complainant prosecutor who was remiss in the performance of his duties.
Respondent judge should not have granted bail based simply on the failure of the prosecution to prove that the
evidence of guilt of the accused was strong but should have endeavored to determine the existence of such
evidence. Considering, however, the fact that the case was referred to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for
preliminary investigation, the accused could be considered entitled to bail as a matter of right.

Second. As to the allegation that the amount of bail required by respondent judge is 50% less than the amount
recommended in the 1996 Bailbond Guide of the Department of Justice, the Office of the Court Administrator
correctly finds that the amount of the bail under the Bailbond Guide is P40,000.00 only, so that, in requiring the
accused to post bail in the amount of P100,000.00, respondent judge exceeded the limits. It appears, however, that
respondent judge was led to his error by the prosecutor who moved for a reconsideration of respondent judges
order originally fixing the amount of bail at P50,000.00. At all events, the remedy was for either the accused or the
prosecution to ask for a reduction of the amount of bail. Not all errors of a judge can be the subject of disciplinary
action, but only those tainted by fraud, dishonesty, corruption or malice, of which none has been shown in this
case.

WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the instant complaint, the same is hereby DISMISSED. Sce dp

SO ORDERED.
ESTER F. BARBERO, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1682, 555 SCRA 193

Complainant,

- versus -

JUDGE CESAR M. DUMLAO,

Municipal Trial Court, Promulgated:

San Mateo, Isabela,

Respondent. June 19, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law filed by Ester F. Barbero (Barbero) against Judge Cesar
M. Dumlao (Judge Dumlao), Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Isabela.

Barbero filed a criminal case[1] for estafa against a certain Herman A. Medina (Medina). The case was raffled to
Judge Anastacio D. Anghad (Judge Anghad), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region II,
Branch 36, Santiago City, Isabela. On 19 February 2003, Judge Anghad issued a warrant of arrest [2] commanding the
proper officer to arrest Medina.

Medina was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest. However, Judge Dumlao approved Medinas bail and, on 9
May 2003, issued an order[3] commanding the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and the Philippine National
Police to release Medina. Barberoalleged that Judge Dumlaos approval of Medinas bail and his order to
release Medina were unlawful.

On 15 July 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an affidavit-
complaint[4] from Barbero charging Judge Dumlao with gross ignorance of the law. In its 1st Indorsement[5] dated 7
August 2003, the OCA directed Judge Dumlao to comment on the affidavit-complaint. Judge Dumlao ignored the
1st Indorsement. In its 1st Tracer[6] dated 11 November 2003, the OCA directed Judge Dumlao to comment on the
affidavit-complaint. Judge Dumlao ignored the 1st Tracer. In its 2nd Tracer[7] dated 10 March 2004, the OCA directed
Judge Dumlao to comment on the affidavit-complaint. Judge Dumlao ignored the 2nd Tracer. In a
Resolution[8] dated 6 April 2005, the Court directed Judge Dumlao to comment on the affidavit-complaint and to
show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for ignoring
the OCAs directives. Judge Dumlao ignored the 6 April 2005 Resolution.

In a Resolution[9] dated 17 August 2005, the Court reiterated its 6 April 2005 Resolution. Judge Dumlao ignored
the 17 August 2005 Resolution. In a Resolution dated 6 February 2006, the Court fined Judge Dumlao P500 for
ignoring its directives and directed Judge Dumlao to comply with the 17 August
2005 Resolution. Judge Dumlao ignored the 6 February 2006 Resolution. In Resolutions dated 18 September
2006 and 19 February 2007, the Court considered Judge Dumlao to have waived his right to comment on the
affidavit-complaint and resolved to proceed with the administrative case based on the pleadings already filed.

The Court finds Judge Dumlao liable for gross ignorance of the law and for violation of Court directives.

Section 17(a), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case
is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge,
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city,
or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the
case is pending, bail may also be filed with any regional trial court of said place, or if no judge
thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit
trial judge therein.

In Cruz v. Judge Yaneza,[10] the Court held that:

There are prerequisites to be complied with. First, the application for bail must be filed in
the court where the case is pending. In the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, the
application for bail must be filed with another branch of the same court within the province or
city. Second, if the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the
case is pending, bail may be filed with any regional trial court of the place. (Emphasis ours)

The criminal case Barbero filed against Medina was pending before the RTC of Santiago City. Judge Anghad of
the RTC issued the warrant of arrest, and Medina was arrested by virtue of that warrant.

Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that no person under detention by legal process shall be released
except when he is admitted to bail. Section 19 provides that the accused must be discharged upon approval of the
bail by the judge with whom it was filed in accordance with Section 17. Section 17 provides that the bail may be
filed with the court where the case is pending, unless (1) the judge in that court is absent or unavailable, or (2) the
accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending. If the judge is absent
or unavailable, the bail should be filed with another branch of the same court. If the accused is arrested in a
province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, the bail should be filed with any RTC of the
place.

In the present case, there was no showing that Judge Anghad was absent or unavailable or that Medina was
arrested outside Santiago City. Thus, Medinas bail should have been filed with Judge Anghad. Even if
Judge Anghad were absent or unavailable or even if Medina were arrested in San Mateo, Judge Dumlao would still
be liable because the bail should have been filed with another branch of the RTC in Santiago City or with the RTC of
San Mateo, respectively.[11]
Since the criminal case was pending before the RTC of Santiago City and there was no showing that
Judge Anghad of the RTC was absent or unavailable, Judge Dumlao lacked authority to approve the bail and
order Medinas release.

Barbero alleged that Judge Dumlaos acts of approving Medinas bail and ordering Medinas release were not in
accordance with law:

[N]apag-alaman ko x x x na [si Medina] ay basta na lang pinakawalan ni x x x Judge Cesar M.

Dumlao ng Municipal Trial Court ng San Mateo, Isabela x x x;

[A]ng ginawa ni Judge Cesar M. Dumlao ay hindi naaayon sa batas sapagkat wala siyang
kapangyarihang pakawalan x x x [si Medina];

[N]apag-alaman ko rin na ang pagrerelease na ginawa ni Judge Dumlao ay base sa [bail] na

ipinakita sa kanya;

[S]a akin pong pagkakaalam, lahat po ng [bail] sa criminal

cases ay dapat aksyunan at aprubahan ng hukom o judge na siyang may hawak ng asunto;

xxxx

[K]ung maaari po sana, dahil sa kawalang respeto [ni Judge] Cesar

M. Dumlao sa ating batas x x x, ipinakikiusap [ko] na sana ay imbestigahan ang nasabing pagma
malabis at kawalan ng respeto[.]

The Court directed Judge Dumlao several times to comment on Barberos allegations. Judge Dumlao opted to ignore
all of the Courts directives. By his silence, Judge Dumlao admitted the truth of the allegations. In Palon, Jr. v.
Vallarta,[12] the Court held that silence is admission of the truth of the charges:

Respondent judge failed to comment on the complaint or file any responsive pleading or
manifestation despite receipt of notice to do so. x x x The natural instinct of man impels him to
resist an unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. It is against human nature to just
remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false accusations. Hence, silence x x x is an
admission of the truth of the charges. Respondent judge is deemed to have admitted the
charges against him. (Emphasis ours)

This is the second time Judge Dumlao unlawfully approved the bail and ordered the release of Medina. The instant
case has exactly the same set of facts as Lim v. Dumlao.[13] In that case (1) complainant filed two criminal cases
for carnapping and theft against Medina; (2) the criminal cases were filed with the RTC, Judicial Region II, Branch
35, Santiago City, Isabela; (3) Judge Fe Albano Madrid of the RTC issued a warrant of arrest against Medina; (4)
Medina was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest; (5) Judge Dumlaoapproved the bail of Medina; and (6)
Judge Dumlao ordered the release of Medina.
In Lim,[14] the Court held that:

It is not disputed that the criminal cases filed by complainant against Herman Medina were
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35. In fact, the warrant
of arrest was issued by Judge Fe Albano Madrid, presiding judge of the said court. The order of
release therefore, on account of the posting of the bail, should have been issued by that court, or
in the absence or unavailability of Judge Madrid, by another branch of an RTC in Santiago City. In
this case, however, there is no proof that Judge Madrid was absent or unavailable at the time of
the posting of the bail bond. In fact, complainant Lim avers that on the day [Judge Dumlao]
ordered the release of Medina, Judge Madrid and all the judges of the RTC of Santiago
City, Isabela were at their respective posts.

It is elementary that a municipal trial court judge has no authority to grant bail to an accused
arrested outside of his territorial jurisdiction. The requirements of Section 17(a), Rule 114
x x x must be complied with before a judge may grant bail. The Court recognizes that not every
judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not
warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases within the parameters of tolerable
misjudgment. Where x x x the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know it or
to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

[Judge Dumlao] undeniably erred in approving the bail and issuing the order of release. He is
expected to know that certain requirements ought to be complied with before he can
approve Medinas bail and issue an order for his release. The law involved is rudimentary that it
leaves little room for error. (Emphasis ours)

The acts of approving bail and ordering the release of accused whose cases are pending before other courts
constitute gross ignorance of the law. [15] Gross ignorance of the law is a serious offense [16] punishable by (1)
dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding
six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.[17]

Aside from Lim, the Court also found Judge Dumlao grossly ignorant of the law in Pascual v. Judge Dumlao.[18] In
that case, Judge Dumlao (1) hastily ordered the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) without notice and
hearing; (2) ordered the issuance of the TRO even though there was no showing of any grave or irreparable injury;
(3) hastily granted a motion to deposit harvest without notice and hearing; and (4) failed to order the sheriff to
render an accounting of the harvest.

Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides that competence is a prerequisite
to the due performance of judicial office. Judge Dumlao lacks this prerequisite.
Judge Dumlao disrespected the Court by repeatedly refusing to comment on the affidavit-complaint. In its
1st Indorsement dated 7 August 2003, 1st Tracer dated 11 November 2003, and 2nd Tracer dated 10 March 2004, the
OCA directed Judge Dumlao to comment on the affidavit-complaint. In its Resolutions dated 6 April 2005, 17 August
2005, and 6 February 2006, the Court fined Judge Dumlao P500, directed him to comment on the affidavit-
complaint, and directed him to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for refusing to
comment. Judge Dumlao unjustifiably ignored all six directives.

Court resolutions directing judges to comment on administrative complaints are not mere requests. Judges are
duty-bound to obey them fully and promptly. [19] In refusing to comment on the affidavit-complaint for almost five
years and despite several directives from the Court, Judge Dumlao blatantly demonstrated gross misconduct,
outright disrespect, indifference, and a recalcitrant streak in his character. [20]

This is the third time Judge Dumlao disrespected the Court. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Dumlao,[21] the
Court found him liable for ignoring its directives. In that case, the Court held that:

It appears that Judge Dumlao ignored and continued to ignore this Courts directive requiring
him to file his comment on complainant Sinaon, Jr.s administrative complaint. He had been
afforded more than ample time within which to file the required
pleading. x x x [S]everal Resolutions had been issued by the OCA and this Court requiring
Judge Dumlao to comment on the complaint against him. The first Resolution was issued as early
as 2 August 2002 and the last was issued almost three years later, or 5 July 2005, by which time,
the Court already deemed waived Judge Dumlaos right to file his comment and considered the
case submitted for decision based on the pleadings filed. Subsequently, Judge Dumlao again
failed to comply with the order of this Court to file his manifestation in the re-docketed
administrative complaint (concerning his non-filing of the comment) despite due notice.

Judge Dumlao had been given more than ample time to abide with the orders of this Court, yet
he persistently failed to do so. Judge Dumlao neither offered any reason nor raised any defense
for his failure to comply with the mandates of this Court. Nothing was heard from
Judge Dumlao as to what had prevented him from complying with the Courts directives. Such
insolence should not go unpunished. (Emphasis ours)

In Lim,[22] the Court also found Judge Dumlao liable for ignoring its directives. In that case, the Court held that, We
agree with the OCA that [Judge Dumlao] must be held administratively liable for his unjustified failure to comment
on an administrative complaint.This constitutes gross misconduct and insubordination.

Violation of Supreme Court directives is a less serious offense [23] punishable by (1) suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months, or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but
not exceeding P20,000.[24]

Aside from Lim, Pascual, and Office of the Court Administrator, Judge Dumlao has another administrative case
decided against him. In Morales, Sr. v. Judge Dumlao,[25] the Court found him liable for violating SC Administrative
Circular No. 1-90. In that case, the Court held that:
 [Judge Dumlaos] claim that he did not know how he inadvertently signed the notarized
revocation of power of attorney in this case betrays a deficiency of that degree of circumspection
demanded of all those who don the judicial robe. It is, in fact, an open admission of his
negligence and lack of care in attending to the incidents brought before him for adjudication. This
kind of judicial carelessness runs contrary to Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
states that:

A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality

and diligence. [(Emphasis ours)]

While we do not expect judges to have an encyclopedic recollection of applicable laws,

jurisprudence or administrative circulars we issue periodically in the discharge of their
responsibilities, they nevertheless have the bounden duty to keep abreast with the law and the
changes therein as well as the decisions of this Court. As a trial judge, [Judge Dumlao] is the
visible representation of law and justice. Under Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct he is
expected to be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence to maintain public
confidence in the legal system.

Inefficient judges are equally impermissible in the judiciary as the incompetent and dishonest
ones. Any of them tarnishes the image of the judiciary and brings it to public contempt, dishonor
or disrespect and must then be administratively dealt with and punished accordingly.

Judge Dumlao has amply demonstrated his incorrigibility and unfitness to be a judge. He is undeterred by the
several penalties and stern warnings the Court has given him. The Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate
penalty for it cannot tolerate any conduct that diminishes the faith of the people in the judicial system. [26]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Cesar M. Dumlao, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Isabela, GUILTY of GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and VIOLATION OF SUPREME COURT DIRECTIVES. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES him
from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reinstatement or
appointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335. March 5, 1997]

INOCENCIO BASCO, complainant, vs. JUDGE LEO H. RAPATALO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Agoo, La
Union, respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated August 14, 1995, complainant Inocencio Basco charged respondent Judge
Leo M. Rapatalo of RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union with gross ignorance or willful disregard of established rule of
law for granting bail to an accused in a murder case (Criminal Case No. 2927) without receiving evidence and
conducting a hearing.
Complainant, who is the father of the victim, alleged that an information for murder was filed against a
certain Roger Morente, one of three accused. The accused Morente filed a petition for bail. The hearing for said
petition was set for May 31, 1995 by petitioner but was not heard since the respondent Judge was then on leave. It
was reset to June 8, 1995 but on said date, respondent Judge reset it to June 22, 1995. The hearing for June 22,
1995, however, did not materialize. Instead, the accused was arraigned and trial was set. Again, the petition for bail
was not heard on said date as the prosecution's witnesses in connection with said petition were not notified.
Another attempt was made to reset the hearing to July 17, 1995.
In the meantime, complainant allegedly saw the accused in Rosario, La Union on July 3, 1995. He later learned
that the accused was out on bail despite the fact that the petition had not been heard at all. Upon investigation,
complainant discovered that bail had been granted and a release order dated June 29, 1995 [1] was issued on the
basis of a marginal note [2] dated June 22, 1995, at the bottom of the bail petition by Assistant Prosecutor Manuel
Oliva which stated: "No objection: P80,000.00," signed and approved by the assistant prosecutor and eventually by
respondent Judge. Note that there was already a release order dated June 29, 1995 on the basis of the marginal
note of the Assistant Prosecutor dated June 22, 1995 (when the hearing of the petition for bail was aborted and
instead arraignment took place) when another hearing was scheduled for July 17, 1995.
In his comment dated October 16, 1995, respondent Judge alleged that he granted the petition based on the
prosecutor's option not to oppose the petition as well as the latter's recommendation setting the bailbond in the
amount of P80,000.00. He averred that when the prosecution chose not to oppose the petition for bail, he had the
discretion on whether to approve it or not. He further declared that when he approved the petition, he had a right
to presume that the prosecutor knew what he was doing since he was more familiar with the case, having
conducted the preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the private prosecutor was not around at the time the
public prosecutor recommended bail.
Respondent Judge stated that in any case, the bailbond posted by accused was cancelled and a warrant for his
arrest was issued on account of complainant's motion for reconsideration. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
apparently conformed to and approved the motion for reconsideration. [3] To date, accused is confined at the La
Union Provincial Jail.
A better understanding of bail as an aspect of criminal procedure entails appreciating its nature and purposes.
"Bail" is the security required by the court and given by the accused to ensure that the accused appears before the
proper court at the scheduled time and place to answer the charges brought against him or her. In theory, the only
function of bail is to ensure the appearance of the defendant at the time set for trial. The sole purpose of confining
the accused in jail before conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his presence at the trial. [4] In other words, if
the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is only in theory that the proof being strong, the defendant
would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the court. Hence the exception to the
fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of probability of evasion of the
prosecution.[5] In practice, bail has also been used to prevent the release of an accused who might otherwise be
dangerous to society or whom the judges might not want to release." [6]
It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of bail that it is not a matter of right in cases where the
person is charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Article 114,
section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states, "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to
bail regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
 When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a
matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. "This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be
exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the
weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the
court,[7] it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to
the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal." [8]
To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, "is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and
exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature involves the exercise of the judge's
individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while
allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views, prevent them from getting out of
control. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable discretion on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord
Mansfield, speaking of the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail said: "But discretion when applied
to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must
not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful; but legal and regular." [9]
Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense cpunishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court,
must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. "A
summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the
purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the
weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of
the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the
discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters,
avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination." [10] If a party is denied the
opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of procedural due process.
That it is mandatory for the judge to require a hearing in a petition for bail is emphasized in the following
cases:

(1) People v. Sola decided in 1981.[11] In this case seven separate information for murder were filed against the
accused Sola and 18 other persons. After preliminary investigation, the municipal trial court issued warrants for
their arrest. However without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. the court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release. Citing People v. San
Diego,[12] we held: "We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in
custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire
to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant
special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural
due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground."

(2) People v. Dacudao decided in 1989.[13] In this case, an information was filed against the accused for murder, a
non-bailable offense. The judge, without conducting any hearing, granted bail on the ground that there was not
enough evidence to warrant a case for murder because only affidavits of the prosecution witnesses who were
allegedly not eyewitnesses to the crime were filed. We held: "Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued
the questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to
engender a well founded belief that the crime was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably
committed it. Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to established
unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the strength or
weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or held. It is equally entitled to due process."
(3) People v. Calo decided in 1990.[14] In this case, the prosecution was scheduled to present nine witnesses at the
hearings held to determine whether the evidence against the private respondents was strong. After hearing the
fifth witness, the respondent judge insisted on terminating the proceedings. We held: "The prosecution in the
instant case was not given adequate opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt and to present
within a reasonable time all the evidence it desired to present."

(4) Libarios v. Dabalo decided in 1991[15] which involved an administrative complaint against the respondent judge
for ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion. In this case, the respondent judge, without conducting any
prior hearing, directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused charged with murder, fixing at the
same time the bail at P50,000.00 each on the ground that the evidence against them was merely circumstantial .
We held: "Where a person is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary
proceeding to allow the prosecution to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to
prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary
release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail in the instant case amounted to a violation of
due process." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned to exercise more care in
the performance of his duties.

(5) People v. Nano decided in 1992.[16] In this case. the judge issued an order admitting the accused in a kidnapping
and murder case to bail without any hearing. We held: "The prosecution must first be given an opportunity to
present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence
that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong."

(6) Pico v. Combong, Jr. decided in 1992.[17] In this administrative case, the respondent judge granted bail to an
accused charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, without notice and hearing and even before the
accused had been arrested or detained. We held: "It is well settled that an application for bail from a person
charged with a capital offense (now an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua) must be set for hearing at which
both the defense and the prosecution must be given reasonable opportunity to prove (in case of the prosecution)
that the evidence of guilt of the applicant is strong, or (in the case of the defense) that such evidence of guilt was
not strong." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned to exercise greater care and
diligence in the performance of his duties.

(7) De Guia v. Maglalang decided in 1993,[18] the respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest and also fixed the bail
of an accused charged with the non bailable offense of statutory rape without allowing the prosecution an
opportunity to show that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. Respondent judge alleged that the
only evidence on record the sworn statements of the complaining witness and her guardian were not sufficient to
justify the denial of bail. We held: "It is an established principle that in cases where a person is accused of a capital
offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an opportunity
to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the accused. Failure to
conduct a hearing before fixing bail amounts to a violation of due process." It was noted that the warrant of arrest
was returned unserved and that after the case was re-raffled to the complainant judge's sala, the warrant was set
aside and cancelled. There was no evidence on record showing whether the approved bail was revoked by the
complainant judge, whether the accused was apprehended or whether the accused filed an application for bail.
Hence, the respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 instead of the usual P20,000.00 that the court
imposes on judges who grant the application of bail without notice and hearing.

(8) Borinaga v. Tamin decided in 1993.[19] In this case, a complaint for murder was filed against five persons. While
the preliminary investigation was pending in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, a petition for bail was filed by one of
the accused before the respondent judge in the Regional Trial Court. The respondent judge ordered the prosecutor
to appear at the hearing to present evidence that the guilt of the accused is strong. At the scheduled hearing, the
public prosecutor failed to appear prompting the respondent to grant the application for bail. We held: "Whether
the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in
the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present within a reasonable time all
evidence it may desire to introduce before the court may resolve the motion for bail." The respondent judge was
fined P20,000.00 and was warned that the commission of a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

(9) Aurillo v. Francisco decided in 1994.[20] In this administrative case, the respondent judge issued two separate
warrants of arrest against two persons charged with murder and parricide, but fixed the amount of bail for each
accused without notifying the prosecution of any motion to fix bail nor of any order granting the same. Citing
People v. Dacudao,[21] we held: "A hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine
whether the prosecution's evidence is weak or strong. Hence, a denial of the prosecution's request to adduce
evidence, deprives it of procedural due process, a right to which it is equally entitled as the defense. A hearing is
required to afford the judge a basis for determining the existence of those factors set forth under Rule 114, Sec 6."
The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000 with a warning that the commission of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

(10) Estoya v. Abraham-Singson decided in 1994[22] In this case, an administrative complaint was filed against the
respondent judge, alleging, among others, that she granted an application for bail filed by the accused charged
with murder. The grant was made over the objection of the prosecution which insisted that the evidence of guilt
was strong and without allowing the prosecution to present evidence in this regard. We held: "In immediately
granting bail and fixing it at only P20,000.00 for each of the accused without allowing the prosecution to present its
evidence, the respondent denied the prosecution due process. This Court had said so in many cases and had
imposed sanctions on judges who granted applications for bail in capital offenses and in offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt is
strong." The respondent judge was dismissed from service because the erroneous granting of bail was just one of
the offenses found to have been committed by her in the aforesaid complaint.

(11) Aguirre v. Belmonte decided in 1994.[23] In this administrative case the respondent judge issued warrants of
arrest and, at the same time and on his own motion. authorized the provisional release on bail of the accused in
two criminal cases for murder. The accused were still at large at the time the order granting bail was issued . We
held: "A hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is charged with a capital offense." The
judge was ordered to pay a fine of P25,000.00 with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely. He was meted a fine in a higher amount than the usual P20,000.00 because
it involved two criminal cases wherein the respondent judge, "was not only the grantor of bail but likewise the
applicant therefor."

(12) Lardizabal v. Reyes decided in 1994.[24] In this administrative case, the respondent judge issued an order
directing the arrest of the accused charged with rape and, motu proprio, fixed the bail of the accused in the
amount of P80,000.00 without application on the part of the accused to be admitted to bail. When the accused
filed a motion to reduce bailbond, the respondent judge again, without any prior notice and hearing, reduced the
bail to P40,000.00. We held: "The rule is explicit that when an accused is charged with a serious offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua, such as rape, bail may be granted only after a motion for that purpose has been filed by the
accused and a hearing thereon conducted by a judge to determine whether or not the prosecution's evidence of
guilt is strong." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with a warning that a repetition of
similar or the same offense will be dealt with more severely.

(13) Guillermo v. Reyes decided in 1995[25] involving an administrative complaint against the respondent judge for
granting bail to the two accused charged with serious illegal detention. When the two accused first filed a joint
application for bail, the petition for bail was duly heard and the evidence offered by the accused and the
prosecution in opposition thereto were properly taken into account. However, the respondent judge denied the
application for bail on the ground that it was premature since the accused were not yet in custody of the law. In a
subsequent order, the respondent judge, without conducting any hearing on the aforestated application and
thereby denying the prosecution an opportunity to oppose the same, granted said petition upon the voluntary
appearance in court of the two accused. Respondent judge insisted that there was a hearing but the proceeding he
adverted to was that which was conducted when the motion for bail was first considered and then denied for being
premature. We held: "The error of the respondent judge lies in the fact that in his subsequent consideration of the
application for bail, he acted affirmatively thereon without conducting another hearing and what is worse, his
order concededly lacked the requisite summary or resume of the evidence presented by the parties and necessary
to support the grant of bail." The respondent judge was reprimanded because despite the irregularity in the
procedure adopted in the proceeding, the prosecution was undeniably afforded the benefit of notice and hearing.
No erroneous appreciation of the evidence was alleged nor did the prosecution indicate its desire to introduce
additional evidence in an appropriate challenge to the aforestated grant of bail by the respondent.

(14) Santos v. Ofilada decided in 1995.[26] In this case, an administrative complaint was filed against the respondent
judge, who, without notice and hearing to the prosecution, granted bail to an accused charged with murder and
illegal possession of firearm. We held: "Where admission to bail is a matter of discretion, a hearing is mandatory
before an accused can be granted bail. At the hearing, both the prosecution and the defense must be given
reasonable opportunity to prove, in case of the prosecution, that the evidence of guilt of the applicant is strong,
and in the case of the defense, that evidence of such guilt is not strong." The respondent judge was ordered to pay
a fine of P20,000.00 with a warning that a repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe sanction.

(15) Sule v. Biteng decided in 1995.[27] In this administrative case, the respondent judge, without affording the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard, granted with indecent haste the petition for bail filed by the accused
charged with murder because the accused "x x x voluntarily surrendered to the authorities as soon as he was
informed that he was one of the suspect (sic) x x x" We held: "With his open admission that he granted bail to the
accused without giving the prosecution any opportunity to be heard, the respondent deliberately disregarded
decisions of this court holding that such act amounts to a denial of due process, and made himself administratively
liable for gross ignorance of the law for which appropriate sanctions may be imposed." The respondent judge was
ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned that commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be
dealt with more severely.

(16) Reymualdo Buzon, Jr. v. Judge Tirso Velasco decided in 1996.[28] In this administrative case, the respondent
judge, without hearing nor comment from the prosecution, granted bail to an accused charged with murder.
Notably, no bail was recommended in the warrant of arrest. We held: "When bail is a matter of discretion, the
judge is required to conduct a hearing and to give notice of such hearing to the fiscal or require him to submit his
recommendation. x x x Truly, a judge would not be in a position to determine whether the prosecution's evidence is
weak or strong unless a hearing is first conducted." A fine of P20,000.00 was imposed on the respondent judge
with the stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The aforecited cases are all to the effect that when bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or
otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence,
or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented
by the parties.
Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just
file a comment or leave the application for bail to the discretion of the court. Hence:

(1) In the case of Gimeno v. Arcueno, Sr.,[29] an administrative complaint was filed against the respondent judge for
granting bail to one of the accused in a robbery with homicide case without affording the prosecution a chance to
be heard. The respondent judge explained that he issued an order for the motion to fix bail but the public
prosecutor filed a comment instead which respondent judge thought was adequate compliance with law.
Respondent added that the evidence of guilt of the accused, as disclosed by the records, was not so strong as to
deny the application for bail. In fact, the accused who filed for bail, together with three others, were later dropped
by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor from the information for failure of the witnesses to positively identify
them. We held: "The grant of bail is a matter of right except in cases involving capital offenses when the matter is
left to the sound discretion of the court. That discretion lies, not in the determination whether or not a hearing
should be held but in the appreciation and evaluation of the prosecution's evidence of guilt against the accused. x x
x A hearing is plainly indispensable before a judge can aptly be said to be in a position to determine whether the
evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong." Although the respondent judge's explanation was not enough to
completely exculpate him, the circumstances, coupled with his sincere belief in the propriety of his order warranted
a mitigation of the usual sanction the Court imposes in cases of this nature. The respondent judge was ordered to
pay a fine of P5,000.00 and warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

(2) In the case of Concerned Citizens v. Elma,[30] an administrative complaint was filed against the respondent judge
for granting bail to a person charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa in five separate information.
The accused filed a motion to fix bail and the respondent judge instead of setting the application for hearing,
directed the prosecution to file its comment or opposition. The prosecution submitted its comment leaving the
application for bail to the discretion of the court. The respondent judge, in granting the bail of the accused
rationalized that in ordering the prosecution to comment on the accused's motion to fix bail, he has substantially
complied with the requirement of a formal hearing. He further claimed that he required the prosecution to adduce
evidence but the latter refused and left the determination of the motion to his discretion. This Court held, "It is true
that the weight of the evidence adduced is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. However, such
discretion may only be exercised after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the
purpose of determining whether or not he should be granted liberty. x x x In the case at bar, however, no formal
hearing was conducted by the respondent judge. He could not have assessed the weight of evidence against the
accused Gatus before granting the latter's application for bail." The respondent judge was dismissed from service
because he was previously fined for a similar offense and was sternly warned that a repetition of the same or
similar offense would be dealt with more severely.

(3) In the case of Baylon v. Sison,[31] an administrative complaint was filed against the respondent judge for granting
bail to several accused in a double murder case. The respondent judge claimed that he granted the application for
bail because the assistant prosecutor who was present at the hearing did not interpose an objection thereto and
that the prosecution never requested that it be allowed to show that the evidence of guilt is strong but instead,
submitted the incident for resolution. The respondent judge further claimed that the motion for reconsideration of
the order granting bail was denied only after due consideration of the pertinent affidavits. We held: "The discretion
of the court, in cases involving capital offenses may be exercised only after there has been a hearing called to
ascertain the weight of the evidence against the accused. Peremptorily, the discretion lies, not in determining
whether or not there will be a hearing, but in appreciating and evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt
against the accused." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with a stern warning that the
commission of the same or similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.

A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to
grant and fix bail. "The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases wherein the court ruled
that even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is
still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength
of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused." [32]
In the recent case of Tucay v. Domagas,[33] an administrative complaint was filed against the respondent judge
for granting bail to an accused charged with murder. The application for bail contained the annotation "No
objection" of the provincial prosecutor and the respondent judge, without holding a hearing to determine whether
the evidence of the prosecution was strong, granted bail and ordered the release of the accused from detention
with instructions to the bondsman to register the bond with the Register of Deeds within ten days. It was later
found out that the assessed value of the property given was short of the amount fixed for the release of the
accused. We held: "Although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the
accused, respondent judge should have nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently
ascertained from the prosecution whether the latter was not really contesting the bail application. x x x Only after
satisfying himself that the prosecution did not wish to oppose the petition for bail for justifiable cause (e.g., for
tactical reasons) and taking into account the factors enumerated in Rule 114, Sec. 6 for fixing bail should
respondent judge have ordered the petition for bail and ordered the release of the accused." Respondent judge
herein was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and was given a stern warning that the commission of a similar
offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.
Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for bail is required, as can be gleaned from the
abovecited case, is for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail. [34] This Court, in a number of cases [35] held that even if the prosecution
fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an accused, the court may still require that it
answer questions in order to ascertain not only the strength of the state's evidence but also the adequacy of the
amount of bail.
After hearing, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution.[36] On the basis thereof, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the
evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused. Otherwise, the order granting or
denying the application for bail may be invalidated because the summary of evidence for the prosecution which
contains the judge's evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both
the prosecution and the defense.
This court in the case of Carpio v. Maglalang[37] invalidated the order of respondent judge granting bail to the
accused because "Without summarizing the factual basis of its order granting bail, the court merely stated the
number of prosecution witnesses but not their respective testimonies, and concluded that the evidence presented
by the prosecution was not "sufficiently strong" to deny bail to Escano."
With the mounting precedents, this Court sees no reason why it has to repeatedly remind trial court judges to
perform their mandatory duty of conducting the required hearing in bail applications where the accused stands
charged with a capital offense.
An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals that respondent Judge granted bail to the accused
without first conducting a hearing to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong despite his knowledge that the
offense charged is a capital offense in disregard of the procedure laid down in Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94.
Respondent judge admittedly granted the petition for bail based on the prosecution's declaration not to
oppose the petition. Respondent's assertion, however, that he has a right to presume that the prosecutor knows
what he is doing on account of the latter's familiarity with the case due to his having conducted the preliminary
investigation is faulty. Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial
discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge
before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has
never been reposed upon the prosecutor.
In the case of Montalbo v. Santamaria,[38] this Court held that the respondent judge is duty bound to exercise
judicial discretion conferred upon him by law to determine whether in the case at bar, the proof is evident or the
presumption of guilt is strong against the defendant and to grant or deny the petition for provisional liberty. It also
held that a writ of mandamus will lie in order to compel the respondent judge to perform a duty imposed upon him
by law.
The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for granting bail to the accused. It is the court's
determination after a hearing that the guilt of the accused is not strong that forms the basis for granting bail.
Respondent Judge should not have relied solely on the recommendation made by the prosecutor but should have
ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong. After all, the judge is not bound by the prosecutor's
recommendation. Moreover, there will be a violation of due process if the respondent Judge grants the application
for bail without hearing since Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that whatever evidence presented for or against the
accused's provisional release will be determined at the hearing.
 The practice by trial court judges of granting bail to the accused when the prosecutor refuses or fails to
present evidence to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong can be traced to the case of Herras
Teehankee v. Director of Prisons[39] where this Court gave the following "instructions" to the People's Court, [40] thus:

"1) In capital cases like the present when the prosecutor does not oppose the petition for release on bail, the court
should, as a general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion, grant the release after the approval of the bail
which it should fix for the purpose;

2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special prosecutor's attitude is not justified, it may ask him
questions to ascertain the strength of the state's evidence or to judge the adequacy of the amount of bail;

3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer any particular question on the ground that the answer
may involve a disclosure imperiling the success of the prosecution or jeopardizing the public interest, the court may
not compel him to do so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the Solicitor General, who, as head of
the Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested with the direction and control of the prosecution, and may not, even at
the trial, be ordered by the court to present evidence which he does not want to introduce provided, of course,
that such refusal shall not prejudice the rights of the defendant or detainee." [41]

The rationale for the first instruction was stated by this Court, as follows:

"If, for any reason, any party should abstain from introducing evidence in the case for any definite purpose, no law
nor rule exists by which he may be so compelled and the court before which the case is pending has to act without
that evidence and, in so doing, it clearly would not be failing in its duties. If the Constitution or the law plots a
certain course of action to be taken by the court when certain evidence is found by it to exist, and the opposite
course if that evidence is wanting, and said evidence is not voluntarily adduced by the proper party, the court's
clear duty would be to adopt that course which has been provided for in case of absence of such evidence.
Applying the principle to the case at bar, it was no more within the power nor discretion of the court to coerce the
prosecution into presenting its evidence than to force the prisoner into adducing hers. And when both elected not
to do so, as they had a perfect right to elect, the only thing remaining for the court to do was to grant the
application for bail."

As for the second instruction, this Court stated that:

"The prosecutor might not oppose the application for bail and might refuse to satisfy his burden of proof, but
where the court has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude is not justified, as when he is evidently
committing a gross error or a dereliction of duty, the court must possess a reasonable degree of control over him in
the paramount interest of justice. Under such circumstance, the court is authorized by our second instruction to
inquire from the prosecutor as to the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it is strong, it being
possible for the prosecutor to have erred in considering it weak and, therefore, recommending bail."

As for the third instruction, this Court declared:

"It must be observed that the court is made to rely upon the official statement of the Solicitor General on the
question of whether or not the revelation of evidence may endanger the success of the prosecution and jeopardize
the public interest. This is so, for there is no way for the court to determine that question without having the
evidence disclosed in the presence of the applicant, disclosure which is sought to be avoided to protect the
interests of the prosecution before the trial."

It is to be recalled that Herras Teehankee was decided fully half a century ago under a completely different
factual milieu. Haydee Herras Teehankee was indicted under a law dealing with treason cases and collaboration
with the enemy. The said "instructions" given in the said case under the 1940 Rules of Court no longer apply due to
the amendments introduced in the 1985 Rules of Court.
In the 1940 Rules of Court of the Philippines, the applicable provisions on "Bail" provides, as follows:

"Sec. 5. Capital offenses defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this rule, is an offense which, under the
law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be
punished by death.

Sec. 6. Capital offenses not bailable. No person in custody for the commission of a capital offense shall be admitted
to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Sec. 7. Capital offense Burden of proof . On the hearing of an application for admission to bail made by any person
who is in custody for the commission of a capital offense, the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong
is on the prosecution.

The above-cited provisions have not been adopted in toto in the 1985 Rules of Court, as amended by
Administrative Circular No. 12-94, since some phrases and lines have been intercalated, as shown by the
underscored phrases and statements below:

"Sec. 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in these rules, is an offense which, under the
law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be
punished with death.

Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person
charged with a capital offense, of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for admission to bail filed by any person
who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearings shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party, the court
may recall any witness for additional examination unless the witness is dead, outside of the Philippines or
otherwise unable to testify."

It should be noted that there has been added in Section 8 a crucial sentence not found in the counterpart
provision, Section 7, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Court. The above-underscored sentence in Section 8, Rule 114 of
the 1985 Rules of Court, as amended, was added to address a situation where in case the prosecution does not
choose to present evidence to oppose the application for bail, the judge may feel duty-bound to grant the bail
application. In such a case, the judge may well lose control of the proceedings. In a sense, this undermines the
authority of a judge since all that the prosecution has to do to "force" the judge to grant the bail application is to
refrain from presenting evidence opposing the same. In effect, this situation makes Sections 6 and 7 of the 1940
Rules of Court on "Bail" meaningless since whether or not the evidence of guilt of a person charged with a capital
offense is strong cannot be determined if the prosecution chooses not to present evidence or oppose the bail
application in a hearing precisely to be conducted by the trial judge for that purpose, as called for in the two
sections. In the event that the prosecution fails or refuses to adduce evidence in the scheduled hearing, then a
hearing as in a regular trial should be scheduled. In this regard, a hearing in the application for bail necessarily
means presentation of evidence, and the filing of a comment or a written opposition to the bail application by the
prosecution will not suffice.
The prosecution under the revised provision is duty bound to present evidence in the bail hearing to prove
whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong and not merely to oppose the grant of bail to the accused.
"This also prevents the practice in the past wherein a petition for bail was used as a means to force the prosecution
into a premature revelation of its evidence and, if it refused to do so, the accused would claim the grant of bail on
the ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong." [42]
It should be stressed at this point, however, that the nature of the hearing in an application for bail must be
equated with its purpose i.e., to determine the bailability of the accused. If the prosecution were permitted to
conduct a hearing for bail as if it were a full-dress trial on the merits, the purpose of the proceeding, which is to
secure provisional liberty of the accused to enable him to prepare for his defense, could be defeated. At any rate, in
case of a summary hearing, the prosecution witnesses could always be recalled at the trial on the merits. [43]
In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the jurisprudential principles just enunciated, this Court
reiterates the duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:

(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation
(Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);

(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra);

(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);

(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section
19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied.

The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in
cases of bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in
the proper cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge
or awareness thereof.[44] A judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he is
supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
the statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration of justice only if there be a belief on the
part of litigants that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal
principles.[45]
Respondent judge herein insists that he could exercise his discretion in granting bail to the accused since the
Assistant Prosecutor signified in writing that he had no objection to the grant of bail and recommended, instead,
the bailbond in the sum of P80,000.00. It is to be emphasized that although the court may have the discretion to
grant the application for bail, in cases of capital offenses, the determination as to whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong can only be reached after due hearing which, in this particular instance has not been substantially
complied with by the respondent Judge.
While it may be true that the respondent judge set the application for bail for hearing three times, thus
showing lack of malice or bad faith in granting bail to the accused, nonetheless, this does not completely exculpate
him because the fact remains that a hearing has not actually been conducted in violation of his duty to determine
whether or not the evidence against the accused is strong for purposes of bail. Normally, the Court imposes a
penalty of P20,000.00 fine in cases where the judge grants the application for bail without notice and hearing. In
view however of the circumstances of this case, a reprimand instead of the P20,000.00 would suffice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo, RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union, is
hereby REPRIMANDED with the WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 134203 May 27, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ELVIE EJANDRA @ ELVIES EJANDRA @ BEBOT EJANDRA @ ALEJANDRO EJANDRA @ BEBOT OCAY SUANGCO,
MAGDALENA CALUNOD y MAGANOY @ MAGDALENA SALIOT-SUANGCO, ANTONIO HUERA y RANDA, ROEL
REVILLA CERON, and EDWIN TAMPOS y AMPARO (All detained at Quezon City Jail, Quezon City), appellants.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is a review on automatic appeal of the Decision 1 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 219,
convicting appellants Elvie Ejandra, Magdalena Calunod, Edwin Tampos and Roel Revilla of kidnapping for ransom,
and sentencing them to suffer the death penalty.

The Indictment

The accused were charged of kidnapping for ransom in an Information filed in the Regional Trial Court which reads:

That on or about July 2, 1997, in Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-
named accused, while confederating, conniving, conspiring, and helping each and one another, did then
and there with the use of force, threat and intimidation, take and carry away, a nine-year-old minor child,
Ed Henderson Tan, against the will and consent of the latter nor any of his natural and legal parents or
guardian, to an unknown destination, detain, hold and control Ed Henderson Tan depriving him of his
liberty, and during their control and custody of Ed Henderson Tan, call, demand and negotiate the
payment of ransom money from Eddie Tan, the father of Ed Henderson Tan, for the safe release and return
of the victim Ed Henderson, otherwise, the victim would be harmed or killed, the victims father Eddie Tan
actually paid the accused the amount of 548,000.00 as ransom money, for the safe release of the victim
to the damage and prejudice of the victim Ed Henderson Tan and his father Eddie Tan.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

The accused, assisted by counsel, were arraigned for the crime charged on November 11, 1997, and entered their
respective pleas of not guilty.

The Evidence for the Prosecution

Ed Henderson Tan, the nine-year old son of the spouses Eddie and Marileen Tan, was a Grade III student at the
Philippine Institute of Quezon City, located at Kitanlad, Quezon City. 3 At about 4:00 p.m. on July 2, 1997, Ed
Henderson was dismissed from his classes and proceeded to the nearby house of his tutor in Chinese language,
Huang Lao Shih.4 Ed Henderson and his father, Eddie Tan, had earlier agreed that after the tutorial classes ended at
7:00 p.m., Ed Henderson would phone his father, who would then fetch him from his mentors house. 5 The tutorial
classes ended at 7:00 p.m., as scheduled, and Ed Henderson then proceeded to the store near the gate of the
school to have his periodic test papers photocopied. 6 He left the store and was on his way back to the house of his
tutor to wait for his father.

Suddenly, Ed Tampos, armed with a revolver (de bola),7 chased and overtook Ed Henderson at the Royalty canteen
near the school.8 Tampos ordered the boy to proceed to a motorcyle parked nearby and warned the latter that if he
refused, he would be shot. Petrified, Ed Henderson approached the motorcycle where appellants Elvie Ejandra and
Roel Revilla were waiting. Ejandra had no legs (pilay), while Revilla had curly hair. There was no lamp post outside
the school premises but the lights inside the school were still on. 9 Ejandra covered Ed Hendersons mouth with his
hand, pointed his gun at the boy 10 and warned the latter not to shout. 11 Revilla boarded the motorcycle and took
the drivers seat. Ejandra sat behind him, and Tampos sat behind Ejandra. Tampos ordered Ed Henderson to board
the motorcyle, or else, he would be shot.12 The boy was then ordered to sit behind Tampos.13

Ed was brought to a one-storey house with cemented flooring and white-colored walls. 14 Once inside, he saw a man
who was drinking, who turned out to be Antonio Huera, and a female, who turned out to be Magdalena
Calunod.15Ed Henderson also saw a cell phone. 16 The was ordered to write down his fathers telephone number, as
well as that of their house and their store. 17 Ed Henderson did as he was told, and wrote down the number 737-61-
77 the telephone number of his father, Eddie Tan. It appeared to the boy that Ejandra was the leader of his
abductors because it was he who gave orders to the others.

In the meantime, Eddie went to fetch his son at 7:00 p.m. at his tutors house, but the boy was nowhere to be
found.18 Frantic, Eddie contacted his friends and relatives and asked if they knew where his son was, to no avail. He
even called up hospitals, inquiring if a boy named Ed Henderson had been admitted as a patient. 19 Shortly after
midnight, Eddie received a call from his house that someone had called earlier up his mother, Benita Tan, with the
information that his son had been kidnapped 20 and that the kidnappers wanted to talk to the parents. 21 Eddie
rushed back home.

At 12:30 a.m., Eddie received a call through his home phone, informing him that his son had been kidnapped. The
caller demanded 10,000,000 for the safe release of his son. 22 When Eddie informed the caller that he did not have
10,000,000, the latter hung up the phone.23

In the meantime, as ordered by Ejandra, Ed Henderson called up his father, through the kidnappers cell phone, to
urge his father to pay the ransom money.24

Thereafter, Eddie received several calls threatening him that if he refused to pay the ransom they demanded, the
kidnappers would cut Ed Hendersons ear and finger, and thereafter kill the boy and dump his body in an isolated
place. Eddie pleaded for mercy but the caller would simply hang up the telephone. 25

Eddie and his family were terrified of the callers threats that they could hardly sleep. They lost their appetite just
thinking of what Ed Henderson would suffer in the hands of his kidnappers. 26 At 6:00 p.m. on July 3, 1997, a Sunday,
Eddie received another call informing him that the kidnappers had agreed to reduce the ransom to
5,000,000.27 Eddie told the caller that he did not have 5,000,000 and pleaded that the ransom be reduced.
However, the caller merely repeated his threat that the kidnappers would cut Ed Hendersons fingers and ears, and
dump the boy in an isolated place.28

Meanwhile, Eddie began borrowing money from his relatives and friends. He received another call reiterating the
demand for ransom. He told the caller that he would try to raise 585,000 but the caller told Eddie to raise
600,000. Eddie was finally able to borrow 548,000 from his relatives and friends. When the caller called anew,
Eddie revealed that he was able to raise only 548,000 and reiterated that he could no longer borrow any
additional amount.29
At 10:00 a.m. the next day, July 4, 1997, another call from the kidnappers came through, and Eddie reiterated that
he could no longer raise any additional amount. The caller hung up, but called again and informed Eddie that the
kidnappers had agreed to accept a ransom of 548,000.00. 30 At about noon, the caller contacted Eddie and
instructed him to place the money in a newspaper and to bring the money to the parking lot in front of the Sto.
Domingo Church in Quezon City within ten minutes. The caller further instructed Eddie to open the doors and
windows of his car upon arriving at the designated spot. Eddie was also told that a man would approach him and
call him "Eddie."

Eddie did as he was told.31 He placed the money in a newspaper and placed it in a Shoe Mart (SM) plastic bag. 32He
then proceeded to the designated place on board his Besta van. He parked the van in the parking lot in front of the
convent adjacent to the Sto. Domingo Church. 33 He opened the doors and windows, then alighted from the car.
Momentarily, appellant Calunod approached Eddie and called out, "EddieaEddie." Eddie noted that Calunod had
a scar on her right temple. Eddie was taken aback because he was expecting a man to approach him. Nevertheless,
when he heard Calunod say "Eddie," he handed over the plastic bag which contained the money. 34He asked her
how his son was,35 she told him not to worry because she would bring the boy home. Calunod then walked to the
gate of the Santo Domingo Church. 36 Eddie went home to wait for his sons return. Shortly after his arrival at their
house, Eddie received two telephone calls from a male and a female, respectively, who informed him of his sons
impending release.

Between 3:20 to 3:30 p.m. of July 4, 1997, Ed Henderson was told that he would be brought back home. 37 The boy
then called up his mother and told her that he would be back soon. Tampos and Calunod boarded Ed Henderson in
a taxi. Calunod ordered the boy to pretend that she was his aunt. 38 Ed recalled that it was also Calunod who took
care of him and gave him food in the house where he was detained. 39 The taxi stopped near the Imperial Drugstore
at E. Rodriguez Avenue, where Calunod instructed Ed Henderson to get down. She gave the boy 50.00 for his fare
back home. The boy took a taxi and was soon reunited with his waiting family.

On July 7, 1997, Ed Henderson gave a sworn statement to PO3 Terencio Claudio of the Criminal Investigation
Division in Camp Crame, Quezon City.40 He was shown photographs of suspects of kidnappings and he identified,
from the pictures shown to him, Elvie Ejandra alias Alejandro Ejandra and Magdalena Calunod 41 as two of his
kidnappers.

The Case for the Accused

Edwin Tampos denied any involvement in the kidnapping of Ed Henderson, and invoked alibi as an additional
defense. He claimed that the first time he met Elvie Ejandra and Magdalena Calunod was in Camp Crame, Quezon
City, after he was arrested, with Roel Revilla, on board the latters tricycle at 10:00 p.m. on August 13, 1997. He
knew Antonio Huera, who lived in the same place and solicited bets for "ending." He also knew Roel Revilla, who
was a tricycle driver. Tampos claimed that he was arrested without any warrant therefor, and that he was
handcuffed, mauled and blindfolded. He was asked if he was a kidnapper, denied that he was one and was forced
to sign a piece of paper. He testified that he eked out a living as a butcher of pigs at Villa Beatriz, Old Balara,
Quezon City. He sold the butchered pigs three times a week within the neighborhood. His aunt, Biba Oray, financed
his business.42 Tampos also averred that he owned three fighting cocks.43

Tampos claimed that on July 2, 1997, he was so tired of butchering pigs and opted to stay home the whole day and
night. At 10:00 p.m., he went out of his house and bought cigarettes. 44 He returned home immediately thereafter
and slept.45 He and his aunt made plans to buy pigs to be butchered. He was also at home the following day, July 4,
1997, tending to his three fighting cocks.46

Roel Revilla, likewise, denied any involvement in the kidnapping of Ed Henderson and also interposed an alibi. He
testified that he arrived from Sogus, Southern Leyte on August 5, 1997 and stayed in the house of Antonio Huera,
his brothers friend at Villa Beatriz, Old Balara, Quezon City. Huera worked at the Tarpark and promised that he
would help Revilla get a job there. 47 He was arrested on August 13, 1998 by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission
(PACC) agents, along with Huera and Tampos. They were brought to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where they were
blindfolded, mauled and tortured. He was asked if he was a kidnapper, but he denied any involvement in the
incident. He averred that he did not know of any reason why Ed Henderson would implicate him in the kidnapping.

Magdalena Calunod denied any involvement in the crime charged. She testified that she was thirty-five-year-old
businesswoman from Iligan City. She had a stall in Manggahan in 1994, but the same was demolished in 1995. She
returned to Iligan City and tended fighting cocks from 1995 to 1997. 48 In August 1997, she was residing in a rented
house at Bidasari, Lagro Subdivision, Quezon City. Sometime on August 14, 1998, she and Ejandra were on their
way to Nueva Ecija when policemen blocked their vehicle. She, at first, thought that the men were hold-uppers
because they were divested of their money, pieces of jewelry and clothes. The policemen were not armed with any
warrant of arrest. She admitted that she had been charged of kidnapping in another case in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City on August 10, 1997.

Elvie Ejandra also denied any involvement in the kidnapping of Henderson. Like the other accused, he interposed
the defense of alibi. He testified that he and Magdalena Calunod were married. 49 Since 1994, he had been engaged
in the business of onions and ready-to-wear clothes which they sold in Baclaran and Divisoria. They also had a stall
in Manggahan where they sold onions.50 When their stall was demolished in 1994, they went back to Iligan
City.51On July 2, 1993, he and Calunod were in Iligan City tending fighting cocks. They returned to Quezon City from
Iligan City only on July 9 or July 10, 1997. 52 They were arrested on August 14, 1997 by policemen while they were
on their way to Sicsican, Nueva Ecija. When he was arrested, he had a drivers license in the name of Bebot
Suangco.53 He averred that he did not have any cell phone, but had a car with plate no. 413. 54

Antonio Huera also denied the charge and interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that he was employed by the
Car Parts Manufacturing as a power press operator. 55 However, when his employment was terminated on June 25,
1997, he became a collector of bets for "ending." 56 On July 27, 1997, he was in the house of his uncle, which was a
stones throw away from his own house at No. 7, Don Fabian Street, Villa Beatriz Subdivision, Old Balara, Quezon
City.57 His grandfather died that day in Southern Leyte 58 and was later buried on July 3, 1997. 59 Roel Revilla spent
the night in his house when he arrived from Southern Leyte. 60 Huera also admitted that Elvie Ejandra was his
classmate in high school, who visited him on August 5, 1997. 61 He was arrested at 5:30 a.m. of August 14, 1997 at
his house, on the mere suspicion that he was a kidnapper. He and two others were brought to Camp Crame,
Quezon City, where he was beaten and maltreated.

On June 4, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the accused of kidnapping for ransom defined and
penalized in Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced each of them to suffer the death penalty.
Antonio Huera, was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence, The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused Edwin Tampos, Elvie Ejandra, Magdalena Calunod, and Roel Revilla GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for ransom, the court hereby sentences each of
them to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to pay the victim, Ed Henderson Tan and his family, the amount of
548,000.00 as actual damages with legal interest until fully paid, and 1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
and to pay the costs.

Accused Antonio Huera is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. The Warden of Quezon City Jail
is hereby ordered to release him from custody unless he is being detained for another charge or unlawful
case.

SO ORDERED.62

The Present Appeal

Appellants Ejandra and Calunod do not dispute that they kidnapped Ed Henderson. They merely assert that the
prosecution failed to prove that they had a cellular phone, implying that they could not have used it to demand
ransom for the victims release. It was their daughter, Sherry Mae Saliot who was the subscriber to telephone
number 490-55-95. They also assert that they were arrested without any warrant therefor. 63

For their part, appellants Tampos and Revilla contend that the trial court erred in not acquitting them of the crime
charged on reasonable doubt.64 They aver that Ed Henderson could not have recognized them as two of those who
kidnapped him at 7:00 p.m. on July 2, 1997 in the vicinity of the Philippine Institute of Quezon City, because the
place was dark. They assert that it was physically impossible for four people to ride on a motorcycle. The appellants
aver that Ed Hendersons testimony is unreliable, as police officers coached him and taught him what to say during
a confrontation between him and the suspects in Camp Crame, Quezon City.

Appellant Revilla posits that the boy could have mistaken him for Tito Lozada with whom the appellants were when
they were arrested. He argues that he merely stayed in the house of Huera and since the latter was acquitted, he
should also be acquitted. Appellant Revilla insists that his extrajudicial confession is not admissible in evidence
against him because he was forced by policemen into signing the same. He argues that the trial court erred in not
considering his alibi, that on July 7, 1997 he was in Sogus, Southern Leyte. Appellant Tampos further alleges that it
was unlikely that he would be involved in the kidnapping because he was engaged in the lucrative business of being
a butcher and meat vendor. He asserted that he was forced into signing a piece of paper in Camp Crame; hence,
the said paper is inadmissible in evidence against him.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that in failing to assail any irregularity in their arrest before
they were arraigned for the crime charged on November 11, 1993, the appellants thereby waived their right to do
so. The appellants even failed to file their respective counter-affidavits during the preliminary investigation of the
charge against them at the Department of Justice. Moreover, the prosecution adduced overwhelming evidence to
prove the crime charged that the appellants were the perpetrators of the said crime.

The contentions of the appellants do not persuade. Ed Henderson positively and in a straightforward manner
testified that appellant Tampos was the one who chased and grabbed him near his school, and that it was appellant
Revilla who drove the motorcycle from the school to the house where he was detained. Ed Henderson was able to
recognize the two appellants because the lights inside the Philippine Institute illuminated the place where he was
chased and grabbed by appellant Tampos. The victim even noticed that appellant Revilla, who drove the
motorcycle, had curly hair. Appellant Tampos was so close to Ed Henderson, as it was he who poked the gun at the
boy, and even warned the latter that he would be shot if he refused to board the motorcycle. The testimony of Ed
Henderson pointing to appellants Tampos and Revilla as two of his kidnappers near the Philippine Institute of
Quezon City, reads:

ATTY. CHUA:

Q What were you doing when you were kidnapped?

A I have something xeroxed, sir.

Q Can you tell this court how you were "nahuli"?

A When I finished xeroxing something, I was running and then

somebody chased me, sir.

Q Who was the one chasing you?

A "Yung humuli sa akin."

Q If he is in court, will you please step down from the witness stand and point him to us?

A Yes, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Witness stepping down from the witness stand and proceed to a man wearing yellow T-shirt who when
asked to identify himself he gave his name as Edwin Tampos.

ATTY. CHUA:

Q After this man whom you pointed to, caught you, what did you do?

A He showed me a gun, sir.

Q After he showed you a gun, what did you do?

A He told me "sakay."

Q Where?

A In a motorcycle, sir.65

ATTY. ROUS:

Q Mr. Witness, who was the one driving the motorcycle?

A The person with curly hair, sir.

Q Where were you seated when you were boarded

ATTY. CHUA:

At what point in time because he rode the motorcycle twice, Your Honor.

ATTY. ROUS:

Q When you were taken from your school, who was the person driving?

A The person with curly hair, sir.

Q When you were taken from your school, where were you seated in the motorcycle?

A I was positioned "sa pangatlo" sir.

 Q What do you mean by "pangatlo"?

A The first one in the motorcycle was the driver, the curly hair, the second one is Edwin Tampos and I was
on the third part.

Q What was the color of this motorcycle?

A Red, sir.66

Moreover, Ed Henderson was with appellants Revilla and Tampos when they reached the house where the boy was
detained. The lights inside the house were on and Ed Henderson, saw the appellants Revilla and Tampos at close
range. The victim, likewise, identified appellant Tampos when the latter and Calunod boarded him in a motorcycle
in broad daylight in the afternoon of July 4, 1997. Tampos and Calunod brought the boy to the Imperial Drugstore
at E. Rodriguez Avenue where he boarded a taxicab that brought him home. Ed Hendersons testimony on this
matter is quoted, viz:

Q You said you were able to go home. Do you recall what date they released you?

A Yes, sir.

Q What date was that?

A July 4, 1997, sir.

Q Around what time were you released?

A In the afternoon, sir.

Q How were you able to go home?

A At first they load me in a motorcycle and they hailed me a taxicab, sir.

Q Who were with you in the motorcycle?

A Edwin Tampos and the female, sir.

Q What happened after the female called the taxicab?

A She told me to pretend that she is my aunt and afterwards, she gave me 50.00. 67

Finally, appellants Revilla and Tampos were identified by Ed Henderson in open court, pointing to both of them as
two of his kidnappers.

It bears stressing that Ed Henderson was only nine years old and in Grade III when he was kidnapped. In People vs.
Bisda, et al.,68 the kidnap victim Angela was barely six years old when she testified. We held that, considering her
tender years, innocent and guileless, it is incredible that she would testify falsely that the appellants took her from
the school through threats and detained her in the "dirty house" for five days. Thus, testimonies of child victims are
given full weight and credit.
The testimony of children of sound mind is likewise to be more correct and truthful than that of older
persons.69 In People vs. Alba,70 this Court ruled that children of sound mind are likely to be more observant of
incidents which take place within their view than older persons, and their testimonies are likely more correct in
detail than that of older persons.

In the case at bar, the trial court found the testimony of Ed Henderson credible and entitled to full probative
weight. Well settled is the rule that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of
witnesses, its assessment of the credibility of the said witnesses and its evidence based on the said findings are
given high respect if not conclusive effect by the appellate court, unless the trial court overlooked, misconstrued or
misinterpreted facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case. 71 We
have meticulously reviewed the records and find no justification to deviate from the findings of facts of the trial
court, its assessment of the credibility of Ed Henderson and the veracity and probative weight of his testimony.

The appellants denials and alibi, which are merely self-serving evidence cannot prevail over the positive, consistent
and straightforward testimony of Ed Henderson. 72 Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate
and highly unreliable.73 To merit approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was
in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed. 74 Appellants Revilla and Tampos failed to
prove their alibi. They relied merely and solely on their bare and dubious testimonies to prove their defense.
Appellant Revilla, likewise, failed to adduce any documentary evidence to prove exactly when he left Sogus,
Southern Leyte, via a domestic vessel and the time and date of his arrival in Manila.

The acquittal of Huera on reasonable doubt is not a ground for the acquittal of appellant Revilla. As gleaned from
the trial courts decision, Huera was acquitted on reasonable doubt because the only evidence against him was the
testimony of Ed Henderson, that when he and his kidnappers arrived in the house where the latter was thereafter
detained, he saw Huera drinking. There is no evidence against Huera relating to the boys detention and his release
on July 4, 1997. There is even no evidence that Huera was in the house when Ed Henderson was detained on July 3
and 4, 1997.

Contrary to the assertion of the appellants, it is not physically impossible for four people to ride on a motorcycle,
taking into account the sizes and weights of the riders. Ed Henderson was, after all, only nine years old at that time.

The Court also rejects appellant Tampos plea that the Court take discretionary judicial notice that the business of
butchering pigs and selling their meat is, by nature, a lucrative business. The appellant was burdened to prove his
claim that he was so affluent that it was incredible for him to indulge in kidnapping for ransom. The appellant failed
to do so, and merely relied on his bare testimony. There is no evidence how much the appellant earned from the
business he was allegedly engaged in. In contrast, the appellants collected 548,000.00 by way of ransom from
Eddie Tan for the kidnapping of his son.

The fact that the cell phone used by the kidnappers to demand ransom was owned by Sherry Mae Saliot, the
daughter of appellants Ejandra and Calunod, does not constitute evidence that the said appellants could not have
used the said cell phone to demand ransom from Eddie Tan. Sherry Mae Saliot could have just given the cell phone
to her parents for their use, while she paid for the charges thereon.

We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that the appellants Ejandra and Calunod waived any irregularities
relating to their warrantless arrest when they failed to file a motion to quash the Information on that ground, or to
object to any irregularity in their arrest before they were arraigned. They are now estopped from questioning the
legality of their arrest.75

In People vs. Bisda,76 we had the occasion to state:

 In People v. Pagalasan, this Court held that conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing
that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two
or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing
a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected
and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.
Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished unless abandoned or
broken up. To hold accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy
which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with
intending that result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs
radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit. As Judge Learned Hand put it in United States
v. Andolscheck, "when a conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as
to its content and membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes as he understands them.

In the case at bar, the overt acts of the appellants were so coordinated to attain a common purpose: that of
kidnapping and detaining Ed Henderson for ransom. Appellants Ejandra, Tampos and Revilla abducted the victim.
Appellant Revilla drove the motorcycle from the place of abduction to the house where the victim was detained.
Appellant Calunod guarded the victim during the latters detention, and later brought the victim to E. Rodriguez
Avenue in Quezon City prior to his release, along with appellant Tampos. Appellant Calunod also collected the
ransom from the victims father. All the foregoing facts indubitably show that the appellants conspired to kidnap
the victim for ransom.

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 reads:

ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death.

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were
present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. 77

For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping or serious illegal detention, the prosecution is burdened to prove
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely, (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he
kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of h is liberty; (3) the act of detention or
kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c)
any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or
(d) the person kidnapped and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial.
Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his
detention is immaterial.78

To warrant an imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom,
the prosecution must prove the following beyond reasonable doubt: (a) intent on the part of the accused to
deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and, (c) motive of the accused,
which is ransom for the victim or other person for the release of the victim. The purpose of the offender in
extorting ransom is a qualifying circumstance which may be proven by his words and overt acts before, during and
after the kidnapping and detention of the victim. 79 Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is
necessary for the crime to be committed. 80 Ransom as employed in the law is so used in its common or ordinary
sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption
of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment that releases from captivity. 81 It may include benefits not necessarily
pecuniary which may accrue to the kidnapper as a condition for the victims release. 82

In this case, the appellants not only demanded but also received ransom for the release of the victim. The trial
court correctly sentenced the appellants to death. However, the trial court erred in failing to order the appellants
to pay, jointly and severally, to Ed Henderson, his parents Eddie and Marileen Tan the amount of 485,000.00 as
actual damages and the amount of 1,000,000.00 as moral damages. Under Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code,
the principals are jointly and severally liable for the civil liabilities arising from the delict.

Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that Rep. Act No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes
the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional, and that
the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219, convicting
appellants Elvie Ejandra alias Elvies Ejandra alias Bebot Ejandra alias Bebot Ocay Suangco, Magdalena Calunod y
Maganoy alias Magdalena Saliot-Suangco, Roel Ceron Revilla and Edwin Tampos y Amparo of kidnapping for
ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, sentencing each of them to suffer the death
penalty is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The aforementioned appellants are ORDERED to pay, jointly and
severally, to the victim Ed Henderson Tan and his parents 350,000 as moral damages, and to pay, jointly and
severally, to the Spouses Eddie and Marileen Tan, the amount of 485,000 as actual damages.

In accordance with Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659 amending Section 83 of the Revised Penal Code, let the records
of this case be forthwith forwarded, upon finality of this Decision, to the Office of the President for possible
exercise of the pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 138859-60. February 22, 2001]

ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP, petitioner, vs. The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The right of a person to preliminary investigation is recognized by the law and is governed by the Rules of
Court. However, the failure to accord this right does not ipso facto result in the dismissal of the information; the
case is merely suspended, and the prosecutor directed to conduct the proper investigation.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing two Orders [1] of the
Sandiganbayan,[2] both dated February 15, 1999. The first Order rejected the attempt of petitioner to stop his
arraignment in Criminal Case Nos. 24524-25, on the ground that he had been denied the right to a preliminary
investigation. In the assailed second Order, the Sandiganbayan directed that a plea of not guilty be entered for all
the accused, including herein petitioner.

The Facts

Acting on an Affidavit-Complaint[3] filed by a certain Erlinda Fadri, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
issued an Order[4] dated September 19, 1995, naming the following as respondents: Benjamin Arao, Frederick
Winters, Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay and the city jail warden of Pagadian City. The Order also
required respondents, within ten days from receipt thereof to submit their counter-affidavits and other pieces of
controverting evidence.
The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao issued a Resolution dated January 15, 1998,[5] recommending
the prosecution of the aforenamed respondents for violation of Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code and Section
3-a in relation to Section 3-e of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. Significantly, the name of Petitioner Alvarez A.
Yusop was included as one of the persons to be prosecuted, although he was not one of the original respondents
mentioned in the Order of September 19, 1995. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the recommendation.
Accordingly, two Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. They were docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
24524 (violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019) and 24525 (unlawful arrest under Article 269 of the Revised Penal
Code).
On April 16, 1998, an Order of Arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24524. Petitioner,
however, posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City on May 20 of the same year. On the
same day, he filed a Motion To Remand Case To The Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary Investigation.
In a Resolution dated June 8, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion of petitioner for his alleged failure
to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court.
On August 8, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, grounded again on the lack of preliminary
investigation. In an Order dated September 22, 1998, the Sandiganbayan resolved not to take action on the Motion,
because petitioner had not yet submitted himself to its jurisdiction insofar as Criminal Case No. 24525 was
concerned.
On the scheduled arraignment on February 15, 1999, petitioner reiterated his claim that he had not been
accorded preliminary investigation. In its two assailed Orders, the Sandiganbayan rejected his claim and proceeded
with the arraignment.
Hence, this recourse.[6]
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan rejected petitioners plea for preliminary investigation in this wise:

This morning, the accused herein appeared for arraignment duly represented by their counsel. Before proceeding,
Atty. Omar A. Rivera appearing in behalf of accused Yusop informed this court of his reservations about proceeding
with the arraignment this morning, primarily on the ground that accused Yusop did not undergo preliminary
investigation, with the additional claim that he had not been furnished any notice nor was he informed of the
proceedings before the Ombudsman with respect to these cases. It would appear that one of the reasons
[therefor] is that the accused despite notice of the existence of the accusation against him in Criminal Case No.
24525, had not given any timely notice nor any statement of any alleged inadequacy of the proceeding regarding
the filing of the Information herein; thus, the Court is not persuaded that the claim of the accused Yusop with
regard to the inadequacy of the proceedings as against him could still be validly entertained at this time. This is
more particularly significant under Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 and x x x Criminal Cases 24524 and 24525 refer
to the same incident although the prosecution, for its part, has filed Informations under different statutes covering
the same incident. Thus, the claim of accused Yusop that he was not notified with respect to one of the cases on an
identical set of facts herein is not [of] particular significance since this would be indulging in a superfluity.

xxxxxxxxx

Thus, in view of all the following, the Court will now proceed to the arraignment of the accused herein.

The Issue

Although the parties did not specify the issue in this case, it is clear from their submissions that they are
asking this Court to resolve this question: Whether the Sandiganbayan, despite being informed of the lack of
preliminary investigation with respect to petitioner, in Criminal Case No. 24524, committed grave abuse of
discretion in proceeding with his arraignment.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious in part. While petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation, the case against
him should not be dismissed.

Main Issue:
Preliminary Investigation

Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to

engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
and should be held for trial.[7] The Court explained that the rationale of a preliminary investigation is to protect the
accused from the inconvenience, expense and burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the reasonable
probability of his guilt shall have been first ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer.[8]
 The Rules of Court requires such investigation before an information for an offense punishable by at least four
years, two months and one day may be filed in court.[9] The old Rules, on the other hand, mandates preliminary
investigation of an offense cognizable by the regional trial court.[10]
Petitioner is charged in Criminal Case No. 24524 with violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019. Such offense is
punishable with, among other penalties, imprisonment of six years and one month to fifteen years.[11] Under the
aforecited Rules, whether in the old or the revised version, he is entitled to a preliminary investigation.
It is undisputed, however, that before the Information against petitioner was filed, no preliminary
investigation had been conducted. In fact, the Office of the Ombudsman admitted that petitioner was denied of his
right to preliminary investigation.[12]
We find no basis for the Sandiganbayans ruling that petitioner had not given timely notice nor any statement
of the alleged inadequacy of the proceeding regarding the filing of the Information.
First, there was no showing that petitioner was notified of the charges filed by Erlinda Fadri. As earlier noted,
he had not been named as a respondent in the September 19, 1995 Order of the Office of the Ombudsman in
Mindanao. His name did not even appear in the caption of its January 15, 1998 Resolution,[13] which
recommended the filing of charges against the accused. Indeed, in his Compliance with the August 26, 1998
Sandiganbayan Resolution,[14] Special Prosecution Officer Diosdado V. Calonge manifested that petitioner was not
notified of the proceedings of the preliminary investigation and was accordingly not given the opportunity to be
heard thereon.[15]
After learning of the filing of the Information against him when he was served a Warrant of Arrest, petitioner
did not dally. He immediately informed the Sandiganbayan that no preliminary investigation had been conducted in
regard to him. Several months later, moments before his arraignment, he reiterated his prayer that the preliminary
investigation be conducted. In this light, the Sandiganbayan erred in saying that he had not given the court timely
notice of this deficiency.
Even assuming that prior to the filing of the Information, petitioner had known that the proceedings and the
investigation against his co-accused were pending, he cannot be expected to know of the investigators subsequent
act of charging him. Precisely, he had not been previously included therein and, consequently, he had not been
notified thereof.
In Go v. Court of Appeals,[16] this Court held that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. Conversely, if the accused does
invoke it before arraignment, as the petitioner did in this case, the right is not waived.
Neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a waiver of petitioners right to preliminary investigation. Under
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, [a]n application for or admission to bail shall not
bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from
assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him,
provided that he raises them before entering his plea. x x x.
We stress that the right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or technical. To deny it
to petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process.[17] Hence, preliminary investigation
with regard to him must be conducted.
We disagree with the Sandiganbayans reliance on Section 27 of Republic Act 6770. [18] This provision cannot
justify the evasion of the requirement set forth in the Rules of Court for conducting preliminary investigation. The
law does not sanction such interpretation, for it deals merely with the finality of orders, directives and decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman -- not the deprivation of the substantive right to a preliminary
investigation. Moreover, petitioner cannot be bound by the Ombudsmans January 15, 1998 Resolution, which
recommended the filing of charges. He was not a party to the case and was not accorded any right to present
evidence on his behalf.
 In any event, even the Ombudsman agrees that petitioner was deprived of this right and believes that the
former has the duty x x x to see to it that the basic rudiments of due process are complied with.[19] For its part, the
Sandiganbayan opted to remain silent when asked by this Court to comment on the Petition.

Dismissal of the Charges

Not Justified

Petitioner also prays that the cases against him be dismissed for lack of preliminary investigation.[20] We
disagree. In the first place, nowhere in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or even the old Rules, is there any
mention that this lack is a ground for a motion to quash.[21] Furthermore, it has been held that responsibility for
the absence of a preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity
of the proceedings.[22] We reiterate the following ruling of the Court in People v. Gomez:

If there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of
the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information, should conduct such investigation,
order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be
conducted.[23]

In sum, Criminal Case No. 24524 must be suspended with respect to petitioner even if the case is already
undergoing trial, because [t]o reach any other conclusion here, that is, to hold that petitioners rights to a
preliminary investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the record
would be to legitimize the deprivation of due process and to permit the government to benefit from its own wrong
or culpable omission and effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point.
[24]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is partially GRANTED. The assailed Orders are REVERSED, and the Office of the
Ombudsman is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge of violation of
Section 3-a of RA 3019 against Petitioner Alvarez Aro Yusop. The trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 24524 shall
be SUSPENDED in regard to petitioner until the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.