StateSecretPrivilege

Bush9/11Coverup

ThestatesecretsprivilegeisanevidentiaryrulecreatedbyUnitedStateslegalprecedent.Applicationofthe
privilegeresultsinexclusionofevidencefromalegalcasebasedsolelyonaffidavitssubmittedbythegovernment
statingthatcourtproceedingsmightdisclosesensitiveinformationwhichmightendangernationalsecurity. [1][2][3][4][5]
[6]
UnitedStatesv.Reynolds,[7]whichinvolvedmilitarysecrets,wasthefirstcasethatsawformalrecognitionofthe
privilege.

Followingaclaimof"statesecretsprivilege",thecourtrarelyconductsanincameraexaminationoftheevidenceto
evaluatewhetherthereissufficientcausetosupporttheuseofthisdoctrine.Thisresultsincourtrulingsinwhich
eventhejudgehasnotverifiedtheveracityoftheassertion.[1]Theprivilegedmaterialiscompletelyremovedfrom
thelitigation,andthecourtmustdeterminehowtheunavailabilityoftheprivilegedinformationaffectsthecase. [3][5]

[edit]Function
Thepurposeofthestatesecretsprivilegeistopreventcourtsfromrevealingstatesecretsinthecourseofcivil
litigation(incriminalcases,theClassifiedInformationProceduresActservesthesamepurpose).Thegovernment
mayinterveneinanycivilsuit,includingwhenitisnotapartytothelitigation,toaskthecourttoexcludestate
secretsevidence.Whilethecourtsmayexaminesuchevidenceclosely,inpracticetheygenerallydefertothe
ExecutiveBranch.Oncethecourthasagreedthatevidenceissubjecttothestatesecretsprivilege,itisexcluded
fromthelitigation.Often,asapracticalmatter,theplaintiffcannotcontinuethesuitwithouttheprivileged
information,anddropsthecase.Recently,courtshavebeenmoreinclinedtodismisscasesoutright,ifthesubject
matterofthecaseisastatesecret.

[edit]Distinguishedfromotherlegaldoctrines

Thestatesecretsprivilegeisrelatedto,butdistinctfrom,severalotherlegaldoctrines:theprincipleofnon
justiciabilityincertaincasesinvolvingstatesecrets(thesocalled"TottenRule");[8]certainprohibitionsonthe
publicationofclassifiedinformation(asinNewYorkTimesCo.v.UnitedStates,thePentagonPaperscase);andthe
useofclassifiedinformationincriminalcases(governedbytheClassifiedInformationProceduresAct).

[edit]History
[edit]Origins

ThedoctrinewaseffectivelyimportedfromBritishlawwhichhasasimilarprivilege.[1][2]Itisdebatablewhetherthe
statesecretsprivilegeisbaseduponthePresident'spowersascommanderinchiefandleaderofforeignaffairs(as
suggestedinUnitedStatesv.Nixon)orderivedfromtheideaofseparationofpowers(assuggestedinUnitedStatesv.
Reynolds)[1]ItseemsthattheUSprivilege"hasitsinitialrootsinAaronBurr'strialfortreason."Inthiscase,itwas
allegedthataletterfromGeneralJamesWilkinsontoPresidentThomasJeffersonmightcontainstatesecretsand
couldthereforenotbedivulgedwithoutrisktonationalsecurity. [1]

[edit]SupremeCourtrecognitioninUnitedStatesv.Reynolds

TheprivilegewasfirstofficiallyrecognizedbytheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesinthe1953decisionUnited
Statesv.Reynolds(345U.S.1).Amilitaryairplane,aB29Superfortressbomber,crashed.Thewidowsofthree
civiliancrewmemberssoughtaccidentreportsonthecrashbutweretoldthattoreleasesuchdetailswouldthreaten
nationalsecuritybyrevealingthebomber'stopsecretmission.[1][2][3][4][5][6][9][10]Thecourtheldthatonlythe
governmentcanclaimorwaivetheprivilege,anditisnottobelightlyinvoked,andlasttheremustbeaformal
claimofprivilege,lodgedbytheheadofthedepartmentwhichhascontroloverthematter,afteractualpersonal
considerationbythatofficer.[1]Thecourtstressedthatthedecisiontowithholdevidenceistobemadebythe
presidingjudgeandnottheexecutive.[1]

In2000,theaccidentreportsweredeclassifiedandreleased,anditwasfoundthattheassertionthattheycontained
secretinformationwasfraudulent.Thereportsdid,however,containinformationaboutthepoorconditionofthe
aircraftitself,whichwouldhavebeenverycompromisingtotheAirForce'scase.Manycommentatorshavealleged
governmentmisuseofsecrecyinthislandmarkcase.[11]

Despitethisruling,acasemightstillbesubjecttojudicialreviewsincetheprivilegewasintendedtopreventcertain,
butnotall,informationtobeprecluded.[1]

[edit]Recentuse

AccordingtoformerWhiteHouseCounsel,JohnDean:

Whileprecisenumbersarehardtocomeby(becausenotallcasesarereported),arecentstudyreportsthatthe
"Bushadministrationhasinvokedthestatesecretsprivilegein23casessince2001."Bywayofcomparison,
"between1953and1976,thegovernmentinvokedtheprivilegeinonlyfourcases." [9]

WhileHenryLanmanreportsinSlate:

"...theReportersCommitteeforFreedomofthePressreportedthatwhilethegovernmentassertedtheprivilege
approximately55timesintotalbetween1954(theprivilegewasfirstrecognizedin1953)and2001,it'sassertedit23
timesinthefouryearsafterSept.11."[10][12]

However,atleastonearticlehasretractedthesefigures,findingtheywerebasedonerroneousinformation:

"Correction:Inthisarticle,weincorrectlyreportedthatthegovernmentinvokedthestatesecretsprivilegein23
casessince2001.Thefigurecamefromthe2005SecrecyReportCardpublishedbyOpenTheGovernment.org.The
privilegewasactuallyinvokedseventimesfrom2001to2005,accordingtothecorrected2005reportcard,whichis
notanincreasefrompreviousdecades"[13]

LanmancontinuestocitetwopoliticalscienceprofessorsattheUniversityofTexasElPasowhoconcludedthat

"courtshaveexaminedthedocuments'underlyingclaimsofstatesecrecyfewerthanonethirdofthetimesithas
beeninvoked.And,...,courtshaveonlyactuallyrejectedtheassertionoftheprivilegefourtimessince1953." [10]

FollowingtheSeptember11,2001attacks,theprivilegeisincreasinglyusedtodismissentirecourtcases,insteadof
onlywithholdingthesensitiveinformationfromacase.[1]Alsoin2001,GeorgeW.BushissuedExecutiveOrder
13233extendingtheaccessibilityofthestatesecretsprivilegetoalsoallowformerpresidents,theirdesignated
representatives,orrepresentativesdesignatedbytheirfamilies,toinvokeittobarrecordsfromtheirtenure. [5]

AnarticleintheNYT,inAugust2007,onalawsuitinvolvingSocietyforWorldwideInterbankFinancial
TelecommunicationconcludesthatitwouldseemthattheunprecedentedfrequencywithwhichtheBush
administrationinvokedandinvokesthisprinciplehasmadejudgesmoreskepticalandwillingtoaskthe
governmenttovalidateitsclaims.InthewordsofTomBlanton,directoroftheNationalSecurityArchiveatGeorge
WashingtonUniversity

"Whatseemsclearisthatuntilayearortwoago,thejudgesrarelyevenquestioneditwhenthegovernmentraised
the'statesecrets'claim.Itwasaneutronbombnoplaintiffsleftstanding.Butwe'renowseeingthatjudgesare
startingtoactuallylookbehindthegovernment'ssecrecyclaimsandseewhat'sreallythere." [14]

[edit]Criticism
Since2001,therehasbeenmountingcriticismofthestatesecretsprivilege.Suchcriticismgenerallyfallsintofour
categories:

[edit]Weakexternalvalidationofexecutiveassertionofprivilege

Manycommentatorshaveexpressedconcernthatthecourtsnevereffectivelyscrutinizeexecutiveclaimsof
privilege.[1]Lackingindependentnationalsecurityexpertise,judgesfrequentlydefertothejudgmentofthe
executiveandneversubjectexecutiveclaimstomeaningfulscrutiny.

[edit]Executiveabuseoftheprivilegetoconcealembarrassingfacts

Commentatorshavesuggestedthatthestatesecretsprivilegemightbeusedasoftentopreventdisclosureof
embarrassingfactsastoprotectlegitimatesecrets. [1][2][3][4][5][10][15][16]Or,inthewordsofProfessorsWilliamG.Weaver
andRobertM.PallittoinanarticleinthePoliticalScienceQuarterly:

"[T]heincentiveonthepartofadministratorsistousetheprivilegetoavoidembarrassment,handicappolitical
enemies,andtopreventcriminalinvestigationofadministrativeaction." [13][17]

Inseveralprominentcases,theevidencethatthegovernmentsuccessfullyexcludedwaslaterrevealedtocontainno
statesecrets.i.e.UnitedStatesv.Reynolds,Sterlingv.Tenet,Edmondsv.DepartmentofJusticeandthePentagon
Papers.

[edit]Expansionintoajusticiabilitydoctrine

Someacademicsandpractitionershavecriticizedtheexpansionofthestatesecretsprivilegefromanevidentiary
privilege(designedtoexcludecertainpiecesofevidence)toajusticiabilitydoctrine(designedtoexcludeentire
lawsuits).Underitsoriginalformulation,thestatesecretsprivilegewasmeantonlytoexcludeaverynarrowclassof
evidencewhoserevelationwouldharmnationalsecurity.However,inalargepercentageofrecentcases,courtshave
goneastepfurther,dismissingentirecasesinwhichthegovernmentassertstheprivilege,inessenceconvertingan
evidentiaryruleintoajusticiabilityrule.Thegovernmentresponsehasbeenthatincertaincases,thesubjectofthe
caseisitselfprivileged.Inthesecases,thegovernmentargues,thereisnoplausiblewaytorespondtoacomplaint
withoutrevealingstatesecrets.

[edit]Eliminationofjudicialcheckonexecutivepower

GlennGreenwaldallegesthattheBushadministrationattemptedtoexpandexecutivepower,asevidencedbythe
unitaryexecutivetheorypropagatedbyJohnYoo.ThetheorysuggeststhatthePresident,asCommanderinChief,
cannotbeboundbyCongressoranylaw,nationalorinternational.Byinvokingthestatesecretsprivilegeincases
involvingactionstakeninthewaronterror(i.e.extraordinaryrendition,allegationsoftorture,allegedlyviolating
theForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceAct)[18]Greenwaldopinestheadministrationtriedtoevadejudicialreviewof
theseclaimsofexceptionalwarpowers.Ineffect,thisispreventingajudicialrulingdeterminingwhetherthereisa
legalbasisforsuchexpansiveexecutivepower.[12][19]Withthatinmind,applyingthisprivilegemakesimpeachment
theonlypossiblemeansleftforCongresstoexercisetheirdutytoupholdthechecksandbalancesconstitutionally
intendedtopreventabuseofpower.[2][13][16]

[edit]Callsforreform
Seealso:StateSecretsProtectionAct

Inrecentyears,anumberofcommentatorshavecalledforlegislativereformstothestatesecretsprivilege. [20][21][22]
Thesereformscenteraroundseveralideas:

1. Requiringjudgestorevieweachpieceofevidencethattheexecutiveclaimsissubjecttotheprivilege. [20][23][24]
2. Requiringtheexecutivetocraftalternativeevidencethatisnotsubjecttotheprivilege,fortheopposing
partytouseinplaceoftheoriginal,privilegedevidence. [23]Suchsubstituteevidenceshouldonlyberequired
whenitispossibletodosowithoutharmingnationalsecurity.

3. Prohibitingcourtsfromdismissingclaimsonthebasisofthestatesecretsprivilegeuntilaftertheyhave
reviewedallavailableevidence.

4. Permittingthecourttoappointanoutsideexperttoscrutinizetheevidencefornationalsecuritycontent. [21]

5. Excludingillegalgovernmentactionfromthedefinitionof"statesecrets,"orotherwiseallowingthecourt
toaddressthelegality(insteadofjustthesecrecy)ofgovernmentconduct.Thiswouldpreventthe
governmentfromusingthestatesecretsprivilegetoconcealitsillegalconduct. [21]

OnJanuary22,2008,SenatorsEdwardKennedyandArlenSpecterintroducedS.2533,theStateSecretsProtection
Act.[25]

[edit]Courtcases
[edit]UnitedStatesv.Reynolds

Mainarticle:UnitedStatesv.Reynolds

InUnitedStatesv.Reynolds(1953),thewidowsofthreecrewmembersofaB29Superfortressbomberthathad
crashedin1948soughtaccidentreportsonthecrash,butweretoldthereleasesuchdetailswouldthreatennational
securitybyrevealingthenatureofthebomber'stopsecretmission.TheSupremeCourtruledthattheexecutive
branchcouldbarevidencefromthecourtifitdeemedthatitsreleasewouldimpairnationalsecurity.In1996,the
accidentreportsinquestionweredeclassifiedandreleased,andwhendiscoveredin2000werefoundtocontainno
secretinformation.Theydid,however,containinformationaboutthepoorconditionoftheaircraftitself,which
wouldhavebeenverycompromisingtotheAirForce'scase.Manylegalexpertshaveallegedgovernmentabuseof
secrecyinthislandmarkcase.[2][3][5][9][10]

[edit]RichardHorn

Mainarticles:RichardHornandHornv.Albright
FormerDEAagentRichardHornbroughtasuitagainsttheCIAforbugginghishome.Thecasewasdismissed
becauseoftheprivilege.[1][6]

RichardHorn'scasewasreinstatedonJuly20,2009byUSDCJudgeRoyceC.LambrethonthebasisthattheCIA
hadengagedinfraudonthecourt.

On30March2010,asaresultofamultimilliondollarsettlementagreementbetweenHornandthegovernment,
Lamberthdismissedtheunderlyingcasewithprejudice.Subsequently,laterthatsameyear,ina22September
order,LamberthissuedafinalordervacatinghisearlieropinionsandordersfindingthatCIAlawyers,Tenet,and
Brownhadcommittedfraudonthecourt.Lamberthalsospecificallyorderedthatasentenceberemovedfromhis
30March2010Memorandum.Theremovedsentencehadstatedthat"allegationsofwrongdoingbythegovernment
attorneysinthiscasearenotonlycredible,theyareadmitted."

[edit]NotraTrulock

InFebruary2002itwasinvokedinthecaseofNotraTrulock,wholaunchedadefamationsuitagainstLosAlamos
scientistWenHoLee,chargedwithstealingnuclearsecrets;PresidentBushstatedthatnationalsecuritywouldbe
compromisedifTrulockwereallowedtoseekdamagesfromLee;thoughitresultedinthecasebeingdismissed,
anothersuitwaslauncheddirectlyattackingthenFBIDirectorLouisFreehforinterferingandfalselyinvokingthe
statesecretsprivilege.

[edit]SibelEdmonds

Mainarticle:SibelEdmonds

TheprivilegewasinvokedtwiceagainstSibelEdmonds.[1][2][6]Thefirstinvocationwastopreventherfromtestifying
thattheFederalGovernmenthadforeknowledgethatAlQaedaintendedtouseairlinerstoattacktheUnitedStates
onSeptember11,2001;thecasewasa$100trillionactionfiledin2002bysixhundred9/11victims'familiesagainst
officialsoftheSaudigovernmentandprominentSaudicitizens.Thesecondinvocationwasinanattempttoderail
herpersonallawsuitregardingherdismissalfromtheFBI,whereshehadworkedasapost9/11translatorandhad
beenawhistleblower.

[edit]ThomasBurnett

TheprivilegewasinvokedinThomasBurnettvs.AlBarkaInvestment&DevelopmentCorporation(CivilNo.
04ms203)amotiontoquashasubpoenaforthetestimonyofSibelEdmonds.Thegovernment'smotiontoquash
basedonstatesecretsprivilegewasgrantedinpart.

[edit]Sterlingv.Tenet

Mainarticles:Sterlingv.TenetandJeffreyAlexanderSterling

JeffreySterlingwasablackCIAagentwhostartedaracialdiscriminationsuit.Itwasthrownoutonaccountofthis
privilege.[1][6]

[edit]NiraSchwartz

TheprivilegewasinvokedinSchwartzvs.TRW(CivilNo.963065,CentralDistrict,Cal)aQuiTamclaimby
Schwartz.Interventionandassertionofthestatesecretsprivilege,bythegovernment,resultedincasedismissal.
[edit]CraterCorporation

TheprivilegewasinvokedintheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheFederalCircuitcaseofCraterCorporation
vs.LucentTechnologiesInc.andAT&TCompany,(CraterCorp.v.LucentTechnologies,September7,2005).
Craterwaspreventedfromproceedingwithdiscoveryinitspatentinfringementcase(U.S.PatentNo.5,286,129)by
theUnitedStates'assertionthatdiscoverycouldcause"extremelygravedamagetonationalsecurity".The
infringementcasecenteredonWetMateunderwaterfiberopticcouplingdevicesbeneaththesea.

[edit]ACLUvs.NSA/CIA

OnMay26,2006,theU.S.JusticeDepartmentfiledamotiontodismissACLUv.NSA,theACLU'slawsuitagainst
theNSAbyinvokingthestatesecretsprivilege.OnJuly26,2006,thecasewasdismissed.Inadifferentcasein
Michigan,broughtbytheACLUagainsttheNSAonbehalfofvariousscholars,journalists,attorneys,andnational
nonprofitorganizations,JudgeAnnaDiggsTaylorruledonAugust17,2006,thattheprogramwasunconstitutional
andshouldbehalted.Sheupheldthedoctrine,butruledthatthegovernment'spublicstatementsconcerningthe
operationwereadmissibleandconstitutedsufficientproofforthecasetocontinuewithoutanyprivilegedevidence
ordiscovery.OnJuly6,2007,theSixthCircuitCourtofAppealsthrewoutTaylor'sdecision,ruling21thatthe
ACLUcouldnotproduceevidencetoprovethattheACLUhadbeenwrongfullywiretappedbytheNSA,and
thereforedidnothavethestandingtobringsuchacasetocourt,regardlessofthelegalityquestion.OnFebruary19,
2008,theSupremeCourtdeclinedtoheartheACLU'sappeal.SeeACLUv.NSA.

[edit]CenterforConstitutionalRightsetal.v.Bushetal.

OnMay27,2006theJusticeDepartmentmovedtopreempttheCenterforConstitutionalRights(CCR)challengeto
warrantlessdomesticsurveillancebyinvokingthestatesecretsprivilege.TheBushAdministrationisarguingthat
CCR'scasecouldrevealsecretsregardingU.S.nationalsecurity,andthusthepresidingjudgemustdismissit
withoutreviewingtheevidence.

[edit]AT&TandNSAwiretapcase

Mainarticles:NSAcalldatabase,NSAwarrantlesssurveillancecontroversy,andHeptingv.AT&T

InApril2006,theBushadministrationtookinitialstepstousethestatesecretsruletoblockalawsuitagainstAT&T
andtheNationalSecurityAgencybroughtbytheElectronicFrontierFoundation.TheEFFallegedthatthe
governmenthassecretcomputerroomsconductingbroad,illegalsurveillanceofU.S.citizens. [5][10]Testifyingata
January29,2008HouseJudiciaryCommitteehearingonreformofthestatesecretsprivilege,EFFattorneyKevin
Bankstoncontendedthattheadministration'sinterpretationoftheprivilegewasoverlybroad,andfailedto
properlyconsidertheevidentiaryproceduresprovidedforbySection1806(f)oftheForeignIntelligence
SurveillanceAct.[26]However,thecasewasdismissedonJune3,2009,[27]citingretroactivelegislation(section802of
FISA)statingthatinthecaseofacoveredcivilaction,theassistanceallegedtohavebeenprovidedbytheelectronic
communicationserviceproviderwasinconnectionwithanintelligenceactivityinvolvingcommunicationsthatwas
authorizedbythePresidentduringtheperiodbeginningonSeptember11,2001,andendingonJanuary17,2007;
designedtodetectorpreventaterroristattack,oractivitiesinpreparationforaterroristattack,againsttheUnited
States;andthesubjectofawrittenrequestordirective,oraseriesofwrittenrequestsordirectives,fromthe
AttorneyGeneralortheheadofanelementoftheintelligencecommunity(orthedeputyofsuchperson)tothe
electroniccommunicationserviceproviderindicatingthattheactivitywasauthorizedbythePresident;and
determinedtobelawful.

[28]
[edit]KhalidElMasri

Mainarticles:KhalidElMasriandExtraordinaryrendition

InMay2006,theillegaldetentioncaseofKhalidElMasriwasdismissedbasedontheprivilege,whichwasinvoked
bytheCentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA).KhalidElMasriallegedthathewasfalselyheldbytheCIAforseveral
months(whichtheCIAacknowledges)andwasbeaten,drugged,andsubjectedtovariousotherinhumaneactivity
whileincaptivity.HewasultimatelyreleasedbytheCIAwithnochargeeverbeingbroughtagainsthimbythe
UnitedStatesgovernment.JudgeT.S.Ellis,IIIoftheU.S.DistrictCourtdismissedthecasebecause,accordingto
thecourt,thesimplefactofholdingproceedingswouldjeopardizestatesecrets,asclaimedbytheCIA. [3][2].On
March2,2007,theUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheFourthCircuitaffirmed.[3]OnOctober9,2007,the
SupremeCourtdeclinedtohearanappealoftheFourthCircuit'sdecision,lettingthedoctrineofstatesecrets
privilegestand.[29]

[edit]MaherArar

Mainarticles:MaherArarandExtraordinaryrendition

TheprivilegewasinvokedagainstacasewhereMaherArar,awrongfullyaccusedandtorturedvictim,soughtto
sueAttorneyGeneralJohnAshcroftforhisroleindeportingArartoSyriatofacetortureandextractfalse
confessions.ItwasformallyinvokedbyDeputyAttorneyGeneralJamesB.ComeyinlegalpapersfiledintheUnited
StatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofNewYork.Theinvocationread,"Litigating[the]plaintiff's
complaintwouldnecessitatedisclosureofclassifiedinformation",whichitlaterstatedincludeddisclosureofthe
basisfordetaininghiminthefirstplace,thebasisforrefusingtodeporthimtoCanadaashehadrequested,andthe
basisforsendinghimtoSyria.

[edit]JaneandJohnDoe

OnJanuary4,2007DistrictCourtJudgeLauraTaylorSwainorderedthedismissalofJaneDoeetal.v.CIA,05
Civ.7939basedonthestatesecretsprivilege.JaneDoeandherchildrensuedtheCIAformoneydamagesafterher
husband'scovertemploymentwiththeCIAwas"terminatedimmediatelyforunspecifiedreasons".[4].

[edit]Quotes
"Becauseitissopowerfulandcantramplelegitimateclaimsagainstthegovernment,thestatesecretsprivilege
isnottobelightlyinvoked"(UnitedStatesv.Reynolds,345U.S.1,7(1953))[5]

"Thestatesecretsprivilegeisacommonlawevidentiaryrulethatallowsthegovernmenttowithhold
informationfromdiscoverywhendisclosurewouldbeinimicaltonationalsecurity."Zuckerbraunv.General
DynamicsCorp.,935F.2d544,546(2dCir.1991).

[edit]Seealso
EspionageActof1917
Executiveprivilege
ExtraordinaryrenditionbytheUnitedStates
 Mosaictheory
Unitaryexecutivetheory
Whistleblower
FederalTortClaimsAct
ClassifiedInformationProceduresAct,Silentwitnessrule
StateSecretsProtectionAct
Silentwitnessrule

[edit]Externallinks
InTheNameOfNationalSecurity:UncheckedPresidentialPowerAndTheReynoldsCase,LouisFisher.
Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas,2006,ISBN0700614648.
StateSecretsandtheLimitsofNationalSecurityLitigationRobertChesney,WakeForestUniversity
SchoolofLaw
TheStateSecretsPrivilegeandSeparationofPowersAMANDAFROST,AmericanUniversity
WashingtonCollegeofLaw
SelectedCaseFilesInvolving"StateSecrets"ProjectonGovernmentSecrecy,FederationofAmerican
Scientists

[edit]References
1. ^abcdefghijklmnoThestatesecretsprivilege:ExpandingItsScopeThroughGovernmentMisuse
byCarrieNewtonLyons,theLewis&ClarkLawReview,publishedbyLewis&ClarkLawSchool,Volume
11/Number1/Spring2007.
2. ^abcdefgTheStateSecretsPrivilegeandexecutiveMisconductbyShayanaKadidal,oneofthe
leadattorneysontheCenterforConstitutionalRights,JURIST,May30,2006
3. ^abcdefDangerousDiscretion:StateSecretsandtheElMasriRenditionCasebyAzizHuq,
DirectoroftheLibertyandNationalSecurityProjectattheBrennanCenterforJusticeatNYUSchoolof
Law,JURIST,March12,2007
4. ^abcTheSuitChallengingtheNSA'sWarrantlessWiretappingCanProceed,DespitetheState
SecretsPrivilege
TheSuitChallengingtheNSA'sWarrantlessWiretappingCanProceed,DespitetheState
SecretsPrivilege:WhyTheJudgeMadetheRightCallByJULIEHILDEN,FIndLaw,August15,
2006
ExaminingTwoRecentRulingsAllowingSuitsAgainsttheNSA'sWarrantless
WiretappingToProceed,DespitetheStateSecretsPrivilege:PartTwoinaSeriesByJULIE
HILDEN,FindLaw,August23,2006
5. ^abcdefgBuildingtheSecrecyWallhigherandhigherbyGlennGreenwald,UnclaimedTerritory,
April29,2006
6. ^abcdeBushWieldingSecrecyPrivilegetoEndSuitsByAndrewZajac,TheChicagoTribune,
March3,2005
7. ^UnitedStatesv.Reynolds,345U.S.1,paragraph8(1953)(theprivilegeagainstrevealingmilitary
secrets,aprivilegewhichiswellestablishedinthelawofevidence).Text
8. ^Tenetv.Doe,544U.S.1(2005)
9. ^abcACLUv.NationalSecurityAgency:Whythe"StateSecretsPrivilege"Shouldn'tStopthe
LawsuitChallengingWarrantlessTelephoneSurveillanceofAmericansByJOHNW.DEAN,FindLaw,
June16,2006
10. ^abcdefSecretGuardingThenewsecrecydoctrinesosecretyoudon'tevenknowaboutitBy
HenryLanman,Slate,May22,2006,
 11. ^Stephens,Hampton.SupremeCourtFilingclaimsAirForce,governmentfraudin1953case:
Casecouldaffect'statesecrets'privilegeInsidetheAirForceMarch14,2003.RetrievedMay3,2007.
12. ^abRecheckingtheBalanceofPowersTheBushadministrationhasfinallybeenrebukedforits
repeatedeffortstoevadejudicialreviewByGlennGreenwald,InTheseTimes,July21,2006
13. ^abc[1]BySusanBurgess,TheNewsMediaandtheLaw,Fall2005
14. ^Lichtblau,Eric(August31,2007)."U.S.CitesSecretsPrivilegeasItTriestoStopSuiton
BankingRecords".TheNewYorkTimes.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/31/us/nationalspecial3/31swift.html?ref=us.Retrieved20090709.
15. ^CongressandJudgesGaggedArlenSpecterandaCIAtorturevictimknowOnlytheOval
OfficedecideswhatthelawisbyNatHentoff,VillageVoice,June19th,2006
16. ^abClosingOurCourtsCrying'statesecrets,'theadministrationsealsthecourtstoavoidscrutiny
byNatHentoff,VillageVoice,June9th,2006
17. ^HouseCommitteeonOversightandGovernmentReformWhistleblowerProtection
EnhancementActof2007TestimonyofWilliamG.Weaver,J.D.,Ph.D.SeniorAdvisor,NationalSecurity
WhistleblowersCoalitionandAssociateProfessorUniversityofTexasatElPaso,Inst.forPolicyandEcon.
DevelopmentandDept.ofPoliticalScience,February13,2007
18. ^SecrecyandForeignPolicybyRobertPallitto,ForeignPolicyInFocus(FPIF),December8,2006
19. ^SnapshotsoftheU.S.undertheBushadministrationbyGlennGreenwald,UnclaimedTerritory,
May23,2006
20. ^abFlorence,JustinandGerke,Matthew:"StateYourSecrets:Thesmartwayaroundtelecom
immunity."http://www.slate.com/id/2177962/
21. ^abc"StateSecretsandtheLimitsofNationalSecurityLegislation"byRobertChesney.George
WashingtonLawReview(2007).
22. ^"TheStateSecretsPrivilege:ExpandingItsScopeThroughGovernmentMisuse"byCarrie
NewtonLyons,11Lewis&ClarkL.Rev.99(2007).
23. ^abReportonReformingtheStateSecretsPrivilege,AmericanBarAssociation,2007.
24. ^"StateYourSecrets"byLouFisher.LegalTimes,2006.
25. ^"IntroductionoftheStateSecretsProtectionAct".FederationofAmericanScientists.200801
22.http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_cr/statesec.html.Retrieved20080208.
26. ^"StatementofKevinS.Bankston,SeniorStaffAttorneyElectronicFrontierFoundation"(PDF).
OversightHearingonReformoftheStateSecretsPrivilegebytheU.S.HouseofRepresentatives
CommitteeontheJudiciary,SubcommitteeontheConstitution,CivilRights,andCivilLiberties.200801
29.http://www.eff.org/files/EFF_HJC_SSP_written_testimony_Final.pdf.Retrieved20080208.
27. ^Heptingv.AT&T,U.S.DistrictCourt(U.S.DistrictCourtfortheNorthernDistrictofCalifornia
3June2009).Text
28. ^Bazan,ElizabethB.(7July2008)."TheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceAct:AnOverviewof
SelectedIssues"(PDF).CongressionalResearchService.http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34279.pdf.
29. ^Greenhouse,Linda(20071010)."SupremeCourtRefusestoHearTortureAppeal".TheNew
YorkTimes.http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/10/washington/10scotus.html?ref=us.Retrieved20071010.

Retrievedfrom"http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_secrets_privilege"

Categories:UnitedStatesgovernmentsecrecy|Evidencelaw|GeorgeW.Bushadministrationcontroversies|
ExecutivebranchoftheUnitedStatesgovernment|Classifiedinformation

Thispagewaslastmodifiedon20May2011at06:09.

PoliticalCorruption
Politicalcorruptionistheuseoflegislatedpowersbygovernmentofficialsforillegitimateprivategain.Misuseof
governmentpowerforotherpurposes,suchasrepressionofpoliticalopponentsandgeneralpolicebrutality,isnot
consideredpoliticalcorruption.Neitherareillegalactsbyprivatepersonsorcorporationsnotdirectlyinvolvedwith
 thegovernment.Anillegalactbyanofficeholderconstitutespoliticalcorruptiononlyiftheactisdirectlyrelatedto
theirofficialduties.

Formsofcorruptionvary,butincludebribery,extortion,cronyism,nepotism,patronage,graft,andembezzlement.
Whilecorruptionmayfacilitatecriminalenterprisesuchasdrugtrafficking,moneylaundering,andhuman
trafficking,itisnotrestrictedtotheseactivities.

Theactivitiesthatconstituteillegalcorruptiondifferdependingonthecountryorjurisdiction.Forinstance,certain
politicalfundingpracticesthatarelegalinoneplacemaybeillegalinanother.Insomecases,governmentofficials
havebroadorpoorlydefinedpowers,whichmakeitdifficulttodistinguishbetweenlegalandillegalactions.
Worldwide,briberyaloneisestimatedtoinvolveover1trillionUSdollarsannually. [1]Astateofunrestrained
politicalcorruptionisknownasakleptocracy, literally meaning "rule by thieves".

Political corruption

Corruption Perceptions Index, 2010

Concepts

Electoral fraud Economics of corruption

Nepotism Bribery Cronyism Slush fund
Corruption by country

Angola Armenia Canada

Chile China (PRC) Colombia
Cuba Ghana India Iran Kenya
Ireland Nigeria Pakistan
Paraguay Philippines Russia
South Africa Venezuela United States
This box: view talk edit

Contents
[hide]
1 Effects
o 1.1 Effects on politics, administration, and institutions
o 1.2 Economic effects
o 1.3 Environmental and social effects
o 1.4 Effects on Humanitarian Aid
 o 1.5 Other areas: health, public safety, education, trade unions, etc.
2 Types
o 2.1 Bribery
o 2.2 Trading in influence
o 2.3 Patronage
o 2.4 Nepotism and cronyism
o 2.5 Electoral fraud
o 2.6 Embezzlement
o 2.7 Kickbacks
o 2.8 Unholy alliance
o 2.9 Involvement in organized crime
3 Conditions favorable for corruption
o 3.1 Size of public sector
4 Governmental corruption
5 Fighting corruption
6 Whistleblowers
7 Campaign contributions
8 Measuring corruption
9 See also
10 References
11 Further reading

12 External links

[edit]Effects

[edit]Effectsonpolitics,administration,andinstitutions

DetailfromCorruptLegislation(1896)byElihuVedder.LibraryofCongressThomasJeffersonBuilding,Washington,
D.C.

Corruptionposesaseriousdevelopmentchallenge.Inthepoliticalrealm,itunderminesdemocracyandgoodgovernanceby
floutingorevensubvertingformalprocesses.Corruptioninelectionsandinlegislativebodiesreducesaccountabilityand
distortsrepresentationinpolicymaking;corruptioninthejudiciarycompromisestheruleoflaw;andcorruptioninpublic
administrationresultsintheinefficientprovisionofservices.Itviolatesabasicprincipleofrepublicanismregardingthe
centralityofcivicvirtue.Moregenerally,corruptionerodestheinstitutionalcapacityofgovernmentasproceduresare
disregarded,resourcesaresiphonedoff,andpublicofficesareboughtandsold.Atthesametime,corruptionundermines
thelegitimacyofgovernmentandsuchdemocraticvaluesastrustandtolerance.

[edit]Economiceffects

Seealso:Corporatecrime

Corruptionundermineseconomicdevelopmentbygeneratingconsiderabledistortionsandinefficiency.Intheprivate
sector,corruptionincreasesthecostofbusinessthroughthepriceofillicitpaymentsthemselves,themanagementcostof
negotiatingwithofficials,andtheriskofbreachedagreementsordetection.Althoughsomeclaimcorruptionreducescosts
bycuttingbureaucracy,theavailabilityofbribescanalsoinduceofficialstocontrivenewrulesanddelays.Openly
removingcostlyandlengthyregulationsarebetterthancovertlyallowingthemtobebypassedbyusingbribes.Where
corruptioninflatesthecostofbusiness,italsodistortstheplayingfield,shieldingfirmswithconnectionsfromcompetition
andtherebysustaininginefficientfirms.[2]

Corruptionalsogenerateseconomicdistortionsinthepublicsectorbydivertingpublicinvestmentintocapitalprojects
wherebribesandkickbacksaremoreplentiful.Officialsmayincreasethetechnicalcomplexityofpublicsectorprojectsto
concealorpavethewayforsuchdealings,thusfurtherdistortinginvestment.Corruptionalsolowerscompliancewith
construction,environmental,orotherregulations,reducesthequalityofgovernmentservicesandinfrastructure,and
increasesbudgetarypressuresongovernment.

EconomistsarguethatoneofthefactorsbehindthedifferingeconomicdevelopmentinAfricaandAsiaisthatinthe
former,corruptionhasprimarilytakentheformofrentextractionwiththeresultingfinancialcapitalmovedoverseasrather
thaninvestedathome(hencethestereotypical,butoftenaccurate,imageofAfricandictatorshavingSwissbankaccounts).
InNigeria,forexample,morethan$400billionwasstolenfromthetreasurybyNigeria'sleadersbetween1960and1999.[3]
UniversityofMassachusettsresearchersestimatedthatfrom1970to1996,capitalflightfrom30subSaharancountries
totaled$187bn,exceedingthosenations'externaldebts.[4](Theresults,expressedinretardedorsuppresseddevelopment,
havebeenmodeledintheorybyeconomistMancurOlson.)InthecaseofAfrica,oneofthefactorsforthisbehaviorwas
politicalinstability,andthefactthatnewgovernmentsoftenconfiscatedpreviousgovernment'scorruptlyobtainedassets.
Thisencouragedofficialstostashtheirwealthabroad,outofreachofanyfutureexpropriation.Incontrast,Asian
administrationssuchasSuharto'sNewOrderoftentookacutonbusinesstransactionsorprovidedconditionsfor
development,throughinfrastructureinvestment,lawandorder,etc.

[edit]Environmentalandsocialeffects

Corruptionfacilitatesenvironmentaldestruction.Corruptcountriesmayformallyhavelegislationtoprotectthe
environment,itcannotbeenforcedifofficialscaneasilybebribed.Thesameappliestosocialrightsworker
protection,unionizationprevention,andchildlabor.Violationoftheselawsrightsenablescorruptcountriestogain
illegitimateeconomicadvantageintheinternationalmarket.

TheNobelPrizewinningeconomistAmartyaSenhasobservedthat"thereisnosuchthingasanapoliticalfoodproblem."
Whiledroughtandothernaturallyoccurringeventsmaytriggerfamineconditions,itisgovernmentactionorinactionthat
determinesitsseverity,andoftenevenwhetherornotafaminewilloccur.Governmentswithstrongtendenciestowards
kleptocracycanunderminefoodsecurityevenwhenharvestsaregood.Officialsoftenstealstateproperty.InBihar,India,
morethan80%ofthesubsidizedfoodaidtopoorisstolenbycorruptofficials. [5]Similarly,foodaidisoftenrobbedat
gunpointbygovernments,criminals,andwarlordsalike,andsoldforaprofit.The20thcenturyisfullofmanyexamplesof
governmentsunderminingthefoodsecurityoftheirownnationssometimesintentionally.[6]

[edit]EffectsonHumanitarianAid

Thescaleofhumanitarianaidtothepoorandunstableregionsoftheworldgrows,butitishighlyvulnerabletocorruption,
withfoodaid,constructionandotherhighlyvaluedassistanceasthemostatrisk.[7]Foodaidcanbedirectlyandphysically
divertedfromitsintendeddestination,orindirectlythroughthemanipulationofassessments,targeting,registrationand
distributionstofavourcertaingroupsorindividuals.[7]Elsewhere,inconstructionandshelter,therearenumerous
opportunitiesfordiversionandprofitthroughsubstandardworkmanship,kickbacksforcontractsandfavouritisminthe
provisionofvaluablesheltermaterial.[7]Thuswhilehumanitarianaidagenciesareusuallymostconcernedaboutaidbeing
divertedbyincludingtoomany,recipientsthemselvesaremostconcernedaboutexclusion.[7]Accesstoaidmaybelimited
tothosewithconnections,tothosewhopaybribesorareforcedtogivesexualfavours. [7]Equally,thoseabletodosomay
manipulatestatisticstoinflatethenumberbeneficiariesandsyphonoftheadditionalassistance. [7]

[edit]Otherareas:health,publicsafety,education,tradeunions,etc.

Seealso:Policecorruption

Corruptionisnotspecifictopoor,developing,ortransitioncountries.Inwesterncountries,therehavebeencasesofbribery
andotherformsofcorruptioninallpossiblefields:underthetablepaymentsmadetoreputedsurgeonsbypatientswilling
tobeontopofthelistofforthcomingsurgeries,[8]bribespaidbysupplierstotheautomotiveindustryinordertosellpoor
qualityconnectorsusedforinstanceinsafetyequipmentsuchasairbags,bribespaidbysupplierstomanufacturersof
defibrillators(tosellpoorqualitycapacitors),contributionspaidbywealthyparentstothe"socialandculturefund"ofa
prestigiousuniversityinexchangeforittoaccepttheirchildren,bribespaidtoobtaindiplomas,financialandother
advantagesgrantedtounionistsbymembersoftheexecutiveboardofacarmanufacturerinexchangeforemployer
friendlypositionsandvotes,etc.Examplesareendless.Thesevariousmanifestationsofcorruptioncanultimatelypresenta
dangerforthepublichealth;theycandiscreditcertainessentialinstitutionsorsocialrelationships.

Corruptioncanalsoaffectthevariouscomponentsofsportsactivities(referees,players,medicalandlaboratorystaff
involvedinantidopingcontrols,membersofnationalsportfederationandinternationalcommitteesdecidingaboutthe
allocationofcontractsandcompetitionplaces).

Therehavealsobeencasesagainst(membersof)varioustypesofnonprofitandnongovernmentorganisations,aswellas
religiousorganisations.

Ultimately,thedistinctionbetweenpublicandprivatesectorcorruptionsometimesappearsratherartificialandnational
anticorruptioninitiativesmayneedtoavoidlegalandotherloopholesinthecoverageoftheinstruments.

[edit]Types
[edit]Bribery

Mainarticle:Bribery

Abribeisapaymentgivenpersonallytoagovernmentofficialinexchangeofhisuseofofficialpowers.Briberyrequires
twoparticipants:onetogivethebribe,andonetotakeit.Eithermayinitiatethecorruptoffering;forexample,acustoms
officialmaydemandbribestoletthroughallowed(ordisallowed)goods,orasmugglermightofferbribestogainpassage.
Insomecountriesthecultureofcorruptionextendstoeveryaspectofpubliclife,makingitextremelydifficultfor
individualstostayinbusinesswithoutresortingtobribes.Bribesmaybedemandedinorderforanofficialtodosomething
heisalreadypaidtodo.Theymayalsobedemandedinordertobypasslawsandregulations.Inadditiontousingbribery
forprivatefinancialgain,theyarealsousedtointentionallyandmaliciouslycauseharmtoanother(i.e.nofinancial
incentive).Insomedevelopingnations,uptohalfofthepopulationhaspaidbribesduringthepast12months. [9]

Inrecentyears,effortshavebeenmadebytheinternationalcommunitytoencouragecountriestodissociateandincriminate
asseparateoffences,activeandpassivebribery.Activebriberycanbedefinedforinstanceasthepromising,offeringor
givingbyanyperson,directlyorindirectly,ofanyundueadvantage[toanypublicofficial],forhimselforherselforfor
anyoneelse,forhimorhertoactorrefrainfromactingintheexerciseofhisorherfunctions.(article2oftheCriminal
LawConventiononCorruption(ETS173)oftheCouncilofEurope).Passivebriberycanbedefinedastherequestor
receipt[byanypublicofficial],directlyorindirectly,ofanyundueadvantage,forhimselforherselforforanyoneelse,or
theacceptanceofanofferorapromiseofsuchanadvantage,toactorrefrainfromactingintheexerciseofhisorher
functions(article3oftheCriminalLawConventiononCorruption(ETS173)).Thereasonforthisdissociationistomake
theearlysteps(offering,promising,requestinganadvantage)ofacorruptdealalreadyanoffenceand,thus,togiveaclear
signal(fromacriminalpolicypointofview)thatbriberyisnotacceptable.Besides,suchadissociationmakesthe
prosecutionofbriberyoffenceseasiersinceitcanbeverydifficulttoprovethattwoparties(thebribegiverandthebribe
taker)haveformallyagreeduponacorruptdeal.Besides,thereisoftennosuchformaldealbutonlyamutual
understanding,forinstancewhenitiscommonknowledgeinamunicipalitythattoobtainabuildingpermitonehastopay
a"fee"tothedecisionmakertoobtainafavourabledecision.Aworkingdefinitionofcorruptionisalsoprovidedasfollows
inarticle3oftheCivilLawConventiononCorruption(ETS174):ForthepurposeofthisConvention,"corruption"means
requesting,offering,givingoraccepting,directlyorindirectly,abribeoranyotherundueadvantageorprospectthereof,
whichdistortstheproperperformanceofanydutyorbehaviorrequiredoftherecipientofthebribe,theundueadvantage
ortheprospectthereof.

[edit]Tradingininfluence

Tradingininfluence,orinfluencepeddlingincertaincountries,referstothesituationwhereapersonissellinghis/her
influenceoverthedecisionprocessinvolvingathirdparty(personorinstitution).Thedifferencewithbriberyisthatthisis
atrilateralrelation.Fromalegalpointofview,theroleofthethirdparty(whoisthetargetoftheinfluence)doesnotreally
matteralthoughhe/shecanbeanaccessoryinsomeinstances.Itcanbedifficulttomakeadistinctionbetweenthisformof
corruptionandcertainformsofextremeandpoorlyregulatedlobbyingwhereforinstancelawordecisionmakerscan
freely"sell"theirvote,decisionpowerorinfluencetothoselobbyistswhoofferthehighestretribution,includingwherefor
instancethelatteractonbehalfofpowerfulclientssuchasindustrialgroupswhowanttoavoidthepassingofcertain
environmental,social,orotherregulationsperceivedastoostringent,etc.Wherelobbyingis(sufficiently)regulated,it
becomespossibletoprovideforadistinctivecriteriaandtoconsiderthattradingininfluenceinvolvestheuseof"improper
influence",asinarticle12oftheCriminalLawConventiononCorruption(ETS173)oftheCouncilofEurope.

[edit]Patronage

Mainarticle:Patronage

Patronagereferstofavoringsupporters,forexamplewithgovernmentemployment.Thismaybelegitimate,aswhena
newlyelectedgovernmentchangesthetopofficialsintheadministrationinordertoeffectivelyimplementitspolicy.Itcan
beseenascorruptionifthismeansthatincompetentpersons,asapaymentforsupportingtheregime,areselectedbefore
moreableones.Innondemocraciesmanygovernmentofficialsareoftenselectedforloyaltyratherthanability.Theymay
bealmostexclusivelyselectedfromaparticulargroup(forexample,SunniArabsinSaddamHussein'sIraq,the
nomenklaturaintheSovietUnion,ortheJunkersinImperialGermany)thatsupporttheregimeinreturnforsuchfavors.A
similarproblemcanalsobeseeninEasternEurope,forexampleinRomania,wherethegovernmentisoftenaccusedof
patronage(whenanewgovernmentcomestopoweritrapidlychangesmostoftheofficialsinthepublicsector).

[edit]Nepotismandcronyism

Mainarticles:NepotismandCronyism

Favoringrelatives(nepotism)orpersonalfriends(cronyism)ofanofficialisaformofillegitimateprivategain.Thismay
becombinedwithbribery,forexampledemandingthatabusinessshouldemployarelativeofanofficialcontrolling
regulationsaffectingthebusiness.Themostextremeexampleiswhentheentirestateisinherited,asinNorthKoreaor
Syria.Amilderformofcronyismisan"oldboynetwork",inwhichappointeestoofficialpositionsareselectedonlyfroma
closedandexclusivesocialnetworksuchasthealumniofparticularuniversitiesinsteadofappointingthemost
competentcandidate.

Seekingtoharmenemiesbecomescorruptionwhenofficialpowersareillegitimatelyusedasmeanstothisend.For
example,trumpedupchargesareoftenbroughtupagainstjournalistsorwriterswhobringuppoliticallysensitiveissues,
suchasapolitician'sacceptanceofbribes.

IntheIndianpoliticalsystem,leadershipofnationalandregionalpartiesarepassedfromgenerationtogenerationcreating
asysteminwhichafamilyholdsthecenterofpower,someexamplesaremostoftheDravidianpartiesofsouthIndiaand
alsothelargestpartyinIndiaCongress.

[edit]Electoralfraud

Mainarticle:Electoralfraud

Electoralfraudisillegalinterferencewiththeprocessofanelection.Actsoffraudaffectvotecountstobringaboutan
electionresult,whetherbyincreasingthevoteshareofthefavoredcandidate,depressingthevoteshareoftherival
candidates,orboth.Alsocalledvoterfraud,themechanismsinvolvedincludeillegalvoterregistration,intimidationat
polls,andimpropervotecounting.

[edit]Embezzlement

Mainarticle:Embezzlement

Embezzlementisoutrighttheftofentrustedfunds.Itisamisappropriationofproperty.

Anothercommontypeofembezzlementisthatofentrustedgovernmentresources;forexample,whenadirectorofapublic
enterpriseemployscompanyworkerstobuildorrenovatehisownhouse.

[edit]Kickbacks

Seealso:AnticompetitivepracticesandBidrigging

Akickbackisanofficial'sshareofmisappropriatedfundsallocatedfromhisorherorganizationtoanorganizationinvolved
incorruptbidding.Forexample,supposethatapoliticianisinchargeofchoosinghowtospendsomepublicfunds.Hecan
giveacontracttoacompanythatisnotthebestbidder,orallocatemorethantheydeserve.Inthiscase,thecompany
benefits,andinexchangeforbetrayingthepublic,theofficialreceivesakickbackpayment,whichisaportionofthesum
thecompanyreceived.Thissumitselfmaybealloraportionofthedifferencebetweentheactual(inflated)paymenttothe
companyandthe(lower)marketbasedpricethatwouldhavebeenpaidhadthebiddingbeencompetitive.Kickbacksare
notlimitedtogovernmentofficials;anysituationinwhichpeopleareentrustedtospendfundsthatdonotbelongtothem
aresusceptibletothiskindofcorruption.Kickbacksarealsocommoninthepharmaceuticalindustry,asmanydoctorsand
physiciansreceivepayinreturnforaddedpromotionandprescriptionofthedrugthesepharmaceuticalcompaniesare
marketing.

[edit]Unholyalliance
Anunholyallianceisacoalitionamongseeminglyantagonisticgroups,especiallyifoneisreligious,[10]foradhocorhidden
gain.Likepatronage,unholyalliancesarenotnecessarilyillegal,butunlikepatronage,byitsdeceptivenatureandoften
greatfinancialresources,anunholyalliancecanbemuchmoredangeroustothepublicinterest.Anearly,wellknownuse
ofthetermwasbyTheodoreRoosevelt(TR):

"TodestroythisinvisibleGovernment,todissolvetheunholyalliancebetweencorruptbusinessandcorrupt
politicsisthefirsttaskofthestatesmanshipoftheday."1912ProgressivePartyPlatform,attributedtoTR[11]and
quotedagaininhisautobiography[12]whereheconnectstrustsandmonopolies(sugarinterests,StandardOil,etc.)
toWoodrowWilson,HowardTaft,andconsequentlybothmajorpoliticalparties.

[edit]Involvementinorganizedcrime

Anillustrativeexampleofofficialinvolvementinorganizedcrimecanbefoundfrom1920sand1930sShanghai,where
HuangJinrongwasapolicechiefintheFrenchconcession,whilesimultaneouslybeingagangbossandcooperatingwith
DuYuesheng,thelocalgangringleader.Therelationshipkepttheflowofprofitsfromthegang'sgamblingdens,
prostitution,andprotectionracketsundisturbed.

TheUnitedStatesaccusedManuelNoriega'sgovernmentinPanamaofbeinga"narcokleptocracy",acorruptgovernment
profitingonillegaldrugtrade.LatertheU.S.invadedPanamaandcapturedNoriega.

[edit]Conditionsfavorableforcorruption
Itisarguedthatthefollowingconditionsarefavorableforcorruption:

Informationdeficits
o Lackingfreedomofinformationlegislation.TheIndianRighttoInformationAct2005has"already
engenderedmassmovementsinthecountrythatisbringingthelethargic,oftencorruptbureaucracytoits
kneesandchangingpowerequationscompletely."[13]
o Lackofinvestigativereportinginthelocalmedia.
o Contemptforornegligenceofexercisingfreedomofspeechandfreedomofthepress.
o Weakaccountingpractices,includinglackoftimelyfinancialmanagement.
o Lackofmeasurementofcorruption.Forexample,usingregularsurveysofhouseholdsandbusinessesin
ordertoquantifythedegreeofperceptionofcorruptionindifferentpartsofanationorindifferent
governmentinstitutionsmayincreaseawarenessofcorruptionandcreatepressuretocombatit.Thiswill
alsoenableanevaluationoftheofficialswhoarefightingcorruptionandthemethodsused.
o Taxhavenswhichtaxtheirowncitizensandcompaniesbutnotthosefromothernationsandrefuseto
discloseinformationnecessaryforforeigntaxation.Thisenableslargescalepoliticalcorruptioninthe
foreignnations.[14][citationneeded]

Lackingcontrolofthegovernment.
o Lackingcivicsocietyandnongovernmentalorganizationswhichmonitorthegovernment.
o Anindividualvotermayhavearationalignoranceregardingpolitics,especiallyinnationwideelections,
sinceeachvotehaslittleweight.
o Weakcivilservice,andslowpaceofreform.
o Weakruleoflaw.
o Weaklegalprofession.
o Weakjudicialindependence.
o Lackingprotectionofwhistleblowers.
o Lackofbenchmarking,thatiscontinualdetailedevaluationofproceduresandcomparisontootherswho
dosimilarthings,inthesamegovernmentorothers,inparticularcomparisontothosewhodothebest
work.ThePeruvianorganizationCiudadanosalDiahasstartedtomeasureandcomparetransparency,
costs,andefficiencyindifferentgovernmentdepartmentsinPeru.Itannuallyawardsthebestpractices
 whichhasreceivedwidespreadmediaattention.Thishascreatedcompetitionamonggovernment
agenciesinordertoimprove.[15]

Opportunitiesandincentives
o Individualofficialsroutinelyhandlecash,insteadofhandlingpaymentsbygirooronaseparatecashdesk
illegitimatewithdrawalsfromsupervisedbankaccountsaremuchmoredifficulttoconceal.
o Publicfundsarecentralizedratherthandistributed.Forexample,if$1,000isembezzledfromalocal
agencythathas$2,000funds,itiseasiertonoticethanfromanationalagencywith$2,000,000funds.
Seetheprincipleofsubsidiarity.
o Large,unsupervisedpublicinvestments.
o Saleofstateownedpropertyandprivatization.[citationneeded]
o Poorlypaidgovernmentofficials.
o Governmentlicensesneededtoconductbusiness,e.g.,importlicenses,encouragebribingandkickbacks.
o Longtimeworkinthesamepositionmaycreaterelationshipsinsideandoutsidethegovernmentwhich
encourageandhelpconcealcorruptionandfavoritism.Rotatinggovernmentofficialstodifferent
positionsandgeographicareasmayhelppreventthis;forinstancecertainhighrankofficialsinFrench
governmentservices(e.g.treasurerpaymastersgeneral)mustrotateeveryfewyears.
o Costlypoliticalcampaigns,withexpensesexceedingnormalsourcesofpoliticalfunding,especiallywhen
fundedwithtaxpayermoney.
o Lessinteractionwithofficialsreducestheopportunitiesforcorruption.Forexample,usingtheInternet
forsendinginrequiredinformation,likeapplicationsandtaxforms,andthenprocessingthiswith
automatedcomputersystems.Thismayalsospeeduptheprocessingandreduceunintentionalhuman
errors.SeeeGovernment.
o Awindfallfromexportingabundantnaturalresourcesmayencouragecorruption.[16](SeeResourcecurse)
o Warandotherformsofconflictcorrelatewithabreakdownofpublicsecurity.
Socialconditions
o Selfinterestedclosedcliquesand"oldboynetworks".
o Family,andclancenteredsocialstructure,withatraditionofnepotism/favouritismbeingacceptable.
o Agifteconomy,suchastheSovietblatsystem,emergesinaCommunistcentrallyplannedeconomy.
o Lackingliteracyandeducationamongthepopulation.
o Frequentdiscriminationandbullyingamongthepopulation.
o Tribalsolidarity,givingbenefitstocertainethnicgroups

AccordingtoastudyoftheconservativethinktankTheHeritageFoundation,lackofeconomicfreedomexplains71%of
corruption[17]

[edit]Sizeofpublicsector

Itisacontroversialissuewhetherthesizeofthepublicsectorperseresultsincorruption.Asmentionedabove,lowdegree
ofeconomicfreedomexplains71%ofcorruption.Theactualsharemaybeevengreater,asalsopastregulationaffectsthe
currentlevelofcorruptionduetotheslowingofculturalchanges(e.g.,ittakestimeforcorruptedofficialstoadjustto
changesineconomicfreedom).[18]Thesizeofthepublicsectorintermsoftaxationisonlyonecomponentofeconomicun
freedom,sotheempiricalstudiesoneconomicfreedomdonotdirectlyanswerthisquestion.

Extensiveanddiversepublicspendingis,initself,inherentlyatriskofcronyism,kickbacks,andembezzlement.
Complicatedregulationsandarbitrary,unsupervisedofficialconductexacerbatetheproblem.Thisisoneargument
forprivatizationandderegulation.Opponentsofprivatizationseetheargumentasideological.Theargumentthatcorruption
necessarilyfollowsfromtheopportunityisweakenedbytheexistenceofcountrieswithlowtononexistentcorruptionbut
largepublicsectors,liketheNordiccountries.[19]However,thesecountriesscorehighontheEaseofDoingBusinessIndex,
duetogoodandoftensimpleregulations,andhaveruleoflawfirmlyestablished.Therefore,duetotheirlackofcorruption
inthefirstplace,theycanrunlargepublicsectorswithoutinducingpoliticalcorruption.

Likeothergovernmentaleconomicactivities,alsoprivatization,suchasinthesaleofgovernmentownedproperty,is
particularlyattheriskofcronyism.PrivatizationsinRussia,LatinAmerica,andEastGermanywereaccompaniedbylarge
scalecorruptionduringthesaleofthestateownedcompanies.Thosewithpoliticalconnectionsunfairlygainedlarge
wealth,whichhasdiscreditedprivatizationintheseregions.Whilemediahavereportedwidelythegrandcorruptionthat
accompaniedthesales,studieshavearguedthatinadditiontoincreasedoperatingefficiency,dailypettycorruptionis,or
wouldbe,largerwithoutprivatization,andthatcorruptionismoreprevalentinnonprivatizedsectors.Furthermore,thereis
evidencetosuggestthatextralegalandunofficialactivitiesaremoreprevalentincountriesthatprivatizedless. [20]

Thereisthecounterpoint,however,thatoligarchyindustriescanbequitecorrupt("competition"likecollusiveprice
fixing,pressuringdependentbusinesses,etc.),andonlybyhavingaportionofthemarketownedbysomeoneotherthan
thatoligarchy,i.e.publicsector,cankeeptheminline(ifthepublicsectorgascompanyismakingmoney&sellinggasfor
1/2ofthepriceoftheprivatesectorcompanies...theprivatesectorcompanieswon'tbeabletosimultaneouslygougetothat
degree&keeptheircustomers:thecompetitionkeepstheminline).Privatesectorcorruptioncanincreasethe
poverty/helplessnessofthepopulation,soitcanaffectgovernmentcorruption,inthelongterm.

IntheEuropeanUnion,theprincipleofsubsidiarityisapplied:agovernmentserviceshouldbeprovidedbythelowest,
mostlocalauthoritythatcancompetentlyprovideit.Aneffectisthatdistributionoffundsintomultipleinstances
discouragesembezzlement,becauseevensmallsumsmissingwillbenoticed.Incontrast,inacentralizedauthority,even
minuteproportionsofpublicfundscanbelargesumsofmoney.

[edit]Governmentalcorruption
Ifthehighestechelonsofthegovernmentsalsotakeadvantagefromcorruptionorembezzlementfromthestate'streasury,it
issometimesreferredwiththeneologismkleptocracy.Membersofthegovernmentcantakeadvantageofthenatural
resources(e.g.,diamondsandoilinafewprominentcases)orstateownedproductiveindustries.Anumberofcorrupt
governmentshaveenrichedthemselvesviaforeignaid,whichisoftenspentonshowybuildingsandarmaments.

Acorruptdictatorshiptypicallyresultsinmanyyearsofgeneralhardshipandsufferingforthevastmajorityofcitizensas
civilsocietyandtheruleoflawdisintegrate.Inaddition,corruptdictatorsroutinelyignoreeconomicandsocialproblemsin
theirquesttoamassevermorewealthandpower.

Theclassiccaseofacorrupt,exploitivedictatoroftengivenistheregimeofMarshalMobutuSeseSeko,whoruledthe
DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo(whichherenamedZaire)from1965to1997.Itissaidthatusageofthe
termkleptocracygainedpopularitylargelyinresponsetoaneedtoaccuratelydescribeMobutu'sregime.Anotherclassic
caseisNigeria,especiallyundertheruleofGeneralSaniAbachawhowasdefactopresidentofNigeriafrom1993untilhis
deathin1998.HeisreputedtohavestolensomeUS$34billion.HeandhisrelativesareoftenmentionedinNigerian419
letterscamsclaimingtooffervastfortunesfor"help"inlaunderinghisstolen"fortunes",whichinrealityturnoutnotto
exist.[21]Morethan$400billionwasstolenfromthetreasurybyNigeria'sleadersbetween1960and1999.[22]

Morerecently,articlesinvariousfinancialperiodicals,mostnotablyForbesmagazine,havepointedtoFidelCastro,
GeneralSecretaryoftheRepublicofCubasince1959,oflikelybeingthebeneficiaryofupto$900million,basedon"his
control"ofstateownedcompanies.[23]Opponentsofhisregimeclaimthathehasusedmoneyamassedthroughweapons
sales,narcotics,internationalloans,andconfiscationofprivatepropertytoenrichhimselfandhispoliticalcronieswhohold
hisdictatorshiptogether,andthatthe$900millionpublishedbyForbesismerelyaportionofhisassets,althoughthat
needstobeproven.[24]

[edit]Fightingcorruption
Mobiletelecommunicationsandradiobroadcastinghelptofightcorruption,especiallyindevelopingregionslikeAfrica,[25]
whereotherformsofcommunicationsarelimited.

Inthe1990s,initiativesweretakenataninternationallevel(inparticularbytheEuropeanCommunity,theCouncilof
Europe,theOECD)toputabanoncorruption:in1996,theCommitteeofMinistersoftheCouncilofEurope,forinstance,
adoptedacomprehensiveProgrammeofActionagainstCorruptionand,subsequently,issuedaseriesofanticorruption
standardsettinginstruments:

theCriminalLawConventiononCorruption(ETS173);
theCivilLawConventiononCorruption(ETS174);
theAdditionalProtocoltotheCriminalLawConventiononCorruption(ETS191);
theTwentyGuidingPrinciplesfortheFightagainstCorruption(Resolution(97)24);
theRecommendationonCodesofConductforPublicOfficials(RecommendationNo.R(2000)10);and
theRecommendationonCommonRulesagainstCorruptionintheFundingofPoliticalPartiesandElectoral
Campaigns(Rec(2003)4)

Thepurposeoftheseinstrumentswastoaddressthevariousformsofcorruption(involvingthepublicsector,theprivate
sector,thefinancingofpoliticalactivities,etc.)whethertheyhadastrictlydomesticoralsoatransnationaldimension.To
monitortheimplementationatnationalleveloftherequirementsandprinciplesprovidedinthosetexts,amonitoring
mechanismtheGroupofStatesAgainstCorruption(alsoknownasGRECO)wascreated.

FurtherconventionswereadoptedattheregionallevelundertheaegisoftheOrganizationofAmericanStates(OASor
OEA),theAfricanUnion,andin2003,attheuniversallevelunderthatoftheUnitedNations.

[edit]Whistleblowers
Mainarticle:Whistleblower

[edit]Campaigncontributions
Inthepoliticalarena,itisdifficulttoprovecorruption.Forthisreason,thereareoftenunprovenrumorsaboutmany
politicians,sometimespartofasmearcampaign.

Politiciansareplacedinapparentlycompromisingpositionsbecauseoftheirneedtosolicitfinancialcontributionsfortheir
campaignfinance.Iftheythenappeartobeactingintheinterestsofthosepartiesthatfundedthem,itcouldbeconsidered
corruption.Thoughdonationsmaybecoincidental,thequestionaskedis,whyaretheyfundingpoliticiansatall,iftheyget
nothingfortheirmoney.

LawsregulatingcampaignfinanceintheUnitedStatesrequirethatallcontributionsandtheiruseshouldbepublicly
disclosed.Manycompanies,especiallylargerones,fundboththeDemocraticandRepublicanparties.Certaincountries,
suchasFrance,banaltogetherthecorporatefundingofpoliticalparties.Becauseofthepossiblecircumventionofthisban
withrespecttothefundingofpoliticalcampaigns,Francealsoimposesmaximumspendingcapsoncampaigning;
candidatesthathaveexceededthoselimits,orthathavehandedinmisleadingaccountingreports,riskhavingtheir
candidacyruledinvalid,orevenbeingpreventedfromrunninginfutureelections.Inaddition,thegovernmentfunds
politicalpartiesaccordingtotheirsuccessesinelections.

Insomecountries,politicalpartiesarerunsolelyoffsubscriptions(membershipfees).

Evenlegalmeasuressuchasthesehavebeenarguedtobelegalizedcorruption,inthattheyoftenfavorthepoliticalstatus
quo.Minorpartiesandindependentsoftenarguethateffortstoreinintheinfluenceofcontributionsdolittlemorethan
protectthemajorpartieswithguaranteedpublicfundingwhileconstrainingthepossibilityofprivatefundingbyoutsiders.
Intheseinstances,officialsarelegallytakingmoneyfromthepubliccoffersfortheirelectioncampaignstoguaranteethat
theywillcontinuetoholdtheirinfluentialandoftenwellpaidpositions.

Asindicatedabove,theCommitteeofMinistersoftheCouncilofEuroperecognisedin1996theimportanceoflinks
betweencorruptionandpoliticalfinancing.Itadoptedin1837theRecommendationonCommonRulesagainstCorruption
intheFundingofPoliticalPartiesandElectoralCampaigns(Rec(2003)4).Thistextisquiteuniqueatinternationallevelsas
itaimsi.a.atincreasingtransparencyinthefundingofpoliticalpartiesandelectioncampaigns(thesetwoareasaredifficult
todissociatesincepartiesarealsoinvolvedincampaigningandinmanycountries,partiesdonothavethemonopolyover
thepresentationofcandidatesforelections),ensuringacertainlevelofcontroloverthefundingandspendingconnected
withpoliticalactivities,andmakingsureinfringementsaresubjecttoeffective,proportionate,anddissuasivesanctions.In
thecontextofitsmonitoringactivities,theGroupofStatesAgainstCorruptionhasidentifiedagreatvarietyofpossible
improvementsinthoseareas(seethecountryreportsadoptedundertheThirdEvaluationRound).

[edit]Measuringcorruption
Measuringcorruptionstatisticallyisdifficultifnotimpossibleduetotheillicitnatureofthetransactionandimprecise
definitionsofcorruption.[26]While"corruption"indicesfirstappearedin1995withtheCorruptionPerceptionsIndex,allof
thesemetricsaddressdifferentproxiesforcorruption,suchaspublicperceptionsoftheextentoftheproblem. [27]

TransparencyInternational,ananticorruptionNGO,pioneeredthisfieldwiththeCorruptionPerceptionsIndex,first
releasedin1995.Thisworkisoftencreditedwithbreakingatabooandforcingtheissueofcorruptionintohighlevel
developmentpolicydiscourse.TransparencyInternationalcurrentlypublishesthreemeasures,updatedannually:a
CorruptionPerceptionsIndex(CPI)(basedonaggregatingthirdpartypollingofpublicperceptionsofhowcorruptdifferent
countriesare);aGlobalCorruptionBarometer(basedonasurveyofgeneralpublicattitudestowardandexperienceof
corruption);andaBribePayersIndex,lookingatthewillingnessofforeignfirmstopaybribes.TheCorruptionPerceptions
Indexisthebestknownofthesemetrics,thoughithasdrawnmuchcriticism[27][28][29]andmaybedecliningininfluence.[30]

TheWorldBankcollectsarangeofdataoncorruption,includingsurveyresponsesfromover100,000firmsworldwideand
asetofindicatorsofgovernanceandinstitutionalquality.Moreover,oneofthesixdimensionsofgovernancemeasuredby
theWorldwideGovernanceIndicatorsisControlofCorruption,whichisdefinedas"theextenttowhichpowerisexercised
forprivategain,includingbothpettyandgrandformsofcorruption,aswellas'capture'ofthestatebyelitesandprivate
interests."[31]Whilethedefinitionitselfisfairlyprecise,thedataaggregatedintotheWorldwideGovernanceIndicatorsis
basedonanyavailablepolling:questionsrangefrom"iscorruptionaseriousproblem?"tomeasuresofpublicaccessto
information,andnotconsistentacrosscountries.Despitetheseweaknesses,theglobalcoverageofthesedatasetshasledto
theirwidespreadadoption,mostnotablybytheMillenniumChallengeCorporation.[26]

Inpartinresponsetothesecriticisms,asecondwaveofcorruptionmetricshasbeencreatedbyGlobalIntegrity,the
InternationalBudgetPartnership,andmanylesserknownlocalgroups,startingwiththeGlobalIntegrityIndex,first
publishedin2004.Thesesecondwaveprojectsaimnottocreateawareness,buttocreatepolicychangeviatargeting
resourcesmoreeffectivelyandcreatingcheckliststowardincrementalreform.GlobalIntegrityandtheInternationalBudget
Partnershipeachdispensewithpublicsurveysandinsteadusesincountryexpertstoevaluate"theoppositeofcorruption"
whichGlobalIntegritydefinesasthepublicpoliciesthatprevent,discourage,orexposecorruption. [32]Theseapproaches
complimentthefirstwave,awarenessraisingtoolsbygivinggovernmentsfacingpublicoutcryachecklistwhichmeasures
concretestepstowardimprovedgovernance.[26]

Typicalsecondwavecorruptionmetricsdonotoffertheworldwidecoveragefoundinfirstwaveprojects,andinsteadfocus
onlocalizinginformationgatheredtospecificproblemsandcreatingdeep,"unpackable"contentthatmatchesquantitative
andqualitativedata.Meanwhile,alternativeapproachessuchastheBritishaidagency'sDriversofChangeresearchskips
numbersentirelyandfavorsunderstandingcorruptionviapoliticaleconomyanalysisofwhocontrolspowerinagiven
society.[26]

Rule of Law
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_of_law
The Rule of law in its most basic form is no one is above the law.
Perhaps the most important application of the rule of law is the principle that governmental authority is
legitimately exercised only in accordance with,
publicly disclosed laws,
adopted and enforced in accordance with established procedural steps that are referred to as due
 process.
The rule of law is hostile to dictatorship and to anarchy.
According to modern Anglo-American thinking, hallmarks of adherence to the rule of law commonly
include a
clear separation of powers,
legal certainty,
the principle of legitimate expectation
and equality of all before the law.
The concept is not without controversy, and it has been said that
"the phrase the rule of law has become meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and
general over- use"

GOCL

Government Organized Criminals Law Ipso Facto Prima Facia Evidence Exposed

Rule of Law Legal Certainty