You are on page 1of 13

29.

Quintos-Deles vs Commission on Appointments


GR No. 83216 (September 4, 1989)
FACTS:
On April 6, 1988, petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Article VII,
Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. In the May 12, 1988 meeting of the Committee on
Appointments ruled against the position of petitioner Deles. Petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles contends that her appointment as
Sectoral Representative for Women by the President does not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments to qualify
her to take her seat in the House of Representatives.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments

HELD:
The first group of people that may be appointed by the president, as previously stated in the Sarmiento v. Mison case, are the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank
of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. Since the seats reserved
for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of
Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the
other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution, referred to in the first sentence of Section 16,
Article VII (or the first group of people who may be appointed) whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments.

30. Bautista vs Salonga (G.R. No. 86439 , April 13, 1989)

FACTS:
The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second
sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of government "whom he
(the President) may be authorized by law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged ad interim appointment as
Chairperson of the CHR in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.
2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.

RULING:
1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the
Constitution, which provides that the appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the
authority of President, vested upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint executive officials without
confirmation of CoA.
The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to review presidential
appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has reserved to the President alone.

2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the President to make. Ad
interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the
Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to
make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.

31. Kilusang Bayan vs Dominguez (G.R. 85439, January 13,1992)


31. KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA NG BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG
MUNTINLUPA, INC. (KBMBPM) vs. HON. CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ

Facts: The case, G.R. No. 85439 (hereinafter referred to as the Kilusang Bayan case), questions the validity of the order
of 28 October 1988 of then Secretary of Agriculture Hon. Carlos G. Dominguez which ordered: (1) the take-over by the
Department of Agriculture of the management of the petitioner Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod Ng Mga Magtitinda ng
Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntilupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) pursuant to the Department's regulatory and supervisory powers
under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 13, (2) the creation of a Management
Committee which shall assume the management of KBMBPM upon receipt of the order, (3) the disbandment of the Board
of Directors, and (4) the turn over of all assets, properties and records of the KBMBPM the Management Committee.

Issue: WON the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture on October 28, 1988 is valid being an alter ego of the
President.

Ruling: As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply where
the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the
latter, unless actually disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts
when most needed. There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office of the President; recourse to the courts
could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other
exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is
patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.

A substantially identical provision, found in Section 17, Article III of the KBMBPM's by-laws, reads:

Sec. 17. Removal of Directors and Committee Members. Any elected director or committee member
may be removed from office for cause by a majority vote of the members in good standing present at the
annual or special general assembly called for the purpose after having been given the opportunity to be
heard at the assembly.

Under the same article are found the requirements for the holding of both the annual general assembly and a special
general assembly.

Indubitably then, there is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of cooperatives. It is likewise
manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even
without said provision, petitioners cannot be deprived of that right.

The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto himself the power of the
members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take
refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which grants him authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section
does not give him that right.

An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the
exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may to necessary for their just and
reasonable execution.

32. Biraogo vs The Philippine Truth Commission (G.R. 192935 , December 7, 2010)
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all
the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render
awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest.
Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law.
Facts:
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds
for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the
delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers
duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created
under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of
the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and
present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily
include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the
Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize
the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of
funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding
body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate
funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent
the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office
remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury
attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-
parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or
taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition
covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the
petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to
those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this
constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no
usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be
earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President
will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing
auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of
the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to
obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of
the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly
constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not
to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the
Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
33. Ang-Angco vs Castillo (G.R. L-17169. November 30, 1963)

FACTS: On October 8, 1956, the Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc. wrote a letter to the Secretary of Commerce and
Industry requesting for special permit to withdraw certain commodities from the customs house which were imported without any
dollar allocation or remittance of foreign exchange. On the same date, the company addressed an identical request to the Secretary
of Finance who was also the Chairman of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank. Senator Pedro Sabido, in behalf of the company,
likewise wrote said official urging that authority be given to withdraw the abovementioned concentrates. Not content with this step,
he also wrote to Dr. Andres Castillo, Acting Governor of the Central Bank, urging, the same matter. Then Secretary Hernandez wrote
another letter to Dr. Castillo stating, "Senator Sabido is taking this to you personally. Unless we have legal objection, I would like to
authorize the withdrawal of the concentrates upon payment of all charges in pesos. Please expedite action. The Monetary Board,
however, failed to take up the matter in its meeting of October 12, 1956 for the reason that the transaction did not involve any
dollar allocation or foreign exchange, and of this decision Mr. Licaros was informed. Collector Ang-Angco, while still in doubt as to
the propriety of the action suggested, finally authorized the release of the concentrates upon payment of the corresponding duties,
customs charges, fees and taxes.

On the strength of this complaint President Ramon Magsaysay constituted an investigating committee to investigate , the
committee submitted to President Magsaysay its report recommending that a suspension of 15 days, without pay, be imposed upon
Ang-Angco chargeable against the period of his suspension but the decision on the administrative case against him remained
pending until the death of President Magsaysay. Upon learning said decision from the newspapers, Collector Ang-Angco wrote a
letter to President Carlos P. Garcia calling attention to the fact that the action taken by Secretary Castillo in removing him from office
had the effect of depriving him of his statutory right to have his case originally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service, as well
as of his right of appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, whose decision under Republic Act No. 2260 is final, besides the fact
that such decision is in violation of the guaranty vouchsafed by the Constitution to officers or employees in the civil service against
removal or suspension except for cause in the manner

ISSUE: whether the President has the power to take direct action on the case of petitioner even if he belongs to the classified service
in spite of the provisions now in force in the Civil Service Act of 1959

HELD: It is hereby ordered that petitioner be immediately reinstated to his office as Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila,
without prejudice of submitting his case to the Commissioner of Civil Service to be dealt with in accordance with law. No costs.

the Power of control of the President may extend to the Power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who
belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be
justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint (Lacson V. Romero, supra), but not with
regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised.
This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that "the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior
officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department" (Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to
these officers whose appointments are vested on heads of departments, Congress has provided by law for a procedure for their
removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act of 1959.

we may conclude that the action taken by respondent Executive Secretary, even with the authority of the President, in taking direct
action on the administrative case of petitioner, without submitting the same to the Commissioner of Civil Service, is contrary to law
and should be set aside.

34. Drilon vs Lim (G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994)


35. VILLENA VS SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
G.R. No. L-46570 April 21 1939

FACTS:
Division of Investigation of the DOJ, upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior, conducted an inquiry into the conduct of the
Villena, mayor of Makati, Rizal, as a result of which the latter was found to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of
authority ad unauthorized practice of the law profession. The respondent recommended the suspension of Villena to the President
of the Philippines, in which it was verbally granted. The Secretary then suspended Villena from office. Villena filed a petition for
preliminary injunction against the Sec. to restrain him and his agents from proceeding with the investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of the Interior has jurisdiction or authority to suspend and order investigation over Villena.

RULING:
The Secretary of Interior has the power to order investigation and to suspend Mayor Villena. As to the power to order investigation,
it was provided in Section 79 (C) of RAC that Department of Interior was given the authority to supervise bureaus and offices under
its jurisdiction. This was interpreted in relation to Section 86 of the same Code which granted the said Department of executive
supervision over administration of provinces, municipalities and other political subdivisions.

This supervision covers the power to order investigation because supervision implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions
in order to render power real and effective.However, unlike this power to order investigation, the power to suspend a mayor was
not provided in any law. There was no express grant of authority to the Secretary of Interior to suspend a Mayor. Nevertheless,
Section 2188 of the Administrative Code granted the provincial governor the power of suspension. Yet this did not mean that the
grant precluded the Secretary of Interior.

The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency which provides that the acts of the department secretaries, performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the President, presumptively the acts of the President.
The power to suspend may be exercised by the President. It follows that the heads of the Department under her may also exercise
the same, unless the law required the President to act personally or that situation demanded him so, because the heads of the
departments are assistants and agents of the President.

36. Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs Pano (G.R. No. L-27811, November 17, 1967)
LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs.
JOSE PAO, HON. JUAN PAJO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, defendants-appellees.

May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision of the Director of Lands that had been affirmed
by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources?

Facts:
In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land situated in Tamlangon,
Municipality of Bansalan, Province of Davao.
On January 9, 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion of the above public land to plaintiff LACSON-
MAGALLANES CO., INC.
On April 13, 1954, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and
declared agricultural land.
On January 26, 1955, Jose Pao and 19 other claimants applied for the purchase of ninety hectares of the released area.
On March 29, 1955, plaintiff corporation in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire released area. This was
protested by Jose Pao and his companions before the Director of Lands upon the averment that they are actual occupants
of the part thereof covered by their own sales application. The Director of Lands dismissed the claim of Jose Pao and his
companions.
On July 5, 1957, Jose Pao and his companions filed an appeal with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
who held that the appeal was without merit and dismissed the same.
The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines.
On June 25, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "by authority of the President" decided the controversy, modified the
decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and (1) declared that "it
would be for the public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for their
existence, be allocated that portion on which they have made improvements;" and
(2) directed that the controverted land "should be subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and allocated to actual
occupants, without prejudice to the corporation's right to reimbursement for the cost of surveying this portion."
Plaintiff took the foregoing decision to the Court of First Instance praying that judgment be rendered declaring: (1) that the
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has full force and effect; and (2) that the decision of the
Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of no legal force and effect.
The CFI dismissed plaintiff's case.

ISSUES:
1. WON the President cannot undo an act of his department secretary.
Plaintiff's contention:
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 141 provides that decisions of the Director of Lands "as to questions of facts shall be
conclusive when approved" by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Plaintiff claims that this statute is controlling not only upon courts but also upon the President.

Supreme Court Ruling:


Plaintiff's position is incorrect. The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all
executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is
the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over,
confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries.
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President's power of control over the
executive departments. And control simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
The decisions of the Director of Lands, as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, may be appealed to the
Office of the President so that failure to pursue or resort to this last remedy of appeal is considered a fatal defect, warranting
dismissal of the case, for non-exhaustion of all administrative remedies.
This unquestionably negates the assertion that the President cannot undo an act of his department secretary.

2. WON the decision of the Executive Secretary herein is an undue delegation of power.
Plaintiffs Contention: The Constitution does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated
to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.
Supreme Court ruling:
It is not correct to say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not
command that he perform in person. The President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and
administrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has
thus gained recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of
the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.

3. WON the Executive Secretary cannot intrude into the zone of action allocated to another department secretary.
Supreme Court ruling:
The Executive Secretary acts "[b]y authority of the President," his decision is that of the President's. Such decision is to be given full
faith and credit by our courts. The assumed authority of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the President may
rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the action taken is "disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive," that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed. No such
disapproval or reprobation is even intimated in the record of this case.

HELD: For the reasons given, the judgment of the CFI dismissing the plaintiffs case review is hereby affirmed.

37. City of Iligan vs Director of Lands (G.R. No. L-30852, February 26, 1988)
1. President issued
Proclamation 335
:a. Withdrawing certain parcels of public land in Iligan from sale or settlement and
b. Reserving such for the use of NPC (Natl Power Corporation)
2. By virtue of said proclamation, NPC constructed a fertilizer plant named Maria Cristina
3. Later, NPC: a. Sold the fertilizer plant to Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corp with all the machineries, right of occupancy, and use of
land
b. Covenanted to collaborate with DANR in facilitating sale and right to lease for at least 25 years, the lands where plant is
erected
4. Proclamation 20 and 198 were issued:
a. Proc. 20 excluding from operation of Proc. 335 certain areas occupied by Ma. Cristina and Employees Housing and
declaring such lands for OPEN DISPOSITION
b.Proc. 198 - changing the technical description of said areas (6 lots)
5.Marcelo Steel and Ma. Cristina filed a Msc. Sales Applicationwith the Bureau of Lands.
a Marcelo Tire and Ma. Cristina are sister corporations.
b. Purchaser was Marcelo Tire but another sister corp. Marcelo Steel operated said plant
6. In the notice of sale issued in Manila, Director of Lands advised that Bureau will sell in an auction said lands of Marcelo Steel
7. President then issued Proc. 469 excluding from the reservation made in favor to NPC certain lands in Iligan (Lot 1, 1-a, 3, and 4)
and DONATING said lands in favor of Iligan City.
8. Mayor of Iligan wrote to Director of Lands informing him that City is the owner of said lands and foreshores in auction.
9. BUT no action was taken on said request for exclusion and so City filed a complaint for injunction in CFI against Director.
Injunctiontemporarily issued.
10. Pending case, President Marcos issued Proc. 94 excluding from the donation in Proc. 469 certain lands (Lot 1-a, 2-a, and 3)
anddeclaring same for open disposition.11. CFI dismissed the complaint of City and dissolved injunction. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: WON President has the authority to grant a portion of public domain to any government like the City of Iligan.

Held: YES
1. Section 60 of Public Land Act states that tracts of land can be disposed of by grant, donation or transfer made to a province,
municipality,branch, or subdivision of government for purposes conducive to public interest.
a. Who has authority to donate? Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources through Director of Lands (Sec 60)
2. Can President donate instead of Secretary and Director? YES
a. Director has direct executive control of lands (e.g. lease, sale, concession, disposition of land of public domain)
b. Director SUBJECT to control of Secretary of Agriculture.
c. Secretarys control is SUBJECT to control of PRESIDENT
d. Under Art VII Sec 17: President shall control ALL executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
e. Hence, President has the same authority to dispose of portions of public domain as his subordinates.
f. Such authority to dispose is also granted to the President under Section 69 of the Public Land Act.
3. Since, President has the authority to donate lands of public domain for residential, commercial, & industrial purposes.
QuestionedProclamation 469 is VALID and binding:
a. Ownership of lands now vested in City of Iligan.
b. Mayor of City upon proclamation immediately had the lots surveyed and entered into negotiation with National
Investment andDevelopment Corp. and those interested in developing the Coco-Chemical Plant in order to accelerate economic
expansion in theCity.

4. Proclamation 94 is NULL and VOID as said parcels had been segregated and had become property of Iligan.
5. Decision of CFI REVERSED

38. Gascon vs. Arroyo (Section 17) G.R. 78389 ( October 16, 1989 )

Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, Faustino "Bong" L. Lapira, and Spouses Alberto and Karla Lim, petitioners, vs. The Hon. Joker T. Arroyo, in
his official capacity as Executive Secretary to the President, Hon. Teodoro Benigno, as Press Secretary, Hon. Reneirio Reyes, as the
Secretary of Transportation and Communication, Hon. Jose Alcuaz, as Chairman of the National Telecommunications Commission,
Hon. Conrado A. Limcaoco, Jr., as the Officer-in-Charge of the People's Television, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, and Messrs.
Vicente Abad Santos, Pastor Del Rosario and Catalino Macaraig, Jr., in their respective capacities as Chairman and Members of the
"Arbitration Committee", respondents.
Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the State - Expropriation

Facts:
Lopez family is the owner of 2 television stations, namely: Channels 2 and 4, which they have operated through the ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corporation
When martial law was declared on Sept 21, 1972, Ch. 4 was closed by the military and its facilities were taken over by
Kanlaon Broadcasting System (KBS) which operated it as a commercial TV station
In 1978, KBS was taken over by the National Media Production Center (NMPC), which operated it under Maharlika
Broadcasting System TV 4 (MBS-4)
After the February 1986 Edsa Revolution, the PCGG sequestered the TV stations and the Office of Media Affairs took over
the operation of Ch. 4
On. April 17, 1986, the Lopez family requested Pres. Aquino to order to return to them Chs. 2 and 4
On October 18 1986, Ch 2 was returned to the Lopez family
Upon the Lopez family's request, the respondent Executive Secretary, by the authority of the President, entered into with

ABS-CBN, represented by its Pres. Eugenio Lopez, Jr., an "Agreement to Arbitrate"


Arbitration Committee was created composed of Atty. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., for RP and Atty. Pastor del Rosario
for ABS-CBN, and retired Justice Vicente Abad Santos as Chairman

Issue:
Note: There wasn't exactly an issue, as the court dismissed the case because the petitioners did not have locus standi. If the
need arises, I would say the issue is"Whether or not the Agreement to Arbitrate, as an alternative to a lawsuit against the
State, is valid"; to which, the answer is yes. Either way, I'll just enumerate below the court's statements regarding the
expropriation topic.

1. The Executive Secretary, in entering into the "Agreement to Arbitrate," was acting for and in behalf of the President when
he signed it. Hence, the aforesaid agreement is valid and binding upon the Republic of the Philippines.

2. Where the government takes property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby
violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.

3. The government's immunity cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.

4. Note: In a separate opinion, Justice Feliciano remarks that the above comments as obiter dicta.

Petition dismissed.
39. NAMARCO v. Arca G.R. L-25743 ( September 30,1969 )

This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin respondent Judge
Francisco Arca from enforcing his Order dated January 12, 1966, directing petitioners to reinstate respondent Juan T. Arive to his
former position in the National Marketing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as NAMARCO) and the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued pursuant thereto on January 14, 1966.

Respondent Juan T. Arive was the Manager of the Traffic-Storage Department of the NAMARCO receiving an annual compensation
of P7,200.00. Pursuant to the General Manager's Administrative Order No. 118 dated February 24, 1960, he was investigated by a
committee for violating Management Memorandum Order dated February 1, 1960, directing "that the allocation and deliveries of
merchandise imported under the so-called Trade Assistance Program to its designated beneficiaries be stopped;" and causing the
improper release of shipments intended for delivery upon full payment thereof by the Federation of United NAMARCO Distributors
(FUND), which were covered by certain domestic letters of credit for the total sum of P361,053.85. After due hearing, the
investigating committee found Arive guilty of the charges but left the imposition of the penalty to the discretion of the General
Manager and the Board of Directors. Subsequently, the General Manager issued Administrative Order No. 137, series of 1960,
holding Arive guilty of the charges and dismissing him from the service

On April 6, 1965, the NAMARCO, through its General Manager, in a letter addressed to the President, asked for a reconsideration of
the decision ordering Arive's reinstatement. In that letter it was contended that the Office of the President had no jurisdiction to
review any decision of the NAMARCO Board of Directors removing, suspending, or otherwise disciplining any of its subordinate
employees, because Republic Act No. 1345 (the NAMARCO Charter), which grants that power to the General Manager and to the
Board of Directors, does not provide for an appeal to any governmental body. In a letter to the NAMARCO dated June 8, 1965, then
Executive Secretary Ramon A. Diaz, this time expressly acting "[b]y authority of the President," refused to reconsider the decision,
stating that the President had jurisdiction under his constitutional power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and
offices, and directing that the decision be implemented.

ISSUE
whether the President of the Philippines had authority to reverse the decision of the Board of Directors of the NAMARCO and to
order the reinstatement of Juan T. Arive

Held:
The President of the Philippines authority to review and reverse the decision of the NAMARCO Board of Directors
dismissing Juan T. Arive from his position in the NAMARCO and to order his reinstatement falls within the constitutional power of
the President over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Under our governmental set-up, corporations owned or
controlled by the government, such as the NAMARCO, partake of the nature of government bureaus or offices, which are
administratively supervised by the Administrator of the Office of Economic Coordination, whose compensation and rank shall be
that of a head of an Executive Department and who shall be responsible to the President of the Philippines under whose control
his functions ... shall be exercised. (Executive Order No. 386 of December 22, 1950, section 1, issued under the Reorganization Act
of 1950).

The fact that section 13(d) of Republic Act No. 1345 (the NAMARCO Charter and likewise section 11(d) of the Uniform
Charter for Government Owned or Controlled Corporations (Ex. Order No. 399 of January 5, 1951) which authorize the general
manager of such corporations, with the approval of the Board of Directors, to remove for cause any subordinate employee of the
Corporation do not provide for an appeal from the general managers decision of removal to any superior officer, body or agency,
does not mean that no appeal lies from such decision to the President.

The right to appeal to the President reposes upon the Presidents power of control over the executive departments.
And control simply means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.

40. Mondano vs Silvosa (97 Phil 143)

FACTS:
The Assistant Executive Secretory indorsed the complaint for rape and concubinage against Mondano, duly elected and qualified
mayor of Mainit, Surigao,to Silvosa, provincial governor of Suriga, for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. Silvosa
issued an Administrative Order suspending Mondano from office. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor
from further proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of suspension by the provincial governor is illegal.

RULING:
Yes. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction as provided for in Sec. 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local
governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments
over which the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the RAC
are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local
governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office,
such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution. If general supervision
over all local governments is to be construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in sec 79 (c) of the RAC, then
there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control and that of supervision.

Supervision - overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.

Control - power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is the import of the provisions of section 79 (c) of
RAC.

Section 18
41. David vs Arroyo (G.R. No. 171396, May 3,2006)

Facts:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA she
declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of
extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time
revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit,
KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the
editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA
news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however
grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail
because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national
emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual
basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural
calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected
and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by
virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power
and take over power.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD:The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative
because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar.
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled
in the following way;

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals
Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the
Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the
communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the
growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the
seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she
believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Over breadth Theory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases.
The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not
primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth
claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which
is manifestly subject to state regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents calling-out power as a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The
SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of
graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. And such criterion has been met.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2ndsentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president
declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative
power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to
the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017
is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province
of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out
of laws but cannot create or enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any
authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural
calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency
but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The
authority from Congress must be based on the following:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.


(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of
the president by the president.

You might also like