POLITICAL LAW AND

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW
UST Civil Law

MUST READ CASES (POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW)

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POLITICAL LAW

HOLY SEE v. ROSARIO, G.R. No. 101949,December 1, 1994

The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City for the purpose of assuring to the Holy See
absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international
relations.

In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether the statehood is vested in the Holy
See or in the Vatican City. Some writers even suggested that the treaty created two international persons the Holy
See and Vatican City.

The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the attribution to it of sovereignty must
be made in a sense different from that in which it is applied to other states. In a community of national states, the
Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international objects.
Despite its size and object, the Vatican City has an independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also
head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the
demands of its mission in the world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to
make it in a sense an international state.

HEIRS OF DIOSDADO M. MENDOZA vs. DPWH, G.R. No. 203834, July 9, 2014

We reiterate that the DPWH is an unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its
own and it enjoys immunity from suit. The then Ministry of Public Works and Highways, now DPWH, was created
under Executive Order No. 710, series of 1981 (EO 710). EO 710 abolished the old Ministry of PublicWorks and the
Ministry of Public Highways and transferred their functions to the newly-created Ministry of Public Works of
Highways.

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D. et. al. vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT in his
capacity as Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet et.al.

G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014

If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily
a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the
foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. However, a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the
scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who
had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the
unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military
duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and
appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of
State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice
and Robling.

SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19,1997

Republic Act No. 6735 provided for the system of initiative and referendum for local legislation and national statutes,
without providing for initiative for the amendment of the Constitution. A petition was filed to amend the constitution
regarding term limits. However, the SC held that the constitutional provision on peoples initiatives under the 1987
Constitution (Article XVII 2) required implementing legislation to be executory. R.A. 6735 lacked the implementing
rules for peoples initiatives and such lack could not be cured by Comelec providing rules. Congress also could not
delegate its legislative authority to Comelec, so Comelec could not validly promulgate rules on the matter as it was
not empowered to do so under law.

LAMBINO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006

Lambino made a petition to amend the 1987 Constitution via peoples initiative. However, his petition did not include
the full text of the proposed amendments. The SC ruled that the initiative did not meet the requirements of the
Constitution. An amendment is directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition only if the people
sign a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. To do otherwise would be deceptive and
misleading and would render the initiative void, since there should be both direct proposal and authorship by the
person affixing their signature to the petition.
TANADA v. ANGARA, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state policies. The counterpart of this
article in the 1935 Constitution is called the basic political creed of the nation by Dean Vicente Sinco. These
principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They
are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in
its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state
policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not self-executing provisions, the disregard of
which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights
but guidelines for legislation.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not
self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action.

OPOSA v. FACTORAN, G.R. No. 101083, February 30, 1993

Oposa, et al. filed a petition to prevent further logging licenses from being issued. The Supreme Court, recognizing
the intergenerational equity of the petitioners as the basis of their standing, held that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is explicitly provided in Art. II 16 of the Constitution. While it is found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies, not Bill of Rights, but it is not any less important than any civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. It concerns nothing less than self- preservation and self-perpetuation and is assumed to
exist from the inception of mankind. Thus, those provisions are self-executing.

ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR, A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003

Considering the American origin of the Philippine religion clauses and the intent to adopt the historical background,
nature, extent and limitations of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution when it was included in the 1935 Bill of
Rights, it is not surprising that nearly all the major Philippine cases involving the religion clauses turn to U.S.
jurisprudence in explaining the nature, extent and limitations of these clauses. However, a close scrutiny of these
cases would also reveal that while U.S. jurisprudence on religion clauses flows into two main streams of
interpretation separation and benevolent neutrality the well-spring of Philippine jurisprudence on this
subject is for the most part, benevolent neutrality which gives room for accommodation.
IMBONG v. OCHOA, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of
the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is
of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded
primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law.
If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of the principle of
non-coercion enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR. v. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice, CSP
CLARO ARELLANO, as Chief State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF
PROSECUTORS OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, G.R. No. 197291,
April 3, 2013

Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a sound
judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive Department,
through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be
allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when
he has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law. Hence, in matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be
resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot
be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or
reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.

DIMAPORO v. MITRA, G.R. No.96859, October 15, 1991

Dimaporo, while serving as Representative of Lanao del Sur, filed a COC for the post of ARMM Governor. He lost
the latter election, and despite making known his desire to continue as Representative, was not able to return to that
office. The Supreme Court did not allow him to take office as Representative again. It differentiated a term, i.e. the
period an official may serve as provided for by law from tenure, i.e. the period that an official actually serves. The
Constitution protects the term, not the tenure. By filing the certificate of candidacy, Dimaporo shortened his tenure.
Thus, there is no violation of the Constitution when he was prevented from re-assuming his post. A term of office
prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by law, but the period during which an officer
actually serves (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of the officer.

BAGABUYO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008

RA 9371, which provided for apportionment of lone district of City of Cagayan de Oro was assailed on constitutional
grounds, on the ground that it is not re-apportionment legislation but that it involves the division and conversion of an
LGU. The Supreme Court held that RA 9371 is simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the
authority granted to Congress under Article VI, section 5(4).

BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009

The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list seats depends on
the number of participants in the party-list election. If only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election, then,
despite the availability of 54 seats, the maximum possible number of occupied party-list seats would only be 30
because of the three-seat cap. In such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the mandatory allocation of all the 54
available seats.

Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast guarantees a party one seat. This 2%
threshold for the first round of seat allocation does not violate any provision of the 1987 Constitution. In the second
round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote requirement to obtain a party-list seat because the
Court has struck down the application of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats. Specifically, the
provision in Section 11(b) of the Party-List Act stating that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in the proportion to their total number of votes can no longer be given any effect.
Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in the total membership of the House of Representatives as provided in
the 1987 Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill up. However, a party-list organization has to obtain a
sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in the second round of seat allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number
of votes is dependent upon the circumstances of each election, such as the number of participating parties, the
number of available party-list seats, and the number of parties with guaranteed seats received in the first round of
seat allocation.

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R.
No. 203766, April 2, 2013

The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women
and the youth, need not be marginalized and underrepresented will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties who lack well-defined political constituencies a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On
the other hand, limiting to the marginalized and underrepresented the sectoral parties for labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors
that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the marginalized and underrepresented an
opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.

This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system
where those marginalized and underrepresented, both in economic and ideological status, will have the
opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-
list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to
masquerade as wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity, even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in
SUVs.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented
and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies. The participation of major political parties in party-list
elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the marginalized and
underrepresented and those who lack well-defined political constituencies, giving them a voice in law-making.
Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district
elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth
wing, that can register under the party-list system.

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, G.R. No.
207264, June 25, 2013

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the
exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives. To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there
must be a concurrence of all of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3)
assumption of office. Absent any of the foregoing, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over the said contests.

JIMENEZ v. CABANGBANG, G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966

The expression speeches or debates herein in Art. VI 15 (1935 Constitution) only refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches (sponsorship, interpellation, privilege
uttered in Committees or to Congress in plenary session), statements and votes cast while Congress is in session,
as well as bills introduced in Congress. It also includes other acts performed by the same either in or out of
Congressional premises while in the official discharge of their duty when they performed the acts. It does not include
acts not connected with the discharge of their office.

Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993

Gordon, an incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, being appointed to other government
posts, does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On the
contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or designation
thereto cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This provision should not be confused with
Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where (n)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any
other office or employment in the Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his seat . . . . The difference
between the two provisions is significant in the sense that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts
only after they have been appointed to another government office, while other incumbent elective officials must first
resign their posts before they can be appointed, thus running the risk of losing the elective post as well as not being
appointed to the other post. It is therefore clear that ineligibility is not directly related with forfeiture of office. . . . .
The effect is quite different where it is expressly provided by law that a person holding one office shall be ineligible to
another. Such a provision is held to incapacitate the incumbent of an office from accepting or holding a second office
(State ex rel. Van Antwerp v Hogan, 283 Ala. 445, 218 So 2d 258; McWilliams v Neal, 130 Ga 733, 61 SE 721) and
to render his election or appointment to the latter office void (State ex rel. Childs v Sutton, 63 Minn 147, 65 NW 262.
Annotation: 40 ALR 945) or voidable (Baskin v State, 107 Okla 272, 232 p 388, 40 ALR 941). Where the
constitution, or statutes declare that persons holding one office shall be ineligible for election or appointment to
another office, either generally or of a certain kind, the prohibition has been held to incapacitate the incumbent of the
first office to hold the second so that any attempt to hold the second is void (Ala. State ex rel. Van Antwerp v.
Hogan, 218 So 2d 258, 283 Ala 445).

AVELINO v. CUENCA, G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949

As there were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor), twelve
senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority
of each House shall constitute a quorum, the House does not mean all the members. Even a majority of all the
members constitute the House. There is a difference between a majority of all the members of the House and a
majority of the House, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the
members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of
the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt about Quorum then, and Senator
Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and
one abstained

OSMENA v. PENDATUN, G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960

Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or
Members of the House of Representative shall not be questioned in any other place. This section was taken or is a
copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always
been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress,
the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that they shall not be
questioned in any other place than Congress. Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has
invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the Houses power to hold a member responsible for words spoken in
debate.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005

Congress did not give President the power to exercise discretion in making a law, only the power to ascertain the
facts necessary to exercise the law. The criteria for valid delegation are that:(1) Law is complete in itself, setting forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate (2) Law fixes a standard, the limits of
which are determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

GARCILLANO v. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008

It would be an injustice if a citizen is burdened with violating a law or rule he did not get notice of. It consists of
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines (Civil Code Art.
2) and the law shall only take effect 15 days after said publication. Publication via the Internet alone is considered
invalid since the provisions state that the rules must be published in the OG or in a newspaper. According to RA
8792, an electronic document serves as the functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary purposes.
Thus, it does not make the Internet a medium for publishing laws, rules, and regulations. The rules must also be
republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of 12 Senators as it is a continuing body independent of the
Senate before it, and its own rules state that they expire after every Senate.

BENGZON v. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE, G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991

Investigations must be in aid of legislation in accordance with duly published rules of procedure and must respect
the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by the inquiries. Senator Enriles privilege speech that prompted
the committee investigation contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation, only a call to look into a possible
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The call seems to fall under the jurisdiction of the courts rather
than the legislature, such as the case filed with the Sandiganbayan. For the Committee to probe and inquire into the
same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment into the exclusive
domain of the court.

SENATE v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006

In question hour, attendance is meant to be discretionary. In aid of legislation, attendance is compulsory. In the
absence of a mandatory question period, it becomes a greater imperative to enforce Congress right to executive
information in the performance of its legislative function. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, department
heads can only exempt themselves by a valid claim of inquiry. The only officials exempt are the President on whom
the executive power is vested and members of the Supreme Court on whom the judicial power is vested as a
collegial body as co-equal branches of government. For 1, the requirement for Presidential consent is limited only
to appearances of department heads in the question hour but not in inquiries in aid of legislation unless a valid claim
of privilege is made by the President or Executive Secretary.

Although some executive officials hold information covered by executive privilege, there can be no implied claim of
executive privilege thereby exempting some officials from attending inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress has a
right to know the reasons behind the claim of executive privilege before an official would be exempt from the
investigation.

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. SENAE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND

CURRENCIES, G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007

The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish contempt is based on the principle of
self-preservation. As the branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial
branch, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it. Such power is sui generis, as it attaches
not to the discharge of legislative functions per se, but to the sovereign character of the legislature as one of the
three independent and coordinate branches of government.

ABAKADA v. PURISIMA, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008

Any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined to the following: (1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative
vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains
a right or power to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in
the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a
congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law
initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitutions diagram of power
as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.

LIDASAN v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967

The Constitution has 2 limitations for bills: 1) Congress can not conglomerate under 1 statute heteregeneous
subjects, and, 2) The title of the bill must be couched in language sufficient to notify legislators and the public of the
import of the single title. Complying with the second directive is imperative since the Constitution does not require
Congress to read a bills entire text during deliberations.

BELGICA et al. v. OCHOA JR.; SJS v. DRILON et al.; NEPOMUCENO v. PRESIDENT AQUINO III, G.R. No.
208566, G.R. No. 208493, G.R. No. 209251, November 19, 2013

The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate must be
exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Under the 2013
PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how
much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since
these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes
individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate
which the Constitution does not, however, allow.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said
amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations
and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these
intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it
means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill
and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs the Presidents power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the
President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the
specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the
whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.

TAGUIWALO, et. al. vs. Aquino et. al. G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014

The DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and
is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate
the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were
withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which
were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.

MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN, et al. vs. BENIGNO
SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.

G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015

If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially
after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would
surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Herein, the Executive has violated
the GAA when it stated that savings as a concept is an ordinary species of interpretation that calls for legislative,
instead of judicial determination.

Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution states: 5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.

Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code provide: Section 39. Authority to Use Savings in
Appropriations to Cover Deficits.Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act, any savings in
the regular appropriations authorized in the General Appropriations Act for programs and projects of any
department, office or agency, may, with the approval of the President, be used to cover a deficit in any other item of
the regular appropriations: Provided, that the creation of new positions or increase of salaries shall not be allowed to
be funded from budgetary savings except when specifically authorized by law: Provided, further, that whenever
authorized positions are transferred from one program or project to another within the same department, office or
agency, the corresponding amounts appropriated for personal services are also deemed transferred, without,
however increasing the total outlay for personal services of the department, office or agency concerned.
On the other hand, Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain text of Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution
because it allows the President to approve the use of any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the
GAA for programs and projects of any department, office or agency to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular
appropriations. As such, Section 39 violates the mandate of Section 25(5) because the latter expressly limits the
authority of the President to augment an item in the GAA to only those in his own Department out of the savings in
other items of his own Departments appropriations. Accordingly, Section 39 cannot serve as a valid authority to
justify cross-border transfers under the DAP. Augmentations under the DAP which are made by the Executive within
its department shall, however, remain valid so long as the requisites under Section 25(5) are complied with.

ESTRADA v. DESIERTO, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

Estrada had constructively resigned, because both elements of resignation were present, namely: 1. Intent 2. Acts of
relinquishment (calling for snap election in which Estrada would not be a candidate, listening to Pimentels advice for
resignation, negotiation for peaceful and orderly transfer of power, declaring his intent to leave without anything
about reassuming the presidency, etc.)

As for prosecution of cases against him, resignation or retirement is not a bar to prosecution. Neither was there a
pending impeachment case when he resigned; if this were a bar to a criminal prosecution, then he would be
perpetually immune. Finally, Congress has already recognized Arroyo as the new President, and so the decision can
no longer be reviewed by the Court.

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL and ALFREDO S. LIM vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

When the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua
and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended
to former President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence
that followed, which states that (h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights, expressly remitted the
accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, from the text of the pardon
that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted
together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Furthermore, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., [w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective position or office, neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate
against the conclusion that former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been
restored. A preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes.
It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text. Hence if the pardon was
intended be conditional, it should have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since it did not make
an integral part of the decree of pardon, the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the
pardon extended.
NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008

Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of the President. It exists to protect
public interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure that the nation will
receive the benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled communication and exchange of information between the
President and his/her advisers in the process of shaping or forming policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise
of the functions of the Presidency under the Constitution. The confidentiality of the Presidents conversations and
correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality of judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value as
the right to privacy of all citizens and more, because it is dictated by public interest and the constitutionally ordained
separation of governmental powers.

AKBAYAN v. AQUINO, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008

The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and presidential
communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the rationale for the confidential character of diplomatic
negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential communications is similar, if not identical.

MANALO v. SISTOZA, G.R. No. 107369, August 11, 1999

Conformably, as consistently interpreted and ruled in the leading case of Sarmiento III vs. Mison, and in the
subsequent cases of Bautista vs. Salonga, Quintos-Deles vs. Constitutional Commission, and Calderon vs. Carale;
under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to be appointed
by the President:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first category, need
not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

MATIBAG v. BENIPAYO, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad
interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

PIMENTEL v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005

Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective
upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting
appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the
Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused,
they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

DENNIS FUNA v. ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO C. AGRA, et al., G.R. No. 191644, February 19,
2013

The language of Section 13, Art. VII of the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or
designation, as such, the prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as
to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary.

DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 191672, November
25, 2014

The concerned GOCCs are vested by their respective charters with various powers and functions to carry out the
purposes for which they were created. While powers and functions associated with appointments, compensation
and benefits affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government
officials and employees, the concerned GOCCs are also tasked to perform other corporate powers and functions
that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions, whether personnel-related or not, are carried out
and exercised by the respective Boards of the concerned GOCCs. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a
member of the governing Boards of the concerned GOCCs, he may exercise these powers and functions, which are
not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman. Such being the case, the designation of Duque was
unconstitutional.

MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015

The Court cannot rule on the validity of the alleged approval by the then President Estrada of the grant of additional
allowances and benefits. MIA failed to prove its existence. The alleged approval of the President was contained in a
mere photocopy of the memorandum The original was not presented during the proceedings. A copy of the
document is not in the Malacaang Records Office.

Further, the grant of allowances and benefits amounts to double compensation proscribed by Art. IX(B), Sec. 8 of
the 1987 Constitution.

DE CASTRO v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May, letting the elections
fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the
period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days.
Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court. The result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest possible period of
the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in
no position to comply with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that
the framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity. In fact, in their deliberations on the
mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the framers
neither discussed, nor mentioned, nor referred to the ban against midnight appointments under Section 15, Article
VII, or its effects on the 90-day period, or vice versa. They did not need to, because they never intended Section 15,
Article VII to apply to a vacancy in the Supreme Court, or in any of the lower courts.

GARAFIL v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015

Paragraph (b), Section 1 of EO 2 considered as midnight appointments those appointments to offices that will only
be vacant on or after 11 March 2010 even though the appointments are made prior to 11 March 2010. EO 2
remained faithful to the intent of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: the outgoing President is prevented
from continuing to rule the country indirectly after the end of his term.

IBP v. ZAMORA, G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000

Calling out armed forces is discretionary power solely vested in the Presidents wisdom but the matter may be
reviewed by the Court to see whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion.

SANLAKAS v. REYES, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004

Actual invasion/rebellion and requirement of public safety are not required for calling out the armed forces. Nothing
prohibits President from declaring a state of rebellion; it springs from powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-
Chief. Finally, calling out of the armed forces is not the same as a declaration of martial law.

DAVID v. ARROYO, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances
have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected
with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the
powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS, G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989

Imelda Marcos wanted to return home from Hawaii. Her return was prevented by Pres. Aquino. She invoked her
rights to travel and abode.

The SC upheld the decision to prevent her from returning to the Philippines as an exercise of the Presidents
residual powers. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive. The Presidents residual power is for protecting peoples general welfare, preserving and defending the
Constitution, protecting the peace, attending to day-to-day problems. Even the Resolution proposed in the House
urging the President to allow Marcos to return shows recognition of this power. Residual powers are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty to safeguard and protect general welfare.

YNOT v. IAC, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review
by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among
others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of such
cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.

MIRANDA v. AGUIRRE, G.R. No. 133064, September 16, 1999

A political question connotes a question of policy and referred to those questions which under the constitution were
1) to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or 2) in regard to which full discretionary authority had
been delegated to the legislative/executive branch of government.

Political questions are concerned with issues on the wisdom and not legality of a particular measure. Additionally, a
political question has no standards by which its legality or constitutionality could be determined. A purely justiciable
issue implied a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right and a
remedy granted and sanctioned by law for said breach of right.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP.
NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013

A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with
the shift to bicameralism. It is also very clear that the Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on
congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its primary function to legislate. In
the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3)
representatives from the major branches of government. In so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the
Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of
government. Hence, the argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the
JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the
House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress.

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA, vs. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014

a.) Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides:

SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. In every case where the integrity of an
applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all the
Members of the Council must be obtained for the favorable consideration of his nomination.
A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a higher voting requirement is absolute in
cases where the integrity of an applicant is questioned. Simply put, when an integrity question arises, the voting
requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post becomes unanimous instead of the majority
vote required in the preceding section. Considering that JBC-009 employs the term integrity as an essential
qualification for appointment, and its doubtful existence in a person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the
unanimous vote of all the members of the JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that integrity as used in the rules
must be interpreted uniformly. Hence, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an applicants
moral fitness is challenged. It follows then that the unanimity rule only comes into operation when the moral
character of a person is put in issue. It finds no application where the question is essentially unrelated to an
applicants moral uprightness.

ROMUALDEZ v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167011, April 30, 2008

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.
This Court has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for
the statute to be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.

FRANKLlN ALEJANDRO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU,

represented by Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013

The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution. It is tasked to exercise disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials, save only for impeachable officers. The Ombudsman has primary
jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction extends only to public officials occupying positions corresponding
to salary grade 27 and higher. Consequently, any act or omission of a public officer or employee occupying a salary
grade lower than 27 is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular courts or other
investigative agencies.

BRILLANTES v. YORAC, G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990

Yorac, as Associate COMELEC Chairman, was appointed by the President as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Brillantes challenged Yoracs appointment for being contrary to Article IX-C, Sec. 1(2) of 1987 Constitution, where
(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity. The SC agreed. The appointment was unconstitutional. Article IX-A, Sec. 1 provides for the
independence of ConCom from the executive department.

DAZA v. SINGSON, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989

The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting in a political realignment in the lower house.
LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza
(LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in
the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such
replacement on the ground that the LDPs reorganization was not permanent and stable.

The LDP has been existing for more than one year and its members include the Philippine President, and its internal
disagreements are expected in any political organization in a democracy. The test that the party must survive a
general congressional election was never laid down in jurisprudence. The Court ruled in favor of the authority of the
House to change its representation in the CoA to reflect at any time the permanent changes and not merely
temporary alliances or factional divisions without severance of loyalties/formal disaffiliation that may transpire in the
political alignments of its members.

AGAN v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001, January 21, 2004

Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides that in times of national emergency, when the public interest
so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take
over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

MANILA MEMORIAL PARK v. SECRETARY OF DSWD, G.R. No. 175356, December 3, 2013

Traditional distinctions exist between police power and eminent domain. In the exercise of police power, a property
right is impaired by regulation, or the use of property is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted to promote public
welfare. In such cases, there is no compensable taking, hence, payment of just compensation is not required.
Examples of these regulations are property condemned for being noxious or intended for noxious purposes (e.g., a
building on the verge of collapse to be demolished for public safety, or obscene materials to be destroyed in the
interest of public morals) as well as zoning ordinances prohibiting the use of property for purposes injurious to the
health, morals or safety of the community (e.g., dividing a citys territory into residential and industrial areas).

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION v. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009

Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the
conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the
State. These range from the regulation of dance halls, movie theaters, gas stations and cockpits. The awesome
scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nations
legal system, its use has rarely been denied.
REPUBLIC v. CASTELLVI, G.R. No. L-20620, August 5, 18974

The SC said that the prices in 1959 will apply since in 1947, they did not possess the property with a permanent
characteristic seeing that they were just leasing on a yearly basis. Their possession did not also deprive the owner
of the benefits of the land since they were paying rent. It was only in 1959 when they filed the expropriation
proceedings that they gained possession with a permanent character when the lower court granted them such
possession. The price of Php 10.00 however was quite high taking in consideration that the said properties could be
sold on a range of Php 2.50 4.00 per sq meters and the fact that the value of the peso went down. The proper
price is now at Php5.00 per square meters.

This case is doctrinal for giving the elements of a compensable taking, to wit:

1. The expropriator must enter a private property

2. For more than a momentary period
3. Under warrant or color of legal authority
4. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected
5. The owner must be ousted of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

HACIENDA LUISITA INCORPORATED v. PARC, G.R. No. 171101, April 24, 2012

Precisely because due regard is given to the rights of landowners to just compensation, the law on stock distribution
option acknowledges that landowners can require payment for the shares of stock corresponding to the value of the
agricultural lands in relation to the outstanding capital stock of the corporation.

FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY,
REPRESENTED BY HIS FATHER RENATO P. CUDIA, WHO ALSO ACTS ON HIS OWN BEHALF,
AND BERTENI CATALUA CAUSING vs. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY
ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA AND HC MEMBERS,
AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB)

G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015

Contending that Cadet Cudia was dismissed without being afforded due process, the petitioners filed the instant
petition assailing the dismissal of Cadet Cudia from the PMA. In order to be proper and immune from constitutional
infirmity, a cadet who is sought to be dismissed or separated from the academy must be afforded a hearing, be
apprised of the specific charges against him, and be given an adequate opportunity to present his or her defense
both from the point of view of time and the use of witnesses and other evidence. In the case at bar, the investigation
of Cadet 1CL Cudias Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He
was notified of the Honor Report from Maj. Hindang. He was then given the opportunity to explain the report against
him. He was informed about his options and the entire process that the case would undergo. Thus, the petitioners
could not argue that Cadet Cudia was not afforded due process.
ANG TIBAY v. CIR, G.R. No. L-46496, February 27, 1940

The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental
and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are
primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character.

PEOPLE v. CAYAT, G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be
reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not
be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

BIRAOGO v. PTC, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010

In the instant case, the fact that other administrations are not the subject of the PTCs investigative aim is not a case
of selective prosecution that violates equal protection. The Executive is given broad discretion to initiate criminal
prosecution and enjoys clear presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance thereof. For petitioners to
overcome that presumption, they must carry the burden of showing that the PTC is a preliminary step to selective
prosecution, and that it is laden with a discriminatory effect and a discriminatory purpose. However, petitioner has
sorely failed in discharging that burden.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION v. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.,
G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973

As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a
coveted boon at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming
ideal of our enlightened civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for
him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the
demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and
hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the
demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is a potent means
of inhibiting speech and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.

BAYAN v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2005

A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that
would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really
have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither are the
words opinion, protesting and influencing in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer
to any subject. The words petitioning the government for redress of grievances come from the wording of the
Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists
and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.

CHAVEZ v. GONZALES, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

It is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some form of restraint on freedom of speech. A
distinction has to be made whether the restraint is (1) a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the
incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; or
(2) a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or
speech. The cast of the restriction determines the test by which the challenged act is assayed with.

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE
BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY vs. COMMISSION OF ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION
OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON

G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

When petitioners, a Diocese and its Bishop posted tarpaulins in front of the cathedral which aimed to dissuade
voters from electing candidates who supported the RH Law, and the COMELEC twice ordered the latter to dismantle
the tarpaulin for violation of its regulation which imposed a size limit on campaign materials, the case is about
COMELECs breach of the petitioners fundamental right of expression of matters relating to election. Thus, the
COMELEC had no legal basis to issue said order as the tarpaulins were not paid for by any candidate or political
party and the candidates therein were not consulted regarding its posting. It was part of the petitioners advocacy
against the RH Law. Jurisprudence which sets the limit to free speech of candidates during elections but do not limit
the rights of broadcasters to comment on the candidates do not apply to the petitioners, as the petitioners are
private individuals who have lost their right to give commentary on the candidates when the COMELEC ordered the
tarpaulin removed. Second, the tarpaulin is protected speech. The size of the tarpaulins is fundamentally part of
protected speech, as it is important to convey the advocacy of the petitioners, who are also part of the electorate.
More importantly, every citizens expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. While
the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted in return for consideration by
any candidate, political party or party-list group. The COMELEC, therefore, has no jurisdiction to issue its order as it
lacks the requisites of a valid content-based regulation of speech. Third, the tarpaulins and their messages are not
religious speech, as they do not convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic Church. With all due respect to the
Catholic faithful, the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the
Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its
members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the
tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.

IN RE: JURADO, A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC April 6, 1995

Liability for published statements demonstrably false or misleading, and derogatory of the courts and individual
judges, is what is involved in the proceeding at bar than which, upon its facts, there is perhaps no more
appropriate setting for an inquiry into the limits of press freedom as it relates to public comment about the courts and
their workings within a constitutional order.

SWS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001

SWS and Kamahalan Publishing seek to enjoin COMELEC from enforcing Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act)
which prohibits the publishing of election surveys 15 days before the election of national candidates and 7 days
before the election of local candidates. The petitioners wish to publish surveys covering the entire election period
and argue that the resolution violates their right to free speech and expression. The SC held that the resolution is
invalid as because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and that (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of
expression.

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA, vs. ST. THERESAS COLLEGE,
MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, AND JOHN DOES,

G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014

The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having an influential
part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Punos speech, The Common
Right to Privacy, where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational
privacy; (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is
the right to informational privacyusually defined as the right of individuals to control information about
themselves.

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY, G.R. No.
179736, June 26, 2013

An individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence
as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase prying into
the privacy of anothers residence, therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual
considers as private, including a business office. In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed
practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should
not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right
to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Simply put, a person have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
property, whether he uses it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance
cameras directly facing his property or covering a significant portion thereof, without his consent, is a clear violation
of their right to privacy.

AGLIPAY v. RUIZ, G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1997

Gregorio Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, filed for a writ of prohibition against Juan
Ruiz, Director of Posts, to stop him from selling postage stamps which commemorated the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress organized by the Catholic Church in Manila. Petitioner alleges that this violates the
Constitutional provision prohibiting the use of public money for the benefit of any religious denomination. The Court
denied the petition. The Director of Posts acted by virtue of Act No. 4052 which appropriated 60,000 pesos for the
cost of printing of stamps with new designs. The stamps themselves featured a map of the Philippines. The
governments goal was to promote the Philippines. There was no religious goal. The proceeds of the sale of the
stamps also went to the government and not to any church.

AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY v. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. L-9637, April 30, 1957

American Bible Society (ABS) is a nonstock, nonprofit, religious missionary corporation distributing and selling
bibles/gospel portions in the Philippines. ABS was informed that it has to comply with Ordinance No. 3000 (obtain a
mayors permit) and Ordinance No. 2529 (pay municipal license fee for the period covering 1945 to 1953 and
amounting to 5, 821.45). ABS paid in protest and filed a case to declare said Ordinances void and to seek a refund.
Trial court dismissed case. SC ruled that Ordinance 3000 is valid as it merely requires a mayors permit. Ordinance
2529 is also valid but cannot be made to apply to ABS because such license fee constitutes a restraint in the free
exercise of religion. The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right could only be justified
like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is clear and present danger of any
substantive evil, which the State has the right to prevent.

EBRALINAG v. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT, G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993

Petitioners in this consolidated petition are high school and elementary students from Cebu who were expelled for
not participating in the flag ceremony of their schools. They are represented by their parents. As Jehovahs
Witnesses, they consider the flag as an idol which, according to their religion, should not be worshipped. They
believe that the flag ceremony is a form of worship which is prohibited by their religion. Respondents counter by
invoking RA 1265, Department Order 8 and the ruling of Gerona v. Secretary of Education which upheld that all
students should participate in the flag ceremony. The Court reversed the Gerona ruling and ruled in favor of the
petitioners. Expelling them based on their religious beliefs would be a curtailment of their right to religious profession
and worship and their right to free education.

Iglesia Ni Cristo v. CA (1996)

The Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) operates a TV program titled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. The Board of Review for Motion
Pictures and Television classified such program as rated X, being not fit for public viewing as it offends and
constitutes an attack against other religions. The SC held that INC is protected by Art. III, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
The Board failed to show any imminent or grave danger that would be brought about by the telecast of the show.
Also, the show itself is not an attack against, but rather a criticism of, other religions. Such ground (i.e., criticism) is
not a valid ground in order to prohibit the broadcasting of the show. SC also affirmed MTRCBs power to regulate
these types of television programs citing the 1921 case of Sotto v Ruiz regarding the Director of Posts power to
check as to whether or not publications are of a libelous character.
RUBI v. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, G.R. No. L-14078, March 7, 1919

The right to travel can validly be suspended in the valid exercise of police power.

CHAVEZ v. PEA, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002

The right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information,
however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets, and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.

STONEHILL v. DIOKNO, G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a violation of Central Ban
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MARK JASON CHAVEZ Y BITANCOR ALIAS NOY, G.R. No. 207950,
September 22, 2014

The Miranda rights is a right guaranteed by the Constitution to the accused during custodial investigation. Republic
Act No. 7438 even expanded its definition to include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the
inviting officer for any violation of law. This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police
officer must be apprised of their Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this
scenario. Chavez is also being questioned by an investigating officer in a police station. As an additional pressure,
he may have been compelled to surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the police station.

MARIETA DE CASTRO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015

The right to remain silent and to counsel can be invoked only in the context in which the Miranda doctrine applies
when the official proceeding is conducted under the coercive atmosphere of a custodial interrogation. There are no
cases extending them to a non-coercive setting. The rights are invocable only when the accused is under custodial
investigation. A person undergoing a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation and, hence, the
audit examiner may not be considered the law enforcement officer contemplated by the rule. By a fair analogy,
Marieta may not be said to be under custodial investigation. She was not even being investigated by any police or
law enforcement officer. She was under administrative investigation by her superiors in a private firm and in purely
voluntary manner. She was not restrained of her freedom in any manner. She was free to stay or go. There was no
evidence that she was forced or pressured to say anything.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA

G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014

The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is to protect the arresting
officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the
latter from destroying evidence within reach. It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the States police power to
protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and
(2) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the
integrity of the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014

A person apprehended or arrested cannot literally mean any person apprehended or arrested for any crime. The
phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends
persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law. Hence, a drug test can only be
made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. To make the
provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II of the Dangerous
Drugs Act is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Furthermore, making the phrase a person apprehended
or arrested in Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A.
9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for
any crime. Moreover, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA

G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014

One of these jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is stop and frisk. Stop and frisk searches are often
confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of Court. Searches incidental to a lawful arrest
require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the vicinity and within reach
by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.

The balance lies in the concept of suspiciousness present in the situation where the police officer finds himself or
herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. Hence, they should have the
ability to discern based on facts that they themselves observe whether an individual is acting in a suspicious
manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe
the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act. It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a
reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another
person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less
than this would be an infringement upon ones basic right to security of ones person and effects. Police officers
cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there is compliance with the genuine
reason requirement and that the search serves the purpose of protecting the public.

MAPALO v. LIM, G.R. No. 136051, June 8, 2006

The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntary or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding. The right is not to be compelled to be a
witness against himself.

GOVT. OF HONGKONG v. OLALIA, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is
no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, Jr., ET AL v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., G.R. No. 203335. February 18,
2014

Charging offenders of violation of RA 10175 and the RPC both with regard to libel; likewise with RA 9775 on Child
pornography constitutes double jeopardy. The acts defined in the Cybercrime Law involve essentially the same
elements and are in fact one and the same with the RPC and RA 9775.

RENATO M. DAVID vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015

David argued that the Court has disregarded the undisputed fact that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that by
re-acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction deemed not to have lost it at the time of
his naturalization in Canada and through the time when he was said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship in
his Miscellaneous Lease Application. However, while Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, such is qualified
by the phrase under the conditions of this Act. It provides that those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

COQUILLA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 151914, July 13, 2002

A person loses Philippine citizenship and domicile of origin by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S.
Navy, as residence in the U.S. is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. This results in the abandonment
of domicile in the Philippines. The person may only be said to have been domiciled in the Philippines again once he
repatriates or by an act of Congress, but the period before this act of reacquisition will not count in the residency
requirement for elected officials. His status during that period is one of an alien who has obtained an immigrant visa
and has waived his status as a non-resident.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS, G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013

A Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is different from judicial naturalization under CA 473. In the
first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare or confirm his status as a Philippine
citizen. In the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege
of becoming a Philippine citizen based on requirements required under CA 473.

ELECTION, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

YRA v. ABANO, G.R. No. 30187, November 15, 1928

Abano was a native of Meycauayan who studied in Manila, where he was registered to vote. After completing his
studies as a lawyer, Abano returned to Meycauayan and ran for office though his cancellation of voters registration
in Manila was denied because of his failure to deposit in the mails on time. In ruling in Abanos favor, the Court
explained that the registration of a voter does not confer the right to vote; it is but a condition precedent to the
exercise of the right. Registration is a regulation, not a qualification.

SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No. 193314, February 26, 2013
A change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at
the same time, otherwise the residence of origin should be deemed to continue.

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.

BALUA, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013

Dual citizens by naturalization are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office. If by the time
an aspiring candidate filed his certificate of candidacy, he was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of
Filipino and foreign citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a local elective position. By being barred from even
becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning.

Being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves the qualified candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will
not apply.

OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014

The COMELEC has no discretion to give or not to give due couse to COCs. The Court emphasized that the duty of
the COMELEC to give due course to COCs filed in due form is ministerial in character, and that while the COMELEC
may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC. The
determination of whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where
parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Thus, in simply relying on the
Memorandum of Director Amora Ladra in cancelling Kimberlys COC and denying the latters substitution by Olivia,
and absent any petition to deny due course to or cancel said COC, the Court finds that the COMELEC once more
gravely abused its discretion.

LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE v. COMELEC and MIGUEL VILLAFUERTE, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that the false representation in the contents of the Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) must refer to material matters in order to justify the cancellation of the COC. Material
misrepresentation under the Omnibus Election Code refers to Qualifications for elective office (residency, age,
citizenship, or any other legal qualifications necessary to run for local elective office as provided in the Local
Government Code) coupled with a showing that there was an intent to deceive the electorate.

GONZALES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011

We find it necessary to point out that Sections 5 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646, contrary to the erroneous
arguments of both parties, did not in any way amend the period for filing Section 78 petitions. While Section 7 of
the said law makes reference to Section 5 on the procedure in the conduct of cases for the denial of due course to
the CoCs of nuisance candidates (retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v.
Commission on Elections explains that the procedure hereinabove provided mentioned in Section 7 cannot be
construed to refer to Section 6 which does not provide for a procedure but for the effects of disqualification cases,
[but] can only refer to the procedure provided in Section 5 of the said Act on nuisance candidates x x x.), the same
cannot be taken to mean that the 25-day period for filing sec. 78 petitions under the oec is changed to 5 days
counted from the last day for the filing of COCs. The clear language of Section 78 certainly cannot be amended or
modified by the mere reference in a subsequent statute to the use of a procedure specifically intended for another
type of action. Cardinal is the rule in statutory construction that repeals by implication are disfavored and will not be
so declared by the Court unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. In addition, it is noteworthy that Loong,
which upheld the 25-day period for filing Section 78 petitions, was decided long after the enactment of R.A. 6646.
In this regard, we therefore find as contrary to the unequivocal mandate of the law, Rule 23, Section 2 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
As the law stands, the petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

SILVERIO R.TAGOLINO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE

TORRES GOMEZ, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013

The existence of a valid certificate of candidacy (COC) is a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be
validly substituted. If the COC is thereby cancelled or denied due course, the candidate cannot be validly
substituted.

RENATO M. FEDERICO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 199612, January 22, 2013

When there has been no valid substitution, the candidate with the highest number of votes should be proclaimed as
the duly elected mayor.

EMILIO RAMON E.R. P. EJERCITO vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR EGAY S. SAN
LUIS, G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014

San Luis filed a disqualification case against co-gubernatorial candidate Ejercito. The COMELEC First Division and
COMELEC En banc granted the disqualification petition. In the said petition, San Luis alleges that Ejercito was
distributing an Orange Card with the intent to entice voters to vote for him and that Ejercito exceeded the allowable
amount for campaign funds. Ejercito alleges that a preliminary investigation should have been conducted prior to the
decision of the COMELEC. In this regard, the Supreme Court ruled that, As contemplated in paragraph 1 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, a complaint for disqualification filed before the election which must be inquired into
by the COMELEC for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed.
Where the inquiry results in a finding before the election, the COMELEC shall order the candidates disqualification.
In case the complaint was not resolved before the election, the COMELEC may motu propio or on motion of any of
the parties, refer the said complaint to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary investigation.
PENERA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 131613, November 25, 2009

Penera was disqualified as a mayoralty candidate for engaging in election campaigning before the campaign period.
The Court ruled in her favor. A candidate is any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed
a certificate of candidacy. Any person who files a certificate of candidacy within the period for filing shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.
Accordingly, a candidate is only liable for an election offense for acts done during the campaign period, not before.
Any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period,
when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate. Before the start of the campaign period, the same
partisan political acts are lawful.

MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MUSTAPHA J. OMAR, G.R. No. 207900,
April 22, 2014

As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed in order that the will of the
people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Settled is the rule that the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret
or even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all
matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of
its objectives ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving
just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the
COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with public interest. It involves not only the
adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also the paramount need of dispelling the
uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding duty to
ascertain, by all means within its command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader.

ANGEL G. NAVAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND NELSON B. JULIA

G.R. No. 207851, July 08, 2014

It bears noting that the actual difference in the population of the old Second District from that of the current Third
District amounts to less than 10% of the population of the latter. This numerical fact renders the new Third District as
essentially, although not literally, the same as the old Second District. Hence, while Naval is correct in his argument
that Sanggunian members are elected by district, it does not alter the fact that the district which elected him for the
third and fourth time is the same one which brought him to office in 2004 and 2007. Accordingly, Naval is disqualified
to serve another term a Sangguniang Member.

Navals ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does not undermine the right to equal
representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or without him, the renamed Third District, which he
labels as a new set of constituents, would still be represented, albeit by another eligible person.

JOSEPH B. TIMBOL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015
Petitioner filed the instant petition contending that he was denied due process for being considered a nuisance
candidate even before a clarificatory was even conducted. The SC ruled that nuisance candidates are persons who
file their certificates of candidacy to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among
the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly
demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy
has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate. To minimize the logistical
confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by
respondent. This denial or cancellation may be motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested
party, subject to an opportunity to be heard. Respondent in this case declared petitioner a nuisance candidate
without giving him a chance to explain his bona fide intention to run for office. Respondent had already declared
petitioner a nuisance candidate even before the clarificatory hearing. This was an ineffective opportunity to be
heard.

GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014

There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily authorized to enforce election
laws but it cannot exercise its powers without limitations or reasonable basis. It could not simply adopt measures
or regulations just because it feels that it is the right thing to do, in so far as it might be concerned. It does have
discretion, but such discretion is something that must be exercised within the bounds and intent of the law. The
COMELEC is not free to simply change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal provision in a
particular manner in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same must be properly explained with sufficient
basis. Clearly, the respondent in this instance went beyond its legal mandate when it provided for rules beyond what
was contemplated by the law it is supposed to implement.

FORTICH v. CORONA, G.R. No. 131457, November 17, 1998

It must be emphasized that a decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or tribunal which is declared
void on the ground that the same was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is elementary that jurisdiction of a body,
court or tribunal is an essential and mandatory requirement before it can act on a case or controversy. And even if
said body, court or tribunal has jurisdiction over a case, but has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion, such act is still invalid. The decision nullifying the questioned act is an adjudication on the merits.

REPUBLIC v. EXPRESS TELLECOMMUNICATION, CO. INC. G.R. No. 147096, January 15, 2002

The 1993 Revised Rules of the NTC were not published in a newspaper of general circulation, thus, they did not
take effect. Even though the 1993 Rules were filed with the UP Law Center, in accordance with Section 3, Chapter
2, Book VII of the Administrative Code, the same is not the operative act that gives rules valid force and effect since
the bulletin of codified rules by the ONAR is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate
courts, the National Library, and other public officers or agencies specified by Congress. Publication in the Official
Gazette or newspaper of general circulation is required before laws can take effect.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GSIS v. MOLINA, G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011

The assailed resolutions pertain only to internal rules to regulate GSIS personnel, thus, there was no need to comply
with the publication or filing requirements. According to the UP Law Centers guidelines, interpretative regulations,
and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public need not be filed with the center.

PUBLIC HEARING COMMITTEE v. SM PRIME HOLDINGS INC., G.R. No. 170599, SEPTEMBER 22, 2010

the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with
respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region. In expounding on this issue, the Court held that the
adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except where a special
law, such as the LLDA Charter, provides for another forum. The Court further ruled that although the PAB assumed
the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution
cases, this does not preclude the LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of pollution cases within its area of responsibility
and to impose fines as penalty.

OPLE v. TORRES, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998

It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It
establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a
delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy
interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice
Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought. As said administrative order
redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates
the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident
that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.

KILUSANG MAYO UNO v. BAYAN MUNA, G.R. No. 167798, April 16, 2006

A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two ways. First, the heads of these
existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform. If the
government entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to their regular functions under existing
laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format, especially if the uniform format will result in
substantial savings, greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is purely an administrative matter, and does
not involve the exercise of legislative power.

Panay Autobus Co. v. Philippine Railway Co. (1933)

Public Service Commission granted the Phil. Railway Co. the power to fix its own rates in order to compete with the
rates of road trucks and auto buses. Such grant is invalid. The Legislature delegated to the PSC the power of fixing
rates of public services but it was not authorized by law to delegate to Phil. Railway Co. the power to alter its freight
rates whenever it should find it necessary to do so, because the PSC cannot determine whether such new rates will
be just and reasonable.

Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA (2000)

Parcels of land owned by petitioner were taken by the DAR for distribution pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. It was dissatisfied with the valuation of the land so it filed a petition for a determination of just
compensation for its property with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond
the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB.

Pursuant to Rule XIII, Sec. 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the decision of the Adjudicator on the land
valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but
shall be brought to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court within 15 days from receipt of the notice thereof.
Since Veterans petition in the RTC was filed beyond the 15-day period, the RTC correctly dismissed the case.

HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN;
HON. ROGELIO L. SINGSON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
SECRETARY vs. JOSEFINO N. RIGOR, G.R. No. 206661, December 10, 2014

Falsification of an official document such as the SALN is considered a grave offense. It amounts to dishonesty. Both
falsification and dishonesty are grave offenses punishable by dismissal from the service, even for the first offense,
with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in government service. The act of falsifying an official document is in itself grave because of its
possible deleterious effects on government service. At the same time, it is also an act of dishonesty, which violates
fundamental principles of public accountability and integrity. Under Civil Service regulations, falsification of an official
document and dishonesty are distinct offenses, but both may be committed in one act, as in this case. The
constitutionalization of public accountability shows the kind of standards of public officers that are woven into the
fabric of our legal system. To reiterate, public office is a public trust, which embodies a set of standards such as
responsibility, integrity and efficiency. Unfortunately, reality may sometimes depart from these standards, but our
society has consciously embedded them in our laws so that they may be demanded and enforced as legal
principles, and the Court is mandated to apply these principles to bridge actual reality to the norms envisioned for
our public service.

SALES v. CARREON, G.R. No. 160791, February 13, 2007

All 83 appointments are void. The CSC is required to publish the list of vacant positions and such publication shall
be posted by the chief personnel or administrative officer of all local government units in the designated places. The
vacant positions may only be filled by the appointing authority after they have been reported to the CSC as vacant,
and only after publication. In this case, the publication of vacancies was made even before the positions involved
actually became vacant.
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES EMMPLOYEES UNION (CAAP-EU) vs. CIVIL AVIATION
AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINE, et al.,

G.R. No. 190120, November 11, 2014

Apropos then is the Courts ruling in Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board v. Barin, to wit:
however, abolition of an office and its related positions is different from removal of an incumbent from his office.
Abolition and removal are mutually exclusive concepts. From a legal standpoint, there is no occupant in an
abolished office. Where there is no occupant, there is no tenure to speak of. Thus, impairment of the constitutional
guarantee of security of tenure does not arise in the abolition of an office. On the other hand, removal implies that
the office and its related positions subsist and that the occupants are merely separated from their positions. Based
on the premise that there was a valid abolition of ATO, in the absence of any bad faith, we rule that the ATO
employees right to security of tenure was not violated.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. MARICELLE M. CORTES

G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014

Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority; (2) recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office;
and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.1 Here, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes
is a relative of Commissioner Mallari in the first degree of consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter of
Commissioner Mallari. The defense of respondent Cortes that her appointment was made by the Commission En
Banc and that his father, a member of the Commission, abstain from voting for his appointment did not cure the
nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His mere
presence during the deliberation for the appointment of IO V created an impression of influence and cast doubt on
the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc.

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

AURELIO M. UMALI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V. VERGARA, and THE CITY
GOVERNMENT OF CABANATUAN

G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014

The plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into a highly urbanized citys
should be participated by the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija not of Cabanatuan City
only. While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution we nevertheless
observe that the conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries. As the phrase
implies, substantial alteration of boundaries involves and necessarily entails a change in the geographical
configuration of a local government unit or units. However, the phrase boundaries should not be limited to the mere
physical one, referring to the metes and bounds of the LGU, but also to its political boundaries. It also connotes a
modification of the demarcation lines between political subdivisions, where the LGUs exercise of corporate power
ends and that of the other begins. And as a qualifier, the alteration must be substantial for it to be within the ambit
of the constitutional provision.

CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, represented by its Mayor, HON. DARLENE MAGNOLIA R. ANTONINO-
CUSTODIO vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014

Designing and implementing a local government units own organizational structure and staffing pattern also
implies the power to revise and reorganize. Without such power, local governments will lose the ability to adjust to
the needs of its constituents. Effective and efficient governmental services especially at the local government level
require rational and deliberate changes planned and executed in good faith from time to time. However, the assailed
decision by respondent Commission on Audit was anchored on Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No.
186, otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4968, which
proscribes all supplementary retirement or pension plans for government employees.

NAVARRO v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011

Republic Act 9355 is valid and constitutional. The exemption from the minimum land area requirement when the
Local Government Unit to be created consists of one or more islands is expressly stated in the Local Government
Code for municipalities but is absent in the requisites for the creation of a province, but such exemption is expressly
stated in Art. 9(2) of the Local Government Code Implementing Rules and Regulations (LGC-IRR). The omission of
the exemption in the case of provinces was intended to be corrected by Art. 9(2) of the LGC-IRR to reflect the true
legislative intent. This will also be consistent with the declared policy to provide said local government units genuine
and meaningful local autonomy by construing liberally the contiguity and minimum land area requirements for
prospective local government units in order to achieve the desired results.

MMDA v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000

The MMDAs power is limited to administration and implementation of metro-wide services in Metro Manila and is not
a Local Government Unit nor a public corporation endowed with legislative power nor police power to enact
ordinances for the closure or opening of roads. It can only lay down policies and coordinate with various agencies,
as well as the private sector.

LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, April 12, 2011

The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. Senator Pimentel during the deliberations showed that Republic Act 9009
would not apply to the conversion bills then pending deliberation in the Senate during the 11th Congress, for Local
Government Units covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class of their own, having proven themselves viable
and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces (by being tourism spots, centers of trade and
commerce, points of convergence of transportation, and havens of agricultural, mineral and other natural resources).

AQUINO v. ROBREDO, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010

Republic Act 9716 is constitutional. Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only
for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not for a province. Records of the Constitutional Commission show
that the population was not the sole determinant of the creation of a legislative district.

SEMA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008

Sec. 19, Art. VI of Republic Act 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces and cities. Regional legislative bodies may be delegated the power to create
municipalities and barangays provided in Sec. 10, Art, X of the Constitution but only Congress may create provinces
and cities.

ORDILLO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990

The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the CAR. The Constitution is clear that the autonomous regions
must consist of more than one province, as the term region used in its ordinary sense means two or more
provinces. Further, it can be seen from Republic Act 6766 (Organic Act of the CAR) that Congress never intended
that a single province can constitute an autonomous region; otherwise, the province will be composed of two sets of
officials: one for the Ifugao Local Government Unit and another set of regional officials for the CAR, both of whom
will be exercising executive and legislative powers over the same area.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO v. MENDEZ, G.R. No. 103702, December 6, 1994

The Municipality of San Andres attained a status closely approximating that of a de facto municipal corporation, by
virtue of the circumstances of the case, such as the existence of governmental acts (e.g., EO 174 classifying the
municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality) that point to the states recognition of the continued
existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Furthermore, by virtue of Sec. 442 (d) of the Local Government Code,
which states that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which
have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall
be considered regular municipalities, it has now attained the status of a de jure municipality. Also, the petitioner
challenged the legality of EO 353 only thirty years after its issuance. A quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful
authority of a political subdivision should be timely raised.
SAMPIANO v. INDAR, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953, December 21, 2009

The IRA may not be automatically released. The automatic release of the IRA under Sec. 286 is a mandate to the
national government through the Department of Budget and Management to effect automatic release of the said
funds from the treasury directly to the local government units, free from any holdbacks or liens imposed by the
national government, but this automatic realease of the IRA from the national treasury does not prevent the proper
court from deferring or suspending its release to particular local officials when there is a legal question presented in
court as to the rights of the parties to receive the IRA.

PIMENTEL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012

There was no recentralization as the local government units have no power over a program for which funding has
been provided by the National Government under the General Appropriations Act, even if the said program is within
the jurisdiction of an LGU. The programs and services involved in the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program are
funded by the National Government, which it may designate to implementing agencies such as the DSWD. The
concept of local autonomy does imply the establishment of local government units into mini-states, as what is
involved in local autonomy is decentralization of administration and not of power.

GANCAYCO v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011

Congress granted the city government, through its city council, police power by virtue of the Revised Quezon City
Charter, which allowed the regulation of the construction of buildings. Property rights of individuals may be subjected
to restraints and burdens in the exercise of police power, but the methods and means used in exercising such power
to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view. The ordinance
in question is valid as the citys primary goal in enacting it was to increase health and safety of the city since these
arcardes were intended to provide safe and convenient passageways along the sidewalk for pedestrians.

SJS v. LIM, G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014

The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is vested with the power
to reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city116 subject to the pertinent provisions of the Code. It is also settled
that an ordinance may be modified or repealed by another ordinance.

The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of any
convincing reason to persuade this Court that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer
put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, we hold that Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals
is invalid and unconstitutional.
PARAYNO v. JOVELLANOS, G.R. No. 148408, July 14, 2006

The Resolution was an invalid exercise of police power as the Ordinance which served as its basis only prohibits
gasoline service stations within 100 meters from any school, church or hospital, and not gasoline filling stations. The
ordinance makes a distinction between gasoline filling stations and gasoline service centers, prohibiting the latter
and not the former. Also, there was no due process as the Sangguniang Bayan sought to abate the alleged nuisance
(Paraynos gasoline filling station) without proper judicial proceedings.

CITY OF MANILA v. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. L-14355, October 31, 1919

Though the City Charter of Manila allows it to expropriate land for public purposes, the right of expropriation is not
an inherent power in a municipal corporation in that where the statute does not designate the property to be taken
nor how it may be taken, the necessity of taking a particular property is a question for the courts to decide. In this
case, the first condition on expropriation by the City of Manila was met, as the land sought to be expropriated is
private but the second condition (public purpose) was not met as it was not shown that the extension of the street
was necessary and its extension through the cemetery was also not shown to be necessary as other lots have been
offered to the city free of charge.

JIL CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION v. CITY OF PASIG, G.R. No. 152230, August 9, 2005

The expropriation was improper as there was no valid and definite offer. Before a local government unit can exercise
the power of eminent domain, there must first be a) an ordinance enacted by the local legislative council authorizing
the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property; b) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose
or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless; c) There is payment of just compensation, as required
under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution and other pertinent laws; and d) A valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. There was
no offer because the letter Pasig sent the Cuangcos and the invitation to the engineers office only proved its intent
to acquire the property for a right of way and did not amount to a valid and definite offer.

ONGSUCO v. MALONES, G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009

The rentals and goodwill fees imposed by the municipal ordinance are charges, making the municipal ordinance
void and unenforceable as there was no valid public hearing conducted as mandated by Sec. 186 of the Local
Government Code, which expressly provides that ordinances levying taxes, fees or charges cannot be enacted
without any public hearing.

QUEZON CITY v. BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, G.R. No. 162015, March 6, 2006

Bayantel is exempt from realty taxes on its properties that are actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of
its franchise. Congress may grant a tax exemption previously withdrawn by the LGC. Despite the fact that Sec. 5,
Article X of the Constitution gives local legislative bodies the power to tax, their exercise of this power may be
subject to guidelines and limitations as Congress may provide. Thus, the power to tax is still primarily vested in
Congress. Through Sec. 232 of the Local Government Code which provides that a province or city or municipality
within the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real propertynot hereinafter specifically
exempted, the Congress highlighted its power to thereafter exempt certain realties from the taxing power of local
government units. The use, in turn, of the same phrase exclusive of this franchise in Republic Act 7633, which was
the basis for Bayantes exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC, shows the intention on the part of Congress to
once again remove from the LGCs delegated taxing power all of the franchisees properties actually, directly and
exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.

MIAA v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006

MIAA, not being a government-owned and controlled corporation, is exempt from real estate tax because it is a
government instrumentality vested with corporate powers. An instrumentality refers to any agency of the National
Government not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter. Sec. 133 of the LGC states that the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays shall not extend to the levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its
agencies and instrumentalities. This constitutes a limitation imposed by Congress on the local governments
exercise of the power to tax. Furthermore, the power of local governments to tax national government
instrumentalities is construed strictly against local governments and the rule is that a tax is never presumed and that
there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax.

QUEZON CITY v. ABS-CBN, G.R. No. 166408, October 6, 2008

While Congress has the inherent power to tax and grant tax exemptions, Sec. 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
confers on municipal corporations a general power to levy taxes and otherwise create sources of revenue and they
no longer have to wait for a statutory grant of these powers. In interpreting statutory provisions on municipal fiscal
powers, doubts will be resolved in favor of municipal corporations. In this case, the in lieu of other taxes provision
does not expressly provide in clear and unambiguous language what kind of taxes ABS-CBN is exempted from, and
as a claim of tax exemption is not favored nor presumed in law but must be clearly shown, ABS-CBN is liable for
Quezon Citys franchise tax.

SMART COMMUNICATIONS v. CITY OF DAVAO, G.R. No. September 16, 2008

Smart is liable to pay Davaos franchise tax because its legislative franchise did not expressly provide the specific
taxes from which it was exempt. The in lieu of all taxes clause in Smarts legislative franchise did not expressly and
categorically state that the exemption applies to both local and national taxes and thus, the phrase in question must
be applied only to national internal revenue taxes. Tax exemptions are never presumed and are construed strictly
against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.
SANGALANG v. IAC, G.R. No. 71169, December 22, 1988

The Mayors act is valid because in this case, the city has the power to open a city street for public use. Despite loss
of privacy among Bel-Air residents, more important than this is the duty of a local executive to take care of the needs
of the majority at the expense of the minority.

CITY OF MANILA v. TEOTICO, G.R. No. L-23053, January 29, 1968

The applicable provision is that of Art. 2189 of the Civil Code as it governs liability due to defective streets, which
Teotico alleged to be the cause of his injuries. Sec. 4 of the City Charter is not decisive on the issue as it refers
merely to liability arising from negligence in general, regardless of the object thereof, while Art. 2189 governs liability
due to defective streets in particular. On the allegation of the City of Manila that it is not liable because the street
where Teotico was injured was a national highway, the Court ruled that under Art. 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not
necessary that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality on which responsibility is
placed. It is enough that the said province, city or municipality have either control or supervision over the said street
or road.

TORIO v. FONTANILLA, G.R. No. L-29993, October 23, 1978

The provision simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a
duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the
town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public
performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure
profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the
maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from
the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service.

KANANGA v. MADRONA, G.R. No. 141375, April 30, 2003

Sec. 118 of the Local Government Code, requiring that boundary disputes involving municipalities or component
cities of different provinces be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces concerned, has no
application in this case since one party is an independent component city. Since there is no legal provision
specifically governing jurisdiction over boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component
city, the general rules governing jurisdiction should then be used and as the RTCs have general jurisdiction to
adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary powers, the RTCs have the power to
hear and resolve the dispute in the case at bar.

SOCRATES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002

The recall assembly was proper. Hagedorn is not disqualified from running in the recall election as any subsequent
election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition on serving for more than 3 consecutive terms
contained in Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code. Any subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate re-election after three consecutive terms and the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption
in the continuity of service.

MONTEBON v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008

Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms, and that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of
service. For an official to be disqualified from running because of the three-term limit, the official must have been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and he must have fully served three
consecutive terms. In this case, there was an interruption in Potenciosos second term as municipal councilor as he
succeeded the retired Vice Mayor Mendoza. Such succession in local government offices is by operation of law and
does not constitute voluntary renunciation of office. Thus, since the succession did not amount to a voluntary
renunciation of office (which does not interrupt the continuity of service), Potencioso could not be said to have fully
served his second term and as such, he is entitled to run for another term as municipal councilor.

MENDOZA v. LAXINA, G.R. No. 146875, July 14, 2003

The re-taking of an oath of office by a duly-proclaimed but subsequently unseated local elective official is not a
condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption into his office. Once Laxina was proclaimed and duly
sworn into office the first time, he became entitled to assume office and exercise its functions. The pendency of an
election protest is not sufficient basis to stop him from assuming office or discharging his functions. When the
COMELEC nullified the writ of execution pending appeal issued by the MTC in favor of Fermo, the MTCs decision
proclaiming Fermo as winner of the election was stayed and the status quo or when Laxina was occupying the
office of Barangay Captain was restored. As such, the re-taking of his oath was a mere formality, because through
the stay of the MTCs decision, it was as if the writ of execution was not issued and he was not ousted from office.

VALLES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000

Lopez is not disqualified. Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government Code uses the term dual citizenship as a
disqualification, meaning dual allegiance. For candidates like Lopez with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship. As such, if in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she
will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto, such a
declaration, under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. In this case, Lopez should not
be disqualified as the Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child
follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth. Lopez, is a Filipino citizen,
having been born to a Filipino father. Also, the fact that Lopez was born in Australia did not amount to her losing her
Philippine citizenship. Furthermore, the fact that Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien
certificate of registration did not mean that she was renouncing her Filipino citizenship since a renunciation must be
express to result in the loss of citizenship.
MERCADO v. MANZANO, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999

Manzano should not be disqualified because the dual citizenship meant in Sec. 40 (d) of the Local Government
Code as a ground for disqualification, refers to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national
by the said states, while dual allegiance, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. For candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine
citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.
Manzanos oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and
adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, shows his election of Philippine citizenship.

MONDANO v. SILVOSA, G.R. No. L-7708, May 30, 1955

The investigation and suspension were illegal because, although provincial supervision over municipal officials
belongs to the Provincial Governor and he may submit written charges before the Provincial Board and suspend the
official, the charges in this case are not malfeasances contemplated under Sec. 2188 of the Revised Administrative
Code. The charges may be considered as involving moral turpitude, but before the Provincial Board/Governor may
formally charge and suspend the petitioner, there must first be a conviction which was lacking in this case.

TALAGA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012

Talaga deliberately made misrepresentations in his COC, therefore the same was null and void. The false
representation here must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. To prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race, one may resort to either a petition for
disqualification under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code (the effect of which will be the prohibition of the person
from continuing as a candidate) or to a petition to deny due course to, or cancel, a certificate of candidacy grounded
on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false (the effect of which is the cancellation
or denial of due course of the persons certificate, with the said person not treated as a candidate at all as if she
never filed a COC). A person whose COC was cancelled does not give rise to a valid candidacy and therefore
cannot be substituted by another person.

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 187167, August 6, 2011

Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the
extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-
based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce
customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living
and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).

VINUYA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010

The Latin phrase, erga omnes, has since become one of the rallying cries of those sharing a belief in the
emergence of a value-based international public order. However, as is so often the case, the reality is neither so
clear nor so bright. Whatever the relevance of obligations erga omnes as a legal concept, its full potential remains to
be realized in practice.

The term is closely connected with the international law concept of jus cogens. In international law, the term jus
cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting
treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not
admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority.

As a general principle and particularly here, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the
treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign
policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners
and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are
appropriate or necessary.

ANG LADLAD v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on
the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the
current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and
rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION v. DUQUE, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when,
by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution which provides that [n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred
in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go
through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to
domestic conflicts.

PIMENTEL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy,
the President acts as the countrys mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested
with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic
relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making,
the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides
a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the
treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that no treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Prosecutor v. Galic (Trial Judgment, ICTY, 2003)

Galic was convicted of crimes against humanity for acts during the Siege of Sarajevo in the War in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. His many acts included intentionally launching attacks to spread terror among the civilian population,
which he defended as an act of military necessity. The Court convicted him, explaining that if excessive casualties
are expected to result, the attack should not be pursued. The test for proportionality is whether a reasonably well-
informed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available
to him or her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack.

Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (American Case, 1980)

This was a wrongful death action brought under the American Alien Torts Statute charging Pena-Irala, then the
Inspector-General of the police in Paraguay, of torturing to death a teenage Paraguayan. The Court held that
deliberate torture under the color of official authority violated customary international law, regardless of the
nationality of the parties.