CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW- JUDICIAL ASSIGNMENT evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutoryorder that did not terminate the
he petitioners was an interlocutoryorder that did not terminate the proceedings, and the
Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015 -RUTH
ISSUE: Is the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 insofar as it prohibits all courts [except the Supreme
Court], from issuing provisional writs of injunction to enjoin an Ombudsman investigation, valid and
constitutional? (Just copy the parts nga gi-bold)
RULING: I qualify. The prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure solely
belongs to the Court, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. The Court
described its authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure as exclusive and "one of
the safeguards of its institutional independence."
Congress, in this case interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court
under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every court's
exercise of judicial power. Without the Court's consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an
adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor,
there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.
However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the Court is not
oblivious to the policy considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other
statutory provisions of similar import. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the same,
the Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure, deems it proper to
DECLARE as INEFFECTIVE the first paragraph of Sec. 14 of RA 6770, until it is adopted as part of the rules
of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor.
Cudia vs. PMA Superintendent, G.R. No. 211362, Feb. 24, 2015 -KYLE
ISSUE: Can the court exercise the judicial power to determine whether the AFP and the members of the
court martial acted with grave abuse of discretion in their military investigation?
RULING: Yes. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expanded the scope of judicial power by
mandating that the duty of the courts of justice includes not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions. No one is above the law, including the military In fact, the present Constitution declares it as a
matter of principle that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. Consistent with the
republican system of checks and balances, the Court has been entrusted, expressly or by necessary
implication, with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any
assailed legislative or executive action.
Arroyo vs. People, G.R. No. 220598/G.R. No. 220953. July 19, 2016 ROSING
ISSUE: Considering Sec. 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, can the Supreme Court review on certiorari the
Sandiganbayan Order denying accuseds Demurrer to Evidence?
RULING: YES. The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for certiorari because the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.The special civil
action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court
because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover,Section 23, Rule
119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that "the orderdenying the motion for leave of court to file
demurrer to evidence or thedemurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before
judgment." It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that thedenial of the demurrers to
proper recourse of thedemurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction theymay
then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors tobe reviewed. Indeed, it is
doctrinal that the situations in which the writ ofcertiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do
so would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness.
So wide is the discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to showthat certiorari is more
discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus.In the exercise of our superintending control over other
courts, we areto be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case 'as the ends of justice may
require.' So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts of justice the
duty to correct errors of jurisdiction as a result of capricious arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of
discretion byexpressly incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII the following provision:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable andenforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuseof
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch orinstrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of
procedureto the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the
bounden constitutional duty to strike down graveabuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is
committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of thedemurrers to
evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselvesof the remedy of certiorari when the denial
was tainted with grave abuse ofdiscretion.
Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014 -YANG
ISSUE #1: Can the Supreme Court exercise its power of judicial review over the RH law --- a social legislation
which is "a product of a majoritarian democratic process" and "characterized by an inordinate amount of
transparency"?
RULING #1: Yes. While the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no
distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social
legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon
the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review
their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective
authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no
constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.
This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
ISSUE #2: Considering that the RH Law has yet to be implemented, do the petitions present actual
controversy ripe for adjudication?
RULING #2: Yes. The Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe
for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken
effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the
subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Saguisag vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426 & 212444, Jan. 12, 2016 -NININ
ISSUE: Did the 1987 Constitution limit or expand the power of judicial review? What is its effects on the
political question doctrine?
RULING: The power of judicial review has since been strengthened in the 1987 Constitution. The scope of
that power has been extended to the determination of whether in matters traditionally considered to be
within the sphere of appreciation of another branch of government, an exercise of discretion has been
attended with grave abuse. The expansion of this power has made the political question doctrine "no
longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that
protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review."
Saguisag vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426 & 212444, Jan. 12, 2016 -BEVERLY
ISSUE #1: In view of the abstention of the Senators from the present proceedings, is there an actual case or
controversy that is already ripe for adjudication?
RULING #1: Yes. We find that the matter before us involves an actual case or controversy that is already
ripe for adjudication. The Executive Department has already sent an official confirmation to the U.S.
Embassy that "all internal requirements of the Philippines x x x have already been complied with." By this
exchange of diplomatic notes, the Executive Department effectively performed the last act required under
Article XII(l) of EDCA before the agreement entered into force. Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution,
is clear that the presence of foreign military forces in the country shall only be allowed by virtue of a treaty
concurred in by the Senate. Hence, the performance of an official act by the Executive Department that led
to the entry into force of an executive agreement was sufficient to satisfy the actual case or controversy
requirement.
ISSUE #2: Will the present petitions qualify as citizens', taxpayers', or legislators' suits and, thus, the
petitioners have legal standing?
RULING #2: No. The present petitions cannot qualify as citizens', taxpayers', or legislators' suits; the Senate
as a body has the requisite standing, but considering that it has not formally filed a pleading to join the suit,
as it merely conveyed to the Supreme Court its sense that EDCA needs the Senate's concurrence to be
valid, petitioners continue to suffer from lack of standing.
As correctly argued by respondent, the power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an
institutional prerogative granted by the Constitution to the Senate, not to the entire Legislature. In
Pimentel v. Office of the Executive Secretary, this Court did not recognize the standing of one of the
petitioners therein who was a member of the House of Representatives. The petition in that case sought to
compel the transmission to the Senate for concurrence of the signed text of the Statute of the International
Criminal Court. Since that petition invoked the power of the Senate to grant or withhold its concurrence in
a treaty entered into by the Executive Department, only then incumbent Senator Pimentel was allowed to
assert that authority of the Senate of which he was a member. Therefore, none of the initial petitioners in
the present controversy has the standing to maintain the suits as legislators.
ISSUE #3: What are matters of transcendental importance? Does this petition involve matters of
transcendental importance?
RULING #3: While this Court has yet to thoroughly delineate the outer limits of this doctrine, we emphasize
that not every other case, however strong public interest may be, can qualify as an issue of transcendental
importance. Before it can be impelled to brush aside the essential requisites for exercising its power of
judicial review, it must at the very least consider a number of factors: (1) the character of the funds or other
assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any
other party that has a more direct and specific interest in raising the present questions.
Yes. An exhaustive evaluation of the memoranda of the parties, together with the oral arguments,
shows that petitioners have presented serious constitutional issues that provide ample justification for the
Court to set aside the rule on standing. The transcendental importance of the issues presented here is
rooted in the Constitution itself. Section 25, Article XVIII thereof, cannot be any clearer: there is a much
stricter mechanism required before foreign military troops, facilities, or bases may be allowed in the
country. The DFA has already confirmed to the U.S. Embassy that "all internal requirements of the
Philippines x x x have already been complied with." It behooves the Court in this instance to take a liberal
stance towards the rule on standing and to determine forthwith whether there was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Executive Department.
Jardeleza vs. CJ Sereno, G.R. Nos. 213181, Aug. 19, 2014 -SHEILA
ISSUE #1: Can the Supreme Court exercise its expanded certiorari jurisdiction over the JBC which does not
exercise judicial nor quasi-judicial function?
RULING #1: Yes. The Court is of the position that it can exercise the expanded judicial power of review
vested upon it by the 1987 Constitution. Thus:
Article VIII. Section 1. The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any
branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
ISSUE #2: What is the unanimity rule under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009?
RULING #2: SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. - In every case
where the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged,
the affirmative vote of all the Members of the Council must be obtained for the favorable consideration of
his nomination.
A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a higher voting requirement is
absolute in cases where the integrity of an applicant is questioned. Simply put, when an integrity question
arises, the voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post becomes "unanimous"
instead of the "majority vote" required in the preceding section.
ISSUE #3: Is Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 on the unanimity rule valid and constitutional?
RULING #3: Amidst a myriad of issues submitted by the parties, most of which are interrelated such that
the resolution of one issue would necessarily affect the conclusion as to the others, the Court opts to
narrow down the questions to the very source of the discord - the correct application of Section 2, Rule 10
JBC-009 and its effects, if any, on the substantive rights of applicants.
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that a facial scrutiny of the petition does not directly raise the
unconstitutionality of the subject JBC rule. Instead, it bewails the unconstitutional effects of its application.
It is only from the comment of the Executive Secretary where the possible unconstitutionality of the rule
was brought to the fore. Despite this milieu, a practical approach dictates that the Court must confront the
source of the bleeding from which the gaping wound presented to the Court suffers.
The Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the
President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the
unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se, but from the violation by the JBC of its own
rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. By no means does the Court intend to strike down
the "unanimity rule" as it reflects the JBCs policy and, therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even
so, the Court refuses to turn a blind eye on the palpable defects in its implementation and the ensuing
treatment that Jardeleza received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination,
but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due
process.
Obiter: In the Courts study of the petition, the comments and the applicable rules of the JBC, the Court is of
the view that the rules leave much to be desired and should be reviewed and revised. It appears that the
provision on the "unanimity rule" is vague and unfair and, therefore, can be misused or abused resulting in
the deprivation of an applicants right to due process.
Primarily, the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity is effectively a veto power over the collective
will of a majority. This should be clarified. Any assertion by a member aftervoting seems to be unfair
because it effectively gives him or her a veto power over the collective votes of the other members in view
of the unanimous requirement. While an oppositor-member can recuse himself orherself, still the
probability of annulling the majority vote ofthe Council is quite high.
Second, integrity as a ground has not been defined. While the initial impression is that it refers to the moral
fiber of a candidate, it can be, as it has been, used to mean other things. Infact, the minutes of the JBC
meetings n this case reflect the lack of consensus among the members as to its precise definition. Not
having been defined or described, it is vague, nebulous and confusing. It must be distinctly specified and
delineated.
Third, it should explicitly provide who can invoke it as a ground against a candidate. Should it be invoked
only by an outsider as construed by the respondent Executive Secretary or also by a member?
Fourth, while the JBC vetting proceedings is "sui generis" and need not be formal or trial type, they must
meet the minimum requirements of due process. As always, an applicant should be given a reasonable
opportunity and time to be heard on the charges against him or her, if there are any.
At any rate, it is up to the JBC to fine-tune the rules considering the peculiar nature of its function. It need
not be stressed that the rules to be adopted should be fair, reasonable, unambiguous and consistent with
the minimum requirements of due process.
The invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity is effectively a veto power over the collective will of a
majority. This should be clarified. Any assertion by a member after voting seems to be unfair because it
effectively gives him or her a veto power over the collective votes of the other members in view of the
unanimous requirement. While an oppositor-member can recuse himself or herself, still the probability of
annulling the majority vote of the Council is quite high.
ISSUE #4: Does the unanimity rule apply in cases where the main point of contention is the professional
judgment sans charges or implications of immoral or corrupt behavior?
RULING #4: No. Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an applicants moral fitness
is challenged. It follows then that the unanimity rule only comes into operation when the moral character
of a person is put in issue. There must be a showing that the act complained of is, at the least, linked to the
moral character of the person and not to his judgment as a professional. Hence, it finds no application
where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicants moral uprightness.
Villanueva vs. JBC, G.R. No. 211833, Apr. 07, 2015 -RAM
ISSUE: Is the policy of the JBC requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can
qualify as applicant to second-level courts constitutional?
RULING: Yes. Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended appointees does
not constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate when it employs
number of years of service to screen and differentiate applicants from the competition. The number of
years of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven competence which may be measured by
experience, among other factors.
Persons with this qualification are neither automatically selected nor do they automatically become
nominees. The applicants are chosen based on an array of factors and are evaluated based on their
individual merits. Thus, it cannot be said that the questioned policy was arbitrary, capricious, or made
without any basis.
OCA v. Judge Flores, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2325, April 14, 2015 MARQ
ISSUE: Does taking cognizance of cases outside the courts jurisdiction tantamount to gross ignorance of
the law?
RULING: Yes. Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office and
every judge is required to observe the law. There is gross ignorance of the law when an error committed by
the judge was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious, or when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply
settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. In this case, the OCA
report is replete with findings showing that Judge Flores deliberately disregarded the [rule on venue for
declaration of nullity of void marriages]. He continued to try and resolve cases despite glaring
circumstances, which should have created doubt as to the veracity of the residential addresses declared in
the petitions. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules of procedure must
be at the palm of a judges hands. The utter disregard show by Judge Flores displays not only a lack of
familiarity with the law but a gross ignorance thereof.
[Further Ruling]
>>No less than the Code of Judicial conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the laws and
maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge. A judge must be
acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter
lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is
gross ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court
the duty to be proficient in the law.
>>Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior
in connection with ones performance of official functions and duties. For grave or gross misconduct to
exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a
persistent disregard of well-known rules. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere
error of judgment. No less than the New Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to conduct his office
and personal demeanor with integrity, competence and diligence.

OCA vs. Judge Ruiz, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361, Feb. 2, 2016 -DONNA

ISSUE #1: Is respondent judge administratively liable for acts he is alleged to have committed while he was
still the mayor of Dapitan City?

RULING #1: Yes. Respondent was found administratively liable. Respondent's convictions before the
Sandiganbayan constitute serious charges under Rule 140, Section 8(2) and (5) of the Rules of Court:

The respondent's convictions by the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for
malversation of public funds confirm that the administrative charges for which he may be found liable are
serious charges under Section 8(2) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Malversation is likewise
considered as a serious charge since it is a crime involving moral turpitude.

In this determination, it is immaterial that the respondent was not yet a member of the Judiciary when he
allegedly committed the acts imputed to him; judges may be disciplined for acts committed prior to their
appointment to the judiciary. Our Rules itself recognizes this situation, as it provides for the immediate
forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication of charges against justices and judges
before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary . It need not be shown that
the respondent continued to do the act or acts complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record
supports the charge/s against the respondent through proof that the respondent committed the imputed
act/s violative of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE #2: Is the administrative case against the judge premature since his criminal convictions by the
Sandiganbayan are not yet final?

RULING #2: No. The acts or omissions of a judge may well constitute at the same time both a criminal act
and an administrative offense. A criminal case against an attorney or judge is distinct and separate from an
administrative case against him. Only substantial evidence is required to support our conclusions in
administrative proceedings. Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary in an
administrative proceeding.

The substantial evidence rule is only proper, as the present proceeding is not an appeal from the
Sandiganbayan ruling but is an original one for purposes of establishing or negating the claimed
administrative liability on the part of the respondent.