(9 pages)
Section 14_ Right of Confrontation
(1) (United States v. Javier, G.R. No. L-12990, January 21, 1918)
(4) (Talino v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. L-75511-14, March 16, 1987)
Section 14_ Compulsory Process
(6) (Roco v. Contreras, G.R. No. 158275, June 28, 2005)
Section 14_ Right of Confrontation
(United States v. Javier, G.R. No. L-12990, January
21, 1918)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-12990. January 21, 1918.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LAZARO
JAVIER ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Modesto Castillo, Eusebio Lopez and G.N. Trinidad
for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. THEFT OF LARGE CATTLE; PROOF. A carabao,
seen in the possession of the accused and later
found tied in front of a house, was identified as the
carabao, which had been taken from the corral of
Doroteo Natividad. Held: That the accused having
offered no satisfactory explanation for their
possession of the carabao, they can properly be
convicted of the crime of theft.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONFRONTATION OF
WITNESSES. There are two principal reasons for
the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which
says: "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face
to face." The first reason is the right of cross-
examination, and the second is that the tribunal
may have before it the department and
appearance of the witness while testifying.
3. ID.; ID. Exhibit B of the prosecution is the sworn
statement before the justice of the peace of the
municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas,
of the sergeant, now deceased, who was the
leader of the patrol of the Constabulary which
encountered the accused, and whose signature
was identified. Held: That Exhibit B was improperly
received in evidence in the lower court.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J p:
We find the proven facts as brought out in the trial
of this case to be as follows.
Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of October 22,
1915, fastened his carabao valued at P150 in his
corral situated in the barrio of Trapiche, municipality
of Tananuan, Province of Batangas. On the
following morning when he went to look after the
animal, he found the gate to the corral open and
that the carabao had disappeared. He reported
1|CONSTI2_Section14_Right of Confrontation and Compulsory
Processes
the matter to the Constabulary, and a patrol of the
Constabulary under the leadership of sergeant
Presa, now deceased, on the 20th of November
following, encountered the accused Lazaro Javier,
Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez
leading a carabao. When the ladrones saw the
Constabulary, they scattered in all directions. On
the following day, the Constabulary found this
carabao tied in front of the house of one Pedro
Monterola in the barrio of Santa Clara, municipality
of San Pablo. The carabao was identified by
Doroteo Natividad as the one which had been
taken from his corral on the night of October 22,
1915, and by the Constabulary as the one seen in
the possession of the accused.
As corroborative of such evidence, we have the
well-known legal principle, which as applied to
cases of this character is that, although the persons
who unlawfully took a certain carabao are not
recognized at the time, and their identify remains
entirely unknown, nevertheless, if the stolen animal
is found in the possession of the accused shortly
after the commission of the crime and they make
no satisfactory explanation of such possession they
may be properly convicted of the crime. (See U.S.
vs. Divino [1911], 18 Phil. 425.) In the present
instance, the attempt of the accused to insinuate
that one of the Constabulary soldiers testified
against them falsely because of enmity is hardly
believable.
The foregoing statement of the facts and the law
disposes of all but one assignment of error, namely,
that the lower court erred in admitting Exhibit B of
the prosecution as evidence. Exhibit B is the sworn
statement of sergeant Presca, now deceased,
whose signature was identified, before the justice of
the peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas,
Province of Batangas. Appellant's argument is
predicated on the provision of the Philippine Bill of
Rights which says, "That in all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the
witnesses face to face," and the provision of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5), which
say that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant
shall be entitled: . . . to be confronted at the trial by
and to cross-examine the witnesses against him."
With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights,
which we have quoted, Justice Day said in a case
of Philippine origin (Dowdell vs. U.S. [1911], 221 U.S.
325) that it "intends to secure the accused in the
right to be tried, so far as facts provable by
witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as
meet him face to face at the trial, who give their
testimony in his presence, and give to the accused
an opportunity of cross-examination. It was
intended to prevent the conviction of the accused
upon depositions or ex parte affidavits, and
particularly to preserve the right of the accused to
test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of
the right of cross-examination." In other words,
confrontation is essential because cross-
examination is essential. A second reason for the
prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the
deportment and appearance of the witness while
testifying. (U.S. vs. Anastasio [1906], 6 Phil., 413.) The
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has applied
this constitutional provision on behalf of accused
persons in a number of cases. (See for example U.S.
vs. Tanjuanco [1902], 1 Phil., 374; U.S. vs. Bello [1908,
12 Phil. 87.) It is for us now to determine whether the
present facts entitle the accused to the protection
of the Bill of Rights or whether the facts fall under
some exception thereto.
The sworn statement of Presa was not made by
question and answer under circumstances which
gave the defense an opportunity to cross-examine
the witness. The proviso of the Code of Criminal
Procedure as to confrontation is therefore
inapplicable. Presa's statement again is not the
testimony of a witness deceased, given in a former
action between the same relating to the same
matter. Consequently, the exception provided by
section 298. No. 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure
and relied upon by the prosecution in the lower
court is also inapplicable. Nor is the statement of
Presca a dying declaration or a deposition in a
former trial or shown to be a part of the preliminary
examination. Under these circumstances, not to
burden the opinion with an extensive citation of
authorities, we can rely on the old and historic case
of R. vs. Paine (1 Salk., 281 [King's Bench Div])
occurring in the year 1696. It Bristol under oath, but
not in P's presence, was offered. It was objected
that B, being dead, the defendant had lost all
opportunity of cross-examining him. The King's
Bench consulted with the Common Pleas, and "it
was the opinion of both courts that these
depositions should not be given in evidence, the
defendant not being present when they were
taken before the Mayor and so had lost the benefit
of a cross-examination." Although we are faced
with the alternative of being unable to utilize the
statements of the witness now deceased, yet if
there has been no opportunity for cross-
examination and the case is not one coming within
one of the exceptions, the mere necessity alone of
accepting the statement will not suffice. In fine,
Exhibit B was improperly received in evidence in the
lower court.
With such a resolution of this question, we could, as
has been done in other cases, further find this to be
versible error and remand the case for a new trial.
We are convinced, however, that this would gain
the accused nothing except delay for the
testimony of the owner of the carabao and of the
two Constabulary soldiers, rebutted by no
reasonable evidence on behalf of the accused, is
deemed sufficient to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The facts come under article 518, No. 3, connection
with article 520, as amended, of the Penal Code.
Accordingly the defendants and appellants are
2|CONSTI2_Section14_Right of Confrontation and Compulsory
Processes
each sentenced to four years, two months, and
one day of presidio correccional, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay
one-third part of the costs of both instances; the
carabao shall be returned to Doroteo Natividad, if
this has not already been done. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, Araullo,
Street, and Avancea, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-75511-14. March 16, 1987.]
AGUSTIN V. TALINO, petitioner, vs. THE
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed to one
of two or more defendants, his testimony therein
imputing guilt to any of the co-accused is not
admissible against the latter who was not able to
cross-examine him. 1 The issue in this case is
whether or not such testimony was considered by
the respondent court against the petitioner, who
claims that it was in fact the sole basis of his
conviction. prLL
The petitioner, along with several others, were
charged in four separate informations with estafa
through falsification of public documents for having
allegedly conspired to defraud the government in
the total amount of P26,523.00, representing the
cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken,
but actually not needed and never made, on four
government vehicles, through falsification of the
supporting papers to authorize the illegal payments
2 Docketed as CC Nos. 6681, 6682, 6683 and 6684,
these cases were tried jointly for all the accused
until after the prosecution had rested, when
Genaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and
petitioner Talino asked for separate trials, which
were allowed. 3 They then presented their
evidence at such trials, while the other accused
continued defending themselves in the original
proceedings, at which one of them, Pio Ulat, gave
damaging testimony against the petitioner, relating
in detail his participation in the questioned
transactions. 4 In due time, the Sandiganbayan
rendered its decision in all the four cases finding
Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang, Ulat and Renato
Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged while absolving the other
defendants for insufficient evidence. This decision is
now challenged by the petitioner on the ground
that it violates his right of confrontation as
guaranteed by the Constitution.
In its decision, the respondent court ** makes the
following remarks about the separate trial:
"The peculiarity of the trial of these cases is the fact
that We allowed, upon their petition, separate trials
for the accused Basilio and Talino and
Macadangdang. This being the case, We can only
consider, in deciding these cases as against them,
the evidence for the prosecution as well as their
own evidence. Evidence offered by the other
accused can not be taken up.
"It would really have been simpler had there been
no separate trial because the accused Pio B. Ulat
said so many incriminatory things against the other
accused when he took the stand in his own
defense. But because Basilio, Talino and
Macadangdang were granted separate trials and
they did not cross examine Ulat because, as a
matter of fact, they were not even required to be
present when the other accused were presenting
their defenses, the latter's testimonies can not now
be considered against said three accused.
"We cannot understand why, after it had heard the
long and sordid story related by Ulat on the stand,
the prosecution did not endeavor to call Ulat and
put him on the stand as part of its rebuttal
evidence. Had this been done, there would have
been no impediment to the consideration of Ulat's
testimony against all the accused." 5
The grant of a separate trial rests in the sound
discretion of the court and is not a matter of right to
the accused, especially where, as in this case, it is
sought after the presentation of the evidence of
the prosecution. 6 While it is true that Rule 119,
Section 8, of the Rules of Court does not specify
when the motion for such a trial should be filed, we
have held in several cases that this should be done
before the prosecution commences presenting its
evidence, although, as an exception, the motion
may be granted later, even after the prosecution
shall have rested, where there appears to be an
antagonism in the respective defenses of the
accused. 7 In such an event, the evidence in chief
of the prosecution shall remain on record against all
the accused, with right of rebuttal on the part of
the fiscal in the separate trial of the other accused.
8 "If, as claimed, by Macadangdang, he had no
The rule in every case is that the trial court should
exercise the utmost circumspection in granting a
motion for separate trial, allowing the same only
after a thorough study of the claimed justification
therefor, if only to avoid the serious difficulties that
may arise, such as the one encountered and
regretted by the respondent court, in according
the accused the right of confrontation.
The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution 9 to the
person facing criminal prosecution who should
know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be
given a chance to cross-examine them on their
charges. No accusation is permitted to be made
against his back or in his absence nor is any
derogatory information accepted if it is made
3|CONSTI2_Section14_Right of Confrontation and Compulsory
Processes
anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by
persons who cannot stand by their libels and must
shroud their spite in secrecy. That is also the reason
why ex parte affidavits are not permitted unless the
affiant is presented in court 10 and hearsay is
barred save only in the cases allowed by the Rules
of Court, like the dying declaration. 11
In United States v. Javier, 12 this Court emphasized:
". . . With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights,
which we have quoted, Justice Day said in a case
of Philippine origin (Dowdell v. U.S. [1911], 221 U.S.
325) that it `intends to secure the accused in the
right to be tried, so far as facts provable by
witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as
meet him face to face at the trial who give their
testimony in his presence, and give to the accused
an opportunity of cross-examination. It was
intended to prevent the conviction of the accused
upon depositions or ex parte affidavits, and
particularly to preserve the right of the accused to
test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of
the right of cross-examination.' In other words,
confrontation is essential because cross-
examination is essential. A second reason for the
prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the
deportment and appearance of the witness while
testifying. (U.S. v. Anastacio [1906], 6 Phil. 413.) The
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has applied
this constitutional provision on behalf of accused
persons in a number of cases. (See for example U.S.
v. Tanjuanco [1902], 1 Phil., 374; U.S. v. Bello [1908],
11 Phil., 526; U.S. v. De la Cruz [1908], 12 Phil. 87.) . . .
."
We have carefully studied the decision under
challenge and find that the respondent court did
not consider the testimony given by Ulat in
convicting the petitioner. The part of that decision
finding Talino guilty made no mention of Ulat at all
but confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in
approving the questioned vouchers as proof of his
complicity in the plot to swindle the government.
Thus: LexLib
knowledge nor participation in the conspiracy to
defraud, he would have questioned this obvious
irregularity. He would have asked whoever was
following up the vouchers why two biddings were
conducted, why the awards to `D'Alfenor' were
cancelled, when the latter were cancelled, and
when the new bidding was made.
"The very same case is true as regards the accused
Agustin Talino. While his duty to initial or sign the
vouchers as regards the adequacy of funds may
have been ministerial, his failure to observe the
obvious irregularity is clear evidence of his
complicity in the conspiracy.
"Talino declared that in the morning of May 23,
1980, four vouchers (including three made out in
favor of `D'Alfenor Repair Shop') were brought to
him for his certificate as regards the availability of
funds. He had signed all the four vouchers. In the
afternoon of the same day, three other vouchers
were also presented to him for certification as to
funds these three were in substitution of Exhibits `A',
`B' and `C' which he had earlier signed but which,
according to Talino, were disallowed and
cancelled. Talino claims that he had examined the
supporting documents of the last three vouchers
the RIV, the bids signed by the repair shops and the
abstract of bids. If what Talino says is true, at least
the abstract of bids submitted in the morning,
where `D'Alfenor Motor Shop' appears to be the
lowest bidder, must have been different from the
ones submitted together with vouchers in the
afternoon. This would have raised his suspicions as
to why these last three abstracts could be dated as
they were (May 18, May 15 and May 11,
respectively) when it was only that morning that the
abstracts containing the name of `D'Alfenor Motor
Shop' were submitted. The fact that he readily
approved the substitute vouchers with the
substitute winning bidders is a clear indication that
he knew he was facilitating an irregular transaction.
"It is our view that the evidence on record has
established beyond doubt the participation of both
Agustin Talino and Alejandro Macadangdang in all
the four felonies charged in the informations." 13
The petitioner makes much of the statement in the
Comment that the petitioner's guilt could be
deduced "from the evidence for the prosecution
and from the testimony of Pio Ulat," 14 but that was
not the respondent court speaking. That was the
Solicitor General's analysis. As far as the
Sandiganbayan was concerned, the said testimony
was inadmissible against the petitioner because he
"did not cross examine Ulat," and was not even
required to be present when the latter was
testifying. In fact, the respondent court even
expressed the wish that Ulat had been presented as
rebuttal witness in the separate trial of the petitioner
as there would then have been "no impediment to
the use of his testimony against the other accused."
As this was not done, the trial court could not and
did not consider Ulat's testimony in determining the
petitioner' s part in the offenses.
The factual findings of the respondent court being
supported by substantial evidence other than Ulat's
testimony, we see no reason to disturb them. It is
futile for the petitioner to invoke his constitutional
presumption of innocence because his guilt has in
the view of the trial court been established beyond
reasonable doubt, and we agree.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner. LLphil
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez,
Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and
Cortes, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., on official
leave. Alampay, J., took no part, was on leave
during deliberation.
4|CONSTI2_Section14_Right of Confrontation and Compulsory
Processes
(Talino v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. L-75511-14,
March 16, 1987)
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-75511-14. March 16, 1987.]
AGUSTIN V. TALINO, petitioner, vs. THE
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed to one
of two or more defendants, his testimony therein
imputing guilt to any of the co-accused is not
admissible against the latter who was not able to
cross-examine him. 1 The issue in this case is
whether or not such testimony was considered by
the respondent court against the petitioner, who
claims that it was in fact the sole basis of his
conviction. prLL
The petitioner, along with several others, were
charged in four separate informations with estafa
through falsification of public documents for having
allegedly conspired to defraud the government in
the total amount of P26,523.00, representing the
cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken,
but actually not needed and never made, on four
government vehicles, through falsification of the
supporting papers to authorize the illegal payments
2 Docketed as CC Nos. 6681, 6682, 6683 and 6684,
these cases were tried jointly for all the accused
until after the prosecution had rested, when
Genaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and
petitioner Talino asked for separate trials, which
were allowed. 3 They then presented their
evidence at such trials, while the other accused
continued defending themselves in the original
proceedings, at which one of them, Pio Ulat, gave
damaging testimony against the petitioner, relating
in detail his participation in the questioned
transactions. 4 In due time, the Sandiganbayan
rendered its decision in all the four cases finding
Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang, Ulat and Renato
Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged while absolving the other
defendants for insufficient evidence. This decision is
now challenged by the petitioner on the ground
that it violates his right of confrontation as
guaranteed by the Constitution.
In its decision, the respondent court ** makes the
following remarks about the separate trial:
"The peculiarity of the trial of these cases is the fact
that We allowed, upon their petition, separate trials
for the accused Basilio and Talino and
Macadangdang. This being the case, We can only
consider, in deciding these cases as against them,
the evidence for the prosecution as well as their
own evidence. Evidence offered by the other
accused can not be taken up.
"It would really have been simpler had there been
no separate trial because the accused Pio B. Ulat
said so many incriminatory things against the other
accused when he took the stand in his own
defense. But because Basilio, Talino and
Macadangdang were granted separate trials and
they did not cross examine Ulat because, as a
matter of fact, they were not even required to be
present when the other accused were presenting
their defenses, the latter's testimonies can not now
be considered against said three accused.
"We cannot understand why, after it had heard the
long and sordid story related by Ulat on the stand,
the prosecution did not endeavor to call Ulat and
put him on the stand as part of its rebuttal
evidence. Had this been done, there would have
been no impediment to the consideration of Ulat's
testimony against all the accused." 5
The grant of a separate trial rests in the sound
discretion of the court and is not a matter of right to
the accused, especially where, as in this case, it is
sought after the presentation of the evidence of
the prosecution. 6 While it is true that Rule 119,
Section 8, of the Rules of Court does not specify
when the motion for such a trial should be filed, we
have held in several cases that this should be done
before the prosecution commences presenting its
evidence, although, as an exception, the motion
may be granted later, even after the prosecution
shall have rested, where there appears to be an
antagonism in the respective defenses of the
accused. 7 In such an event, the evidence in chief
of the prosecution shall remain on record against all
the accused, with right of rebuttal on the part of
the fiscal in the separate trial of the other accused.
8
The rule in every case is that the trial court should
exercise the utmost circumspection in granting a
motion for separate trial, allowing the same only
after a thorough study of the claimed justification
therefor, if only to avoid the serious difficulties that
may arise, such as the one encountered and
regretted by the respondent court, in according
the accused the right of confrontation.
The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution 9 to the
person facing criminal prosecution who should
know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be
given a chance to cross-examine them on their
charges. No accusation is permitted to be made
against his back or in his absence nor is any
derogatory information accepted if it is made
anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by
persons who cannot stand by their libels and must
shroud their spite in secrecy. That is also the reason
why ex parte affidavits are not permitted unless the
affiant is presented in court 10 and hearsay is
5|CONSTI2_Section14_Right of Confrontation and Compulsory
Processes
barred save only in the cases allowed by the Rules
of Court, like the dying declaration. 11
In United States v. Javier, 12 this Court emphasized:
". . . With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights,
which we have quoted, Justice Day said in a case
of Philippine origin (Dowdell v. U.S. [1911], 221 U.S.
325) that it `intends to secure the accused in the
right to be tried, so far as facts provable by
witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as
meet him face to face at the trial who give their
testimony in his presence, and give to the accused
an opportunity of cross-examination. It was
intended to prevent the conviction of the accused
upon depositions or ex parte affidavits, and
particularly to preserve the right of the accused to
test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of
the right of cross-examination.' In other words,
confrontation is essential because cross-
examination is essential. A second reason for the
prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the
deportment and appearance of the witness while
testifying. (U.S. v. Anastacio [1906], 6 Phil. 413.) The
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has applied
this constitutional provision on behalf of accused
persons in a number of cases. (See for example U.S.
v. Tanjuanco [1902], 1 Phil., 374; U.S. v. Bello [1908],
11 Phil., 526; U.S. v. De la Cruz [1908], 12 Phil. 87.) . . .
."
We have carefully studied the decision under
challenge and find that the respondent court did
not consider the testimony given by Ulat in
convicting the petitioner. The part of that decision
finding Talino guilty made no mention of Ulat at all
but confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in
approving the questioned vouchers as proof of his
complicity in the plot to swindle the government.
Thus: LexLib
"If, as claimed, by Macadangdang, he had no
knowledge nor participation in the conspiracy to
defraud, he would have questioned this obvious
irregularity. He would have asked whoever was
following up the vouchers why two biddings were
conducted, why the awards to `D'Alfenor' were
cancelled, when the latter were cancelled, and
when the new bidding was made.
"The very same case is true as regards the accused
Agustin Talino. While his duty to initial or sign the
vouchers as regards the adequacy of funds may
have been ministerial, his failure to observe the
obvious irregularity is clear evidence of his
complicity in the conspiracy.
"Talino declared that in the morning of May 23,
1980, four vouchers (including three made out in
favor of `D'Alfenor Repair Shop') were brought to
him for his certificate as regards the availability of
funds. He had signed all the four vouchers. In the
afternoon of the same day, three other vouchers
were also presented to him for certification as to
funds these three were in substitution of Exhibits `A',
`B' and `C' which he had earlier signed but which,
according to Talino, were disallowed and
cancelled. Talino claims that he had examined the
supporting documents of the last three vouchers
the RIV, the bids signed by the repair shops and the
abstract of bids. If what Talino says is true, at least
the abstract of bids submitted in the morning,
where `D'Alfenor Motor Shop' appears to be the
lowest bidder, must have been different from the
ones submitted together with vouchers in the
afternoon. This would have raised his suspicions as
to why these last three abstracts could be dated as
they were (May 18, May 15 and May 11,
respectively) when it was only that morning that the
abstracts containing the name of `D'Alfenor Motor
Shop' were submitted. The fact that he readily
approved the substitute vouchers with the
substitute winning bidders is a clear indication that
he knew he was facilitating an irregular transaction.
"It is our view that the evidence on record has
established beyond doubt the participation of both
Agustin Talino and Alejandro Macadangdang in all
the four felonies charged in the informations." 13
The petitioner makes much of the statement in the
Comment that the petitioner's guilt could be
deduced "from the evidence for the prosecution
and from the testimony of Pio Ulat," 14 but that was
not the respondent court speaking. That was the
Solicitor General's analysis. As far as the
Sandiganbayan was concerned, the said testimony
was inadmissible against the petitioner because he
"did not cross examine Ulat," and was not even
required to be present when the latter was
testifying. In fact, the respondent court even
expressed the wish that Ulat had been presented as
rebuttal witness in the separate trial of the petitioner
as there would then have been "no impediment to
the use of his testimony against the other accused."
As this was not done, the trial court could not and
did not consider Ulat's testimony in determining the
petitioner' s part in the offenses.
The factual findings of the respondent court being
supported by substantial evidence other than Ulat's
testimony, we see no reason to disturb them. It is
futile for the petitioner to invoke his constitutional
presumption of innocence because his guilt has in
the view of the trial court been established beyond
reasonable doubt, and we agree.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner. LLphil
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez,
Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and
Cortes, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., on official
leave.
Alampay, J., took no part, was on leave during
deliberation.
6|CONSTI2_Section14_Right of Confrontation and Compulsory
Processes
(Roco v. Contreras, G.R. No. 158275, June 28, 2005)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 158275. June 28, 2005.]
DOMINGO ROCO, petitioner, vs. HON. EDWARD B.
CONTRERAS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CAL'S
POULTRY SUPPLY CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J p:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this appeal
by way of a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the following
issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
66038, to wit:
1. Decision dated 20 August 2002, 1 dismissing the
appeal filed by herein petitioner Domingo Roco
contra the 18 October 2000 resolution of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Roxas City, denying
due course to and dismissing his petition for
certiorari in SP Case No. 7489; and
2. Resolution dated 12 May 2003, 2 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The material facts are not at all disputed:
Petitioner Domingo Roco was engaged in the
business of buying and selling dressed chicken.
Sometime in 1993, he purchased his supply of
dressed chicken from private respondent Cal's
Poultry Supply Corporation (Cal's Corporation, for
short), a domestic corporation controlled and
managed by one Danilo Yap. As payment for his
purchases, petitioner drew five (5) checks payable
to Cals Corporation against his account with the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB),
which checks bear the following particulars:
Check No. Date Amount
004502 26 April 1993 P329,931.40
004503 4 May 1993 P319,314.40
004507 19 May 1993 P380,560.20
004511 26 May 1993 P258,660.20
004523 22 May 1993 P141,738.55
Cal's Corporation deposited the above checks in its
account with PCIB but the bank dishonored them
for having been drawn against a closed account.
Thereafter, Cal's Corporation filed criminal
complaints against petitioner for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law.
After preliminary investigation, five (5) informations
for violation of BP 22 were filed against petitioner
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Roxas City, thereat docketed as Crim. Cases No.
94-2172-12 to 94-2176-12, all of which were raffled
to Branch 2 of said court.

Meanwhile, and even before trial could
commence, petitioner filed with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) at Iloilo City a denunciation
letter against Cal's Corporation for the latter's
alleged violation of Section 258 in relation to
Section 263 of the National Internal Revenue Code
in that it failed to issue commercial invoices on its
sales of merchandise. Upon BIR's investigation, it
was found that Cal's Corporations sales on
account were unavoidable, hence, the
corporation had to defer the issuance of "Sales
Invoices" until the purchases of its customers were
paid in full. With respect to the sales invoices of
petitioner, the investigation disclosed that the same
could not, as yet, be issued by the corporation
precisely because the checks drawn and issued by
him in payment of his purchases were dishonored
by PCIB for the reason that the checks were drawn
against a closed account. Accordingly, the BIR
found no prima facia evidence of tax evasion
against Cal's Corporation. 3 aEHADT
Thereupon, trial of the criminal cases proceeded.
After the prosecution rested, the MTCC declared
the cases submitted for decision on account of
petitioner's failure to adduce evidence in his behalf.
Later, the same court rendered a judgment of
conviction against petitioner.
Therefrom, petitioner went on appeal to the
Regional Trial Court, contending that he was
unlawfully deprived of his right to due process when
the MTCC rendered judgment against him without
affording him of the right to present his evidence.
Agreeing with the petitioner, the RTC vacated the
MTCC decision and remanded the cases to it for
the reception of petitioner's evidence.
On 11 March 1999, during the pendency of the
remanded cases, petitioner filed with the MTCC a
"Request for Issuance of Subpoena Ad
Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum",
requiring Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap, both of
Cal's Corporation or their duly authorized
representatives, to appear and testify in court on 19
May 1999 and to bring with them certain
documents, records and books of accounts for the
years 1993-1999, to wit: DHcTaE
a) Sales Journal for the year 1993;
b) Accounts Receivable Journal for the year 1993;
c) Sales Ledger for the year 1993;
d) Accounts Receivable Ledger for the year 1993
(in its absence, Accounts Receivable Ledger for the
years 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 or 1999);
e) Audited Income Statement for the years 1993,
1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and Income
Statements as of February 1999;
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f) Audited Balance Sheet for the years 1993, 1994,
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and Balance Sheet as of
February 1999; and
g) Income Tax Returns for the years 1993, 1994,
1995, 1996 and 1997.
The prosecution did not object to this request.
When the cases were called on 19 May 1999, the
MTCC, then presided by Acting Judge Geomer C.
Delfin, issued an order granting petitioner's
aforementioned request and accordingly directed
the issuance of the desired subpoenas.
During the trial of 14 July 1999, the private
prosecutor manifested that it was improper for the
trial court to have directed the issuance of the
requested subpoenas, to which the petitioner
countered by saying that Judge Delfin's order of 19
May 1999 had become final and hence,
immutable. Nonetheless, the trial court issued an
order allowing the prosecution to file its comment
or opposition to petitioner's request for the issuance
of subpoenas. IADaSE
The prosecution did file its opposition, thereunder
arguing that:
a) Vivian Deocampo, who previously testified for
Lota Briones-Roco in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-2177-12
to 94-2182-12 before Branch 1 of the MTC, had
earlier attested to the fact that the following
documents, records and books of accounts for
1993 sought by petitioner were already burned:
1. Audited Income Statement for the years 1993,
1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and Income Statement
as of February 1999;
2. Audited Balance Sheet for the years 1993, 1994,
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and Balance Sheet as of
February 1999; and
3. Income Tax Returns for the years 1993, 1994, 1995,
1996 and 1997.
b) the Sales Ledger for the year 1993 cannot be
produced because Cal's Corporation did not
maintain such ledger; and
c) the account Receivable Ledger for the periods
from 1993, the Income Statement for 1993 and the
Balance Sheet as of February 1999, cannot also be
produced because Cal's Corporation recently
computerized its accounting records and was still in
the process of completing the same. SEcTHA
For its part, the corporation itself maintained that
the production of the above-mentioned
documents was inappropriate because they are
immaterial and irrelevant to the crimes for which
the petitioner was being prosecuted.
In a resolution dated 19 October 1999, the MTCC,
this time thru its regular Presiding Judge, Judge
Edward B. Contreras, denied petitioner's request on
the following grounds: (a) the requested
documents, book ledgers and other records were
immaterial in resolving the issues posed before the
court; and (b) the issuance of the subpoenas will
only unduly delay the hearing of the criminal cases.
His motion for reconsideration of the denial
resolution having been similarly denied by Judge
Contreras, petitioner then went to the RTC on a
petition for certiorari with plea for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Judge Contreras, which
petition was docketed in the RTC as SP Case No. V-
7489. cDAITS
In a resolution dated 18 October 2000, the RTC
denied due course to and dismissed the petition for
petitioner's failure to show that Judge Contreras
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction. A motion for
reconsideration was thereafter filed by petitioner,
but it, too, was likewise denied.
Undaunted, petitioner went on appeal via certiorari
to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66038.
As stated at the outset hereof, the Court of
Appeals, in a decision dated 20 August 2002, 4
dismissed the petition and accordingly affirmed the
impugned resolutions of the RTC. With his motion for
reconsideration having been denied by the same
court in its resolution of 12 May 2003, 5 petitioner is
now with us via the present recourse on his
submissions that
I.
. . . THE DENIAL OF THE REQUEST FOR THE ISSUANCE
OF SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM AND SUBPOENA
DUCES TECUM IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED AS ENSHRINED IN ART. III,
SEC. 14 (2) OF THE CONSTITUTION; and
II.
. . . THERE MUST BE A BALANCING OF INTEREST
BETWEEN THE RIGH [sic] OF AN ACCUSED TO PROVE
HIS INNOCENCE AND THE RIGHT OF A duces tecum, it must appear, by clear and
COMPLAINANT TO THE SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS
CASE.
As we see it, the pivotal issue is whether or not the
three (3) courts below committed reversible error in
denying petitioner's request for the issuance of
subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces
tecum in connection with the five (5) criminal cases
for violation of BP 22 filed against him and now
pending trial before the MTCC.
We rule in the negative.
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A subpoena is a process directed to a person
requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing
or trial of an action or at any investigation
conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for
the taking of his deposition. 6
In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of
subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and
subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to compel
a person to testify, while the second is used to
compel the production of books, records, things or
documents therein specified. As characterized in
H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine Vegetable Oil
Company: 7
The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like
the ordinary subpoena ad testificandum with the
exception that it concludes with an injunction that
the witness shall bring with him and produce at the
examination the books, documents, or things
described in the subpoena. aEDCAH
Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena
duces tecum may issue, the court must first be
satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1)
the books, documents or other things requested
must appear prima facie relevant to the issue
subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and
(2) such books must be reasonably described by
the parties to be readily identified (test of
definiteness). Again, to quote from H.C. Liebenow:
8
In determining whether the production of the
documents described in a subpoena duces tecum
should be enforced by the court, it is proper to
consider, first, whether the subpoena calls for the
production of specific documents, or rather for
specific proof, and secondly, whether that proof is
prima facie sufficiently relevant to justify enforcing
its production. A general inquisitorial examination of
all the books, papers, and documents of an
adversary, conducted with a view to ascertain
whether something of value may not show up, will
not be enforced. (Emphasis supplied) CHIEDS
Further, in Universal Rubber Products, Inc. vs. CA, et
al., 9 we held:
Well-settled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to
entitle a party to the issuance of a subpoena
unequivocal proof, that the book or document
sought to be produced contains evidence relevant
and material to the issue before the court, and that
the precise book, paper or document containing
such evidence has been so designated or
described that it may be identified. (Emphasis
supplied)
Going by established precedents, it thus behooves
the petitioner to first prove, to the satisfaction of the
court, the relevancy and the definiteness of the
books and documents he seeks to be brought
before it.

Admittedly, the books and documents that
petitioner requested to be subpoenaed are
designated and described in his request with
definiteness and readily identifiable. The test of
definiteness, therefore, is satisfied in this case.
It is, however, in the matter of relevancy of those
books and documents to the pending criminal
cases that petitioner miserably failed to discharge
his burden.
In the recent case of Aguirre vs. People of the
Philippines, 10 the Court reiterated the following
discussions regarding violations of BP 22:
. . . what the law punishes is the issuance of a
bouncing check not the purpose for which it was
issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check
is malum prohibitum. (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 233
SCRA 301). All the elements, therefore, of the
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are all present
in the instant criminal cases and for which the
accused is solely liable, to wit: [a] the making,
drawing and issuance of any check to apply to
account or for value; [2] the knowledge of the
maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment; and [3] subsequent dishonor
of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment. (Navarro vs.
Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 639).
We stress that the gravamen of the offense under
BP 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment. 11 The offense is already
consummated from the very moment a person
issues a worthless check, albeit payment of the
value of the check, either by the drawer or by the
drawee bank, within five (5) banking days from
notice of dishonor given to the drawer is a
complete defense because the prima facie
presumption that the drawer had knowledge of the
insufficiency of his funds or credit at the time of the
issuance of the check and on its presentment for
payment is thereby rebutted by such payment. 12
Here, petitioner would want it appear that the
books and documents subject of his request for
subpoena duces tecum are indispensable, or, at
least, relevant to prove his innocence. The Court
disagrees.
Based on the records below and as correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner had
been issued by Cals Corporation with temporary
receipts in the form of yellow pad slips of paper
evidencing his payments, which pad slips had been
validated by the corporation itself. Clear it is, then,
that the production of the books and documents
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requested by petitioner are not indispensable to
prove his defense of payment. In the words of the
appellate court:
The Petitioner admitted, when he testified in the
Regional Trial Court, that he had been issued
temporary receipts in the form of yellow pad slips of
paper, by the Private Respondent, for his payments
which were all validated by the Private Respondent
(Exhibits "8" and "F" and their submarkings). Even if
the temporary receipts issued by the Private
Respondent may not have been the official
receipts for Petitioner's payments, the same are as
efficacious and binding on the Private Respondent
as official receipts issued by the latter.
We do not find any justifiable reason, and petitioner
has not shown any, why this Court must have to
disbelieve the factual findings of the appellate
court. In short, the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum or ad testificandum to compel the
attendance of Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap of
Cal's Corporation or their duly authorized
representatives, to testify and bring with them the
records and documents desired by the petitioner,
would serve no purpose but to further delay the
proceedings in the pending criminal cases.
Besides, the irrelevancy of such books and
documents would appear on their very face
thereof, what the fact that the requested Audited
Income Statements, Audited Balance Sheets,
Income Tax Returns, etc. pertained to the years
1994 to 1999 which could not have reflected
petitioner's alleged payment because the subject
transaction happened in 1993. Again, we quote
from the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals:
The checks subject of the criminal indictments
against the Petitioner were drawn and dated in
1993. The Petitioner has not demonstrated the
justification, for the production of the books/records
for 1994, and onwards, up to 1999. Especially so,
when the "Informations" against the Petitioner, for
violations of BP 22, were filed, with the Trial Court, as
early as 1994. aCSHDI
We are inclined to believe, along with that court,
that petitioner was just embarking on a "fishing
expedition" to derail "the placid flow of trial".
With the above, it becomes evident to this Court
that petitioners request for the production of books
and documents referred to in his request are
nakedly calculated to merely lengthen the
proceedings in the subject criminal cases, if not to
fish for evidence. The Court deeply deplores
petitioner's tactics and will never allow the same.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the
challenged decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Panganiban,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio Morales,
JJ., concur.