Hearsay Rule
Desierto
A. Testimonial Knowledge
1. Rule 130, Sec. 36
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal
knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in these
rules.
People vs. Gaddi
People vs. Gaddi
170 SCRA 649 (1989)
Hearsay (Testimonial Knowledge)
Facts: Nerio Gaddi was charged with murder for the death of
one Augusto Esguerra. The prosecutions version of the facts
(which was the version believed by the court) show that in the
afternoon of December 11, 1981, at San Bartolome, Novaliches,
Quezon City, Ernesto Guzman saw appellant Nerio Gaddi and
the victim Augusto Esguerra drinking gin. In the morning of the
following day, appellent told Ernesto Guzman that he killed
Esguerra and dumped his body in a toilet located in the
backyard of Guzman. Guzman advised appellant to surrender
to the police. Guzman went to the police and reported what
appellant told him. On December 12, 1981, the appellant was
arrested. Appellant voluntarily surrendered and told the police
that he killed the victim and that he buried the body. The
appellant led the police to where the body is buried. Patrolman
Patriarca noted the statements of Guzman and Gaddi and took
down the confession of appeallant. In his defense, Gaddi points
to Guzman as the perpetrator of the crime and that he was only
forced by the latter to admit the crime. The court convicted the
appellant of the crime charged. In this appeal, appellant
disputes the trial courts reliance on the testimonies of the
prosecution witness Guzman as a basis for his convition. He
claims that Ernesto Guzmans testimony on Gaddis confession
of the crime to him cannot be given credence for being hearsay.
Issue: Whether or not Guzmans testimony is hearsay.
Ruling: No. This tribunal had previously declared that a
confession constitutes evidence of the high order since it is
suported by the strong presumption that no person of normal
mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to crime unless
prompted by truth and his conscience. Proof that a person
confessed to the commission of a crime can be presented in
evidence without violating the hearsay rule which only prohibits
a witness from testifying as to those facts which he merely
learned from other persons but not as to those facts which he
knows of his own knowledge;that is, which are derived from his
own perception. Hence, while the testimony of a witness
regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to
establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is
clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of
placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the
fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such
statement.
Here, when Guzman testified that the appellant, who
probably was bothered by his conscience, admitted the killing
to him, there was no violation of the hearsay rule as Guzman
was testifying to a fact which he knows of his own personal
knowledge; that is, he was testifying to the fact that the
appellant told him that he stabbed Augusto Esguerra and not to
the truth of the appellants statement.
(In this case, it should also be noted that the appellant
was not convicted based only on the prosecution witness
testimony but also on the presence of other circumstantial
evidence proved.)
Estrada vs. Desierto
Estrada vs.
356 SCRA 108 (2001)
Hearsay (Testimonial Knowledge)
Facts: This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the Courts
resolution in GR. No. 146710-15 and Omnibus Motion in GR.
146738 of the Courts Decision of March 2, 2001.
In G.R. No. 146738, petitioner raises and argues the
following issues:
1. Whether petitioner resigned or should be
considered resigned as of Janury 20, 2001;
2. Whether the Anagara Diary is inadmissible for
being violative of the following rules on evidence: hearsay, best
evidence, authentication, admissions, and res inter alios acta;
3. Whether reliance on newspaper accounts is
violative of the hearsay rule.
It is urged that the use of the Angara Diary to
determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of his
resignation violates the rule against the admission of hearsay
rule.
Ruling: We are unpersuaded. To begin with, the Angara Diary is
not an out of court statement. The Angara Diary is part of the
pleadings in the cases at bar. Even assuming arguendo that the
Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not
covered by the hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when
its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the
competency and reliability of some persons other than the
witness by whom it is sought to produce it. There are three
reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross-
examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3)
absence of oath. Not all hearsay evidence, however, is
inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body of
hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to their
relevance, trustworthiness and necessity. A complete analysis
of any hearsay problem requires that we further determine
whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules
of exclusion. A more circumspect examination of our rules of
exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a party
and the Angara Diary belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule
130 provides that the act, declaration, or omission of a party
as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. It
has long been settled that these admissions are admissible
even if they are hearsay.
That Angara Diary contains direct statements of
petitioners which can be categorized as admissions of a party:
his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not
be a candidate; his statement that he only wanted the five-day
period promised by chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements
that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be
opened by Monday and pagod na Pagod na ako. Ayoko na,
masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape,
bureaucracy, intriga.
It is however argued that the Angara Diary is not the
Diary of petitioner, hence, non-binding on him. The argument
overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive
admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by
another person when it is reasonable to treat the partys
reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the
other person. The basis for admissibility of admissions made
vicariously is that arising from the ratification or adoption by
the party of the statement which the other person had made.
In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to
dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its support from him
as president and commander-in-chief. Thus, executive
Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to
advise petitioner to consider the option of dignified exit or
resignation. Petitioner did not object to the suggested option
but simply said he could never leave the country. Petitioners
silence on this and other related suggestions can be taken as
an admission by him.
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Petitioner also contends that the use of Angara Diary
against him violated the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule is
expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz:
The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration or omission of another, except as hereinafter
provided. Again, petition errs in his contention. The res inter
alios acta rule has several exceptions. One of them is provided
in Section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-
partner or agent. Executive Secretary Angara as such was an
alter ego of the petitioner. Under our rules of evidence,
admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the
principal (petitioner).
Moreover the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover
independently relevant statements. These are statements
which are relevant independently of whether they are true or
not. They belong to two (2) classes: (1) those statements which
are the very facts in issue, and (2) those statements which are
circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The second class
include the following:
Statements of a person showing his state
of mind, that is his mental condition, knowledge belief,
intention, ill will and other emotions;
x x x imposed by the trial court should, therefore, be, and is hereby,
statements of a person from which an
inference may be made as to the state of mind of another, that
is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. og the
latter;
As afore discussed, the Angara Diary contains
statements of the petitioner which reflects his state of mind and
are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also
contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can
reasonably deduce petitioners intent to resign. They are
admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay.
B. Exceptions to Hearsay
1. Dying Declaration
Rule 130, Sec. 37
Sec. 37. Dying declaration. The declaration of a
dying person, made under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case wherein
his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the
cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.
US vs. GIL
FACTS:
In the information, it charges the accused the crime of
assassination with treachery and deliberate premeditation. The
accused on the 27th day of December, 1907 entered the office
of Governor Benito Lopez in the Building located in the City of
Ilo-ilo. That few minutes after his entry, a gun shots was heard.
meanwhile, the Governor was found wounded and brought to
the hospital. after few days, the Governor died because of the
shots obtained. While in the Hospital, he told the Fiscal who was
then present at that time the circumstances of his death. The
accused on the other hand has different version. That
accordingly, he entered the office of the Governor on that very
day to acquire license for his revolver however, the governor
instead insulted him. That after shouting to him that he was a
son of a whore, he was driven by a anger. that the governor
tried to take the revolver which resulted to his injuries while
forcibly taking it from the accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Dying declaration contrary to the
testimony of the accused be given weight.
RULING:
Dying declarations have always been regarded as an
exception to the general rule rejecting hearsay evidence, on the
general principle, as laid down by Lord Baron Eyre, "That they
are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at that
point of death, and when every hope of this world is gone; when
every motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced
by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. A
situation so solemn and so awful as to be considered by the law
as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a
positive oath in a court of justice." That the declarant was
conscious of his impending death, and that he spoke with the
prospect of "almost immediate dissolution" confronting him;
that he understood the meaning and effect of his statement;
and that he knew he was addressing the law officers of the
town and province wherein he lived, and informing them as to
the circumstances which led up to his death, are facts which we
think are sufficiently established by the evidence of record.
It appearing from the evidence of record that the
accused was guilty, as charged, of unlawfully taking the life of
Benito Lopez, and that the crime was committed with treachery
(alevosa) and with deliberate premeditation (premeditacin
conocida), and that his victim was engaged in the performance
of the functions of his office, as governor of the Province of
Iloilo, at the time when the crime was committed, and the
commission of the crime not being marked by any extenuating
circumstance, the accused was properly convicted of the crime
of assassination, and the penalty described by law was properly
imposed in its maximum degree. The sentence of death
affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellant.
People vs. Sabio
People vs. Sabio
102 SCRA 218 (1981)
Dying Declaration (Exception to Hearsay)
Facts: Catalino Espina, 80 years old and owner of a sari-sari
store in Cebu, was found on the second floor of his home,
wounded on the forehead, from which injury he died 3 days
later. Prosecution witness Jesusa Birondo testified that around
5am that day, as she was preparing to go to the seashore, she
heard cries for help coming from Espinas house. When she
looked outside her window, she saw the accused, Rodulfo Sabio
(nicknamed Papu) coming out of the door of the store of
Espinas house. Another witness, Camilo Semilla, grandnephew
of the victim, who lived at the latter since childhood, testified
that he left the victims home at around 4am to go fishing.
Sometime later, he observed Sabio from 6 meters away,
running past him and towards his (Sabios) home. Semilla
observed that Sabio had his hands tucked inside his shirt while
running. Minutes later, a certain Enok Calledo arrived and told
Semilla to go home because his grand-uncle was crying for
help. When Semilla arrived, he saw Espina lying wounded
upstairs and the latter was only able to speak when his head
was raised. Semilla also observed that the tin can (called a
barrio) containing the cash sales of the store amounting to
around 8 pesos was lying empty on the floor.
Espina asked Semilla to call for the police and
Patrolmen Fuentes and Burgos responded. Upon arrival, Fuentes
asked Espina questions about his wounding and wrote the
answers on torn calendar page. According to Fuentes, in
response to his questions, Espina identified Papu Sabio as his
assailant, the latter having attacked him after demanding
money. Fuentes then had Espina thumbmark this ante-mortem
statement with his own blood, there being no ink available.
Fuentes and Burgos signed as witnesses. Espina was then
brought to the hospital where he died 3 days later due to his
head wounds.
In his defense, Sabio testified that at the time of the
supposed robbery and homicide, he was asleep at home. Sabio
also presented a certain Jacinto Mendez who testified that he
slept at the home of the accused the night before and
corroborated Sabios presence therein.
The RTC found Sabio guilty of Robbery with Homicide
and sentenced him to death.
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Issues:
1. Whether or not the RTC correctly convicted Sabio of
robbery with homicide.
2. Whether or not the Ante-mortem Statement of Espina
is admissible as evidence against Sabio
Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that only the crime of
homicide had been committed and sentenced him to 12-20
years of imprisonment. The evidence in support of robbery is
circumstantial at best and does not establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that Sabio had carried away the money
contained in the tin can. The consummation of robbery cannot
be presumed from the circumstance that the accused was seen
running with his hands inside his shirt or that the tin can
allegedly contained 8 pesos or that the house was in disarray.
Nor can the dying declaration be admitted to establish
the robbery (part of which read: Q: Who slashed and robbed
you? A: Rodulfo Sabio). The admission of dying declarations
has always been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for
homicide or murder, as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of death.
2. The Ante-mortem Statement is admissible versus
Sabio. The arguments of the defense are unavailing. That the
victim was under the consciousness of impending death is
strengthened by the following circumstances: the seriousness of
injury to the victims forehead, the profuse bleeding, the
inability to speak unless his head was raised, the spontaneous
answers to Fuentes questions, his subsequent demise from the
wounds. The fact that death did not ensue until 3 days later
does not alter its probative force since it is not an indispensable
requirement that the declarant expire immediately after. It is
the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of
death in point of fact, that renders the dying declaration
admissible.
Further, the fact that the victim told his grandnephew to fetch
the police does not negative the victims feeling of
hopelessness of recovery. Rather, it emphasizes the realization
that he had little time to disclose his assailant to the
authorities.
2. Declaration Against Interest
a. Rule 130, Sec. 38
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. The
declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact
is asserted in the declaration was at the time it was
made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made
the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may
be received in evidence against himself or his
successors in interest and against third persons.
People vs. Toledo
Toledo
51 PHIL 825 (1928)
Declaration Against Interest (Exception to Hearsay)
Facts: Sisenado Holgado and Filomeno Morales had a dispute
over parcels of land located in Pinamalayan, Mindoro. One
morning, the 2 men happened to me and their argument was
renewed. They agreed to engage in a bolo duel which resulted
in the death of Morales. Holgado, however, was seriously
wounded and fled to the neighboring house of Dalmacio
Manlisic. He then proceeded to the municipal building where he
made a sworn statement before the municipal president that
only there were the only 2 persons who fought. A month later,
Holgado died of his wounds.
The querida of Morales, Justina Villanueva, testified
however that appellant Eugenio Toledo, one of Holgados
workers had intervened in the fight and dealt a mortal blow to
Morales. Her testimony was partially corroborated by a certain
Justina Llave. Toledo denied having participated in the fight and
stated that his only involvement was having met Holgado after
the fight and helping him get to the Manlisic residence. Toledos
counsel presented Exhibit 1, the affidavit of Holgado made at
the municipal building after the fight. This Exhibit however was
ruled to be hearsay evidence and hence, inadmissible.
Toledo was convicted of homicide by the trial court,
which is the subject of this appeal. The counsel of Toledo
contends that Exhibit 1 should have been admitted into
evidence.
Issue: Whether or not the affidavit of the deceased Holgado is
admissible as evidence.
Ruling: The conviction is reversed and Toledo acquitted. The
trial court erred in not admitting Exhibit 1 as a statement of fact
against penal interest and had it been received, its influence
would have been felt by the trial court.
Hearsay evidence is generally excluded by the courts. One of
the recognized exceptions has been the declarations of third
parties contrary to their pecuniary or proprietary interest.
Traditionally, this exception has been made only to apply to
admissions against a pecuniary or proprietary interest but not a
penal interest. The Court however fails to see why a man will be
presumed to tell the truth in the former instances and not the
latter. To limit the exception to statements against pecuniary
interests and not criminal liability cannot be justified on grounds
of public policy.
The purpose of evidence is to get the truth. The reason for the
hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial statements of another are
not the best way of serving this purpose. In other words, the
great possibility of fabrication and falsehood and the inability to
prove such untruths requires the doors to be closed to such
evidence. So long therefore as the declarant is available, his
extrajudicial statement should not be heard.
Where however, the declarant is dead or has disappeared, his
previous out-of-court statements are the best evidence, if not
inadmissible on other grounds. But they cannot be rendered
inadmissible by the mere fact that the declarant is unavailable.
One fact that will satisfy this necessity is that the declaration is
or was against the declarants interest and this is because no
sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own
detriment.
3. Pedigree
a. Rule 130, Sec.39
Sec. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act
or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy,
and the relationship between the two persons is shown
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by evidence other than such act or declaration. The
word "pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and
the places where these fast occurred, and the names
of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.
Gravador vs. Mamigo
Mamigo
20 SCRA 742 (1967)
Pedigree
Facts: The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the
Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Sta. Catalina, Negros
Oriental on August 15, 1964 when he was advised by the
Superintendent of Schools Angel Salazar, Jr., through Teodulfo
Dayao, of his separation from the service on the ground that he
had reached the compulsory retirement age of 65. The latters
findings were based on pre-war records which included
Gravadors Employees Record Card that stated that he was
born on November 26, 1897 (He was thus 66 years, 8 months
and 22 days old on record).
In a letter dated August 31, 1964, the petitioner
protested his forced retirement on the ground that the date of
his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901.
Attached to this letter was the affidavit of Lazaro Bandoquillo
and Pedro Sienes who were their neighbors even during the
lifetime of the parents of Gravador. They stated that Gravadors
true birth date is December 11, 1901.
The Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental ruled
that Gravador was born on December 11, 1901 and ordered his
reinstatement, back salaries and damages amounting to
P52,400. Respondent Eutiquio Mamigo, the District Supervisor,
appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Mamigo contends that
it was error on the part of the trial court to rely solely on post-
war records to determine petitioners true date of birth.
According to respondent, these records were only manufactured
since it was believed that the original pre-war records had been
lost or destroyed.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court correctly relied on post-
war records.
Ruling: Yes. The trial court committed no error in relying on
post-war records that reflected Gravadors birth date as
December 11, 1901.
Although a person can have no personal knowledge of
the date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as he learned
it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case
is an assertion of a family tradition. In his application for back
pay filed with the Department of Finance and when he asked
the GSIS and the Civil Service Commission to correct the date of
his birth, he repeatedly asserted that his birthday was on
December 11, 1901.
In the second place, the import of the declaration of
petitioners brother, contained in a verified pleading in a
cadastral survey way back in 1924, to the effect that the
petitioner was then 23 years old, can not be ignored. Made ante
litem motam by a deceased relative, this statement is at once a
declaration regarding pedigree within the intendment and
meaning of section 33 (now section 39) of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.
Thus, December 11, 1901 is established as the date of
birth of the petitioner not only by evidence of family tradition
but also by the declaration ante litem motam of a deceased
relative.
Tison vs. CA
Tison v. Court of Appeals
276 SCRA 582 (1997)
Pedigree
Facts: It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene
Dezoller are the niece and nephew of the deceased Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero. Teodora died on March 5, 1983 without any
ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her
husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Hence they
seek to inherit from Teodora Guerrero by right of representation.
Upon the death of his wife, Martin executed an Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating to himself, allegedly as
sole heir, a parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon
located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. On January 2,
1988, Martin sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora
Domingo.
Martin Guerrero died on October 1988. Subsequently,
petitioners filed for an action for reconveyance claiming that
they have a right to inherit one half of the property. During the
pre-trial hearing, Corazon Tison was presented as the lone
witness and she offered the following evidence to prove their
filiation to their father and their aunt: baptismal certificates,
death certificates, and certificates of destroyed records of births
of Teodora Dezoller and their father Hermogenes Dezoller, a
family picture, affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar,
marriage certificates of Martin and Teodora, among other
documents shown. Tison also testified as to her filiation
Tedorora. Private respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence on
the ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate
filiation under Article 172 of the Family Code. The Trial Court
granted the demurrer and dismissed the complaint. The CA
affirmed the TC ruling.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners failed to prove to establish
their legitimacy and filiation to the deceased Teodora Guerrero
with evidence merely consisting of several documents and the
testimony of Corazon Tison.
Held: Yes. They have proved their filiation. TC and CA ruling are
reversed and set aside.
It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by
petitioners, taken separately and independently of each other,
are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even of
pedigree. However, both courts failed to recognize the
presumption of legitimacy. There is no presumption more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and reason than
the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.
And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot
be attacked collaterally as in an action for reconveyance. The
presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of
petitioners.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the
relationship between the parties is the testimony of Corazon
Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in
her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that
the former is Teodoras niece. Such a statement is considered a
declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception
to the hearsay rule under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant
is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to
the person whose pedigree is subject to inquiry; (3) that such
relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration;
and (4) that the declaration be made ante litem moam, that is,
not only before the commencement of the suit involving the
subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy
has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute as the first, second and fourth requirements.
As to the third requirement, where the party claiming seeks
recovery against a relative common to both claimant and
declarant not from the declarant himself or the declarants
estate the relationship of the declarant to the common
relative may not be proved by the declaration itself, but this
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 requirement does not apply where it is sought to reach the
estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a
right through his declarations to the property of some other
member of the family. Where a party claims a right to the part
of the estate of the declarant, the declaration of the latter that
the former is her niece is admissible and constitutes sufficient
proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there
was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason that such
declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of
receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice.
4. Family Tradition
a. Rule 130, Sec.40
Rule 130, Section 40
Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding
pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a
family previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be received
in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a
member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or
charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the
like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
Ferrer vs. De Inchausti
Ferrer v. De Inchausti
38 Phil. 905 (1918)
Family Tradition & Common Reputation
Facts: Plaintiffs Rafael and Maria Angelina Ferrer filed a
complaint praying for a declaration that Rosa Matilde
Viademonte, mother of the plaintiffs herein, had the right to
succeed to the inheritance left by Isabel Gonzales in the same
proportion and capacity as the other four children of the latter
namely, Ramon, Rafael, Joaquin, and Clotilde. The plaintiffs
allege that they are the only legitimate heirs of Rosa
Viademonte and are entitled to receive the latters share, that
is, one-fifth of the estate left by Isabel Gonzales. They allege
that Isabel was first married to Ramon Martinez Viademonte
and that their mother Rosa was the fruit of their relationship.
Isabel was then married Jose Joaquin de Inchausti, father of
defendants herein.
Counsel for the plaintiffs sought to establish that Rosa Matilde
Viademonte has been treated and considered as a daughter of
Isabel Gonzales and that on one occasion, the said Gonzales
remarked that the father of Rosa Matilde was Ramon Martinez
de Viademonte. Also, that Joaquin C. de Inchausti dedicated a
picture to Rosa in the following manner: To my dear and
unforgettable sister Rosa. College records of the latter at
Collegio de Santa Isabel were shown to use establish filiation.
a.
The defendants presented an entry in the notebook of Ramon
Viademonte Jr. which showed that true name of Rosa Matilde
Viademonte was Rosa Matilde Robles, born of unknown parents
in September 1, 1952. Notwithstanding the arguments of the
plaintiff, Joaquin de Inchausti testified that one day he was
assured by his half brother Ramon Martinez Viademonte that
Rosa Matilde was not his sister but a mere protge and that
her true name was Rosa Matilde Robles and that on occasion
the said brother showed him the certificate of birth of which
Exhibit 6 is a copy, which he took from the parochial church.
Issue: Whether or not Joaquin de Inchaustis testimony and the
diary accounts of Ramon Viademonte Jr. are admissible to prove
the filiation of Rosa Matilde Viademonte to Isabel Gonzales
Ruling: Yes. Evidence adduced at the trial to prove the origin of
the cause of action shows, in a manner which leaves no room
for doubt, that Rosa was not a legitimate daughter of Isabel
Gonzales and it follows that her children have no right to a part
of the hereditary property of Isabel Gonzales.
In view of the fact that Ramon Martinez Viademonte is now
dead, the testimony of Joaquin Jose de Inchausti referring to the
said deceased is admissible as evidence of family tradition, for
they are members of the same family and consequently the
conclusion is that Rosa Matilde is the same Rosa Matilde Robles
mentioned in Exhibit 6 and because she was born in 1952, in no
manner could she be a legitimate daughter of Ramon
Viademonte and Isabel Gonzales, whose marriage was
dissolved 1n 1936 by the death of the husband.
In Re Mallare
A.M. No. 533 September 12, 1974
Facts: Mallares father Esteban was the illegitimate child of
a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, and believed himself to
be Chinese. Mallare became a lawyer, but his admission to the
bar was revoked because his citizenship was questionable.
Issue: Is Mallare a Filipino citizen?
Whether the declaration that a person was reputedly born out
of wedlock is admissible evidence of illegitimacy.
HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the revocation after finding
that Esteban was a Filipino because his mother was not married
to his Chinese father. Furthermore, when Mallare came of age,
he registered as a voter and exercised his right of suffrage. The
Court considered these acts to be enough to show that Mallare
had elected Filipino citizenship, without needing any formal
declaration on his part.
SCRA
Civil procedure; Evidence; Declaration that a person was
reputedly born out of wedlock admissible evidence of
illegitimacy.The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had
personal knowledge of the person, birth and residency of both
Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in their declaration
that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in
the place, and that Esteban, her son, was reputedly born out of
wedlock. Such declarations constitute admissible evidence of
the birth and illegitimacy of Esteban Mallare. Reputation has
been held admissible as evidence of age, birth, race, or race-
ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was born alive.
Unlike that of matters of pedigree, general reputation of
marriage may proceed from persons who are members of the
familythe reason for the distinction is the public interest that
is taken in the question of the existence of marital relations.
The principle could not have been more true than in a Philippine
rural community where relationships not in conformity with
established conventions become the subject of criticisms and
public censure.
5. Common Reputation
Rule 130, Sec.41
Sec. 41. Common reputation. Common reputation
existing previous to the controversy, respecting facts
of public or general interest more than thirty years old,
or respecting marriage or moral character, may be
given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in
public places may be received as evidence of common
reputation.
Ferrer vs. De Inchausti
Ferrer v. De Inchausti
38 Phil. 905 (1918)
Common Reputation
5
 Ruling: Counsel for the plaintiffs likewise objected to the
admission in evidence of the day-book kept by Ramon Martinez
Viademonte Jr. as hearsay. Their contention is untenable as the
section 298, No, 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section
41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court) provides that evidence may
be given upon trial of monuments and inscriptions in public
places as evidence of common reputation; and entries in family
Bibles or other family books or charts; engravings on rings,
family portraits and the like, as evidence of pedigree.
City of Manila vs. Del Rosario
City of Manila v. Del Rosario
5 Phil. 227 (1905)
Common Reputation
Facts: This is action to recover possession of two parcels of
land located in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, district of Tondo,
filed by the City of Manila against its present occupant, Jacinto
del Rosario. The plaintiff introduced both documentary and oral
evidence. The latter consisted of the testimony John Wilson,
Eduardo Timoteo, Juan Villegas, Sotera Roco, Lorenzo del
Rosario, and Modesto Reyes, the city attorney.
The third witness, Juan Villegas, testified that the land
in question was formerly included in the Gran Divisoria, and
that all the land included in it belonged to the city. This
particular testimony is at variance with the testimonies of
Wison and Timoteo who testified that the land belonged to the
Central Government (not the city). His testimony was based on
what he had learned from the oldest residents of that section of
the city and was introduced by the City of Manila apparently for
the purpose of proving that the city was generally considered
the owner of the land drawing from this fact the presumption of
actual ownership under paragraph 11, section 334, of the Code
of Civil Procedure (now Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court).
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Villegas is admissible as
proof of common reputation.
Ruling: No. Villegas testimony is merely hearsay.
Since it consisted of what he had learned from some of
the old residents of Manila, it was hearsay as to the court since
those who said it were not produced. Such testimony does not
constitute the common reputation referred to in the section
mentioned. Common reputation as used in that section, is
equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony of Villegas is
not sufficient to establish the presumption referred to.
Furthermore, this witness stated that the land in Calle
Azcarraga had been partitioned between the municipality and
the Central Government, share and share alike, and that the
Central Government (not the city) retained Calles Gabriel de
Rivera and Barcelona, which are precisely the streets on which
the property abuts.
6. Res Gestae
a. Rule 130, Sec.42
Sec. 42. Part of res gestae. Statements made by a
person while a starting occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect
to the circumstances thereof, may be given in
evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,
and giving it a legal significance, may be received as
part of the res gestae.
People vs. Lungayan
People vs. Lungayan
162 SCRA 100 (1988)
Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Res Gestae
Facts: This appeal from the decision of the RTC arose due to
the complaint filed by Agripina Juan Vda. De Garzota, then 52
years old and widow, charging the accused of rape. At about 10
in the evening of January 20, 1980, the complainant was
already asleep inside the room at their market stall when the
accused, who was then the barangay captain, awakened her by
entering her room after one of her children opened the door for
him. He invited her to join him to observe the persons drinking
wine in the market because they are in violation of a barangay
ordinance prohibiting drinking after 10 pm. She consented.
While they were standing two meters away from the open door
of the canteen, the accused suddenly grabbed both of her
hands and allegedly pointed a gun at her after she shouted
loudly (only once). The accused then pulled her and she fell
hitting her head on the ground. When she regained
consciousness, she was dragged to a banana grove where she
was allegedly raped which lasted for less than an hour. She only
reached home at about 12 midnight and one of her daughters
asked her what happened. She revealed that the accused
abused her and when pressed for details, she just said that she
will just tell everything in the morning. She told her as such and
they then reported the incident. She was also submitted for to a
medical examination. Based on the evidence presented, the
accused was convicted. By way of rebuttal during appeal, the
accused emphasized the failure of the prosecution to establish
involuntariness on the part of the victim.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish the
involuntariness of the victim.
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in considering the
revelation of the complainant to her daughter of what
happened to her as part of the res gestae.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The prosecution failed. The circumstances of the
case militated against the claim of the complainant that force
and intimidation was employed by the accused. She should
have declined the invitation. Going out alone with a man late in
the evening is not good taste nor safe. She was also not
discreet because she did not even put any underwear. She also
only shouted for help once when she could have done more and
just ran. She also offered no resistance nor struggle making the
consummation last for almost an hour.
2. Yes. The RTC erred in considering the revelation as part
of the res gestae. The Court stressed that in order for the
statement to be part of the res gestae, it must not only be
spontaneous but also be made at a time when there was no
opportunity to concoct or develop a story. As the Court
observed, she did not go home immediately after the incident.
She took a walk and spent sometime thinking of what to do.
She had enough time to make a decision of what will be the
nature of her story.
People vs. Putian
People vs. Putian
74 SCRA 133 (1976)
Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Res Gestae
Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the CFI convicting
the accused of murdering Teodulo Panimdim. On November 22,
1969, while the victim was attending a dance, he was stabbed
in the left groin. As a result, he died five days later. Putian was
charged and convicted of murder on the basis of the testimony
6
 of the doctor who treated the victim and of the policeman who
arrested the accused and seized from him the dagger allegedly
used in the stabbing and who took down the victims ante-
mortem statement identifying the accused as the assailant. The
trial court regarded the victims ante-mortem statement as part
of the res gestae and not as a dying declaration since it was not
made under the consciousness of an impending death. The
victim was even able to go home after the medical treatment
without any assistance. The appellant challenges the trial
courts ruling that the statement be made part of the res gestae
because it was not spontaneous, being made several hours
after the incident. He claims that the requisite that the
declarant gave the statement before he had time to devise or
contrive was not present in this case.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the
statement be made part of the res gestae.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court did not
err in characterizing Panimdims statement as part of the res
gestae and as proving beyond reasonable doubt that Putian is
guilty of stabbing the victim.
The res gestae rule embraces (a) spontaneous
declarations and (b) verbal acts. Panimdims statement was a
spontaneous statement made after the commission of the
felony. Although a declaration does not appear to have been
made by the declarant under the expectation of a sure and
impending death, and, for the reason, is not admissible as a
dying declaration, yet if such declaration was made at the time
of, or immediately thereafter, the commission of the crime, or
at a time when the exciting influence of the startling
occurrence still continued in the declarants mind, it is
admissible as part of the res gestae.
Panimdims staetement was given sometime after the
stabbing while he was undergoing treatment at a medical clinic.
He had no time to concoct a falsehood or fabricate a malicious
charge again Putian. No motive has been shown as to why he
would frame up Putian.
Putian, however, was convicted only of homicide since
treachery was not proven.
7. Entries in the Course of Business
a. Rule 130, Sec. 43
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries
made at, or near the time of transactions to which they
refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who
was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may
be received as prima facie evidence, if such person
made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.
8. Official Records
a. Rule 130, Sec.44
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official
records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance
of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. (38)
People vs. Leones
People vs. Leones
117 SCRA 382 (1982)
Official Records
Facts:
Complainant Irene Dulay was a salesgirl employed in the store
of Spouses Leones in La Union where she also resided. The
accused, Joseph Leones, was a member of the Leones family.
One day, all the members of the Dulay family went for a picnic.
When the accused and her sister went back to the house, they
saw the condition of Irene, who was then feeling very dizzy. The
accused tried to give Irene medicine but the later refused so he
forced her to drink it. After drinking the medicine, Irene felt
more dizzy. The accused took advantage of Irenes condition
and succeeded in raping her. The stepmother of the accused
found Irene without any panty and brought her to the hospital
where she was examined by a doctor.
The medical examination conducted by Dr. Cayao revealed the
following
1. healing lacerations of the hyment at 2 oclock and 10
oclock
2. smear exam for sperm cell negative
3. easily admit one finger with pain
Thereafter, the case for rape was filed against the accused. The
accused denied the charge imputed to him and set up the
defense of alibi claiming that he was at the beach with his
family at the time the alleged incident happened.
RTC ruled that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
having committed the crime of rape and was sentenced to
Reclusion Perpetua. Hence the direct appeal to the SC.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the evidentiary value of the medical record
presented by the government is sufficient to warrant conviction
Held:
1. No. Supreme Court ruled for the acquittal of the accused. The
clinical case record of Irenes admission and confinement at the
hospital contain entries which totally and completely belie the
claim of the complainant that she was raped by the accused.
The entry in the medical record of Irene stated VAGINAL
BLEEDING HEALING LACERATED WIDE AT 2 oclock and 10 o
clock hymen. Assuming that the victim was raped between 2
and 3 pm. Then the lacerations of the hymen at 2 oclock and
10 oclock would not have been described and indicated to be
HEALING in the clinical case record. It would be described as
LACERATION FLESH.
The findings of healing laceration clearly indicates that the
defloration occurred SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE, which may have
happened when Irene took a week-long vacation to her
hometown in Pugo La Union.
The written entries in the clinical case record showing the date
of her admission the hospital and her complaint of vaginal
bleeding and the diagnosis of healing lacerated wide at 2
oclock and 10 oclock hymen are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated, the said entries having been made in
official records by public officer of the Philippines in the
performance of his duty especially enjoined by law which is that
of a physician in a government hospital. [ Rule 130 sec. 38,
Rules of Court]
The court also found that Irene never complained of being rape
but that her vaginal bleeding was caused by her menstruation.
The court also observed that it is quite abnormal and unheard
of in human experience and behavior that a man would have
sexual intercourse with a woman having her menstrual period.
The court acquitted the accused after it concluded that the
evidence produced by the prosecution were not persuasive to
establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused.
People vs. Gabriel
7

People vs. San Gabriel
253 SCRA 84 (1996)
Entries in the Official Record
Facts:
The evidence shows that on 26 November 1989, at the
vicinity of the North Harbor, Manila, a fistfight ensued between
Jaime Tonog on one hand and the accused Ricardo San Gabriel
together with "Ramon Doe" on the other. The fight was
eventually broken up when onlookers pacified the protagonists.
Ricardo and Ramon then hastened towards Marcos Road but in
no time were back with bladed weapons. They approached
Tonog surreptitiously, surrounded him and simultaneously
stabbed him, after which the assailants ran towards the
highway leaving Tonog behind on the ground. He was then
brought to Mary Johnson Hospital where he was pronounced
dead on arrival.
The accused on the other hand has a different version.
He testified that he saw Tonog drunk; Tonog attempted to box
him but he parried his blow; Tonog continued walking but when
he chanced upon Ramon he suddenly and without provocation
boxed and kicked Ramon; Ramon fought back but was subdued
by his bigger assailant so the former ran towards the highway;
when Tonog met a certain "Mando" he boxed the latter who
however fought back despite his (accused) warning not to; at
this moment he saw Ramon return with a bolo on hand; he
warned Ramon not to fight but his advice went unheeded;
instead, with bolo on hand Ramon struck Tonog on the belly;
when "Mando" saw what happened he ("Mando") pulled out his
knife and also stabbed Tonog at the back; Ramon and "Mando"
then fled towards the highway.
The lower court did not believe the accuseds version
and instead convicted him based on the testimony of two
prosecution witnesses Brenda Gonzales and Pio Ochobillo.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are incredible and conflicting.
2. Whether or not the Advance Information Sheet did
not mention him at all and named only "Ramon Doe" as the
principal suspect. In relation thereto, was the Advance
Information Sheet an exception to hearsay rule, being entries
made in the official records?
Held:
1. No. RTC Decision was affirmed. Gonzales and Ochobillo
testified in a direct and candid manner. The court was not
convinced that Gonzales would testify against accused-
appellant for a crime so grave simply because he owed her a
measly sum of P300.00. Furthermore, the accused did not offer
any information regarding the person and circumstances of
"Mando." Up to this date "Mando" remains a myth. Not a single
witness was presented by the defense to prove who "Mando"
was, nor even a hint of his personal circumstances. During the
entire proceedings in the court below "Mando"was never
mentioned by the prosecution witnesses. Nobody ever
implicated him except the accused.
2. Yes. As regards the Advance information sheet, which did not
mention San Gabriel at all and named only "Ramon Doe" as the
principal suspect. Unfortunately this cannot defeat the positive
and candid testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Entries in
official records, as in the case of a police blotter, are only prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. They are not
conclusive. The entry in the police blotter is not necessarily
entitled to full credit for it could be incomplete and inaccurate,
sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of
suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the witness
may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances
necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his
memory and for his accurate recollection of all that pertain to
the subject. It is understandable that the testimony during the
trial would be more lengthy and detailed than the matters
stated in the police blotter. Significantly, the Advance
Information Sheet was never formally offered by the defense
during the proceedings in the court below. Hence any reliance
by the accused on the document must fail since the court
cannot consider any evidence, which has not been formally
offered.
Furthermore, the Advance Information Sheet was prepared by
the police officer only after interviewing Camba, an alleged
eyewitness. The accused then could have compelled the
attendance of Camba as a witness. The failure to exert the
slightest effort to present Camba on the part of the accused
should militate against his cause.
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty
by a public officer or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. But to be admissible in evidence three (3)
requisites must concur: (a) The entry was made by a police
officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and, (c) The public officer or other
person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated,
which must have been acquired by him personally or through
official information.
The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute an
exception to the hearsay rule, hence, inadmissible. The public
officer who prepared the document had no sufficient and
personal knowledge of the stabbing incident. Any information
possessed by him was acquired from Camba which therefore
could not be categorized as official information because in order
to be classified as such the persons who made the statements
not only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but
must have the duty to give such statements for the record. In
the case of Camba, he was not legally so obliged to give such
statements. Hence, conviction was affirmed.
9. Commercial Lists
a. Rule 130, Sec.45
Sec. 45. Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of
statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an
occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other
published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the
truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is
published for use by persons engaged in that occupation
and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. (39)
10. Learned Treatises
a. Rule 130, Sec. 46
Sec. 46. Learned treatises. A published treatise,
periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science,
8
 or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a
matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a
witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the
statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is
recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the
subject. (40a)
11. Prior Testimony
a. Rule 130, Sec.47
Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding.
The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or
unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and
subject matter, may be given in evidence against the
adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine
him. (41a)
Tan vs. CA
Tan vs. Court of Appeals
20 SCRA 54 (1967)
Prior Testimony
Facts:
Petitioners Carmelita and Rodolfo Tan through their
mother Celestina Daldo as guardian ad litem sued respondent
Francisco Tan for acknowledgment and support. However, after
petitioners have presented their evidence, Celestina moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the parties have come to
an amicable settlement and prayed that the same be
dismissed. She also subscribed to an affidavit stating that Tan
is not the father of my said minor children named Carmelita
and Rodolfo but another person whose name I cannot divulge
and that she prepared said affidavit to record what is true and
correct what misinterpretation may arise in the future.
RTC issued an order stating that dismissal of action
with prejudice based on the ground that the parties have
already come to an amicable settlement with the conformity of
counsel.
One year and eight months after dismissal of the case,
petitioners through their maternal grandfather Servillano Daldo
as guardian ad litem filed action for acknowledgment and
support involving the same parties, cause of action and subject
matter. RTC dismissed the case based on res judicata. Petitioner
moved to reconsider. RTC reconsidered previous decision and
declared petitioners to be the illegitimate children of defendant
and ordered the him to support minors in the amount of P200 a
month, to be paid directly to Carmelita for herself and her
younger brother, additional amount of P300 semi-annually for
matriculation expenses, and reimburse Servillano P2,000 as his
expenses in supporting petitioners as well as attorneys fees
and costs of suit.
Tan appealed to the CA, which reversed RTC decision
and dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies made by petitioners
witnesses in the former case may be admissible as evidence
under Section 41 of Rule 130.
HELD: No. The witnesses are available. They are not dead nor
are they outside the Philippines. They just refused to testify.
Thus, they do not come within the legal purview of those
unable to testify. Petitioners also failed to avail court remedies
to secure their attendance.
Petitioners tried to prove that Daldo and Tan lived
together as husband and wife for more than 8 years. Carmelita
and Rodolfo were allegedly fruits of such cohabitation.
Respondent denies such and alleges that he is very much a
married man with several children. Daldo by her own admission,
had been a nursemaid (yaya) in the respondents residence but
for a short period of not less than one year. Carmelita was born
on May 8, 1942 and Rodolfo on September 11, 1944. The
validity of the testimony of petitioners witnesses was
downgraded by the affidavit of Celestina. In such affidavit,
Daldo deposed that petitioners were not fathered by Tan but by
another person whose name she could not divulge. SC affirmed
judgment of CA.
MANLICLIC v. CALAUNAN
FACTS: Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by petitioner Mauricio
Manliclic; and owner-type jeep owned by respondent Modesto
Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.the two vehicles
collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the
rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the
shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water
resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the
left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the
RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries. Subsequently on 2 December 1991,
respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
Manliclic and PRBLI.
Counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs)4of the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the
criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as
much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil
case.
ISSUE: WON the transcripts may be admitted in evidence.
HELD: YES. Petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
Fernando Ramos should not be admitted in evidence for failure
of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must
be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his
testimony or deposition was given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same
parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former
case involved the same subject as that in the present case,
although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to
by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in
the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity
to cross-examine the witness in the former case.
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the
requisites set forth by the Rules for a testimony given in a
former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to
the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal
Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine the
three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed
exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLIs
employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of
employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not
parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party
in said criminal case, the testimonies of the three witnesses are
9
still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to
object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time
when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence;
otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the
right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.
Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not
conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are
inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to
object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as
sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. 24 Hearsay
evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit
but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other
evidence, to be considered and given the importance it
deserves.25
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs
containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo
Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the
same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the
TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were
admitted by both petitioners.26Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even
offered in evidence the TSN containing the testimony of
DonatoGaniban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues
that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiffs witnesses in the
criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why
then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was
given in the criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI
wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that the
TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in
the criminal case should not be admitted and at the same time
insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the
accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in
evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo
Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit
the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.
XII. Opinion Rule
A. Rule 130, Secs. 48-50
Sec. 48. General rule. The opinion of witness is not
admissible, except as indicated in the following sections.
(42)
Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness. The opinion of a
witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill,
experience or training which he shown to posses, may be
received in evidence. (43a)
Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. The opinion of a
witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in
evidence regarding
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has
adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient
familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is
sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the
emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person.
(44a)
B. Cases:
People vs. Adoviso
People vs. Adoviso
309 SCRA 1 (1999)
Opinion Rule
Facts:
At around 8:00 in the evening, Emeterio Vasquez was
preparing coffee as his wife was about to retire for the night.
Their grandson Rufino had already gone to sleep in the papag.
The wife has just finished spreading the sleeping mats when
she heard several gunshots. Emeterio uttered that he was shot.
Bonifacio, the spouses son, upon hearing the shots rushed to
his parents house. He hid himself at dark portion a few meters
from the house and saw Rufino being shot. He recognized Pablo
Adoviso as one of the assailants. After the assailants left,
Bonifacio went to the municipal building to fetch a police
inspector, brought the cop to the scene of the crime, and
together, they took Emeterio and Rufino to the hospital.
Unfortunately, both did not make it to the hospital alive.
Adoviso was charged with murder. He put up alibi as
defense. He claimed that he was at another place drinking
when the murder took place. He also offered in evidence the
testimony a NBI polygraph examiner who conducted a
polygraph test on him. The report of the examiner opined that
Adovisos polygram revealed that there were no specific
reactions indicative of deception to pertinent questions relevant
to the investigation of the crime.
The trial court found Adoviso guilty.
Issue/s: Whether or not the negative results of the polygraph
test should be given weight to absolve the accused of the
crime.
Held: The Supreme Court still found Adoviso guilty.
A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that
simultaneously measures and records certain physiological
changes in the human body that are believed to be involuntarily
caused by an examinees conscious attempt to deceive the
questioner. The theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test is
that a person who lies deliberately will have a rising blod
pressure and subconscious block in breathing which will be
recored on the graph. However, American Courts almost
uniformly reject the results of polygraph tests when offered in
evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt or innocence
of one accused of a crime, whther the accused or the
prosecutor seeks its introduction, for the reason that polygraph
has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and
accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception. The rule is
no different in this jurisdiction. Thus, in People vs. Daniel,
stating that much faith and credit must not be vested upon the
lie detector test as it is not conclusive. Appellant, in this case,
has not advanced any reason why this rule should not apply to
him.
CHINA BANKING V CA
FACTS: The deceased Avelina Vda. de Piero (Avelina), herein
respondents predecessor-in-interest, was the registered owner
of two adjoining parcels of land with improvements. Alfonso
Kipte obtained a P1,200,000.00 loan from petitioner, secured by
a promissory note and a real estate mortgage signed by Avelina
over her properties. The mortgage was annotated on the titles.
The loan was also secured by a surety agreement signed by
Kipte as principal and by Avelina as surety. Due to Kiptes failure
to pay his indebtedness, the mortgaged properties were
foreclosed and auction sale was scheduled. Thus, Avelina and
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respondent Emmanuel Piero filed the complaint with the RTC,
with Avelina denying having signed the documents.

the foreclosure is void since she never voluntarily executed the

mortgage or surety agreement, never appeared before the
notary public, never received any proceeds from the loan, and
was never a business associate of Kipte; Emmanuels common-
law wife, Ludivina Rinnoces, asked Avelina to sign some
documents allegedly pertaining to a loan from one Cerila de
Leon; Avelina signed these documents without reading the
same, as she is blind, and without knowing the contents
thereof; allegedly to pay the account to Cerila; again, Avelina
was not able to read or know the contents of these documents.

ISSUE: Whether opinion of expert witness necessary?

HELD: NO!! Expert Witnesses; Blindness; The rule of evidence
requiring the opinion of expert witnesses applies only to such
matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not
to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind
which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts; To
prove whether one is blind, it is not necessary to submit a
medical certificate attesting to the blindness or to require an
expert witness, such as an ophthalmologist, to testify to such
fact, since the fact of blindness can be determined through
common knowledge and by anyone with sufficient familiarity of
such fact.The rule of evidence requiring the opinion of expert
witnesses applies only to such matters clearly within the
domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within
the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to
by anyone familiar with the facts. Thus, to prove whether one is
blind, it is not necessary to submit a medical certificate
attesting to the blindness or to require an expert witness, such
as an ophthalmologist, to testify to such fact, since the fact of
blindness can be determined through common knowledge and
by anyone with sufficient familiarity of such fact. In this case,
Avelina, then alive during the trial of the case, categorically
testified and attested to her own blindness, a fact which even
the trial court noted.

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