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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the accused
himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon
which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the
defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence
touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the
material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province,
and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers'
quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087,
was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly
occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along
the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered
by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent
bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door,
and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair.
In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and
window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly
awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?"
He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent
upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very
dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you
enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had
been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted
by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events,
it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it
rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder
who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the
steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the
moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and
ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of
which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was
because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
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The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable terms prior
to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and
acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his
friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibaez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house
to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their
room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and
Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally
wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who
immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the
impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's
warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the
boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his
way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was
being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from
the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple
homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum
penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted
that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception
from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room
had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such
circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having
forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill
the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room,
with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly
justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without
waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his
property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That
there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling
and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or
the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who,
by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts
were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had
known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but
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one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the
alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a
particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus
furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in
those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence;
and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which
he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases
cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham
vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration is
whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination
as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given of these as well
as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting
the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held
criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties
described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of
article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative
enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain
provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the
general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential
requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule,
such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to
commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little
distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not.
Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm
and a disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since,
therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and
since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that
the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does
greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded
from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the
wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article, say
that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do
wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con
malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the
code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included
in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal
responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of
negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of
the code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown
above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
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In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no intention there is no
crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no
act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio
169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of May
31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from the
operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the civil effects
of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can
be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or
ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the
commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted
to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various crimes
and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which
are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave
crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its
minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or negligence shall
incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being
subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or less
than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto
in the degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct
inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice
(criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the word "willful"
as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word
"willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a
little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without
justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or
"causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that
ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English
and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words
indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the
word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and
signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and
cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime that it be
committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally
construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with
the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop,
who supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
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In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In
controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important, not
always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence of
wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal
sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It
is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is
the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by
Legal maxims. The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It
consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does
not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by
me against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs
from civil. So also
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we inculpate or
exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result
of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground,
we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of
excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But
with the return of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his
neighbors does not offend. And
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems another to
deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a
person is made to suffer a punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil
mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of
bad intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its
truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her
immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because first in nature from
which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice
result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no
man"), without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of
necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of
certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these
exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless the intention of
the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and
beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the
rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental
principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law,
and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and
cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to
be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is
Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient
excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act
committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability
provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the
accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs.
Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg.
vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the
question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect
which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent,
criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
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If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which
will justify a killing or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if
without fault or carelessness he does believe them he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he
mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with
reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and
sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a
man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or
carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus
supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no
occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there
cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case where a
man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief,
and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the
attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent
danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be
he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew
the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide
or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption
of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by
law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of
the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious design against
him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such
design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree
of caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart,
Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms and a
pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near
enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant
the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that
the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would
have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man so
attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded a doctrine which
would entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the
cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can
be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here set
out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of his
wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was attending
to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows,
producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the
stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the
floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left
the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon
as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting
from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-
in-law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be
considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances related
in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he
was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the
employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him
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to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was
acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the
sentence to have been proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his
wife who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which
they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the room,
and considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger
his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his assailant was unknown, he
should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he did not
exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly
because the instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of
producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such
strong aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more assailants,
nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower
court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and
that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of
Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of the city,
upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces,
saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two
shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a
different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon
the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the
victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the
place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted
in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal
branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites
of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore,
condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the
accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and
excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the
darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence
supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown
against his window at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is
answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be burned" because of which, and
observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he
fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be
declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of
law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that
there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but
not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months of
prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned,
finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by
threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and family.
(Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck
the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping
room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the
property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to
the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no
more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would
have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty
of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means
adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his
property and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant
acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de
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oficio. So ordered.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.
Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:
The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that, according to the merits of the
case, the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code, was
committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was done without malice
or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could not
warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the person who
assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person
who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable motive.
By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused should be sentenced
to the penalty of one year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties provided in article
61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the costs of both instances, thereby
reversing the judgment appealed from.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
8/23/2017 G.R. No. L-25366
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SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25366 March 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE BUAN, accused-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Felipe C. Magat and Amado D. Dyoco for accused-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
Direct appeal by the accused from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in its Criminal Case No.
5243 (for serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence), overruling a motion to
quash on the ground of double jeopardy.
Stripped to essentials, the case arose in this wise:
The accused was driving a passenger bus of the La Mallorca Company on July 23, 1962, along the MacArthur
Highway in the municipality of Guiguinto, Bulacan. Allegedly because of his negligence and recklessness, the
vehicle driven by him struck and collided with the passenger jeep of Sergio Lumidao, damaging said jeep and
causing it to turn turtle, and injuring its passengers. Six of the latter suffered slight physical injuries requiring medical
attendance for 5 to 9 days: three other riders came out with serious bodily injuries that needed medical attention for
30 to 45 days; while the jeep was damaged to the extent of P1,395.00.
A charge was filed against the accused-appellant, one for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, in the Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto, for which he was tried and acquitted on December 16,
1963. Prior to this acquittal, however, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed in the Court of First Instance the
information in the case now before us, for serious physical injuries, and damage to property through reckless
imprudence. Admittedly, both charges referred to the same highway collision.
When the accused was arraigned in the Court of First Instance, his counsel moved to quash the charges on
the ground that he had already been acquitted of the same offense by the Justice of the Peace Court. The
prosecution opposed the motion and the Court denied the motion quash. Unable to secure reconsideration, the
accused appealed to this Court.
Sole issue before us, therefore, is whether the second case placed the appellant twice in jeopardy for the
same offense, and is barred by the previous acquittal.
We agree with the appellant that the Court below erred in not dismissing the information for "serious physical
injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence," in view of the appellant's previous acquittal by the
Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, for the same imprudence.
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of
criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent
act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act,
not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
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person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into
different crimes and prosecutions. This has been the constant ruling of the Spanish Supreme Court, and is also that
of this Court in its most recent decisions on the matter.
Thus, in People vs. Silva, L-15974, January 30, 1962, where as the result of the same vehicular accident one
man died, two persons were seriously injured while another three suffered only slight physical injuries, we ruled that
the acquittal on a charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, was a bar to another prosecution
for homicide through reckless imprudence. In People vs. Diaz, L-6518, March 30, 1954, the ruling was that the
dismissal by the Municipal Court of a charge of reckless driving barred a second information of damage to property
through reckless imprudence based on the same negligent act of the accused. In People vs, Belga, 100 Phil. 996,
dismissal of an information for physical injuries through needless imprudence as a result of a collision between two
automobiles was declared, to block two other prosecutions, one for damage to property through reckless
imprudence and another for multiple physical injuries arising from the same collision. The same doctrine was
reasserted in Yap vs. Lutero, et al., L-12669, April 30, 1959. In none of the cases cited did the Supreme Court
regard as material that the various offenses charged for the same occurrence were triable in Courts of differing
category, or that the complainants were not the individuals.
As for the Spanish jurisprudence, Cuello Calon, in his Derecho Penal (12th Ed.), Vol. I, p. 439, has this to
say: 1wph1.t
Aun cuando de un solo hecho imprudente se originen males diversos, como el hecho culposo es uno
solo, existe un solo delito de imprudencia. Esta es jurisprudencia constante del Tribunal Supremo. De
acuerdo con esta doctrinael automovilista imprudente que atropella y causa lesiones a dos personas y
ademas daos, no respondera de dos delitos de lesiones y uno de daos por imprudencia, sino de un solo
delito culposo.
The said author cites in support of the text the following decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain (footnotes 2
and 3).
8 octubre 1887, 18 octubre 1927.
Si con el hecho imprudente se causa la muerte de una persona y ademas se ocasionan daos, existe
un solo hecho punible, pues uno solo fue el acto, aun cuando deben apreciarse dos enorden a la
responsabilidad civil, 14 diciembre 1931 si a consecuencia de un solo acto imprudente se produjeron tres
delitos, dos de homicidio y uno de daos, como todos son consecuencia de un solo acto culposo, no cabe
penarlos por separado, 2 abril 1932.
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same
argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. Diaz, supra:
... The prosecution's contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute
the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge
of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant
for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the
defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.
In view of the foregoing, we must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the
Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the
Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same
vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and the Court of First Instance of Bulacan is directed to
quash and dismiss the charge in its Criminal Case No. 5243. No costs. So ordered.
Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., took no part.
8/23/2017 G.R. No. L-25366
8/23/2017 G.R. No. 152133
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FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 152133 February 9, 2006
ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner Rollie Calimutan
prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29 August 2001,1
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, of Masbate, Masbate, in Criminal Case No.
8184, dated 19 November 1998,2 finding petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Information3 filed with the RTC charged petitioner Calimutan with the crime of homicide, allegedly committed as
follows
That on or about February 4, 1996, in the morning thereof, at sitio Capsay, Barangay Panique, Municipality of
Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and throw a stone at PHILIP
CANTRE, hitting him at the back left portion of his body, resulting in laceration of spleen due to impact which caused
his death a day after.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Masbate, Masbate, September 11, 1996.
Accordingly, the RTC issued, on 02 December 1996, a warrant4 for the arrest of petitioner Calimutan. On 09
January 1997, however, he was provisionally released5 after posting sufficient bailbond.6 During the arraignment on
21 May 1997, petitioner Calimutan pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide charged against him.7
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, a Senior
Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); (2) Belen B. Cantre, mother of the victim, Philip
Cantre; and (3) Rene L. Saano, companion of the victim Cantre when the alleged crime took place. Their
testimonies are collectively summarized below.
On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim Cantre and witness Saano, together with two other
companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar in Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate. From the
videoke bar, the victim Cantre and witness Saano proceeded to go home to their respective houses, but along the
way, they crossed paths with petitioner Calimutan and a certain Michael Bulalacao. Victim Cantre was harboring a
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grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as the culprit responsible for throwing stones at the Cantres house
on a previous night. Thus, upon seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly punched him. While Bulalacao ran away,
petitioner Calimutan dashed towards the backs of victim Cantre and witness Saano. Petitioner Calimutan then
picked up a stone, as big as a mans fist, which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at the left side of his back.
When hit by the stone, victim Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back. Witness Saano put himself between
the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan, and attempted to pacify the two, even convincing petitioner Calimutan to
put down another stone he was already holding. He also urged victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan to just go
home. Witness Saano accompanied victim Cantre to the latters house, and on the way, victim Cantre complained
of the pain in the left side of his back hit by the stone. They arrived at the Cantres house at around 12:00 noon, and
witness Saano left victim Cantre to the care of the latters mother, Belen.8
Victim Cantre immediately told his mother, Belen, of the stoning incident involving petitioner Calimutan. He again
complained of backache and also of stomachache, and was unable to eat. By nighttime, victim Cantre was
alternately feeling cold and then warm. He was sweating profusely and his entire body felt numb. His family would
have wanted to bring him to a doctor but they had no vehicle. At around 3:00 a.m. of the following day, 05 February
1996, Belen was wiping his son with a piece of cloth, when victim Cantre asked for some food. He was able to eat a
little, but he also later vomited whatever he ate. For the last time, he complained of backache and stomachache,
and shortly thereafter, he died.9
Right after his death, victim Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer of
Aroroy, Masbate. The Post-Mortem Examination Report10 and Certification of Death,11 issued and signed by Dr.
Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food
poisoning. The body of victim Cantre was subsequently embalmed and buried on 13 February 1996.
Unsatisfied with the findings of Dr. Ulanday, the Cantre family, with the help of the Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de
Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation, requested for an exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre
by the NBI. The exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre was conducted by Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez
on 15 April 1996,12 after which, he reported the following findings
Body; fairly well-preserved with sign of partial autopsy; clad in white Barong Tagalog and blue pants placed inside a
wooden golden-brown coffin and buried in a concrete niche.
Contused-abrasion, 2.3 x 1.0 cms., posterior chest wall, left side.
Hematoma, 16.0 x 8.0 cms., abdomen, along mid-line.
Hemoperitoneum, massive, clotte [sic].
Laceration, spleen.
Other visceral organ, pale and embalmed.
Stomach contains small amount of whitish fluid and other partially digested food particles.
xxxx
CAUSE OF DEATH: TRAUMATIC INJURY OF THE ABDOMEN.
In his testimony before the RTC, Dr. Mendez affirmed the contents of his exhumation and autopsy report. He
explained that the victim Cantre suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was massive accumulation of blood
in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen. The laceration of the spleen can be caused by any blunt
instrument, such as a stone. Hence, Dr. Mendez confirmed the possibility that the victim Cantre was stoned to death
by petitioner Calimutan.13
To counter the evidence of the prosecution, the defense presented the sole testimony of the accused, herein
petitioner, Calimutan.
According to petitioner Calimutan, at about 1:00 p.m. on 04 February 1996, he was walking with his house helper,
Michael Bulalacao, on their way to Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate, when they met with the victim
Cantre and witness Saano. The victim Cantre took hold of Bulalacao and punched him several times. Petitioner
Calimutan attempted to pacify the victim Cantre but the latter refused to calm down, pulling out from his waist an
eight-inch Batangas knife and uttering that he was looking for trouble, either "to kill or be killed." At this point,
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petitioner Calimutan was about ten meters away from the victim Cantre and was too frightened to move any closer
for fear that the enraged man would turn on him; he still had a family to take care of. When he saw that the victim
Cantre was about to stab Bulalacao, petitioner Calimutan picked up a stone, which he described as approximately
one-inch in diameter, and threw it at the victim Cantre. He was able to hit the victim Cantre on his right buttock.
Petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao then started to run away, and victim Cantre chased after them, but witness
Saano was able to pacify the victim Cantre. Petitioner Calimutan allegedly reported the incident to a kagawad of
Barangay Panique and to the police authorities and sought their help in settling the dispute between Bulalacao and
the victim Cantre. Bulalacao, meanwhile, refused to seek medical help despite the advice of petitioner Calimutan
and, instead, chose to go back to his hometown.14
Petitioner Calimutan was totally unaware of what had happened to the victim Cantre after the stoning incident on 04
February 1996. Some of his friends told him that they still saw the victim Cantre drinking at a videoke bar on the
night of 04 February 1996. As far as he knew, the victim Cantre died the following day, on 05 February 1996,
because of food poisoning. Petitioner Calimutan maintained that he had no personal grudge against the victim
Cantre previous to the stoning incident.15
On 19 November 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision,16 essentially adopting the prosecutions account of the
incident on 04 February 1996, and pronouncing that
It cannot be legally contended that the throwing of the stone by the accused was in defense of his companion, a
stranger, because after the boxing Michael was able to run. While it appears that the victim was the unlawful
aggressor at the beginning, but the aggression already ceased after Michael was able to run and there was no more
need for throwing a stone. The throwing of the stone to the victim which was a retaliatory act can be considered
unlawful, hence the accused can be held criminally liable under paragraph 1 of Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on the left side was a treacherous one and
the accused committed a felony causing physical injuries to the victim. The physical injury of hematoma as a result
of the impact of the stone resulted in the laceration of the spleen causing the death of the victim. The accused is
criminally liable for all the direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate result had not
been intended. (Art. 4, Par. 1, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Narciso, CA-G.R. No. 03532-CR, Jan. 13, 1964)
One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural consequences of ones illegal acts merely because one does
not intend to produce such consequences (U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310).
The crime committed is Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that accused ROLLIE CALIMUTAN is GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code with no mitigating
or aggravating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby imposes the penalty of
imprisonment from EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision Mayor as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Philip Cantre the sum of Fifty Thousand
(50,000.00) Pesos as compensatory damages and the sum of Fifty Thousand (50,000.00) Pesos as moral
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Petitioner Calimutan appealed the Decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its
Decision, dated 29 August 2001,17 sustained the conviction of homicide rendered by the RTC against petitioner
Calimutan, ratiocinating thus
The prosecution has sufficiently established that the serious internal injury sustained by the victim was caused by
the stone thrown at the victim by the accused which, the accused-appellant does not deny. It was likewise shown
that the internal injury sustained by the victim was the result of the impact of the stone that hit the victim. It resulted
to a traumatic injury of the abdomen causing the laceration of the victims spleen.
This is clearly shown by the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, a Senior Medico Legal Officer of the
NBI after the exhumation of the victims cadaver
The Court cannot give credence to the post mortem report prepared by Municipal Health Officer Dr. Conchita
Ulanday stating that the cause of the victims death was food poisoning. Dr. Ulanday was not even presented to
testify in court hence she was not even able to identify and/or affirm the contents of her report. She was not made
available for cross-examination on the accuracy and correctness of her findings.
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Dr. Conchita Ulandays post mortem report cannot prevail over the autopsy report (Exh. "C") of the Medico-Legal
Officer of the NBI who testified and was cross-examined by the defense.
Besides, if accused-appellant was convinced that the victim indeed died of food poisoning, as reported by Dr.
Conchita Ulanday, why did they not present her as their witness to belie the report of the Medico-Legal Officer of the
NBI.
The trial courts evaluation of the testimony of Dr. Mendez is accorded the highest respect because it had the
opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of said witness.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Branch 46, finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution, dated 15 January 2002,18 denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner Calimutan for lack of merit since the issues raised therein had already been passed and ruled upon in its
Decision, dated 29 August 2001.
Comes now petitioner Calimutan, by way of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking (1) the reversal of
the Decisions of the RTC, dated 19 November 1998, and of the Court of Appeals, dated 29 August 2001, convicting
him of the crime of homicide; and, (2) consequently, his acquittal of the said crime based on reasonable doubt.
Petitioner Calimutan contended that the existence of the two autopsy reports, with dissimilar findings on the cause
of death of the victim Cantre, constituted reasonable doubt as to the liability of petitioner Calimutan for the said
death, arguing that
x x x [I]t was Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate was the first physician of the
government who conducted an examination on the cadaver of the victim Philip Cantre whose findings was that the
cause of his death was due to food poisoning while the second government physician NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr.
Ronaldo Mendez whose findings was that the cause of the death was due to a traumatic injury of the abdomen
caused by a lacerated spleen and with these findings of two (2) government physicians whose findings are at
variance with each other materially, it is humbly contended that the same issue raised a reasonable doubt on the
culpability of the petitioner.
As there are improbabilities and uncertainties of the evidence for the prosecution in the case at bar, it suffices to
reaise [sic] reasonable doubt as to the petitioners guilt and therefore, he is entitled to acquittal (People vs.
Delmendo, G.R. No. 32146, November 23, 1981).19
In this jurisdiction, an accused in a criminal case may only be convicted if his or her guilt is established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it does not demand absolute certainty and the exclusion of all
possibility of error.20
In the Petition at bar, this Court finds that there is proof beyond reasonable doubt to hold petitioner Calimutan liable
for the death of the victim Cantre.
Undoubtedly, the exhumation and autopsy report and the personal testimony before the RTC of prosecution witness,
NBI Senior Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Mendez, are vital pieces of evidence against petitioner Calimutan. Dr. Mendez
determined that the victim Cantre died of internal hemorrhage or bleeding due to the laceration of his spleen. In his
testimony, Dr. Mendez clearly and consistently explained that the spleen could be lacerated or ruptured when the
abdominal area was hit with a blunt object, such as the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre.
It bears to emphasize that Dr. Mendez was presented by the prosecution as an expert witness, whose "competency
and academic qualification and background" was admitted by the defense itself.21 As a Senior Medico-Legal
Officer of the NBI, Dr. Mendez is presumed to possess sufficient knowledge of pathology, surgery, gynecology,
toxicology, and such other branches of medicine germane to the issues involved in a case.22
Dr. Mendezs testimony as an expert witness is evidence,23 and although it does not necessarily bind the courts,
both the RTC and the Court of Appeals had properly accorded it great weight and probative value. Having testified
as to matters undeniably within his area of expertise, and having performed a thorough autopsy on the body of the
victim Cantre, his findings as to the cause of death of the victim Cantre are more than just the mere speculations of
an ordinary person. They may sufficiently establish the causal relationship between the stone thrown by the
8/23/2017 G.R. No. 152133
petitioner Calimutan and the lacerated spleen of the victim Cantre which, subsequently, resulted in the latters death.
With no apparent mistake or irregularity, whether in the manner by which Dr. Mendez performed the autopsy on the
body of the victim Cantre or in his findings, then his report and testimony must be seriously considered by this Court.
Moreover, reference to other resource materials on abdominal injuries would also support the conclusion of Dr.
Mendez that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan caused the death of the victim Cantre.
One source explains the nature of abdominal injuries24 in the following manner
The skin may remain unmarked inspite of extensive internal injuries with bleeding and disruption of the internal
organs. The areas most vulnerable are the point of attachment of internal organs, especially at the source of its
blood supply and at the point where blood vessels change direction.
The area in the middle superior half of the abdomen, forming a triangle bounded by the ribs on the two sides and a
line drawn horizontally through the umbilicus forming its base is vulnerable to trauma applied from any direction.
In this triangle are found several blood vessels changing direction, particularly the celiac trunk, its branches (the
hepatic, splenic and gastric arteries) as well as the accompanying veins. The loop of the duodenum, the ligament
of Treitz and the pancreas are in the retroperitoneal space, and the stomach and transverse colon are in the
triangle, located in the peritoneal cavity. Compression or blow on the area may cause detachment, laceration,
stretch-stress, contusion of the organs (Legal Medicine 1980, Cyril H. Wecht et., p. 41).
As to injuries to the spleen, in particular,25 the same source expounds that
The spleen usually suffers traumatic rupture resulting from the impact of a fall or blow from the crushing and
grinding effects of wheels of motor vehicles. Although the organ is protected at its upper portion by the ribs and also
by the air-containing visceral organs, yet on account of its superficiality and fragility, it is usually affected by
trauma. x x x.
Certainly, there are some terms in the above-quoted paragraphs difficult to comprehend for people without medical
backgrounds. Nevertheless, there are some points that can be plainly derived therefrom: (1) Contrary to common
perception, the abdominal area is more than just the waist area. The entire abdominal area is divided into different
triangles, and the spleen is located in the upper triangle, bounded by the rib cage; (2) The spleen and all internal
organs in the same triangle are vulnerable to trauma from all directions. Therefore, the stone need not hit the
victim Cantre from the front. Even impact from a stone hitting the back of the victim Cantre, in the area of the afore-
mentioned triangle, could rupture the spleen; and (3) Although the spleen had already been ruptured or lacerated,
there may not always be a perceptible external injury to the victim. Injury to the spleen cannot, at all times, be
attributed to an obvious, external injury such as a cut or bruise. The laceration of the victim Cantres spleen can be
caused by a stone thrown hard enough, which qualifies as a nonpenetrating trauma26
Nonpenetrating Trauma. The spleen, alone or in combination with other viscera, is the most frequently injured
organ following blunt trauma to the abdomen or the lower thoracic cage. Automobile accidents provide the
predominating cause, while falls, sledding and bicycle injuries, and blows incurred during contact sports are
frequently implicated in children. x x x
The sheer impact of the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim Cantre could rupture or
lacerate the spleen an organ described as vulnerable, superficial, and fragile even without causing any other
external physical injury. Accordingly, the findings of Dr. Mendez that the victim Cantre died of internal hemorrhage
from his lacerated spleen, and the cause of the laceration of the spleen was the stone thrown by petitioner
Calimutan at the back of the victim Cantre, does not necessarily contradict his testimony before the RTC that none
of the external injuries of the victim Cantre were fatal.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the prosecution was able to establish that the proximate cause of the death of
the victim Cantre was the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan. Proximate cause has been defined as "that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred."27
The two other witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely Saano and Belen Cantre, had adequately
recounted the events that transpired on 04 February 1996 to 05 February 1996. Between the two of them, the said
witnesses accounted for the whereabouts, actions, and physical condition of the victim Cantre during the said
period. Before the encounter with petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao, the victim Cantre seemed to be physically
fine. However, after being hit at the back by the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, the victim Cantre had
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continuously complained of backache. Subsequently, his physical condition rapidly deteriorated, until finally, he died.
Other than being stoned by petitioner Calimutan, there was no other instance when the victim Cantre may have
been hit by another blunt instrument which could have caused the laceration of his spleen.
Hence, this Court is morally persuaded that the victim Cantre died from a lacerated spleen, an injury sustained after
being hit by a stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan. Not even the post-mortem report of Dr. Ulanday, the
Municipal Health Officer who first examined the body of the victim Cantre, can raise reasonable doubt as to the
cause of death of the victim Cantre. Invoking Dr. Ulandays post-mortem report, the defense insisted on the
possibility that the victim Cantre died of food poisoning. The post-mortem report, though, cannot be given much
weight and probative value for the following reasons
First, a closer scrutiny of the words used by Dr. Ulanday in her post-mortem report, as well as in the death certificate
of the victim Cantre, reveals that although she suspected food poisoning as the cause of death, she held back from
making a categorical statement that it was so. In the post-mortem report, 28 she found that "x x x the provable (sic)
cause of death was due to cardio-respiratory arrest. Food poisoning must be confirm (sic) by laboratory e(x)am." In
the death certificate of the victim Cantre, 29 she wrote that the immediate cause of death was "Cardio-Respiratory
Arrest" and the antecedent cause was "Food Poisoning Suspect." There was no showing that further laboratory
tests were indeed conducted to confirm Dr. Ulandays suspicion that the victim Cantre suffered from food poisoning,
and without such confirmation, her suspicion as to the cause of death remains just that a suspicion.
Second, Dr. Ulanday executed before the NBI a sworn statement30 in which she had explained her findings in the
post-mortem report, to wit
05. Q: Did you conduct an autopsy on his cadaver?
A: I did sir, but not as exhaustive as that done by the NBI Medico-legal.
06. Q: Now, what do you want to state regarding your certification on the death of PHILIP B. CANTRE?
A: I stated in the certification and even in the Death Certificate about "Food Poisoning". What I stated in the Death
Certificate was that CANTRE was a SUSPECTED victim of food poisoning. I didnt state that he was a case of food
poisoning. And in the Certification, I even recommended that an examination be done to confirm that suspicion.
07. Q: What gave you that suspicion of poisoning?
A: As there were no external signs of fatal injuries except that of the contusion or abrasion, measuring as that size of
a 25 centavo coin, I based my suspicion from the history of the victim and from the police investigation.
08. Q: You also mentioned in your Certification that there was no internal hemorrhage in the cadaver. Did you open
the body of the cadaver?
A: As I have already stated sir, I did not conduct an exhaustive autopsy. I made an incision on the abdomen and I
explored the internal organs of the cadaver with my hand in search for any clotting inside. But I found none. I did not
open the body of the cadaver.
09. Q: You mentioned about a contusion you have observed on the cadaver. Where was it located?
A: On the left portion of his back, sir.
10. Q: Now, is it possible that if somebody be hit by a hard object on that part of his body, his SPLEEN could be
injured?
A: Yes, sir. But that would depend on how strong or forceful the impact was.
In contrast, Dr. Mendez described in his testimony before the RTC31 how he conducted the autopsy of the body of
the victim Cantre, as follows
Q What specific procedure did you do in connection with the exhumation of the body of the victim in this case?
A We opened the head, chest and the abdomen.
Q That was part of the autopsy you have conducted?
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A Yes, sir.
Q Aside from opening the head as well as the body of the victim Philip Cantre, what other matters did you do in
connection therewith?
A We examined the internal organs.
Q What in particular internal organs you have examined?
A The brain, the heart, the lungs, the liver, the kidneys, the pancreas plus the intestines.
xxxx
Q The cause of death as you have listed here in your findings is listed as traumatic injury of the abdomen, will you
kindly tell us Doctor what is the significance of this medical term traumatic injury of the abdomen?
A We, medico-legal officers of the NBI dont do what other doctors do as they make causes of death as internal
hemorrhage we particularly point to the injury of the body like this particular case the injury was at the abdomen of
the victim.
Q Will you tell as Doctor what particular portion of the abdomen of the victim this traumatic injury is located?
A Along the midline but the damaged organ was at the left.
Q What particular organ are you referring to?
A The spleen, sir.
The difference in the extent of the examinations conducted by the two doctors of the body of the victim Cantre
provides an adequate explanation for their apparent inconsistent findings as to the cause of death. Comparing the
limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her unconfirmed suspicion of food poisoning of the victim Cantre, as
opposed to the exhaustive autopsy performed by Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a ruptured spleen as the
cause of death of the victim Cantre, then the latter, without doubt, deserves to be given credence by the courts.
Third, that the prosecution no longer presented Dr. Ulanday before the RTC despite being included in its list of
witnesses did not amount to a willful suppression of evidence that would give rise to the presumption that her
testimony would be adverse to the prosecution if produced.32 As this Court already expounded in the case of
People v. Jumamoy33
The prosecution's failure to present the other witnesses listed in the information did not constitute, contrary to the
contention of the accused, suppression of evidence. The prosecutor has the exclusive prerogative to determine the
witnesses to be presented for the prosecution. If the prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case,
the prosecutor need not present all of them but only as many as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof
necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses
may, therefore, be dispensed with for being merely corroborative in nature. This Court has ruled that the non-
presentation of corroborative witnesses would not constitute suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the
prosecution's case. Besides, there is no showing that the eyewitnesses who were not presented in court as
witnesses were not available to the accused. We reiterate the rule that the adverse presumption from a suppression
of evidence is not applicable when (1) the suppression is not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is
merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4) the suppression is an
exercise of a privilege. Moreover, if the accused believed that the failure to present the other witnesses was
because their testimonies would be unfavorable to the prosecution, he should have compelled their appearance, by
compulsory process, to testify as his own witnesses or even as hostile witnesses.
It was a judgment call for the prosecution to no longer present Dr. Ulanday before the RTC, perhaps believing that it
had already presented sufficient evidence to merit the conviction of petitioner Calimutan even without her testimony.
There was nothing, however, preventing the defense from calling on, or even compelling, with the appropriate court
processes, Dr. Ulanday to testify in court as its witness if it truly believed that her testimony would be adverse to the
case presented by the prosecution.
While this Court is in accord with the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals and affirms that there is
ample evidence proving that the death of the victim Cantre was caused by his lacerated spleen, an injury which
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resulted from being hit by the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, this Court, nonetheless, is at variance
with the RTC and the Court of Appeals as to the determination of the appropriate crime or offense for which the
petitioner should have been convicted for.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which they are committed, in
particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. These two types of felonies are distinguished from each
other by the existence or absence of malicious intent of the offender
In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the language of Art. 3, the act is performed
with deliberate intent (with malice). The offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention
to cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender is not malicious. The injury
caused by the offender to another person is "unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed
without malice." (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.34
In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to petitioner Calimutan any malicious intent to
injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent, this Court cannot sustain the conviction
of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide, as rendered by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Instead, this Court finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides for the definition of reckless imprudence
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform
such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and
other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
There are several circumstances, discussed in the succeeding paragraphs, that demonstrate petitioner Calimutans
lack of intent to kill the victim Cantre, and conversely, that substantiate the view of this Court that the death of victim
Cantre was a result of petitioner Calimutans reckless imprudence. The RTC and the Court of Appeals may have
failed to appreciate, or had completely overlooked, the significance of such circumstances.
It should be remembered that the meeting of the victim Cantre and witness Saano, on the one hand, and petitioner
Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao, on the other, was a chance encounter as the two parties were on their way to
different destinations. The victim Cantre and witness Saano were on their way home from a drinking spree in
Crossing Capsay, while petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao were walking from the market to Crossing
Capsay. While the evidence on record suggests that a running grudge existed between the victim Cantre and
Bulalacao, it did not establish that there was likewise an existing animosity between the victim Cantre and petitioner
Calimutan. 1avvphil.net
In both versions of the events of 04 February 1996 submitted by the prosecution and the defense, it was the victim
Cantre who was the initial aggressor. He suddenly punched Bulalacao, the helper and companion of petitioner
Calimutan, when they met on the road. The attack of the victim Cantre was swift and unprovoked, which spurred
petitioner Calimutan into responsive action. Given that this Court dismisses the claim of petitioner Calimutan that the
victim Cantre was holding a knife, it does take into account that the victim Cantre was considerably older and bigger,
at 26 years of age and with a height of five feet and nine inches, compared to Bulalacao, the boy he attacked, who
was only 15 years old and stood at about five feet. Even with his bare hands, the victim Cantre could have hurt
Bulalacao. Petitioner Calimutan sought only to protect Bulalacao and to stop the assault of the victim Cantre against
the latter when he picked up a stone and threw it at the victim Cantre. The stone was readily available as a weapon
to petitioner Calimutan since the incident took place on a road. That he threw the stone at the back of the victim
Cantre does not automatically imply treachery on the part of petitioner Calimutan as it is highly probable that in the
midst of the fray, he threw the stone rashly and impulsively, with no regard as to the position of the victim Cantre.
When the victim Cantre stopped his aggression after being hit by the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan, the latter
also desisted from any other act of violence against the victim Cantre.
The above-described incident could not have taken more than just a few minutes. It was a very brief scuffle, in which
the parties involved would hardly have the time to ponder upon the most appropriate course of action to take. With
this in mind, this Court cannot concur in the declaration made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner Calimutan
threw the stone at the victim Cantre as a retaliatory act. It was evidently a swift and spontaneous reaction to an
unexpected and unprovoked attack by the victim Cantre on Bulalacao. That Bulalacao was already able to run away
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from the victim Cantre may have escaped the notice of the petitioner Calimutan who, under the pressure of the
circumstances, was forced to act as quickly as possible.
The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre with the specific
intent of killing, or at the very least, of harming the victim Cantre. What is obvious to this Court was petitioner
Calimutans intention to drive away the attacker who was, at that point, the victim Cantre, and to protect his helper
Bulalacao who was, as earlier described, much younger and smaller in built than the victim Cantre.35
Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled by a lawful objective when he threw the stone at the victim Cantre,
his act was committed with inexcusable lack of precaution. He failed to consider that a stone the size of a mans fist
could inflict substantial injury on someone. He also miscalculated his own strength, perhaps unaware, or even
completely disbelieving, that he could throw a stone with such force as to seriously injure, or worse, kill someone, at
a quite lengthy distance of ten meters.
Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre was the proximate cause of
the latters death, despite being done with reckless imprudence rather than with malicious intent, petitioner
Calimutan remains civilly liable for such death. This Court, therefore, retains the reward made by the RTC and the
Court of Appeals to the heirs of the victim Cantre of the amount of 50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death and
another 50,000.00 as moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29 August 2001,
affirming the Decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998, is hereby MODIFIED.
Petitioner Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and is accordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period of 4
months of arresto mayor to a maximum period of two years and one day of prision correccional. Petitioner
Calimutan is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre the amount of 50,000.00 as civil indemnity for
the latters death and 50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona with Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Eloy R.
Bello, Jr., concurring; Rollo, pp. 21-26.
2 Penned by Judge Narciso G. Bravo, Id., pp. 27-31.
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3 RTC Records, p. 1.
4 Id., p. 18.
5 Order of Release, penned by Judge Designate Silvestre L. Aguirre, Id., p. 38.
6 Bailbond, Id., pp. 32-35.
7 Certificate of Arraignment, Id., p. 46.
8 TSN, 15 January 1998, pp. 1-13.
9 TSN, 16 January 1998, pp. 1-8.
10 RTC records, p. 12.
11 Id., p. 11.
12 Id., pp. 13-14.
13 TSN, 23 September 1997, pp. 1-16.
14 TSN, 17 March 1998, pp. 1-18.
15 Id.
16 Rollo, pp. 30-31.
17 Id., p. 25.
18 Id., p. 35.
19 Id., p. 17.
20 Revised Rules of Court, Rule 133, Section 2.
21 TSN, 23 September 1993, p. 2.
22 Pedro P. Solis, LEGAL MEDICINE, p. 2 (1987).
23 REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Section 49.
24 Supra note 22, p. 317.
25 Id., p. 319.
26 II Seymour I. Schwartz, et al., PRINCIPLES OF SURGERY, p. 1377 (4th ed., 1984).
27 Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186 (1957).
28 RTC records, p. 12.
29 Id., p. 11.
30 Id., p. 10.
31 TSN, 23 September 1997, pp. 5-9.
32 Revised Rules of Court, Rule 131, Section 3(e).
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33 G.R. No. 101584, 07 April 1993, 221 SCRA 333, 344-345.
34 I Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, pp. 33-34 (13th Ed., 1993).
35 In the following cases, the accused were convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, rather
than murder or homicide, for they were found to have acted without criminal intent: (1) The accused, a faith
healer, who caused the death of a boy after she immersed the boy in a drum of water, banged the boys head
against a wooden bench, pounded the boys chest with clenched fists, and stabbed the boy to collect his
blood. The boy was allegedly possessed by an evil spirit which the accused was merely attempting to drive
out (People v. Carmen, G.R. No. 137268, 26 March 2001, 355 SCRA 267); (2) The accused shot his gun at
the ground to stop a fist fight, and when the bullet ricocheted, it hit and killed a bystander (People v. Nocum,
77 Phil. 1018 [1947]); (3) The accused carried a gun to shoot birds, when the victim attempted to wrest
possession thereof. The gun went off, hitting and killing the victim (People v. Sara, 55 Phil 939 [1931]); and
(4) While hunting, the accused shot at and killed what he thought was a prey, but who turned out to be one of
his companions (People v. Ramirez, 48 Phil 204 [1926]).
8/23/2017 G.R. No. L-66884
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SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66884 May 28, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VICENTE TEMBLOR alias "RONALD," defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Wilfred D. Asis for defendant-appellant.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The accused-appellant Vicente Temblor alias "Ronald" was charged with the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 1809 of the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City for shooting to death Julius Cagampang. The information alleged:
That on or about the evening of December 30, 1980 at Talo-ao, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused conspiring, and
confederating with one another with Anecito Ellevera who is at large, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and with intent to kill, attack, assault and shoot with firearms
one Julius Cagampang, hitting the latter on the vital parts of the body thereby inflicting mortal wounds,
causing the direct and instantaneous death of the said Julius Cagampang.
CONTRARY TO LAW: Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Upon arraignment on June 8, 1982, he entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, he was convicted and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties thereof under Articles 41 and 42 of the
Revised Penal Code, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. He appealed.
The evidence of the prosecution showed that at about 7:30 in the evening of December 30, 1980, while
Cagampang, his wife and their two children, were conversing in the store adjacent to their house in Barangay Talo-
ao, Buenavista, Province of Agusan del Norte, the accused Vicente Temblor alias Ronald, arrived and asked to buy
a half-pack of Hope cigarettes. While Cagampang was opening a pack of cigarettes, there was a sudden burst of
gunfire and Cagampang instantly fell on the floor, wounded and bleeding on the head. His wife Victorina, upon
seeing that her husband had been shot, shouted her husband's name "Jul" Two persons, one of whom she later
Identified as the accused, barged into the interior of the store through the main door and demanded that she brings
out her husband's firearm. "Igawas mo ang iyang armas!" ("You let out his firearm!") they shouted. The accused
fired two more shots at the fallen victim. Terrified, Victorina hurried to get the "maleta" (suitcase) where her
husband's firearm was hidden. She gave the suitcase to the accused who, after inspecting its contents, took her
husband's .38 caliber revolver, and fled.
In 1981, some months after the incident, Victorina was summoned to the Buenavista police station by the Station
Commander Milan, where she saw and Identified the accused as the man who killed her husband.
The accused's defense was an alibi. He alleged that from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 30, 1980, he
and his father had been in the house of Silverio Perol in Barangay Camagong, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, where
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/may1988/gr_l_66884_1988.html 1/3
8/23/2017 G.R. No. L-66884
they spent the night drinking over a slaughtered dog as "pulutan," until 8:00 o'clock in the morning of the following
day, December 31, 1980.
The accused and his companion, admittedly members of the dreaded NPA (New People's Army) were not
apprehended earlier because they hid in the mountains of Malapong with other members- followers of the New
People's Army. Temblor surrendered to Mayor Dick Carmona of Nasipit during the mass surrender of dissidents in
August, 1981. He was arrested by the Buenavista Police at the Buenavista public market on November 26, 1981
and detained at the Buenavista municipal jail.
The accused capitalized the fact that the victim's widow, Victorina, did not know him by name. That circumstance
allegedly renders the Identification of the accused, as the perpetrator of her husband's killing, insufficient. However,
during the trial, the accused was positively identified by the widow who recognized him because she was less than a
meter away from him inside the store which was well lighted inside by a 40-watt flourescent lamp and by an
incandescent lamp outside. Her testimony was corroborated by another prosecution witness a tricycle driver,
Claudio Sabanal who was a long-time acquaintance of the accused and who knew him as "Ronald." He saw the
accused in the store of Cagampang at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of December 30, 1980. He heard the
gunshots coming from inside the store, and saw the people scampering away.
Dr. Alfredo Salonga who issued the post-mortem examination report certified that the victim sustained three (3)
gunshot wounds.
Rebutting the accused's alibi, the prosecution presented a Certification of the Nasipit Lumber Company's Personnel
Officer, Jose F. Tinga (Exh. D), and the NALCO Daily Time Record of Silverio Perol (Exh. D), showing that Perol was
not at home drinking with the accused and his father, but was at work on December 30, 1980 from 10:50 o'clock in
the evening up to 7:00 o'clock in the morning of December 31, 1980. The accused did not bother to overcome this
piece of rebuttal evidence.
In this appeal, the appellant alleges that the court a quo erred:
1. in finding that he was positively identified by the prosecution witness as the killer of the deceased
Julius Cagampang; and
2. in rejecting his defense of allbi.
The appeal deserves no merit. Was the accused positively Identified as the killer of Cagampang? The settled rule is
that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is generally binding on the appellate
court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor and its findings, when supported
by convincingly credible evidence as in the case at bar, shall not be disturbed on appeal (People vs. Dava, 149
SCRA, 582). <re||an1w>
The minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the eyewitness Victorina Vda. de Cagampang did not diminish her
credibility, especially because she had positively Identified the accused as her husband's assailant, and her
testimony is corroborated by the other witnesses. Her testimony is credible, probable and entirely in accord with
human experience.
Appellant's self-serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot prevail over the positive Identification made by the
prosecution witnesses who had no base motives to falsely accuse him of the crime. Furthermore, the rule is that in
order for an alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it is not enough that the appellant was somewhere else when the
crime was committed; it must be demonstrated beyond doubt that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime. Here it was admitted that Perol's house in barrio Camagong, Nasipit is accessible to barrio Talo-
ao in Buenavista by jeep or tricycle via a well-paved road in a matter of 15 to 20 minutes. The testimony of the
witnesses who had positively Identified him could not be overcome by the defendant's alibi. (People vs. Mercado, 97
SCRA 232; People vs. Venancio Ramilo, 146 SCRA 258.)
Appellant's alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang was rejected by the trial court which opined that the
defendant's knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm was motive enough to kill him as killings perpetrated
by members of the New People's Army for the sole purpose of acquiring more arms and ammunition for their group
are prevalent not only in Agusan del Norte but elsewhere in the country. It is known as the NPA's "agaw armas"
campaign. Moreover, proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has been positively Identified (People vs. Tan,
Jr., 145 SCRA 615).
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The records further show that the accused and his companion fled after killing Cagampang and taking his firearm.
They hid in the mountains of Agusan del Norte. Their flight was an implied admission of guilt (People vs. Dante
Astor, 149 SCRA 325; People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 422).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all respects, except as to the civil indemnity payable to
the heirs of the Julius Cagampang which is increased to P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
8/23/2017 Guiyab vs People : 152527 : October 20, 2005 : J. Quisumbing : First Division : Decision
FIRST DIVISION
JOEY GUIYAB y DANAO, G.R. No. 152527

Petitioner,
Present:
Davide Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman),
Quisumbing,
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondent.
October 20, 2005
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
[1]
This petition for review seeks to set aside the Decision dated September 27, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23703, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22,
Cabagan, Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 22-1074, convicting Joey Guiyab of Homicide, and the
[2]
Resolution dated February 26, 2002 denying his motion for reconsideration.
On March 11, 1993, petitioner Joey Guiyab was charged with Homicide before the Regional Trial
Court of Cabagan. The Information reads:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1992, in the [M]unicipality of Tumauini, [P]rovince of
Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and without any just motive, assault, attack and stab
with a bladed pointed instrument one Rafael Bacani, inflicting upon him, a stab wound on the right anterior
back wall, which directly caused his death.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/152527.htm 1/7
[3]
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits
ensued.
Prosecution witness JOSEPH MADRIAGA testified that on December 12, 1992 at about 9:00 p.m.,
while the victim Rafael Bacani and he were conversing in front of the Community Center in Tumauini, a
certain Juan Sanchez approached and kicked them. As they posed for a fist fight, petitioner Joey Guiyab
uttered Pureban nu ta inanna nu (You try and you will see.) while brandishing a knife. He recalled that he
retreated and jumped over the fence. He then picked up a stone, grabbed Juan Sanchez by the hair and
struck him in the head. It was then that petitioner chased him. Failing to catch him, petitioner turned to
Rafael who was following them. Petitioner stabbed Rafael once on the right chest. Rafael ran a few meters
before he fell. Joseph and Rafaels brother, Bong Matias, brought the victim to the hospital.
DR. ERASMO A. CRUZ, the resident physician of Isabela Integrated Provincial Health Office
(otherwise known as the Isabela Provincial Hospital), testified that at around 10:45 in the evening of
December 12, 1992, he attended to Rafael Bacani. Rafael had a 1.5 centimeter stab wound located on the
fourth interpostal state (middle part of the chest above the nipple). The victim died, according to the
medical certificate, of cardiorespiratory arrest, the antecedent cause of which is hypovolemic shock and
the underlying cause is the stab wound at the anterior chest. He died at about 6:25 a.m. the next day.
VISITACION MATIAS VDA. DE BACANI, the victims mother, testified that she spent P10,000 for
the medical expenses, P18,000 for the coffin and P30,000 for the other funeral expenses.
For his part, petitioner raised the defense of alibi. JOEY GUIYAB testified that he was not at
Tumauini Cultural and Sports Center at the time the incident happened. He averred that he was farming
until 5:00 p.m. at Sitio Bayabo, Camasi, and slept at around 9:00 p.m. in their house at Sitio Bayabo. His
testimony was corroborated by Domingo Gumaru, and petitioners parents, Silvino and Vicenta Guiyab.
DOMINGO GUMARU, petitioners neighbor, testified that he saw the petitioner at Sitio Bayabo at
6:00 p.m. on December 12, 1992 and again at 8:00 a.m. of December 13, 1992. He also testified that to go
to the Centro (the town center of Tumauini) from Camasi, one has to go to Cumabao and take a jeep there
to the Centro. In 1992, there were only three passenger vehicles plying Cumabao to Centro and the last trip
was at around 4:00 p.m.
As rebuttal, the prosecution presented SP04 ROMEO TUMOLVA who swore that he personally
knows the petitioner as he is a compadre of the petitioners parents. He testified seeing the petitioner along
the fenced area of the Community Center at the night of the incident.
[4]
On July 7, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment finding the accused Joey Guiyab GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of prision mayor medium to reclusion
temporal minimum or from eight (8) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, to pay
the Heirs of Rafael Bacani P50,000.00 as death indemnity, plus P30,000.00 for actual damages and
P18,000.00 for funeral expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Costs de officio.
[5]
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision
and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner now comes before us raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE GUILT OF THE PETITIONER WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT TO CONVICT HIM OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSED AS THE ASSAILANT WAS FULLY
[6]
ESTABLISHED BY THE PROSECUTION.
The core issue of the present case is whether the guilt of the petitioner was established beyond
reasonable doubt. We must likewise inquire as to whether the petitioner was adequately identified.
Petitioner claims that the real identity of the assailant was not fully established by the prosecution
since the lone eyewitness learned the name of the petitioner only after it was fed to him by Police Officer
Armando Lugo. Petitioner contends that the identification of the petitioner was tainted with conjecture and
speculation.
The Solicitor General counters that Joseph Madriaga witnessed the whole incident and positively
identified the petitioner. This is sufficient to convict petitioner.
We have carefully examined the records and find nothing in them that supports petitioners claim that
his identification was tainted with conjectures and speculation. Our review of the transcript shows that
Joseph Madriaga testified in a categorical and straightforward manner on the events leading to the death of
Rafael Bacani. We quote:
Q: Do you know Joey Guiyab?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Tell the Court why you know him?
A: I know him to be a resident of San Vicente and I often see his face.
Q: If Joey Guiyab is in Court, could you point him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please point to him.
Court Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a person who when asked gave his name as Joey Guiyab.
...
Q: After Juan Sanchez hit you with (sic) Rafael Bacani with one single kick, what did you do?
A: Because we were surprised by the kick of Juan Sanchez we acted by preparing our fists to fight back but this Joey
Guiyab took his knife and said in the Ibanag dialect Pureban nu ta inanna nu which means you try and you
will see.
Q: After Joey Guiyab brought out a knife and said to you, you try and you will see, what happened next?
A: I moved back and jumped over the fence.
Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court why you jumped over the fence?
A: Because Joey Guiyab is trying to attack me with his balisong.
Q: While (sic) you jumped over the fence what happened next?
A: After jumping over the fence, I picked up a stone and when I saw Juan Sanchez I hit him with a stone.
Q: When you went over that fence, where was Rafael Bacani?
A: He ran inside the premises.
Q: After you hit Juan Sanchez with a stone what happened next?
A: Then Joey Guiyab chased me.
Q: Did he overtake you when he chased you?
A: No, sir.
Q: Now, when he was not able to overtake you, what did he do?
A: Because he was not able to chase me he was able to get hold of Rafael Bacani and that was the time he stabbed
him.
Q: When Joey Guiyab stabbed Rafael Bacani was Rafael Bacani hit?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What part of his body?
A: Here, sir.
Court Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a portion of his right chest near the nipple.
...
Q: When Rafael Bacani was hit and stabbed with a knife, how far were you?
A: Five (5) meters.
...
Q: You saw the accused stabbed (sic) Rafael Bacani, is it not?
[7]
A: Yes, sir.
As a rule, appellate courts will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the
credibility of a witness, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which has been overlooked, or the significance of which has been misinterpreted or
[8]
misapprehended. That general rule holds true in this case.
We do not doubt Josephs identification of Joey Guiyab. Even if he did not know the name of the
petitioner prior to the incident, he was able to identify him in open court. Besides, Joseph maintained that
[9]
although he did not know the name of the petitioner, he knew him by his face. There is nothing in law or
jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua non, that, for a positive identification of a felon by a
[10]
prosecution witness to be good, the witness must first know the former personally. The witness need
[11]
not have to know the name of the accused for so long as he recognizes his face. We ruled that knowing
the identity of an accused is different from knowing his name. Hence, the positive identification of the
malefactor should not be disregarded just because his name was supplied to the eyewitness. The weight of
the eyewitness account is premised on the fact that the said witness saw the accused commit the crime, and
[12]
not because he knew his name.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 27, 2001 and the Resolution
dated February 26, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23703, which sustained the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court, finding petitioner JOEY GUIYAB guilty of Homicide and sentencing him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum or from eight (8)
years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, and to PAY the heirs of Rafael Bacani
P50,000.00 as death indemnity, plus P30,000.00 for actual damages and P18,000.00 for funeral expenses,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, are AFFIRMED.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
Chairman
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.

Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 71-95. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner, and Mariano C. Del
Castillo concurring.
[2]
Id. at 101.
[3]
Records, p. 1.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 25-31.
[5]
Id. at 31.
[6]
Id. at 14.
[7]
TSN, 11 May 1993, pp. 15, 19-23 (Joseph Madriaga).
[8]
People v. Federico, G.R. No. 146956, 25 July 2003, 407 SCRA 290, 296.
[9]
Supra, note 7 at 40-42.
[10]
People v. Barreta, G.R. No. 120367, 16 October 2000, 343 SCRA 199, 208.
[11]
People v. Vaynaco, G.R. No. 126286, 22 March 1999, 305 SCRA 93, 100.
[12]
People v. Agsunod, Jr., G.R. No. 118331, 3 May 1991, 306 SCRA 612, 622.
8/23/2017 G.R. No. L-68969
Custom Search

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68969 January 22, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is a pauper's appeal of the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Ninth Judicial Region Branch XIII, dated January 25, 1984, which "finds
the accused USMAN HASSAN y AYUN guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the Crime of MURDER, and there being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance attending the commission of the crime, and pursuant to Paragraph No. 1 of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby imposes upon the said
accused the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and all its accessory penalties; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro the amount
of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2
Usman Hassan was accused of murder for stabbing to death Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, 24, single, and a resident of
Zamboanga City. 3 At the time of his death on July 23,1981, the deceased was employed as manager of the sand
and gravel business of his father. On the other hand, Hassan was an illiterate, 15-year-old pushcart cargador. 4
The quality of justice and the majesty of the law shine ever brightest when they are applied with more jealousy to the
poor, the marginalized, and the disadvantaged. Usman Hassan, the herein accused-appellant, belongs to this class.
At the time of the alleged commission of the crime, he was poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged. He was a
flotsam in a sea of violence, following the odyssey of his widowed mother from one poverty-stricken area to another
in order to escape the ravages of internicine war and rebellion in Zamboanga del Sur. In the 15 years of Hassan's
existence, he and his family had to evacuate to other places for fear of their lives, six times. His existence in this
world has not even been officially recorded; his birth has not been registered in the Registry of Births because the
Samal tribe, to which he belongs, does not see the importance of registering births and deaths.
Usman was convicted on the bases of the testimony of a lone eyewitness for the prosecution and the sloppiness of
the investigation conducted by the police investigator, Police Corporal Rogelio Carpio of the Homicide and Arson
Section of the Zamboanga City Police Station, who also testified for the prosecution.
We rule that Usman Hassan's guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and that Usman Hassan must,
therefore, be set free.
The lone eyewitness for the prosecution is Jose Samson, 24 years old when he testified, married, and a resident of
Zamboanga City. On the day of the killing, he was employed at the sand and gravel business of the father of the
deceased but was jobless at the time of his examination-in-chief on February 3, 1982.
He testified that he was with Ramon Pichel, Jr. at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of July 23, 1981; that he was a
backrider in the motorcycle of Ramon when they went to buy mangoes at Fruit Paradise near the Barter Trade Zone
in Zamboanga City that while he was selecting mangoes, he saw a person stab Ramon who was seated at his red
Honda motorcycle which was parked about two or three meters from the fruit stand where he Samson) was
selecting mangoes; that he saw the assailant stab Ramon "only once" and that after the stabbing, the assailant ran
towards the PNB Building. When asked at the cross-examination if he knew the assailant, Samson said, "I know him
by face but I do not know his name." 5
This sole eyewitness recounted the stabbing thus: "While Ramoncito Pichel, Jr. was holding the motorcycle with
both of his hands, the assailant come from behind, held his left hand and stabbed him from behind on his chest
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8/23/2017 G.R. No. L-68969
while the victim was sitting on the motorcycle." He claimed that he was able to see the assailant because it was very
bright there that Ramon was facing the light of a petromax lamp, and that all these happened in front of the fruit
stand a distance of about 6 to 7 meters from the side of the road.
Samson described the assailant as wearing a white, short-sleeved t-shirt and maong pants, but "he did not see if the
aggressor was wearing shoes," that the assailant stabbed Ramon with a knife but "he did not exactly see what kind
of knife it was, and he did not see how long the knife was He said he brought the wounded Ramon to the
Zamboanga City General Hospital in a tricycle.
On cross-examination, Samson testified:
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you rushed Ramon Pichel, Jr. to the hospital you came to know that he was
already dead, is that correct?
A Yes, sir, I learned that he was already dead.
Q In the hospital, were you investigated by the police?
A They just asked the description of that person as to his attire and his appearance.
Q And it was while in the hospital that you told them the description of the one who
stabbed Ramon Pichel, Jr.?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And the body of Ramon Pichel, Jr., was brought to the Funeraria La Merced?
A Yes, sir,
Q Can you recall what time was that?
A I do not know what time was that.
Q And it was all La Merced Funeraria that the police brought to you the accused?
A...
Q For Identification?
A Yes, sir.
Q And he was alone when you Identified him?
A Yes he was alone.
Q Aside from working with the Pichel family in their sand and gravel business, do you have any blood
relationship with them?
A Yes. sir. 6
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
What comes as a surprise is that Samson's statement 7 which was taken only on July 25, 1981, two days after the
stabbing, and sworn to only on July 27, 1981, also two days after it was taken, or four days after the killing, was
never presented or mentioned by the prosecution at all. The information was practically forced out of Police Corporal
Rogelio P. Carpio, a witness for the People, during his cross-examination. 8 The sworn statement contained the
following questions and answers:
xxx xxx xxx
8/23/2017 G.R. No. L-68969
Q-14. What and please narrate it to me briefly in your own words, the incident you are
referring?
A-14. While I was busy selecting some mangoes, I saw unidentified person whom I can
recognize by face if seen again embraced my companion Ramon Pitcher Jr. while the
latter was aboard his motorcycle parked within the area. That this person without much
ado, and armed with a knife suddenly stabbed him (Ramon). That by coincidence to this
incident, our eye met each other and immediately thereafter, he fled the area toward the
Philippine National Bank (PNB). That this unidentified person was sporting a semi-long
hair, dressed in White Polo-Shirt (Short sleeve), maong pants height to more or less 5'5,
Dark Complexion. That as this unidentified person fled the area I immediately came to aid
my companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., and rushed him to Zamboanga General Hospital, on
board a Tricycle. That may companion (Ramon) did not whispered (sic) any words to me
for he was in serious condition and few minutes later, he expired.
Q-15. Was tills unidentified person was with companion when he attack (sic) Ramon
Pitcher Jr.?
A-15. He was alone Sir.
Q-16. Can you really Identified (sic) this person who attacked and stabbed your
companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., that evening in question?
A-16. Yes, Sir,
Q-17. Do you still remember that confrontation we made at the Office of La Merced
Funeral Homes, wherein you were confronted with one Usman Hassan, whom this Officer
brought along?
A-17. Yes, Sir.
Q-18. Was he the very person, who attacked and stabbed your companion, Ramon
Pitcher, Jr.?
A-18. Yes, Sir, he was the very person who attacked and stabbed my companion, Ramon
Pitcher, Jr., that evening in question.
Q-19. Why?
A-19. Because his face and other physical appearance were fully noted by me and this I
cannot forget for the rest of my life.
Q-20. Before this incident, was there any altercation that had ensued while in the process
of buying some mangoes in that area?
A-20. None Sir.
Q-21. Were you able to note what kind of knife used by said Usman Hassan in stabbing
your companion, Ramon Pitcher Jr.?
A-21: None Sir,
Q-22. Well, I have nothing more to ask of you, do you have anything more to say, add or
alter in this statement?
A-22. No more Sir.
Q-23. Are you willing to give a supplemental statement if needed in the future?
A-23. Yes, Sir. 9
(Emphasis supplied)
8/23/2017 G.R. No. L-68969
xxx xxx xxx
The version of the sole eyewitness appearing in his statement 10 is substantially the same as that embodied in the
"Case Report," Exhibit it "C", by Police Corporal Carpio, also admitted a s Exhibit "2." This exhibit for the prosecution
confirms the sworn statement of witness Samson that an unidentified person, whom he recognized only by face,
appeared and without any provocation, the latter embraced the victim and stabbed the same allegedly with a knife."
The rest of the Case Report: is also significant in that it confirms the confrontation between the accused and Jose
Samson in the funeral parlor arranged by the police Investigator and prosecution witness, Corporal Carpio.
xxx xxx xxx
From this end, a follow-up was made within the premises of the Old Barter Trade, wherein the person
of USMAN HASSAN Y AYUN, of Paso Bolong, this City, was arrested in connection with the above
stated incident. That this Officer and companions arrested this person Usman due to his physical
appearance, which was fully described by victim's companion. Jose Samson. During his arrest, a knife,
measuring to more or less seven (7) inches in blade was confiscated in his possession. The person of
Usman Hassan was brought along at the La Merced Funeral Homes for a confrontation with victims
companion, Jose Samson and in this confrontation, Jose Samson positively Identified said Usman
Hassan as the very person who stabbed the victim.
Usman Hassan, on the other hand, denied the charges levelled against hub and admitted ownership of
said knife; claiming among other things that he used said knife for slicing mangoes. 11
xxx xxx xxx
We hold that the evidence for the prosecution in its entirety does not satisfy the quantum of proof beyond
reasonable doubt required by the Constitution, the law, and applicable jurisprudence to convict an accused
person. The said evidence denies us the moral certainty which would allow us to pronounce, without uneasiness of
conscience. Usman Hassan y Ayun guilty of the killing of the deceased Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, and condemn him
to life imprisonment and in effect turning him into a flotsam again in a sea of convicted felons in which he would be a
very young stranger.
In evaluating the worth of the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution against the denial and alibi of the
accused, value judgment must not be separated from the constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence.
When the evidence for the prosecution and the evidence for the accused are weighed, the scales must
be tipped in favor of the latter. This is because of the constitutional presumtion of innocence the
accused enjoys as a counter-foil to the awesome authority of the State that is prosecuting him.
The element of doubt, if reasonable in this case, must operate against the inference of guilt the
prosecution would draw from its evidence. That evidence, as it happens, consists only of the
uncorroborated statement of the two policemen which, as previously observed, is flawed and therefore
suspect. 12
The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, is weak and unconvincing. And so with the evidence sought to
be introduced by Police Corporal Carpio. We discover, for example, that the expert testimony of the medico-legal
officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Dr. Valentin Bernalez, presented by the prosecution, contradicted, on
material points, the testimony of the one eyewitness, Jose Samson. While Samson averred on the witness stand
that he saw the assailant stab the deceased "from behind on his chest" 13 only once, the NBI medico-legal officer
Identified two stab wounds, one at the front portion of the chest at the level and third rib, (sic) and another stab
wound located at the left arm posterior aspect." 14 The same medical expert also concluded from the nature and
location of the chest wound, which was the cause of death, that the same was inflicted on the victim while the
alleged accused was in front of him." 15
The investigation of this case by the Homicide/Arson Section of the Zamboanga Southern Police Sector, 16 at
Zamboanga City, particularly by Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, leaves much to be desired. For one, we are not
satisfied with the procedure adopted by the police investigators in the Identification of the accused as the assailant.
We have no doubt that Usman Hassan was "presented" alone 17 to Jose Samson by the police investigator and
prosecution witness, Police Corporal Carpio, and his police companions, at the office of the La Merced Funeral
Homes in Zamboanga City. As correctly termed by the very evidence 18 of the prosecution, the procedure adopted
by the police investigators was a confrontation" between Jose Samson, Jr. and Usman. Earlier, on direct
examination, Corporal Carpio testified that Usman was alone when he was brought to Samson for confrontation in
8/23/2017 G.R. No. L-68969
the funeral parlor. However, on cross-examination, Carpio made a turnabout by saying that the accused was
Identified by Samson in a "police line-up;" this tergiversation we dare say, was an afterthought, more the result of an
over or careless cross-examination, augmented by the leading questions 19 of the trial judge rather than a
fastidiousness if not sincerity, on the part of the police investigator, to honestly correct erroneous statements in his
examination-in-chief. The fact remains that both Samson and the accused testified clearly and unequivocably that
Usman was alone when presented to Samson by Carpio. There was no such police line-up as the police
investigator, to honestly correct erreoneous statements in his examination-in-chief. The fact remains that both
Samson and the accused testified clearly and unequivocably that Usman was alone when presented to Samson by
Carpio. There was no such police investigator claimed on second thought.
The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to confront and Identify the accused alone at the funeral parlor,
without being placed in the police line-up, was "pointedly suggsestive, generated confidence where there was none,
activated visual imagination, and, all told, subserted his reliability as eyewitness. This unusual, coarse, and highly
singular method of Identification, which revolts against the accepted principles of scientific crime detection, alienates
the esteem of every just man, and commands neither our respect nor acceptance." 20
Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police investigator between the self-proclaimed eyewitness and the
accused did violence to the right of the latter to counsel in all stages of the investigation into the commission of a
crime especially at its most crucial stage the Identification of the accused.
As it turned out, the method of Identification became just a confrontation. At that critical and decisive moment, the
scales of justice tipped unevenly against the young, poor, and disadvantaged accused. The police procedure
adopted in this case in which only the accused was presented to witness Samson, in the funeral parlor, and in the
presence of the grieving relatives of the victim, is as tainted as an uncounselled confession and thus falls within the
same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched protection. For this infringement alone, the accused-appellant should
be acquitted.
Moreover, aside from this slipshod Identification procedure, the rest of the investigation of the crime and the
preparation of the evidence for prosecution were done haphazardly, perfunctorily, and superficially. Samson was not
investigated thoroughly and immediately after the incident. As previously mentioned, his statement was taken by the
investigator only two days after the murder of Ramon Pichel, Jr. and sworn only two days after it had been taken.
Similarly, there is nothing in the record to show that the fruit vendorfrom whom Samson and the deceased were
buying mangoes that fateful evening and who certainly must have witnessed the fatal stabbingwas investigated,
or why he was not investigated. Nor is any explanation given as to why the companion 21 of the accused at the time
Corporal Carpio arrested him (accused) 'sitting on a pushcart " 22 at about 8:00 P.M. (around 7:00 P.M., according to
Usman) of that same evening near the scene of the crime, was not also investigated when he could have been a
material witness of the killing or of the innocence of the accused. In addition, the knife and its scabbard, 23
Confiscated by Carpio from Usman (tucked on the right side of his waist") at the time of his arrest, were not even
subjected to any testing at all to determine the presence of human blood which could be typed and compared with
the blood type of the deceased. A crime laboratory test had Carpio or the prosecuting fiscal, or even the trial
judge, insisted on it would have revealed whether or not the knife in question (confiscated from the accused by
Carpio one hour after the alleged commission of the crime) had indeed been the weapon used to kill Ramon. The
police investigator instead nonchalantly dismissed this sin of omission by saying that the knife could have been
cleaned or the bloodstain could have been taken away. 24 This presumption of the deadly weapon's having been
"cleaned" of bloodstains is tantamount to pronouncing the accused of being guilty.
Our doubt about the guilt of the accused is further deepened by a resolution, 25 in a separate case, 26 of Assistant
City Fiscal of Zamboanga City and deputized Tanod bayan Prosecutor Pablo Murillo, which clearly reveals that on
July 24, 1981, a day after the killing of Ramon Pichel, Jr., a similar stabbing took place at Plaza Pershing near the
place of the earlier incident, with the suspect in that frustrated homicide case being a certain Benhar Isa, 'a
notorious and a deadly police character" in Zamboanga City, with a long record of arrests. In that resolution, Fiscal
Murillo said the same Benhar Isa was tagged as 'also a suspect in the stabbing of Ramon Pichel, Jr. to death and
the stabbing of Pastor Henry Villagracia at the Fruit Paradise, this City." The said resolution further states that "with
regards to this incident or witnesses ever testified for fear of possible reprisals." 27
The trial of Usman Hassan began on October 27, 1981. Benhar Isa himself was killed by a policeman on August 28,
1981, while he (Isa) "was apparently under the influence of liquor armed with a knife (was) molesting and extorting
money from innocent civilians' and "making trouble." 28 The records of the case at bar do not show any attempt on
the part of Corporal Carpio, or any other police officer, to investigate or question Benhar Isa in connection with the
killing of Pichel, Jr. Was it fear of the notorious police character that made the police officers disregard the possible
connection between the slaying of Ramon and that of the person (Harun Acan y Arang of the Ministry of National
Defense) 29 who was allegedly stabbed by Benhar Isa a day after the killing of Ramon Jr.? And yet questioning Isa
8/23/2017 G.R. No. L-68969
might have provided that vital link to the resolution of Usman's guilt or innocence. But why should the police officers
investigate Isa when Usman Hassan was already in custody and could be an available fall guy? Usman Hassan,
instead, became a victim of a grave injustice. Indeed, Usman Hassan is too poor to wage a legal fight to prove his
innocence. And he is so marginalized as to claim and deserve an honest-to-goodness, thorough, and fair police
investigation with all angles and leads pursued to their logical, if not scientific, conclusions. Sadly circumstanced as
he is, the authority of the State was too awesome for him to counteract.
The appealed decision made much ado of the admission by Usman "that he was arrested at the former barter trade,
which is a place just across the place of the stabbing at the Fruit Paradise." 30 The trial judge found it "therefore
strange that on the very evening of the stabbing incident he was still at the barter trade area by 8:00 o'clock in the
evening when he usually comes to the city proper at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning and goes home at past 5:00
o'clock and sometimes 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon." 31 Usman's explanation that, at around 7:00 o'clock P.M., he
was waiting for transportation to take him home was found by the trial court as 'flimsy and weak since he did not
explain why he had to go home late that evening." 32 But the whole trouble is nobody asked him. The trial judge did
not propound any single question to the accused, and only three to his mother on innocuous matters, by way of
clarification, if only to put on record what the mother and son could articulate with clarity. Taking into account their
poverty and illiteracy, the mother and son needed as much, if not more, help, than the trial judge extended to the
prosecution witnesses during their examination by asking them clarificatory and mostly leading questions. In that
sense and to that extent, the accused was disadvantaged.
A fact that looms large, though mutely to testify on the innocence of the accused but the importance of which was
brushed away by the trial judge was the presence of the accused near the scene (about 100 to 150 meters away)
soon after the stabbing (he testified at around 7:00 P.M. although Police Corporal Carpio stated it was 8:00 P.M.)
where he was found sitting on his pushcart with a companion. If he were the assailant, he would have fled. But the
trial court instead indulged in conjecture, foisting the probability that the accused 'was lulled by a false sense of
security in returning to the place (of the stabbing), when no police officers immediately responded and appeared at
the scene of the crime," adding 'there are numerous cases in the past where criminals return to the scene of their
crimes, for reasons only psychologist can explain." 33 It must have escaped the trial court's attention that Usman has
no criminal record, and, therefore, he could not be generally classed with criminals. In the second place, the trial
court's rationalization ignores the biblical truism recognized by human nature and endorsed with approval by this
Court that "(T)he wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion." 34
And now as a penultimate observation, we could not help but note the total absence of motive ascribed to Usman
for stabbing Ramon, a complete stranger to him. While, as a general rule, motive is not essential in order to arrive at
a conviction, because, after all, motive is a state of mind, 35 procedurally, however, for purposes of complying with
the requirement that a judgment of guilty must stem from proof beyond reasonable doubt, the lack of motive on the
part of the accused plays a pivotal role towards his acquittal. This is especially true where there is doubt as to the
Identity of the culprit 36 as when 'the Identification is extremely tenuous," 37 as in this case.
We can not end this travail without adverting to the cavalier manner in which the trial court disregarded the claimed
young age of Usman Hassan.
The defense claims that the accused Usman Hassan is a minor, basing such claim on the testimony of
Lahunay Hassan, the mother of said accused, who declared that her son Usman Hassan, who is one of
her four (4) children, was born in the year 1967. She testified that she was just told by a person coming
from their place about the year of the birth of her son Usman. However on cross-examination, Lahunay
Hassan cannot even remember the date or year of birth of her other children. The failure of Lahunay
Hassan to remember the date or year of birth of her children is of course understandable, considering
that she is unschooled and she belongs to a tribe that does not register births, deaths or marriages,
however, it is strange that she only took pains to find out the year of birth of her son Usman. For this
reason, the Court granted a motion of the defense on September 13, 1982, to have the herein accused
examined by a competent dentist to determine his age. However, the findings of the dentist of
Zamboanga General Hospital which is marked as Exhibit "5" shows the following: "age cannot be
determined accurately under present mouth conditions. Approximately, he can be from 14 to 21 years
of age." This simply means that the herein accused could either be 14 years of age or 21 years of age,
or any age in between those aforestated years. From the observation of this court, the accused Usman
Hassan was about 18 years of age at the time he committed this crime and this observation is based
on his personal appearance, his size and facial features and other personal characteristics, hence he
can not be classified as a youthful offender under Article. 189 of Presendential Decree No. 603, as
ammended by Presedential Decree No. 1179. In the case of U.S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil. 13 and People vs.
Reyes and Panganiban, CA 48 O.G. 1022, cited in the Edition, Page 680, it was ruled by the Supreme
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Court that "In cases where the age of the culprit is at issue as a basis for claiming an exempting
mitigating circumstance, it is incumbent upon the accused to establish that circumstance ad any other
elements of defense. 38
Considering that the age of the accused could exempt him from punishment or cause the suspension of his
sentence under Articles 12 and 80, respectively of the Revised Penal Code, if found guilty, more meticulousness
and care should have been demanded of medical or scientific sources, and less reliance on the observation of the
judge as had happened in this case. The preliminary findings of the dentist that the accused could be anywhere
between fourteen to twenty one years, despite the difficulty of arriving at an accurate determination due to Hassan's
mouth condition, would have placed the trial judge on notice that there is the probability that the accused might be
exempted from criminal liability due to his young age. All the foregoing indicates that the accused had not been
granted the concern and compassion with which the poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged so critically deserve. It
is when judicial and police processes and procedures are thoughtlessly and haphazardly observed that cries of the
law and justice being denied the poor are heard. In any event, all this would not be of any moment now, considering
the acquittal of the accused herein ordered.
WHEREFORE, the decision is hereby REVERSED, and the accused Usman Hassan y Ayun is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged. His release from confinement is hereby Ordered, unless he is held for another legal cause. With
costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
That the testimony of the lone eyewitness is weak and unconvincing.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
That the testimony of the lone eyewitness is weak and unconvincing.
Footnotes
1 Rendered by the Honorable Carlito A. Eisma, Regional Trial Judge.
2 Decision, 12; Rollo, 35.
3 Exhibit "A", Death Certificate.
4 T.S.N., 2, July 28,1982.
5 T.S.N., 5 February 3, 1982.
6 T.S.N.,., 11 February 10, 1982.
7 Exhibit "I", Original Records, 4-5.
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8 T.S.N., S. April 28, 1982.
9 Exhibit "1", Id.
10 Id.
11 Exhibit "C", (also Exhibit "2').
12 (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution, Identical with Sec. 14(2), Art. III, 1987 Constitution; People vs.
Pecardal, No. L-71381, November 24,1986,145 SCRA 652-653; People v. Opida, No. L-46272, June
13, 1986, 142 SCRA 295; Liwanag Aguirre v. People, G.R. No. 56013, October 30, 1987.
13 T.S.N., 5-6, February 3, 1982.
14 T.S.N., 7, October 27, 1981, Exhibit "B."
15 Id., 10.
16 Exhibits "C" and "D".
17 T.s.n. 11 February 10, 1982. T.s.n., 4 April 28, 1982, Exh. "1", Original Records, Id.
18 Exh. "C", T.s.n., April 28,1982, Id.
19 T.S.N. 10-11, Id.
20 People v. Cruz. No. L-24424, March 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 181, 186; People vs. Olvis, et al., No. L-
71092, September 30, 1987; Chavez Court of Appeals. No. L-29169, 24 SCRA 663, 679.
21 T.S.N., 4, April 28,1982.
22 Id.
23 Exhibits "E" and "E-1", respectively.
24 T.S.N., 9, April 28, 1982.
25 Exhibit "4".
26 People of the Philippines, Complainant, versus Pat. Hamid Akbar, Respondent, Slip No. 734-81 for
HOMICIDE."
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Decision, 10, Original Records, 113.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Decision, 8 Original Records 111.
34 People of the Philippines vs. Rolly Anquillano alias Dagol, G.R. No. 72318, 4.
35 People vs. Jacinto, L-51908, November 29, 1984, 133 SCRA 498.
36 People vs. Verzo, L-22517, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1403; People vs. Pajenado, L-26458,
January 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 172; People vs. Dueno L-31102, May 5, 1979, 90 SCRA 23; People vs.
Manalo, L-45088, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 84.
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37 People vs. Pervelo, L-50631, June 29, 1981, 105 SCRA 236, 238.
38 Decision, 9, Original Records, 112.
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Custom Search

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig
City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower
courts ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L.
Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal
Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses
Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the
suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A.
No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment
and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued
a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his
arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803
for petitioners loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on
petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for
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his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No.
2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego participation
in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence
sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil
action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence,
petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense
bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for
the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple
consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting petitioners standing to
maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence
holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge
in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and
damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion not to file a comment to the
petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803
when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366;
and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of
personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding
petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are
governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review
judgments of convictions.
The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on
the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under
procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTCs reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling
because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTCs ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal
by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending
trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death
sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.10
The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366
as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Courts treatment of a
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defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the defendants absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject
to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing
and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day
period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not
ipso facto convert the accuseds status to that of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled
proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension
of the MeTCs proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803.
Following the MeTCs refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered
petitioners arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367

Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense"13
protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in
Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case
turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense."
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless
imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an
entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter]
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,

its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the
provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto
menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a
less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another,
the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times
such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple
imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two
paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that
8/23/2017 G.R. No. 172716
which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be
caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform
such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and
other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be
caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to
lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to
the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or
both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5);
and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-
offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These
structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the
first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined
and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we
already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition
that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of
analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to
treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal
intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself
but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve
unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder,
treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a
mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor,
then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should
be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the
willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal
Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional
[medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range
all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal
negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of
crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in
damage, either to person or property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to Property
through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional
crime conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
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Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly
reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller22 that
"[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has long been
abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller
in 1939. Quizon rejected Fallers conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365
are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon
jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules
defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of
quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses,
barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a
quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the
second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of

Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means
to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the
same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a
full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru
reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same
act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal
question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the
Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the
Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v.
Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by
the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per
Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.),
Buerano v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court
of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second
prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to
quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution
for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accuseds prior
acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the
Court explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify
the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person
or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different
crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning
of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more
than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940,
allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite
his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle
8/23/2017 G.R. No. 172716
upon which the second prosecution was based. Estiponas inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of
jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in
Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals conviction of an accused for "damage to property for reckless
imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence,"
arising from the same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona.
We reversed on the strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona
decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this
Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify
the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person
or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different
crimes and prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto,
Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both
charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second
accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with
the accused, a fact which did not escape the Courts attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82
of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioners plea of double jeopardy and
submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner
guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if
double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same
consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and
physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any
amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the
mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to
petitioners case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular
collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and
"Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the
accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief,
but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accuseds claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial
court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding:
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in People v.
Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the
two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or
otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection
with the same collision one for damage to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the
owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless
imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints
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were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim.
Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through
reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of
the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after
trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the
case for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the
collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of
the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two
informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to
property through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the
defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of
dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of police
constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property through
reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in the
municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having
driven an automobile in a fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident. After the accused had pleaded
not guilty the case was dismissed in that court for failure of the Government to prosecute. But some time thereafter
the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage
to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be 249.50. Pleading double
jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things
we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law
prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence
charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second
offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is
to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second
charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting attorney that the
charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the
prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before
pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having
first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more
serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same
alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court.43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of
delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double jeopardy,
upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence.
In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the
ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor
General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or
clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case,
the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the
government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of
the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the
identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
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Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent
but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law,
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the
Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under
either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding
from its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The
legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve
the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of
the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more
consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple
intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the
prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce
a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-
crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses.
The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48s
framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding
those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single
charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the
scheme of penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double
jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless one
consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting
acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other
hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is
the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No.
7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which
is prision correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article
365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution
of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense
and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply
and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave
offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-
crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity,51 penalizing each consequence
separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging
"reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another,
the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times
such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be
imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information
cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis
supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
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Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing one
framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts
into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing
under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple
consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal
code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single
prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in
Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon
and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases. 1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws constrains
us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code.
Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-
offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a
necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor Generals
argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was
considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused
for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense
in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney
is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has
been previously cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in
second jeopardy for the same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365,
irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible
second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper
use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number
or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under
Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article
365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the
favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the
certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious
consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-
crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single
prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact
the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting
crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against
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petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of
double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
Designated additional member per Raffle dated 22 September 2010.
1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 Dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006.
3 In a Resolution dated 4 October 2004.
4 In an Order dated 17 May 2005 (Records, p. 142).
5 In a Resolution dated 24 May 2005.
6 Denied in an Order dated 2 May 2006.
7 Rollo, pp. 30-33.
8 The provision states: "Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. x x x x
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The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal."
9 329 Phil. 339 (1996).
10 Id. at 350.
11 The provision states: "Forfeiture of bail. When the presence of the accused is required by the court or
these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time. If the
accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given
thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show why no judgment should be rendered
against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must:
(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and
(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and
severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the
bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted."
12 Rollo, p. 40.
13 Section 21, Article III, 1987 Constitution.
14 Section 7, Rule 117 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The right has, of course, broader scope to cover
not only prior guilty pleas but also acquittals and unconsented dismissals to bar prosecutions for the same,
lesser or graver offenses covered in the initial proceedings (id.)
15 Rollo, p. 97.
16 Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga, 97 Phil. 342, 345 (1955) (emphasis in the original).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 345-346.
19 We observed in Quizon: "Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive
phrases as homicide through reckless imprudence, and the like; when the strict technical offense is, more
accurately, reckless imprudence resulting in homicide; or simple imprudence causing damages to property.
(Id. at 345; emphasis supplied)
20 In People v. Buan, 131 Phil. 498, 500-502 (1968), which applied Quizons logic, the Court canvassed
relevant jurisprudence, local and Spanish:
[T]he quasi-offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony.
The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of
the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or
several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot be split into
different crimes and prosecutions. This has been the constant ruling of the Spanish Supreme Court,
and is also that of this Court in its most recent decisions on the matter.
Thus, in People vs. Silva, L-15974, January 30, 1962, where as a result of the same vehicular accident
one man died, two persons were seriously injured while another three suffered only slight physical
injuries, we ruled that the acquittal on a charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
was a bar to another prosecution for homicide through reckless imprudence. In People vs. Diaz, L-
6518, March 30, 1954, the ruling was that the dismissal by the Municipal Court of a charge of reckless
driving barred a second information of damage to property through reckless imprudence based on the
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same negligent act of the accused. In People vs, Belga, 100 Phil. 996, dismissal of an information for
physical injuries through needless imprudence as a result of a collision between two automobiles was
declared, to block two other prosecutions, one for damage to property through reckless imprudence
and another for multiple physical injuries arising from the same collision. The same doctrine was
reasserted in Yap vs. Lutero, et al., L-12669, April 30, 1959. In none of the cases cited did the Supreme
Court regard as material that the various offenses charged for the same occurrence were triable in
Courts of differing category, or that the complainants were not the individuals.
As for the Spanish jurisprudence, Cuello Calon, in his Derecho Penal (12th Ed.), Vol. I, p. 439, has this
to say:
Aun cuando de un solo hecho imprudente se originen males diversos, como el hecho culposo es uno
solo, existe un solo delito de imprudencia. Esta es jurisprudencia constante del Tribunal Supremo. De
acuerdo con esta doctrina el automovilista imprudente que atropella y causa lesiones a dos personas y
ademas daos, no respondera de dos delitos de lesiones y uno de daos por imprudencia, sino de un
solo delito culposo.
The said author cites in support of the text the following decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain
(footnotes 2 and 3).
xxxx
Si con el hecho imprudente se causa la muerte de una persona y ademas se ocasionan daos, existe
un solo hecho punible, pues uno solo fue el acto, aun cuando deben apreciarse dos enorden a la
responsabilidad civil, 14 diciembre 1931 si a consecuencia de un solo acto imprudente se produjeron
tres delitos, dos de homicidio y uno de daos, como todos son consecuencia de un solo acto culposo,
no cabe penarlos por separado, 2 abril 1932. (Emphasis supplied)
21 E.g. Samson v. Court of Appeals, 103 Phil. 277 (1958); People v. Cano, 123 Phil. 1086 (1966); Pabulario v.
Palarca, 129 Phil. 1 (1967); Corpus v. Paje, 139 Phil. 429 (1969).
22 67 Phil. 529 (1939) (affirming a conviction for malicious mischief upon a charge for "damage [to property]
through reckless imprudence"). A logical consequence of a Fallerian conceptualization of quasi-crimes is the
sanctioning of the split prosecution of the consequences of a single quasi offense such as those allowed in El
Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513 (1940) (finding the separate prosecutions of damage to property
and multiple physical injuries arising from the same recklessness in the accuseds operation of a motor
vehicle not violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause).
23 67 Phil. 529 (1939).
24 E.g. Lontok v. Gorgonio, 178 Phil. 525, 528 (1979) (holding that the "less grave offense" of "damage to
property through reckless imprudence" (for 2,340) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the penal code
with a prescribed " slight offense" of "lesiones leves through reckless imprudence," citing Faller); Arcaya v.
Teleron, 156 Phil. 354, 362 (1974) (noting, by way of dicta in a ruling denying relief to an appeal against the
splitting of two charges for "less serious physical injuries and damage to property amounting to 10,000
though reckless imprudence" and "slight physical injuries though reckless imprudence," that the Quizon
doctrine, as cited in Corpus v. Paje, 139 Phil. 429 (1969) and People v. Buan, 131 Phil. 498 (1968), "may not
yet be settled in view of the contrary dictum" in Faller).
25 94 Phil. 715 (1954).
26 100 Phil. 996 (1957) (barring subsequent prosecutions for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and
damage to property thru reckless imprudence following an acquittal for "reckless imprudence with physical
injury").
27 105 Phil. 1307 (1959) (Unrep.) (barring subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries" following an
acquittal for "reckless driving").
28 107 Phil. 737 (1960) (barring subsequent prosecution for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence"
following a conviction for "multiple slight and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.")
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29 No. L-15974, 30 January 1962, 4 SCRA 95 (barring subsequent prosecution for "homicide thru reckless
imprudence" following an acquittal for "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence").
30 123 Phil. 48 (1966) (barring subsequent prosecution for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence"
following an acquittal for two counts of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.")
31 131 Phil. 498 (1968) (barring subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property
thru reckless imprudence" following an acquittal for "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence").
32 200 Phil. 486 (1982) (reversing a subsequent conviction for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence"
following a conviction for "slight and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence").
33 206 Phil. 555 (1983) (barring subsequent prosecution for "homicide thru reckless imprudence" following a
conviction for "serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence").
34 131 Phil. 498, 500 (1968).
35 Id.
36 70 Phil. 513 (1940), also cited in other sources as People v. Estipona.
37 Supra note 32.
38 Supra note 31.
39 Buerano v. Court of Appeals, 200 Phil. 486, 491 (1982).
40 Id. at 491-492.
41 No. L-15974, 30 January 1962, 4 SCRA 95.
42 Supra note 26.
43 No. L-15974, 30 January 1962, 4 SCRA 95, 97-100 (internal citations omitted).
44 Id. at 100.
45 Id.
46 Defined under Article 9, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, thus: "Light felonies are
those infractions of law for the commission of which a penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200
pesos or both is provided."
47 Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga, 97 Phil. 342, 345 (1955).
48 E.g. People v. Lara, 75 Phil. 786 (1946) (involving "homicidio por imprudencia temeraria" with several
victims [or, roughly, "multiple homicide thru reckless imprudence"]); People v. Agito, 103 Phil. 526 (1958)
(involving "triple homicide and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence").
49 E.g. People v. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001 (1927) (sustaining a dismissal on demurrer of a criminal case for the
prosecutors failure to amend a charge for "damage to property and of lesions leves [slight physical injuries]
through negligence and imprudence" to remove the charge for the slight offense, under Article 89 of the penal
code, the precursor of Article 48); Arcaya v. Teleron, 156 Phil. 354 (1974) (finding no grave abuse of
discretion in the filing of separate charges for "less serious physical injuries and damage to property
amounting to 10,000 though reckless imprudence" and "slight physical injuries though reckless imprudence"
arising from the same facts); Lontok v. Gorgonio, 178 Phil. 525 (1979) (granting a petition to split a single
charge for "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple [slight] physical injuries" by
limiting the petitioners trial to "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property"). See also Reodica v.
Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 90 (1998) (holding that the "less grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in
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damage to property" (for 8,542) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with "the
light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries," citing Lontok); People v. De Los Santos, 407
Phil. 724 (2001) (applying Article 48 of the penal code to hold the accused liable for the "complex crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical
injuries" (upon an information charging "multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted
murder.") In a dicta, the decision stated that separate informations should have been filed for the slight
physical injuries the victims sustained which cannot be complexed with the more serious crimes under Article
48.)
50 Section 2 of RA 7691 provides: "Section 2. Section 32 of [Batas Pambansa Blg. 129] is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional
Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of
kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof."
(Underlining supplied)
51 E.g. Angeles v. Jose, 96 Phil. 151 (1954) (reversing the ruling of the then Court of First Instance of Manila
which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a complaint for "damage to property in the sum of 654.22, and with
less serious physical injuries through reckless negligence," holding improper the splitting of the charge). We
relied on Angeles for our ruling in People v. Villanueva, 111 Phil. 897 (1962) resolving similar jurisdictional
issue and People v. Cano, 123 Phil. 1086, 1090 (1966) (reversing a dismissal order which found the
complexing of "damage to property with multiple [slight] physical injuries through reckless imprudence"
improper, holding that the Information did not and could not have complexed the effect of a single quasi-
offense per Quizon. The Court noted that "it is merely alleged in the information that, thru reckless negligence
of the defendant, the bus driven by him hit another bus causing upon some of its passengers serious physical
injuries, upon others less serious physical injuries and upon still others slight physical injuries, in addition to
damage to property").
52 Angeles v. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, 152 (1954).
53 Thus, we were careful to label the crime in question as "what may be called a complex crime of physical
injuries and damage to property" (id., emphasis supplied), because our prescription to impose "additional
penalty" for the second consequence of less serious physical injuries, defies the sentencing formula under
Article 48 requiring imposition of "the penalty for the most serious crime x x x the same to be applied in its
maximum period."
54 Supra note 31 at 502 (internal citation omitted). This also explains why in People v. Cano we described as
"not altogether accurate" a trial court and a litigants assumption that a charge for "damage to property with
multiple [slight] physical injuries through reckless imprudence" involved two crimes corresponding to the two
effects of the single quasi-crime albeit complexed as a single charge:
[A]ppellee and the lower court have seemingly assumed that said information thereby charges two
offenses, namely (1) slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence; and (2) damage to property, and
serious and less serious physical injuries, thru reckless negligence which are sought to be
complexed. This assumption is, in turn, apparently premised upon the predicate that the effect or
consequence of defendants negligence, not the negligence itself, is the principal or vital factor in said
offenses. Such predicate is not altogether accurate.
As early as July 28, 1955 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, had the occasion to state,
in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, Pampanga x x x, that:
8/23/2017 G.R. No. 172716
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal
liability" is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure can not be
committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi-offense, and dealt separately from
willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act
itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the "imprudencia
punible." Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrases as
"homicide through reckless imprudence", and the like; when the strict technical offense is more
accurately, "reckless imprudence resulting in homicide", or "simple imprudence causing damages to
property." (People v. Cano, 123 Phil. 1086,1090 (1966), (Emphasis supplied), reiterated in Pabulario v.
Palarca, 129 Phil. 1 (1967) (reversing a lower court which quashed a charge alleging reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple slight physical injuries).
55 See Section 32(2), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691.
8/23/2017 Manuel vs People : 165842 : November 29, 2005 : J. Callejo Sr : Second Division : Decision
SECOND DIVISION
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, G.R. No. 165842

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. November 29, 2005
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
[1]
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
[2]
G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch
3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then
previously and legally married to RUBYLUS [GAA] and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/165842.htm 1/24
GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not know the existence of the first marriage of said
EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaa].
[3]
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaa before
[4]
Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal. He met
the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in
Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer
Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her.
Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tinas resistance, Eduardo
succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that
he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and was assured by
them that their son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were married
on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch
[5]
61. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was single.
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts,
they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel
started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and
[6]
whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her. Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took
all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics
Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an
[7]
NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract. She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned
[8]
that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own vows.
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a Guest
Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous
marriage to Rubylus Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in
order until this one time when he noticed that she had a love-bite on her neck. He then abandoned her.
Eduardo further testified that he declared he was single in his marriage contract with Tina because he
believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to
seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to
commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He
visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing
that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina
[9]
Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardos belief, that his first
marriage had been dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him
[10]
from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu, the trial court further ruled
that even if the private complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would
still be criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy
because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious
intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief
that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal
Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in
marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful
marriage. He posited that the trial court should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code.
[11]
To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v. Pealosa and
[12]
Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardos defense of good faith and reliance
[13]
on the Courts ruling in United States v. Enriquez were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of
the Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic
[14]
v. Nolasco, the OSG further posited that as provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need
for a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry.
Even assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for
themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the
private complainants knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an
offense against the State and not just against the private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court was
erroneous and sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to
the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel
could lawfully marry the private complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaas
presumptive death as the absent spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v.
[15] [16]
Tan and Domingo v. Court of Appeals to support its ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002 is hereby
MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of
prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
[17]
SO ORDERED.
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONERS FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF
THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS
PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.
[18]
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the felony, i.e., that the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaa had been
absent for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of
law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent
for seven years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for
succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of death with respect to
succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by operation of law
upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouses reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He insists that he was
able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of her
whereabouts or whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive
death of Gaa had arisen by operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are
present. The petitioner concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390 of the Civil
Code, the rule therein on legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the
Civil Code does it require that there must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on
presumptive death would apply. He further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate
courts, the requirement of a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code
is only a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral damages in favor of
the private complainant. The private complainant was a GRO before he married her, and even knew that he
was already married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her financial support. He also
pointed out that she had an illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA affirming the petitioners
conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the
[19]
OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legtimamente disuelto el anterior, ser castigado
con la pena de prision mayor. xxx
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage
[20]
established by law. The phrase or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code
because the drafters of the law were of the impression that in consonance with the civil law which
provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of
[21]
presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy.
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has
been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having
been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
[22]
subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage,
having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
[23]
Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the second marriage must be entered into with
[24]
fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element of a felony by dolo. On the
other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a
marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not
matter whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects until
[25]
lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction. As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of
[26] [27]
Appeals and Mercado v. Tan, under the Family Code of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and declared that
there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent
[28]
intention constituting the felony of the act. He explained that:
This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in the principle
antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no
willfulness there is no crime. There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by very strong evidence,
and if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a
second marriage in the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many
years that have elapsed since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her,
cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent intent which is one of the
[29]
essential elements of the crime.
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo
(deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is
performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is
[30]
classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary. Although the words with malice do not
[31]
appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word voluntary.
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or
[32]
justification from which another suffers injury. When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is
[33]
proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional.
Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable consequence of his
voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a
[34]
reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence.
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an
[35]
evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaa in 1975, and such
[36]
marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. The
prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the
effectivity of the Family Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private
complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a
prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of
the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant
in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He
should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his
first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family
Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would
negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could
not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
The phrase or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered on the proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment
of empty or useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse
is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second
marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith
based on mere testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section
12 of the Constitution, the State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the
interest of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its
[37]
severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes specified by law. The laws regulating civil
marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the
community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage
anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare
of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving
State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every
aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to
society, are so serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most
[38]
positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent spouse after the
lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a
competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a
subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse. Indeed, men readily believe
what they wish to be true, is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first
because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the existence of the marital relation
determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the
[39]
subjective condition of individuals. Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to
[40]
permit second marriages. Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of
marriage dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily
[41]
capable of accurate judicial cognizance, namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent
spouse.
The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is
misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the absentee still lives, he shall
be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten
years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in
order that his succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among
the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has
not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not
been known for four years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being unknown
whether or not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of judicial
[42]
declaration. However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on
presumptive death, reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the
[43]
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
[44]
With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years under the first paragraph of
Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may
contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the
[45]
presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the
[46]
absentee spouse. As explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the
contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of
death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old
rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can
institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in
consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article
41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
The Court rejects petitioners contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for declaration
of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present
to contract a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision
was designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the
confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.
[47]
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela that, for purposes of the
marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee before the
spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage,
however, the law only requires that the former spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living,
that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of
[48] [49]
the celebration of the marriage. In In Re Szatraw, the Court declared that a judicial declaration that
a person is presumptively dead, because he or she had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final;
and that proof of actual death of the person presumed dead being unheard from in seven years, would have
to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined. The Court ruled that if a
judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead because he or she had not been heard from in seven
years cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an
appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a
petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The
Court stated that it should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and
[50]
meaningless act. The Court also took note that a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of
an absent spouse may even be made in collusion with the other spouse.
[51]
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines, the Court declared that the words proper proceedings
in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by law such as Articles 390
and 391 of the Civil Code which refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased
[52]
person. In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines, the Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein
that, under Article 390 of the Civil Code, the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death of a
person after an absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that the provision of Article 349 or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in the proper
proceedings is erroneous and should be considered as not written. He opined that such provision
presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not
been declared presumptively dead in a proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He
[53]
maintains that the supposition is not true. A second marriage is bigamous only when the circumstances
[54]
in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not present. Former Senator Ambrosio
Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of dissolution or
judicial declaration of absence but even with such decree, a second marriage in good faith will not
constitute bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give
[55]
rise to bigamy. Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view that in the case of an
absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code, the spouse present cannot
[56]
be charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a second marriage.
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a
spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after
securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and
convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief
[57]
that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present
spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with
bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by former
Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:
Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing that the present spouse
must first ask for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy
in case he or she marries again.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the present spouse
contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the
declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latters reappearance. This
provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of
the Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively dead,
[58]
the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second marriage is already established.
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that
things are now clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now authorized for purposes
of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice,
with possible clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the
facts. The judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the said absentee.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead x x x should be disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph
3 of the Civil Code. With the new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration
[59]
of the presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on Criminal Law,
in some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of
[60]
presumptive death, which could then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate.
Before such declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in
[61]
good faith. Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and
the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however, appears to have been set to rest by
Article 41 of the Family Code, which requires a summary hearing for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absent spouse before the other spouse can remarry.
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same
[62]
Code.
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for awarding moral damages
in favor of the private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in
any of the cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner
[63]
asserts that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc, where an award of moral
damages for bigamy was disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed
to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding that she
adduced evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not included in those
cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages
against the petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v.
Bondoc:
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daos, ello se debi indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del
Cdigo Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicacin de daos morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto, violacin,
adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeracin el delito de bigamia. No existe,
[64]
por consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aqu los daos de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados.
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and the law. The
OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.
The Court rules against the petitioner.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants
[65]
wrongful act or omission. An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the following
conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by
the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third, the wrongful act
or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the
award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil
[66]
Code.
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases enumerated in
Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may
also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No.
9 of this article in the order named.
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the aggrieved
party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there
[67]
would not have been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 2219 and analogous cases
(which refer to those cases bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling, in
[68]
other respects, as in form, proportion, relation, etc.)
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in
which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party.
Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in
relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. This provision contains
what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. The standards
are the following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The
elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the
[69]
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially
provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the
standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
[70]
committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. If the provision does not provide a remedy
for its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be
proper. Article 20 provides that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage
to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. On the other hand, Article 21 provides that any person
who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. The latter provision
is adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate
legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prove
for specifically in the statutes. Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in
damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends
[71]
upon the circumstances of each case.
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured
her that he was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and
his parents made the same assurance that he was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the
petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner
and dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For
two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that
he was already married to another before they were married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners chicanery and heartless
deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he
maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of
a single man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a
[72]
man who it turned out was not her lawful husband.
The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his
marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the
latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in
[73]
Morris v. Macnab, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries, damages for shame,
humiliation, and mental anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra,
at p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all recognize that where the wrong is
willful rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences
though they consist of shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117
NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591,
99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the defendants conduct was not merely
negligent, but was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in shame, humiliation, and
mental anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to
compensatory but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v
Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev.
517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because of the defendants bigamous marriage to her and the attendant
publicity she not only was embarrassed and ashamed to go out but couldnt sleep but couldnt eat, had terrific
headaches and lost quite a lot of weight. No just basis appears for judicial interference with the jurys
reasonable allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super
[74]
249, 117 A.2d 298 (App. Div. 1955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert
the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners perfidy, she is not barred
from claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would not prevent her from
[75]
recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:
Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in consequence of
such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense,
he has a right of action against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by him in consequence of
his having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17
N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation by the defendant that he was divorced
from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It
seems to have been assumed that the fact that she had unintentionally violated the law or innocently
committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground
for enhancing her damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the promise to give
the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband and to assume and act in a relation
and condition that proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to be
recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of the
law by herself but upon the defendants misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed, innocently
on her part, were but one of the incidental results of the defendants fraud for which damages may be
assessed.
[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage relation have been
maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819;
Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v.
Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery
where the circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal action
was induced solely by the defendants misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of action upon
any transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the enforcement of a contract
illegal on its face or to one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which
[76]
the cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958.
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral
damages to be just and reasonable.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ DANTE O. TINGA

On leave
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

Chief Justice
* On leave.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, concurring; rollo,
pp. 28-41.
[2]
Penned by Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan.
[3]
Records, p. 1.
[4]
Exhibit B, records, p. 7.
[5]
Exhibit A, id. at 6.
[6]
TSN, April 23, 2002, p. 15.
[7]
Exhibit B, records, p. 7.
[8]
TSN, April 23, 2002, p. 15.
[9]
Records, pp. 111-116.
[10]
58 Phil. 817 (1933).
[11]
1 Phil. 109 (1902).
[12]
G.R. No. 111656, March 20, 1996, 255 SCRA 202.
[13]
32 Phil 202 (1915).
[14]
G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 20.
[15]
G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000, 337 SCRA 122.
[16]
G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993, 226 SCRA 572.
[17]
Rollo, p. 41.
[18]
Rollo, pp. 14-15.
[19]
Supra, at note 14.
[20]
CUELLO CALON, DERECHO PENAL REFORMADO, VOL. V, 627.
[21]
AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, VOL. III, 497 (1988 ed.) (emphasis supplied).
[22]
Id. at 634.
[23]
People v. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 247 (1935).
[24]
Tres son los elementos esenciales del mismo; el vinculo matrimonial anterior, la celebracin de nuevo matrimonio antes de la disolucin de ese
vinculo anterior, y por ultimo, la intencin fraudulenta, que constituye la criminalidad misma del acto. Este ultimo elemento no lo consigna el
articulo, por hallarse indudablemente embebido en ese principio anterior a todos los Codigos, e inscrito en el frontispicio del nuestro (Art. I.), que
donde no hay voluntad, no hay delito. xxx (CODIGO PENAL REFORMADO, TOMO 5, 560) Groizard is of the view that bigamy may be committed
by culpa. (id. at 558).
[25]
DERECHO PENAL REFORMADO, VOL. 1, 629-630.
[26]
Supra, at note 16.
[27]
Supra, at note 15.
[28]
ALBERT, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, 819 (1932 ed.).
[29]
Id.
[30]
L.B. REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, BOOK ONE, 37 (13th ed. 1993).
[31]
United States v. Pealosa, 1 Phil. 109.
[32]
WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW, VOLUME 1, 302.
[33]
People v. Vogel, 46 Cal.2d. 798; 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
[34]
WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW, VOL. 1, 203.
[35]
Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111656, March 20, 1996, 255 SCRA 202.
[36]
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 747.
[37]
People v. Bitdu, supra, at note 10.
[38]
Geisselman v. Geisselman, 134 Md. 453, 107 A. 185 (1919).
[39]
WHARTON CRIMINAL LAW, VOL. 2, 2377 (12th ed., 1932).
[40]
Id.
[41]
Id.
[42]
TOLENTINO, THE NEW CIVIL CODE, VOL. I, 690.
[43]
Emphasis supplied.
[44]
The Family Code (Executive Order No. 209) took effect on August 4, 1988.
[45]
Navarro v. Domagtoy, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996, 259 SCRA 129.
[46]
G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 201.
[47]
64 Phil. 179 (1937).
[48]
Id. at 83.
[49]
81 Phil. 461 (1948).
[50]
Id. at 463.
[51]
98 Phil. 574 (1956).
[52]
107 Phil. 381 (1960).
[53]
AQUINO, REVISED PENAL CODE, VOL. III, 490.
[54]
Id. at 497.
[55]
PADILLA, COMMENTS ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE, VOL. IV, 717-718.
[56]
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, 1981 ED., VOL. II, 906.
[57]
Republic v. Nolasco, supra, at note 19.
[58]
HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE, 48-49.
[59]
THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED, 62-63 (1992 ed.).
[60]
REGALADO, CRIMINAL LAW CONSPECTUS, 633 (1st ed., 2000), citing Lukban v. Republic, supra.
[61]
Id. citing People v. Reyes, CA-G.R. No. 12107-R, June 30, 1955, and People v. Malana, CA-G.R. No. 5347, January 30, 1940.
[62]
SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 358.
[63]
CA-G.R. No. 22573-R, April 23, 1959.
[64]
Article 2217, Civil Code.
[65]
Francisco v. Ferrer, Jr., G.R. No. 142029, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 261.
[66]
Id. at 266.
[67]
TOLENTINO, NEW CIVIL CODE, VOL. II, 658, citing People v. Plaza, 52 O.G. 6609.
[68]
Id.
[69]
Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993, 217 SCRA 16.
[70]
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989, 176 SCRA 778.
[71]
Id.
[72]
Leventhal v. Liberman, 186 N.E. 675 (1933).
[73]
135 A.2d 657 (1957).
[74]
Id. at 662.
[75]
Id. at 611-612.
[76]
164 N.E. 609 (1929).
8/23/2017 G.R. No. L-47722
Custom Search

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.

Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibaez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief
of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty
by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty
of from one year and six months to two years and two months of prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received
escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod
accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta,
and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the
office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a newspaper
clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the
instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise
called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he
answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of
police tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and
failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two
groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to the
house where Irene was supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida
Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place
and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately
returned to her own room which was very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and
Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they
were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the
gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the
defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and
killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson,
Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to
who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was
thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds
inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the testimony of
Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta, when
he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1943/jul1943/gr_l-47722_1943.html 1/6
8/23/2017 G.R. No. L-47722
the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in
the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If
you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was about to sit
up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is
Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after having said, "if
you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still lying
on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the
door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and picking up something from
the floor, he fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only because they are
vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are materially contradictory.
Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently watching somebody in an attitudes of picking
up something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson while the latter was about to
sit up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed
Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still
lying on bed. It is apparent from these contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of
the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their mutual incriminating averments dovetail with and
corroborate substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to Requinea, Tecson
was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is confirmed by both
appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was
still in bed about to sit up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot
Tecson, the latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that the trial court had the opportunity to
observe her demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold that no error was committed in accepting her testimony
and in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's
testimony will show not only that her version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity.
In her cross-examination, even misleading questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the witness having
stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in
disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards the door,
Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but
without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the question is whether or not they
may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants
acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson
was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared
them guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the
circumstances of the case, the crime committed by appellants is murder through specially mitigated by
circumstances to be mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah
Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed
without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was awakened by
someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the
intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that
precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door and believing that he was then
being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-
mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a footpad at night
and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He
was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was
loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances,
there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no
time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no
alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant
case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press
them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to
ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort
to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only
legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not
8/23/2017 G.R. No. L-47722
to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by
him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and
detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself
from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating
him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S.,
par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force
shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is
necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal
liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109).
It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to
the peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his
arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the
principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to life which
he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal
offers resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot
see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands
of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can
justify precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost
an innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a
reasonably prudent man, condemnation not condonation should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a
premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental.
In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another
act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para que se celifique un
hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de daar; existiendo esa
intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente
el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed.
pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the
idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such
unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of
alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance
defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person incurs no
criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two
requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the
instance case, only the first requisite is present appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second
requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of
their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are
overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in
the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him
and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the
mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5)
years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay
the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.
Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.
Separate Opinions
8/23/2017 G.R. No. L-47722
PARAS, J., dissenting:
Anselmo Balagtas, a life termer and notorious criminal, managed to escape and flee form Manila to the provinces.
Receiving information to the effect that he was staying with one Irene in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, the office of the
Constabulary in Manila ordered the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan by telegram dispatched on December 25,
1938, to get Balagtas "dead or alive". Among those assigned to the task of carrying out the said order, were Antonio
Z. Oanis, chief of police of Cabanatuan, and Alberto Galanta, a Constabulary corporal, to whom the telegram
received by the Provincial Inspector and a newspaper picture of Balagtas were shown. Oanis, Galanta and a
Constabulary private, after being told by the Provincial Inspector to gather information about Balagtas, "to arrest him
and, if overpowered, to follow the instructions contained in the telegram," proceeded to the place where the house of
Irene was located. Upon arriving thereat, Oanis approached Brigida Mallari, who was then gathering banana stalks
in the yard, and inquired for the room of Irene. After Mallari had pointed out the room, she was asked by Oanis to tell
where Irene's paramour, Balagtas, was, whereupon Mallari answered that he was sleeping with Irene. Upon
reaching the room indicated, Oanis and Galanta, after the former had shouted "Stand up, if you are Balagtas,"
started shooting the man who was found by them lying down beside a woman. The man was thereby killed, but
Balagtas was still alive, for it turned out that the person shot by Oanis and Galanta was one Serapio Tecson.
Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged with having committed murder. The Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, however, convicted them only of homicide through reckless imprudence and sentenced them each to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of from 1 year and 6 months to 2 years and 2 months of prision correctional, to
jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Serapio Tecson in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. Oanis and
Galanta have appealed.
In accomplishing the acts with which the appellants were charged, they undoubtedly followed the order issued by
the Constabulary authorities in Manila requiring the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan to get Balagtas dead or
alive, in the honest belief that Serapio Tecson was Anselmo Balagtas. As the latter became a fugitive criminal, with
revolvers in his possession and a record that made him extremely dangerous and a public terror, the Constabulary
authorities were justified in ordering his arrest, whether dead or alive. In view of said order and the danger faced by
the appellants in carrying it out, they cannot be said to have acted feloniously in shooting the person honestly
believed by them to be the wanted man. Conscious of the fact that Balagtas would rather kill than be captured, the
appellants did not want to take chances and should not be penalized for such prudence. On the contrary, they
should be commended for their bravery and courage bordering on recklessness because, without knowing or
ascertaining whether the wanted man was in fact asleep in his room, they proceeded thereto without hesitation and
thereby exposed their lives to danger.
The Solicitor-General, however, contends that the appellants were authorized to use their revolvers only after being
overpowered by Balagtas. In the first place, the alleged instruction by the Provincial Inspector to that effect, was in
violation of the express order given by the Constabulary authorities in Manila and which was shown to the
appellants. In the second place, it would indeed be suicidal for the appellants or, for that matter, any agent of the
authority to have waited until they have been overpowered before trying to put our such a character as Balagtas. In
the third place, it is immaterial whether or not the instruction given by the Provincial Inspector was legitimate and
proper, because the facts exist that the appellants acted in conformity with the express order of superior
Constabulary authorities, the legality or propriety of which is not herein questioned.
The theory of the prosecution has acquired some plausibility, though quite psychological or sentimental, in view only
of the fact that it was not Balagtas who was actually killed, but an "innocent man . . . while he was deeply asleep."
Anybody's heart will be profoundly grieved by the trade, but in time will be consoled by the realization that the life of
Serapio Tecson was not vainly sacrificed, for the incident will always serve as a loud warning to any one desiring to
follow in the footsteps of Anselmo Balagtas that in due time the duly constituted authorities will, upon proper order,
enforce the summary forfeiture of his life.
In my opinion, therefore, the appellants are not criminally liable if the person killed by them was in fact Anselmo
Balagtas for the reason that they did so in the fulfillment of their duty and in obedience to an order issued by a
superior for some lawful purpose (Revised Penal Code, art. 11, pars. 5 and 6). They also cannot be held criminally
liable even if the person killed by them was not Anselmo Balagtas, but Serapio Tecson, because they did so under
an honest mistake of fact not due to negligence or bad faith. (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488).
It is true that, under article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a
felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; but said article is clearly inapplicable
since the killing of the person who was believed to be Balagtas was, as already stated, not wrongful or felonious.
8/23/2017 G.R. No. L-47722
The case of U.S. vs. Mendieta (34 Phil., 242), cited by the Solicitor-General, is not in point, inasmuch as the
defendant therein, who intended to injure Hilario Lauigan with whom he had a quarrel, but killed another by mistake,
would not be exempted from criminal liability if he actually injured or killed Hilario Lauigan, there being a malicious
design on his part. The other case involved by the prosecution is U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234). This is also not in
point, as it appears that the defendants therein killed one Pedro Almasan after he had already surrendered and
allowed himself to be bound and that the said defendants did not have lawful instructions from superior authorities to
capture Almasan dead or alive.
The appealed judgment should therefore be reversed and the appellants, Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta,
acquitted, with costs de oficio.
HONTIVEROS, J., dissenting:
According to the opinion of the majority, it is proper to follow the rule that a notorious criminal "must be taken by
storm without regard to his life which he has, by his conduct, already forfeited," whenever said criminal offers
resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Precisely, the situation which
confronted the accused-appellants Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta in the afternoon of December 24, 1938,
was very similar to this. It must be remembered that both officers received instructions to get Balagtas "dead or
alive" and according to the attitude of not only the said appellants but also of Capt. Monsod, constabulary provincial
inspector of Nueva Ecija, it may be assumed that said instructions gave more emphasis to the first part; namely, to
take him dead. It appears in the record that after the shooting, and having been informed of the case, Capt. Monsod
stated that Oanis and Galanta might be decorated for what they had done. That was when all parties concerned
honestly believed that the dead person was Balagtas himself, a dangerous criminal who had escaped from his
guards and was supposedly armed with a .45 caliber pistol Brigida Mallari, the person whom the appellants met
upon arriving at the house of Irene Requinea, supposed mistress of Balagtas, informed them that said Balagtas was
upstairs. Appellants found there asleep a man closely resembling the wanted criminal. Oanis said: If you are
Balagtas stand up," But the supposed criminal showed his intention to attack the appellants, a conduct easily
explained by the fact that he should have felt offended by the intrusion of persons in the room where he was
peacefully lying down with his mistress. In such predicament, it was nothing but human on the part of the appellants
to employ force and to make use of their weapons in order to repel the imminent attack by a person who, according
to their belief, was Balagtas It was unfortunate, however that an innocent man was actually killed. But taking into
consideration the facts of the case, it is, according to my humble opinion, proper to apply herein the doctrine laid
down in the case of U.S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488). In the instant case we have, as in the case supra, an
innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness on the part of the accused, who having no time
to make a further inquiry, had no alternative but to take the facts as they appeared to them and act immediately.
The decision of the majority, in recognition of the special circumstances of this case which favored the accused-
appellants, arrives at the conclusion that an incomplete justifying circumstance may be invoked, and therefore,
according to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should be one which is lower by one or
two degrees than that prescribed by law. This incomplete justifying circumstance is that defined in Article 11, No. 5
of the Revised Penal Code, in favor of "a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office." I believe that the application of this circumstance is not proper. Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code
provides as follows:
Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. A penalty lower by one
or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of
the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several
cases mentioned in articles 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts
shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the
conditions of exemption present or lacking.
This provision has been copied almost verbatim from Article 84 of the old Penal Code of the Philippines, and which
was also taken from Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
Judge Guillermo Guevara, one of the members of the Committee created by Administrative Order No. 94 of the
Department of Justice for the drafting of the Revised Penal Code, in commenting on Article 69, said that the
justifying circumstances and circumstances exempting from liability which are the subject matter of this article are
the following: self-defense, defense of relatives, defense of strangers, state of necessity and injury caused by mere
accident. Accordingly, justifying circumstance No. 5 of Article 11 dealing with the fulfillment of a duty or the lawful
exercise of a right, calling or office, cannot be placed within its scope.
8/23/2017 G.R. No. L-47722
The eminent treatiser of criminal law Mr. Groizard, in his commentary of Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code of
1870 which is the source of Article 69 of our Code says:
Ni tratandose de la imbecilidad, ni de la locura, ni de la menor edad, ni del que obra violentado por una
fuerza inrresistible o impulsado por miedo insuperable de un mal igual o mayor, o en cumplimiento de un
deber, o en el ejercito legitimo de un derecho, oficio o cargo, o en virtud de obediencia debida, ni del que
incurre en alguna omision hallandose impedido por causa legitima o insuperable, puede tener aplicacion al
articulo que comentamos. Y la razon es obvia. En ninguna de estas execiones hay pluralidad de requisitos.
La irrespondabilidad depende de una sola condicion. Hay o no perturbacion de la razon; el autor del hecho
es o no menor de nueve aos; existe o no violencia material o moral irresistible, etc., etc.; tal es lo que
respectivamente hay que examinar y resolver para declarar la culpabilidad o inculpabilidad. Es, por lo tanto,
imposible que acontezca lo que el texto que va al frente de estas lineas rquiere, para que se imponga al
autor del hecho la penalidad excepcional que establece; esto es, que falten algunos requisitos de los que la
ley exige para eximir de responsabilidad, y que concurran el mayor numero de ellos, toda vez que, en los
casos referidos, la ley no exige multiples condiciones.
It must be taken into account the fact according to Article 69 a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the
conditions required by the law to justify the same or exempt from criminal liability. The word "conditions" should not
be confused with the word "requisites". In dealing with justifying circumstance No. 5 Judge Guevara states: "There
are two requisites in order that this circumstance may be taken into account: (a) That the offender acted in the
performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) That the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office." It is evident that
these two requisites concur in the present case if we consider the intimate connection between the order given to
the appellant by Capt. Monsod, the showing to them of the telegram from Manila to get Balagtas who was with a
bailarina named Irene, the conduct of said appellants in questioning Brigida Mallari and giving a warning to the
supposed criminal when both found him with Irene, and the statement made by Capt. Monsod after the shooting.
If appellant Oanis is entitled to a reversal of the decision of the court below, there are more reasons in favor of the
acquittal of appellant Galanta. According to the evidence no bullet from the gun fired by this accused ever hit
Serapio Tecson. Galanta was armed in the afternoon of December 24, 1938, with a .45 caliber revolver (Exhibit L).
He so testified and was corroborated by the unchallenged testimony of his superior officer Sgt. Valeriano Serafica.
According to this witness, since Galanta was made a corporal of the Constabulary he was given, as part of his
equipment, revolver Exhibit L with a serial No. 37121. This gun had been constantly used by Galanta, and,
according to Sgt. Pedro Marasigan, who accompanied said accused when he took it from his trunk in the barracks
on the night of December 24, 1938, upon order of Captain Monsod, it was the same revolver which was given to the
witness with five .45 caliber bullets and one empty shell. Fourteen unused bullets were also taken from Galanta by
Sergeant Serafica, thus completing his regular equipment of twenty bullets which he had on the morning of
December 24, 1938, when Sergeant Serafica made the usual inspection of the firearms in the possession of the
non-commissioned officers and privates of the constabulary post at Cabanatuan. Galanta stated that he had fired
only one shot and missed. This testimony is corroborated by that of a ballistic expert who testified that bullets
exhibits F and O, the first being extracted from the head of the deceased, causing wound No. 3 of autopsy report
Exhibit C and the second found at the place of the shooting, had not been fired from revolver Exhibit L nor from
any other revolver of the constabulary station in Cabanatuan. It was impossible for the accused Galanta to have
substituted his revolver because when Exhibit L was taken from him nobody in the barracks doubted that the
deceased was none other than Balagtas. Moreover, Exhibit L was not out of order and therefore there was no
reason why Galanta should carry along another gun, according to the natural course of things. On the other hand,
aside from wound No. 3 as above stated, no other wound may be said to have been caused by a .45 caliber
revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives the conclusion that wound No. 2 must have been caused by a .45
caliber revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives the conclusion that wound No. 2 must have been caused by a
.45 caliber bullet, but inasmuch as the diameter of the wound's entrance was only 8 mm., the caliber should be .32
and not .45, because according to the medico-legal expert who testified in this case, a bullet of a .45 caliber will
produce a wound entrance with either 11 mm. or 12 mm. diameter. All other wounds found by the surgeon who
performed the autopsy appeared to have been caused by bullets of a lesser caliber. In consequence, it can be
stated that no bullet fired by Galanta did ever hit or kill Serapio Tecson and therefore there is no reason why he
should be declared criminally responsible for said death.
8/23/2017 People vs Delos Santos : 135919 : May 9, 2003 : J. Sandoval-Gutierrez : En Banc
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135919. May 9, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DANNY DELOS SANTOS Y FERNANDEZ,

appellant.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision[1] dated October 2, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 3551798, finding appellant Danny delos Santos guilty of the crime of
murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
In the Information[2] dated February 23, 1998, appellant was charged with murder, thus:
That on or about the 6th day of November 1997, in the Municipality of San Jose, Del Monte, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a kitchen knife, with
intent to kill one Rod Flores y Juanitas, with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said kitchen knife said
Rod Flores y Juanitas, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which
directly caused his death.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.[3] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution
presented Marcelino de Leon, Marvin Tablate, Dr. Benito Caballero and Romeo Flores as its witnesses.
Appellant and Sonny Bautista took the witness stand for the defense.
Marcelino De Leon testified that at around 8:00 p.m. of November 6, 1997, he saw Rod Flores drinking gin
with Narciso Salvador, Marvin Tablate and Jayvee Rainier at the latters house in Sarmiento Homes, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan.[4] As he was about to fetch water from a nearby faucet, he approached them and borrowed
Flores cart.[5] While waiting for the cart, he stood across Flores who was then seated and conversing with the
group.[6] Suddenly, appellant emerged from the back of Flores and stabbed him with a knife,[7] making an upward
and downward thrust.[8] Flores ran after he was stabbed twice.[9] Appellant pursued him and stabbed him many
times.[10] As a result, Flores intestines bulged out of his stomach.[11] Appellant ceased stabbing Flores only after
he saw him dead. Thereafter, he turned his ire against Jayvee Rainier and chased him. Fearful for his life,
witness De Leon hid himself and later on reported the incident to the police.[12]
Marvin Tablate corroborated De Leons testimony. On cross-examination, Tablate testified that he tried to help
Flores by separating him from the appellant who ran away.[13] He also testified that the latter joined his group at
about 11:00 a.m. and kept on coming back and forth.
Dr. Caballero declared on the witness stand that Flores suffered twenty-one (21) stab wounds in the frontal,
posterior and lateral side of his body, eleven (11) of which were fatal. Dr. Caballero said it was possible that
appellant was behind Flores considering the stab wounds inflicted at his back.[14] According to the doctor, Flores
died because of massive external/internal hemorrhages due to multiple stab wounds in the thorax and abdomen
penetrating both lungs, heart, stomach, liver, spleen and intestines.[15]
Romeo Flores testified that his son Rod Flores was then working at Vitarich, Marilao, Bulacan, earning
P600.00 every 15th day of the month;[16] that he spent P100,000.00 for his sons burial and wake; that he has
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/may2003/135919.htm 1/8
receipts in the amount of P19,110.00 spent for the funeral services and the cost of the cemetery lot[17] and a list
of other expenses in the amount of P35,960.00;[18] and that his family has been grieving for the loss of a loved
one.
Appellant had a different version of the events. He denied the accusation and declared that on November 6,
1997 at 8:00 p.m., he was in his aunties house in Muson, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan,[19] forty (40) meters
away from the scene of the crime. He was then fetching water.[20] Earlier, at about 5:30 p.m., he and Flores met
but they did not greet each other. There was no altercation between them. Hence, he could not understand why
De Leon and Tablate testified against him.
Sonny Bautista testified that on that particular date and time, he and appellant were in their aunties house in
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.[21] They watched television up to 8:30 p.m. and then went home. At about 10:00
p.m., appellant was arrested. Bautista did not inform the policemen that they were watching television in their
aunties house at the time the crime took place. Neither did he accompany appellant to the police station.[22]
On October 2, 1998, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
All premises considered, this Court resolves and so holds that the prosecution has been able to establish the criminal
culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Danny delos Santos is hereby found guilty of the crime of
Murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
In the imposition of the penalty, the Court hereby takes into account the brutality in the manner by which the life of the
victim was taken, and if only to serve as deterrent to others who might be similarly obsessed, it is believed that the higher of
the two penalties provided should be meted to the accused herein. Absent any circumstance that would mitigate the severity
of his criminal act and pursuant to Articles 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6, Republic Act no. 7659,
the accused Danny delos Santos y Fernandez is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death by lethal injection.
Further, the accused is condemned to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the amount of P50,000.00 for the victims death.
Moreover, accused delos Santos is ordered to pay the said heirs of the deceased Rod Flores the following sums of money:
1. P264,000.00 for loss of earning capacity;
2. P55,070.00 for actual and compensatory damages;
3. P50,000.00 for moral damages;
4. P50,000.00 for exemplary damages.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
In his Appellants brief, appellant ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY
OF THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESSES, AND IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELANT ON GROUND OF
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF

VICTIM THE AMOUNT OF P50,000.00 FOR VICTIMS DEATH; P264,000.00 FOR LOSS OF EARNING
CAPACITY; P55,070.00 FOR ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES; P50,000.00 FOR MORAL
DAMAGES; AND P50,000.00 FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.[23]
Appellant contends that there are some inconsistencies between the testimonies of De Leon and Tablate, the
prosecution witnesses. Also, there is no evidence that he has a motive to kill Flores. In fact, there was no
previous heated argument or altercation between them. That the prosecution witnesses executed their sworn
statements only after two months from the commission of the crime raises doubt as to their credibility. Finally, the
evidence for the prosecution failed to meet the exacting test of moral certainty, hence, the trial court should not
have ordered him to indemnify the heirs of Flores.
The Solicitor General, in the Appellees brief, counters that: (a) the inconsistencies pointed out by appellant
are minor and do not vitiate the fact that he was the one who killed Flores; (b) appellants defenses of alibi and
denial are worthless since he was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses; (c) he failed to proffer any
explanation why the prosecution witnesses implicated him; (d) the crime was aggravated by cruelty because he
butchered Flores until his intestines bulged out of his stomach; and (e) the heirs of Flores are entitled to
indemnification as it has been shown beyond reasonable doubt that appellant killed him.
The first assigned error involves a determination of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Settled is the
rule that when it comes to credibility of witnesses, appellate courts generally do not overturn the findings of trial
courts. The latter are in a best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses
through their actual observation of the witnesses manner of testifying, demeanor and behavior in court.[24]
We see no reason to deviate from this rule.
Appellant maintains that there are inconsistencies in the testimonies of De Leon and Tablate. While De Leon
testified that appellant did not join Flores group, however, Tablate declared that he was drinking gin with them at
about 11:00 a.m. De Leon testified that no one assisted Flores when he was being attacked by appellant.
However, Tablate stated that he attempted to separate Flores from appellant after the former had sustained two
stab wounds.
The first alleged inconsistency is understandable. Unlike Tablate who was with the group in a drinking spree,
De Leon approached Flores only when he borrowed the cart from the latter at about 8:00 p.m. He stayed with
Flores group only for about thirty minutes,[25] or up to 8:30 p.m. Thus, he could not have observed that appellant
joined the group earlier, or at about 11:00 a.m.
The second alleged inconsistency is a minor one that does not enfeeble the prosecutions theory that
appellant killed Flores. Evident from De Leons testimony is the fact that he was so shocked in witnessing the
gruesome killing of his companion. With such a state of mind, it would be too much to demand from him a full
recollection of the details surrounding the event. Many times we have ruled that inconsistencies in the testimony
of witnesses when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their
declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony.[26] They only serve to strengthen rather than weaken
the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[27] What we find important in the
case at bar is that the two prosecution witnesses were one in saying that it was appellant who stabbed Flores
with a knife. We quote the clear and straightforward account of the incident by De Leon and Tablate. During
cross-examination, De Leon testified as follows:
Atty. De la Cruz:
Q You did not see the accused because it was dark in that place, is it not?
A No, sir, he suddenly appeared from the back of Rod Flores and started stabbing Rod that is why we
were surprised.
Court:
Q How did the accused thrust the weapon to the victim?
A (Witness demonstrating by making upward, downward thrust at the back of the victim)
Atty. De la Cruz
Q Where was Rod Flores hit, if you know?
A At the back, sir.
Q How many times?

A At first, twice, sir.
Court:
Q That was the time when Rod Flores ran away after having been stabbed twice.
A Yes, Your Honor.
xxxxxx
Court:
Q How did the accused thrust for the second time the weapon at the back of the victim.
A Both at the back, sir.
xxxxxx
Atty. De la Cruz:
Q Was Rod Flores able to ran away?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you when Rod Flores was running away?
A We were left behind, sir. I was not able to move anymore.
Q And was the accused able to reach Flores?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did the accused do?
A Again, he started stabbing at the back, sir.
Q So the stabbing was inflicted at the back of the victim?
A Not all, sir, because he turned him face up and stabbed him again, sir.[28]
Tablates direct testimony reads:
Fiscal Vicente:
xxxxxx
Q How did Danny delos Santos stab Rod Flores?
A Patalikod, sir.
Q What do you mean?
A Danny delos Santos stabbed Rod Flores at the back, sir.
Q When you said Danny delos Santos stabbed Rod Flores at the back, are you saying that Danny delos
Santos was at the back of Rod Flores at the time?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many times did the accused stab Rod Flores?
A I saw him stabbed the victim twice, sir. (Witness demonstrated in downward position as if he was
holding something).
Q What was he holding?
A A knife, sir.
xxxxxx
Court:
xxxxxx
Q Are you sure that when Rod Flores fell to the ground, he was not able to rise nor was he able to run
away?
A He was able to run but then he was drunk and the accused was able to catch and stab him again, sir.
xxxxxx
Q Are you positive to the identity of Danny delos Santos that he was the one who stabbed Rod Flores?
A Yes, sir.[29]
Appellant argues that since the prosecution witnesses testified that there was no altercation between him
and Flores, it follows that no motive to kill can be attributed to him. This is an inconsequential argument. Proof of
motive is not indispensable for a conviction, particularly where the accused is positively identified by an
eyewitness and his participation is adequately established.[30] In People vs. Galano,[31] we ruled that in the
crime of murder, motive is not an element of the offense, it becomes material only when the evidence is
circumstantial or inconclusive and there is some doubt on whether the accused had committed it. In the case
before us, no such doubt exits as De Leon and Tablate positively identified appellant.
In a last-ditch attempt to cast doubt on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant questions why
their statements were taken only on January 29, 1998 when the incident happened on November 6, 1997. The
two-month delay is hardly an indicium of a concocted story. It is but natural for witnesses to avoid being involved
in a criminal proceeding particularly when the crime committed is of such gravity as to show the cruelty of the
perpetrator. Born of human experience, the fear of retaliation can have a paralyzing effect to the witnesses.[32]
Thus, in People vs. Dacibar,[33] we held that the initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a
criminal case is of common knowledge and has been judicially declared as insufficient to affect credibility,
especially when a valid reason exists for such hesitance.
Anent the second error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in indemnifying the heirs of Flores since
his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Suffice it to state at this point that the evidence for the
prosecution produces moral certainty that appellant is guilty of the crime charged, hence, should be answerable
for all its consequences.
As earlier mentioned, appellants defenses are mere alibi and denial. He testified that at the time the crime
took place, he was in his aunties house in Muson, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. When probed by the trial court,
he categorically stated that the house is only 40 meters away from the scene of the crime and may be traveled in
about three or five minutes.[34] For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be convincing enough to preclude any
doubt on the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.
[35]
Certainly, the required impossibility does not exist here.
Weighing the evidence of the prosecution vis--vis that of the defense, the scale of justice must tilt in favor of
the former. Time and again, we ruled that positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without
any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial
which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of
weight in law.[36] With marked relevance is the fact that appellant did not present any evidence to show that the
prosecution witnesses, in testifying against him, have improper motive.
The prosecution was able to establish that appellants attack on Flores was from behind without any slightest
provocation on his part[37] and that it was sudden and unexpected. This is a clear case of treachery. Where the
victim was totally unprepared for the unexpected attack from behind with no weapon to resist it, the stabbing
could only be described as treacherous.[38] There being treachery, appellants conviction for murder is in order.
However, in the imposition of penalty, we cannot appreciate the aggravating circumstance of cruelty
considered by the trial court. Pursuant to the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, every Information must
state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances.[39] This rule may be given retroactive effect
in the light of the well-established rule that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.[40] The aggravating circumstance of
cruelty, not having been alleged in the Information, may not be appreciated to enhance the liability of appellant.
Under Article 248[41] of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the consummated crime of murder is
reclusion perpetua to death. In this case, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties shall be imposed, there being
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending the crime.[42]
In keeping with the current jurisprudence, the heirs of Flores are entitled to the amount of P50,000.00 by way
of civil indemnity ex delicto.[43] As regards the actual damages, it appears that out of the P55,070.00 awarded by
the trial court, only P19,170.00[44] was actually supported by receipts. The other amounts were based solely on a
list prepared by Romeo Flores. To be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of
loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable
to the injured party.[45] In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to present receipts for the other expenses
incurred. Thus, in light of the recent case of People vs. Abrazaldo,[46] we grant the award of P25,000.00 as
temperate damages inasmuch as the proven actual damages is less than P25,000.00. The moral damages
awarded in the amount of P50,000.00 is affirmed, there being proofs that because of Flores death, his heirs
suffered wounded feelings, mental anguish, anxiety and similar injury.[47] However, we reduce to P25,000.00 only
the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.[48]
The amount of indemnity for loss of earning capacity is based on the income at the time of death and the
probable life expectancy of the victim. In the case at bar, the trial court found that Flores annual gross income is
P14,400.00 computed at the rate of P1,200.00 a month for twelve (12) months. From this amount is deducted the
necessary and incidental expenses, estimated at 50%, leaving a balance of P7,200.00. His net income would
then be multiplied by his life expectancy, using the following formula: 2/3 x 80 25 (age of the victim at time of
death). Considering that he was 25 years old when he died, his life expectancy would be 37. Multiplying the net
balance of his annual income by his life expectancy, the loss of his earning is P266,400.00, thus:
In computing the life expectancy and loss of earning capacity of a person the following formula is used:
Life expectancy
2/3 x (80-the age of the victim at the time of death)

2/3 x (80-25)
2/3 x 55
= 36.66 or 37
Loss of earning capacity
net annual income x life expectancy

P7,200 x 37
= P266,400.00 [49]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 2, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Malolos,
Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 3551798, finding appellant Danny delos Santos y Fernandez guilty of the crime of
murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the late Rod Flores y Juanitas the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P25,0000.00 as temperate damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P266,400.00 for loss of earning capacity.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Judge Cesar M. Solis, Rollo at 123-128.
[2] Rollo at 2.
[3] Records at 15.
[4] TSN, July 3, 1998 at 2; July 1, 1998 at 4.
[5] TSN, July 1, 1998 at 5.
[6] Id. at 4.
[7] TSN, July 3, 1998 at 4.
[8] Id. at 5.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 6.
[13] Id. at 8.
[14] TSN, September 21, 1998 at 3.
[15] RTC Decision at 17, Rollo at 124.
[17] Id.
[18] Records at 99.
[20] Id. at 4.
[21] Id. at 7.
[22] Id. at 8.
[23] Rollo at 47-57.
[24] People vs. Ave, G.R. Nos. 137274-75, October 18, 2002; People vs. Alfanta, 378 Phil 95 (2000).
[25] TSN, July 1, 1998 at 5.
[26] People vs. Bato, 382 Phil 558 (2000).
[27] People vs. Dando, 382 Phil. 290 (2000).
[28] TSN, July 3, 1998 at 5-6.
[29] TSN, August 17, 1998 at 3-8.
[30] People vs. Lozada, G.R. No. 130589, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 602; Lack of motive for committing the crime does not preclude
conviction for such crime when the crime and participation of the accused are definitely proved. People vs. Quillosa, 382 Phil.
638 (2000).
[31] 384 Phil. 206 (2000).
[32] Fear of reprisal and the natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case are sufficient explanations for a witness
delay in reporting a crime to the authorities. (People vs. Galido, 383 Phil. 61 (2000).
[33] 382 Phil. 618 (2000).
[34] TSN, September 28, 1998 at 4-5.
[35] People vs. Tanail, 380 Phil. 646 (2000).
[36] People vs. Jose, 381 Phil. 845 (2000).
[37] People vs. Aquino, 379 Phil. 845 (2000); People vs. Lumacang, 381 Phil. 266 (2000).
[38] People vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. 128890, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA 485.
[39] Section 8, Rule 110.
[40] People vs. Antonio, G.R. No. 144266, November 27, 2002; People vs. Arrojado, G.R. No. 130492, January 31, 2001, 350 SCRA
679.
[41] Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death x x x.
[42] People vs. Alcodia, G.R. No. 134121, March 5, 2003; Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code; People vs. Piedad, G.R. No.
131923, December 5, 2002.
[43] People vs. Ilo, G.R. No. 140731, November 21, 2002.
[44] Records at 99, 100-103.
[45] People vs. Acosta, G.R. No. 140386, November 29, 2001; People vs. Suelto, 381 Phil. 351 (2000); People vs. Samolde, G.R. No.
128551, July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 632.
[46] G.R. No. 124392, February 6, 2003.
[47] People vs. Manlansing, G.R. No. 131736, March 11, 2002.
[48] People vs. Catubig, G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 636.
[49] People vs. Cabande, 381 Phil. 889 (2000). People vs. Rubio, G.R. No. 128871, March 17, 2003; See also People vs. Visperas, Jr.,
G.R. No. 147315, January 13, 2003, citing People vs. Laut, G.R. No. 137751, February 1, 2001, 351 SCRA 93.

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8/23/2017 G.R. No.

Today is Wednesday, August 23, 2017

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

Gibb & Gale, for appellant.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Illegal aggression.

(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.

Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:

Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

TORRES, J., dissenting:

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Wednesday, August 23, 2017

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-25366 March 29, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

Stripped to essentials, the case arose in this wise:

8 octubre 1887, 18 octubre 1927.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Wednesday, August 23, 2017

G.R. No. 152133 February 9, 2006

ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, Petitioner,

Masbate, Masbate, September 11, 1996.

Contused-abrasion, 2.3 x 1.0 cms., posterior chest wall, left side.

Hematoma, 16.0 x 8.0 cms., abdomen, along mid-line.

Hemoperitoneum, massive, clotte [sic].

Other visceral organ, pale and embalmed.

CAUSE OF DEATH: TRAUMATIC INJURY OF THE ABDOMEN.

As to injuries to the spleen, in particular,25 the same source expounds that

05. Q: Did you conduct an autopsy on his cadaver?

07. Q: What gave you that suspicion of poisoning?

A: On the left portion of his back, sir.

A We opened the head, chest and the abdomen.

Q That was part of the autopsy you have conducted?

A We examined the internal organs.

Q What in particular internal organs you have examined?

Q What particular organ are you referring to?

A The spleen, sir.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

5 Order of Release, penned by Judge Designate Silvestre L. Aguirre, Id., p. 38.

6 Bailbond, Id., pp. 32-35.

7 Certificate of Arraignment, Id., p. 46.

8 TSN, 15 January 1998, pp. 1-13.

9 TSN, 16 January 1998, pp. 1-8.

10 RTC records, p. 12.

12 Id., pp. 13-14.

13 TSN, 23 September 1997, pp. 1-16.

14 TSN, 17 March 1998, pp. 1-18.

16 Rollo, pp. 30-31.

20 Revised Rules of Court, Rule 133, Section 2.

21 TSN, 23 September 1993, p. 2.

22 Pedro P. Solis, LEGAL MEDICINE, p. 2 (1987).

23 REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Section 49.

24 Supra note 22, p. 317.

26 II Seymour I. Schwartz, et al., PRINCIPLES OF SURGERY, p. 1377 (4th ed., 1984).

27 Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186 (1957).