The Peace Process Must Live On: Juba’s Lessons and Its Legacy

June 2008

For twenty-two years, northern Ugandans have sought an end to the horrific war that has devastated
their communities and torn apart their families. The Juba negotiations process, which took place from
August of 2006 to March of 2008, came closer than any prior peace effort and provoked a surge of
international attention and diplomatic support. Though negotiators reached a final peace deal in March,
the leader of the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) Joseph Kony refused to sign. His forces, which
number less than a thousand, have established bases in South Sudan, Central African Republic, and
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and recommenced the horrific practice of abducting children to
bolster their depleted ranks.

Despite these setbacks, U.S. and international leaders must not allow the momentum gained through
this process to be lost. First, the substantial humanitarian progress made during the Juba negotiations
must be sustained and consolidated. Second, continued efforts to engage with the rebels should be
supported, but also reinforced with credible pressure on Kony and spoilers of a settlement. By learning
from Juba’s lessons and building on its legacy, lasting peace is still attainable in the near future.

The Juba Peace Talks: What Happened?

The Juba negotiations between the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the LRA, mediated by the
Government of South Sudan, were the most serious peace initiative in the history of the conflict. Such
sustained and direct dialogue between the parties, with strong regional and international support, was
unprecedented. The process facilitated dramatic improvements in regional security and humanitarian
conditions, enabling nearly 700,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Uganda to return home.

The Juba negotiations were also the first initiative to openly address the political roots of the crisis. With
input from civil society leaders, the parties signed five separate agreements that provide frameworks to
address historical grievances, facilitate disarmament and demobilization, promote reconciliation and
establish accountability for crimes committed during the war. The cumulative Final Peace Agreement
(FPA) is one of the most comprehensive of its kind, laying out a clear agenda for the transition to peace.

Kony’s failure then to sign the FPA in April 2008 and again in May 2008 delivered a devastating blow to
the process. His refusal was ostensibly the result of enduring fears for his personal security. Yet, Kony’s
anxiety can also be traced to weaknesses within the Juba initiative. Corruption and opportunism
amongst LRA negotiators—who were largely surrogates from the Ugandan Diaspora—were allegedly
exploited by GoU bribes, fueling Kony’s suspicion. These suspicions reached a climax in late 2007, with
Kony firing several of his negotiators and killing his deputy, Vincent Otti. Mixed signals from top GoU
officials added to the atmosphere of uncertainty.

Yet, Kony’s refusal to sign also demonstrated the availability of options more attractive to him than
accepting a peace settlement, especially one stipulating that he stand trial. Despite pressure on him
through Sudan’s peace agreement and outstanding International Criminal Court indictments, the
region’s porous borders and ungoverned spaces continue to provide profitable outlets for a warlord. In
addition, growing prospects of renewed instability in southern Sudan give the LRA promising
opportunities to rekindle old ties with the Government of Sudan. Without greater incentives or pressure,
Kony chose to leave such options open and maintain his maneuverability.

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Post-Juba Developments

With Kony’s refusal to sign, officials in Uganda, DRC, and South Sudan have already begun plans for a
fresh military offensive against the LRA. Although this may seem a sensible last resort, it is unclear at
present how any of the likely candidates to lead such action—the DRC military, U.N. forces in DRC,
South Sudanese forces or the Ugandan army—could do so with any probability of success and without
greatly endangering civilians in the region, not to mention women and children within rebel ranks. In the
past, military offensives have caused backlash against civilians, leading to greater displacement and
mass abductions. A recurrence of such dynamics could dramatically reverse the humanitarian gains
made during the Juba process, especially were the LRA to return to Uganda. Moreover, a military
offensive would risk inflaming tensions between the governments in the region.

Ugandan civil society leaders are therefore emphasizing that channels of direct dialogue with rebel
leaders should continue to be pursued to induce them to accept the peace settlement. Maintaining such
engagement can build trust to expedite a settlement when the timing is right, and may encourage
defections in the meantime.

Simultaneously, there is consensus among all stakeholders of the need to take advantage of the LRA’s
departure from Uganda to support IDP return and recovery while rebuilding war-affected areas. To that
end, GoU officials have pledged to unilaterally implement mechanisms of the FPA. However, civil
society leaders fear that, as in the past, such promises will not translate into actual implementation.
Furthermore, there is concern that the GoU’s proposed plans emphasize technical reconstruction
without including political measures to address regional inequalities and promote reconciliation.

The Imperative for Continued International Leadership

Too often, when past attempts to end the war have faced setbacks, the diplomatic community has
retreated. However, the recent resolution of other protracted conflicts show that successful peace
processes entail multiple stages and require long-term persistence. At this critical juncture, it is
imperative that international leaders intensify their efforts toward ultimately ensuring a peaceful
resolution to this conflict. To do so, U.S. and international leaders must look beyond the narrow
dichotomy of dialogue versus military aggression.

Building on the groundwork of the Juba process, the U.N. Special Envoy and his U.S. and E.U.
counterparts should reinforce the efforts of local civil society leaders to continue developing direct
dialogue between the Ugandan government and LRA. Diplomacy is needed to ensure sustained
investment of GoU officials in such communication channels as well as support from regional actors,
particularly the Sudanese government.

However, the Juba experience has shown that such engagement is likely to fail without greater
pressure on Kony and other spoilers amongst the rebel leadership. Regional militaries have committed
to confront the LRA, but conventional military offensives should be avoided, as they are
counterproductive against a diffuse rebel force operating amidst civilians across vast lawless territory.
What is needed is a credible strategy to isolate and even apprehend such spoilers that is both in sync
with a longer-term peace process and prioritizes civilian protection. Devising such a strategy with any
chance of success will require greater international involvement, namely from France, the U.K. or U.S.

In the meantime, donors should help the Ugandan government fund and implement post-conflict
reconstruction and reconciliation plans for northern Uganda, and ensure adequate protection against
the threat of the LRA returning to Uganda. The international community can play a critical role in holding
the GoU accountable to its commitments in a transparent manner, such that local communities feel an
immediate peace dividend and are able to return home.

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