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by Paul Benacerraf
Review by: George S. Boolos
The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Dec., 1968), pp. 613-615
Published by: Association for Symbolic Logic
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ing argument: There can be no mechanical model of the capacities of the mind to prove
theoremsof arithmetic,for to any machine therecorresponds a formalsystemwhose theorems
are just those arithmeticalstatementsthat the machine can produce as true. The Godelian
formulaforany consistentformalsystem(the formulathat asserts its own unprovabilityin the
system)cannot be proved in the system."But we can see that the Gbdelian formula is true:
any rational being could follow Godel's argument, and convince himselfthat the Godelian
formula, although unprovable-in-the-given-system, was nonetheless-in fact, for that very
reason-true." Thus, "for everymachine thereis a truthwhich it cannot produce as being true,
but which a mind can. This shows that a machine cannot be a complete and adequate model of
the mind."
It seems to the reviewerthat Lucas's claim that a mind can produce as true the Godelian
formula for any consistentmachine is either unsubstantiated,for,if "produce as true" means
"'show to be true," it is tantamountto the assertion that minds can prove the consistencyof
any consistentmachine,or insufficient to distinguishminds from machines, for,if "produce as
true" means "display," it is merely the claim that minds can find G6delian formulas. But
machines can do this too, for the Godel number of a true formula that is not a theorem of
a consistentaxiomatizable extensionof (say) Robinson's systemQ is a mechanicallycalculable
functionof the Godel number (recursivelyenumerable index) of the set of axioms of the exten-
sion. This mightbe put: Given a formalsystemcorrespondingto a machine, we can calculate a
formulasuch that we can prove that if the systemis consistent,then the formulais unprovable
in the system.This is not the same as saying: Given a formalsystem,if it is consistent,then we
can calculate a formulasuch thatwe can prove thatthe formulais unprovable in the system.The
Gbdelian formula for a sufficiently strong consistentsystem might indeed not be capable of
being shown true by a machine, but then the systemmightwell be so strongthat a mind could
not show the formula true,either,as it mightnot be able to show the systemconsistent(con-
sider Zermelo-Fraenkei set theoryor Peano arithmetic+ Fermat's Last "Theorem").
Lucas states that we can know that we are consistent (page 124), but he allows that it is
conceivable that simple arithmeticis inconsistent(page 123). The reviewerfinds it hard to
reconcile these assertions.
Error: page 112, lines 17-18. . . . in any consistentsystemnothingfalse can be proved-in-
the-system,but only truths." Misprints: page 120, line 8, read "consistent" for "complete";
page 123, line 14, delete "not."
Aftersummarizingthe proofs of Godel's incompletenesstheorems,Benacerraf proceeds to
criticizethe article of Lucas reviewedabove. His objections are that (1) Lucas's argumentthat
the mind has a prowess that Godel's (first)theoremshows machines lack equivocates: Though
a (consistent) machine cannot prove its own Godelian formula in the correspondingformal
system,neithercan a mind. At best,a mind can give eitheran informalproof of it or, perhaps,a
proof of the conditional with the hypothesisof the machine's consistencyas antecedent and
the formulaas consequent. A machine mightdo these too. (2) On a non-equivocal versionof the
argument,Lucas is claiming thatgivenany machine,he can prove somethingthe machinecan't.
Little reason has been given for believingthis. (3) Lucas's claim that he could finda flawin any
mechanist's model of the mind is inconclusive,as a mechanist is " but a man, and therefore
probably a machine of relativelylow order of complexity," who may be limited as to the
kinds of machines he can devise.
Benacerraf then presents an argument which he claims representswhat underlies Lucas's
arguments,and "which contains the assumption that the mind is at best a Turing machine,
employs both Godel theorems,and ends in a contradiction." The argumentis the derivationof
a contradiction from the assumption that there is a number j such that " Q c WI" X S*,
" Wy' S*" X S*, and S* c Wf,where Q is Robinson's arithmetic,W, is (the output of) the
machine with program numberj, and S* is the closure under first-orderlogic of the set of
statementsBenacerraf can prove. (The sense of "prove" used in the derivation implies that
what is proved is correct,but does not implythat what Benacerrafcan prove is the output of a
machine.) Benacerraf asserts that the derivation shows "that given any Turing machine WI,
eitherI cannot prove that W1 is adequate forarithmetic,or ifI am a subset of W1,thenI cannot
prove that I can prove everythingW, can. It seems to be consistentwithall thisthatI am indeed
a Turing machine, but one with such a complex machine table (program) that I cannot ascertain
whatit is."
In an appendix Benacerraf notes that the derivation of the contradiction makes use of the
principle that whatever he can prove is true, a principle from which he shows the existence of a
statement that he can and cannot prove to follow. This second contradiction appears to him to
cast "serious doubt on the meager results that we had been able to salvage for Lucas."
In conclusion, Benacerraf expresses the,hope that the principles used in his reconstruction
of Lucas's argument can be shown to preserve the implications drawn from it, but he does not
indicate how this might be done without the use of principles that lead to inconsistency.
Misprints:page 12, line 18, read ")" for ","; line 23, read "sometimes" for "sometime";
page 31, line 23, insert"n" between" F" and "6". GEORGE S. BOOLOS
E. J. LEMMON. On sentences verifiableby their use. Analysis (Oxford), vol. 22 no. 4 (1962),
pp. 86-89.
JAAKKO HINTIKKA. Cogito, ergo sum: inferenceor performance? The philosophical review,
vol. 71 (1962), pp. 3-32.
Lemmon proposes "the following definition: A sentence S is verifiable by its use if and only
if there are circumstances and a manner of delivery such that it is analytic that, for all people: .
if in those circumstances x delivers S in the given manner then what x delivers is true." He hold!
that Descartes' sentence 'Cogito' is verifiable by its use, on the grounds that "speech entail