COMPREHENSIVE

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA
SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo,
Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
[Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784
Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan
Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other
written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-
editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for
the return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer,
Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City,
their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined
from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other
accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People
v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of
respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned
articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of
2
the aforementioned articles. ..." With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory
injunction was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to
this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent
judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should
3
have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. But this procedural flaw
notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the
constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We
Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies.
The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to
suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de
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Ordoveza v. Raymundo, "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its
rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid
on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition
impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six
[6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
5
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the petition
thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with the fact
that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had
been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this long to bring
their case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events of the
past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in this country, from release of public funds to
release of detained persons from custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or
largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the President, like
Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the
return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had been sent, through
Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command,
they were further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court. [pp. 123-124,
Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no
ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts
exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to
the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as
evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from
challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents. These
documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with
them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any
way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in
question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional
 6
provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . This objection, however, may properly
be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on
August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col.
Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19,
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter
address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b]
which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the crime of
subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were
applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would
be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and
the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set
forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed
the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is
more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was
applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address
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appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. Obviously this is the same place that
respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with
sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer
is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who
issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the
executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the
8
warrant as to the place to be searched."
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the
warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose
Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized
under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under
subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen
property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose
possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no
consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or
possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in
relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed
warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables,
instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which
may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the
9
said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo where
this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature
becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when
placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such
person acted as the agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to
the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col.
10
Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. The application was accompanied
by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence
and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the
search warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have
provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue
in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the
case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner
"is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications
and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12
is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a
finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a
grave error for respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in
the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and
collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things
above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy
with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement,
Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon
which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose
thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of
the existence of probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets
the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is
that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to
be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets,
tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or
connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents
communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote the
objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as Movement for Free Philippines,
Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive
materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards,
receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was
declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith
the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the
seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing
with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be
seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history: the
era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown
were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the
literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode would not
be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that
speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure,
these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of
said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the
press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express
themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant
press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they
have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which
authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in
subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance
with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It
is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than
President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property
seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of the WE
FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in Quezon City and
took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the premises.
Cendaa said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at the disposal of
the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by the reply of then Foreign Minister
Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos,
20
expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM " case. In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:

2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our authorities to
21
close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent
judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The
prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all
articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez,
Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring

I am glad to give my concurrence to the ponencia of Mr. Justice Escolin At the same time I wish to
state my own reasons for holding that the search warrants which are the subject of the petition are
utterly void.
The action against "WE FORUM" was a naked suppression of press freedom for the search warrants
were issued in gross violation of the Constitution.
The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in Section 3, Article IV, stresses two points,
namely: "(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in
the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things
to be seized." (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 126 Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)
Any search warrant is conducted in disregard of the points mentioned above will result in wiping "out
completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims caprice or passion of peace officers." (Ibid, p. 748.)
The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To satisfy the requirement of probable
cause a specific offense must be alleged in the application; abstract averments will not suffice. In the
case at bar nothing specifically subversive has been alleged; stated only is the claim that certain
objects were being used as instruments and means of committing the offense of subversion
punishable under P.D. No. 885, as amended. There is no mention of any specific provision of the
decree. I n the words of Chief Justice C Concepcion, " It would be legal heresy of the highest order,
to convict anybody" of violating the decree without reference to any determinate provision thereof.
The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both search warrants authorize Col.
Rolando Abadilla to seize and take possession, among other things, of the following:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books and other publication to promote the objectives
and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire
Movement and April 6 Movement.
The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, etc. subversive?
What did they contain to make them subversive? There is nothing in the applications nor in the
warrants which answers the questions. I must, therefore, conclude that the warrants are general
warrants which are obnoxious to the Constitution.
In point of fact, there was nothing subversive published in the WE FORUM just as there is nothing
subversive which has been published in MALAYA which has replaced the former and has the same
content but against which no action has been taken.
Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything seized pursuant to the warrants should be
returned to the owners and all of the items are subject to the exclusionary rule of evidence.
Teehankee, J., concur

DEFINITION OF TERMS

TERMS FOR MEDIA LAW

1. A writ of certiorary is an order by a higher court for a lower court to send a case they had
before them up to the higher court (including the records). In the US, you often hear this in the
context of SCOTUS "granting cert." meaning they will hear a case.

2. A writ of mandamus is an order of a court telling a lower court, governmental office, or

corporation to do or not do something that is specifically the duty of that court, agency, etc.. It is
not often used in federal courts anymore, but some state and administrative courts still use it in
limited contexts.

3. Injunction - A court order by which an individual is required to perform, or is restrained from

performing, a particular act. A writ framed according to the circumstances of the individual case.
An injunction commands an act that the court regards as essential to justice, or it prohibits an
act that is deemed to be contrary to good conscience. It is an extraordinary remedy, reserved
for special circumstances in which the temporary preservation of the status quo is necessary.

4. A preliminary or temporary injunction is a provisional remedy that is invoked to preserve the

subject matter in its existing condition. Its purpose is to prevent dis-solution of the plaintiff's
rights. The main reason for use of a preliminary injunction is the need for immediate relief.
Preliminary or temporary injunctions are not conclusive as to the rights of the parties, and they
do not determine the merits of a case or decide issues in controversy. They seek to prevent
threatened wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until such time as the rights of
the parties can be ultimately settled. Preliminary injunctive relief ensures the ability of the court
to render a meaningful decision and serves to prevent a change of circumstances that would
hamper or block the granting of proper relief following a trial on the merits of the case.

5. Prohibitory Injunction An injunction directing an individual to refrain from doing an act is

preventive, prohibitive, prohibitory, or negative. This type of injunction prevents a threatened
injury, preserves the status quo, or restrains the continued commission of an ongoing wrong,
but it cannot be used to redress a consummated wrong or to undo that which has already been
done.

6. Mandatory Injunctions Although the court is vested with wide discretion to fashion injunctive
relief, it is also restricted to restraint of a contemplated or threatened action. It also might
compel Specific Performance of an act. In such a case, it issues a mandatory injunction,
commanding the performance of a positive act. Because mandatory injunctions are harsh,
courts do not favor them, and they rarely grant them.

7. enjoin v. for a court to order that someone either do a specific act, cease a course of conduct,
or be prohibited from committing a certain act. To obtain such an order, called an injunction, a
private party or public agency has to file a petition for a writ of injunction, serve it on the party
he/she/it hopes to be enjoined, allowing time for a written response. Then a court hearing is held
in which the judge will consider evidence, both written and oral, listen to the arguments and then
either grant the writ or deny it. If granted the court will issue a final or permanent injunction.

8. The Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the Republic of the
Philippines.

9. Moot means that a case's issue no longer matters. For instance, if there was a dispute over
ending life support for someone and while the case is pending that individual dies, the case will
be moot. Generally, this is a reason for a court (particularly an appellate court) to refuse to hear
a case. The issue of mootness can be overcome under some circumstances (for instance if the
issue is likely to arise again and the matter at hand is not able to be delayed long enough for
court proceedings to continue, as was the case in Roe v. Wade).
Once, an issue has been made moot, discussion of it is said to be purely academic. This is
because certain decisions cannot be undone, so only academics seeking to analyze the
situation will benefit from further discussion of that particular matter.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
With the conduct of the 2010 barangay elections, a supervening event has transpired that has
rendered this case moot and academic and subject to dismissal. This is because, as stated in
Fernandez v. Commission on Elections,[17] whatever judgment is reached, the same can no
longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be enforced.

10. Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Laches A defense to an equitable action, that bars recovery by the plaintiff because of the
plaintiff's undue delay in seeking relief.
Laches is a defense to a proceeding in which a plaintiff seeks equitable relief. Cases in Equity
are distinguished from cases at law by the type of remedy, or judicial relief, sought by the
plaintiff. Generally, law cases involve a problem that can be solved by the payment of monetary
damages. Equity cases involve remedies directed by the court against a party.
Types of equitable relief include Injunction, where the court orders a party to do or not to do
something; declaratory relief, where the court declares the rights of the two parties to a
controversy; and accounting, where the court orders a detailed written statement of money
owed, paid, and held. Courts have complete discretion in equity, and weigh equitable principles
against the facts of the case to determine whether relief is warranted.

11. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
Probable cause- Apparent facts discovered through logical inquiry that would lead a reasonably
intelligent and prudent person to believe that an accused person has committed a crime,
thereby warranting his or her prosecution, or that a Cause of Action has accrued, justifying a
civil lawsuit.
Probable cause is a level of reasonable belief, based on facts that can be articulated, that is
required to sue a person in civil court or to arrest and prosecute a person in criminal court.
Before a person can be sued or arrested and prosecuted, the civil plaintiff or police and
prosecutor must possess enough facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the
claim or charge is true.

12. Mandate A judicial command, order, or precept, written or oral, from a court; a direction that
a court has the authority to give and an individual is bound to obey.
A mandate might be issued upon the decision of an appeal, which directs that a particular action
be taken, or upon a disposition made of a case by an inferior tribunal.
The term mandate is also used in reference to an act by which one individual empowers another
individual to conduct transactions for an individual in that person's name.

13. Magistrate Any individual who has the power of a public civil officer or inferior judicial officer,
such as a Justice of the Peace.
The various state judicial systems provide for judicial officers who are often called magistrates,
justices of the peace, or police justices. The authority of these officials is restricted by statute,
and jurisdiction is commonly limited to the county in which the official presides. The position
may be elected or appointed, depending on the governing state statute. The exact role of the
official varies by state; it may include handling hearings regarding violations of motor vehicle
codes or breaches of the peace, presiding over criminal preliminary hearings, officiating
marriages, and dispensing civil actions involving small sums of money.

14. Sequester v. to keep separate or apart. In so-called "high-profile" criminal prosecutions

(involving major crimes, events, or persons given wide publicity) the jury is sometimes
"sequestered" in a hotel without access to news media, the general public or their families
except under supervision, in order to prevent the jury from being "tainted" by information or
opinions about the trial outside of the evidence in the courtroom. A witness may be sequestered
from hearing the testimony of other witnesses, commonly called being "excluded," until after
he/she has testified, supposedly to prevent that witness from being influenced by other evidence
or tailoring his/her testimony to fit the stories of others.

LAWS

Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court

RULE 126 - SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.

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Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:

SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.

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Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or
implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be
carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the
said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo9
where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by
nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but
not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary
right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.

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Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be
seized under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

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P.D. 885
Section 1. Short Title This decree shall be known as the Revised Anti-Subversion Law.
Section 2. Subversive Associations and Organizations Any association, organization, political
party, or group of persons organized for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines with the open or covert assistance and support of a foreign power by
force, violence, deceit or other illegal means shall be considered and is hereby declared an
illegal organization.
Section 3. Penalties
(a) Members. Whoever knowingly, wilfully and by overt act affiliates with, becomes or remains a
member of a subversive associations or organization as defined in Section 2 hereof shall be
punished by arresto mayor and shall be disqualified permanently from holding any public office,
appointive or elective, and from exercising the right to vote; in case of a second conviction, the
principal penalty shall be prision correccional; and in all subsequent convictions the penalty of
prision mayor shall be imposed.
The following acts shall constitute prima facie evidence of membership in any subversive
association:
1. Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the lists, records,
correspondence, or any other document of the organization;
2. Subjecting himself to the discipline of such association or organization in any form
whatsoever;
3. Giving financial contribution to such association or organization in dues, assessments, loans,
or in any other forms;
4. Executive order, plans or directives of any kind of such association or organization;
5. Acting as an agent, courier, messenger, correspondent, organizer, or in any other capacity,
on behalf of such association or organization;
6. Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance
of any plan or enterprise thereof;
7. Transmitting orders, directives, or plans of such association or organization orally or in writing
or any other means of communication such as by signal, semaphore, sign or code;
8. Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any other type of publication to promote
the objectives and purposes of such association or organization;
9. Mailing, shipping, circulating, distributing, or delivering to other persons any material or
propaganda of any kind on behalf of such association or organization;
10. Advising, counselling, or in other way giving instruction, information, suggestions, or
recommendations to officers or members or to any other person to further the objectives of such
association or organization;
11. Participating in any way in the activities, planning action, objectives, or purposes of such
association or organization.

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Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes "the sequestration of
the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the
government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance with implementing rules and
regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense."

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Section 3, Article IV of the Philippine COnstitution, stresses two points, namely: "(1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized."

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DIGEST

Burgos vs. Chief of Staff (G.R. No. L-64261)

Facts:
On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Pao, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon
City], issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and
784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and
printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of
Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the We Forum newspaper, were seized. A petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was
filed after 6 months following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants, and to
enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using
the articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v.
Burgos).

Issue:
Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials may be the basis of the
issuance of search warrants.

Held:
Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In
mandating that no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. Herein, a
statement in the effect that Burgos is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and
other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under
PD 885, as amended is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable
cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Further, when
the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection
with the publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must
contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has
published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.

DIGEST