LUTGARDA CRUZ, petitioner, vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the HEIRS OF

ESTANISLAWA C. REYES, represented by MIGUEL C. REYES, respondents.

The Antecedent Facts

The City Prosecutor of Manila charged petitioner with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document
before the Manila Regional Trial Court.[3] Petitioner executed before a Notary Public in the City of Manila an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of a parcel of land stating that she was the sole surviving heir of the registered owner
when in fact she knew there were other surviving heirs. Since the offended party did not reserve the right to file a
separate civil action arising from the criminal offense, the civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal case.

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision dated January 17, 1994 acquitting petitioner on the
ground of reasonable doubt. In the same decision, the trial court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case,
ordering the return to the surviving heirs of the parcel of land located in Bulacan. [4]

On January 28, 1994, petitioner received a copy of the decision.

On February 10, 1994, petitioner filed by registered mail a motion for reconsideration dated February 7, 1994,
assailing the trial courts ruling on the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner furnished the City Prosecutor a
copy of the motion by registered mail.

On April 18, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration stating:

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 7, 1994, filed by the accused through counsel and
considering that there is nothing to show that the Office of the City Prosecutor was actually furnished or served
with a copy of the said Motion for Reconsideration within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days from receipt
by the accused on January 28, 1994 of a copy of the Courts decision dated January 17, 1994, so that the same is
already final and executory, let the Motion for Reconsideration be Denied for lack of merit. [5]

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the trial courts order of April 18, 1994. The trial court denied the same in
an order dated May 6, 1994, to wit:

Under the Interim Rules, no party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment
(Sec. 4). The motion of accused dated 22 April 1994 is a violation of this rule.

WHEREFORE, said motion is DENIED.[6]

Left with no recourse, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals to nullify
the two assailed orders of the trial court. Petitioner also asked the Court of Appeals to compel the trial court to
resolve her motion for reconsideration of the decision dated February 7, 1994.

On March 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition and dismissed the case for being
insufficient in substance.

The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts order of April 18, 1994 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals declared in part:

Section 10, Rule 13, Rules of Court, provides as follows:

SEC. 10. Proof of Service. Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or the
affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is
by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with
Section 5 of this rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry
receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon receipt thereof by the
sender, or in lieu thereof the letter unclaimed together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the
postmaster to the addressee.

Patent from the language of the said section is that in case service is made by registered mail, proof of service shall
be made by (a) affidavit of the person mailing and (b) the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. Both must
concur. In the case at bench, there was no such affidavit or registry receipt when the motion was considered. Thus,
respondent Judge cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in
ruling in the manner he did.[7]

The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial courts order of May 6, 1994 denying the subsequent motion for
reconsideration, as follows:

xxx, while there is merit in petitioners submission that the motion for reconsideration dated April 22, 1994 was not
a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment, as contemplated in the Interim Rules because the
motion sought to impugn the order dated 18 April 1994 not on the basis of the issues raised in the motion for
reconsideration dated 07 February 1994 but on the erroneous legal conclusion of the order dated May 6, 1994,
[8]
this is already academic. The decision dated January 7, 1994 had long become final when the second motion for
reconsideration was filed on 03 May 1994. Hence, the pairing Judge who issued the order on 06 May 1994 had no
more legal competence to promulgate the same. [9]

Finally, the Court of Appeals upheld the assailed decision of the trial court on the civil aspect of the case, to wit:

x x x, the institution of a criminal action carries with it the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising
from the offense charged. There was neither reservation nor waiver of the right to file the civil action separately
nor has one been instituted to the criminal action. Hence, the civil action for the civil liability has been impliedly
instituted with the filing of the criminal case before respondent Judge. This is the law on the matter. The
proposition submitted by petitioner that the court presided by respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over the
property because it is located in Bulacan - outside the territorial jurisdiction of said court -does not hold water.
Being a civil liability arising from the offense charged, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the
civil procedure rules which pertain to civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit. [10]

In the dispositive portion of its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals declared:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition not being sufficient in substance is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and the case
DISMISSED.

The Issues

In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:

1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS DULY FURNISHED
WITH COPY OF THE PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE DECISION ON THE CIVIL
ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-54773 (SIC) OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 53.
2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA HAD
JURISDICTION TO RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-57743 FOR FALSIFICATION
OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT, INVOLVING A PROPERTY LOCATED IN BULACAN.

3. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS
WHEN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 53, RENDERED DECISION ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-57743.[13]

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

When the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but is adjudged civilly liable, his motion for reconsideration of
the civil aspect must be served not only on the prosecution, also on the offended party if the latter is not
represented by a private counsel. Moreover, if the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, it necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all
matters that the law requires the court to resolve. This includes the power to order the restitution to the offended
party of real property located in another province.

Petitioner asserts that the location of the subject property outside the courts territorial jurisdiction deprived the
trial court of jurisdiction over the civil aspect of the criminal case. This argument is contrary to the law and the
rules.

There are three important requisites which must be present before a court can acquire criminal jurisdiction. First,
the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Second, the court must have jurisdiction over the territory
where the offense was committed. Third, the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused. [18] In the
instant case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has conferred on the court the
power to hear and decide cases involving estafa through falsification of a public document. The trial court also had
jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The trial court
also acquired jurisdiction over the person of accused-petitioner because she voluntarily submitted to the courts
authority.

Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was
committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law
requires the court to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case is the civil liability of the accused arising from the
crime. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [E]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. Article 104 of the same Code states that civil liability x x x includes restitution.

The action for recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted in the criminal action unless reserved by the offended
party.[19] In the instant case, the offended party did not reserve the civil action and the civil action was deemed
instituted in the criminal action. Although the trial court acquitted petitioner of the crime charged, the acquittal,
grounded on reasonable doubt, did not extinguish the civil liability. [20] Thus, the Manila trial court had jurisdiction to
decide the civil aspect of the instant case - ordering restitution even if the parcel of land is located in Bulacan.

Consequently, while we find no reversible error in

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , G.R. No. 192565

Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false
narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Information against her reads:

That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter before a competent person authorized
to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of
merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action
or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material
statement was false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood. [2]

The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for
a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint, docketed as
Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch
47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping.
Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the
Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other action or
proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,[3] citing two grounds. First, she argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is
the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-
Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury
case. Second, she argued that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because: (a) the third element of
perjury the willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood was not alleged with particularity without specifying what
the other action or proceeding commenced involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was
no other action or proceeding pending in another court when the second complaint was filed; and (c) she was
charged with perjury by giving false testimony while the allegations in the Information make out perjury by making
a false affidavit.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate
against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City.[4] The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the allegations in the
Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury.[5] The MeTC-Makati Citysubsequently denied Tomas motion for
reconsideration.[6]

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside the MeTC-
Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their petition on the
rulings in United States v. Canet[7] and Ilusorio v. Bildner[8] which ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the
place where the false document was presented.

In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:

[I]nsofar as the petitioners stance is concerned[,] the more recent case of [Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 &
179438, March 30, 2009) however, reaffirms what has been the long standing view on the venue with respect to
perjury cases. In this particular case[,] the high court reiterated the rule that the criminal action shall be instituted
and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed, or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred. It went on to declare that since the subject document[,] the execution of which was
the subject of the charge[,] was subscribed and sworn to in Manila[,] then the court of the said territorial
jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal action[.]

x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not amiss to state that the city court of Makati City
has jurisdiction to try and decide the case for perjury inasmuch as the gist of the complaint itself which
constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner dwells solely on the act of subscribing to a false certification. On the
other hand, the charge against the accused in the case of Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based on the complaint-affidavits
therein[,] was not simply the execution of the questioned documents but rather the introduction of the false
evidence through the subject documents before the court of Makati City. [9] (emphasis ours)

The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of discretion since the order
denying the Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City also observed
that the facts in Ilusorio are different from the facts of the present case. Lastly, the RTC-MakatiCity ruled that the
Rule 65 petition was improper since the petitioners can later appeal the decision in the principal case. The RTC-
Makati City subsequently denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should
be Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification
was presented to the trial court.

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place where the criminal
action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this
rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can
only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction. [12] Second, laying the venue in
the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality of
province where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available. [13]

Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional consequences.
In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it,
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]

The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which states:

Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its
allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the
jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the
offense charged or is necessary for its identification.

Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where the
offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of
action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was
committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., v MAGDALENO M. PEA

Respondent Magdaleno Pea instituted a civil case for recovery of agents compensation and expenses, damages,
and attorneys fees,[2] against Urban Bank and the petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros
Occidental, Bago City. The case was raffled to Branch 62 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 754.Respondent
anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of agency [3] allegedly entered into with the petitioners
wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from
unlawfully occupying Urban Banks property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. Petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss[4] arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. Attached to the motion were the
following documents: 1) a letter[5] dated December 19, 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of
Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the subject property; 2) an unsigned letter [6] dated
December 7, 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong; 3) a letter [7] dated December 9, 1994
addressed to Teodoro Borlongan and signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and 4) a Memorandum [8] dated November 20, 1994
from Enrique Montilla III. Said documents were presented in an attempt to show that the respondent was
appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.

In view of the introduction of the above-mentioned documents, respondent Pea filed his Complaint-Affidavit [9] with
the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City.[10]He claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged
signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and
employees of ISCI.[11] Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they
were falsified.

In a Resolution[12] dated September 23, 1998, the City Prosecutor concluded that the petitioners were probably
guilty of four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents penalized by the second paragraph of
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified
because the alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of the respondent; that petitioners
knew that the documents were falsified considering that the signatories were mere dummies; and that the
documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used by petitioners as evidence in
support of their motion to dismiss, adopted in their answer and later, in their Pre-Trial Brief. [13] Subsequently, the
corresponding Informations[14] were filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City. The cases were
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the
warrants[15] for the arrest of the petitioners.

The rest of the issues raised by the petitioners may be grouped into two, which are: (1) the procedural
aspect, i.e., whether the prosecution and the court a quo properly observed the required procedure in the instant
case, and, (2) the substantive aspect, which is whether there was probable cause to pursue the criminal cases to
trial.

THE PROCEDURAL ASPECT:

Petitioners contend that they were denied due process as they were unable to submit their counter-affidavits and
were not accorded the right to a preliminary investigation. Considering that the complaint of Atty. Pea was filed in
September 1998, the rule then applicable was the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The provisions of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure relevant to the issue are Sections 1, 3(a) and 9(a) of Rule
112, to wit:
Section 1. Definition. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has
been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

Sec. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an offense cognizable
by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the
following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such number of copies as there are
respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary
public, who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily
executed and understood their affidavits.

Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts nor covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure.

(a) Where filed with the fiscal. If the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or state prosecutor, the procedure
outlined in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. The fiscal shall take appropriate action based on the
affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant. (underscoring supplied)

The crime to which petitioners were charged was defined and penalized under second paragraph of Article 172 in
relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any
public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; and

2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private
document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage of another or
who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding
article or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.

Prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods translates to imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months and 1
day.[26] The next lower in degree to prision correccional is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period which translates to 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months [27]of
imprisonment. Since the crime committed is not covered by the Rules of Summary Procedure, [28] the case falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts but applying the ordinary rules. In such instance,
preliminary investigation as defined in Section 1, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable
since such section covers only crimes cognizable by the RTC. That which is stated in Section 9(a) is the applicable
rule.

Under this Rule, while probable cause should first be determined before an information may be filed in court, the
prosecutor is not mandated to require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavits to oppose the complaint. In
the determination of probable cause, the prosecutor may solely rely on the complaint, affidavits and other
supporting documents submitted by the complainant. If he does not find probable cause, the prosecutor may
dismiss outright the complaint or if he finds probable cause or sufficient reason to proceed with the case, he shall
issue a resolution and file the corresponding information.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v MA. THERESA PANGILINAN,

On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and
violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount
of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor of private
complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for payment.

On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents,
enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance against private complainant before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.

Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of
Prejudicial Question before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil
action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City.

On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the suspension of the criminal
proceedings pending the outcome of the civil action respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of
Valenzuela City. The recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City and ordered the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with
her issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of P4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the
amount of P4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22
charges involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-complaint filed on 16 September 1997 were,
however, dismissed.

Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999, were filed against respondent
Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000.

On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City.She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished
by reason of prescription.

The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in an Order dated 5 October 2000.

On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal cases were raffled to RTC, Branch
218, Quezon City.

In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000
Order of the MeTC. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000 with the Clerk of Court although
received by the Court itself only on 07 June 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the latest
amendment. The criminal action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed when
the same was filed with the court a quo considering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having
been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997 yet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is
hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153.

In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the petition of the OSG should be dismissed
outright for its failure to comply with the mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified true copy of the
decision of the CA and the required proof of service. Such procedural lapses are allegedly fatal to the cause of the
petitioner.

Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the City Prosecutors Office did not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a special law.

Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored on erroneous premises. She claims
that the cases relied upon by petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and are
therefore covered by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) [14] and Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.[15] Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed against her is for violation of BP Blg. 22,
which is indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits that a
distinction should thus be made between offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, as in this case,
and offenses covered by the RPC.

The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg.
22 against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the
period of prescription of such offense.

We find merit in this petition.

Initially, we see that the respondents claim that the OSG failed to attach to the petition a duplicate original or
certified true copy of the 12 March 2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by the
record. A perusal of the record reveals that attached to the original copy of the petition is a certified true copy of
the CA decision. It was also observed that annexed to the petition was the proof of service undertaken by the
Docket Division of the OSG.

With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred in ruling that the offense
committed by respondent had already prescribed.Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for
Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, as amended, is
the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:

SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than
one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.

SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to
run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not
more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the
aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of
proceedings against the guilty person.

STATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR B. PINOTE, v JUDGE ROBERTO L. AYCO,

On August 13 and 20, 2004, Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Branch 26, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of South Cotabato
allowed the defense in Criminal Case No. 1771 TB, People v. Vice Mayor Salvador Ramos, et al., for violation of
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses,
even in the absence of State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case.

State Prosecutor Pinote was on August 13 and 20, 2004 undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart
Center in Quezon City, hence, his absence during the proceedings on the said dates.

On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case on August 27, October 1, 15 and 29, 2004, State
Prosecutor Pinote refused to cross-examine the two defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, he
maintaining that the proceedings conducted on August 13 and 20, 2004 in his absence were void.

State Prosecutor Pinote subsequently filed a Manifestation on November 12, 2004 before the trial court, he
restating why he was not present on August 13 and 20, 2004, and reiterating his position that Judge Aycos act of
allowing the defense to present evidence in his absence was erroneous and highly irregular. He thus prayed that he
should not be coerced to cross-examine those two defense witnesses and that their testimonies be stricken off the
record.

By Order issued also on November 12, 2004, Judge Ayco, glossing over the Manifestation, considered the
prosecution to have waived its right to cross-examine the two defense witnesses.

Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by State Prosecutor Pinote (complainant) against Judge
Ayco (respondent), for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct.

By Comment dated March 18, 2005, respondent proffers that complainant filed the complaint to save his face and
cover up for his incompetence and lackadaisical handling of the prosecution of the criminal case as in fact
complainant was, on the request of the Provincial Governor of South Cotabato, relieved as prosecutor in the case
by the Secretary of Justice.

And respondent informs that even after complainant was already relieved as the prosecutor in the case, he filed a
motion for his inhibition without setting it for hearing.

On the above-said Manifestation filed by complainant before the trial court on November 12, 2004, respondent
brands the same as misleading and highly questionable, complainants having undergone medical treatment at the
Philippine Heart Center on August 13 and 20, 2004 having been relayed to the trial court only on said date.

On his Order considering the prosecution to have waived presenting evidence, respondent justifies the same on
complainants failure to formally offer the evidence for the prosecution despite several extensions of time granted
for the purpose.
Finally, respondent proffers that no substantial prejudice was suffered by the prosecution for complainant was
permitted to cross examine the two defense witnesses but he refused to do so.

By way of counter-complaint, respondent charges complainant with Contempt of Court and Grave Misconduct
and/or Conduct Unbecoming of a Member of the Bar and as an Officer of the Court.

On evaluation of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), citing Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rule on Criminal Procedure, finds respondent to have breached said rule and accordingly recommends that he be
reprimanded therefor, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. - All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall
be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule or in the event of
lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution
Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the Court. Once so
authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the
end of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.

x x x (Underscoring supplied)

Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction of the public
prosecutor.

If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there are no public prosecutors, a
private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State
Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized, the private
prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until the termination of the trial even in the absence of a public
prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.

Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person
directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. [1] It is on this account that the presence of a public
prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest
to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people. [2]

Respondents act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of complainant public
prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is thus a clear transgression of the Rules which could
not be rectified by subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross-examine the witnesses.

Respondents intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no matter how noble
it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due process, so is the State.

Respondents lament about complainants failure to inform the court of his inability to attend the August 13 and 20,
2004 hearings or to file a motion for postponement thereof or to subsequently file a motion for reconsideration of
his Orders allowing the defense to present its two witnesses on said dates may be mitigating. It does not absolve
respondent of his utter disregard of the Rules.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Roberto L. Ayco is hereby ordered to pay a fine FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00)
with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Respecting the counter-complaint against complainant State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote, respondent is advised
that the same should be lodged before the Secretary of Justice.

SO ORDERED.

DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR v SEC. LEILA DE LIMA

History will never forget the atrocities perpetrated on November 23, 2009, when 57 innocent civilians were
massacred in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the principal suspects was
petitioner, then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao Province. Inquest proceedings were
conducted against petitioner on November 26, 2009 at the General Santos (Tambler) Airport Lounge, before he was
flown to Manila and detained at the main office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) charged other suspects, numbering more than a hundred, for what became aptly
known as the Maguindanao massacre.3

Through Department Order No. 948, then Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera constituted a Special Panel of
Prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation.

On November 27, 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) resolved to file the corresponding informations for murder
against petitioner, and to issue subpoenae to several persons. 4 On December 1, 2009, 25 informations for murder
were also filed against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region, in Cotabato City. 5

On December 3, 2009, Secretary of Justice Devanadera transmitted her letter to Chief Justice Puno requesting the
transfer of the venue of the trial of the Maguindanao massacre from Cotabato City to Metro Manila, either in
Quezon City or in Manila, to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 6 On December 8, 2009, the Court granted the request
for the transfer of venue.7 However, on December 9, 2009, but prior to the transfer of the venue of the trial to
Metro Manila, the Prosecution filed a manifestation regarding the filing of 15 additional informations for murder
against petitioner in Branch 15 of the Cotabato City RTC. 8 Later on, additional informations for murder were filed
against petitioner in the RTC in Quezon City, Branch 211, the new venue of the trial pursuant to the resolution of
the Court.9

The records show that petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the 41 informations for murder when he was
arraigned on January 5, 2010,10 February 3, 2010,11 and July 28, 2010.12

In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with multiple
murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. 13 It appears that in issuing the joint resolution of February 5,
2010 the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag, both dated December 7,
2009.14

On August 13, 2010, Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. 15 On September 7,
2010, the QC RTC issued its amended pre-trial order, 16 wherein Dalandag was listed as one of the Prosecution
witnesses.17

On October 14, 2010, petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations for
murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the massacre through his two sworn
declarations.18 Petitioner reiterated the request twice more on October 22, 2010 19 and November 2, 2010.20

By her letter dated November 2, 2010,21 however, Secretary De Lima denied petitioners request.
Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues, to wit:

1. WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE
KENNY DALANDAG AS AN ACCUSED IN THE INFORMATIONS FOR MULTIPLE MURDER IN THE MAGUINADANAO
MASSACRE CASES IN LIGHT OF HIS ADMITTED PARTICIPATION THEREAT IN AFFIDAVITS AND OFFICIAL RECORDS
FILED WITH THE PROSECUTOR AND THE QC RTC; and,

2. WHETHER THE SUBSEQUENT INCLUSION OF KENNY DALANDAG IN THE WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM
JUSTIFIES EXCLUSION AS AN ACCUSED AND HIS NON-INDICTMENT FOR HIS COMPLICITY IN THE MAGUINDANAO
MASSACRE NOTWITHSTANDING ADMISSIONS MADE THAT HE TOOK PART IN ITS PLANNING AND EXECUTION. 35

The crucial issue is whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an
accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness
Protection Program of the DOJ.

Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose principal power and
responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of the power to execute
our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide
range of discretion the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord
of factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors.36

The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the amount of evidence sufficient to
establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate criminal charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the
quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not criminal cases should be filed in court. 37

Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a sound
judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive Department,
through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be
allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is,
when he has exercised his discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law."38

The records herein are bereft of any showing that the Panel of Prosecutors committed grave abuse of discretion in
identifying the 196 individuals to be indicted for the Maguindanao massacre. It is notable in this regard that
petitioner does not assail the joint resolution recommending such number of individuals to be charged with
multiple murder, but only seeks to have Dalandag be also investigated and charged as one of the accused based
because of his own admissions in his sworn declarations. However, his exclusion as an accused from the
informations did not at all amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Panel of Prosecutors whose
procedure in excluding Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section 2,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that "the complaint or information shall be xxx against all persons
who appear to be responsible for the offense involved," albeit a mandatory provision, may be subject of some
exceptions, one of which is when a participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state witness.

The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a state witness are, namely: (a) by
discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval
of his application for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act
No. 6981 (The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act). 39 These modes are intended to encourage a person
who has witnessed a crime or who has knowledge of its commission to come forward and testify in court or quasi-
judicial body, or before an investigating authority, by protecting him from reprisals, and shielding him from
economic dislocation.

These modes, while seemingly alike, are distinct and separate from each other.

Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial court of one or more of several accused
with their consent so that they can be witnesses for the State is made upon motion by the Prosecution before
resting its case. The trial court shall require the Prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statements of the
proposed witnesses at a hearing in support of the discharge. The trial court must ascertain if the following
conditions fixed by Section 17 of Rule 119 are complied with, namely: (a) there is absolute necessity for the
testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) the testimony of said
accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) said accused does not appear to be most guilty;
and (e) said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS

Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. (Balidoy) was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the PMMA. 3 In order to reach
active status, all new entrants were required to successfully complete the mandatory Indoctrination and
Orientation Period,4 which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001.5 Balidoy died on 3 May
2001.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) probed the death of Balidoy. After months of investigation, it forwarded
its findings7 to the provincial prosecutor of Zambales for the preliminary investigation and possible criminal
prosecution of those involved in the orientation and indoctrination of the PMMA Class of 2005. 8 Subsequently, the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales issued a Resolution 9 finding probable cause to charge the following as
principals to the crime of hazing: Aldwin Alvarez (Alvarez), Leotharius C. Montez (Montez), Rudence G. Reyes
(Reyes), and Jed Nicholas S. Simpas (Simpas) collectively, Alvarez et al. A criminal case against Alvarez et al. was
then filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales (RTCZambales).

The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military the finding of
probable cause to charge the following school authorities as accomplices to hazing: Rear Admiral (RADM) Virginio
R. Aris (Aris), Lieutenant Senior Grade (LTSG.) Dominador D. Bayabos (Bayabos), Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG.)
Gerry P. Doctor (Doctor), LTJG. Manny Ferrer (Ferrer), LTJG. Kruzaldo Mabborang (Mabborang), LTJG. Ronald G.
Magsino (Magsino), Ensign (ENS.) Dennis Velasco (Velasco), and ENS. Dominador Operio (Operio) collectively,
respondents. The Ombudsman Investigator agreed with the findings of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. The
matter was thus ordered re-docketed for the purpose of conducting the proper administrative proceedings against
respondents for grave misconduct and abuse of authority.10 The Office of the Special Prosecutor eventually filed
with the Sandiganbayan a criminal case charging respondents as accomplices to the crime of
hazing.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Meanwhile, the RTCZambales issued an Order dismissing the Information against the principal accused, Alvarez et
al.12 The Order was later entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment.

Bayabos, Ferrer, Magsino, Doctor, and Operio (collectively, Bayabos et al.) filed a Motion to Quash the
Information.13 They argued that the Information did not contain all the essential elements of the offense. They also
pointed out that there was no allegation that the purported act had been made a prerequisite for admission to the
PMMA, especially considering that the victim had already been accepted in the academy. Moreover, they stressed
that there was no averment in the Information that the PMMA was a fraternity, a sorority, or an organization. Also
underscored was the absence in the Information of any assertion that the alleged hazing was not part of the
physical, mental, and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the
physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members. Furthermore, they emphasized that
there was no allegation that they were given prior written notice of the hazing and that they had permitted the
activity.

As a final point, Bayabos et al. argued that the case against the principal accused had already been dismissed with
finality by the RTC. There being no more principals with whom they could have cooperated in the execution of the
offense, they asserted that the case against them must be dismissed.

The Special Prosecutor opposed14 the motion of Bayabos et al. He insisted that the Information alleged the
material facts that would sufficiently establish the presence of the essential ingredients of the crime
of accomplice to hazing. He also stressed that there was nothing in the law requiring that the principals
must be prosecuted first before a case could be filed against the accomplices. The Comment/Opposition of
the Special Prosecutor was, however, silent on the issue of whether the Information contained an allegation
that the supposed hazing had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, and whether the
academy was considered an organization within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.

Six days before Bayabos et al. were set to be arraigned,15 the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution
(SB Resolution I) quashing the Information and dismissing the criminal case against them. According to the
court, the fact that the charge against the principal accused Alvarez et al. was dismissed with finality
favorably carried with it the indictment against those charged as accomplices, whose criminal responsibility
was subordinate to that of the former. It stressed that before there can be an accomplice, there must be a
principal by direct participation, the latter being the originator of the criminal design. In this case, as there
were no principal perpetrators to speak of, necessarily, there was no one else with whom they could have
cooperated in the execution of the crime of hazing. In view of the dismissal of the case against the
principals, the court ruled that the Information charging Bayabos et al. as accomplices could no longer stand
on its own.

The Special Prosecutor asks this Court to address a number of legal issues. After a thorough evaluation of the
Petitions, however, we cull the threshold issues needing to be addressed by this Court as follows:

I. Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can proceed in spite of the
dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused

II. Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the material averments for the prosecution
of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law
Nevertheless, we find albeit for a different reason that the Motion to Quash must be granted, as the
Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing. The Information
charging respondents reads as follows:

The undersigned Assistant Special Prosecutor, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses [RADM] Virginio R.
Aris, [LTSG.] Dominador D. BAYABOS, [LTJG.] Manny G. Ferrer, [LTJG.] Ronald G. Magsino, [LTJG.] Kruzaldo G.
Mabborang, [LTJG.] Gerry P. Doctor, [ENS.] Dominador B. Operio, Jr., and [ENS.] Dennis S. Velasco, as accomplices
for Violation of R.A. 8049 (Anti-Hazing Law), committed as follows:

That during the period from the 2 nd of May 2001 up to the 3 rd of May 2001, inside the campus of the Philippine
Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA), in the Municipality of San Narciso, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused RADM Virginio R. Aris, President of PMMA with [Salary
Grade (SG) 29]; LTSG. Dominador D. BAYABOS, Commandant of the Cadets; (LTJG.) Manny G. Ferrer, 1 stBatallion
Officer; LTJG. Ronald G. Magsino, Security Officer; LTJG. Kruzaldo G. Mabborang, 2 nd Battalion Officer; LTJG. Gerry P.
Doctor, Batl. Mast.; ENS. Dominador B. Operio, Jr., 1 st Battalion Company Officer; and ENS. Dennis S. Velasco, Mess
Officer, all public officers, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, committing the offense in
relation to office and while in the performance of their duties as such public officers being the school authorities
and/or faculty members did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, consent or have actual knowledge of
the hazing perpetrated by the principal accused, all First Class Midshipmen, against probationary midshipman
FERNANDO BALIDOy, JR. during the schools Indoctrination and Orientation; and, fail to take any action to prevent
the occurrence of the hazing and the infliction of psychological and physical injuries against said FERNANDO
BALIDOy, JR. thereby causing the instantaneous death of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
FERNANDO BALIDOy, JR.36

As can be gleaned from the above, the indictment merely states that psychological pain and physical injuries were
inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for
admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful
prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of
hazing. Plain reference to a technical term37 in this case, hazing is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a
characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court, expressly states that the information must include, inter alia, both the designation of the offense given
by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The Special Prosecutors
belated argument38 in his Petition before this Court that the successful completion of the indoctrination and
orientation program was used as a prerequisite for continued admission to the academy i.e., attainment of active
midshipman status does not cure this defect in the Information. Thus, the Information must be quashed, as the
ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime of accomplice to hazing.

Finally, we reject the Special Prosecutors claim that the Sandiganbayan should just have ordered the filing of
another information or the correction of the defect by amendment, instead of dismissing the case
outright.39 Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, provides that if a motion to quash is based on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court shall give the prosecution a chance to correct
the defect by amendment. However, the provision also states that if the prosecution fails to make the amendment,
the motion shall be granted. Here, we point out that the Special Prosecutor insisted in his Comment on the Motion
to Quash40 that there was no defect in the Information. Neither has he filed a new information after the motion
was sustained, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 117. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ordering the quashal of the
Information and the eventual dismissal of the case.

This does not mean, however, that the Special Prosecutor is now precluded from filing another information. Section
6, Rule 117, specifically states that an order sustaining a motion to quash would not bar another prosecution. That
is, of course, unless respondents are able to prove that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, or that
double jeopardy has already attached.

Given the foregoing, the Court no longer sees the necessity to pass upon the other issues raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 171222 is hereby DENIED and the petition
for certiorari in G.R. No. 174786, DISMISSED. The dismissal of the case in Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated 27
January 2006 and 3 August 2006 in Criminal Case No. 28339 are thus AFFIRMED.

PO3 BENITO SOMBILON, JR.,- versus -PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The facts found during the trial reveal that on or about August 15, 1998, AAA, a fifteen (15)-year old minor, was
investigated by Appellant at the Calinan Police Station, Davao City in connection with a complaint for Theft filed by
a certain Aileen Dagoc.

AAA alleged that Appellant, in conducting the investigation, took her inside a room and locked it. She testified that
the room had no window but had a cot, a table, and a clothesline where some clothes were hanged. She claimed
that Appellant pointed a gun at her, with the end of the barrel touching her forehead and pushed her with it,
causing her head to violently bang against the wall, and asked her: Did you steal the necklace? She answered that
she did not. Appellant then took an electric wire from a drawer and inserted its male plug to a socket. She was
ordered to place her two hands on top of the table where her fingers were electrocuted with the end of the
wire. She was again asked the same question, which she kept answering in the negative. Subsequently, she was
asked: Dalaga ka na ba? (Are you a woman now?), and was told: I am single too. Simultaneously, she was touched
all over her body including her breasts, her belly, and her private parts. She was also kissed on her cheek. She
struggled to resist the sexual advances but Appellant prevailed.She claimed that they were inside the room for
more than one (1) hour.

Thereafter, they went out of the room where Appellant announced to P03 Danilo Mendez and Aileen Dagoc that
she had already admitted having stolen the necklace. Pale, AAA was trembling and crying; her hair disheveled, her
dress wet. She also had bruises on her forehead.

The police officers allowed AAA and her mother to go home on the condition that they would pay the value of the
necklace. Because of AAAs condition, AAAs mother brought her daughter to the Medical Clinic of St. Luke where
AAA was examined by Dr. Manuel Garcia, Sr.[4] Dr. Garcia gave AAA a tranquilizer to calm down the latter who was
trembling and incoherent.[5] At first, AAA could not answer the doctor when she was asked what happened to
her. Later, upon regaining her composure, she revealed that she was electrocuted and sexually molested by
petitioner.[6] The Medical Certificate[7] issued by Dr. Garcia disclosed the following injuries:

1. Slight contusion over occiput region.

2. Slight contusion over center area of forehead.

3. Multiple slight contusions of fingers of bilateral hands.

4. Multiple slight contusions of bilateral breast areas.

5. Slight body tremors.

Diagnosis: Slight Physical Injuries

In an Information[8] dated August 23, 1999, petitioner was charged with the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness
committed as follows:

The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, under Art. 336, in
relation to Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the instance of the complainant AAA, who is 15 years old,
whose affidavit is hereto attached to form part of this Information. The crime is committed as follows:

That on or about August 14, 1998, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-mentioned accused, motivated by lewd design, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously upon the
person of AAA, by then and there embracing, mashing the breast, and touching the private part, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued thereafter.

Petitioners assertion that the locus criminis i.e., the police station makes it unlikely for him to commit the crime of
acts of lasciviousness is specious. The presence of other policemen on duty and of the victims mother outside the
room where the incident took place does not render commission of the offense impossible. It has been shown that
there was a room in the precinct which, except for two doors which could be locked, was totally enclosed. [17] During
the commission of the acts of lasciviousness, petitioner and AAA were the only persons inside the room. Lust, as
we have often held, is no respecter of either place or time. [18]

As to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position, petitioner points out
that said circumstance was not alleged in the information. The Solicitor General shares the same view.

Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000,
provide:

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by
the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusations. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying
and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language
used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

Clearly, it is now a requirement that the aggravating as well as the qualifying circumstances be expressly and
specifically alleged in the complaint or information.Otherwise, they cannot be considered by the trial court in its
judgment, even, if they are subsequently proved during trial.[19] A reading of the Information shows that there was
no allegation of any aggravating circumstance.

In People v. Buayaban,[20] the crime was committed and the Information was filed in 1990. Still, the Court gave the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure retroactive application since it benefited the accused and disregarded the generic
aggravating circumstance of band because it was not alleged in the Information. The Court explained, viz:
Section 8 simply provides that the information or complaint must state the designation of the offense given by the
statute and specify its qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances. With regard to Section 9, we held
in People vs. Nerio Suela that the use of the word must in said Section 9 indicates that the requirement is
mandatory and therefore, the failure to comply with sec. 9, Rule 110, means that generic aggravating
circumstances, although proven at the trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if such circumstances are
not stated in the information.

In this case, we cannot properly appreciate the ordinary aggravating circumstance of band in the commission of the
crime since there was no allegation in the information that more than three armed malefactors acted together in
the commission of the crime.

Here, the crime was committed in 1998, the generic aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public
position was not alleged in the information. As such, it cannot be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance. Consequently, the penalty imposed must be modified.

U ZHI SHAN @ ALVIN CHING SO,v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES/SOLICITOR GENERAL,

That on or about March 31, 2000, in Barangay Potrero, Malabon, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized to possess or use any
regulated drug, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly have in his possession methamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, a regulated drug with an approximate weight of fifteen thousand
seventy six point one (15,076.1) grams, in violation of the aforecited law [Section 16, Article III of RA No. 6425 as
amended by RA No. 7659].

CONTRARY TO LAW.

x x x x[2]

From the account of the prosecution, the following events led to the filing of the cases:

On being informed on March 20, 2000 by a confidential informant that one Su Zhi Shan alias Alvin Ching So (the
accused) was pushing drugs in Manila, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group conducted a 10-day
surveillance in the vicinity of the residence of the accused at 19 Yellowbell, Araneta Village, Potrero, Malabon,
Metro Manila.

In the course of the surveillance, a test-buy operation was conducted by SPO1 Ed Badua (SPO1 Badua) and the
informant during which 1.27 grams of a substance were obtained. When subjected to laboratory examination, the
substance was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Another test-buy, which was later to become a buy-bust operation, was thereafter arranged by SPO1 Badua and the
informer to take place on March 31, 2000.[3]

As scheduled, PO1 Christopher Guste (PO1 Guste), acting as poseur-buyer, and the informant went to the pre-
arranged meeting place at 31 McArthur Highwaycorner Victoneta Avenue in Malabon, Metro Manila on March 31,
2000. As the accused arrived, the confidential informant spoke to him in Chinese and pointed to PO1 Guste as the
buyer. When the accused asked PO1 Guste for the purchase money, the latter brought out a folded long brown
envelope containing marked money and two bundles of boodle money. The accused soon went inside his car and
returned after a few seconds, carrying a red plastic bag which he handed to PO1 Guste and which the latter found
to contain a white crystalline substance. PO1 Guste then placed the plastic bag in his car through an open window
and handed the envelope of marked money to the accused as he (PO1 Guste) scratched his head, a pre-arranged
signal that the sale was consummated. Policemen at once arrested the accused and brought him to Camp Crame.[4]

While the accused was in custody, the PNP Narcotics Group applied for, and was granted, a search warrant on his
residence.[5] During the search, the PNP Narcotics Group seized a box of 16 transparent plastic bags containing an
undetermined quantity of white crystalline substance, and a digital weighing scale. [6]

The red plastic bag of white crystalline substance which was obtained during the buy-bust operation on March 31,
2000 and those seized during the raid on the residence of the accused tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.[7]

The PNP Narcotics Group thus brought the accused to the Office of the National Prosecution Service of the
Department of Justice for inquest proceedings.Finding probable cause to hale the accused into court, the above-
quoted informations were filed against him.

The accused, denying that his name is Alvin Ching So or Su Zhi Shan, claimed that he was a victim of hulidap.[8] He
gave the following details of the circumstances attendant to his arrest:

After he withdrew P500,000 from Equitable Bank at Blumentritt, Sta. Cruz, Manila on March 31, 2000, he was
intercepted by unidentified men somewhere along Blumentritt Street. He was immediately blindfolded, forced into
another car, and divested of his clutch bag containing the P500,000 he had just withdrawn. He was then brought
to Camp Crame after which he was forced by his captors to repair to his apartment and, over his protest, his room
was searched.[9]

The accused questioned the search warrant as a general warrant which is not based on the applicants personal
knowledge.

The Court of Appeals thus disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment as follows:

a. The Decision pertaining to Crim. Case No. 22992-MN, for violation of Section 15, RA No. 6425, as amended,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua

b. Appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No. 22993-MN, for violation of Section 16,
RA No. 6425, as amended. However, the 15,076.1 grams of shabu shall remain in the custody of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, for proper disposition in accordance with law; and

c. The van ordered by the trial court to be forfeited in favor of the State shall be returned to him through the
regular legal processes.

SO ORDERED.[18] (Italics, emphasis and underscoring in the original)

His Motion for Reconsideration[19] having been denied,[20] the accused, through counsel, filed the instant
Petition[21] for review, assigning 24 errors[22] which are synthesized in capsule form as follows:

1. Convicting the wrong person

2. Not finding irregularities in the procurement and service of the search warran
3. Considering documents which were not offered in evidence, thus ignoring Sec. 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court

4. Failing to comply with standard procedures of drug analysis

5. Holding that possessing or selling of any substance, such as tawas, as shabu is punishable

6. Failure to apply the ruling in People v. Ventura[23] that it is incredible to buy without the shabu in sight[24]

7. Failing to apply the rule on entertained denial or alibi

8. Imposing two outlandish death penalties and imposing P20 million fine

9. Crediting the clear hearsay evidence regarding the alleged test-buy and the bizarre story regarding the
alleged buy-bust

10. Holding that the elements of selling and possessing shabu are present although not proved (specifically the
element that the accused lacked the authority to sell shabu)[25]

11. Finding that there was no withdrawal of P500,000, and

12. Ignoring non-compliance with safeguards against illegal buy-bust or with Supreme Court decisions on buy-
bust.

At the outset, this Court declares it unnecessary to entertain the issues on alleged irregularities in the procurement
and service of the search warrant, the Court of Appeals having acquitted the accused in the case
for illegal possession of shabu. Just as it declares it unnecessary to dwell on the alleged impropriety in the
imposition of the death penalty, the appellate court having imposed instead reclusion perpetua, and given that
RA 9346 has prohibited the imposition of death penalty to thus accordingly modify the present provision of RA
7659.[26]

In support of his plea for acquittal, the accused (hereafter petitioner) submits that the following grounds dent the
credibility of PO1 Gustes account on the buy-bust operation:

FIRST Badua and confidential informant allegedly conducted a test-buy. They never mentioned or arranged a buy-
bust operation with Guste or anybody. Instead, Badua and Balolong applied for a search warrant based on the
alleged test-buy. They did not participate in the alleged buy-bust. They never coordinated with Guste they never
arranged any buy-bust with Guste.

SECOND There was no negotiation to sell. Badua and the confidential informant never negotiated with the accused
to sell along MacArthur Highway cor. Victoneta Avenuewhere the alleged buy-bust was conducted. Badua, Balolong
and the alleged confidential informant were not presented during the trial.

THIRD There was no surveillance of the venue of the alleged buy[-]bust operation. Matta testified that what was
placed under surveillance was allegedly the residence of the appellant and Ryan Ong for the purpose of securing
the search warrant.

FOURTH The alleged money was not in sight. It was allegedly wrapped.
FIFTH Alvin Ching So (not Su Jing Yue or So Alvin Cheng) allegedly delivered the shabu without first seeing the
money. Guste allegedly delivered the wrapped boodle without seeing the shabu first.

SIXTH On cross-examination, Guste admitted that his only participation was allegedly as poseur-buyer.

SEVENTH The testimony of Guste, alleged poseur-buyer was not corroborated; hence, incredible.

EIGHT The alleged buy-bust is contrary to human experience and ordinary course of things. The boodle is readily
detectible, especially only two (2) pieces of genuine money were allegedly placed on top and bottom of the
bundles of boodle. The bundles were wrapped with brown envelope folded twice. The boodle was not shown to
the alleged seller.How could there be buying and busting under the circumstances? The buyer himself does not
believe selling could be made for a boodle appearing as fake; hence the clumsy use of two (2) pieces of genuine
money. x x x[27] (Emphasis in the original)

Petitioners submissions do not persuade. PO1 Gustes testimony was not hearsay. He was the poseur-buyer who
participated in the buy-bust operation. His testimony was corroborated by Chief Inspector Eleazar Matta who
declared that: He (Matta) was present when the confidential informer relayed information regarding Alvin Ching
Sos drug pushing activities;[28] he participated in planning and conducting the surveillance operation in the vicinity
of the residence of the accused;[29]after the test-buy was conducted, SPO1 Badua reported to him;[30] and he was
the team leader dispatched to conduct and he was present during the buy-bust operation on March 31, 2000
at Victoneta Avenue, Malabon.[31]

PO1 Gustes account is likewise complemented by overwhelming documentary and object evidence, including his
request for laboratory examination of the seized substance, [32] the laboratory examination reports,[33] the buy-bust
money used,[34] the pre-operational coordination sheet of the PNP Narcotics Group, [35] the Booking Sheet/Arrest
Report,[36] and the substance obtained during the buy-bust operation [37] and a photograph thereof.[38]

That the prosecution failed to present SPO1 Badua and the confidential informer does not weaken its case as the
discretion to choose witnesses to be presented for the State and to dispense with the testimonies of witnesses who
would only give corroboration rests on the prosecution. [39]

If petitioner believed that there were witnesses who could have exculpated him, he could have called for them,
even by compulsory process,[40] but he did not.

That no evidence was presented on the conduct of the surveillance and of the venue for the test-bust operation
and that the surveillance was for the purpose of procuring the search warrant do not help petitioners case. For
even if no prior surveillance were made, the validity of an entrapment operation, especially when the buy-bust
team members were accompanied to the scene by their informant, [41] as in the case at bar,[42] is not affected.

Invoking People v. Ventura[43] and inviting attention to the fact that the purchase money presented as evidence of
the second buy-bust operation was not visible as it was wrapped in an envelope, petitioner argues:

In [People v. Ventura], the Supreme Court ruled that it is incredible to buy without the shabu in sight. Logically, it
is incredible to sell without the money in sight. To sell without the seeing and counting the money is contrary to
human nature, habit and ordinary course of things. [44] (Italics and emphasis in the original)

Petitioners argument does not persuade too. It will be recalled that a test-buy operation had earlier been
conducted, facilitated by the same confidential informant who was undoubtedly known to petitioner. Given the
trust accorded to the informant, the hurried nature of consummating similar transactions and the place of the
transaction a busy street open to bystanders and passersby, there was nothing unusual about petitioners not
checking first the contents of the brown envelope.

Neither does the contention of petitioner that it would have been improbable for the buy-bust sale to have taken
place because under the circumstances the boodle money could have been easily detected as fake persuade. This
Court has affirmed convictions in cases of buy-bust operations where the accused actually saw that the money was
boodle.[45]

Respecting petitioners disclaimer that he is the Su Zhi Shan alias Alvin Ching So accused in the case, he contends
that there is no scintilla of evidence offered to prove that said accused is the same Su Jing Yue alias So Alvin Cheng
that he is.[46] This contention falls in the face of this Courts repeated rulings that the erroneous designation in the
Information of the name of the accused does not vitiate it if it is clearly proven that the person accused and
brought to court is the person who committed the crime.[47]

As People v. Navaja[48] holds, whether there lived another person with the same name as the accused in the area
where the buy-bust operation was conducted is immaterial, the identity of the therein accused as the person who
sold the marijuana to the poseur-buyers having been established, [49] as in the present case.

It bears noting that the information charging petitioner was prepared after he was arrested and while he was in
custody. There could, therefore, be no doubt that the person who was arrested and brought to court is the same
person charged in the information. Even PO1 Guste identified petitioner in open court[50] as the person who sold
the shabu to him as the poseur-buyer.

On petitioners taking issue with the manner by which laboratory analysis of the confiscated plastic bags
of shabu were examined, thus:

The Chemist allegedly examined only 3% of the confiscated substance. With respect to the 3% specimen, she did
not know how and why the 3% represented the entire substance in 16 [sic] packages. She did not get the specimen
or sampling in accordance with universally accepted sampling procedure; that is mixing, coning and quartering of
10 packages in accordance with the UN Guideline. Therefore, she could not know that the 3% specimen was the
correct representative specimen.[51] (Emphasis in original),

he proffers that a quantitative examination of the confiscated substance should have been done because

x x x [the] substance sold as shabu being merely regulated, should be proved beyond reasonable doubt as real
shabu. Hence, the essential requisite of proper qualitative and quantitative examination to determine the shabu
content of a substance suspected as shabu. The reason is: The punishable crime is selling or possessing
shabu. Besides, the penalty is based on the shabu content. For example, we have a 200 grams [sic] of tawas.
99.999% is tawas, .001% is shabu. The 200 grams of tawas cannot be the basis of [the penalty] because it is only
positive of .001% of shabu.[52] (Emphasis in the original)

Albeit this issue is immaterial in so far as the charge for illegal possession is concerned, petitioner having been
acquitted by the appellate court, this Court notes, en passant, that petitioners position does not likewise persuade.

Laboratory tests confirmed that the substance confiscated during the operations is shabu.[53] The records of the
case reveal that the forensic chemical officer, Police Inspector Miladenia O. Tapan, who conducted the laboratory
examination took representative samples, by using the quartering method, from the plastic bag of substance
subject of the test-buy transaction, as well as from that subject of the buy-bust operation. [54]
Case law has it that the forensic chemist is not mandated to examine the entire mass of shabu confiscated by the
policemen xxx. It is enough that a sample of the said substance be subjected to qualitative examination.
x x x [A] sample taken from one package is logically presumed to be representative of the entire contents of the
package unless proven otherwise by the accused himself.[55] (Citations omitted; Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

In the case at bar, the accused failed to present evidence refuting the presumption that the samples taken from the
contents of the plastic bags are representative of the entire contents thereof. As this Court observed in People v.
Johnson,[56] x x x if accused appellant were not satisfied with the results, it would have been a simple matter for
[him] to ask for an independent examination of the substance by another chemist. This [he] did not do.[57]

As for the contention of the accused that the prosecution failed to prove that he lacked the authority to sell shabu,
this Court, in addressing a similar contention in People v. Manalo, [58] held:

The general rule is that if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative allegation, or a negative averment is an
essential element of a crime, the prosecution has the burden to prove the charge. However, this rule admits of
exceptions. Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the facts are more
immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi rests upon him. Stated otherwise, it is not
incumbent on the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the truth of which
is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of
documents or other evidence within the defendants knowledge or control. For example, where a charge is made
that a defendant carried on a certain business without a license (as in the case at bar, where the accused is charged
with the sale of a regulated drug without authority), the fact that he has a license is a matter which is peculiarly
within his knowledge and he must establish that fact or suffer conviction. x x x[59] (Italics in the original)

As in Manalo, the circumstances surrounding the two occasions of sale subject of the first case indicate that
petitioner had no authority to sell shabu. Petitioner sold the shabu not in a hospital or pharmacy but at a street
corner.[60] He could have very easily presented a copy of his license or any other document proving his authority to
sell but he did not.[61]

The bare allegation then of petitioner that his constitutional rights were violated during the March 31, 2000 buy-
bust operation[62] cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties enjoyed by
the officers tasked to enforce the law.[63]

The trial court thus correctly rejected the defense of hulidap. Indeed, courts generally view with disfavor this
defense, which is commonly raised in drug cases, it being easy to concoct and difficult to prove. [64]

Exhibits 5 and 6 the photocopies of withdrawal slips[65] presented by the accused to prove that he withdrew money
before the supposed hulidap incident do not help petitioners case. As the trial court noted,

The hulidap aspect of the defense put up by So will not hold water in view of Exhibit W, a pass book of Equitable
PCI Bank in the name of Alvin C. So bearing the same account number as those listed in Exhibits 5 and 6. This
passbook does not reflect any withdrawal having been made on March 31, 2000 in the total amount of
P606,000.00. As a matter of fact, no withdrawals in said total amount could have been made at all on said date
because the outstanding balance of the deposit as of March 29, 2000 was only P25, 256.14 and this is the last
entry in the said pass book, thus showing that on March 31, 2000, no withdrawal at all was made from said
account.[66] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner nevertheless contends that the trial court, in appreciating the bank passbook as evidence, violated
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence which prohibits courts from considering evidence which has not been
formally offered. The records of the case show, however, that the passbook was formally offered as evidence. [67]

Finally, on the discrediting of petitioners defenses of denial and/or alibi, these defenses gain strength only if the
prosecution fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
[68]
In the case at bar, however, the prosecution has proven the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

BRAULIO ABALOS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

On November 11, 1994, an Information for Falsification of Private Documents was filed against the
accusedappellant Braulio Abalos (hereinafter referred to as the accused-appellant) before the Municipal Trial Court
of Dagupan City, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 22707. The information alleged-

That on or about the 12th day of July, 1994, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ENGR. BRAULIO ABALOS, with intent to cause damage to the heirs of
Roman Soriano of Lingayen, Pangasinan, among them is EVELYN C. SORIANO, complainant herein, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, cause(d) the production of and the filling in of entries on Cash Receipts
Nos. 39185, 39414 and 41775 of the Pangasinan Photostat, and thereafter offered the same to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 37 of Lingayen, Pangasinan, as supporting documents to his Bill of Cost in Civil Case No. 15958, giving
the impression to the court that the receipts were authentic when in fact, to his own knowledge, they were not,
thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of fact; that as a consequence thereof, the adverse party in
Civil Case No. 15958, represented by EVELYN C. SORIANO, sustained damages.

Thereafter, or on December 12, 1994, another Information for Falsification of Private Document was filed against
the accused-appellant before the Municipal Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, docketed as Criminal Case No.
10024.

Meanwhile, on June 5, 1995, during his arraignment before the Dagupan Municipal Trial Court, the accused-
appellant entered a plea of not guilty. On August 7, 1995, he filed a Motion to Quash, arguing that the Municipal
Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.

On October 20, 1995, the Municipal Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 2, ordered the quashal of Criminal Case No.
22707 for lack of jurisdiction. Private complainants Motion for Reconsideration was denied on November 20, 1995.

On January 3, 1996, private complainant filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan
City. On May 14, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40 issued the Order now on appeal,
reversing and setting aside the October 20, 1995 and November 20, 1995 Orders of the Municipal Trial Court of
Dagupan City, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 22707.

xxx

On the other hand, after the filing of the Information before the Lingayen court, the accused-appellant filed a
Motion to Quash x x x. The court a quo denied the Motion to Quash in its Order of September 8, 1996. Undaunted,
the accused-appellant went on Certiorari to the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 69 which
rendered a Decision on October 28, 1996, dismissing the Petition for Certiorari of the accused-appellant for lack of
merit.[2]

Twice rebuffed by two different trial courts, petitioner appealed the said cases to the Court of Appeals. The appeal
in Criminal Case No. 22707 was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42482, while that in Criminal Case No. 10024 was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43237. On February 22, 1997, petitioner moved to consolidate the two appeals, which
the Court of Appeals granted on April 4, 1997.

On August 10, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, both Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42482 and 43237 are hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

On December 14, 1998, petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, the present petition, where petitioner ascribes the following errors to the Court of Appeals:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING AND RULING THAT:

(a) UNDER THE FACTS OF THE CASE AT BENCH (sic), BOTH MTC LINGAYEN AND MTCC DAGUPAN HAVE
JURISDICTION OVER THE RESPECTIVE INFORMATION FILED FOR FALSIFICATION OF PRIVATE DOCUMENTS;

(b) THAT THE FACTS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION IN THE MTC LINGAYEN AND IN THE INFORMATION IN THE
MTCC DAGUPAN DO NOT CONSTITUTE ONLY ONE CRIME OF FALSIFICATION OF PRIVATE DOCUMENTS; AND

(c) THAT IN THE CASE AT BENCH (sic), EACH FALSIFICATION COMMITTED ON EACH OF THE INDIVIDUAL RECEIPTS
AND VOUCHERS CONSTITUTES A SEPARATE CRIME EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY HAVE BEEN COMMITTED IN THE
COURSE OF A CONTINUOUS TRANSACTION ON THE SAME DATE OR EVEN ON THE SAME PIECE OF PAPER.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING AND RULING THAT THE COMPLAINANT EVELYN C. SORIANO
AND THE PEOPLE ARE NOT GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING IN THE FILING OF TWO INFORMATIONS FOR ONE AND
SAME OFFENSE IN TWO DIFFERENT BRANCHES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.

III. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THE DECISION APPEALED FROM, THAT THE
FALSIFICATION OF EACH RECEIPT AND EACH INVOICE CONSTITUTES A SEPARATE OFFENSE, THE INFORMATION IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 10024, MTC LINGAYEN IS DISMISSIBLE FOR CHARGING MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE, AND THE
DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 22707 MTCC DAGUPAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED. [4]

The main issue to be resolved is whether MTCC-Dagupan and MTC-Lingayen have jurisdiction over the crimes
allegedly committed by petitioner. In this connection, we must also resolve whether the filing of separate
complaints supported by the identical affidavits and annexes to the informations filed in two courts constitutes
forum shopping. Lastly, we must also determine whether the respective informations in Lingayen as well as in
Dagupan, MTCC, were dismissible for multiplicity of offenses merged in one information.

Primarily, petitioner assails the assumption of jurisdiction over the criminal cases for falsification by the MTCC-
Dagupan and the MTC- Lingayen. He argues that both courts could not have simultaneous jurisdiction over his
case. He avers that only one crime was committed pursuant to the unified and indivisible nature of the criminal
intent proved.
Petitioner also contends that the filing of two separate complaints using the same complaint-affidavit and
supported by the same annexes constitutes forum shopping. He points out that if indeed the acts committed by
him constitute several offenses, then the informations filed against him in Criminal Cases Nos. 10024 and 22707
should be dismissed on the ground of multiplicity of felonies charged in a single information. [5]

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that both MTCC-Dagupan and MTC-Lingayen
have properly assumed jurisdiction over petitioners criminal cases since these involved different acts of
falsification, where some were committed in Dagupan and others in Lingayen. The OSG adds that each falsified
document constitutes one separate act of falsification, such that there could be as many acts of falsification as
there are falsified documents.[6] Citing People vs. Madrigal-Gonzales, 7 SCRA 942 (1963), the OSG contends that in
this case, the use of several falsified documents during one occasion does not diminish the number of acts of
falsification that petitioner had committed.[7]

On the issue of jurisdiction, we find enlightening the findings of the Court of Appeals:

Stripped to the core, the issue in these consolidated cases is whether or not the Dagupan and Lingayen trial courts
have jurisdiction over the respective information for Falsification of Private Documents.

This question finds its answer in the case of Alfelor, Sr. vs. Intia, 70 SCRA 480, citing the case of Lopez vs. City
Judge, 18 SCRA 616, where the Supreme Court stated:

xxx

It is settled law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense was committed not only determines
the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction (U.S. v. Pagdayuman, 5 Phil. 265). Thus, under the
provisions of Section 86 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal courts have original jurisdiction only over criminal
offenses committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction.

xxx

Coming now to the cases at bench (sic), it is clear that both the Dagupan and Lingayen courts may exercise
jurisdiction over the respective criminal cases filed before it.

In the Dagupan case involving the cash receipts issued by the Pangasinan Photostat of Dagupan City, the
Information alleges that the offense was committed in Dagupan City. This suffices to give said court jurisdiction
over the crime of falsification as charged. Petitioners argument that the crime of falsification x x x arose ONLY when
the intent to cause damage became evident, that is, when the receipts and invoices were submitted in court as
proof of the Bill of Costs proves futile in light of the pronouncement in Lopez (supra), that the act of falsification is
committed by the signing of the document and the coetaneous intent to cause damage and whether the falsified
private document was thereafter put or not put to the illegal use for which it was intended is in no wise a material
or essential element of the crime of falsification of a private document.

As for the Lingayen case, it appears that the subject invoices were issued by the Xerox Copying Machine of
Lingayen, Pangasinan. Again, it suffices for jurisdiction to vest that the Information alleges that the crime of
falsification, as charged, was committed within the municipality of Lingayen. [8]

A detailed disquisition could throw but little additional light on the issue of jurisdiction. Petitioner was charged with
five counts of falsification. The first three, concerning Cash Receipts Nos. 39185, 39414, and 41775, were allegedly
committed in Dagupan. The other two counts, involving Invoices Nos. 1070 and 1071, were allegedly committed in
Lingayen. It is obvious the cases had to filed where the offenses had been committed, either in Dagupan or in
Lingayen, respectively.

For jurisdiction to be acquired by a court in a criminal case, the offense should have been committed or any one of
its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The Dagupan court
could not validly take cognizance of offenses committed in Lingayen. Nor could the Lingayen court legally entertain
charges for acts done in Dagupan. The fact that the falsified receipts and invoices were allegedly used at the same
time in one court proceedings (at the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Branch 7, in connection with Civil Case No.
15958) is of no moment. The offenses of falsification took place much earlier, separately, when the cash receipts
were produced repetitively in Dagupan and Lingayen.

Likewise, considering that five separate offenses of falsification were involved, there can be no forum-shopping. It
was erroneous for petitioner to argue that only one offense was committed. There are as many acts of falsification
as there are documents falsified.[9]

The real problem, however, is why the first three offenses were lumped in a single information filed in Dagupan.
Likewise, why were two offenses joined in a single information filed in Lingayen? Thus, petitioner now claims, with
ostensible merit, that Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court was violated. [10]

The Rules of Court, particularly Rule 110, Section 13, indeed frowns upon multiple offenses being charged in a
single information. However, petitioner failed to raise this issue during arraignment, in Lingayen as well as in
Dagupan. His failure to do so amounts to a waiver, and his objection on this point can no longer be raised on
appeal.[11] In his Motion to Quash filed in Dagupan City, petitioner alleged lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, in
his Motion to Quash filed in Lingayen, petitioner alleged forum-shopping, double jeopardy, lack of jurisdiction, and
that the facts do not constitute an offense. He only raised the issue of multifariousness of offenses alleged in his
petition before this Court. By this time, his objection is belated, and obviously to no avail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The consolidated decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 10, 1998, in CA-G.R. SP No. 42484 and CA-G.R. SP No. 43237, is AFFIRMED.