JURADO BOOK

A testator, a bachelor of 60, executed a will bequeathing a ricefield to the Church worth P100,000.00.
The will further provided that all other assets owned by me after death shall be equally divided among
my two brothers A and B. The testator subsequently married a young woman, begot a son, and left
another will designating his wife and son as his heirs in equal shares. The second will did not expressly
revoke the first will. He left an estate worth P300,000.00 (including the ricefield).
A. Who is entitled to the ricefield? Reasons. (1981)
ANS: It must be observed that the testator left 2 wills. In his first will, he bequeathed the ricefield to the
Church and instituted as heirs in equal shares his two brothers A and B with respect to the rest of his estate.
In his second will, he instituted his wife and his son as heirs in equal shares. Under our law on revocation of wills,
a will may be revoked by another will. The revocation may be effected either expressly or impliedly. Since there
is no express revocation, is there an implied revocation in the instant case? It is undeniable that there is an implied
revocation if the testamentary dispositions found in the first will are totally or partially incompatible with those
found in the second will. It is also undeniable that the incompatibility must be absolute in character in the sense
that the testamentary dispositions cannot stand together. The real issue, therefore, is whether the 2 testamentary
dispositions found in the first will can stand together with the single testamentary disposition found in the second
will.
There are 2 possible views.

According to one view, reading the 2 wills together, it is clear that the testatorial intention is that only the testators
wife and son shall inherit. They are instituted as universal heirs with respect to the hereditary estate in its totality.
Therefore, the second will in its totality cannot stand together with the first will in its totality. Consequently, the
incompatibility between the testamentary dispositions found in the first will and those found in the second will is
both total and absolute in character. Hence, the first. Will is impliedly revoked, by the second will. The testators
widow and his son are, therefore, entitled to the ricefield.

According to a second view, only the institution of A and B in the first will as heirs and that portion or
part of the bequest given to the Church which will impair the legitime of the testators son and widow are revoked
by the second will. The reason is that it is only to that extent that there is absolute incompatibility between the
testamentary dispositions found in the first will and those found in the second will. Consequently, the Church
shall be entitled to the ricefield but only to the extent that it does not encroach upon the legitime of the testators
son and widow.
(Note: The above answers are based on the law on revocation of wills, such as Arts. 830, et seq.,
CC and on well-settled principles in American jurisprudence. Thus, whether the bar candidate will solve
the problem either in accordance with the first view or in accordance with the second view, it should be
considered a correct answer.)

B. Who acquires the rest of the assets? Explain. (1981)

 ANS: Suggested answer for those who adhere to the first view stated above:
There are 2 views with regard to the distribution of the entire stated, including the ricefield.

According to one view, shall be given to the testators son and the other shall be given to the testators
widow. This division would be more in conformity with the testatorial intention.
According to another view, first, satisfy the legitime of the 2 heirs. The testators son shall be entitled to
of P300,000.00 or P150,000.00, while the testators widow shall be entitled to or P75,OOO.OO. The disposable
free portion shall then be divided equally between the 2. This would be more inconformity with the testatorial
intention.
(Note: Either answer should be considered correct.)
Suggested answer for those who adhere to the second view stated above:
The testators son shall be entitled to a legitime of of the entire estate, or P150,000.00; the widow shall
be entitled to a legitime of of the entire estate, or P75,000.00. That means that the bequest in favor of the
Church is inofficious to the extent of P25, 00. Consequently, said bequest or devise should be reduced by .
Therefore, the Church shall be entitled only to an undivided share of 3 of the ricefield.
The testator has 3 children A, B, and C, a wife W, a father F, an acknowledged natural
child N, and an adulterous child T. A is a handicapped child, and the testator wants to leave
to him as much of his estate as he can legally do under the law. State the specific aliquot parts of
the estate that the testator can leave to his son A as well as to his other aforementioned relatives.
State how you arrived at the result. (Assume a net estate of P1,200,000.00 and that all of the above-
named relatives survived the testator.) (1982)

ANS: Under the law on legitime, the survivors shall be entitled to the following legitime:

(1) A, B, and C of the estate which they shall divide in equal shares. Since the net
value of the estate is P1,200,000.00, each of them shall, therefore, be entitled to P200,000.00

(2) W the same as each of the legitimate children, or P200,000.00.

(3) F none. F cannot participate in the 3eserves33 because he is excluded by the legitimate
children of the testator.

(4) N of the legitime of each of the legitimate children, or P100,000.00.

(5) T of the legitime of each of the legitimate children, or P100,000.00 (by virtue of the
FC).

Thus, the disposable free portion is P200,000.00. If the testator so desires, he can leave this
disposable portion to his son A.
141. (1) What is the reason or rationale for 4eserve troncal? (1982)

(2) May the 4eserves4 (reservista) dispose of the reservable property

(a) By acts inter vivos?
(b) By acts mortis causa?

ANS: (1) The reason or rationale for 4eserve troncal is evident: it is to reserve certain property
in favor of certain relatives. Hence, its name 4eserve lineal or troncal. It seeks to prevent persons outside
a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise remain therein.
Its principal aim is to maintain as absolutely as is possible, with respect to the property to which it refers,
a separation between the paternal and maternal lines, so that property of one line may not pass to the
other, or through them to strangers.

(Note: The above answer is lifted from 6 Sanchez Roman 1015 and 14 Scaevola 213.)

(2) (a) The reservista may dispose of the reservable property by acts inter vivos. This is logical
because he acquires the ownership of the reservable property upon the death of the descendantpropositus,
subject to the resolutory condition that there must exist at the time of his death relatives of the descendant
who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which the property came. He can,
therefore, alienate or encumber the property if he so desires but he will only alienate or encumber what
he has and nothing more. As a consequence, the acquirer will only receive a limited and revocable title.
Therefore, after the death of the reservista, the reservatarios may then rescind the alienation or
encumbrance, because the resolutory condition to which the 4eserve is subject has already been fulfilled.

(Note: The above answer is based on Edroso vs. Sablan, 26 Phil. 295 and Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46
Phil. 664. It is also based on comments of distinguished commentators.)

(b) The reservista cannot dispose of the reservable property by acts mortis causa. The reason is
crystal-clear. Upon the death of said ascendant-reservista, the reservable property does not belong to his
or her estate. Because the resolutory condition to which the 4eserve is subject has already been fulfilled,
therefore, the reservatarios or 4eserves nearest the descendant-propositus have already become
automatically and by operation of law owners of the reservable property.

(Note: The above answer is based on Cano vs. Director of Lands [105 Phil. IJ and on Gonzales
vs. Legarda [104 SCRA 479J.)
 . A had 2 legitimate children, namely, Band C. He made a will, instituting C and a friend, D,
as his heirs and giving a P10, 000 legacy to E, his former driver. He, however, expressly disinherited
B without specifying the reason therefor.

Assuming that As net estate is worth P100, 000 upon his death, how will it be distributed?

ANS: The disinheritance of B is defective or imperfect because there is no specification of the cause in the
will as required by law. However, the institution of heirs will only be partially annulled insofar as it may prejudice
his legitime. (Art. 918, CC.) Therefore, B will still be entitled to his legitime, which is of ofP100, 000, or
P25, 000. The legacies, however, are valid so long as they are not inofficious. (Ibid.) It is obvious that the legacy
of P10, 000 given to E is not inofficious because it can easily be contained in the free portion of P50, 000.
Therefore, E will be entitled to such legacy. Since A had instituted as heirs his child C and his friend D as heirs
without designation of shares, therefore, applying the view of Manresa, which has been adopted by commentators
in this country, Tolentino among them (6 Manresa 98-99; 3 Tolentino 161; Art. 846, CC), the legitime of C,
which is of of P100, 000, or P25, 000, must first be separated and allotted to him because the testator cannot
deprive him of it. Then, the remainder of P40, 000, which is the disposable free portion, will be divided equally
between C and D, the two instituted heirs.

Consequently, the estate of P100, 000 will be distributed as follows:

B P25, 000 as compulsory heir;

C P25, 000 as compulsory heir;
P20, 000 as voluntary heir;
D P20, 000 as voluntary heir;
E P10, 000 as legatee.
BAR Q & A
Arthur executed a will which contained only: (i) a provision disinheriting his
daughter Bernica for running off with a married man, and (ii) a provision disposing
of his share in the family house and lot in favor of his other children Connie and
Dora. He did not make any provisions in favor of his wife Erica, because as the will
stated, she would anyway get of the house and lot as her conjugal share. The
will was very brief and straightforward and both the above provisions were
contained in page 1, which Arthur and his instrumental witness, signed at the
bottom. Page 2 contained the attestation clause and the signatures, at the bottom
thereof, of the 3 instrumental witnesses which included Lambert, the driver of
Arthur; Yoly, the family cook, and Attorney Zorba, the lawyer who prepared the
will. There was a 3rd page, but this only contained the notarial acknowledgement.
The attestation clause stated the will was signed on the same occasion by Arthur
and his instrumental witnesses who all signed in the presence of each other, and
the notary public who notarized the will. There are no marginal signatures or
pagination appearing on any of the 3 pages. Upon his death, it was discovered that
apart from the house and lot, he had a P 1 million account deposited with ABC
bank.

A). Was Erica preterited? (1%)

Erica cannot be preterited. Art. 854 of the Civil Code provides that only compulsory
heirs in the direct line can be preterited.

(B). What other defects of the will, if any, can cause denial of probate? (2%)
The other defects of the will that can cause its denial are as follows: (a) Atty. Zorba, the
one who prepared the will was one of the three witnesses, violating the three-witnesses
rule; (b) no marginal signature at the last page; (c ) the attestation did not state the
number of pages upon which the will is written; and, (d) no pagination appearing
correlatively in letters on the upper part of the three pages (Azuela v. C.A., G.R. No.
122880, 12 Apr 2006 and cited cases therein, Art 805 and 806, Civil Code).

(C). Was the disinheritance valid? (1%)

Yes, the disinheritance was valid. Art. 919, par 7, Civil Code provides that "when a child
or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life, like running off with a married
man, there is sufficient cause for disinheritance."

(D). How should the house and lot, and the cash be distributed? (1%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER: Since the probate of the will cannot be allowed, the rules on intestate succession
apply. Under Art. 996 of the Civil Code, if a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are
left, the surviving spouse has the same share as of the children. Thus, ownership over the house and lot will
be created among wife Erica and her children Bernice, Connie and Dora. Similarly, the amount of P 1
million will be equally divided among them.
John and Paula, British citizens at birth, acquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization after their
marriage. During their marriage the couple acquired substanial landholdings in London and in Makati.
Paula bore John three children, Peter, Paul and Mary. In one of their trips to London, the couple executed
a joint will appointing each other as their heirs and providing that upon the death of the survivor between
them the entire estate would go to Peter and Paul only but the two could not dispose of nor divide the
London estate as long as they live. John and Paul died tragically in the London Subway terrorist attack in
2005. Peter and Paul filed a petition for probate of their parent's will before a Makati Regional Trial Court.

(A). Should the will be admitted to probate? (2%)

No. The will cannot be admitted to probate because a joint will is expressly prohibited under Art. 818
of the Civil Code. This provision applies John and Paula became Filipino citizens after their
marriage.

(B). Are the testamentary dispositions valid? (2%)

No. The testamentary dispositions are not valid because (a) omission of Mary, a legitimate child, is
tantamount to preterition which shall annul the institution of Peter and Paul as heirs (Art. 854, Civil
Code); and, (b) the disposition that Peter and Paul could not dispose of nor divide the London estate
for more than 20 years is void (Art. 870, Civil Code).