LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS G.R. NO. 88211, SEPTEMBER 15, 1989

Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

FACTS:
(1) This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus to order respondents to issue travel
documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines. This is in
response to Marcoss wish to return to the Philippines to die. The petitioners case is founded on
the following provisions in the Bill of Rights:

Section 1.No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.

And other contentions including:

President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because
only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their
right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there
must be legislation to that effect.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders
of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:

Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to
liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are
provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public
health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights
recognized in the present Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

(2) The respondents contend primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual
rights, citing Article II

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all
citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil
service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and
the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy.

Page 1 of 22
and the decision of other countries to ban deposed dictators like Cuba (Fulgencio Batista), etc.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines
(2) Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcose's to the
Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

HELD:
Petition dismissed. President did not act with abuse of discretion in determining the return of
former President Marcos and his family at the present time since it poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare.

RATIO:
(1) Even from afar, the Marcoses had the capacity to stir trouble to the fanaticism and blind
loyalty of their followers.
(2) Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right
under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel.
(3) "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends in important measure on who is
President." (Corwin) Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to
the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more
than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power
inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
(4) The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the
Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,
the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." The power
involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare
of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

(5) Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the
State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President,
sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot
shirk from that responsibility.

Page 2 of 22
MANOTOC VS CA
Facts:

Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management
Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc., a stock brokerage house. He was in US for a certain time.
He went home to file a petition with SEC for appointment of a management committee for both
businesses. Pending disposition of the case, the SEC requested the Commissioner of
Immigration not to clear Manotoc for departure, and a memorandum to this effect was issued by
the Commissioner. Meanwhile, six clients of Manotoc Securities Inc. filed separate criminal
complaints for estafa against Manotoc. Manotoc posted bail in all cases. He then filed a motion
for permission to leave the country in each trial courts stating as ground therefor his desire to go
to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." His motion was
denied. He also wrote the Immigration Commissioner requesting the recall or withdrawal of the
latter's memorandum, but said request was also denied. Thus, he filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the judges' orders, as well as the
communication-request of the SEC, denying his leave to travel abroad. The same was denied;
hence, he appealed to the Supreme Court. He contends that having been admitted to bail as a
matter of right, the courts which granted him bail could not prevent him from exercising his
constitutional right to travel.

Issue:

Whether a court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.

Held:

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is
a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is
in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be
required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon petitioner to
make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines
without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.

Page 3 of 22
SILVERIO VS CA

In 1985, Ricardo C. Silverio was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised
Securities Act. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty. In 1988, or more than 2
years after the filing of the Information, the People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte
Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold departure Order against Silverio on the
ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in
postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings. Overruling opposition, the Regional
Trial Court issued an Order directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioners
passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent
Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the Trial Courts finding
that since the filing of the Information, the accused has not yet been arraigned because he has
never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to
show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the
knowledge and permission of this Court. CA affirmed. Petitioner contends that CA erred in not
finding that the trial court committed grace abuse of discretion finding that the right to travel can
be impaired upon a lawful order of the courts even on grounds other than the interest of
national security, public safety or public health.

Issue:

Whether the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds
other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."

Held:

Yes. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition
imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his
presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to
use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them.
When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxillary writs, process
and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer.

Silverio has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the
Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes
would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his
pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case
within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be
considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance
with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to
their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality
without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and
processes.

How should Article III, Section 6 of

the 1987 Constitution be interpreted?

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the
liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or
administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can
impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as
may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text.

Page 4 of 22
 RIGHT TO INFORMATION
LEGASPI VS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Facts:

The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is

invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi
against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for
information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the
Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the
civil service examinations for sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said
information.

The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to give due course to this Petition.
He challenges the petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess
any clear legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees
concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in
securing this particular information. He further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the
part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.

Issues:

a. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is obliged to produce the information regarding
the eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu
City?

b. Whether or not the petitioner has a standing to assert the right to information?

Ruling:

a. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the
desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any
discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the
burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public
concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold
otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is
in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard
Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the
government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access
may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test
which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to
know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in
a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or
affects the public.
Page 5 of 22
 b. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the
respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the
petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial
notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar
examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public.
Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed.
Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the
government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any
citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.

The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of
express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said
position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility
of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.

WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles
for the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as
requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.

Page 6 of 22
VALMONTE VS BELMONTE, JR.
Facts: Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be
"furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who
were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic)of Mrs. Imelda Marcos" and
also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan.
Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious legal
implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the
Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that
a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever
they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that
it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by
the courts." On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government
Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte
another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free
to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our
desiredobjective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte,Oswaldo
Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bartolome, LeoObligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsin
g, Jun "Ninoy" Alba,Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed a special civil action
for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that
Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP Laban who were able to secure clean
loans immediately before the February7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then
First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public
records for the subject information.
Issue: Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS
records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.

Held: The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the
administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds
assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46of PD 1146, as amended (the
Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977),provide for annual appropriations to pay
the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as
employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or
guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its
resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and
regulations. Thus, one of the
reasonsthat prompted the revision of the old GSIS law(CA 186, as amended) was the necessity "
to preserve at all times the actuarialsolvency of the funds administered by the Systems [Second
Whereas Clause, PD1146.] Consequently, as Feliciano Belmonte himself admits, the GSIS "is
not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure
that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits
that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were
Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS
and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the
greatest degree of fidelity and that all its transactions were above board. In sum, the public
nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers
make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. Still, Belmonte
maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued
that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information. Yet,
Page 7 of 22
Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards
the documents subject of the present petition. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the
Court in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and
not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked
by juridical entities like the GSIS. Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the
respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature,
and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the
Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and
controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are
accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a
government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the
people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government
dealings.

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS,
subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours
of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right
of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured.

Page 8 of 22
PROVINCE OF COTABATO VS THE GOVERNEMENT OF THE RP PEACE PANEL ON
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN

Facts: Five consolidated petitions assailed a peace negotiation document which is the Memorandum
of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of
2001 (MOA).

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF,
through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for
upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of
the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the
same.

On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato[8] and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a
petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.[9] Invoking the right to information on matters of
public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete
and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of
the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public
consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional.

Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19, 2008, stated that the Executive
Department shall thoroughly review the MOA-AD and pursue further negotiations to address the
issues hurled against it, and thus moved to dismiss the cases.

The MOA-AD mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it
grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the
Bangsamoro.

As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region, involving the present ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in the
inclusion to ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two categories, A which will be
subject to plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after the signing and B which will be subject to
plebiscite 25 years from the signing of another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that
the BJE shall have jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the BJE
territory; they shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters
up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland
Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the government shall exercise joint
jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources. There will also be sharing of
minerals in the territorial waters; but no provision on the internal waters.

Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade
missions in those countries, as well as environmental cooperation agreements, but not to include
aggression in the GRP. The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the
government. The BJE shall have participation in international meetings and events" like those of the
ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to participate in Philippine
official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for
environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of
water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also
have the right to explore its resources and that the sharing between the Central Government and the
BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. And they
Page 9 of 22
shall have the right to cancel or modify concessions and TLAs.

And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship between the GRP and MILF
is associative i.e. characterized by shared authority and responsibility. This structure of governance
shall be further discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which was highly contested
before the court. The BJE shall also be given the right to build, develop and maintain its own
institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the comprehensive compact as well.

Issue: WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and
the right to information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD

Held: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as it does the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at
large.

As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, and integrated therein is the recognition of the duty of the officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical
principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to
know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy.
These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public
officials at all times accountable to the people.

Also, it was held that such stipulation in the Constitution is self-executory with reasonable
safeguards the effectivity of which need not await the passing of a statute. Hence, it is essential to
keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the
people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to
the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.

The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought for since it is corollary to the twin rights to
information and disclosure. And feedback means not only the conduct of the plebiscite as per the
contention of the respondents. Clearly, what the law states is the right of the petitioners to be
consulted in the peace agenda as corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure.
As such, respondent Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion for failing to carry out the furtive
process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal
authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise
thereto. Moreover, he cannot invoke of executive privilege because he already waived it when he
complied with the Courts order to the unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft
of the MOA-AD.

In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to be involved in matters related to such peace talks as
enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and
unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively
and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their
total environment.

With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/ indigenous people (ICC/IPPs), they also have
the right to participate fully at all levels on decisions that would clearly affect their lives, rights and
destinies. The MOA-AD is an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, hence it should have
observed the free and prior informed consent to the ICC/IPPs; but it failed to do so. More specially
noted by the court is the excess in authority exercised by the respondentsince they allowed
delineation and recognition of ancestral domain claim by mere agreement and compromise; such
power cannot be found in IPRA or in any law to the effect.

Page 10 of 22
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.
[G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998.]
Facts:
On June 25, 1996, this Court affirmed 1 the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo
for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition
upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising mainly factual issues, Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7659 (the death penalty law) and the imposition of the death penalty for the
crime of rape.
During the pendency of the proceedings, Republic Act No. 7659 was amended by the
congress in passing Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL
INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.
Petitioners now contend that there is undue delegation of legislative power in R.A. No. 8177 to
the Respondent Director of Bureau of Corrections by the Secretary of Justice.
The court held that there were no undue delegation of power but the court found that section 19
thereof as invalid, which states that:

"SEC. 19. EXECUTION PROCEDURE. Details of the procedure prior to, during and after
administering the lethal injection shall be set forth in a manual to be prepared by the Director.
The manual shall contain details of, among others, the sequence of events before and after
execution; procedures in setting up the intravenous line; the administration of the lethal drugs;
the pronouncement of death; and the removal of the intravenous system.

Said manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be limited to authorized prison
personnel."
Issue: Whether or not Section 19 of RA 8177 was invalid for violating the right to information.
Held: As to the second paragraph of section 19, the Court finds the requirement of
confidentiality of the contents of the manual even with respect to the convict unduly
suppressive. It sees no legal impediment for the convict, should he so desire, to obtain a copy of
the manual. The contents of the manual are matters of public concern "which the public may
want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters
naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen." Section 7 of Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides:
SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well as to government research data used as a basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitation as may be provided by law."
Therefore, Section 19 of RA 8177 is held invalid for violation of the right of the people to
information.

Page 11 of 22
CHAVEZ VS PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
Facts:
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information, demands that respondents make
public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the
Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. Respondents' opposite view is that the constitutional provisions
refer to completed and operative official acts, not to those still being considered. The Court said
that the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and
imbued with public interest, and there is no question that petitioner has a right to respondents'
disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses' purported ill-gotten
wealth. The question that remains is whether.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutional provision also guarantees access to information
regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreement

Held: the Court held that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other
government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement
they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such
information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to
intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when
common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage.

Page 12 of 22
RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 SALN OF SC JUSTICES, A.M. NO. 09-8-6-SC,
JUNE 13, 2012
Facts: On July 30, 2009, Rowena C. Paraan, Research Director of the Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), sought copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and
Networth (SALN) of the Justices of the Court for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of
the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) or the Curriculum Vitae (CV) of the Justices of this Court for the
purpose of updating their database of information on government officials. Likewise, Karol M.
Ilagan, a researcher-writer also of the PCIJ, likewise sought for copies of the SALN and PDS of
the Justices of the Court of Appeals (CA) on August 13, 2009, for the same above-stated
purpose.
Issue: Can the SALN of justices be accessed via the right to information?
Held:
in Re: Request of Jose M. Alejandrino, where the Court denied the request
of Atty. Alejandrino for the SALNs of the Justices of the Court due to a plainly
discernible improper motive. in order to give meaning to the constitutional right of
the people to have access to information on matters of public concern, the Court
laid down the guidelines to be observed for requests made. Thus: 1. All requests
for copies of statements of assets and liabilities of any Justice or Judge shall be
filed with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court or with the Court
Administrator, as the case may be (Section 8 [A][2], R.A. 6713), and shall state
the purpose of the request.

2. The independence of the Judiciary is constitutionally as important as the

right to information which is subject to the limitations provided by law. Under
specific circumstances, the need for fair and just adjudication of litigations may
require a court to be wary of deceptive requests for information which shall
otherwise be freely available. Where the request is directly or indirectly traced to a
litigant, lawyer, or interested party in a case pending before the court, or where the
court is reasonably certain that a disputed matter will come before it under
circumstances from which it may, also reasonably, be assumed that the request is
not made in good faith and for a legitimate purpose, but to fish for information
and, with the implicit threat of its disclosure, to influence a decision or to warn the
court of the unpleasant consequences of an adverse judgment, the request may be
denied.

3. Where a decision has just been rendered by a court against the person
making the request and the request for information appears to be a fishing
expedition intended to harass or get back at the Judge, the request may be denied.

4. In the few areas where there is extortion by rebel elements or where the
nature of their work exposes Judges to assaults against their personal safety, the
request shall not only be denied but should be immediately reported to the
military.

5. The reason for the denial shall be given in all cases.

Section 7, Article III of the Constitution is relevant in the issue of public disclosure of SALN
and other documents of public officials, viz:

Page 13 of 22
 Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded
the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Emphasizing the import and meaning of the foregoing constitutional provision, the Court,
in the landmark case of Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.,[50] elucidated on the import of the right to
information in this wise:

The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power

by the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions
operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to
information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey
to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The
postulate of public office is a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution to
protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere
empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied x x x.

x x x The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies

of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance
the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in
checking abuse in government. (Emphases supplied)
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information, with its companion
right of access to official records, is not absolute. While providing guaranty for that right, the
Constitution also provides that the peoples right to know is limited to matters of public
concern and is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Jurisprudence[54] has provided the following limitations to that right: (1) national security
matters and intelligence information; (2) trade secrets and banking transactions; (3) criminal
matters; and (4) other confidential information such as confidential or classified information
officially known to public officers and employees by reason of their office and not made
available to the public as well as diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and
executive sessions of either house of Congress, and the internal deliberations of the Supreme
Court.

This could only mean that while no prohibition could stand against access to official
records, such as the SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation.

Page 14 of 22
 RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATIONS
SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the unions demands, which
included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues, payment of accrued overtime pay, night
differential pay and holiday pay conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6)
months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the
same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and
payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from
the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor
practices.
On June 11, 1987, SSS filed a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners alleging that he officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal
strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from
reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was
reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return
to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result
of the strike.
The trial court issued a TRO enjoining the petitioners from staging another strike or from
pursuing the notice of strike they filed with the Department of Labor and Employment on
January 25, 1989 and to maintain the status quo. Petitioners averred that the Regional Trial
Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining order
and the writ of preliminary injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and
Employment or the National Labor Relations Commission, since the case involves a labor
dispute.
Issue: WON the employees of SSS have the right to strike.
Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides
guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities
such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that the Civil Service law
and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum Circular
No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that prior to the enactment by
Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. SSS is one such government-controlled
corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees
are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum
prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was
illegal. Therefore, in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike
they are prohibited from doing so.

Page 15 of 22
VICTORIANO VS ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS UNION
Facts: Plaintiff is a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union who later resigned from his
affiliation to the said union by reason of the prohibition of his religion for its members to
become affiliated with any labor organization. The union has subsisting closed shop agreement
in their collective bargaining agreement with their employer that all permanent employees of the
company must be a member of the union and later was amended by Republic Act No. 3350 with
the provision stating "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".. By his resignation, the
union wrote a letter to the company to separate the plaintiff from the service after which he was
informed by the company that unless he makes a satisfactory arrangement with the union he will
be dismissed from the service. The union contends that RA 3350 impairs obligation of contract
stipulated in their CBA and discriminatorily favors religious sects in providing exemption to be
affiliated with any labor unions.
Issue: WON RA 3350 impairs the right to form association.
Held: The court held that what the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and
guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations which involves two broad notions, namely:
first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for
himself without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may join or
refrain from joining an association. Therefore the right to join a union includes the right to
abstain from joining any union. The exceptions provided by the assailed Republic Act is that
members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when
said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop
agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from
their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. Thus
this exception does not infringe upon the constitutional provision on freedom of association but
instead reinforces it.

Page 16 of 22
RE: IBP MEMBERSHIP DUES DELINQUENCY OF ATTY. MARCIAL EDILLON,
A.C. NO. 1928, AUGUST 3, 1978
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the
Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of
the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues
assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24,
Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership
fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in
the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to
him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court
Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners right not to associate was violated.

HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. It
does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. Hebecame
a member of the bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All lawyers are subject to comply
with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual
fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues
and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not
compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order
to further the States

Page 17 of 22
 NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
RUTTER VS ESTEBAN
FACTS:
In August 20, 1941, Rutter sold to Esteban 2 parcels of land in Manila. Esteban paid 3/4ths of
the purchase price and they constituted a mortgage over one of the parcels to secure the payment
of the balance.

However, the war broke out and somehow, Esteban was not able to pay the balance of the
purchase price on the due date and so, on August 2, 1949, Rutter instituted an action to recover
the balance with the CFI.

Esteban admitted the averments of the complaint but as a defense, he claimed that his obligation
was a pre-war obligation covered by the moratorium embodied in R.A. No. 342.

Section 2 of Republic Act No. 342 provides that all debts and other monetary obligations
contracted before December 8, 1941, any provision in the contract creating the same or any
subsequent aggreement affecting such obligation to the contrary notwithstanding, shall not due
and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the war damage
claim of the debtor by the Philippine War Damage Commission.

The CFI ruled in favor of the debtor Esteban. This brings us to the sole issue raised by petitioner
on appeal

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 342, which declared a moratorium on certain pre-war obligations, is
unconstitutional for violation of the Constitutional provision prohibiting the impairment of the
obligation of contracts.

HELD:
Yes. R.A. No. 342 is unconstitutional.

Statutes declaring a moratorium on obligations are generally constitutional

Statutes declaring a moratorium on obligations are not new: For some 1,400 years western
civilization has made use of extraordinary devices for saving the credit structure, devices
generally known as moratoria. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations
decreed by the state through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the
application of the sovereign power.

Such laws were often passed during or after times of financial distress such as wars and
disasters. Similar laws were passed in some US states after the civil war and they have been
declared constitutional. Some laws however, were declared unconstitutional where the period of
moratorium prescribed is indefinite or unreasonable.

The argument that moratorium laws impair the obligation of contracts does not hold water. It is
justified as a valid exercise of the state of it's police power.

In the US case, Home Building and Loan Association vs. Blaisdell, it was held that:

The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant
protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts. . . .

xxx

Page 18 of 22
Similarly, where the protective power of the State is exercised in a manner otherwise
appropriate in the regulation of a business it is no objection that the performance of existing
contracts may be frustrated by the prohibition of injurious practices. . . .

. . . . The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly
or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken
are reasonable and appropriate to that end.

Thus the true test of constitutionality of a moratorium statute lies in the determination
of the period of a suspension of the remedy. It is required that such suspension be definite
and reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of the constitution.

R.A. No. 342 is unconstitutional for being unreasonable

The moratorium law, enacted in 1948, came on the heels of executive orders likewise declaring
moratoriums. With its 8 year moratorium period, it is clearly unreasonable for creditors who
have to observe a vigil of 12 years to collect on debts which have become demandable as
early as 1941. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even
required to pay interest during the operation of the relief.

The court also noted that the reconstruction is paying off and that the Philippines is headed to
better times. Hence the Supreme Court declared R.A. No. 342 unreasonable and oppressive and
hence, null and void and without effect.

Disposition:
Esteban was ordered to pay the balance with interest at the rate of 7% per annum with 12%
attorneys fees.

Page 19 of 22
 ORTIGAS & CO. LTD. PARTNERSHIP VS FEATI BANK & TRUST CO.
Facts:
Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership engaged in real estate business developing and selling
lots to the public particularly Highway Hills subdivision along EDSA
March 4, 1952 Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles entered into separate
agreements of sale on installments over Lots 5 and 6 Block 31, Highway Hills
July 19, 1962 Augusto and Natividad transferred their rights and interests in favor of Emma
Chavez
o Transfer contained the following restrictions and stipulations:
For residential purposes only
All buildings and improvements (except fences) should use strong building material, have
modern sanitary installations connected to the public sewer or own septic tank and shall not be
more than 2 meters from the boundary lines
Resolution 27 Feb 4, 1960 reclassified the western part of EDSA (Shaw boulevard to
Pasig River) as a commercial and industrial zone
Such restrictions were annotated on the TCTs
July 23, 1962 - Feati bank bought Lot 5 from Emma Chavez while lot 6 was purchased by
Republic Flour Mills

May 5, 1963 Feati Bank began laying foundation and construction of a building for banking
purposes on lots 5 and 6
Ortigas & Co. Demanded that they comply with the annotated restrictions
Feati Bank refused arguing that it was following the zoning regulations
Ortigas & Co. filed a case in the lower courts which held that Resolution No. 27 was a valid
exercise of police power of the municipality hence the zoning is binding and takes precedence
over the annotations in the TCTs because private interest should bow down to general interest
and welfare.
March 2, 1965 motion for reconsideration by Ortigas & Co. which was denied on March
26, 1965
April 2, 1965 Ortigas filed notice of appeal which was given due course on April 14, 1965
hence this case.

Issues:
WON Resolution No. 27 is a valid exercise of police power
WON Resolution No. 27 can nullify or supersede contractual obligations by Feati Bank and
Trust Co.

Held:
YES it is a valid exercise police power.
YES it can nullify contractual obligations by Feati with Ortigas & Co.

Ratio:
The validity of the resolution was never assailed in the lower courts and can therefore not be
raised for the first time on appeal
o The rule against flip flopping issues and arguments prevents deception in courts
o Ortigas & Co. also did not dispute the factual findings of the lower court on the validity of the
resolution
Assuming arguendo it was properly raised the resolution is still valid
o RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) Sec 3 empowers municipalities to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations for the municipality
o The resolution is regulatory measure!
o RA 2264 Sec 12 any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be
interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist this gives more
Page 20 of 22
 power to LGUs to promote general welfare, economic conditions, social welfare and material
progress in their locality
The non-impairment clause of contracts is not absolute since it must be reconciled with the
legitimate exercise of police power
o when general welfare and private property rights clash, the former must prevail through police
powers of the state
Lots 5 and 6 front EDSA and has become surrounded by industrial and commercial
complexes
o Development in the area has resulted in extreme noise and air pollution that is not conducive to
health, safety and welfare of the would-be residents justifies the usage by Feati Bank of the
land for more reasonable purposes

Decision: Affirmed

Dissenting: Abad Santos, J.

Resolution 27 is valid because it has not yet been struck down but it is not a legitimate
exercise of police power because its means (zoning) do not fit with its purpose of general
welfare
Zoning the area as industrial and commercial will contribute to chaos, frenzy, pollution, noise
which suffocate and cause the deterioration of the ecology Lowers quality of life for residents
in Metro Manila

GANZON VS INSERTO
G.R. No. L-56450 July 25, 1983
Facts:.
Rodolfo Ganzon sold a land to respondent RANDOLPH C. TAJANLANGIT and ESTEBAN C.
TAJANLANGIT. Respondent avers that the balance of the price would be secured by a
mortgage on that land. However a provision in the deed of sale contained a warranty that
petitioner would guarantee that the occupants on the land would vacate within 120 days and
since the warranty was breached because the occupants were still there, the foreclosure would be
illegal. Respondents then came to trial court when petitioner tried to foreclose the mortgage. The
trial court canceled the mortgage and substituted it with surety bond upon stating that petitioner
failed to comply with the clearing of the occupants and since respondent now are willing to pay
for the money promised by the mortgage
Issue: Wheter or not court may order substitution of mortgage with surety bond
Ruling: No. Court cannot substitute mortgage with surety bond. A mortgage is but an accessory
contract. "The consideration of the mortgage is the same consideration of the principal contract
without which it cannot exist as an independent contract... By Article 2126 of the Civil Code,
(Formerly Article 1876 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889.) a 'mortgage directly and
immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to
thefulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted.' Sale or transfer cannot
affect or release the mortgage. A purchaser is necessarily bound to acknowledge and respect the
encumbrance to which is subject the purchased thing and which is at the disposal of the creditor
'in order that he, under the terms of the

Page 21 of 22
LOZANO VS MARTINEZ
This is a consolidated case, the petition arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses
under the BP 22 also known as Bouncing Check Law. The defendant in these case moved
seasonably to quash the information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an
offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial
court, except in one case, which is the subject of G.R No. 75789, wherein the trial court declared
the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to the
court for remedy. Those who question the constitutionality of the said statute insist the following
ground:

1) It offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;

2) it impairs freedom of contract;
3) it contravenes the equal protection clause;
4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and
5) its enactment is flawed in the sense that during its passage the interim Batasan violated the
constitutional provision prohibiting to a bill on Third Reading.

ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 22 or the Bouncing Check Law is unconstitutional.

RULING:
No, the enactment of the assailed statute is a valid exercise of Police power and is not repugnant
to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. It may be constitutionally
impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of debt ex contractu, but
certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to prescribe certain acts deemed
pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not only acts which the law can
punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se,
but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally
punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.

The enactment of the said statute is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public
policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated
by the imposition of penal sanctions.

ISSUE: W/N BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract.

HELD: No. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into
"lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must
bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument
which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part
of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

Page 22 of 22