NATURE AND PURPOSES
1. UY vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos. 105965-70, March
20, 2001
FACTS: Petitioner George Uy was the deputy comtroller of the
Philippine Navy designated to act on behalf of Captain Fernandez,
the latters supervisor, on matters relating the activities of the Fiscal
Control Branch. Six informations for
Estafa through falsification of official documents and one
information for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 (anti-graft and
corrupt practices act) were filed with the Sandiganbayan against
petitioner Uy and 19 other accused. The Sandiganbayan
recommended that the infomation be withdrawn against some of
the accused after a comprehensive investigation. Petitioner filed a
motion to quash contending that it is the Court Martial and not the
Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the offense charged or
the person of the accused.
ISSUE: What is the extent of the investigatory and prosecutorial
power of the Ombudsman?
What is the purpose of preliminary investigation conducted by
the Ombudsman? Can the Ombudsman designate any officers or
prosecutors to assist him in conducting preliminary investigation? If
so, does the Ombudsman exercise control over said officers or
prosecutors?
HELD:
1. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law
to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to
any act or omission of any public officer or employee when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those
cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the
clause any illegal act or omission of any public official is
broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public
officer or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15 (1) giving the
Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11 (4) granting the
Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary
investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed
as confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory
power of the Ombudsman to such cases.
2. The jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not
be equated with the limited authority of the Special
Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of
the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision
and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its
power to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not
intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power
of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The
Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints
against officers and employees of the government and to
enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in
every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this
duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office
and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in
the government service to act as special investigator or
prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of
certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him
work under his supervision and control. The law likewise
allows him to direct the Special Prosecutor to prosecute
cases outside the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction in
accordance with Section 11 (4c) of RA 6770.
2. PCGG v. Desierto
GR No. 132120; Feb. 10, 2003
FACTS: The PCGG charged Disini with "bribing the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos as a means to induce him to assist and favor
individuals and corporate entities."The charge pertained to the
"negotiation, award, signing, amendment and implementation of the
main and related contracts for the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant
(PNPP) project of the National Power Corporation (NPC). The
Ombudsman decided in favor of Disini and ordered the dismissal of
the Complaint against the latter on the basis of lack of testimonial
evidence and documentary evidence, unauthenticated documents,
and insufficient supporting evidence, among others.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PCGG has submitted sufficient evidence
to engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that Disini is probably guilty thereof, but that public
respondent -- in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction -- capriciously and arbitrarily dismissed the
charges.
RULING: YES. Indeed, during the preliminary investigation, the
PCGG was not obliged to prove its cause beyond reasonable doubt.
It would be unfair to expect the Commission to present the entire
evidence needed to secure the conviction of the accused prior to the
filing of the information. The reason lies in the nature and the purpose
of a preliminary investigation. At this stage, the prosecutor does not
decide whether the guilt of the person charged is backed by evidence
beyond reasonable doubt. The former merely determines whether
there is sufficient basis to believe that a crime has been committed,
and whether the latter is guilty of it and should be held for trial.
The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties respective
sets of evidence. It is for the presentation only of such evidence as
may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been
committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
During the preliminary investigation, the main function of the
government prosecutor -- the ombudsman in this case -- is merely to
determine the existence of probable cause and, if it does exist, to file
the corresponding information.
3. Baytan v Comelec |396 SCRA 703| February 4, 2003|
Facts: Petitioners, Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian
Baytan were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections when
they met the newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio, in
Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City, who led them to register in
Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18. Upon realizing that their residence
is situated within the jurisdiction of Barangay 28 not Barangay 18,
petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and
registered anew. Subsequently, petitioners sent a letter to former
COMELEC Assistant Executive Director Jose Pio O. Joson
requesting for advice on how to cancel their previous registration.
Petitioners Voters Registration Records were forwarded to the
Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito V. Ravanzo, for
evaluation, who,subsequently, recommended filing an information for
double registration against petitioners. The COMELEC affirmed
Ravanzos resolution. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which,
was denied by COMELEC en banc.
Issue: Can Petitioners invoke their best defense of good faith and
substantial compliance with the Election Codes requirement of
cancellation of previous registration in the preliminary investigation?
Ruling: No. The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is
not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties
evidence; It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed
and accused is probably guilty thereof. A preliminary investigation is
essentially inquisitorial and is only the means to discover who may
be charged with a crime, its function being merely to determine
probable cause. All that is required in the preliminary investigation is
the determination of probable cause to justify the holding of
petitioners for trial.
4. Aguilar vs. Department of Justice, 705 SCRA 629, G.R. No.
197522 September 11, 2013
FACTS: Petitioner is the father of one Francisco M. Aguilar, alias
Tetet (Tetet). On April 10, 2002, he filed a criminal complaint for
murder against the members of a joint team of police and military
personnel who purportedly arrested Tetet and later inflicted injuries
upon him, resulting to his death. In a Resolution dated March 10,
2003, 1st Asst. Provincial Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge Levitico
B. Salcedo of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental
Mindoro (Provincial Prosecutor) dismissed petitioners complaint
against all respondents for lack of probable cause. Aggrieved,
petitioner elevated the matter via a petition for review to the DOJ. In
a Resolution dated November 27, 2008, the DOJ dismissed
petitioners appeal and thereby, affirmed the Provincial Prosecutors
ruling. Unperturbed, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA. In a Decision dated June 30, 2011, the CA dismissed
petitioners certiorari petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the DOJ in sustaining the Provincial Prosecutors ruling.
ISSUE: How do public prosecutors determine probable cause?
RULING: In particular, case law states that probable cause, or the
purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does
not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import absolute
certainty. Rather, it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief
and, as such, does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is
believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. As pronounced in Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities,
Inc.:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the
average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical
knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial . It does
not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction. (Emphasis supplied)
Apropos thereto, for the public prosecutor to determine if there exists
a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the
suspect is probably guilty of the same, the elements of the crime
charged should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present. This is
based on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements,
without which there should be, at the most, no criminal offense.
5. PUNZALAN vs PLATA
G.R. No. 160316, September 2, 2013
FACTS:
Attempted Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearms was filed
against Plata and Cagara, while Dela Pena was investigated for
Attempted Homicide as per the directions of the DOJ. Dela Pena filed
counter charges against Punzalan, including Grave Threats and
Attempted Murder. Subsequently, Cagara filed Grave Oral
Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainer, after her
remark during a meeting at the Office of the Prosecutor.
The Prosecutor dismissed the complaints as regards the Attempted
Murder and Grave Oral Defamation. It was appealed to the DOJ, to
which only reduced the charges to Attempted Homicide and Slight
Oral Defamation. Upon motion for reconsideration, it directed to
withdraw all the informations. Dela Pena appealed to the CA where
the petition was granted, reinstating the charges against the
Punzalans.
In essence, the petitioners argue that the determination of the
existence of probable cause is lodged with the prosecutor, who
assumes full discretion and control over the complaint. They insist
that the DOJ committed no grave abuse of discretion when it issued
the June 6, 2000 and October 11, 2000 Resolutions ordering the
withdrawal of the informations. In the absence of grave abuse of
discretion, they contend that the courts should not interfere with the
discretion of the prosecutor.
ISSUE: Did the DOJ commit grave abuse of discretion when it
issued the Resolutions ordering the withdrawal of the informations?
RULING:
NO. The well-established rule is that the conduct of preliminary
investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable
cause is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. The
prosecution of crimes lies with the executive department of the
government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that
the laws of the land are faithfully executed. Thus, the rule is that the
Supreme Court (SC) will not interfere in the findings of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary on the insufficiency of the
evidence presented to establish probable cause unless it is shown
that the questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The party
seeking the writ of certiorari must establish that the DOJ Secretary
exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner,
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a
unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law.
In the present case, there was no clear evidence of grave abuse of
discretion committed by the DOJ when it set aside its March 23, 2000
Resolution and reinstated the July 28, 1998 Resolution of the public
prosecutor. The DOJ was correct when it characterized the complaint
for attempted murder as already covered by two (2) other criminal
cases. As to the other complaints, the SC agreed with the DOJ that
they were weak and not adequately supported by credible evidence.
Thus, the CA erred in supplanting the prosecutors discretion with its
own. Evidently, the conclusions arrived at by the DOJ were neither
whimsical nor capricious as to be corrected by certiorari. Even on the
assumption that the DOJ Secretary made erroneous conclusions,
this error alone would not subject his act to correction or annulment
by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. After all, not every
erroneous conclusion of law or fact is an abuse of discretion.
6 LANIER v PEOPLE, GR 189176, 19 Mar 2014
PEREZ, J.
FACTS: Pursuant to the search warrant, the police operatives
recovered 10.4 grams of shabu, and 1750 grams of marijuana.
Thereafter, petitioners were placed under arrest. On 18 Dec 2003,
the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Kalibo, Aklan filed an
Information charging petitioner for violation of Sec 11, Art II of RA
9165. However, petitioners filed for a Motion for Preliminary
Investigation/Re-investigation. The prosecutor upheld the
Information and directed the return of the records to the trial court for
disposition. On 28 March 2004, however, petitioners filed a petition
for review before the DOJ assailing the 8 March 2004 Resolution of
the provincial prosecutor. On 6 May 2004, the Secretary of Justice
acted on the petition favorably and directed the withdrawal of the
Information which directive the provincial prosecutor heeded by filing
a Motion to Withdraw Information before the trial court. The Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari seeking to annul the DOJ Resolutions directing the
withdrawal of the Information against petitioners and the RTCs Order
granting the Motion to Withdraw filed by the provincial prosecutor. On
26 September 2008, the Court of Appeals nullified and set aside the
DOJ Resolutions and the RTC Order and reinstated the Information
against petitioners in Criminal Case No. 6972.
ISSUE: Is the trial court, having acquired jurisdiction over the case,
bound by the resolution of Secretary of Justices resolution?
RULING: NO. The court emphasizes that the trial court, having
acquired jurisdiction over the case, is not bound by such resolution
but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial.
The RTC erroneously held that it has not yet effectively acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused as no commitment order
has yet been issued against them. In Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held
that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the
accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and
discretion of the trial court. The rule applies to a motion to withdraw
the Information or to dismiss the case even before or after
arraignment of the accused. When the trial court grants a motion of
the public prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the
Information, or to withdraw the Information in compliance with the
directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it
does so not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the
Secretary of Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial prerogative.
7.) Ladlad vs. Velasco
An inquest is a summary inquiry conducted by a prosecutor for the
purpose of determining whether the warrantless arrest of a person
was based on probable cause.
FACTS:
Petitioners are private individuals. Petitioners all face charges for
Rebellion. This is a consolidation of cases: G.R. No. 175013 (The
Beltran Petition) and G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76 (The
Maza and Ladlad Petitions).
In beltran, petitioner was arrested without a warrant and was
subjected to an inquest for Inciting to Sedition. He was subjected to a
second inquest, this time for Rebellion.
In maza and ladlad, petitioners was required to appear at the DOJ
Office to get copies of the complaint and its attachment. During the
preliminary investigation, the counsel for the CIDG presented a
masked man, who claimed to be an eyewitness against petitioners.
Masked man subscribed to his affidavit before respondent prosecutor
Emmanuel Velasco who then gave copies of the affidavit to media
members present during the proceedings. The panel of prosecutors
gave petitioners 10 days within which to file their counter-affidavits.
Petitioners were furnished the complete copies of documents
supporting the CIDG`s letters only 4 days later.
ISSUE: Was the inquest made on Beltran valid?
RULING: NO. It is Void. The joint affidavit of Beltran`s arresting
officers states that the officers arrested Beltran, without a warrant, for
Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest
prosecutor could only have conductedas he did conductan inquest
for Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently, when another
group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest
proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority.
ISSUE:
Was the PI of maza and ladlad case made in accordance to Revised
Rules of Crim. Pro.?
RULING:
NO. Respondent prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3(a) of
Rule 112 which provides that the complaint be accompanied by the
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and
sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary
public. Respondent prosecutors accepted the affidavits attached to
the letters even though some of them were notarized by a notary
public without any showing that a prosecutor was unavailable as
required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112.
Further, Section 3(b) of Rule 112 mandates that the prosecutor, after
receiving the complaint, must determine if there are grounds to
continue with the investigation. If there is none, he shall dismiss the
case, otherwise he shall, issue a subpoena to the respondents. Here,
During the investigation, respondent prosecutors allowed the CIDG
to present a masked Fuentes. Velasco proceeded to distribute copies
of Fuentes` affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to
members of the media who covered the proceedings. Respondent
prosecutors then required petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits
in 10 days. It was only four days later, that petitioners received the
complete copy of the attachments to the CIDG letters. These
uncontroverted facts belie that the preliminary investigation was done
in accordance with rules.
WHO MAY CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS
8. Baviera v Paglinawan
Facts: Manuel Baviera, complainant, former head of the HR Service
Delivery and Industrial Relations of Standard Chartered Bank-
Philippines (SCB). SCB, a foreign banking corporation duly licensed
to engage in banking, trust, and other fiduciary business in the
Philippines, did not comply with the conditions in conducting
business within this jurisdiction. Instead, as early as 1996, it acted as
a stock broker, soliciting from local residents foreign securities called
GLOBAL THIRD PARTY MUTUAL FUNDS (GTPMF), denominated in
US dollars. These securities were not registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). These were then remitted
outwardly to SCB-Hong Kong and SCB-Singapore.
SCBs counsel, advised the bank to proceed with the selling of the
foreign securities although unregistered with the SEC, under the
guise of a custodianship agreement; and should it be questioned, it
shall invoke Section 72 of the General Banking Act (Republic Act
No.337).
On July 18, 1997, the Investment Capital Association of the
Philippines (ICAP) filed with the SEC a complaint alleging that SCB
violated the Revised Securities Act, particularly the provision
prohibiting the selling of securities without prior registration with the
SEC.
However, notwithstanding its commitment and the BSP directive,
SCB continued to offer and sell GTPMF securities in this country.
Upon knowing that SCB was prohibited by the BSP to sell GPTMF
Securities petitioner filed a complaint charging SCN officials of
syndicated Estafa. And was followed with perjury as against
respondents.
On December 4, 2003, the SEC issued a Cease and Desist Order
against SCB. Subsequently, the SEC and SCB reached an amicable
settlement.
Meanwhile DOJ dismissed all the complaints of Petitioner. While the
CA dismissed petitioners petition and sustained the ruling of the DOJ
that the case should have been filed initially with the SEC. Hence this
petition for certiorari.
Issue: Who may conduct Preliminary Investigations?
Ruling: The Court of Appeals held that under the provision, a criminal
complaint for violation of any law or rule administered by the SEC
must first be filed with the latter. If the Commission finds that there is
probable cause, then it should refer the case to the DOJ. Since
petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing procedural requirement,
the DOJ did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing his
complaint in I.S. No. 2004-229.
A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a
specialized dispute. Hence, it must first be referred to an
administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine a
controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge
and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact.[12] The Securities Regulation Code is a
special law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC. Hence,
all complaints for any violation of the Code and its implementing rules
and regulations should be filed with the SEC. Where the complaint is
criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the complaint to the DOJ for
preliminary investigation and prosecution as provided in Section 53.1
earlier quoted.
9. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport
Resources Corporation, G.R. 135808, October 6, 2008
Facts:
The Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of
Agreement with GHB (Ganda Holdings Berhad). Under said
memorandum of agreement, IRC acquired 100% of the entire capital
stock of GEHI (Ganda Energy Holdings Inc.) which would own and
operate a 102 megawatt gas turbine power generating barge. In
exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock
of IRC. On the side, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire capital of
PRCI (Philippine Racing Club). It is alleged herein that a press
release announcing the approval of the agreement was sent to the
Philippine Stock Exchange through facsimile and the SEC, but the
facsimile machine of the SEC could not receive it. However, the SEC
received reports that the IRC failed to make timely public disclosures
of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors, heavily
traded IRC shares utilizing this material insider information. For this
reason, the SEC required the directors to appear before the SEC to
explain the alleged failure to disclose material information as required
by the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts. Unsatisfied with the
explanation, the SEC issued an order finding that the IRC violated
the Rules in connection with the then Old Securities Act when it failed
to make timely disclosures of its negotiations with GHB. In addition,
the SEC found that the directors of IRC entered into transactions
involving IRC shares in violation of the Revised Securities Act.
Respondents, however, questioned the authority of the SEC to
investigate on said matter since according to PD 902-A, jurisdiction
upon the matter was conferred upon the PED (Prosecution and
Enforcement Department) of the They also contended that their right
to due process was violated when the SEC required them to appear
before the SEC to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed
upon them since such requirement shifted the burden of proof to
respondents.
Before discussing the merits of this case, it should be noted
that while this case was pending in this Court, Republic Act
No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation
Code, took effect on 8 August 2000. Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 902-A, as amended, which created the PED, was
already repealed as provided for in Section 76 of the
Securities Regulation Code. Thus, under the new law, the
PED has been abolished, and the Securities Regulation Code
has taken the place of the Revised Securities Act.
Issue:
1.) Whether or not the SEC retained the jurisdiction to investigate
violations of the Revised Securities Act, reenacted in the Securities
Regulations Code, despite the abolition of the PED.
RULING: YES. Section 53 of the Securities Regulations Code
clearly provides that criminal complaints for violations of rules and
regulations enforced or administered by the SEC shall be referred to
the Department of Justice (DOJ) for preliminary investigation, while
the SEC nevertheless retains limited investigatory powers.
Additionally, the SEC may still impose the appropriate administrative
sanctions under Section 54 of the aforementioned law. In Morato v.
Court of Appeals, the cases therein were still pending before the PED
for investigation and the SEC for resolution when the Securities
Regulations Code was enacted. The case before the SEC involved
an intra-corporate dispute, while the subject matter of the other case
investigated by the PED involved the schemes, devices, and
violations of pertinent rules and laws of the company's board of
directors. The enactment of the Securities Regulations Code did not
result in the dismissal of the cases; rather, this Court ordered the
transfer of one case to the proper regional trial court and the SEC to
continue with the investigation of the other case. The case at bar is
comparable to the aforecited case. In this case, the SEC already
commenced the investigative proceedings against respondents as
early as 1994. Respondents were called to appear before the SEC
and explain their failure to disclose pertinent information on 14
August 1994. Thereafter, the SEC Chairman, having already made
initial findings that respondents failed to make timely disclosures of
their negotiations with GHB, ordered a special investigating panel to
hear the case. The investigative proceedings were interrupted only
by the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals,
which became permanent by virtue of the Decision, dated 20 August
1998, in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 37036. During the pendency of this case,
the Securities Regulations Code repealed the Revised Securities Act.
As in Morato v. Court of Appeals, the repeal cannot deprive SEC of
its jurisdiction to continue investigating the case; or the regional trial
court, to hear any case which may later be filed against the
respondents.
Investigations by the SEC is a requisite before a criminal case may
be referred to the DOJ since the SEC is an administrative agency
with the special competence to do so. According to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, the courts will not determine a controversy
involving a question within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and
expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.
10 Arroyo v. Department of Justice
FACTS: The Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating
and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the
2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation
cases. In its Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team concluded that
manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in
the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was
indeed perpetrated. It recommended that Petitioner Benjamin S.
Abalos, GMA, and Mike Arroyo be subjected to preliminary
investigation for electoral sabotage and manipulating the election
results. Petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
assailing the creation of the Joint Panel. The Court thereafter
rendered the assailed Decision. It ruled that:
1. Fact- Finding Teams Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are
declared VALID. However, the Rules of Procedure on the Conduct of
Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004
and 2007 National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of
publication.
2. The Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in
accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and
Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the
preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary
investigation only when deputized by the Comelec but not exercise
concurrent jurisdiction./ Who may conduct preliminary investigation?
RULING: The grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the
DOJ nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order
whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable
cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in
accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. The creation of a
Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent
jurisdiction" authorized by the amendatory law. The doctrine of
concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same
subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is
no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two
coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files
a complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such as the
Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted
upon by said office and the re-filing of substantially the same
complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent
assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed
will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency
that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of the others.
11. GREGORIO B. HONASAN II vs. THE PANEL OF
INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE
Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the Department
of Justice.
Facts:
Senator Gringo Honasan was charged with the crime of coup detat
before DOJ. , Capt. Gerardo Gambala, for and in behalf of the
military rebels occupying Oakwood, made a public statement aired
on nation television, stating their withdrawal of support to the chain of
command of the AFP and the Government of President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo and they are willing to risk their lives in order to
achieve the National Recovery Agenda of Sen. Honasan, which they
believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society.
Subpoena was issued for preliminary investigation.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's
jurisdiction over the case, asserting that since the imputed acts were
committed in relation to his public office, it is the Office of the
Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to conduct the
corresponding preliminary investigation; that should the charge be
filed in court, it is the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, that can
legally take cognizance of the case considering that he belongs to
the group of public officials with Salary Grade 31.
He is directed to file a counter-affidavit, but instead Senator Gregorio
B. Honasan II filed the herein petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-
PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V.
Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ
Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order on the ground that the DOJ
has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Honasans contention:
Ombudsman and not DOJ has the jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation over all public officials, including him as he is a senator.
Since, Honasan is charged with coup detat in relation to his office.
As according the Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, it confers to the
Ombudsman the power to investigate moto proprio, or by complaint
of any person, any act or omission that appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient. Petitioner rationalizes that the 1987
Administrative Code and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 cannot prevail
over the Constitution.
DOJs contention:
DOJ has the jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation pursuant
to the Revised Administrative Code. And Coup detat is not directly
related to his public office as a senator. Thus, the jurisdiction of the
DOJ is a statutory grant and is not derived from provisions of the joint
circular.
Ombudsman;s contention:
DOJ has the jurisdiction because coup detat falls under the
Sandiganbayan only if its committed in relation to office. Thus, Joint
Circulat need not be published because it is merely an internal
arrangement between DOJ and Ombudsman and it neither regulates
nor penalizes conduct of persons.
Issue: Whether or not DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation over the charge of coup detat against Senator Gringo
Honasan II.
Held: The Court finds the petition without merit. In summation, the
Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section
4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give, to the
Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed
by public officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to
investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is
concurrent with other government investigating agencies such as
provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating
agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. In other
words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any
investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of
penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise
of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.
To reiterate for emphasis, the power to investigate or conduct
preliminary investigation on charges against any public officers or
employees may be exercised by an investigator or by any provincial
or city prosecutor or their assistants, either in their regular capacities
or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. The fact that all
prosecutors are in effect deputized Ombudsman prosecutors under
the OMB-DOJ Circular is a mere superfluity. The DOJ Panel need not
be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the
preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the
DOJs authority to act as the principal law agency of the government
and investigate the commission of crimes under the Revised Penal
Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had
been held in the Natividad case as not being contrary to the
Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the conduct
of the preliminary investigation to an agency which has the
jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may
assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.
Since the DOJ has concurrent jurisdiction to investigate charges
against public officers, the fact that petitioner, a Senator, holds a
Salary Grade 31 position does not by itself remove from the DOJ
Panel the authority to investigate the charge of coup detat against
him.
12. Alawiya v Datumanong | g.r 164170 | April 16, 2009 |
Facts: Alawiya and other two petitioners executed sworn statements
before the Western Police District charging five policemen with
kidnapping for ransom. The sworn statements alleged that petitioners
were cruising on a board a vehicle when a Toyota Sedan bumped
behind them. That when they went to assess the damage, several
armed men alighted from the vehicle and forced them to ride in. They
were brought to an office and Php 10Million and two vehicles were
demanded from them in exchange for their freedom. After further
negotiations, the amount was reduced and Php 700Thousand and
two vehicles were delivered to the accused. Petitioners were
released in the morning. The PNP ordered recommended that the
accused be charged with violation of Article 267 of the RPC. State
Prosecutor Velasco conducted the preliminary investigation and
issued a resolution that the accused be charged with the crime of
kidnapping for ransom. He then subsequently filed the Information
with the RTC of Manila. Meanwhile, the accused filed a petition for
review on the Resolution of Prosecutor Velasco with the Office of the
Secretary of Justice and moved for the quashal of the Information on
the ground that the Officer has no authority to do so. RTC denied the
motion to quash. Secretary of Justice reversed the Resolution of
Prosecutor Velasco and ordered Velasco to withdraw or dismissed
the information. It ruled on the ground that prior approval with the
Office of the Ombudsman should be secured before the filing of the
Information. The Secretary also found out that the incident
complained of was buy-bust operation and not kidnapping for
ransom. Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with then
Secretary Datumanong against the Resolution but were denied. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Secretary.
Issue: Is the prior approval of the Ombudsman required for the
investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against the
accused policemen.
Ruling: No. Prior approval by the Ombudsman is not required for
the investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against the
accused policemen. The power of the Ombudsman to investigate
offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is
concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the
government such as the provincial, city and state prosecutors.
13. PEREZ VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Salvador and Juanita are Mayor and Treasurer of San
Manuel, Pangasinan, respectively. They willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally caused the purchase of 1 computer unit costing P120,000
acquisition by personal canvass, violating Sec. 362 and 367 of the
LGC. No public bidding occurred and no Committee of Awards was
constituted to approve the procurement Salvador and Juanita gave
Mobil Link Enterprises/Starlet Sales Center undue advantage or
preference through manifest partiality, showing evident bad faith and
gross, inexcusable negligence, but this was not included in the
original information, so it was recommended by the Special
Prosecutor that the information be amended to show the manner of
the commission of the offense, based on the Ombudsmans margin
notes in the original information. The amended information was
admitted. The petitioners challenge this, saying that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in accepting the
amended information, which had no approval from the Ombudsman,
amounting to denial of due process. The SC granted the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Special Prosecutor has the
power to file informations without delegation from the Ombudsman.
RULING: NO. The Ombudsmans margin notes order was to "study
whether the accused, assuming arguendo that there was no
overprice, gave unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to the
seller of the subject computer and submit your recommendation
soonest.
It is clear that the recommendation must be submitted to one
who has authority to implement such recommendation. The
Ombudsman has the power to file informations, as well as the power
to delegate his powers. Office Order No. 40-05 delegates the
disposition of administrative and criminal cases (filing informations) to
the Deputy Ombudsman, but NOT the Special Prosecutor (which is
included in the Office of the Ombudsman). All that is delegated to the
Special Prosecutor is the discretional authority to review and modify
the Deputy Ombudsman-authorized information, but without
departing from the basic resolution.
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor are given the
same rank and salary (RA 6770), but they do NOT have the same
functions.
Since there is no express delegation, the Court looked into
whether or not there was an implied delegation. RA 6770 provides
that the powers of the OSP include: conducting preliminary
investigations and prosecute criminal cases w/in jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan, enter into plea-bargaining agreements, and perform
other duties assigned by Ombudsman. Respondents argue the
doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, saying that since the amended
information has not been disapproved by the Ombudsman, it has his
tacit approval. The SC said no. This doctrine does not apply to the
Office of the Ombudsman, which is an apolitical agency.
14. SIA vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 159659, October 12, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners Ruben and Josephine Sia were charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 27 with three counts of
violation of Section 17 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957,
otherwise known as The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers
Protective Decree, by failing to register with the Register of Deeds of
Naga City, the Contracts to Sell they executed in favor of respondent
Teresita Lee over several subdivision lots she purchased.
On October 15, 2001, the petitioners filed a Consolidated Motion to
Quash alleging that (1) the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged; and (2) the City Prosecutors Office of Naga City has
no authority to file the informations. The trial court denied their
motions holding that it had jurisdiction over the case and stating that
the city prosecutor was authorized to file the informations.
Before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners filed a Petition for
Certiorari with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ
of Preliminary Injunction. They allege the same grounds and further
state that only the enforcement officers under Executive Order No. 71
are authorized to investigate and enforce laws pertaining to
subdivisions.
The appellate court upheld the jurisdiction of the trial court ruling that
the acts complained of were within the trial courts territorial
jurisdiction; and the penalty provided by law for the violation, i.e.,
imprisonment of not more than ten years, is within the trial courts
jurisdiction. Similarly, the appellate court sustained the city
prosecutors authority to file the informations conformably with
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Hence, this petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE #1: Does the City Prosecutors Office of Naga City have
authority to file the informations even without a prior determination
thereof by the Enforcement Officers of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB)?
RULING #1:
YES. Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 71, the enforcement officers of
local government units shall only have full power to monitor,
investigate and enforce compliance with the provisions of national
laws and standards whose implementation have been devolved to
the local government in accordance with E.O. No. 71, Section 1.
Noteworthy, the prosecution for the violation of Section 17 of P.D. No.
957 is not included in the foregoing functions. Hence, it follows
logically that it remained with the City Prosecutors Office of Naga
City.
ISSUE #2: Does the Regional Trial Court of Naga City have
jurisdiction over the offense charged?
RULING #2:
YES. The jurisdiction of the court or agency is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. It cannot be made to depend on the
defenses made by the defendant in his Answer or Motion to Dismiss.
If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend
almost entirely on the defendant. The informations rest the cause of
action on the petitioners failure to register the Contracts to Sell in
accordance with Section 17 of P.D. No. 957. The penalty imposable
is a fine of not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos and/or
imprisonment of not more than ten years. Once again, clearly, the
offense charged is well within the jurisdiction of the trial court.

REVIEW
15.) People vs. Garfin
(prior written approval or authority by the of the city or provincial
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor before filing or dismissal of
cases)
FACTS: Private respondent was charged with violation of Republic
Act No. 8282, otherwise known as the Social Security Act. The
information contains a certification signed by State Prosecutor
Romulo SJ. Tolentino. Accused Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty
to the charge and thereafter filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the information was filed without the prior written authority or
approval of the city prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 112
of the Revised Rules of Court. Trial court granted the motion to
dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether an information filed by a state prosecutor without
the prior written authority or approval of the city or provincial
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor should be dismissed after the
accused has entered his plea under the information.
RULING: YES. The case of Villa is authority for the principle that
lack of authority on the part of the filing officer prevents the court
from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by law while jurisdiction over the case is invested
by the act of plaintiff and attaches upon the filing of the complaint or
information. Hence, while a court may have jurisdiction over the
subject matter, like a violation of the SSS Law, it does not acquire
jurisdiction over the case itself until its jurisdiction is invoked with the
filing of the information. In sum, we hold that, in the absence of a
directive from the Secretary of Justice designating State Prosecutor
Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or a prior written
approval of the information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the
information was filed by an officer without authority to file the same.
As this infirmity in the information constitutes a jurisdictional defect
that cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not err in dismissing
the case for lack of jurisdiction.
16. Tolentino v Pacqueo
Facts: Petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino filed an information
charging private respondent Benedict Tecklo, the owner/proprietor of
Qualistronic Builders, of violation of Sec. 22 (a) in relation to Sec. 28
(e) of RA 8282 for failing to remit the premiums due for his employee
to the SSS despite demand. The cases was raffled by Judge
Paqueo, Jr and was set for arraignment. Counsel for private
respondent moved for the deferment of the arraignment and
requested time to file a motion to quash the Information, which was
granted by court. Private respondent filed a Motion to quash,
however State Prosecutor Tolentino filed an opposition to motion to
quash. RTC issued motion to quash and dismissed the case. Pros.
Tolentino filed an objection and motion praying order to be set aside
which was denied.
Issue: Whether petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino is duly
authorized to file the subject information without approval of City
Prosecutor?
Ruling: No. While the old 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, stated that "[no] complaint or information may be filed or
dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written authority
or approval of the provincial or city fiscal of chief state prosecutor,"
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that "[n]o
complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval
of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy." Since the provision is couched in
negative terms importing that the act shall not be done otherwise
than designated, it is mandatory.
An examination of the functions of the Regional State Prosecutor
under Sec. 8 of Presidential Decree No. 127512 showed that they do
not include that of approving the Information filed or dismissed by the
investigating prosecutor.
It is a rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Since the Regional State Prosecutor is not included among the law
officers authorized to approve the filing or dismissal of the
Information of the investigating prosecutor, the Information filed by
petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino did not comply with the
requirement of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Consequently, the non-compliance was a ground to
quash the Information under Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
17. LEDESMA vs CA, G.R. 113216, Sep. 5, 1997, 278 SCRA
656
FACTS: Sometime in April 1992, a complaint for libel was filed by Dr.
Juan F. Torres, Jr. against Dr. Rhodora M. Ledesma, petitioner
herein, before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. Finding "sufficient
legal and factual basis," the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office filed an
Information for libel against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. A petition for review of the resolution of Assistant City
Prosecutor Vestil was filed by petitioner before the Department of
Justice pursuant to P.D. No. 77 as amended by P.D. No. 911. The
Department of Justice gave due course to the petition and directed
the Quezon City prosecutor to move for deferment of further
proceedings and to elevate the entire records of the case. 5
Accordingly, a "Motion to Defer, Arraignment" dated September 7,
1992 was filed by Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero before the court a quo.
On September 9, 1992, the trial court granted the motion and
deferred petitioner's arraignment until the final termination of the
petition for review. Without the consent or approval of the trial
prosecutor, private complainant, through counsel, filed a Motion to
Lift the Order dated September 9, 1992 and to Set the Case for
Arraignment/Trial.
ISSUE: May the justice secretarys power of review be availed of
despite the filing of information in court?
RULING: YES. In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals the Court clarified
that the Court did not foreclose the power or authority of the
secretary of justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in
criminal cases. The Court recognized in Crespo that the action of the
investigating fiscal or prosecutor in the preliminary investigation is
subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state
prosecutor. Thereafter, it may be appealed to the secretary of justice.
The justice secretarys power of review may still be availed of despite
the filing of an information in court. In his discretion, the secretary
may affirm, modify or reverse resolutions of his subordinates
pursuant to R.A. 5180, as amended, specifically in Section 1 (d).
Pursuant thereto, the Department of Justice promulgated Circular
No. 7 dated January 25, 1990 governing appeals in preliminary
investigation. Appeals under Section 2 are limited to resolutions
dismissing a criminal complaint. However, Section 4 provides an
exception: appeals from resolutions finding probable cause upon a
showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion are allowed,
provided the accused has not been arraigned. In the present case,
petitioners appeal to the secretary of justice was given due course
pursuant to this Circular. Where the secretary of justice exercises his
power of review only after an information has been filed, trial courts
should defer or suspend arraignment and further proceedings until
the appeal is resolved. Such deferment or suspension, however,
does not signify that the trial court is ipso facto bound by the
resolution of the secretary of justice. Jurisdiction, once acquired by
the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution by the secretary of
justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case. Judicial
review of the acts of other departments is not an assertion of
superiority over them or a derogation of their functions. It is not the
purpose of this Court to decrease or limit the discretion of the
secretary of justice to review the decisions of the government
prosecutors under him. Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court,
which recognizes such power, does not, however, allow the trial court
to automatically dismiss the case or grant the withdrawal of the
information upon the resolution of the secretary of justice. The trial
court is required to make its own evaluation of the merits of the case,
because granting the motion to dismiss or to withdraw the
information is equivalent to effecting a disposition of the case itself.
18. METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY v.
REYNADO
FACTS: Petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company charged
respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with
the crime of estafa because of the alleged anomalous/fraudulent
transactions perpetrated by respondents in connivance with client
Universal Converter Philippines, Inc. (Universal). Meanwhile,
petitioner and Universal entered into a Debt Settlement Agreement.
The prosecutors finds after following the requisite preliminary
investigation, found petitioners evidence insufficient to hold
respondents liable for estafa- (The execution of the Debt Settlement
Agreement puts complainant bank in estoppel to argue that the
liability is criminal. Since the agreement was made even before the
filing of this case, the relations between the parties [have] change[d],
novation has set in and prevented the incipience of any criminal
liability on the part of respondents), and recommended its dismissal.
The Department of Justice similarly finds that there has been no
crime of estafa. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner,
but the same was denied. Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA by
filing a Petition for Certiorari & Mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether a judicial review is allowed after prosecutors
finding of probable cause during preliminary investigation.
RULING: YES. Determination of the probable cause, a function
belonging to the public prosecutor; judicial review is allowed where it
has been clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave
abuse of discretion. In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor
determines whether a crime has been committed and whether there
is probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof. The Secretary of
Justice, however, may review or modify the resolution of the
prosecutor. Generally, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude
of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. By way of
exception, however, judicial review is allowed where respondent has
clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of
discretion that is, when he has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law.
Tested against these guidelines, we find that this case falls under the
exception rather than the general rule.
20. Torres v Perez | g.r no. 188225 | November 28, 2012 |
Facts: Petitioner and respondents, previous business partners, had
a misunderstanding and falling out which led to the petitioner filing a
complaint against respondents for violation of Unfair Competition.
RTC of Makati and prosecutor found probable cause for the issuance
of warrant of arrest. DOJ, however, reversed the finding of existence
of probable cause. Prosecutor moved to withdraw the information but
RTC Judge denied it. CA found the RTC judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying the prosecutors motion. The Court
held that there was no probable cause and affirmed the assailed CA
decisions.
Issue: Is the judge bound to the resolution of the prosecution to
withdraw its information when the information is already filed in court.
Ruling: No. Once a complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case as to its dismissal, or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said
court, as it is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case
before it. While the resolution of the prosecutorial arm is persuasive,
it is not binding on the court. It may therefore grant or deny at its
option a motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information based on its
own assessment of the records of the preliminary investigation
submitted to it, in the faithful exercise of judicial discretion and
prerogative, and not out of subservience to the prosecutor.
21. LORELI LIM PO vs . DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and
JASPER T. TAN
FACTS:
Tan was a stockholder of CHVI. Antonio Chiu was the President
of the said company. Tan claimed that Po was the personal
accountant of the Chiu. However, Po argued that she is merely a
consultant of the company.
Tan lamented that pertinent information relative to CHVIs
operations were withheld from him. His repeated requests for copies
of financial statements and allowance to inspect corporate books
proved futile. He filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor against
Chiu and Po for violation of the Corporate Code.
The prosecutor found probable cause. Chiu and Pos
motion to reconsider were denied by the prosecutor. The findings of
the prosecutor was subjected by Po and Chiu to a petition for review
with the DOJ. Initially, the DOJ reversed the prosecutors finding.
However, in the end, it affirmed the findings of the prosecutor.
Po and Chiu, each filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
Pos petition was dismissed on a technical ground. Chius petition
was denied for lack of merit.
Po filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Chiu
filed for certiorari under Rule 65. The SC consolidated the case.
Contention of Po and Chiu: The DOJ gravely abused its discretion in
affirming the prosecutors finding.
Contention of Tan: The Court cannot interfere with an executive
function of the prosecutor in determining the existence of probable
cause during a preliminary investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may interfere with the
determination of probable cause which is an executive function
HELD: No. As we ruled in Metrobank vs. Tobias III, 664 SCRA 165
(2012), in a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor is bound to
determine merely the existence of probable cause that a crime has
been committed and that the accused has committed the same. The
rules do not require that a prosecutor has moral certainty of the guilt
of a person for the latter to be indicted for an offense after the
conduct of preliminary investigation. Further, we have repeatedly
ruled that the determination of probable cause, for purposes of
preliminary investigation, is an executive function. Such
determination should be free from the courts interference save only
in exceptional cases where the DOJ gravely abuses its discretion in
the issuance of its orders or resolutions.
22. VILLANUEVA vs CAPARAS
G.R. No. 190969, January 30, 2013
FACTS:
On August 24, 2006, an altercation occurred between Baron
Villanueva, (petitioner) and Edna Caparass (respondent) husband,
Renato, resulting in the latters death. Edna filed a complaint for
murder, and the corresponding information for homicide was filed
against Baron. Before he could be arraigned, however, Baron filed a
petition for review with the Department of Justice. The Secretary of
Justice, resolving the petition for review, set aside the prosecutors
resolution and directed him to withdraw the information filed against
Baron. Edna moved to reconsider, but her motion was denied, hence
she elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for
certiorari. The Court of Appeals reversed the Secretarys resolution,
ruling that he exceeded the functional requirements of a preliminary
investigation when he passed upon the validity of matters which are
essentially evidentiary in nature. There was grave abuse of
discretion when he passed upon Barons defences, which should
have been ventilated in a proper trial, since the facts and
circumstances presented fully supported a finding of probable cause
to indict Baron for homicide. Baron thus filed this petition for review
on certiorari before the Supreme Court to assail the CA decision.
ISSUE: Did the Secretary exceed the bounds of his jurisdiction when
he reversed the prosecutors resolution finding probable cause to
indict Villanueva for homicide and, pursuant to this conclusion,
ordered the withdrawal of the resolution?
RULING:
YES. The Court found the CA decision and resolution in accord with
law and jurisprudence in finding that the Secretary acted with grave
abuse of discretion when he reversed the prosecutors resolution
finding probable cause to charge Villanueva with homicide.
The determination of probable cause is essentially an executive
function, lodged in the first place on the prosecutor who conducted
the preliminary investigation on the offended partys complaint. The
prosecutors ruling is reviewable by the Secretary who, as the final
determinative authority on the matter, has the power to reverse,
modify or affirm the prosecutors determination. As a rule, the
Secretarys findings are not subject to interference by the
courts, save only when he acts with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; or when he grossly
misapprehends facts; or acts in a manner so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined by law; or when he acts outside the contemplation
of law.
The Secretary, in this case, calibrated the evidentiary weight of the
NBI opinion vis-a-vis the autopsy report, as well as Ednas complaint-
affidavit vis--vis the affidavit of Jovita, and in so doing, already went
into the strict merits of Villanuevas defenses. We note that the NBI
opinion was procured at Villanuevas instance and was based on the
documents and in response to the questions Villanueva posed, while
Jovita was unable to recall the events that transpired relative to
Renatos death when asked during the preliminary investigation.
Whether the alternative scenario on the cause of Renatos injuries
and death (as supported by Jovitas affidavit and the NBI opinion and
which Villanueva proposed by way of defense) is more credible and
more likely than the narrations of Edna in her complaint-affidavit, in
the affidavit of her witness, and the NBI autopsy report should best
be left for the trial court to determine after a full- blown trial on the
merits. When the Secretary made a determination based on his own
appreciation of the pieces of evidence for and against Villanueva, he
effectively assumed the function of a trial judge in the evaluation of
the pieces of evidence and, thereby, acted outside his jurisdiction.
23. Alawiya v CA, GR 164170, 16 Apr 2009
FACTS: Petitioners executed sworn statements before the Western
Police District charging five policemen with kidnapping for ransom.
The PNP recommended that the accused be charged with violation of
Art 267 of the RPC. State Prosecutor conducted the preliminary
investigation and issued a resolution that the accused be charged
with the crime of kidnapping for ransom, and filed the Information
with RTC Manila. The accused filed a petition for review on the
Resolution with the Office of the Secretary of Justice and moved for
the quashal of the Information on the ground that the Officer has no
authority to do so. However, the RTC denied the motion to quash.
The Secretary of Justice, on the other hand, reversed the Resolution
of Prosecutor Velasco and ordered Velasco to withdraw or dismiss
the information. It ruled on the ground that the prior approval with the
Office of the Ombudsman should be secured before the filing of the
Information. The Secretary also found out that the incident
complained of was a buy-bust operation and not kidnapping for
ransom.
ISSUE: IS the reversal of the Secretary of Justice of the resolution
made by Prosecutor Velasco tantamount to executive acquittal?
RULING: NO. As regards to the reversal, it is a well settled rule that
the Secretary of Justice has the power to review resolutions of his
subordinates such as the Prosecutor even after an information was
already filed with the RTC. However, such reversal did not amount to
executive acquittal since the Secretary is only exercising his power
to review including the power to reverse the Resolution of the
Prosecutor. But since information was already filed with the RTC, any
dismissal or continuation is left with the Courts discretion and will not
be bound with the decision of the Secretary.
24.) Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Santos-ortiz
FACTS: Yet another investment scam was exposed with the
disappearance of its primary perpetrator, Liew, chairman of PIPC-
BVI. To do business in the Philippines, PIPC-BVI incorporated herein
as PIPC Corporation. Santos was charged in the complaints in her
capacity as investment consultant of PIPC Corporation, who
supposedly induced private complainants to invest their monies in
PIPC Corporation. DOJ, signed by a panel of three (3) prosecutors,
with recommendation for approval of the Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor, and ultimately approved by Chief State Prosecutor,
indicting Santos for violation of Section 28 of the Securities
Regulation Code. Respondent Santos filed a petition for review
before the Office of the Secretary of the DOJ assailing the
Resolutions dated 18 April 2008 and 2 September 2008 and claiming
that she was a mere clerical employee/information provider who
never solicited nor recruited investors. DOJ, excluded respondent
Santos from prosecution.
ISSUE: Was the Court clothed with power to review the decision of
DOJ in this case?
RULING: YES. Generally, at the preliminary investigation proper, the
investigating prosecutor, and ultimately, the Secretary of the DOJ, is
afforded wide latitude of discretion in the exercise of its power to
determine probable cause to warrant criminal prosecution. The
authority of the prosecutor and the DOJ however is not absolute; it
cannot be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. Where the findings of
the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of the DOJ as to the
existence of probable cause are equivalent to a gross
misapprehension of facts, certiorari will lie to correct these errors.
While it is our policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, we have, on more than one occasion, adhered to
some exceptions to the general rule (.....4. when the acts of the
officer are without or in excess of authority)
In this case, the exculpation of Santos cannot be preliminarily
established simply by asserting that she did not sign the investment
contracts, as the facts alleged in this case constitute fraud
perpetrated on the public. The DOJ`s and Court of Appeals reasoning
that Santos did not sign the investment contracts of Sy and Lorenzo
is specious. The contracts merely document the act performed by
Santos.
25. Lanier v People
Facts: The police operatives conducted a test- buy at petitioners
residence in Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island where they were
able to purchase P5,000.00 worth of shabu and P1,000.00 worth of
marijuana from petitioners. On the basis of the test-buy operation,
they were able to secure a search warrant from the RTC of Aklan. A
Receipt for Property Seized was prepared by SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan,
but petitioners refused to sign the same. Thereafter, petitioners were
placed under arrest. The assistant prosecutor of Kalibo filed an
Information charging the petitioners. The petitioners filed a Motion to
Quash the Information before the RTC of Kalibo but the RTC denied
the motion and remanded the case to the provincial prosecutor for
preliminary investigation. The prosecutor upheld the Information and
directed the return of the records to the RTC for disposition.
Petitioners filed a petition for review before the DOJ. The Sec. of
Justice favored the petitioner on the belief that the evidences seized
were planted. The secretary, in a Resolution, directed the prosecutor
to withdraw the Information before the RTC. RTC then granted the
Motion to Withdraw Information by the prosecutor. OSG filed to the
CA a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the Resolution of the
DOJ. The CA found probable cause to sustain the petitioners
indictment and reinstated the Information against the petitioners. CA
nullified and set
aside the DOJ Resolution and the Order of the RTC
Issue: Whether the review made by the Secretary of Justice binding
in court?
Ruling: No.
It is wellsettled that courts of law are precluded from disturbing the
findings of public prosecutors and the DOJ on the existence or non
existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal
informations, unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The rationale
behind the general rule rests on the principle of separation of powers,
dictating that the determination of probable cause for the purpose of
indicting a suspect is properly an executive function; while the
exception hinges on the limiting principle of checks and balances,
whereby the judiciary, through a special civil action of certiorari, has
been tasked by the present Constitution to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.
Judicial review of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice is limited
to a determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the executive
branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation. Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgment
for that of the executive branch; it may, however, look into the
question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of
discretion.
At the risk of sounding repetitive, we must emphasize that the trial
court, having acquired jurisdiction over the case, is not bound by
such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding
further with the trial. While the Secretarys ruling is persuasive, it is
not binding on courts.
26. AGUILAR vs DOJ, G.R. 197522, Sep 11, 2013
FACTS: Petitioner is the father of one Francisco M. Aguilar, alias
Tetet On April 10, 2002, he filed a criminal complaint4 for murder
against the members of a joint team of police and military personnel
who purportedly arrested Tetet and later inflicted injuries upon him,
resulting to his death. Among others, the Commission on Human
Rights investigated Tetets death and thereafter issued a Final
Investigation Report12 dated October 3, 2002 and Resolution13
dated October 8, 2002, recommending that the case, be closed for
lack of sufficient evidence Likewise, the Office of the Provincial
Director of the Occidental Mindoro Police Provincial Command
conducted its independent inquiry on the matter and, in a Report
dated September 21, 2002, similarly recommended the dismissal of
the charges against respondents. The office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro (Provincial Prosecutor) dismissed
petitioners complaint against all respondents for lack of probable
cause. The DOJ also dismissed petitioners appeal and thereby,
affirmed the Provincial Prosecutors ruling. The petitioner then filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA, which also dismissed petitioners
certiorari petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the DOJ in sustaining the Provincial Prosecutors ruling. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Does the Court have the power to review a public
prosecutors determination of probable cause?
RULING: It depends. Generally, the public prosecutors
determination of probable cause that is, one made for the purpose
of filing an information in court is essentially an executive function
and, therefore, generally lies beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. The
exception to this rule is when such determination is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion and perforce becomes correctible through the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. It is fundamental that the concept of
grave abuse of discretion transcends mere judgmental error as it
properly pertains to a jurisdictional aberration. Corollary, the abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law.31 To note, the underlying
principle behind the courts power to review a public prosecutors
determination of probable cause is to ensure that the latter acts
within the permissible bounds of his authority or does not gravely
abuse the same. In Alberto vs CA, the Court ruled that courts of law
are precluded from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors and
the DOJ on the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the
purpose of filing criminal informations, unless such findings are
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The rationale behind the general rule rests on the
principle of separation of powers, dictating that the determination of
probable cause for the purpose of indicting a suspect is properly an
executive function; while the exception hinges on the limiting
principle of checks and balances, whereby the judiciary, through a
special civil action of certiorari, has been tasked by the present
Constitution to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
27. PUNZALAN v. PLATA
FACTS: Rainier filed a criminal complaint for Attempted Homicide
against Michael Gamaliel Plata (Michael) and one for Illegal
Possession of Firearms against Robert Cagara (Cagara). On the
other hand, Michael, Ruben Plata (Ruben) and several others filed
several complaints against petitioners Rosalinda, Randall, Rainier,
and several individuals before the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Mandaluyong City. The Office of the City Prosecutor, in its Joint
Resolution, dismissed the complaints filed against the petitioners for
lack of sufficient basis both in fact and in law. Complainants filed their
separate petitions before the DOJ. Upon review, the DOJ
reconsidered its findings and ruled that there was no probable cause.
In its Resolution directed the Office of the City Prosecutor to withdraw
the information. The complainants elevated the matter to the CA by
way of certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
DOJ Secretary which ordered the withdrawal of the separate
information for Slight Oral Defamation, Other Light Threats,
Attempted Homicide, Malicious Mischief and Theft. The CA annulled
and set aside the Resolutions of the DOJ.
ISSUE: Are findings of probable cause during preliminary
investigation reviewable?
RULING: YES. The rule is that this Court will not interfere in the
findings of the DOJ Secretary on the insufficiency of the evidence
presented to establish probable cause unless it is shown that the
questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.20 Grave abuse of
discretion, thus "means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The party seeking
the writ of certiorari must establish that the DOJ Secretary exercised
his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason
of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.
28. PEOPLE VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Petitioner Dy avers: The Court of Appeals gravely erred in
holding that the Regional Trial Court Judge had the authority to
reverse [the public prosecutors] finding of probable cause to
prosecute accused x x x and thus dismiss the case filed by the latter
on the basis of a motion to quash warrant of arrest.
RULING: The determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is
an executive function, the correctness of the exercise of which is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to
pass upon.
This broad prosecutorial power is however not unfettered, because
just as public prosecutors are obliged to bring forth before the law
those who have transgressed it, they are also constrained to be
circumspect in filing criminal charges against the innocent. Thus, for
crimes cognizable by regional trial courts, preliminary investigations
are usually conducted. In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, we discussed
the purposes and nature of a preliminary investigation in this manner:
The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free
respondent from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of
defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until the
reasonable probability of his or her guilt in a more or less summary
proceeding by a competent office designated by law for that purpose.
Secondarily, such summary proceeding also protects the state from
the burden of the unnecessary expense an effort in prosecuting
alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous or
groundless charges.
The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial must
be distinguished from the determination of probable cause to issue a
warrant of arrest, which is a judicial function. The judicial
determination of probable cause in the issuance of arrest warrants
has been emphasized in numerous cases. Corollary to the principle
that the judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he
or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so is the rule
that he should not override the public prosecutors determination of
probable cause to hold an accused for trial, on the ground that the
evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant
was insufficient.

29. Tan v Ballena |G.r. no. 168111| July 4, 2008|
Facts: Petitioners, Antonio Tan, Danilo Domingo and Robert Lim,
were sued by the employees of their dissolved company Footjoy
Industrial Corporation for breaching the SSS law after failing to pay
the membership dues. They alleged that they must not be held
accountable since the companys downfall was caused by economic
conditions and a fire that caused some ruins. On 13 November 2001,
petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the DOJ which the latter
granted reversing the assailed resolution directing to cause the
withdrawal of the informations for violation of the Social Security Law
earlier filed against respondents. Respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the DOJ resolution, but the same was denied in a
Resolution. On 16 October 2002, respondents filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79101.
Respondents claimed that the DOJ committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that no
probable cause existed to charge petitioners. The Court of Appeals
rendered a Resolution granting the respondents Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the
above decision, but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Who may review the findings of probable cause by the public
prosecutor
Ruling: Findings of the prosecutor with respect to the existence or
non-existence of probable cause is subject to the power of review by
the Department of Justice. The power of review does not preclude
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals from intervening and
exercising their own powers of review with respect to the DOJs
findings. Indeed, the Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the
resolution of the prosecutor, after which he shall direct the prosecutor
concerned either to file the corresponding information without
conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move
for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties.
But once an information is filed in court, any disposition of the case
as to its dismissal, or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests
on the sound discretion of the said court. In the exceptional case in
which grave abuse of discretion is committed, as when a clear
sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of
probable cause is ignored, the Court of Appeals may take
cognizance of the case via a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
30. HEIRS OF THE LATE NESTOR TRIA VS. OBIAS
FACTS: On July 31, 1998, NBI Regional Director recommended to
the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur the indictment of Roberto
Obet Aclan y Gulpo, Juanito Totoy Ona y Masalonga and Atty. provided further, that, the appeal or petition for review is filed within
Epifania Fanny Gonzales-Obias, for the murder of Engr. Tria. The
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued a resolution directing the
filing of an information for murder against Aclan and Ona but
dismissing the case for insufficiency of evidence as against herein
respondent, Atty. Epifania Obias. Petitioners appealed to the DOJ
assailing the Provincial Prosecutors order to dismiss the charge
against respondent. DOJ Sec. modified the resolution of the
Provincial Prosecutor and directed the latter to include respondent in
the information for murder filed against Aclan and Ona. Respondent
along with Aclan and Ona filed a motion for reconsideration of the
DOJs resolution. Motion was denied.
The information charging Aclan and Ona has already been filed
with the RTC. Thereafter, prosecution filed with the RTC a Motion to
Admit Amended Information to include respondent as one of the
accused for the murder of Tria. Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal
with the DOJ. In a letter dated December 3, 2001 addressed to
respondents counsel, the DOJ denied respondents notice of appeal
on the ground that pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 1266 dated
November 4, 1983, as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 58
dated June 30, 1993, appeals to the OP where the penalty
prescribed for the offense charged is reclusion perpetua to death,
shall be taken by petition for review. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the denial of her notice of appeal. The DOJ denied
respondents motion for reconsideration stating that the proper
procedure is the filing of an appeal or petition for review with the OP
and not before the DOJ. Hence, the case was considered closed and
erminated. However, the DOJ directed the Provincial Prosecutor to
forward the records of the case to the OP in compliance with the
Order dated October 18, 2001 of Deputy Executive Secretary Jose
Tale. It turned out that respondent filed on October 1, 2001 a notice
of appeal before the OP (O.P. Case No. 01-J-118).
Senior Deputy Executive Secretary adopted the findings of facts
and conclusions of law in the appealed Resolutions DOJ, and
affirmed the same. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.
Tespondent filed a Supplemental Pleading and Submission of Newly
Discovered Evidence. Presidential Assistant Manuel C. Domingo
granted respondents motion for reconsideration and reversed the
DOJ resolutions. Accordingly, the case against respondent was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the OP in its. Before the CA,
petitioners filed a petition for mandamus/certiorari. The CA denied the
petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the President erred in taking
cognizance of the appeal of the respondent
RULING: No. On the procedural issue raised by the petitioners, we
hold that the OP did not err in taking cognizance of the appeal of
respondent, and that the CA likewise had jurisdiction to pass upon
the issue of probable cause in a petition challenging the OPs ruling.
Memorandum Circular No. 58 provides: x x x x No appeal from or
petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of
Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be
entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving
offenses punishable by reclu sion perpetua to death wherein new and
material issues are raised which were not previously presented
before the Department of Justice and were not ruled upon in the
subject decision/order/resolution, in which case the President may
order the Secretary of Justice to reopen/review the case, provided,
that, the prescription of the offense is not due to lapse within six (6)
months from notice of the questioned resolution/order/decision, and
thirty (30) days from such notice. Henceforth, if an appeal or petition
for review does not clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the Office of
the President, as set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, it
shall be dismissed outright and no order shall be issued requiring the
payment of the appeal fee, the submission of appeal brief/memo-
randum or the elevation of the records to the Office of the President
from the Department of Justice.
In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 656 (1997), we clarified
that the justice secretary is not precluded from exercising his power
of review over the investigating prosecutor even after the information
has already been filed in court. However, the justice secretarys
subsequent resolution withdrawing the information or dismissing the
case does not cause the court to lose jurisdiction over the case. In
fact, the court is duty-bound to exercise judicial discretion and its own
independent judgment in assessing the merits of the resulting motion
to dismiss filed by the prosecution.
When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the
ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the
secretary of justice, the bounded duty of the trial court is to make an
independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having
acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by
such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding
further with the trial. While the secretarys ruling is persuasive, it is
not binding on courts. A trial court, however, commits reversible error
or even grave abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate
such recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with trial on
the mere pretext of having already acquired jurisdiction over the
criminal action.
It is well within the courts sound discretion to suspend arraignment to
await the result of the justice secretarys review of the correctness of
the filing of the criminal information. There are exceptional cases,
such as in Dimatulac v. Villon, 297 SCRA 679 (1998), wherein we
have suggested that it would have been wiser for the court to await
the justice secretarys resolution before proceeding with the case to
avert a miscarriage of justice. Evidently however, this is not a hard
and fast rule, for the court has complete control over the case before
it.
32. People v Yecyec, GR 183551, 12 Nov 2014
FACTS: Pioneer, a domestic corporation engaged in buying and
selling rubber, tasked Sison with the acquisition of rubber coagulum
and rubber cup lumps in Bukidnon. Sison bought a total of 2433 kilos
of rubber lumps. Sison placed the rubber cup lumps inside the
fenced premises at his residence. Sison was approached by
Sechico, chairman of FARBECO, and two police officers and
members of FARBECO to verify if the rubber cup lumps were stolen
from FARBECO. Upon inspection, 6 tons were found out to be stolen
from FABRECO. Yecyec, the manager of FARBECO, together with
the other respondents who were armed, arrived at Sisons place on
board a weapons carrier truck to take the rubber cup lumps. Sesion
arrived with policer officer Dahug. However, Yecyec and his men
hastily left the premises on board their truck, leaving a portion of the
fence destroyed. Petitioner filed a case of Robbery with intimidation
of Persons before the MCTC. MCTC found probable cause against
the respondents. The provincial prosecutor, however, found that
respondents should only be liable for theft. The RTC dismissed the
cased of theft for want of probable cause. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Did the RTC and CA err in dismissing the information
against the respondents for the crim of Theft for want of probable
cause?
RULING: YES. To determine whether probable cause exists and to
charge those believed to have committed the crime as defined by
law, is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an
executive function. In Crespo v Mogul, it is a cardinal principle that all
criminal actions either commenced by complain or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The
institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of
the fiscal.
REINVESTIGATION/PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
33.) Crespo vs. Mogul
A fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of
evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same
commit no error. The fiscal may re-investigate a case and
subsequently move for the dismissal should the reinvestigation show
either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be
established beyond reasonable doubt. -(rule provided but dli material
sa case.)
FACTS: Fiscal Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed
an information for estafa against Crespo. When the case was set for
arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the
ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the
Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal for the filing of the information. Presiding judge Mogul, denied
the motion. Then Undersecretary of Justice Macaraig, resolving the
petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate
dismissal of the information filed against the accused. Judge denied
the motion and set the arraignment.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a
criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may
refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on
the merits?
RULING:
YES. The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction
and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case
is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant
or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.
34. Paul G. Roberts, et al. v. Court of Appeals
I. THE FACTS
Petitioners, who are corporate officers and members of the
Board of Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. were prosecuted in
connection with the Pepsi Number Fever promotion by handlers of
the supposedly winning 349 Pepsi crowns. Of the four cases filed
against the petitioners, probable cause was found by the
investigating prosecutor only for the crime of estafa, but not for the
other alleged offenses.
On 12 April 1993, the information was filed with the trial
court without anything accompanying it. A copy of the investigating
prosecutors Joint Resolution was forwarded to and received by the
trial court only on 22 April 1993. However, no affidavits of the
witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings
during the preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in
the course thereof were found in the records of the case as of 19
May 1993.
On 15 April 1993, petitioners Roberts, et al. filed a petition
for review to the Department of Justice seeking the reversal of the
finding of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor. They also
moved for the suspension of the proceedings and the holding in
abeyance of the issuance of warrants of arrest against them.
Meanwhile, the public prosecutor also moved to defer the
arraignment of the accused-appellants pending the final disposition
of the appeal to the Department of Justice.
On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion issued the
challenged order (1) denying, on the basis of Crespovs. Mogul , the
foregoing motions respectively filed by the petitioners and the public
prosecutor, and directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest after
June 1993 and setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993. In part,
respondent judge stated in his order that since the case is already
pending in this Court for trial, following whatever opinion the
Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the
independence and integrity his court. To justify his order, he quoted
the ruling of the Supreme Court in Crespo , which stated:
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the
fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left
entirely for the determination of the Court.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that
the respondent judge had not the slightest basis at all for determining
probable cause when he ordered the issuance of warrants of
arrest. After finding that a copy of the public prosecutors Joint
Resolution had in fact been forwarded to, and received by, the trial
court on 22 April 1993, the CA denied petitioners application for writ
of preliminary injunction. The CA ruled that the Joint Resolution was
sufficient in itself to have been relied upon by respondent Judge in
convincing himself that probable cause indeed exists for the purpose
of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest and that the mere
silence of the records or the absence of any express declaration in
the questioned order as to the basis of such finding does not give
rise to an adverse inference, for the respondent Judge enjoys in his
favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official
duty. Roberts, et al. sought reconsideration, but meanwhile, the DOJ
affirmed the finding of probable cause by the investigating
prosecutor. The CA therefore dismissed the petition for mootness.
II. THE ISSUES
1. Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion
in denying, on the basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to
suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants
of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for review
filed with the DOJ shall have been resolved?
2. Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion
in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest without examining the
records of the preliminary investigation?
3. May the Supreme Court determine in
this [sic] proceedings the existence of probable cause either for the
issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners or for their
prosecution for the crime of estafa?
III. THE RULING
[The Court, in a 7-5-2 vote, GRANTED the petition. It SET
ASIDE the decision and resolution of the CA, the resolutions of the
DOJ 349 Committee, and the order of respondent judge.]
1. YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying, on the basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the
motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the
issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until
after the petition for review filed with the DOJ shall have been
resolved.
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ
from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way of a petition for review,
by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the
investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal
from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has
already been filed in Court.
Whether the DOJ would affirm or reverse the challenged
Joint Resolution is still a matter of guesswork. Accordingly, it was
premature for respondent Judge Asuncion to deny the motions to
suspend proceedings and to defer arraignment on the following
grounds:
This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow
whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter
would undermine the independence and integrity of this Court. This
Court is still capable of administering justice.
The real and ultimate test of the independence and
integrity of this court is not the filing of the aforementioned motions
[to suspend proceedings and issuance of warrants of arrest and to
defer arraignment] at that stage but the filing of a motion to dismiss
or to withdraw the information on the basis of a resolution of the
petition for review reversing the Joint Resolution of the investigating
prosecutor. However, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the
information is filed the trial judge may grant or deny it, not out of
subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of
judicial prerogative.
2. YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest
without examining the records of the preliminary investigation.

The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado,
and Webb reject the proposition that the investigating prosecutors
certification in an information or his resolution which is made the
basis for the filing of the information, or both, would suffice in the
judicial determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest. In Webb, this Court assumed that since the respondent
Judges had before them not only the 26-page resolution of the
investigating panel but also the affidavits of the prosecution
witnesses and even the counter-affidavits of the respondents, they
(judges) made personal evaluation of the evidence attached to the
records of the case.
In this case, nothing accompanied the information upon its
filing on 12 April 1993 with the trial court. A copy of the Joint
Resolution was forwarded to, and received by, the trial court only on
22 April 1993. And as revealed by the certification of respondent
judges clerk of court, no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of
stenographic notes of the proceedings during the preliminary
investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof
were found in the records of this case as of 19 May 1993.
Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order
of 17 May 1993 directing, among other things, the issuance of
warrants of arrest, he had only the information, amended information,
and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not have the records
or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable
cause. And strangely enough, he made no specific finding of
probable cause; he merely directed the issuance of warrants of arrest
after June 21, 1993. It may, however, be argued that the directive
presupposes a finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a
constitutional requirement for the protection of individual liberty
cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic.
3. NO, the Supreme Court MAY NOT determine in
this [sic] proceedings the existence of probable cause either
for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners
or for their prosecution for the crime of estafa.
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not
lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to
the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the
case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of
jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal
prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction,
preliminary or final.
There are, however, exceptions to the foregoing rule.
But the Court refused to reevaluate the evidence to determine if
indeed there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
in this case. For the respondent judge did not, in fact, find that
probable cause exists, and if he did he did not have the basis
therefor. Moreover, the records of the preliminary investigation in this
case are not with the Court. They were forwarded by the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City to the DOJ in compliance with the
latter's 1st Indorsement of 21 April 1993. The trial court and the DOJ
must be required to perform their duty.
35. DUNGOG vs CA, G.R. L-77850-51, March 25, 1988
FACTS: First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Bohol Angel S. Ucat, Jr.
issued a resolution finding a prima facie case for the filing of
information of estafa against Pantaleon del Rosario; that the same
resolution was approved by Respondent; that on the last week of
October 1985 and after the information had already been filed in
court, the private respondent filed a Motion for Reinvestigation with
the public respondent Provincial Fiscal; and that the petitioner
submitted his Opposition And/Or Comment to private respondents
Motion For Reinvestigation. Acting on the said Motion, the
respondent Provincial Fiscal reversing himself and his assistant
fiscal, this time found no prima facie case against the same private
respondent; that on the same date, the respondent Provincial Fiscal
filed an Omnibus Motion for Postponement of Arraignment and To
Allow Withdrawal of Information in the above-mentioned case. The
presiding judge of the RTC of Bohol resolved to deny respondent
Fiscals Motion to Withdraw the Information. The CA then decided in
favour of Provincial Fiscal and granted the Motion to Withdraw
Information, enjoining the Presiding Judge from proceeding with the
trial of the criminal case.
ISSUE: May a trial court deny a motion submitted by the Provincial
Fiscal to dismiss an information previously filed by him and insist on
trial on the merits of the case?
RULING: YES. The rule is now well-settled that once a complaint or
information is filed in court any disposition of the case as to its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction
and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case
is already in court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. For
while it is true that the fiscal had the quasi-judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court,
once the case had already been brought to court, whatever
disposition the fiscal may deem proper thereafter should be
addressed to the court for its consideration and approval. In US vs
Valencia, the Court ruled that after the complaint has been presented
and certainly after the trial has been commenced, the court and not
the fiscal has full control of it, and that the complaint cannot be
withdrawn by the fiscal without the consent of the court. In US vs
Barredo, the Court stated that provincial fiscals are not clothed with
power, without the consent of the court, to dismiss or nolle prosequi
criminal actions actually instituted, and pending further proceedings
and that the power to dismiss is vested solely in the court.
36 VELASQUEZ v. UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE
FACTS: Petitioner Felix A. Velasquez filed a complaint for estafa
against Avila in the Manila City Fiscal's Office. Assistant Fiscal
Romulo Lopez dismissed the complaint. However, upon review by
the Chief, Investigation Division of the City Fiscal's Office, the latter
set aside Fiscal Lopez' resolution and ordered the filing of an
information for estafa against Avila in the Regional Trial Court. Avila
twice sought a reconsideration of that resolution, but both motions
were denied by the City Fiscal. Avila filed a second motion for
reconsideration which the Undersecretary of Justice. He directed the
City Fiscal: ... to conduct a reinvestigation of this case to afford
respondent to properly present evidence that he was duly authorized
to pay the subject creditors and for complainant to rebut the same
with controverting evidence, and thereafter to resolve the case anew
on the basis of all the evidence adduced. The complainant filed a
motion for reconsideration of that resolution but it was denied.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the order for reinvestigation is proper.
RULING: NO. This case is governed by the decision in Crespo vs.
Mogul, 151 SCRA 462, where the court ruled that once the
information is filed in court, the court acquires complete jurisdiction
over it. A motion for reinvestigation should, after the court had
acquired jurisdiction over the case, be addressed to the trial judge
and to him alone. Neither the Secretary of Justice, the State
Prosecutor, nor the Fiscal may interfere with the judge's disposition of
the case, much less impose upon the court their opinion regarding
the guilt or innocence of the accused, for the court is the sole judge
of that.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction
and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case
is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant
or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.
The Undersecretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in
ordering the re-investigation of the criminal case against Avila after it
had been filed in court. The avowed purpose of the reinvestigation "to
give an opportunity to the private respondent to present an authentic
copy of the board resolution of the offended party (Techtrade
Management International Corporation) which [allegedly] had
authorized him to deal and otherwise dispose of the funds of the
corporation" can also be achieved at the trial in the lower court where
that piece of evidence may be presented by the accused as part of
his defense.
37. People vs. Beriales, 70 SCRA 361, No. L-39962 April 7,
1976
FACTS: Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Leyte Branch V,
convicting the accused Ricardo Beriales, Benedicto Custodio and
Pablito Custodio of the crime of murder sentencing each of them
reclusion perpetua, and to jointly and severally pay the heirs of
Saturnina Gonzales Porcadilla the sum of Php12,000.00 and to pay
the costs.
September 13, 1974 at around 9:00AM at Barrio
Mahayahay, the appellants with evident premeditation and
treachery feloniously attack, assault, strike and stab
Porcadilla, inflicting mortal wounds which caused her
death.
At the hearing, on November 26, 1974, Atty. Abas,
appellants counsel moved for a reinvestigation of the case
which was granted by the court. The arraignment and trial
was postponed until December 5 at 7:30AM.
Trial court again postponed and cancelled the
hearings (Dec. 3, 17-18) and reset the arraignment instead
on December 10-11.
City Fiscal set the reinvestigation on December
12 and had already issued the subpoena to secure the
attendance of the witnesses. The Court set the hearing on
December 11.
Special Counsel Rosario Polines, in
representation of the City Fiscal manifested that the private
prosecutor Atty. Procadilla, be authorized to conduct the
case for prosecution.
RULING:
Where accused moves for reinvestigation of case, trial court should
hold in abeyance arraignment and trial until after reinvestigation;
Reasons.After the trial court granted the appellants motion for
reinvestigation, it became incumbent upon the court to hold in
abeyance the arraignment and trial of the case until the City Fiscal
shall have conducted and made his report on the result of such
reinvestigation. That was a matter of duty on its part, not only to be
consistent with its own order but also to do justice and at the same
time to avoid a possible miscarriage of justice.
When the trial court ignored the appellants manifestations
objecting to the arraignment and the trial of the case, until
after the City Fiscal shall have rendered a resolution on his
reinvestigation, but instead considered such manifestations on
their part as a plea of not guilty and proceeded to try the
case, received the evidence for the prosecution, and then
rendered judgment against them on the basis thereof, it
committed a serious irregularity which nullifies the
proceedings below because such a procedure is repugnant to
the due process clause of the Constitution.
38. Socrates v Sandiganbayan |253 SCRA 773| February 20,
1996|
Facts: Petitioner who is the incumbent governor of Palawan, was
first elected governor of the said province in 1968 and was again re-
elected in both the 1971 and 1980 elections, until he was replaced by
private complainant Victoriano Rodriguez as Officer-in-Charge
Governor after the EDSA revolution in February 1986. Subsequently,
both petitioner and Rodriguez ran for governor in the 1988 elections
where the latter emerged victorious. In the 1992 synchronized
national and local elections, the two again contested the
gubernatorial post and this time, it was petitioner who won. At the
time Rodriguez was still the OIC Governor of the province, the
Provincial Government of Palawan, as represented by Rodriguez and
the Provincial Board members of Palawan, filed before the Office of
the Tanodbayan two complaints. The first complaint charged
petitioner with violation of section 3(b) of RA no. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the second
charged petitioner, together with several other provincial officers, with
violation of section 3(a) and (g) of the same law. On December 23,
1994, respondent court, without ruling on petitioners motion to
include co-principals, issued its questioned resolution granting the
motion to suspend pendente lite and ordering the suspension of
petitioner as Provincial Governor of Palawan for a period of 90 days
from notice.
Issue: Does the absence of a preliminary investigation in an offense
that requires a preliminary investigation impair the validity of the
information or render it defective.
Ruling: No. It has been consistently held that the absence of a
preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the criminal
information or render it defective. Neither will the absence of a
preliminary investigation, assuming that it is necessary to conduct a
new one, affect the validity of the information filed against petitioner.
Dismissal of the case is not the remedy. It is not a ground for the
quashal of a complaint or information. The proper course of action
that should be taken is for the Sandiganbayan to hold in abeyance
the proceedings upon such information and to remand the case to
the office of the Ombudsman for him or the Special Prosecutor to
conduct a preliminary investigation, if the accused actually makes out
a case justifying such relief.
39. PEOPLE VS. NITCHA
FACTS; An indictment for murder was filed against herein accused-
appellant (p. 18, Rollo) who, after trial, was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt on account of the positive identification made by
the Peoples witnesses, the defense of accused-appellant anchored
on denial being found unavailing.
Accused-appellant argues the procedural infirmities
attended the trial below such as (a) the hearsay character of the
testimony of the Peoples third witness which was heard in the
absence of accused-appellant and his counsel; (b) the denial of due
process on account of the perceived bias of the trial judge; (c) the
illegality of accused-appellants arrest and detention: and (d) the
absence of preliminary investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest was illegal for want of preliminary
investigation
RULING: NO. On the assumption that accused-appellants arrest
was illegal for want of preliminary investigation, such a hypothesis
was nonetheless negated by accused appellants act of posting a bail
bond thereafter, apart from the fact that he entered a plea of not
guilty which is tantamount to foregoing the right to question the
assumed irregularity.
40. GO vs COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street,
nearly bumped Eldon Maguans car. Go alighted from his car, shot
Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant
was able to take down petitioners car plate number. The police
arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting. A manhunt
ensued.
Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan
Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the
police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith
detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police
station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman.
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court,
setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation.
Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to
preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such
situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully,
falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and
procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant
because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting
which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the
crime had not been just committed at the time that he was arrested.
Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an
eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the
personal knowledge required for the lawfulness of a warrantless
arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception
to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of
petitioner.
ISSUE # 1:
Was there a lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner Go effected by the
San Juan Police?
RULING # 1:
NO. The Court does not believe that the warrantless arrest or
detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Petitioners arrest took place six (6) days after the shooting of
Maguan. The arresting officers obviously were not present, within
the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the arrest effected six (6) days after the
shooting be reasonably regarded as effected when [the shooting
had] in fact just been committed within the meaning of Section 5 (b).
Moreover, none of the arresting officers had any personal
knowledge of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who
had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had
been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the
shooting one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was
able to take down the alleged gunmans cars plate number which
turned out to be registered in petitioners wifes name. That
information did not, however, constitute personal knowledge.
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest
of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.
ISSUE # 2:
Did petitioner effectively waive his right to preliminary investigation?
RULING # 2:
NO. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not believe
that by posting bail, petitioner had waived his right to preliminary
investigation. In People v. Selfaison, the Court held that appellants
there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because
immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial
without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a
preliminary investigation.
In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance
or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He
had thus claimed his right to preliminary
investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond
posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991.
Accordingly, the Court cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary
investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor
filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioners claim
to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.
41. San Agustin vs. People, 437 SCRA 392, G.R. No. 158211
August 31, 2004
FACTS:
The petitioner asserts that he was illegally arrested by the NBI;
hence, he was entitled to a regular preliminary investigation, not
merely to an inquest investigation. He contends that since the
Information charging him with kidnapping/serious illegal detention
was filed before the Regional Trial Court without affording him a
preliminary investigation, the Information is void. The RTC, the
petitioner avers, should have granted his motion to quash the
Information and ordered the NBI to refile its complaint against him
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Paraaque for the
appropriate preliminary investigation and that, in the meantime, the
RTC should have ordered his release from detention. The petitioner
posits that the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying his motion to
quash the Information and directing the City Prosecutor to conduct a
reinvestigation. On the other hand, since the Assistant City
Prosecutor did not conduct a regular preliminary investigation before
filing the Information for arbitrary detention against him with the
MeTC, the Information is void. Hence, the MeTC should be ordered
to quash the Information filed therein.
RULING: The petitioner is entitled to a preliminary investigation
before an Information may be filed against him for said crime. The
inquest investigation conducted by the State Prosecutor is void
because under Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, an inquest investigation is proper only when the suspect
is lawfully arrested without a warrant: SEC. 7. When accused lawfully
arrested without warrant.When a person is lawfully arrested
without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary
investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a
prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest
investigation has been conducted in accordance with existing rules.
In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the
complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer
directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the
offended party or arresting officer or person.
The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the
jurisdiction of the trial court but merely the regularity of the
proceedings. It does not impair the validity of the Information or
otherwise render it defective. Neither is it a ground to quash the
Information or nullify the order of arrest issued against him or justify
the release of the accused from detention. However, the trial court
should suspend proceedings and order a preliminary investigation
considering that the inquest investigation conducted by the State
Prosecutor is null and void. In sum, then, the RTC committed grave
abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
ordering the City Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation which is
merely a review by the Prosecutor of his records and evidence
instead of a preliminary investigation as provided for in Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Whether or not there is a need for a preliminary investigation
under Section 1 in relation to Section 9 of Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure depends upon the imposable penalty
for the crime charged in the complaint filed with the City or Provincial
Prosecutors Office and not upon the imposable penalty for the crime
found to have been committed by the respondent after a preliminary
investigation. In this case, the crime charged in the complaint of the
NBI filed in the Department of Justice was kidnapping/serious illegal
detention, the imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua to
death.
WHEN WARRANT OF ARREST MAY ISSUE
42. Sales vs. Sandiganbayan-ortiz
- case did not provide when a WOA may be issued hahaha!
FACTS:
petitioner, the incumbent town mayor fatally shot the former mayor
and his political rival. He surrendered and placed himself under the
custody of the municipal police. The Provincial Prosecutor however,
instead of conducting a preliminary investigation of his own, merely
forwarded the said records to the Ombudsman for the latter to
conduct the same. Then Graft Investigation Officer II Vivar filed a
Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Murder.
Petitioner filed a motion to defer the issuance of Warrant but was
denied. Petitioner asserts that the Information was hastily filed and
the warrant for his arrest was improper because of an incomplete
preliminary investigation. Respondents say otherwise.
ISSUE:
Was the issuance of Warrant of Arrest by the Sandiganbayan proper?
RULING:
NO.the determination of probable cause by the investigating
prosecutor cannot serve as the sole basis for the issuance by the
court of a warrant of arrest. This is because the court with whom the
information is filed is tasked to make its own independent
determination of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of
arrest. This Court cannot accept the Sandiganbayan`s assertions of
having found probable cause on its own, considering the
Ombudsman`s defective report and findings, which merely relied on
the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution and disregarded
the evidence for the defense. In the case at bar, it cannot be said
that the Sandiganbayan reviewed all the records forwarded to it by
the Ombudsman considering the fact that the preliminary
investigation which was incomplete escaped its notice. Suffice it to
state in this regard that such a deprivation of the right to a full
preliminary investigation preparatory to the filing of the information
warrants the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for the
completion thereof.
43. RAMSICAL VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (RAMISCAL) was a retired officer of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
During his term as the president of the AFP-Retirement and
Separation Benefits System, he approved the acquisition of
15,020 sqm of land in General Santos City for housing
devt projects.
RAMISCAL, along with Atty. Flaviano (attorney-in-fact of
the 12 vendors), executed and signed 12 deeds of sale
over the lands at the agreed price of P10,500 per sqm.
However, the deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of
only P3,000 per sqm instead of the P10,500.
On Dec. 1997, Congresswoman Antonino filed in the
Ombudsman (OMB) a complaint-affidavit against the
petitioner for:
Violation of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act)o Malversation of public funds or property through
falsification of public documents.
After preliminary investigation, OMB found RAMSICAL
guilty of violation of Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 3019.
On Feb. 1999, RAMSICAL filed his first motion for
reconsideration, which was set aside because it was
proven that RAMSICAL indeed participated and affixed his
signature on the deeds of sale with the false purchase
price. Afterwards, OMB filed in the Sandiganbayan 12
informations for the falsification of documents of
RAMSICAL and other co-accused.
On Feb. 2006, pending his SECOND MR in the OMB, the
petitioner was arraigned in the Sandiganbayan. However,
RAMSICAL refused to enter a plea. Because of his refusal,
the Sandiganbayan entered in his favor a plea of not guilty.
RAMSICAL filed a motion to SET ASIDE his arraignment
for the reason that he still has an MR concerning the
OMBs findings of probable cause against him.
Sandiganbayan denied his motion stating that whatever
defense or evidence he may have should be presented in
the trial of the case before it.
RULING: The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require
cases to be set for hearing to determine probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the accused before any
warrant may be issuedthe Sandiganbayans determination of
probable cause is made ex parte and is summary in nature, not
adversarial.We agree with the Sandiganbayans ruling that the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require cases to be set
for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
for the arrest of the accused before any warrant may be issued.
Section 6, Rule 112 mandates the judge to personally evaluate the
resolution of the Prosecutor (in this case, the Ombudsman) and its
supporting evidence, and if he/she finds probable cause, a warrant of
arrest or commitment order may be issued within 10 days from the
filing of the complaint or Information; in case the Judge doubts the
existence of probable cause, the prosecutor may be ordered to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice. The
provision reads in full: SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.
(a) By the Regional Trial Court.Within ten (10) days from the filing
of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate
the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already
been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who
conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of
doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from
notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30)
days from the filing of the complaint of information. The periods
provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are mandatory,
and as such, the judge must determine the presence or absence of
probable cause within such periods. The Sandiganbayans
determination of probable cause is made ex parte and is summary in
nature, not adversarial. The Judge should not be stymied and
distracted from his determination of probable cause by needless
motions for determination of probable cause filed by the accused.
44. PEOPLE vs JUDGE YADAO, G.R. No. 169727-28
FACTS: In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces
of the Philippine National Polices Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence
Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat, then
headed by Police Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson killed 11
suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang along
Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City. Subsequently, SPO2
Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation Command told
the press that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out between
the police and those who were slain. After investigation, the Deputy
Ombudsman for Military Affairs absolved all the police officers
involved. On review, however, the Office of the Ombudsman reversed
the finding and filed charges of murder against the police officers
involved before the Sandiganbayan. On March 29, 1999 the RTC of
Quezon City ordered the provisional dismissal of the cases for lack of
probable cause to hold the accused for trial following the recantation
of the principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the
private complainants. The case was reopened in March 27, 2001 but
the CA rendered a Decision, granting Lacsons petition on the ground
of double jeopardy but on appeal to the SC, the latter directed the
RTC to try the case. It was re-raffled to branch 81 presided by Judge
Yadao. Yadao in 2003 junked the murder case against Lacson and
other police officials for lack of probable cause. On March 3, 2004 the
prosecution filed the present special civil action of certiorari.
ISSUE: Did Judge Yadao gravely abuse her discretion when she
deferred the issuance of warrants of arrest?
RULING: NO. The general rule of course is that the judge is not
required, when determining probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrests, to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only
needs to personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor
finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial
evidence. But here, the prosecution conceded that their own
witnesses tried to explain in their new affidavits the inconsistent
statements that they earlier submitted to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Consequently, it was not unreasonable for Judge
Yadao, for the purpose of determining probable cause based on
those affidavits, to hold a hearing and examine the inconsistent
statements and related documents that the witnesses themselves
brought up and were part of the records. Besides, she received no
new evidence from the respondents. The SC held that the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against the
respondents.
The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal
action outright, Judge Yadao should have ordered the panel of
prosecutors to present additional evidence pursuant to Section 6,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal
information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it
finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to
the existence of probable cause. But the option to order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory. The
courts first option under the above is for it to immediately dismiss
the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause. That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails
to establish probable cause against the respondents. In the absence
of probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of multiple
murder, they should be insulated from the tribulations, expenses and
anxiety of a public trial.
45 CAJIPE v. PEOPLE
FACTS: Before the DOJ, Lilian filed a complaint charging multiple
murder against certain police officers from the PNP-HPG and PNP-
SAF who were involved in the police action that led to the shooting of
her husband and their daughter. After preliminary investigation, the
DOJ filed the Information before the RTC indicting all the police
officers charged in the complaint. On the following day, the HPG
group of accused police officers filed an omnibus motion for judicial
determination of probable cause with a prayer to hold in abeyance
the issuance of warrants for their arrest. The RTC issued warrants of
arrest against the SAF officers but dismissed the case against the
HPG officers for lack of probable cause. Lilian moved for
reconsideration of the dismissal but it was denied.
For a period of 112 days after receipt of the order of dismissal by the
public prosecutor, the OSG via Rule 65 filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC. The CA granted the petition, ruling that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion and thus ordered the issuance of warrants of
arrest against the HPG officers.
ISSUE: When should a warrant of arrest be issued?
RULING: Warrant of arrest may only issue when there is already a
finding of probable cause. Probable cause for purposes of filing a
criminal information is defined as such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
The prosecution evidence fails to establish probable cause against
petitioner HPG officers.
46. Ligaya vs ORDA [G.R. No. 189402, May 6, 2010]
Facts: On April 2, 2001, Francis Orda (Francis), the son of
respondent Domingo Orda, Jr., was shot to death in Paraaque City.
He was then twenty years old and an engineering student.
A certain Gina Azarcon (Gina) executed her sworn statement that
she saw three male persons perpetrate the crime; two of them, later
identified as Rolly Tonion (Rolly) and Jhunrey Soriano (Jhunrey), shot
Francis inside his car. The City Prosecutor of Paraaque City thus
filed an Information for the crime of murder against Rolly and Jhunrey
Two more witnesses, Ernesto Regala (Ernesto) and his son, Dennis,
surfaced. Dennis testified that before Francis was shot to death, the
former went to the office of Ligaya, who was then a Barangay
Chairperson, to deliver collections from the public toilet. When
Dennis failed to return home, Ernesto proceeded to fetch him. They
then saw Ligaya hand a gun to accused Rolly, saying, Gusto ko
malinis na trabaho at walang bulilyaso, baka makaligtas na naman si
Orda. They learned the following day that, instead of respondent, it
was Francis who was killed.
Gina, Ernesto and Dennis later recanted their testimonies. On June
11, 2002, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a Joint Resolution
directing the City Prosecutor to cause the withdrawal of the
Informations for murder against the accused, holding that the
prosecution witnesses testimonies were not credible because of their
recantation. On motion of the prosecution, the RTC, Branch 258,
issued an Order dated July 5, 2005, allowing the withdrawal of the
Informations against the accused and consequently recalling the
warrants for their arrest
CA nullified the aforesaid Order upon request by respondent said
there was grave abuse of discretion by rtc and was affirmed by the
SC. Ligaya filed motion for reconsideration
Pending the resolution of her motion, Ligaya filed an Urgent Petition
for Bail. SC resolved the Motion for reconsideration of Ligaya by
directing RTC, Branch 258 to make an independent evaluation of the
records before allowing the withdrawal of the Informations against
petitioners. RTC 274 (reraffled to them after inhibition of the judge)
issued ordered dismissing the case stating that there was lack of
probable cause. CA reverse and ordered the reraffling of the case
again.
Issue: whether the CA erred in finding that there was probable cause
against petitioners.
Ruling: No. A closer scrutiny of the Order of the RTC reveals that the
Presiding Judge allowed the withdrawal of the Informations,
consequently dismissed the case against petitioners, and lifted the
warrants for their arrest on the following grounds:
1) the incredibility of the earlier statements of Gina, Ernesto and
Dennis because of their subsequent recantation;
2) the improbability that Dennis and Ernesto saw and heard the
conversations of the accused in view of the counter-evidence
submitted by Ligaya, showing the physical set-up of her residence or
building, the kind of door she maintained thereat, and the inner
private room she had
3) the lack or insufficiency of evidence at the level of prosecution for
purposes of determining probable cause
4) the incredibility of the testimonies of Sabino and Jonas because
of the absence of corroborating evidence.
Base on the foregoing the RTC did not err in finding that no probable
cause existed to indict the petitioners for the crime of murder. Neither
did it gravely abuse its discretion in making said conclusion. There
was no hint of whimsicality, nor of gross and patent abuse of
discretion as would amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law on the part of the Presiding Judge.
On the contrary, he came to the conclusion that there was no
probable cause for petitioners to commit murder, by applying basic
precepts of criminal law to the facts, allegations and evidence on
record.
Said conclusion was thoroughly explained in detail in the lengthy
Order dated September 30, 2005. THE purpose of the mandate of
the judge to first determine probable cause is to insulate from the
very start those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations,
expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
Additional Notes:
Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the
accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and
discretion of the trial court. In Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that
once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the
accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and
discretion of the trial court. The trial court is the best and sole judge
on what to do with the case before it. A motion to dismiss the case
filed by the public prosecutor should be addressed to the court who
has the option to grant or deny the same. Contrary to the contention
of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the
Information or to dismiss the case even before or after arraignment of
the accused. The only qualification is that the action of the court must
not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the
People or the private complainant to due process of law. When the
trial court grants a motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the
case, or to quash the Information, or to withdraw the Information in
compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny
the said motion, it does so not out of subservience to or defiance of
the directive of the Secretary of Justice but in sound exercise of its
judicial prerogative.
The trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the
public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice that no crime was
committed on that the evidence in the possession of the public
prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction of the
accused.In resolving a motion to dismiss the case or to withdraw
the Information filed by the public prosecutor on his own initiative or
pursuant to the directive of the Secretary of Justice, either for
insufficiency of evidence in the possession of the prosecutor or for
lack of probable cause, the trial court should not rely solely and
merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of
Justice that no crime was committed or that the evidence in the
possession of the public prosecutor is insufficient to support a
judgment of conviction of the accused. As the Court emphasized in
Martinez v. Court of Appeals, the trial court must make an
independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case and
the evidence on record of the prosecution.
47. Mendoza v People | G.r no. 197293 |April 21, 2014|
Facts: Juno Cars hired Alfredo as Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor. On
November 19, 2007, its Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia, conducted
a partial audit of the used cars and discovered that five (5) cars had
been sold and released by Alfredo without Rolandos or the finance
managers permission. Juno Cars alleged that taking into account the
unremitted amounts and the acquisition cost of the Honda City,
Alfredo pilfered a total amount of 1,046,000.00 to its prejudice and
damage. On March 4, 2008, Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado
issued a Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the
filing of an information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa.
He then filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice.
While Alfredos motion for reconsideration was still pending before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, two informations
for qualified theft and estafa were filed before the Regional Trial
Court in Mandaluyong City.
On March 3, 2009, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Rizalina
Capco-Umali, issued an order dismissing the complaint, the court
holds that the evidence adduced does not support a finding of
probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa. Juno
Cars then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals and
was granted. Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a petition for review under Rule
45 before this court. He argued that the trial court was correct in
finding that there was no probable cause as shown by the evidence
on record. He argued that "judicial determination of probable cause is
broader than [the] executive determination of probable cause" and
that "it is not correct to say that the determination of probable cause
is exclusively vested on the prosecutor.
Issue: When warrant of arrest may issue
Ruling: The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or
warrants of arrest where the judge has not personally determined the
existence of probable cause. The phrase upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
allows a determination of probable cause by the judge ex parte.
Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter,
Judge Capco-Umali correctly dismissed the case against Alfredo. A
judge must always proceed with caution in dismissing cases due to
lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the
evidence before it. It is only when he or she finds that the evidence
on hand absolutely fails to support a finding of probable cause that
he or she can dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a judge finds
probable cause, he or she must not hesitate to proceed with
arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served.