Case 2:16-cr-01012-SRB Document 223-1 Filed 09/11/17 Page 1 of 13

1 Locke E. Bowman, admission pro hac vice (Illinois Bar # 6184129)

David M. Shapiro, admission pro hac vice (Illinois Bar # 6287364)
2
RODERICK AND SOLANGE MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER
3 Northwestern Pritzker School of Law
375 E. Chicago Avenue
4 Chicago, IL 60611
5 312.503.0711
david.shapiro@law.northwestern.edu
6 locke.bowman@law.northwestern.edu
7
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
10
United States of America, No. CR-16-01012-001-PHX-SRB
11 Plaintiff, [PROPOSED] AMICUS BRIEF OF
RODERICK AND SOLANGE
12 v. MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER
IN OPPOSTION TO ARPAIOS
13 Joseph M. Arpaio, MOTION TO VACATE
Defendant. CONVICTION
14
15 This Court should deny Joseph Arpaios motion to vacate his conviction. The pardon
16 is invalid and unconstitutional because it has the purpose and effect of eviscerating the
17 judicial power to enforce constitutional rights. We show in this brief that the adoption of
18 the Bill of Rights and the Reconstruction Amendments altered the original constitutional
19 framework by specifying individual rights to be enforced, in James Madisons words, by
20 independent tribunals of justice. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed.,
21 1834). Judicial enforcement of these rights would provide an essential and impenetrable
22 bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive. Id. Whatever
23 the limits of the pardon power may have been when the Constitutional Convention finished
24 its work, the adoption of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment makes clear that
25 the executive power, including the pardon power, cannot be exercised to disable the judicial
26 enforcement of constitutional rights.
27
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Yet eviscerating this Courts power to enforce constitutional rights is precisely what
2
the pardon will do if given effect. Such an outcome would not be limited to this Court. It
3
would, by design, diminish the judicial power of every federal court to enforce
4
constitutional rights. The Arpaio pardon is only the Presidents latest assault on the federal
5
judiciary; a succession of statements by the President show an intent to undermine the
6
constitutional function of the federal courts as a check against fundamental deprivations of
7
liberty.
8
Finally, even if the Court were to find that the pardon is valid and erases the effects
9
of the conviction, the conviction itself should stand. Shortly before the pardon, the White
10
House asked Arpaio if he would accept a pardon, and he said that he would. Arpaios lawyer
11
then insisted that the President issue the pardon before sentencing, which the President did.
12
Arpaio now argues that the conviction should be vacated because he has no opportunity to
13
appeal, but he created that scenario by saying he would accept a pardon and by insisting
14
that it occur immediately. A party who voluntarily moots a case is not entitled to vacatur.
15
If this case is moot, it is because of Arpaios voluntary choices.
16
ARGUMENT
17 I. The President Cannot Issue Pardons that Have the Purpose and Effect of
18 Eviscerating the Judicial Power To Enforce the Bill of Rights and the
Reconstruction Amendments.
19 The debates at the 1787 Constitutional Convention suggest that the Framers intended
20 to grant the President very broad pardon power. See William F. Duker, The Presidents
21 Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 475, 501-06 (1977);
22 John Dinan, The Pardon Power and the American State Constitutional Tradition, 35 Polity
23 394-95, 404-05 (2003). The Framers voted down a proposed limitation on pardons for
24 treason and rejected a requirement that the Senate approve pardons. See Duker, supra, at
25 501-506; Dinan, supra, at 394-95, 404-05. The Framers did include one textual limitation
26 on the pardon power in Article II: The President may not issue pardons in cases of
27 impeachment. U.S. Const., Art. II, 1. The Framers of course had no cause to consider the
28

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precise issue presented herewhether the pardon power extends to a criminal contempt
2
conviction resulting from a government officials refusal to obey a court order enforcing a
3
constitutional right conferred by later constitutional amendments.
4
Assuming for the sake of argument that the original constitutional framework would
5
have permitted the Arpaio pardon, structural alterations accomplished through the Bill of
6
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit it. The Framers came to view the original
7
constitutional structure as incomplete and therefore changed it by enacting the Bill of
8
Rights. Geoffrey P. Miller, Liberty and Constitutional Architecture: The Rights-Structured
9
Paradigm, 16 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Poly 87, 90-91 (1993). These alterations established an
10
important limitation on the executive power: The executive power cannot be exercised to
11
eviscerate the judicial power to enforce constitutional rights.
12
James Madisons address to Congress upon his introduction of the Bill of Rights
13
makes it clear that the purpose of the first ten amendments is not only to guarantee certain
14
individual rights but to guarantee the judicial power to enforce them. In the United States,
15
Madison observed, the people of many states, have thought it necessary to raise barriers
16
against power in all forms and departments of government. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 454.
17
[T]he great object of these barriers, which many states had incorporated into their
18
constitutions, was to limit and qualify the powers of Government, by excepting out of the
19
grant of power those cases in which the Government ought not to act, or to act only in a
20
particular mode. They point these exceptions sometimes against the abuse of the executive
21
power, sometimes against the legislative . . . . Id. Madison made it clear that the liberties
22
protected by the Bill of Rights would be secured by the judiciaryindependent tribunals
23
of justice, as he called the courts:
24
If [individual rights] are incorporated into the constitution, independent
25 tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every
26 assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be naturally led
27 to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the
constitution by the declaration of rights.
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Id at 457. The argument Madison makes to Congress is founded on separation of powers.
2
Independent judges would be charged with interpreting and enforcing constitutional rights
3
and thus checking the tendency of the people and the other branches to violate these rights.
4
Douglas Laycock, Individual Liberty and Constitutional Architecture: The Founders
5
Prompt Correction of Their Own Mistake, 16 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Poly 75, 82 (1993).
6
Madison appears to have adopted a view of judicial enforcement that Thomas
7
Jefferson had set forth in previous correspondence. See Randolph J. May, Independent
8
Judicial Review: An Appreciation of Its Origins and Some Contemporary Musings about
9
Its Role Two Hundred Years Later, 2 Geo. Mason Indep. L. Rev. 195, 203 (1993). Jefferson
10
had written to Madison on March 15, 1789:
11
In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, you omit one which has
12 great weight with me, the legal check which it puts into the hands of the
judiciary. This is a body, which if rendered independent & kept strictly to
13 their own department merits great confidence for their learning & integrity.
14 In fact what degree of confidence would be too much for a body composed
of such men as Wythe, Blair & Pendleton? On characters like these the
15 civium ardor prava jubentium would make no impression. 1
16 Drawing on these sources, constitutional scholars have demonstrated that, while the
17 Bill of Rights did not change the text of Article III, it did alter fundamentally the structure
18 of government and the power of the federal courts in relation to the other branches by
19 providing the federal courts with a concrete set of mandates to enforce against officials of
20 the other branches. Thus, the adoption of the Bill of Rights increased judicial power,
21 though it did not do so through an amendment to Article III expressly conferring additional
22 powers upon the judiciary. Laycock, supra, at 83. Rather, the source of power in the Court
23 came from the addition of rights in the people. Id. Similarly, Geoffrey Miller writes:
24
1
25 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (March 15, 1789), in The Works
of Thomas Jefferson in Twelve Volumes (Paul Leicester Ford ed, Fed. ed. 1904). The phrase
26 heat of the populace, written by Jefferson in Latin, is a reference to a Horace verse: The
27 just man tenacious of purpose is not to be turned aside by the heat of the populace nor the
brow of the threatening tyrant. See Robert Browning, Poems of Robert Browning from the
28 Authors Revised Text of 1889 48 (1896).

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1 [T]he Bill of Rights can be seen as rectifying a structural defect in the original
Constitution. The original Constitution established two relatively strong
2
branches of the government, the legislature and the executive. It failed to give
3 equal powers to the judiciary. The Bill of Rights increases the powers of the
judiciary, consonant with its position of equal dignity within the
4 constitutional structure.
5 Miller, supra, at 91; see also May, supra, at 195-96, 205.
6 After the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment further altered the original
7 constitutional structure both by expanding the judicial power and by guaranteeing new
8 rightsincluding equal protectionagainst state actors. A draft of Section 1 of the
9 Fourteenth Amendment did not guarantee any individual rights, and merely granted
10 Congress the power to protect them through legislation. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
11 Sess. 1088 (1866). Senator Giles Hotchkiss criticized this draft sharply because it failed to
12 secure individual rights as the law of the land:
13 I understand the amendment as now proposed by its terms to authorize
Congress to establish uniform laws throughout the United States upon the
14
subject named, the protection of life, liberty and property. I am unwilling that
15 Congress shall have any such power. . . . The object of a Constitution is not
only to confer power upon the majority, but also to restrict the power of the
16 majority and protect the rights of the minority.
17 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866). Hotchkiss therefore proposed a
18 revisionfrom which the Fourteenth Amendment was ultimately derivedthat provided
19 a direct guarantee of Fourteenth Amendment rights. William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth
20 Amendment: From Political Principle to Judicial Doctrine 55 (1998); see also Maggie
21 McKinley, Plenary No Longer: How the Fourteenth Amendment Amended Congressional
22 Jurisdiction-Stripping Power, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1213, 1229 (2011). Hotchkiss insisted on
23 this change because he wanted to be certain that the rights would be enforced by the
24 judiciary. Nelson, supra, at 55. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment, as enacted, guaranteed
25 a neutral federal forum in which to enforce these new rights against state malfeasance.
26 McKinley, supra, at 1229. The point that the Fourteenth Amendment expanded the
27 enforcement power of the federal courts was not lost on the Governor of Alabama, who
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opposed ratification on states rights grounds, and observed that the Amendment would
2
enlarge the judicial powers of the General Government to . . . gigantic dimensions. 2
3
In short, even if the original architecture of the Constitution would have allowed the
4
President to defeat the judicial power to enforce constitutional rights by exercising the
5
pardon power, this much is clear: The President may do so no longer. Subsequent changes
6
in the structure of American government prohibit the Chief Executive from abusing the
7
pardon power to nullify the judicial enforcement of constitutional rights.
8
Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S 87 (1925), is not to the contrary. In Grossman, the
9
district court acted pursuant to a prohibition law and ordered the defendant, a county
10
official, to stop selling liquor from his place of business. Id. at 107. The official defied the
11
injunction, the court convicted him of criminal contempt, and the President pardoned him.
12
Id. In Grossman, there was no constitutional dimension to the order that the defendant
13
defied, and the Supreme Court rejected the claim that the pardon violated the separation of
14
powers or compromised judicial independence. Id. at 119-22. This case is different.
15
Arpaios crime consists of flouting orders issued to enforce constitutional rights, and the
16
fundamental role of the judiciary in the American structure of government is to protect those
17
rights. A pardon that nullifies the punishment for selling alcohol does not defeat the
18
enforcement of constitutional rights. This pardon does so, and is therefore invalid.
19
II. The Arpaio Pardon Has the Purpose and Effect of Eviscerating the Judicial
20 Power To Enforce Constitutional Rights.
21 The Presidents pardon eviscerates this Courts enforcement power in the Melendres

22 litigation by endorsing Arpaios refusal to comply with federal court orders. Not only does

23 the pardon purport to eliminate Arpaios criminal conviction, but it also immunizes him for

24 any future violations of orders entered in Melendres (including orders that have not even

25 been entered yet).

26
27
2
Governors Message, Mobile Daily Advertiser and Register, Nov. 13, 1866, at 2,
28 quoted in Nelson, supra, at 105.

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The text of the pardon is so broad that it purports to allow Arpaio to run for Sheriff
2
again, resume his violation of orders currently in place in Melendresor future orders in
3
Melendres that have not yet been enteredand escape criminal liability for future
4
contempt. 3 This scenario is a very real possibility: Immediately after receiving the pardon,
5
Arpaio refused to rule out the possibility of running for office again. 4 The pardon therefore
6
purports to establish prospective immunity for Arpaio against all criminal liability no matter
7
how many times or how blatantly he flouts orders issued in Melendres. Such a scenario
8
would eviscerate the power of this Court to discharge its constitutional duty to enforce
9
constitutional protections in the Melendres litigation. In fact, the Supreme Court has
10
repeatedly held that the President cannot issue pardons for future conduct. Grossman, 45
11
S.Ct. at 337 (A pardon can only be granted for a contempt fully completed.); Ex parte
12
Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 334 (1866) (stating that the power to pardon an offense may be
13
exercised at any time after its commission) (emphasis added).
14
The consequence of the pardon, if it is given effect, will not be limited to the
15
Melendres litigation. The Presidents statements further demonstrate that the pardon is
16
designed to endorse and encourage government officials who flout court orders. The
17
President did not say that Arpaio deserved a pardon because he committed a forgivable
18
transgression by ignoring this Courts repeated orders. Instead, the President said that
19
Arpaio was doing his job by thumbing his nose at this Courts orders:
20
The most sacred duty of government is to protect the lives of its citizens, and
21 that includes securing our borders, and enforcing our immigration laws.
22 By the way, Im just curious. Do the people in this room like Sheriff Joe?
So, was Sheriff Joe convicted for doing his job? Thats why...
23
24
3
The President has furnished Arpaio with a full and unconditional pardon not
25 only for his current conviction but for any other offenses under Chapter 21 that might
arise, or be charged, in connection with Melendres v. Arpaio. Def.s Mot. Vacate &
26 Dismiss Ex. A (emphasis added).
4
Amy B. Wang, Arpaio, 85, hints at return to politics after pardon from Trump,
27 Wash. Post (Aug. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2017/08/26/arpaio-85-hints-at-return-to-politics-after-pardon-from-
28 trump/?utm_term=.1af0da8de782.

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1 He should have had a jury, but you know what? Ill make a prediction. I think
hes going to be just fine, OK?
2
But but I wont do it tonight, because I dont want to cause any controversy.
3 Is that OK? All right?
4 But Sheriff Joe can feel good. The people of Arizona know the deadly and
heartbreaking consequences of illegal immigration, the lost lives, the drugs,
5
the gangs, the cartels, the crisis of smuggling and trafficking. MS-13 were
6 throwing them out so fast, they never got thrown out of anything like this.
We are liberating towns out on Long Island. Were liberating. 5
7
8 The notion that Arpaio was doing his job when he ignored the orders of this Court

9 sends a message that state and local law enforcement officials need not fear federal courts

10 trying to enforce constitutional rightswhen government officials ignore the courts, they

11 are doing their job, and the President will protect them against sanctions. After the pardon,

12 Trump reiterated the message that Arpaio was unfairly prosecuted for doing his job of

13 protecting the border against undocumented immigrants: Sheriff Joe protected our

14 borders and was unfairly treated by the Obama Administration (presumably because

15 Judge Snow referred the case and the prosecution commenced during that administration). 6

16 The President continually reinforces this messagethe federal courts have no

17 business enforcing constitutional rights against the governmentthrough his public

18 bullying of federal judges. After the Honorable James L. Robart, United States District

19 Judge for the Western District of Washington, temporarily blocked enforcement of the

20 original executive order banning travel to the U.S. from certain Muslim-majority countries,

21 the President tweeted:

The opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes law-enforcement
22
away from our country, is ridiculous and will be overturned! 7
23 The next day, he tweeted:
24
5
President Trump Ranted For 77 Minutes in Phoenix. Heres What He Said, TIME,
25 (Aug. 23, 2017), http://time.com/4912055/donald-trump-phoenix-arizona-transcript/.
6
Remarks by President Trump and President Niintist of Finland in Joint Press
26 Conference, White House Office of the Press Secretary (Aug. 28, 2017, 4:20 P.M.),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/28/remarks-president-trump-and-
27 president-niinist%C3%B6-finland-joint-press.
7
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Feb. 4, 2017, 5:12 AM),
28 https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/827867311054974976.

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1 Just cannot believe a judge would put our country in such peril. If something
happens blame him and court system. People pouring in. Bad! 8
2
After the Ninth Circuit held argument in the same case, President Trump told a crowd
3
of law enforcement officials:
4
I listened to a panel of judges, and Ill comment on that I will not comment
5 on the statements made by certainly one judge. But I have to be honest that
6 if these judges wanted to, in my opinion, help the court in terms of respect
for the court, theyd what they should be doing. I mean, its so sad. 9
7
Trump also excoriated the federal judiciary for enforcing constitutional rights in the
8
sanctuary cities litigation. After U.S. District Judge William H. Orrick (N.D. Cal.) ruled
9
against the Administration, President Trump attacked the judiciary on April 25, 2017:
10
This San Francisco judges erroneous ruling is a gift to the criminal gang and
11 cartel element in our country, empowering the worst kind of human
12 trafficking and sex trafficking, and putting thousands of innocent lives at risk
. . . This case is yet one more example of egregious overreach by a single,
13 unelected district judge. 10
14 Trump again attacked the Ninth Circuit following Judge Orricks decision, mistaking
15 him for the Ninth Circuit:
16 First the Ninth Circuit rules against the ban & now it hits again on sanctuary
citiesboth ridiculous rulings. 11
17
The message from the Presidents statements is clear: The judiciary should leave law
18
enforcement alone, and allow government officials to achieve law and order by violating
19
constitutional rights. The President can say what he chooses, but he must not issue pardons
20
that eviscerate the role of the federal judiciary in our constitutional structure. Viewed
21
together, the breathtaking scope of the pardon, the Presidents statement that Arpaio was
22
23
8
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Feb. 5, 2017, 12:39 PM),
24 https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/828342202174668800?lang=en
9
Remarks by President Trump at MCCA Winter Conference, White House Office of the
25 Press Secretary (Feb. 08, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2017/02/08/remarks-president-trump-mcca-winter-conference.
26 10
Statement on Sanctuary Cities Ruling, (Apr. 25, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/25/statement-sanctuary-cities-
27 ruling.
11
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Apr. 26, 2017, 3:20 AM),
28 https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/857177434210304001?lang=en.

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just doing his job by flouting court orders, and the Presidents repeated attacks on judges
2
who enforce the Constitution make it clear that the purpose and effect of the Arpaio pardon
3
is to neutralize the judiciarys function as an impenetrable bulwark against every
4
assumption of power in the legislative or executive. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. at 457.
5
III. Even If the Court Concludes that the Pardon Is Valid, The Court Should
6 Not Vacate the Conviction Because Arpaio Voluntarily Mooted the Case.
7 A party is entitled to vacatur of existing orders and judgments only if the party did

8 not moot the case through voluntary action. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall

9 Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 24 (1994). Vacatur is appropriate only where a controversy

10 presented for review has become moot due to circumstances unattributable to any of the

11 parties. Id. at 23 (citing Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82 (1987)). In other words, a party

12 who seeks review of the merits of an adverse ruling should not be frustrated by the

13 vagaries of circumstance. Id. at 25.

14 Arpaio mooted this case voluntarily. The White House called Arpaio shortly before

15 the pardon issued and gave him the opportunity to decline the pardon, but Arpaio accepted

16 it. 12 Arpaio was also adamant about the timing of the pardonin response to indications

17 that the President might not issue the pardon until after sentencing, Arpaios counsel wrote

18 to the White House Counsel on August 25 and demanded a pre-sentencing pardon. 13 Thus,

19 he insisted on a timeframe that would eliminate any possibility that his appeals would be

20 exhausted when the pardon issued. Arpaio should not be heard to argue that the very time

21 frame he demanded unfairly denied him the opportunity to challenge the verdict on appeal.

22 Arpaio relies upon United States v. Schaffer, 240 F.3d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en

23 banc), which granted vacatur when a presidential pardon mooted a case with an appeal

24 pending, but this decision is inconsistent with the legal tests established by the Supreme

25 Court. When a convict makes a request for a pardon (as Shaffer presumably did, although

26
12
A letter from Joseph Arpaios lawyer to White House Counsel Donald F. McGahn II, The
27 Washington Post, (https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/politics/a-letter-from-
joseph-arpaios-lawyer-to-white-house-counsel-donald-f-mcgahn-ii/2540/.
28 13
Id.

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the case does not say either way), the pardon is not unattributable to the petitioner, nor is
2
the petitioner frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co., 513
3
U.S. at 23, 25. The successful pardon petitioner obtains mootness through voluntary
4
action, id. at 24, by initiating a pardon request. But even if Schaffer were consistent with
5
Supreme Court precedent, it does not reach the present circumstances. Most pardon
6
petitioners make a request and then relinquish voluntary control over it; they await a
7
decision that will come far in the future and in which they will have little or no involvement.
8
While Arpaio claims he did not request the pardon, he had the opportunity to decline it right
9
before it issued; instead he accepted the pardon, and even obtained it on his preferred
10
schedule. The notion that Arpaio was frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance, id. at 25,
11
is ludicrous.
12
Judicial precedents . . . are not merely the property of private litigants and should
13
stand unless a court concludes that the public interest would be served by a vacatur.
14
Moreover, moot cases must be disposed of in the manner most consonant to justice. Id.
15
at 391-392 (citation omitted). It is difficult to imagine a case in which vacatur would be less
16
consonant to justice and the public interest than it would be here. The President has
17
pardoned Arpaio in a manner repugnant to our constitutional order, rewarding him for
18
waging war on minority communities and for breaking the law repeatedly and willfully.
19
The least this disgraced lawman should suffer is the stigma of conviction. The nation
20
deserves for his conviction to stand.
21
CONCLUSION
22
Amicus requests that the Court hold the pardon invalid and deny the motion to vacate.
23
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25
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27
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1 Dated: September 11, 2017

2 Respectfully Submitted,
3
By /s/David M. Shapiro
4 Locke E. Bowman, admission pro hac vice (Illinois Bar # 6184129)
David M. Shapiro, admission pro hac vice (Illinois Bar # 6287364)
5 RODERICK AND SOLANGE MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER
6 Northwestern Pritzker School of Law
375 E. Chicago Avenue
7 Chicago, IL 60611
8 Attorneys for Amicus Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center
9
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1
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2 I hereby certify that on September 11, 2017, I electronically transmitted the
attached documents to the Clerks Office using the CM/ECF System for filing and
3
transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following CM/ECF registrants:
4
Dennis Ira Wilenchik John Dixon Keller
5 John Douglas Wilenchik US Dept of Justice Public Integrity
Wilenchik & Bartness PC Section
6 2810 N 3rd St., Ste. 103 10th & Constitution Ave.
Phoenix, AZ 85004 Washington, DC 20530
7 602-606-2810 202-514-1412
Fax: 602-606-2811 Email: John.Keller2@usdoj.gov
8 Email: diw@wb-law.com Represents Plaintiff USA
Email: jackw@wb-law.com
9 Represents Defendant Joseph Arpaio

10 Joseph John Popolizio Victor R Salgado

Justin Michael Ackerman US Dept of Justice - Public Integrity
11 Linda Kim Tivorsak Section,
Jones Skelton & Hochuli PLC 1400 New York Ave. NW, 12th Fl.
12 40 N Central Ave., Ste. 2700 Washington, DC 20005
Phoenix, AZ 85004 202-353-4580
13 602-263-1700 Email: victor.salgado@usdoj.gov
Fax: 602200-7876 Represents Plaintiff USA
14 Email: jpopolizio@jshfirm.com
Email: jackerman@jshfirm.com
15 Email: ltivorsak@jshfirm.com
Represents Defendant Joseph Arpaio
16
Jeffrey Sinclair Surdakowski Simon Joseph Cataldo
17 Mark David Goldman US Dept of Justice
Vincent Rene Mayr 1400 New York Ave., 12th Fl.
18 Goldman & Zwillinger PLLC Washington, DC 20005
17851 N 85th St., Ste. 175 202-616-2464
19 Scottsdale, AZ 85255 Email: simon.cataldo@usdoj.gov
480-626-8483 Represents Plaintiff USA
20 Fax: 480-502-7500
Email: jsurdakowski@gzlawoffice.com
21 Email: mgoldman@gzlawoffice.com
Email: vmayr@gzlawoffice.com
22 Represents Defendant Joseph Arpaio

23 Karen Ann Clark

Adams & Clark PC
24 520 E Portland St., Ste. 200
Phoenix, AZ 85004
25 602-258-3542
Fax: 602-258-1377
26 Email: assistant@adamsclark.com
Represents Movant Timothy Casey
27
/s/David M. Shapiro
28

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