POLITCAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

STATE IMMUNITY

Basis: Article XVI of the 1987 Constiutio

Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or non-
governmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the State to engage in matters
partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political character,
are not regarded as suits against the state.

1. Air Transportation Office (ATO) as an agency of the Government NOT performing a

purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the
management of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of
the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, ATO had no claim to the States immunity
from suit.

2. PNCC being a private business entity is not immune from suit. Although the majority
or controlling shares of the PNCC belonged to the Government, the PNCC was
essentially a private corporation due to its having been created in accordance with the
Corporation Code, the general corporation statute. Consequently, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity had no application to the PNCC.

3. Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) and DPWH are immune from suit. They performed
purely government or public functions. As such, they were invested with the inherent
power of sovereignty. Being UNINCORPORATED AGENCIES of the National
Government, they could not be sued as such.

4. The mantle of the States immunity from suit did NOT extend to the National Housing
Authority (NHA), despite its being a GOCC. Under Section 6(i) of PD No. 757 which
was its charter, the NHA could sue and be sued. As such, the NHA was not immune
from the suit of Roxas.

However, the State, although it gives its consent to be sued either by general or special law,
may limit the claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution.
In other words, the power of the court ends when the judgment is rendered because
government funds and property may NOT be seized pursuant to writs of execution or writs of
garnishment to satisfy such judgments.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

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The COMELEC has neither the authority nor license to expand, extend or add anything to the law it
seeks to implement. This invalid rule, regulation or part thereof cannot be a valid source of any right,
obligation or power.

The administrative IRR was not within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature. Sec. 8 of R.A. No.
7941 is clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of the right to change its nominees or to
alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, subject to certain exceptions.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

APPOINTMENTS

1. Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or
Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

Issue: Whether Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution prohibiting the incumbent President to
appoint two months before the presidential elections covers the Judiciary.

Ruling: NO.
First: Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have
ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Second: It has no application to appointments in the Judiciary, because temporary or acting appointments
can only undermine the independence of the Judiciary due to their being revocable at will. The letter
and spirit of the Constitution safeguard that independence.

Third: The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive
Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department.

PROHIBITION OF MULTIPLE OFFICES

Sec. 13, Article VII of the 1987 Consitution: expressly prohibits the President, Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution

Exception:

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a. Vice President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet or acting as President in those
instances provided under the Constitution
b. Posts occupied by Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional
compensation in EX OFFICIO CAPACITIES as provided by law and required by the primary
functions of the officials offices
i. Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently
with his position of Acting Solicitor General, violates the constitutional prohibition against dual or
multiple offices for the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants?

Ruling: Yes.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting
Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra,
whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any
other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution
has not otherwise so provided.

It was of no moment that Agras designation was in an acting or temporary capacity because the
Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition
against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary.

EX OFFICIO CAPACITY

1. The term ex officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from
official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather
annexed to the official position."
2. An ex officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office,
and without further warrant or appointment.
3. The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it
follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services
in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the
compensation attached to his principal office.

JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL

1. Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of
nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint one
of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy.

2. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs, because
that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the
appointment

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FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

The enactments of the Legislature decreed that the money to be paid to the landowner as just compensation
for the taking of his land is to be taken only from the Agrarian Reform Fund.

1. Land Banks liability under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) was to be
satisfied only from the Agrarian Reform Fund (ARF).
2. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9700 which amended the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) expressly provided that all just compensation payments to landowners, including
execution of judgments therefore, shall only be sourced from the Agrarian Reform Fund.
3. Consequently, the immediate and indiscriminate levy by the DARAB sheriffs of Land Banks
MERALCO shares, without first determining whether or not such assets formed part of the
ARF, disregarded Land Banks proprietary rights in its own funds and properties.

EMINENT DOMAIN

The taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or
appropriation. Since the nature of an easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use, full
compensation is warranted.

1. The fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion (tunnel), it is liable to pay not
merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land.
2. Due to the need to construct the underground tunnel, NPC should have first moved to acquire the
land from the Heirs of Macabangkit either by voluntary tender to purchase or through formal
expropriation proceedings. In either case, NPC would have been liable to pay to the owners the
fair market value of the land, for Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395 expressly requires such
payment.

JUST COMPENSATION

1. The just compensation for Lot 1406-B must be based on value of property prevailing in 1993,
the year the parties entered into the Compromise Agreement and thereby agreed that the just
compensation for Lot 1406-B was Lot 434, not at the time of the filing of its expropriation
complaint.
2. By agreeing to a land swap in 1993 in the ill- fated compromise agreement, PEZA had impliedly
agreed to paying just compensation using the market values in 1993.

INTEREST IN JUST COMPENSATION

1. Interest is a part of just compensation only when the payment to the owner was delayed.
2. In this case, Land Bank did not incur delay in the payment of the just compensation. When AFC
and HPI rejected the initial valuation of Land Bank, the latter promptly opened deposit accounts

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in their names and credited amounts equivalent to their valuations, which both of them
withdrew.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Constitutional Basis: Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution complements the States policy of
full disclosure in all transactions involving public interest expressed in Section 28 of Article II of the
1987 Constitution.

1. Two requisites must concur before the right to information may be compelled by writ of
mandamus:
1. The information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or public
interest.
2. It must not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
2. The Supreme Court (SC) has already declared that the constitutional guarantee of the peoples right to
information does not cover national security matters and intelligence information, trade secrets and
banking transactions and criminal matters.
3. The right to information does not extend to matters acknowledged as privileged information
under the separation of powers, which include Presidential conversations, correspondences or
discussion during closed-door Cabinet meetings.
4. The information withheld was within the scope of the exemption from disclosure because the
CTRM ( Committee on Trade and Related Matters) meetings were directly related to the
exercise of the sovereign prerogative of the President as the Head of Sate in the conduct of
foreign affairs and the regulation of trade.

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

The next-in-rank status of a government employee is not a guarantee to ones fitness to the position aspired for,
and the applicant must go through the rigors of a screening and selection process as determined and conducted by a
department or agency, subject only to the standards and guidelines set by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). This
is in keeping with the ideal of promoting through merit rather than entitlement, and thus ensuring that government
service is rewarded with the best fit.

1. Each agency or department is empowered to formulate its own screening process subject
to the standards and guidelines set by the CSC. The appointing authority exercised the
right of choice, freely exercising its best judgment, in determining the best-qualified
applicants from those who had the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.

2. The three salary grade limitation should not be the sole basis for the disapproval of an
appointment but should be taken as an indicator of possible abuse of discretion in the
appointment process.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

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OMBUDSMAN

1. The Office of the Ombudsman is vested with the sole power to investigate and prosecute, motu
proprio or on complaint of any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office, or agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
The Ombudsmans power to investigate and to prosecute is plenary and unqualified.
2. The Congress has vested in the Ombudsman broad powers to enable the Ombudsman to
implement her own actions. Moreover, the Constitution vests in the Office of the Ombudsman
the authority and duty to promulgate rules of procedure. Among such rules of procedure was
Administrative Order No. 07, dated April 10, 1990, as amended, clothing the investigating
officer with the authority and the duty to dismiss outright a complaint for want of palpable merit.

ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH

Two concurring elements to be present before assets or properties were considered as ill-gotten wealth,
namely: (a) they must have originated from the government itself, and (b) they must have been taken by
former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates by illegal means.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE

Misconduct in office, by is such misconduct that affects his performance of his duties as an officer and
not such only as affects his character as a private individual.

1. Misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of

behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected
with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct,
as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.
2. To warrant removal from office, it must have direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or wilLful, intentional
neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office.
a. The act of handing over the letter to Caretero did not constitute grave misconduct
because the act did not show or indicate the elements of corruption, or the clear intent
to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule.
b. A government employee who has pointed a gun with his co-worker with the clear intention to
harm the latter and subsequently found guilty of grave misconduct which arose from the same
event may be dismissed from the service even upon the first offense

PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION

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PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PENDING INVESTIGATION

1. Under Section 51, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the imposition of preventive suspension
by the proper disciplining authority is authorized provided the charge involves
a. dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or
b. if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would
warrant his removal from the service
2. Two Requisites of a valid order of preventive suspension pending investigation:

(1) that the proper disciplining authority has served a formal charge to the affected
officer or employee; and

(2) that the charge involves either dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, neglect in
the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty
of the charges which would warrant her removal from the service.

3. Preventing the subordinate officer or employee from influencing the witnesses and tampering
the documentary evidence under her custody are mere purposes, not requisites, for which an
order of preventive suspension may issue.

4. An employee who is placed under preventive suspension is not a penalty but only a means of
enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation.

PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PENDING APPEAL

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REASSIGNMENT

The reassignment of the petitioner was a personnel and Civil Service matter to be properly
addressed in accordance with the rules and guidelines prescribed by the CSC. Her resort to judicial
intervention could not take the place of the grievance procedure then available to her. Her having
shrouded her complaint in the RTC with language that presented a legal issue against the assailed office
order of Merto did not excuse her premature resort to judicial action.

TRANSFER OR DETAIL

Obviously, the movement involving Causing did not equate to either a transfer or a detail within the contemplation
of the law if Mayor Biron only thereby physically transferred her office area from its old location to the Office of
the Mayor "some little steps" away. We cannot accept the petitioners argument, therefore, that the phrase "any
transfer or detail whatsoever" encompassed "any and all kinds and manner of personnel movement," including the
mere change in office location.

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PROHIBITIONS OF APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS

Constitutional Basis:

Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which bans any appointive official from holding
any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary
functions of his position.

The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official to hold
more than one office only if "allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. There is no legal
objection to a government official occupying two government offices and performing the functions of
both as long as there is no incompatibility. The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists
between two offices was whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has
the right to interfere with the other.

DE FACTO OFFICER

1. A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to
appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face.
2. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of
authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or
informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.
3. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de
jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.
4. A de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the
duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an
appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office.

Agra was a de facto officer during his tenure as Acting Secretary of Justice. During their tenure in the
questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to
emoluments for actual services rendered.

ELECTION LAWS

REMEDIES TO PREVENT A CANDIDATE FROM RUNNING IN AN ELECTORAL RACE

PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION

1. A petition for disqualification, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of

the LGC.
2. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a
candidate.

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PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE OR TO CANCEL HIS CERTIFCATE OF

CANDIDACY

1. the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as
a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
2. The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is based on a finding that the candidate
made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of
the public office he/she is running for.
3. It has been emphasized that in addition to materiality there must be a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinformation, or hide a fact that would otherwise render the candidate ineligible.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

1. The First Division of COMELEC should NOT have conducted the assailed recount proceedings
because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which no existing rule of procedure
allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance.

2. The recount proceedings authorized, as amended, are to be conducted by the COMELEC Divisions
only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests involving
elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city officials.
3. Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, although confers on the Court the power to review
any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of
the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory
order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.

PROHIBITION DURING THE PERIOD OF THE ELECTIONS

1. What is prohibited by law is the release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds for any and
all kinds of public works.
2. Public works is defined as fixed works constructed for public use or enjoyment especially when
financed and owned by the government.
3. The purchase of the lots purportedly to be utilized as cemetery by the City Government of
Tuguegarao cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered as public works, hence it could
not fall within the proscription as mandated under the aforementioned section of the Omnibus
Election Code.

PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY

1. A pre-proclamation controversy, refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings

of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political
party or coalition of parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter in

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relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election
returns.
2. Omnibus Election Code enumerates the scope of a pre-proclamation controversy. The
enumeration is restrictive and exclusive.
3. Resultantly, the petition for a pre-proclamation controversy must fail in the absence of any clear
showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are i
a. Incomplete or contain material defects
b. Appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress
c. Contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference of which
affects the result of the election
4. In a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC is restricted to an examination of the election
returns and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind the election returns and to investigate
election irregularities.

DOCTRINE OF STATISTICAL IMPROBABILITY

1. It is applied only where the unique uniformity of tally of all the votes cast in favor of all the
candidates belonging to one party and the systematic blanking of all the candidates of all the
opposing parties appear in the election return.
2. The doctrine has no application where there is neither uniformity of tallies nor systematic
blanking of the candidates of one party.
3. Thus, the bare fact that a candidate for public office received no votes in one or two precincts,
standing alone and without more, cannot adequately support a finding that the subject election
returns are statistically improbable.
4.

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

COMMISSION ON AUDIT

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