People of the Philippines Vs.

Michael Palanay y Minister

G.R. No. 224583. February 1, 2017

Facts:

The evening of August 30, 2010, AAA was sleeping in her room when she was
suddenly awakened by someone removing her short pants and panty. She
awoke to find accused Palanay, her uncle and brother of her mother, lying
beside her and removing his own short pants. Thereafter, he kissed AAA' s lips,
touched her breasts, and inserted his penis into her vagina. After satisfying his
bestial desires, Palanay slept by AAA's side. AAA put her clothes on, went to
the comfort room, and cried in silence. By early morning, AAA went to the
house of her elder sister, BBB, and narrated her tragic experience. Upon
learning of the incident, BBB went to her elder sister, CCC, to relay what
happened to AAA.

On appeal, Palanay makes much of her failure to offer resistance to his

advances to discount the occurrence of rape to discredit AAA.

Issue:

Whether lack of resistance from the victim may be used as a defense in rape.

Held:

No.

The assertion of lack of resistance on the part of AAA is utterly trivial in nature
and does not affect the merits of the case. It bears to stress that in rape cases,
the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance
because it is not an element of rape.
People of the Philippines Vs. Romeo D. Calinawan

G.R. No. 226145. Feburary 13, 2017

Facts:

At around midnight on September 26, 2007, Marigor Silan (Marigor), Janice's

seven (7)-year old daughter, saw Calinawan stabbing her mother in their
kitchen. Thereafter, Calinawan quickly fled the scene. Meanwhile, Jonathan
Nevado (Jonathan), Janice's brother and neighbor, was awakened by shouts
coming from his sister's house. He rushed to her house and saw her children
crying. After bringing her children to his house, he went looking for Janice
whom he saw outside a neighbor's house pleading for help. Seeing her bloodied,
he carried her and asked her who stabbed her, and she answered it was
Calinawan who did it. Then, Jonathan brought Janice to the hospital. When
Darwin Silan, Janice's husband, arrived at the hospital, he also asked her who
stabbed her and she reiterated that it was Calinawan. After three (3) days,
Janice died in spite of the medical treatment at the hospital.

Calinawan argues that Marigor's identification of him was unreliable because

she admitted she never saw the face of her assailant as it was covered by a
black hood and that she closed her eyes during the commotion. He claims that
treachery was not established and that the trial court merely made a general
assumption that the victim was defenseless because it was night time. He
insists that there was no evidence to show that he consciously and deliberately
adopted the means, method or form of attack.

Issues:

(1) Whether Calinawan was positively identified as the assailant.

(2) Whether the killing of Janice was attended with treachery.

Held:

(1) Yes.

In People v. Caliso, the Court explained that in criminal prosecution, the

identity of the accused must be established with moral certainty, but this did
not necessarily require that the witness must have seen the face of the accused.

It suffices that the witness recognized the accused through identifying marks
which would make the latter unmistakably stand out from other individuals. In
the case at bench, Marigor's family and Calinawan had been neighbors for a
long time. Hence, she was very familiar with the latter's unique physical
characteristics, particularly his amputated fingers. Through this distinct
physical feature of Calinawan, Marigor was able to identify him in open court
as the one who stabbed her mother. Thus, her identification of him was
credible, even if she was not able to clearly see his face, but saw the notable
feature of his hand, which set him apart from others.

(2) No.

Other than Marigor's first-hand account, no other witness actually saw the
stabbing incident. Obviously, her narration of the events that unfolded was
crucial in determining how the killing was perpetrated because she was the
only one who actually saw its execution. Her testimony, however, was lacking
in details; thus, it is insufficient to conclude that the killing was attended with
treachery.

Absent clear and convincing evidence on how the attack was perpetrated, the
conclusion that there was treachery is nothing more but an assumption. It is
unfortunate that the particular means, manner or method of attack was never
clearly illustrated in her testimony leaving the evidence for murder wanting.
Medel Arnaldo B. Belen Vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 211120. February 13, 2017

Facts:

Petitioner filed a case of estafa against his uncle. In order to afford himself the
opportunity to fully present his cause, petitioner requested for a clarificatory
hearing. Without acting on the request, ACP Sufiega-Lagman dismissed
petitioner's complaint in a Resolution dated July 28, 2004. Aggrieved by the
dismissal of his complaint, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (for
Reconsideration & Disqualify), the contents of which became the subject of this
libel case.

On the absence of the element of publication, petitioner contends that in

serving and filing the Omnibus Motion enclosed in sealed envelopes, he did not
intend to expose it to third persons, but only complied with the law on how
service and filing of pleadings should be done. He asserts that the perusal of
the said motion by Michael, the duly authorized representative and son of the
respondent in the estafa case, as well as the two staff of the OCP -Flores and
Enseo -did not constitute publication within the meaning of the law on libel
because they cannot be considered as "third persons to whom copies of the
motion were disseminated." With respect to Flores and Enseo, petitioner insists
that they were both legal recipients as personnel in the OCP where the motion
was addressed and had to be filed. Stating that the absence of publication
negates malice, petitioner posits that he could not have intended to injure the
reputation of ACP Sufiega-Lagman with the filing of the Omnibus Motion since
it was never published, but was sent to its legal recipients.

Issues:

(1) Whether defamatory matters contained in the Omnibus motion is

considered published.
(2) Whether there is publication when defamatory matters are
communicated to an agent of the defamed person.
(3) Whether there is publication as to Flores and Enseo.

Held:

(1) Yes.

Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been
written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written.
A communication of the defamatory matter to the person defamed alone cannot
injure his reputation though it may wound his self-esteem, for a man's
reputation is not the good opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in
which other hold him. In the same vein, a defamatory letter contained in a
closed envelope addressed to another constitutes sufficient publication if the
offender parted with its possession in such a way that it can be read by person
other than the offended party. If a sender of a libelous communication knows
or has good reasons to believe that it will be intercepted before reaching the
person defamed, there is sufficient publication. The publication of a libel,
however, should not be presumed from the fact that the immediate control
thereof is parted with unless it appears that there is reasonable probability that
it is hereby exposed to be read or seen by third persons.

Then being a lawyer, petitioner is well aware that such motion is not a mere
private communication, but forms part of public record when filed with the
government office.

(2) No.

The requirement of publication of defamatory matters is not satisfied by a

communication of such matters to an agent of the defamed person. In this case,
however, the defamatory statement was published when copy of the Omnibus
Motion was furnished to and read by Michael, the son and representative of
respondent Nezer in the estafa complaint, who is clearly not an agent of the
defamed person, ACP Sufiega-Lagman.

(3) Yes.

Petitioner then argues that there is no publication as to Flores and Enseo, the
staff of the OCP of San Pablo City, who had read the contents of the Omnibus
Motion. In support thereof, he cites the settled rule that "when a public officer,
in the discharge of his or her official duties, sends a communication to another
officer or to a body of officers, who have a duty to perform with respect to the
subject matter of the communication, such communication does not amount to
publication." Petitioner's argument is untenable. As mere members of the
administrative staff of the OCP of San Pablo City, Flores and Enseo cannot be
said to have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of his motion,
which is to seek reconsideration of the dismissal of his Estafa complaint and to
disqualify ACP Sufiega-Lagman from the preliminary investigation of the case.
Their legal duty pertains only to the clerical procedure of transmitting the
motions filed with the OCP of San Pablo City to the proper recipients.
People of the Philippines Vs. Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez

G.R. No. 212193. February 15, 2017

Facts:

"AAA," 24 at the time, testified that at around 9:30 p.m. of September 29, 2008,
she was having a drinking session with appellant and Meneses in the house of
appellant. After some time, she felt dizzy so she took a nap. At around 11:00
p.m., she was roused from her sleep by Meneses who was mounting her and
inserting his penis into her vagina. She felt pain but could only cry in silence
for fear that the knife which they used to cut hotdog and now lying on top of a
table nearby would be used to kill her if she resisted. Meneses left after raping
her. While still feeling dizzy, afraid and shivering, appellant approached her
and asked if he could also have sex with her. When she did not reply appellant
mounted and raped her. Appellant stopped only when she tried to
reposition her body. "AAA" then left appellant's house and immediately
returned to the house she shared with her live-in partner.

Issue:

When should resistance be made?

Held:

No. The prosecution failed to prove force, threat, or intimidation as an element

of rape.

Even assuming in the nil possibility that Meneses was able to force or instill
fear in "AAA's" mind, it should be noted that he was already gone when
appellant asked "AAA" for a sexual favor. In other words, the source of the
feigned force, threat or intimidation was no longer present when appellant
casually asked his friend, "AAA," if she "can do it" one more time. "AAA" did not
respond either in the affirmative or in the negative.

Resistance Should be Made Before the Rape is Consummated.

"AAA" could have resisted right from the start.

"AAA's" degree of dizziness or "shivering" was not that grave as she portrays it
to be. "AAA" is used to consuming liquor. And if it is true that the gravity of her
"shivering" at that time rendered her immobile such that she could not move
her head to signal her rejection of appellant's indecent proposal or to whisper
to him her refusal, then she would have been likewise unable to stand up and
walk home immediately after the alleged rape.
People of the Philippines Vs. Salim Ismael y Radang

G.R. No. 208093. February 20, 2017

Facts:

A buy-bust operation was conducted by the Culianan Police. It was then agreed
that SPO1 Santiago would act as poseur buyer with SPO1 Rodriguez as back-
up.

An exchange was made between SPO1 Santiago and the accused. Upon seeing
the exchange, SPO1 Rodriguez arrested appellant[.] SPO1 Rodriguez made a
precautionary search of appellant's body for any concealed weapon, and found
none. Instead, SPO1 Rodriguez found, tucked inside [appellant's left front
pocket the P100.00] marked money and two (2) more plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance wrapped in a golden cigarette paper.

The police officers then brought appellant to the Culianan Police Station [in
Zamboanga City] with SPO1 Santiago keeping personal custody of the items
confiscated from [him]. At the [police] station, the plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance subject of the buy-bust operation, the two (2)
plastic sachets also containing white crystalline substance[, and the P100.00]
marked money bearing Serial No. M419145 recovered from appellant's left
pocket, were respectively turned over by SPO1 Santiago and SPO1 Rodriguez to
the Desk Officer, PO3 Floro Napalcruz [PO3 Napalcruz], who likewise turned
[these over] to the Duty Investigator, [PO2 Tan]. PO2 Tan then placed his initial
"RDT on the items recovered from appellant.

Issue:

Whether the chain of custody was complied with.

Held:

No.

Aside from the failure to mark the seized drugs immediately upon arrest, the
arresting officers also failed to show that the marking of the seized drugs was
done in the presence of the appellant. This requirement must not be brushed
aside as a mere technicality. It must be shown that the marking was done in
the presence of the accused to assure that the identity and integrity of the
drugs were properly preserved. Failure to comply with this requirement is fatal
to the prosecution's case.
People of the Philippines Vs. Adalton Arce y Camargo

G.R. No. 217979. February 22, 2017

Facts:

A buy-bust operation conducted by the PNP resulted in the arrest of Lintag and
the seizure of seven (7) matchboxes containing Marijuana.

Issue:

Whether there is compliance with the rule on the preservation of the integrity of
the confiscated items.

Held:

Yes.

The records also reveal that there was compliance with the rule on the
preservation of the integrity of the confiscated items allegedly sold and
possessed by accused-appellant. PO1 Maquinta testified that he had placed the
markings on the confiscated items; had made an inventory; and had taken
pictures of these items right after the arrests and in the presence of the
representatives of the media, the DOJ, PDEA, and a barangay official. On the
same day, he forwarded these items, along with the letter-request signed by
Police Chief Inspector (PCI) Errol Texon Garchitorena, Jr., to PCI Josephine
Suico Llena, forensic chemist of the crime laboratory. The items were received
and examined by the latter who kept them in the crime laboratory until the test
result, together with the items, was submitted to the court.
People of the Philippines Vs. Rodrigo Macaspac y Isip

G.R. No. 198954. February 22, 2017

Facts:

At around 8:00 in the evening of July 7, 1988, Macaspac was having drinks
with Ricardo Surban, Dionisio Barcomo alias Boy, Jimmy Reyes, and Jebulan
on Pangako Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In the course of their an
argument ensued between Macaspac and Jebulan. It became so heated that,
Macaspac uttered to the group: Hintayin nyo ako d'yan, wawalisin ko kayo,
and then left. After around three minutes Macaspac returned wielding a
kitchen knife. He confronted and taunted Jebulan, saying: Ano? Jebulan
simply replied: Tama na. At that point, Macaspac suddenly stabbed Jebulan on
the lower right area of his chest, and ran away. Surban and the others
witnessed the stabbing of Jebulan. The badly wounded Jebulan was rushed to
the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.

Issue:

Whether treachery and evident premeditation should be appreciated.

Held:

When the accused was alerted to the impending lethal attack due to the
preceding heated argument between him and the accused, with the latter even
uttering threats against the former, treachery cannot be appreciated as an
attendant circumstance. When the resolve to commit the crime was
immediately followed its execution, evident premeditation cannot be
appreciated. Hence, the crime is homicide, not murder.
Aquilina B. Granada, et al. Vs. People of the Philippines/Venancio R. Nava
Vs. The Honorable Justices Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada, et al./Jesusa
Dela Cruz Vs. People of the Philippines/Aquilina B. Granada Vs. People of
the Philippines/Susana B. Cabahug Vs. People of the Philippines and
Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 184092/G.R. No. 186084/G.R. No. 186272/G.R. No. 186488/G.R. No.
186570. February 22, 2017

Facts:

The Special Audit Report disclosed that the various school forms and
construction materials purchased by the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports, now Department of Education, Division Office of Davao for the
Elementary School Building Program were priced above the prevailing market
prices, leading to a loss of P613,755.36 due to overpricing. The auditors
recommended the refund of the excess amount, and the filing of a criminal or
administrative action against the public officials who participated in the
transactions.

Issues:

(1) Whether the prosecution sufficiently proved conspiracy.

(2) Whether private persons may be held liable as conspirators with public
officers.

Held:

(1) Yes.

The series of acts of the accused in signing all the documents to effect the
release of the funds for the purchase of construction supplies and materials
spelled nothing but conspiracy. The signatures of all the accused appearing in
the documents indicate accused's common design in achieving their one goal to
the damage and prejudice of the government.

(2) Yes.

Private persons acting in conspiracy with public officers may be indicted and if
found guilty, be held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 3019. This supports the "policy of the anti-graft law to repress
certain acts of public officers and private persons alike [which constitute] graft
or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto."
Ramon Amparo y Ibaez Vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 204990. February 22, 2017

Facts:

Ignacio testified that he was riding a jeepney when two (2) men boarded the
jeepney. One of them sat beside him, pointed a knife at him and declared a
hold-up. He was ordered to take his necklace off and hand over his mobile
phone.

A warning shot was fired by the police causing the robbers to be rattled and
drop their knives on the jeepney bench. Four (4) men, later identified as
Alcubar, Guarino, Salmeo, and Amparo, were arrested.

Ignacio identified Alcubar as the man who poked a knife at him, and Guarino
as the one who announced the hold-up. He also identified Salmeo and Amparo
as the ones who sat in the front seat beside the driver. He admitted that he did
not know what Salmeo and Amparo were doing at the time of the incident.
However, he testified that he saw them place their knives on the jeepney bench
when the police fired the warning shot.

Issue:

Whether the crime of robbery with a band was committed.

Held:

Yes.

Even if the crime is committed by several malefactors in a motor vehicle on a

public highway, the crime is still classified as robbery in band, not highway
robbery or brigandage under Presidential Decree No. 532. It is highway robbery
only when it can be proven that the malefactors primarily organized themselves
for the purpose of committing that crime.

In this instance, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that petitioner was guilty of robbery in band.
Anita Capulong Vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 199907. February 27, 2017

Facts:

De Guzman, who was a relative and neighbor of the Spouses Capulong,

testified that, on August 7, 1990, the accused obtained from her an amount of
P700,000.00. As stipulated in the Promissory Note, the spouses would pay by
June 7, 1991. As a security for the loan, the Spouses Capulong executed a
Chattel Mortgage with Power of Attorney over their ten-wheeler Isuzu cargo
truck, the original Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration (OR-CR) of
which were likewise delivered to De Guzman. On December 10, 1990, Anita
requested to borrow the OR-CR for a week, excusing that she would apply for
the amendment of the registration certificate to increase the weight or load
capacity of the truck and show it to a prospective buyer. De Guzman was
hesitant at first since the chattel mortgage was not yet registered, but she later
on acceded. She gave the OR-CR in Cabanatuan City, where the same were
being kept in a bank's safety deposit box. As proof of receipt, Anita issued a
handwritten note. Despite the expiration of the one-week period and De
Guzman's repeated demands, the documents were not returned by Anita who
countered that the loaned amount was already paid.

Issue:

Whether Anita committed the crime of estafa.

Held:

Estafa may be committed by any person who shall defraud another by

removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any court record, office
files, document or any other papers.

In this case, Anita contends that there is no competent proof that she actually
removed, concealed or destroyed any of the papers contemplated in Article 315,
paragraph 3 (c) of the RPC. Allegedly, pursuant to Tan Jenjua, Kilayko, and
Dizon, the document removed, concealed or destroyed must contain evidence of
indebtedness so as to cause prejudice, and the OR-CR are not of this nature.

Contrary to Anita's supposition, neither Article 315, paragraph 3 (c) of the RPC
nor Article 535, paragraph 9 of the old penal code requires that the documents
or papers are evidence of indebtedness. Notably, while the old provision broadly
covered "any process, record, document, or any other paper of any character
whatsoever," the new provision refers to "documents or any other papers."
Indeed, there is no limitation that the penal provision applies only to
documents or papers that are evidence of indebtedness.
Norma C. Gamaro and Josephine G. Umali Vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 211917. February 27, 2017

Facts:

Fineza entrusted petitioner Gamaro with the pieces of jewelry amounting to

P2,292,5 l9.00 on the condition that the same will be sold for profit. Petitioner
Gamaro was under obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sale to Fineza.
However, instead of complying with the obligation, she pawned the pieces of
jewelry to M. Lhuillier Pawnshop where petitioner Umali worked as Branch
Manager and kept the proceeds thereof to the damage and prejudice of Fineza.

Issue:

Whether Gamaro is committed the crime of estafa.

Held:

Yes.

The accused is liable for estafa committed by misappropriating or converting to

the prejudice of another money, goods, or any other personal property received
by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same,
even though that obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by
denying having received such money, goods, or other property.