Limbona vs. Mangelin autonomous governments or regions.

What is the extent of self-government

GR No. 80391 28 February 1989 given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?

Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or

Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when
Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao
the central government delegates administrative powers to political
(Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam,
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At
Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly
the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing
of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials.
local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members
President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that
through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November
local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their
as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress.
acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner
political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be
prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further
own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly
authorities.
expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue
that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category
members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved
[CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic
within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit
act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy."
that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution.
On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we
noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the
Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the
President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang
Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are,
debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the
internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our
jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes
unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential
Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us
that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense
(decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that
"[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over
Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make
an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we
review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
This case involves the application of a most
important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have
to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized
power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales
must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions
were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian
Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of
the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the
respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at
the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether
or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the
Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a
plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid
recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his
attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the
sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the
circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the
"recess" called on the ground of good faith.
ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS AND
DEVELOPMENT, INC., VS. ZAMORA
G.R. No. 144256
Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Automatic release of IRA
Facts:
Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the Pres to submit to
Congress a budget of expenditures within 30 days before the opening of
every regular session, submitted the National Expenditures program for FY
2000. The President proposed an IRA of P121,778,000,000. This became
RA 8760, AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM
JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES also known as General Appropriations Act (GAA)
for the Year 2000. It provides under the heading ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS that the IRA for local government units shall amount
to P111,778,000,000.
In another part of the GAA, under the heading UNPROGRAMMED FUND,
it is provided that an amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the
P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to fund the IRA, which
amount shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted
by the President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly
assessment to be conducted by certain committees which the GAA specifies,
namely, the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the Committee
on Finance of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed
Fund, it appropriates a separate amount of P10 Billion of IRA under the
classification of Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount to be released only
upon the occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA.
On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with 3 barangay
officials filed with this Court the petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus With Application for Temporary Restraining Order, against
respondents then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno, then National
Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and the Commission on Audit,
challenging the constitutionality of provision XXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS) referred to by petitioners as Section 1,
XXXVII (A), and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED FUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4
of the GAA (the GAA provisions)
Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy by
unlawfully reducing the IRA allotted by 10B and by withholding its release by
placing the same under Unprogrammed funds. Although the effectivity of
the Year 2000 GAA has ceased, this Court shall nonetheless proceed to
resolve the issues raised in the present case, it being impressed with public
interest. Petitioners argue that the GAA violated the constitutional mandate
of automatically releasing the IRAs when it made its release contingent on
whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally
submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic.
ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not
automatically releasing the whole amount of the allotted IRA.
HELD:
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined
by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this constitutional mandate when it
made the release of IRA contingent on whether revenue collections could
meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than
making the release automatic. Respondents counterargue that the above
constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but to the
executive, hence, the same does not prevent the legislature from imposing
conditions upon the release of the IRA.
Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely
prevents the executive branch of the government from unilaterally
withholding the IRA, but not the legislature from authorizing the executive
branch to withhold the same. In the words of respondents, This essentially
means that the President or any member of the Executive Department
cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of statute, withhold the release of
the IRA.
As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release
the just share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the
legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the executive from performing
this duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional
provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing of statute, is
virtually to make the Constitution amendable by statute a proposition which
is patently absurd. If indeed the framers intended to allow the enactment of
statutes making the release of IRA conditional instead of automatic, then
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would have been worded differently.
Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of
local governments is qualified by the words as determined by law, and not
the release thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is not authorized by
the Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA.
In another case, the Court held that the only possible exception to mandatory
automatic release of the IRA is, as held in Batangas:
if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less
than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which
case what should be automatically released shall be a proportionate amount
of the collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may even be
made on a quarterly basis depending on the actual collections of national
internal revenue taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal year.
This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions by Congress
was motivated by the laudable intent to lower the budget deficit in line with
prudent fiscal management. The pronouncement in Pimentel, however,
must be echoed: [T]he rule of law requires that even the best intentions
must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law.
Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions
1 and 4 of the Year 2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar
as they set apart a portion of the IRA, in the amount of P10 Billion, as part of
the UNPROGRAMMED FUND.
SEMA vs COMELEC
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the
province of Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City
voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two
legislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and
8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it
with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays.
Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff
Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the
municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of
Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the
1st district is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it
later amended this stating that status quo should be retained; however, just
for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive
declaration from Congress as to Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or
part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of
S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that
Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes
therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival
Dilangalen was from there and D was winning in fact he won). She
contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S.
Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and
since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect Cotabato is being
deprived of a representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that
regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not
affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM
can create validly LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is
governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
 established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city,
municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the
creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local
Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political
units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in
the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative
bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its
plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies
the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards
and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact,
Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal
councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to
compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and
the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence,
ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at
least 250k, and that a province, once created, should have at least one
representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative
district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City
did not meet the population requirement so Semas contention is untenable.
On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S.
Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be
legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in
Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and
provinces.
League of Cities v. Comelec
Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the
League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry
P. Treas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and
enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent
municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting
24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009
(RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section
450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to
P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words
of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into
cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment
despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th
Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the
P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th
Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate
for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint
Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood
bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the
16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood
bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except
that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills
lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the Presidents signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine
whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the
conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as
well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament
that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities
will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under
Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution,
and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the
present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA
9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five
years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the
criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any
other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local
government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear,
plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was
never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or
resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th
Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
The National Statistics Office certified that Dinagat Islands population
is 120,813. Its land area is 802.12 square kilometers and its average
annual income is P82,696,433.23, as certified by the Bureau of Local
Government Finance. On October 2, 2006, the President approved into
law R.A. 9355 creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. On December 3,
2006, the COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the
ratification of the creation of the province under the LGC which yielded
69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of
the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the
Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the
interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on
January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized
elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials
who assumed office on July 1, 2007.
Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G.
Navarro and other former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed
before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158)
challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 alleging that that the
creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate
an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of
Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal
Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. Is R.A. No.
9355 constitutional?
April 12, 2011 Ruling
Yes. In Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12,
2011), the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act No. 9355 is as
VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of
Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.
The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, The
land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands, is declared VALID.
According to the SC, with respect to the creation of barangays, land
area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the
creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3)
indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income,
population, and land area, are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created
consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area
requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the
LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a
component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of
the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC,
although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
xxx There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption
should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact,
considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is
a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the
land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities.It
is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was
expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for
component cities) of the LGC, but fellester.blogspot.com was inadvertently
omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was
expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended
to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to
reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to
uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
xxxConsistent with the declared policy to provide local government
units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land
area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally
construed in order to achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation
adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be
counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical.Picture
an intended province that consists of several municipalities and component
cities which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and
municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land
area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the
LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum land
area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several
islands. fellester.blogspot.com This would mean that Congress has opted to
assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area
over one composed of islands and negate the greater imperative of
development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of
basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more
difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province
is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as
compared to one with a contiguous land mass.
xxx What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability
of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot
become a province, taking into account its average annual income
of P82,696,433.23 at the time fellester.blogspot.com of its creation, as
certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times
more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a
province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven
possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite
and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which
cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be
seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a
province. (Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12,
2011)
MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
Posted by kaye lee on 12:46 PM
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999
FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago,
Isabela, into an independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was
approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was
enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of
Santiago from an independent component city to a component city.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision
to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper
plebiscite.
Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the
said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent
component city into a component city. It allegedly did not involve any
creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries
of local government units, therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is
unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of petitioners to file the
petition and argued that the petition raises a political question over which the
Court lacks jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.
RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the
jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political question but a
justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether or not a
law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.
That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528.
Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the
Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and
voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the conversion of
their city through a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus,
denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike down
the law as unconstitutional.

Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instru-mentality of the Government.