CHAPTER 3

EFFECT OF STATUTES
1. When the Constitution Becomes Effective

Alfredo M. de Leon v. Hon. Benjamin B. Esguerra, G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987
2. When Stature Becomes Effective

CIVIL CODE
ARTICLE 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the
Of cial Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines , unless it is otherwise provided.
(As amended by E.O. 200)

Administrative Code, Book 1, Chapter 5, Section 18

CHAPTER 5
Operation and Effect of Laws
SECTION 18. When Laws Take Effect . Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the comple-
tion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is
otherwise provided.
Administrative Code, Book 1, Chapter 6, Sections 24-25
CHAPTER 6
Official Gazette
SECTION 24. Contents. There shall be published in the Of ial c Gazette all legislative acts and resolutions
of a public nature; all executive and administrative issuances of general application; decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, or other courts of similar rank, as may be deemed
by the said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; such documents or classes of documents as
may be required so to be published by law; and such documents or classes of documents as the President
shall determine from time to time to have general application or which he may authorize so to be published.
The publication of any law, resolution or other of cial documents in the Of cial Gazette shall be pri-
ma facie evidence of its authority.
SECTION 25. Editing and Publications. The Official Gazette shall be edited in the Of ce of the President
and published weekly in Pilipino or in the English language. It shall be sold and distributed by the National
Printing Of ce which shall promptly mail copies thereof to subscribers free of postage.
Tanada v. Tuvera GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446)

Facts: On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all un-
published presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have
no binding force and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges. Petitioners move for
reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various questions. Solicitor General avers that the motion
is a request for ad-visory opinion. February Revolution took place, which subsequently required the new
Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court).

Issue: Whether publication is still required in light of the clause unless otherwise provided.

Held: The clause unless it is otherwise provided, in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effec-
tivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause
does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other
date, without its previous publication. The legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-
day peri-od shall be shortened or extended. Publication requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including
those of lo-cal application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by
the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the
purpose of enforcing or imple-menting existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to fill in the details of the Central Bank Act which
that body is supposed to enforce. Fur-ther, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.

Reasoning: The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon there-after as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union vs Judge Vega

G.R. No. 105364, 28 June 2001 [Effectivity and Application of Laws]

FACTS:

On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted R.A. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of Philippine Veterans
Bank. It was published in the Official Gazette in February 24, 1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the la-
bor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening the bank.

In May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite the late
mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, Judge Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings of the
bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication
in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.

RULING:

Yes. RA 7169 expressly provided that it should take effect upon its approval. Aquino signed it into law on
January 2, 1992. Thereafter, said law became effective on said date. Its subsequent publication was not nec-
essary for its effectivity. RA 7169 is of internal nature and not have general application thus it took effect on
the date provided for and hence was rightfully invoked by the petitioners. The Supreme Court upheld that
while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for
exceptions as indicated in the clause unless otherwise provided.
3. When Regulation Becomes Effective
Administrative Code, Book VII, Sections 2 9
BOOK VII
Administrative Procedure
CHAPTER 1
General Provisions
SECTION 2. Definitions. As used in this Book:
(1) "Agency" includes any department, bureau, office, commission, authority or officer of the National Gov-
ernment authorized by law or executive order to make rules, issue licenses, grant rights or privileges, and
adjudicate cases; research institutions with respect to licensing functions; government corporations with
respect to functions regulating private right, privileges, occupation or business; and officials in the exer-
cise of disciplinary power as provided by law.
(2) "Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or interprets a law, fixes
and describes the procedures in, or practice requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The
term includes memoranda or statements concerning the internal administration or management of an
agency not affecting the rights of, or procedure available to, the public.
(3) "Rate" means any charge to the public for a service open to all and upon the same terms, including indi-
vidual or joint rates, tolls, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilome-
terage and other special rates which shall be imposed by law or regulation to be observed and followed
by any person.
(4) "Rule making" means an agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
(5) "Contested case" means any proceeding, including licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges
asserted by specific parties as required by the Constitution or by law are to be determined after hearing.
(6) "Person" includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, public or private organization of
any character other than an agency.
(7) "Party" includes a person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of
right to be admitted as a party, in any agency proceeding; but nothing herein shall be construed to pre-
vent an agency from admitting any person or agency as a party for limited purposes.
(8) "Decision" means the whole or any part of the final disposition, not of an interlocutory character, wheth-
er affirmative, negative, or injunctive in form, of an agency in any matter, including licensing, rate fixing
and granting of rights and privileges.
(9) "Adjudication" means an agency process for the formulation of a final order.
(10) "License" includes the whole or any part of any agency permit, certificate, passport, clearance, approval,
registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission, or regulation of the ex-
ercise of a right or privilege.
(11) "Licensing" includes agency process involving the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annul-
ment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification or conditioning of a license.
(12) "Sanction" includes the whole or part of a prohibition, limitation or other condition affecting the liberty
of any person; the withholding of relief; theimposition of penalty or fine; the destruction, taking, seizure or
withholding of property; the assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation, cost,
charges or fees; the revocation or suspension of license; or the taking of other compulsory or restrictive ac-
tion.
(13) "Relief" includes the whole or part of any grant of money, assistance, license, authority, privilege, ex-
emption, exception, or remedy; recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption or exception;
or taking of any action upon the application or petition of any person.
(14) "Agency proceeding" means any agency process with respect to rule-making, adjudication and licensing.
(15) "Agency action" includes the whole or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or its
equivalent or denial thereof.
CHAPTER 2
Rules and Regulations
SECTION 3. Filing . (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3)
certifed copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not
filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any par-
ty or persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this
section under pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspec-
tion.
SECTION 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent
with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided
unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health,
safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The
agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by
them.
SECTION 5. Publication and Recording . The University of the Philippines Law Center shall:
(1) Publish a quarterly bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter; and
(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together with a com-
plete index and appropriate tables.
SECTION 6. Omission of Some Rules. (1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the
bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise
inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it,
and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies
thereof may be obtained.
(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law is punishable as a crime or
subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text.
SECTION 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. The University of the Philippines Law Center shall
furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the
Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codied
rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select,
and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs.
SECTION 8. Judicial Notice. The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed
or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules.
SECTION 9. Public Participation. (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable,
publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their
views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the xing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been pub-
lished in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

People vs. Que Po Lay, G.R. No. L-6791, March 29, 1954
FACTS:

The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US money orders
amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20.

Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after
the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.

Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular
No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of
P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become effective
and subject violators to corresponding penalties.

HELD:

It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of the Cen-
tral Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective.
This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a
law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of
such contents including its penalties.

Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio.
Lorenzo Taada vs Juan Tuvera (1985)

136 SCRA 27 Civil Law Preliminary Title Publication of Laws Presidential Proclamations

Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concerns as well as the principle that laws to
be valid and enforceable they must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,
Lorenzo Taada et al seek a writ of mandamus to compel Juan Tuvera (then executive secretary to President
Ferdinand) Marcos to publish and/or to cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various Presidential
Decrees (PDs), Letters of Instructions(LOIs), Proclamations(PPs), Executive Orders(EOs), and Administrative
Orders(AOs) issued by the then president.

ISSUE: Whether or not the various PDs et al must be published before they shall take effect.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not pre-
clude their publication in the Official Gazette as they constitute important legislative acts, particularly in the
present case where the president may on his own issue laws. The clear objective of this provision is to give
the public general adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct. With-
out such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis
non excusat. Publication is indispensable.

YAOKASIN V. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (1989)

FACTS:

On May 1988, the Philippine Coast Guard seized sacks of refined sugar, which were being unloaded from the M/V
Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs.

Petitioner presented a sales invoice to prove that the sugar was purchased locally. The District Collector of Customs,
Yutangco, however, proceeded with the seizure of the bags of sugar.

On June 1988, show-cause hearings with Yutangco, were conducted and was held in favor of petitioner.

Days later, the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Board (EIIB) filed a Motion for Reconsideration , for "further hear-
ing on the merits", based on evidence that the seized sugar was of foreign origin. The case was indorsed to Customs
Commisioner, Mison. Petitioner opposed the motion for being merely pro forma and/or that the same was, in effect, a
motion for new trial. Petitioner also applied for and secured a writ of replevin from the RTC.
On July 1988, Mison, reconsidered the June 1988 decision, now in favor of the government.

Petitioner now contendsthat the June 1988 decision became final and executory, in view of the absence of an appeal
therefrom by the "aggrieved party" (himself) within the 15-day period provided for in Sec. 2313 of the Tariff and Customs
Code
.
The Customs argue that since the June 1988 decision is adverse to the government, the case should go to Mison on au-
tomatic review, pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 20-87.

ISSUE: Whether the June 1983 decision became final and executory.

RULING:

NO. The memorandum order implements Section 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan (IRP) which provides that
where a decision of a Collector of Customs in such seizure and protest cases is adverse to the government, it shall auto-
matically be reviewed by the Commissioner of Customs which, if affirmed, shall automatically be elevated for final review
by the Secretary of Finance.
Section 12 of the IRP applies in this case. Section 12 of the IRP and Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code do not
conflict with each other. They may co-exist. Section 2313 of the Code provides for the procedure for the review of the
decision of a collector in seizure and protest cases upon appeal by the aggrieved party. On the other hand, Section 12 of
the IRP refers to the general procedure in appeals in seizure and protest cases with a special proviso on automatic re-
view when the collector's decision is adverse to the government. Section 2313 and the proviso in Section 12, although
they both relate to the review of seizure and protest cases, refer to two different situations when the collector's deci-
sion is adverse to the importer or owner of the goods, and when the decision is adverse to the government.
ISSUE:
Is the enforcement of the Sec. 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan and thereafter CMO No. 20-87 valid when these
laws have not been published in the Official Gazette?

DECISION:
Yes. CMO and Sec 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan is enforceable. The requirement of Art. 2 of the Civil Code
does not apply to CMO No. 20-87 since it is only an administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs to his subordi-
nates, namely the customs collectors. Also in the Commonwealth Act No. 638, which enumerates what shall be pub-
lished in the Official Gazette, states that administrative orders and proclamations shall be published except when these
have no general applicability. CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of the
Plan, is an issuance which is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons, hence no general applicability
therefore need not be published in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE:
Whether or not administrative issuances are considered laws which require publication in the
Official Gazette for their effectivity.
RULING:
It depends. Article 2 of the Civil Code, which requires laws to be published in the Official Gazette, does not apply to CMO
No. 20-87 which is only an administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates, the cus-
toms collectors.Commonwealth Act No. 638 (an Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official
Gazette) enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette besides legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the Congress of the Philippines. Executive and administrative orders and proclamations, shall also be pub-
lished in the Official Gazette, except such as have no general applicability. CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors of cus-
toms to comply strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance which is addressed only to particular persons or a class
of persons (the customs collectors). It need not be published, on the assumption that it has been circularized to all con-
cerned
Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579, 1 February 2012

FACTS:
November 7 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003 (Customs Memorandum Order).
Under the memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat is classified according to: 1. Importer or consignee, 2. Country of
origin, and 3. Port of discharge. Depending on these factors wheat would be classified as either as food grade or food
feed. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for food feed grade 7%. A month after the issuance of CMO
27-200 respondent filed a petition for declaratory for Relief with the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City.
Respondent contented that CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administra-
tive Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with University of the Philippines Law Can-
ter. Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without the benefit of
prior assessment and examination, despite having imported food grade wheat, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff up-
on the arrival of the shipment, forcing to pay 133%. Respondent also claimed that the equal protection clause of the
Constitution was violated and asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss. They alleged that: 1. The RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case, 2. an action for declaratory relief (Rule 63, Sec.1 who may file petition) was improper, 3. CMO 27-
2003 was internal administrative rule not legislative in nature, and 4. The claims of respondent were speculative and
premature, because the Bureau of Customs had yet to examine respondents products.
RTC held that a petition for declaratory relief was proper remedy, and that respondent was the proper party to
file it.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CMO 27-2003 of the petitioner met the requirements for the Revised Administrative Code? Whether
or not the content of the CMO 27-2003 met the requirement of the equal protection clause of the Constitution?

RULING:
No, they did not. The petitioners violated respondents right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003
when they failed to observe the requirements under the Administrative Code which are:
Sec 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of
every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectively of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months
from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party of persons.

Sec 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practica-
ble, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to sub-
mit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be
valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at
least 2 weeks before the first hearing thereon.(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases
shall be observed.

No. CMO 27-2003 did not meet these requirements. For a classification to be reasonable, it
must be shown that 1. it rests on substantial distinctions; 2. it is germane to the purpose of
the law; 3. it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4. it applies equally to all members
of the same class. Petitioners violated respondents right to equal protection of laws when
they provided for unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation. Petitioner
Commissioner of Customs went beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regula-
tion limited the powers of the customs officer to examine and assess imported articles.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Inc., G.R. No. 150947, 15 July 2003

FACTS: Revenue Memorandum Orders (RMOs) were issued imposing a 5% lending investors tax on pawn-
shop. Pursuant to this, the BIR issued an assessment against Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Inc. (hereafter
Lhuillier) demanding payment of deficiency percentage tax. Lhuillier filed an administrative protest, contend-
ing, inter alia, that pawnshops are different from lending investors, which are subject to the 5% percentage
tax under the specific provision of the Tax Code. Its protest having been unacted upon, Lhuillier with the CTA
which declared the RMOs in question null and void insofar as they classify pawnshops as lending investors
subject to 5% percentage tax.

ISSUE: Are pawnshops included in the term lending investors for the purpose of imposing the 5% percentage
tax under then Section 116 of the NIRC?

HELD: NO. While it is true that pawnshops are engaged in the business of lending money, they are not con-
sidered lending investors for the purpose of imposing the 5% percentage taxes since: (1) prior to its
amendment the NIRC, pawnshops and lending investors were subjected to different tax treatments; (2) Con-
gress never intended pawnshops to be treated in the same way as lending investors, since the amendment of
the NIRC treated both tax subjects differently (3) Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the
mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned, Sec. 116 subjects to percentage
tax dealers in securities and lending investors only.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RMOs in question are valid

HELD: NO. There are two kinds of administrative issuances: the legislative rule and the interpretative rule. A
legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof. An interpretative rule, on the other hand, is designed to provide guidelines to
the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its
bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When,
on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or
render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those
governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and
thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.[15]

RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 cannot be viewed simply as implementing rules or corrective measures
revoking in the process the previous rulings of past Commissioners. Specifically, they would have been
amendatory provisions applicable to pawnshops. Without these disputed CIR issuances, pawnshops would
not be liable to pay the 5% percentage tax, considering that they were not specifically included in Section 116
of the NIRC of 1977, as amended. In so doing, the CIR did not simply interpret the law. The due observance
of the requirements of notice, hearing, and publication should not have been ignored.
3. When Local Ordinance Takes Effect
Local Government Code, Sections 54 59
SECTION 54. Approval of Ordinances. (a) Every ordinance enacted by the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan shall be presented to the provincial governor or city or
municipal mayor, as the case may be. If the local chief executive concerned approves the same, he shall
af x his signature on each and every page thereof; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with
his objections to the sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The sanggunian concerned
may override the veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby
making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes.
(b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned to the sanggunian within fifteen
(15) days in the case of a province, and ten (10) days in the case of a city or a municipality; otherwise, the
ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he had signed it.
(c) Ordinances enacted by the sangguniang barangay shall, upon approval by the majority of all its members,
be signed by the punong barangay.
SECTION 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. (a) The local chief executive may veto any ordinance
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan on the ground that it is
ultra viresor prejudicial to the public welfare, stating his reasons therefor in writing.
(b) The local chief executive, except the punong barangay, shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a local development plan and
public investment program, or an ordinance directing the payment of money or creating liability. In such
a case, the veto shall not affect the item or items which are not objected to. The vetoed item or items
shall not take effect unless the sanggunian overrides the veto in the manner herein provided; otherwise,
the item or items in the appropriations ordinance of the previous year corresponding to those vetoed, if
any, shall be deemed reenacted.
(c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once. The sanggunian may override the
veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordi-
nance effective even without the approval of the local chief executive concerned.
SECTION 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang Pan-
lalawigan. (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan shall forward to the sangguniang panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordi-
nances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs for-
mulated by the local development councils. cdtai
(b) Within thirty (30) days after the receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the sangguniang
panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be
none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial prosecu-
tor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the sangguniang panlala-
wigan in writing of his comments or recommendations, which may be considered by the sangguniang
panlalawigan in making its decision.
(c) If the sangguniang panlalawigan nds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred
upon the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or
resolution invalid in whole or in part. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes
and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken. aisa dc
(d) If no action has been taken by the sangguniang panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of
such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.
SECTION 57. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. (a)
Within ten (10) days after its enactment, the sangguniang barangay shall furnish copies of all barangay ordi-
nances to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned for review as to whether the ordi-
nance is consistent with law and city or municipal ordinances.
(b) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, fails to take action on barangay
ordinances within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved.
(c) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, finds the barangay ordinances
inconsistent with law or city or municipal ordinances, the sanggunian concerned shall, within thirty (30) days
from receipt thereof, return the same with its comments and recommendations to the sangguniang
barangay concerned for adjustment, amendment, or modification; in which case, the effectivity of the
barangay ordinance is suspended until such time as the revision called for is effected.

SECTION 58. Enforcement of Disapproved Ordinances or Resolutions. Any attempt to enforce any ordi-
nance or any resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, after the
dis-approval thereof, shall be sufficient ground for the suspension or dismissal of the official or employee
con-cerned.

SECTION 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. (a) Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the
resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, the same shall take effect
after ten (10) days from the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial
capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and in at least two (2) other conspicuous plac-
es in the local government unit concerned.
(b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an ordinance or resolution in the
bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol and the city, municipal, or barangay hall in at least two
(2) conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned not later than five (5) days after approval
thereof.
The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or English and in
the language or dialect understood by the majority of the people in the local government unit concerned,
and the secretary to the sanggunian shall record such fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of
approval and posting.
(c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation
within the province where the local legislative body concerned belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of
general circulation within the province, posting of such ordinances shall be made in all municipalities and
cities of the province where the sanggunian of origin is situated.
(d) In the case of highly urbanized and independent component cities, the main features of the ordinance or
resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be published once in a local newspaper
of general circulation within the city: Provided, That in the absence thereof the ordinance or resolution shall
be published in any newspaper of general circulation.
 Municipality Of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 127820, 20 July 1998
FACTS: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution, the Municipality of Paraaque filed a Complaint for expro-
priation against V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed "for the
purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless
through a socialized housing project." The RTC issued an Order authorizing petitioner to take possession of
the subject property. VM Realty Corp filed its Answer alleging that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of
action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local
Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. The
Municipality then filed its opposition, stressing that the trial court's Order was in accord with RA 7160, and
that the principle of res judicata was not applicable.
The municipality contends the resolution "substantially complies with the requirements of the law" because
the terms "ordinance" and "resolution" are synonymous for "the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the lo-
cal government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exer-
cise of the power of eminent domain."
ISSUE: Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution
by its law-making body.
DECISION: No, an LGU cannot exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its law-
making body.
RATIONALE: The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may del-
egate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise
the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's con-
trol and restraints, imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations." In this case, Sec-
tion 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for
its exercise.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent do-
main:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the
LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor
and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution,
and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be ex-
propriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant
to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the
mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Paraaque, cannot authorize an expropriation of pri-
vate property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly and
clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the sentiment
or opinion of the Municipal Council will not suffice. On the other hand, the principle of res judicata does not
bar subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the same property when all the legal requirements for
its valid exercise are complied with.
Bagatsing v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 41631, 17 December 1976
Facts:
Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, "AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE OPERATION OF
PUBLIC MARKETS AND PRESCRIBING FEES FOR THE RENTALS OF STALLS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIO-
LATION THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." The petitioner City Mayor, Ramon D. Bagatsing, approved the
ordinance.

Respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. commenced a Civil Case before the CFI by respondent
Judge, seeking the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 for the reason that (a) the publication re-
quirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with; (b) the Market Com-
mittee was not given any participation in the enactment of the ordinance, as envisioned by Republic Act
6039; (c) Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has been violated; and (d) the ordinance
would violate Presidential Decree No. 7 of September 30, 1972 prescribing the collection of fees and charges
on livestock and animal products.

Private respondent also bewails that the market stall fees imposed in the disputed ordinance are diverted to
the exclusive private use of the Asiatic Integrated Corporation since the collection of said fees had been let
by the City of Manila to the said corporation in a "Management and Operating Contract."
Resolving the accompanying prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, respondent Judge is-
sued an order denying the plea for failure of the respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. to
exhaust the administrative remedies outlined in the Local Tax Code.

After due hearing on the merits, respondent Judge rendered another decision, declaring the nullity of Ordi-
nance No. 7522 of the City of Manila on the primary ground of non-compliance with the requirement of pub-
lication under the Revised City Charter.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the adverse decision, stressing that (a) only a post-publication is
required by the Local Tax Code; and (b) private respondent failed to exhaust all administrative remedies be-
fore instituting an action in court.

Respondent Judge denied the motion. Hence petitioners brought the matter to the Supreme Court through
the a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
What law shall govern the publication of a tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila, the Re-
vised City Charter (R.A. 409, as amended), which requires publication of the ordinance before its enactment
and after its approval, or the Local Tax Code (P.D. No. 231), which only demands publication after approval.
Held :

There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the
City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local govern-
ments. Blackstone defines general law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and special law as
one relating to particular persons or things of a class. And the rule commonly said is that a prior special law is
not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law. The fact that one is special and the other general cre-
ates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a
general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. However, the rule readily yields to a situa-
tion where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general statute treats in particular.
The exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope thereof, whereas, Section
43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular.
In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless domi-
nant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or
imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code controls. Here, as always, a
general provision must give way to a particular provision. Special provision governs. This is especially true
where the law containing the particular provision was enacted later than the one containing the general pro-
vision. The City Charter of Manila was promulgated on June 18, 1949 as against the Local Tax Code which was
decreed on June 1, 1973. The law-making power cannot be said to have intended the establishment of con-
flicting and hostile systems upon the same subject, or to leave in force provisions of a prior law by which the
new will of the legislating power may be thwarted and overthrown. Such a result would render legislation a
useless and Idle ceremony, and subject the law to the reproach of uncertainty and unintelligibility.

It is maintained by private respondent that the subject ordinance is not a "tax ordinance," because the impo-
sition of rentals, permit fees, tolls and other fees is not strictly a taxing power but a revenue-raising function,
so that the procedure for publication under the Local Tax Code finds no application. The pretense bears its
own marks of fallacy. Precisely, the raising of revenues is the principal object of taxation. Under Section 5,
Article XI of the New Constitution, "Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own
sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such provisions as may be provided by law." And one of
those sources of revenue is what the Local Tax Code points to in particular: "Local governments may collect
fees or rentals for the occupancy or use of public markets and premises * * *." 14 They can provide for and
regulate market stands, stalls and privileges, and, also, the sale, lease or occupancy thereof. They can license,
or permit the use of, lease, sell or otherwise dispose of stands, stalls or marketing privileges.

Private respondent bewails that the market stall fees imposed in the disputed ordinance are diverted to the
exclusive private use of the Asiatic Integrated Corporation since the collection of said fees had been let by
the City of Manila to the said corporation in a "Management and Operating Contract." The assumption is of
course saddled on erroneous premise. The fees collected do not go direct to the private coffers of the corpo-
ration. Ordinance No. 7522 was not made for the corporation but for the purpose of raising revenues for the
city. That is the object it serves. The entrusting of the collection of the fees does not destroy the public pur-
pose of the ordinance. So long as the purpose is public, it does not matter whether the agency through which
the money is dispensed is public or private. The right to tax depends upon the ultimate use, purpose and ob-
ject for which the fund is raised. It is not dependent on the nature or character of the person or corporation
whose intermediate agency is to be used in applying it. The people may be taxed for a public purpose, alt-
hough it be under the direction of an individual or private corporation.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the court below is hereby reversed and set aside. Ordinance No. 7522 is held
validly enacted.
5. Manner of Computing Time
a) Civil Code, Article 13
ARTICLE 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of
three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from
sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respec-
tively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included. (7a)
b) Administrative Code, Book 1, Chapter 8, Sections 31
BOOK I
Sovereignty and General Administration
CHAPTER 8
Legal Weights, Measures and Period
SECTION 31. Legal Periods. "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month"
of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed ac-
cording to the number of days the specifi month contains; "day," to a day of twenty-four hours; and
"night," from sunset to sunrise.
c) Administrative Code, Book 1, Chapter 7, Section 28
CHAPTER 7
Regular Holidays and Nationwide Special Days
SECTION 28. Pretermission of Holiday. Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act re-
quired or permitted by law falls on a regular holiday or special day, the act may be done on the next
succeeding business day.