Rights of Suspects under Custodial Investigation not elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner.
through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner. No written confession was
People vs. Marra, GR No. 108494, September 20, 1994
Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(a)ny person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. . . . ." The critical
inquiry then is whether or not Marra was under custodial investigation when he admitted the killing
but invoked self-defense. We believe that he was not so situated.
In the case at bar, appellant was not under custodial investigation when he made the admission.
There was no coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such a statement. Indeed, he could
have refused to answer questions from the very start when the policemen requested that they all
go to his residence. The police inquiry had not yet reached a level wherein they considered him
as a particular suspect. They were just probing into a number of possibilities, having been merely
informed that the suspect was wearing what could be a security guard's uniform. As we held in
People vs. Dy: 25 "What was told by the accused to Pat. Padilla was a spontaneous statement
sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation. 26 The trial Court,
therefore, cannot be held to have erred in holding that compliance with the constitutional
procedure on custodial investigation is not applicable in the instant case.
In addition, the law provides that the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein may be given in evidence against
him and, in certain circumstances, this admission may be considered as part of the res gestae.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding accused-appellant Samuel Marra y Zarate
guilty of the crime of murder and imposing upon him the penalty and civil liabilities therein stated
is hereby AFFIRMED.
Police line-up People vs. Amestuzo, GR NO. 104383, July 12, 2001
FACTS
One of the cardinal rules of criminal law is that the guilt of the accused must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to support a conviction.[1] In the present case, there being a doubt as to the guilt of
accused-appellant, the constitutional presumption of innocence stands and he must be acquitted.
This is an appeal from the decision dated November 28, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
131, Kalookan City in Criminal Case No. 36930 finding accused-appellant Albino Bagas guilty of
the complex crime of robbery in band with double rape and sentencing him accordingly.
At about nine-thirty in the evening of February 22, 1991, a group of eight armed men wearing
masks entered the house of complainant Perlita delos Santos Lacsamana at Sacred Heart Village,
Kalookan City and robbed the said premises of valuables in the total amount of P728,000.00. In
the course of the robbery, two members of the gang raped Maria Fe Catanyag and Estrella Rolago,
niece and employee, respectively of complainant Lacsamana.
From the judgment of conviction by the trial court, only herein accused-appellant Bagas appealed
to this Court. His appeal is based mainly on (1) the alleged deprivation of his constitutional right
to be represented by counsel during his identification, (2) the trial courts error in giving due weight
to the open court identification of him which was based on a suggestive and irregular out-of-court
identification, and (3) the trial courts improper rejection of his defense of alibi.
Accused-appellant maintains that from the time he was arrested until he was presented to the
complainants for identification, he was deprived of the benefit of counsel.
On February 26, 1991, four days after the alleged incident, a group of policemen together with
accused Federico Ampatin, who was then a suspect, went to the handicrafts factory in NIA Road,
Pasay City where accused-appellant was working as a stay-in shell cutter. They were looking for
a certain Mario and searched the first and second floors of the building. Failing to find said Mario,
the police hit Ampatin at the back of his neck with a gun and uttered, Niloloko lang yata tayo ng
taong ito and Magturo ka ng tao kahit sino. It was at this juncture that Ampatin pointed to accused-
appellant Bagas as he was the first person Ampatin chanced to look upon.
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court committed a serious error when it deprived him of
his constitutional right to be represented by a lawyer during his investigation. His singular
presentation to the complainants for identification without the benefit of counsel, accused-
appellant avers, is a flagrant violation of the constitutional prerogative to be assisted by counsel
to which he was entitled from the moment he was arrested by the police and placed on detention.
He maintains that the identification was a critical stage of prosecution at which he was as much
entitled to the aid of counsel as during the trial proper.
RULING Feeder International Line, Pts. Ltd. Vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 842 (1991)
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution,
or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial
investigation.[6] Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody
by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit
incriminating statements.[7] Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right
to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.[8] This was settled
in the case of People vs. Lamsing[9] and in the more recent case of People vs. Salvatierra.[10]
The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be
claimed by the accused during identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial
investigation process. This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from
the investigatory to the accusatory[11] and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is
interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.[12]

Hence, herein accused-appellant could not yet invoke his right to counsel when he was presented
for identification by the complainants because the same was not yet part of the investigation
process. Moreover, there was no showing that during his identification by the complainants, the
police investigators sought to elicit any admission or confession from accused-appellant. In fact,
records show that the police did not at all talk to accused-appellant when he was presented before
the complainants. The alleged infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused while under
custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extra-judicial admission
or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of his conviction.[13] In the present
case, there is no such confession or extra-judicial admission.

However, we agree that complainants out-of-court identification of accused-appellant was

seriously flawed as to preclude its admissibility. In resolving the admissibility and reliability of out-
of-court identifications, we have applied the totality of circumstances test enunciated in the case
of People vs. Teehankee[15] which lists the following factors:

xxx (1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree
of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level
of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the
crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification process.

The out-of-court identification of herein accused-appellant by complainants in the police station

appears to have been improperly suggestive. Even before complainants had the opportunity to
view accused-appellant face-to-face when he was brought our of the detention cell to be presented
to them for identification, the police made an announcement that he was one of the suspects in
the crime and that he was the one pointed to by accused Ampatin as one of culprits.

The testimony of witness Rosales corroborates Ampatins declaration in court that he does not
know herein accused-appellant and merely pointed to him out of fear of the police. These
testimonies remain unrebutted by the prosecution as the arresting officers were not presented to
refute or deny the same. The foregoing testimonies exculpating accused-appellant have
sufficiently cast at least a shadow of doubt as to his guilt.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court convicting accused-appellant Albino Bagas of the
crime of robbery with multiple rape is hereby REVERSED and he is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. His immediate release is hereby ordered unless he is held for some other valid charges.
Luz vs. People, 667 SCRA 421 (2012)
FACTS:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza testified that he saw the accused driving a motorcycle without a helmet
and this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires
all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said motor vehicle. He invited the accused to
come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front
of the sub-station to where he is assigned as a traffic enforcer. While he and SPO1 Rayford
Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the
accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket. He was alerted and so, he
told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a
weapon inside it. The accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket
which included two (2) plastic sachets of suspected shabu. The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had
been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the
discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. Upon review, the CA
affirmed the RTCs Decision.
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed.
There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic
violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or
by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the
belief and impression that submission is necessary. Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the
offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be
said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him,
deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period
during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In
fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the
police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that place. Hence,
it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to
take petitioner into custody.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed arrested upon being
flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the
requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be
the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that
person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them.
It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the
police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-
0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED
and ordered immediately released from detention, unless his continued confinement is warranted
by some other cause or ground.
RA 7438; People vs. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455, February 1, 1999
Facts: Appellant Larry Mahinay worked as a houseboy with Maria Isip, one of his tasks was to
take care of Isips house which was under construction adjacent to the latters residence. The
victim was a 12-year old girl who used to frequent the residence of Isip.
On the late evening of 25 June 1995, the victim was reported missing by her mother. The following
morning, the Appellant boarded a passenger jeepney and disappeared.
The victims body was found, lifeless, at around 7:30 am that same day. She was found in the
septic tank wearing her blouse and no underwear. The autopsy showed that the victim was raped
and was strangled to death.
Upon re-examining the crime scene, policemen found a pair of dirty white short pants, a brown
belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by the victims mother to belong to her daughter.
Also, they found a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that of the appellant. Also found in
the yard, three armslength away from the septic tank were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair
of dirty long pants and a pliers positively identified by Isip as appellants belongings.
The appellant was soon arrested and executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated
how the crime was committed. The trial ensued and the lower court convicted him of the crime of
Rape and was sentenced to death.
The case was forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused merely on ground of
circumstantial evidence
Whether or not Mahinays rights to lawful custodial investigation was violated.
Held: No. No.
The proven circumstances of this case when juxtaposed with appellants proffered excuse are
sufficient to sustain his conviction beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the absence of any
direct evidence relative to the commission of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Absence of
direct proof does not necessarily absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on
evidence and pursuant to settled jurisprudence, conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence
provided that the following requisites concur:
There is more than one circumstance;
1. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
2. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and
at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt. Facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with
innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct
evidence in its effect upon the court.
In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to several circumstantial evidence, which upon
thorough review of the Court is more than enough to prove appellants guilt beyond the shadow
of reasonable doubt.
IMPORTANT: So-called Miranda rights
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed
in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must
 be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or
communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes
may be used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the
presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer,
one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in
his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one
acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no
custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his
counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate
or confer by the most expedient means telephone, radio, letter or messenger with
his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any
medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family
or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international
non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that
this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that
it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned
that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any
time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that
once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not
yet commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent,
the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time
during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or
volunteered some statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained
in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

People vs. Obrero, 332 SCRA 190, May 17, 2000

There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision:
(1) those which are the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of 12, and (2) those which are given without the
benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same 12.

WHEREFORE, the decision in Criminal Case No. 90-82187 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
12, Manila, convicting accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla of the crime of robbery with
homicide is REVERSED and accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988)
People vs. Viduya, 189 SCRA 403 (1990)
FACTS: Appellant Virginia Matos-Viduya appeals from the decision of the Manila RTC, Branch
35, finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide. The information alleges
that on or about the 26th day of August, 1980, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack the person of ATTY.
JOSE VIDUYA, her husband, stabbing him several times with a bladed weapon, thereby inflicting
upon him mortal stab wounds which were the direct cause of his death.
The prosecution presented the following evidence:
(1) Mrs. Remedios Domingo, a lessee on the ground floor of the victim's house, testified that she
was awakened by moaning sounds, followed by a thud, emanating from the second floor where
the victim lived. Mrs. Domingo, a lessee in the same house for 25 years and had known the victim
to suffer from a heart ailment, presumed that the latter was having a heart attack so she
immediately ran towards the apartment of the victim's family driver, Melanio Cambel, which was
only 4 meters away and shouted to Melanio as he was having a heart attack.
(2) Cambel declared that on that evening, he was aroused from his sleep by the shouts of Mrs.
Domingo. He ran upstairs and was let in by Lydia Firmanes, cousin of the accused. Cambel saw
the victim clutching the handle of the refrigerator and leaning thereon for support. Immediately
standing behind the victim was the accused holding a knife with both hands. As Cambel
approached, the accused stooped down saying "Diosko, Diosko, trying to conceal the knife from
him. Cambel asked the victim what happened but the latter was too weak to speak. Cambel then
asked the accused why she stabbed her husband. The accused initially did not answer, but
hesitantly muttered "Magnanakaw, magnanakaw" after being questioned for the second time.
Cambel then requested assistance to bring the victim to the hospital (St. Jude Hospital in
Sampaloc, Manila) but the latter was pronounced dead on arrival.
(3) Florentino Bagallon, an investigator of the WPD, declared that he conducted an on-the-spot
ocular inspection of the victim's house and found in the bedroom a single bed with a white blanket
soaked in blood. He recovered two pieces of bladed knives at the east yard (parking lot) of the
victim's residence. One of the knives had a bended blade. On the east wall, he found a rectangular
hole which used to hold an air-conditioning unit and also noticed some pieces of wood placed
under a parked heavy truck on the east yard. The accused informed him that those pieces of wood
used to cover the rectangular hole. Thereafter, he advised the accused to go with him to the police
headquarters for a formal investigation. Bagallon testified that at 3:15 in the morning of August 26,
1980, the accused executed a salaysay. Significant portions of the said salaysay are quoted, as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
7. T-Ano ba sa alam ninyo and dahilan ng kanyang pagkamatay?
S-Sinaksak dahil sa panloloob na ginawa sa amin.
xxx xxx xxx
15. T-Nang marinig ninyo ang ungol na nanggaling sa inyong asawa at kayo nga noon ay nagising,
ano naman ang inyong nakita?
S-Dalawang lalaki, ang isa ay nakatayo sa tabi ng kama ko at may nakatutok na patalim sa aking
ulo at sa kabilang kama naman ay nakita ko na may isa pa ring lalaki na sumasaksak sa aking
asawa.
xxx xxx xxx
26. T-Nakikilala po ba naman ninyo and dalawang lalaking pumasok sa loob ng kuwarto ninyo?
S-Kung sakaling makita ko uli ay maaari kong makilala.
27. T-Ano po ba ang hitsura nila?
S-Yun pong sumaksak sa asawa ko ay maitim, mga 5'3 po, nakasuot ng dark color at yong
tumutok naman sa akin ay may mga 5'2, kayumanggi, slender, putian and suot na damit.
xxx xxx xxx
31. T-Nang maganap ang pangloloob sa inyo at pananaksak sa asawa mo hanggang sa makaalis
ang dalawang lalaki, nasaan ba naman ang mga taong kasama mo sa bahay?
S-Nagising silang lahat sa pagsigaw ko.
32. T-At ano ba naman ang isinigaw mo?
S-Magnanakaw, magnanakaw!!!
xxx xxx xxx
Pfc. Bagallon also stated that on same day at about 5:30 in the afternoon, the accused was again
invited for further investigation thereafter executing a second "salaysay" reiterating her narration
contained in her first "salaysay" executed earlier that morning. This time, however, she declared
that one of the malefactors was a certain Edito Pateo, their former employee. On August 30,
1980 at 2:20 in the morning, Mrs. Virginia Viduya again executed a (third) "salaysay". Later, at
about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of the same date, Mrs. Viduya executed her extrajudicial
confession wherein she categorically admitted authorship of the killing of her husband. However,
she claimed that she merely acted in self-defense.
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. The accused alleged that she
was misled and deceived by Pfc. Bagallon into signing her extrajudicial confession since he told
her that she will not be detained if she signs the document.
After due trial, the lower court rendered its decision adjudging the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in admitting the extra judicial confession of the accused
RULING: Article III, Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution mandates that: Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
In this case, it is undisputed that the extrajudicial confession was executed without the presence
of counsel. We quote the relevant excerpt from the extrajudicial confession:
xxx xxx xxx
T- Ikaw ay may karapatan pa rin kumuha ng serbisyo ng isang abogado para makatulong mo sa
imbestigasyong ito at kung wala kang makukuha, ikaw ay aming bibigyan ng libreng abogado,
ano ngayon and iyong masasabi?
S- Nandiyan naman po si Fiscal (pointing to Assistant Fiscal DOMINGO A. MENDOZA) kaya hindi
ko na kailangan and abogado.
xxx xxx xxx
The trial judge, in holding that the extrajudicial confession is admissible, reasoned out that there
is no prohibition for Assistant Fiscal Mendoza to act as counsel for the accused as it is his
primordial duty not only to prosecute a case but also to protect the rights of an accused and to
see that no violence, force, coercion or intimidation be used to secure from a person under
custodial investigation his statement.
Section 12(1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution favors the accused and is fully applicable to
this case. It is also elementary that a Fiscal or Prosecutor cannot be a lawyer for the accused at
the same time.
In his testimony, Assistant Fiscal Mendoza stated that his main functions as Assistant Fiscal in
the City of Manila are to prosecute cases and to render duties as an inquest fiscal. (an inquest
fiscal advises police investigators as to whether or not a prima facie case exists in cases which
they investigate.) Whether or not the subsequent trial of a confessant's case will be assigned to
him as prosecutor is immaterial. He cannot pretend to act as defense counsel.
An assistant fiscal, or a fiscal for that matter, cannot exercise the function of defense counsel even
during custodial investigation. To allow such a happenstance would render illusory the protection
given to the accused during custodial investigation. What the Constitution requires in Article III
Section 12 (1) is the presence of competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively
undertake his client's defense without any intervening conflict of interest.
Moreover, the answer of the accused ("Nandiyan naman po si Fiscal kaya hindi ko na kailangan
ng abogado") is a palpable indication that she did not fully understand her in-custody rights, hence
it cannot be said that she knowingly and intelligently waived those rights.
The remaining issue left for determination is whether or not the prosecution evidence, absent the
extrajudicial confession, is sufficient to sustain the lower court's conviction of the accused.
A rule firmly entrenched in our criminal justice system is that the prosecution must rely on the
strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. (People v. Ramirez, 116 SCRA
48 [1982]; People v. Co, 163 SCRA 453 [1988]) In the case before us, the defense of the accused
is weak. In trying to exculpate herself, the appellant tried to shift culpability to another person. The
attempt is not convincing. But though the accused's defense is weak, the prosecution's evidence
is not strong enough to adduce proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is the guilty party.
A thorough review of the prosecution's evidence discloses that the only proof linking the accused
to the killing of her husband is the testimony of Cambel. It is not shown how twelve stab wounds
could have been inflicted by a woman under the circumstances of his testimony. Two knives were
involved in the stabbing. Other than Cambel's testimony, there is no other evidence pointing to the
accused as the author of the crime.
Moreover, the trial court's complete reliance on only one of 3 extrajudicial statements and its total
rejection of the two other statements without any independent evidence or proof for such action,
is not explained.
Considering the paucity of the State's evidence, we are not satisfied that the constitutional
presumption of innocence accorded to the accused-appellant has been overthrown. The
constitutional presumption of innocence can be overcome only by proof beyond reasonable doubt,
which is the degree of proof that, after investigation of the whole record, produces moral certainty
in an unprejudiced mind of the appellant's culpability. (People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59 [1971])
The prosecution failed to produce such proof. This Court, therefore, has no other recourse but to
acquit the accused-appellant.
JUDGMENT of the trial court convicting the accused-appellant is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and another entered ACQUITTING her on reasonable doubt.
People vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986)
FACTS:
There were no extrajudicial confessions admitted in evidence. But circumstantial evidence was
presented to support a verdict of conviction that Jara was the mastermind of the killing of his wife
and the latters friend: 1.), Jara resented his wife for having a relationship with a girl, the other one
who was killed. 2.) At the canteen where they work, whenever Jara committed even the slightest
mistakes, his wife scolded and cursed him. 3.) One of the waitresses observed that Jara shed no
tears and his face did not show any indication of sorrow when he saw the lifeless body of his wife.
4.) the hammer used in the killing is an instrument with which Jara is familiar. 5.) During the
investigation at the scene of the crime, blood stains were found splattered in the trousers and shirt
worn by accused Jara. His eyeglasses were also smeared with blood. When asked to explain the
presence of said blood stains, accused Jara told the police that before he learned about the killing,
he was with his stepdaughter Minerva Jimenez in the public market dressing chickens.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such evidences are sufficient to overturn the presumption of innocence in favor of
Jara.
RULING:
Yes. No general rule has been formulated as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will
suffice for any case, but that matters not. For all that is required is that the circumstances proved
must be consistent with each other, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he
is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances
constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the
guilt of the Jara beyond reasonable doubt. Mere denials of the accused as to his participation in
the crime are only self-serving negative evidence which cannot outweigh circumstantial evidence
clearly establishing his active participation in the crime.
People vs. Balisteros, 237 SCRA 499 (1994)
FACTS
This case originated from the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 14, wherein the
original three accused were charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 1794-M-91 for the killing
of one Romeo Abad on August 16, 1991 in Pandi, Bulacan, the information therefor alleging that
said accused acted in conspiracy and committed the felony with treachery and evident
premeditation.
Upon arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty. During the trial of the case, the
prosecution moved for the exclusion of accused Ernesto Galvante from the information for murder
so that he could become a witness for the Government as particeps criminis. 2 In an order dated
April 22, 1992, the lower court discharged said accused from the information to be utilized as a
state witness.
A year later, or on April 6, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision finding herein accused-
appellant Salvador Balisteros and Nilo Avestro guilty as charged, with the punitive fallo thereof.
commission of the crime may be fairly inferred, the corroboration is legally sufficient. Moreover,
circumstantial evidence may be sufficiently cogent to satisfy the judicial conscience, and may be
as potent as direct testimony in tending to connect the accused with the commission of the offense.
Another contention of appellants is the alleged violation of the Constitution, particularly Section 12
of Article III, when in accordance with the present rule for the qualification of a state witness, 23
Galvante executed a sworn statement wherein he categorically admitted his guilt but without the
assistance of a counsel. Appellants also claim that Galvante "made his sworn statement in the
presence of Atty. Alejandro, the counsel of the plaintiff (sic), Mr. Matic, the two brothers of the
deceased, the Mayor of Pandi and another person whom he did not know. With this battery of
persons surrounding him, we could imagine the pressure exerted on Galvante." 24
Appellants cannot seek solace in the provision they have invoked. What is provided by the
modified formulation in the 1987 Constitution is that a confession taken in violation of said Section
12 and Section 17 of the same Article "shall be inadmissible in evidence against him," meaning
the confessant. This objection can be raised only by the confessant whose rights have been
violated as such right is personal in nature.

Ernesto B. Galvante, who was discharged from the information to be a State witness, testified that: It should also be noted that Galvante repeated in court what he had stated in his affidavit and,
although he was likewise subjected to a thorough cross-examination, he stood fast on his
On August 3, 1991 he went to his uncle's place (Salvador Balisteros) at Siling Matanda, Pandi, confession and the revelations therein. Appellants' imputations of pressure and coercion are
Bulacan and stayed with him until August 16, 1991. In the morning of August 16, his uncle refuted thereby. Also, by repeating his confession in court, Galvante converted it into a judicial
Salvador Balisteros, ordered two (2) bottles of beer and two (2) bottles of gin then the three (3) of confession which, having been allowed by the trial court, eliminated the need for assistance of
them, he, Salvador and Nilo and another whom he does not know, ha(d) a drinking spree in the counsel which is required in extrajudicial confessions. Furthermore, even in extrajudicial
hut of Salvador. confessions which under jurisprudential doctrines have been held to be generally binding upon
the confessant and not against his co-accused, Galvante's confession would readily fall into the
While they were drinking, Salvador and Nilo were talking about the riceland which Romeo Abad exceptions to that rule since appellants are charged as co-conspirators and said confession is
bought and where the hut of Salvador was erected. According to Salvador, Romeo gave him a used only as a corroborating evidence, 25 or as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of
grace period of one (1) month to remove his hut and vacate the premises. During their participation by the co-conspirator, 26 or is corroborated by other evidence of record.
conversation, he was beside the window, so he could hear what Salvador and Nilo (were) talking
about. He heard the plan of Salvador and Nilo to kill Romeo who was then in his house far from WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against
the hut of Salvador. That he could hear all their conversation because he was just two (2) meters accused-appellants.
away from them.
Confession given to media People vs. Endino, 353 SCRA 307, February 20, 2001
After they ha(d) finished drinking, they rested for about 30 minutes then they proceeded to the
ricefield near the bamboo gr(o)ve. (T)his time Salvador was carrying a small knife (kampit) while
Nilo ha(d) a "taris" which Ernesto identified in court. When they arrived in the place, they waited
for Romeo and after some few minutes, Romeo arrived. (H)e asked Nilo where is his horse and
Nilo told Romeo, his horse is tied in the place where it was rope-grazed (sic). That while Romeo
was asking Nilo, he was walking and when his back was turned towards Salvador, the latter
suddenly held him by the neck and stabbed him three (3) times on the stomach and Romeo
shouted, "huwag, huwag", then he fell on the ground. While Romeo was lying on the ground, Nilo
stabbed him for more than three (3) times until his intestines came out, then Nilo slashed it
(hiniwa-hiwa). That he (Ernesto) vomi(t)ed because he could not bear watching Nilo slashing the
intestine(s) of Romeo so he ran (to) the back of the bamboo gr(o)ve where he saw Salvador
coming out followed by Nilo, so he followed them and they proceeded to the hut of Salvador.

According to Ernesto, he failed to stop Salvador and Nilo from their plan to kill Romeo because
he was then drunk but he could understand what they were talking about. He also failed to warn
Romeo of the impending danger to his life neither was he able to call the barangay Captain or the
police because Salvador was guarding him and sternly looking at him.

ISSUE: W/N Ernesto Galvante testimony can be used as evidence to render court decision.
RULING: YES
It is said that circumstantial evidence consists of such incidental facts surrounding the main fact
in issue and are compared to the strands in a rope, where no one of them may be strong enough
to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The entire conduct of the accused
may be looked to for corroborative circumstances, and if therefrom his connection with the

Confession given to Municipal Mayor People vs. Andan, 269 SCRA 95, GR No. 116437, March
3, 1997
Facts:
Pablito Andan alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with homicide. The offense was
committed on February 19, 1994 in Baliuag, Bulacan; the victim being Marianne Guevarra, 22 and
a 2nd year student at the Fatima School of Nursing.
On said day, victim left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela. While on her way,
appellant invited her to his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's
grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to do so as the old woman was her distant relative.
She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen,
brought her to the kitchen and raped her. By night time, Marianne, who was still unconscious, was
dragged by appellant to their backyard that was adjacent to a vacant lot. Appellant was to transfer
Marianne to the vacant lot when she moved, prompting appellant to hit her head with a piece of
concrete block. No longer moving, he dragged her to the lot and abandoned her. At 11am her
body was discovered. The autopsy revealed that she died of "traumatic injuries."
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad
to form an investigation team. The investigation pointed to the appellant. Appellant's nearby house
was searched but he was not there. On February 24, a police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced
appellant in his parents' house. They took him and brought him to the police headquarters where
he was interrogated. Initially, he denied any knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the
police confronted him with evidence, appellant relented but implicated two of his neighbours, and
that he was merely a lookout. Larin and Dizon were likewise brought there by the police. The
following day a physical examination conducted on the suspects revealed that appellant has
multiple scratches on the neck, chest and back.
By that time, people and media representatives were already at the police headquarters awaiting
the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant
approached him and whispered that they talk privately. The mayor led him to the office of the
Chief of Police and there, he broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the
truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public
and media representatives witness the confession. Since no lawyer was available he ordered the
proceedings photographed and videotaped. In the presence of the mayor, the police,
representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He
asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because
of ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil entered his mind because of the
pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. After his confession, appellant
hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help him. His confession was captured on
videotape and covered by the media nationwide.
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that on said date
he was at his parent's house for the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and son went home
after 5pm, slept at 8pm, and woke up at 6am the next day. Appellant claimed that after he was
picked up by the police on February 24, he was coerced to confess that he raped and killed
Marianne. Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told.
The trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death. He was found guilty of the
crime charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized accordingly. Hence, the
automatic review.
Issue:
W/N the appellants confession not being assisted by a counsel is in violation of the constitution,
and is therefore inadmissible as evidence against him.
Held:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before
the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and
control" over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes
of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession
to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did
not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was
appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private
meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When
appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his
uncounseled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that
the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement,
not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the
compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to
admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence we
hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were
made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating
officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a
televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.
The Court therefore held accused-appellant Pablito Andan guilty of the special complex crime of
rape with homicide.
Signing of acknowledgment receipts People vs. Casimiro, 383 SCRA 390 (2002)
FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC Branch 6, Baguio City finding accused-
appellant ALBERT CASIMIRO guilty of violating Republic Act No. 6425, 4, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and
the costs.
The information against accused-appellant alleged that on or about the 17th day of August 1999,
the accused (Casimiro), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or deliver
to SPO2 DOROTHEO SUPA, posing as buyer, about nine hundred fifty (950) grams of marijuana
dried leaves in brick form, in violation of the aforecited provision of law.
On August 16, 1999, a civilian informer, named Rose, walked into the office of the 14th Regional
Narcotics Office in Baguio City and informed Chief Inspector Benson Dagiw-a Leleng and PO3
Piggangay that a certain Albert Casimiro was engaged in the distribution or sale of marijuana.
Police Chief Inspector Leleng then formed a buy-bust team with PO2 Supa as poseur-buyer and
PO3 Piggangay, Jr. as one of back-up men.
PO2 Supa said he had P1,500.00 with him and asked for the marijuana. Casimiro gave the
poseur-buyer a paper bag, which contained an object wrapped in plastic and newspaper. After
determining from its appearance and smell that the object inside was marijuana, PO2 Supa gave
a signal for the back-up team to make an arrest by combing his hair. He testified that he no longer
gave the marked money to accused-appellant because he placed the latter under arrest, reciting
to him his rights, while the back-up team ran from across the street.
After arresting Casimiro, the policemen took him to the Narcom Office, where PO2 Supa, SPO2
Madlon, and PO3 Piggangay wrote their initials on the brick of marijuana before giving it to the
evidence custodian. The policemen prepared a booking sheet and arrest report, affidavits, and a
request for the laboratory examination of the confiscated marijuana. They also prepared a receipt
of property seized, dated August 18, 1999.
Accused-appellant signed the receipt without the assistance of counsel. The dried leaves were
then examined by forensic chemist Alma Margarita Villaseor of the PNP Crime Laboratory
Service. The chemistry report dated August 20, 1999, signed by Villaseor, stated that the leaves
were positive for marijuana.
At the Narcotics Office, PO3 Piggangay confronted Casimiro about the marijuana allegedly seized
from him. Casimiro denied having carried the bag of marijuana, which he had seen Rose carrying
earlier. After taking pictures of him pointing at the bag, the policemen threatened to shoot him if
he did not admit owning the marijuana. After failing to make him admit ownership of the marijuana,
PO3 Piggangay offered to release Casimiro if he gave them money. When Casimiro replied that
he had no money, PO3 Piggangay said, If you have no money, then we will work on your papers
so that you will go to Muntinlupa. The policemen then took accused-appellant to a hospital for a
physical examination and afterwards asked him to sign a receipt of property, a booking sheet, and
an arrest report without explaining their contents or allowing him to read them.
On October 17, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the
crime charged. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: WON the evidence against accused-appellant is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING: We find the appeal meritorious. Although the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect, the rule does not apply where it is
shown that any fact of weight and substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied by the trial court. In this case, several such circumstances stand out as having been
overlooked or misapprehended by the lower court which entitle accused-appellant to an acquittal.
First. With respect to the receipt of property seized from accused-appellant, the lower court
declared:
The fact that there was a receipt of property seized issued by the police which was signed by the
accused does not affect the liability of the accused. The receipt of property seized was issued by
the police in accordance with their standard operating procedure in a buy-bust operation to show
what property was seized. The receipt should not be treated as an admission or confession.
Indeed, the receipt could not be considered evidence against accused-appellant because it was
signed by him without the assistance of counsel. The receipt states that a brick of dried marijuana
leaves was delivered by the suspect to a poseur buyer and signed by accused-appellant Albert
Casimiro as suspect/ owner. In effect, accused-appellant admitted that he delivered a prohibited
drug to another, which is an offense under the law. Having been made without the assistance of
counsel, it cannot be accepted as proof that marijuana was seized from him. It is inadmissible in
evidence.
In People v. Obrero, this Court held that an uncounseled statement is presumed by the
Constitution to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded
by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of a police interrogation, the suspect needs the
guiding hand of counsel.
Indeed, there is failure in this case to observe standard operating procedure for a buy-bust
operation. The governments drive against illegal drugs deserves everybodys support. But it is
precisely when the governments purposes are beneficent that we should be most on our guard
to protect these rights. As Justice Brandeis warned long ago, the greatest dangers to liberty lurk
in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding. Our desire
to stamp out criminality cannot be achieved at the expense of constitutional rights. For these
reasons, we cannot uphold the conviction of accused-appellant.
The decision of the RTC Branch 6, Baguio City is REVERSED and accused-appellant Albert
Casimiro is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Giving urine samples Gutang vs. People, 335 SCRA 479 (2000)
FACTS:
David Gutang, together with Noel Regala, Alex Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia, Jr. was arrested
by policemen in connection with the enforcement of a search warrant in his residence at
Greenhills, San Juan. Several drug paraphernalia, which later tested positive for marijuana and
methamphetamine hydrochloride, were seized along with a small quantity of marijuana fruiting
tops.
The four were brought to Camp Crame and were subjected to a drug-dependency test and were
asked to give a sample of their urine to which they complied. Their urine samples all tested positive
for shabu.
De Venecia, Jr. voluntarily submitted himself for treatment, rehabilitation and confinement.
Gutang, Regala and Jimenez pleaded not guilty. They were found guilty of possession and use of
prohibited drugs.
Gutang argued that the urine sample is inadmissible in evidence because he had no counsel
during the custodial investigation when it was taken. In effect, it is an uncounselled extra-judicial
confession and a violation of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the urine samples taken were admissible in evidence.
RULING:
The Court ruled that it was admissible. The right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken
into custody and placed under investigation for the commission of crime. Such right is guaranteed
by the Constitution and cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
However, what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be
material to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation and not to unearth
undisclosed facts.
An accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes
removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done without going
against the proscription against testimonial compulsion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED. Accused is CONVICTED of the crime charged.
Admissibility of other evidence obtained - Ho Wai Pang vs. People, 659 SCRA 624 (2011)
Doctrine: Rights of Suspects; Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation
or the so-called Miranda Rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission
made during such investigation."The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to
the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken
in the course of custodial investigation."
Facts:
13 Hongkong nationals came to the Philippines via UAE Flight which arrived at NAIA.
The group leader, Sonny Wong, presented a Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner
Cinco. In the first bag, she saw few personal belongings such as used clothing, shoes and
chocolate boxes which she pressed. In the second bag, Cinco noticed chocolate boxes which
were almost of the same size as those in the first bag. Becoming suspicious, she took out 4 of the
chocolate boxes and opened one of them. She saw a white crystalline substance inside contained
in a white transparent plastic. She called the attention of her immediate superiors Duty Collector
Alalo and Customs Appraiser Sancho, who advised her to call the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) and the police. She guided the tourists to the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU) while
bringing with her the 4 boxes earlier discovered.
At the ICU, Cinco checked Pang's bag and only found personal effects, but recalled that
2 of the chocolate boes discovered earlier at the express lane belonged to him. Cinco called the
other tourists and examined their bags and found a total of 18 chocolate boxes.
NARCOM Agent de Castro corroborated the testimony of Cinco. He conducted a test
on the white crystalline substance using the Mandelline Re-Agent Test. The substance was found
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The chocolate boxes were bundled together
with tape, placed inside a plastic bag and brought to the Inbond Section.
The 13 tourists were brought to NBI for further questioning. The confiscated substance
were turned over to the Forensic Chemist who weighed and examined them, and found them
positive as shabu. Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI found evidence for violation of RA 6425 only
against petitioner Pang and his 5 co-accused.
Six separate informations were filed. Petitioner Pang filed a Motion for Reinvestigation,
which was granted by the trial court. The reinvestigation gave way to a finding of conspiracy among
the accused and this resulted to the filing of a single Amended Information. They plead guilty, and
invoked denial as their defense. They claimed to have no knowledge about the transportation of
illegal substance taken from their traveling bags which provided by the travel agency.
RTC found them guilty. All the accused appealed to the SC, but later on, all accused
except for petitioner Pang withdrew their appeal. SC granted the withdrawal. Petitioner Pang's
appeal was referred to the CA for proper disposition and determination.
CA denied the appeal, and affirmed the RTC decision. While conceding that petitioners
constitutional right to counsel during the custodial investigation was indeed violated, it
nevertheless went on to hold that there were other evidence sufficient to warrant his conviction.
The CA also rebuked petitioners claim that he was deprived of his constitutional and statutory
right to confront the witnesses against him. The CA gave credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and quoted with favor the trial courts ratiocination regarding the existence
of conspiracy among the accused.
Petitioner:
He was not assisted by a competent and independent lawyer during the custodial
investigation. He was not duly informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent
counsel of his choice. CA should have excluded the evidence taken during such investigation.
He was deprived of his right to know and understand what the witnesses testified to.
Only a full understanding of what the witnesses would testify to would enable an accused to
comprehend the evidence being offered against him and to refute it by cross-examination or by
his own countervailing evidence.
Respondent (OSG):
Nothing mentioned in full text on contention regarding violation of rights during custodial
investigation (part in outline)
Petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his accusers and/or witnesses of the
prosecution when his counsel cross-examined them. It is petitioners call to hire an interpreter to
understand the proceedings before him and if he could not do so, he should have manifested it
before the court. Petitioner was nevertheless able to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses
and that such examination suffices as compliance with petitioners right to confront the witnesses
against him.
Issue:
Whether he was duly informed of his (constitutional) right to remain silent and to have competent
counsel during custodial investigation, in accordance with Section 12, Article 3 of the Constitution
Held:
Constitutional right was violated, but substance discovered during inspection at NAIA still
admissible as evidence.
Section 12, Article 3:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Petitioner Pang was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning by the custom authorities
and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right. However, the Constitution only prohibits as
evidence confession and admissions of the accused as against himself.
"Infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession
or admission made during custodial investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided
they are relevant to the issue and are not otherwise excluded by law or rules, are not affected
even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation. - Aquino vs Paiste
Petitioner Pang did not make any confession or admission during his custodial investigation. The
prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from his as evidence of his guilt.
No statement was taken from him during his detention and subsequently used in evidence against
him. The determination of his guilt was based on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
on the existence of the confiscated shabu.
Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to
cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the
basis of their conviction. - People vs. Buluran
Petitioner's conviction was on the strength of his having been caught in flagrante delicto
transporting shabu into the country and not on the basis of any confession or admission. Cinco's
testimony was found to be direct, positive and credible by the trial court; it need not be
corroborated. She witnesses the entire incident and provided direct evidence as eyewitness to the
very act of the commission of the crime.
Right to Bail
Government of the USA vs. Purganan, GR No. 148571, September 24, 2002
FACTS:
Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion. The Secretary was ordered to
furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the
latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on motion
for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez
was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an order for his
immediate arrest pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before
the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte
Motion praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. After the hearing, as
required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative
prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty
at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond,
Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.
Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set
aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty
at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local
jurisprudence to guide lower court.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition
of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his
provisional liberty.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings
Discussions:
The constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused
who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that the constitutional provision on
bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
Ruling/s:
No. The court agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of
the requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from
continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now
has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of
taking it, he ran away.
Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region vs. Olalia, Jr., GR No. 153675,
April 19, 2007
FACTS:
Respondent Muoz was charged of 3 counts of offences of accepting an advantage as agent,
and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud, punishable by the common law of Hongkong. The
Hongkong Depoartment of Justice requested DOJ for the provisional arrest of respondent Muoz;
the DOJ forward the request to the NBI then to RTC. On the same day, NBI agents arrested him.
Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application
for preliminary mandatory injunction and writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the order
of arrest.
The CA declared the arrest void. Hence this petition by the Hongkong Department of Justice thru
DOJ.
DOJ filed a petition for certiorari in this Court and sustained the validity of the arrest.
Hongkong Administrative Region then filed in the RTC petition for extradition and arrest of
respondent. Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed by the petitioner,
initially the RTC denied the petition holding that there is no Philippine Law granting bail in
extradition cases and that private responded is a flight risk.
Motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent, which was granted. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not right to bail can be avail in extradition cases.
HELD:
In Purganan case, the right to bail was not included in the extradition cases, since it is available
only in criminal proceedings.
However the Supreme Court, recognised the following trends in International Law.
1. The growing importance of the individual person in publican international law who, in the 20th
century attained global recognition.
2. The higher value now being given in human rights in international sphere
3. The corresponding duty of countries to observe these human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations
4. The of duty of this court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on
one hand, and the law on extradition on the other.
The modern trend in the public international law is the primacy placed on the sanctity of human
rights.
Enshrined the Constitution The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights. The Philippines therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or
arrested can participate in the proceeding before the a court, to enable it to decide without delay
on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified.
Examination of this Court in the doctrines provided for in the US Vs Purganan provide the
following.
1. The exercise of the States police power to deprive a person of his liberty is not limited to
criminal proceedings.
2. To limit the right to bail in the criminal proceeding would be to close our eyes to jurisprudential
history. Philippines has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only.
This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail
has been involved in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the tendency of administrative
proceedings, taking into cognisance the obligation of the Philippines under international
conventions to uphold human rights.
EXTRADITION, is defined as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of
placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to
hold him in connection with criminal investigation directed against him or execution of a penalty
imposed on him under the penal and criminal law of the requesting state or government. Thus
characterized as the right of the a foreign power, created by treaty to demand the surrender of
one accused or convicted of a crimes within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative obligation
of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.
The extradited may be subject to detention as may be necessary step in the process of extradition,
but the length of time in the detention should be reasonable.
In the case at bar, the record show that the respondent, Muoz has been detained for 2 years
without being convicted in Hongkong.
The Philippines has the obligation of ensuring the individual his right to liberty and due process
and should not therefor deprive the extraditee of his right to bail PROVIDED that certain standards
for the grant is satisfactorily met. In other words there should be CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE.
However in the case at bar, the respondent was not able to show and clear and convincing
evidence that he be entitled to bail. Thus the case is remanded in the court for the determination
and otherwise, should order the cancellation of his bond and his immediate detention.
Go vs. Ramos, GR No. 167569, September 4, 2009
Facts:
These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit[9] for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos
before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T.
Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy
represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys personal circumstances and other records
indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy,
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmys citizenship as
FChinese. Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents,
Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the
citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He
also averred that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and
scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and
untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign
Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit,verring that the complaint for deportation
initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their
business dealings.
Jimmy maintained that there is no truth to the allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he is
a natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father
and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625.
In resolution dated Feb. 14 2001, Associate Comm. Linda L. Malinab Hornilla dismissed the
complaint for deportation against Jimmy.
On March 8 2001, The Board of Commissioner reversed the decision. Their contention is that
Carlos election of citizenship was made out of time.
The board issued a decision dated April 17 2002 for apprehension and deportation of Jimmy Go
to China.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in RTC but was denied by the said court.
They questioned the said decision and filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of appeals. The
petition was granted.
Their motion for reconsideration was denied at Bureu of immigration.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed.
RULING:
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule
102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the
confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired
into is the legality of a persons detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the
writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some
supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4[98] of Rule 102, be no longer
illegal at the time of the filing of the application.[99]
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through
a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information
and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after
the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term court in this
context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the persons
confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.[100] Likewise, the
cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is
detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the
Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in
habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.[101]
Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending
his deportation, coupled by this Courts pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its
jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is rendered
moot and academic. This being so, we find it unnecessary to touch on the other arguments
advanced by respondents regarding the same subject.
Whether or not due process was properly observed in the proceedings before the Board
No. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary court proceedings. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.
Comendador vs. De Villa, GR No. 93177, August 2, 1991
Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to
appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed
coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of
the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their
motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was
denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer
for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the
provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even
military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the
ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred
to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after
more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.

Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side
at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again
after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990,
to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for
reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly
warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be
deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-
emptory challenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM)

It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of
violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and
otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial
Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for
habeas corpus and quo warranto.

The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is
not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The
right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there
was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial.
The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only
after one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the
failed coup.

Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the
petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right
of peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the
petitions are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private
respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.