Federalism Ongpin

11/8/2016
The Federalism Project in the Philippines:

Cautionary Insights from the Institutional Design Literature
Gene Lacza Pilapil
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Mrs. Maria Isabel G. Ongpin and the

Ateneo de Manila University for having me as the speaker
for this years Jaime V Ongpin Annual Memorial Lecture,
which I consider as the most prestigious annual memorial
lecture in the country.
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Equally important, I am honored to be associated with the

legacy of Mr. Jaime V Ongpin who fought the Marcos
dictatorship when it was neither the popular nor the profitable
thing to do at that time.
His example should continue to inspire this generation of

public intellectuals as this countrys democracy is now once
again threatened by another authoritarian challenge and
another regime of untruth.
I would also like to thank everyone in the audience.
Although the topic is a worrying one, it should nevertheless

be a most happy day for me.
Among the audience are former professors, former students,

(some of whom are covering the lecture for the different
media outlets), current students (who braved Makati traffic
without being required nor enticed by any bonus grade),
colleagues, and old-time friends.
A million thanks to everyone for attending.
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Three Main Aims of the Lecture
1. Give a working knowledge of a federal political system
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2. Introduce the importance of the institutional design literature

to the Philippine charter change debate,
thereby helping elevate the level of the debate.
3. Give fair warning on the grave dangers of constitutional overhauls

based on the nature of institutions and institutional changes
as seen from the vantage point of the institutional design literature.
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Outline of the Lecture
Outline
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

II. What is federalism?
III. Why and why not federalism?
IV. Three cautionary insights from the institutional
design literature for the federalism project in the
Philippines (and the overall charter change campaign)
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I. Short Introduction
to the Institutional Design Literature
formal rules institutions
rules that influence the strategies

of state and social actors
written down somewhere

as laws, regulations, parchment institutions
constitutions, treaties, and
so forth (John M. Carey)
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so forth (John M. Carey) meta-institution: constitution
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so forth (John M. Carey) meta-institution: constitution
differences in the arrangement of formal rules
one basic example: form of government
relation between the executive and legislative
horizontal
If separated = presidential
institutional design of a
If fused = parliamentary
countrys form of government If hybrid = semi-presidential
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such as the studies how the design

form of government, (or redesign) of a countrys
political institutions

system of government political institutions
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electoral system,

electoral system,
party system,
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electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,

electoral system,
party system,
judicial system,
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electoral system,
party system,
judicial system,
and
constitutional bodies

electoral system,
party system,
judicial system,
and
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electoral system,
party system, affects or will affect, among others,
judicial system,
and

electoral system,
legislative structure, the accountability,
judicial system,
and
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electoral system,
judicial system, representation,
and

electoral system,
and popular empowerment,
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electoral system,
constitutional bodies elite capture,

electoral system,
constitutional bodies elite capture,
and coherent policymaking
of the state
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other terms
constitutional engineering literature
constitutional design literature
institutional approach
new institutionalism
counts some of the biggest names

in the political science discipline
Todays lecture would recruit supporting arguments from, among others:
Matthew Shugart Robert Kaufman

Scott Mainwaring
John M. Carey
Stephan Haggard
George Tsebelis Giovanni Sartori
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including winners of the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science
"to the scholar who in the view of the Foundation has

made the most valuable contribution to political science
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Arend Lijphart (1997) Rein Taagepera (2008)
Adam Przeworski (2010) Jon Elster (2016)
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Juan Linz (1996)


Arend Lijphart (1997) Rein Taagepera (2008)
Adam Przeworski (2010) Jon Elster (2016)
II. What is Federalism?
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II.A. Definition of Terms
Most famous definition of federalism
is the shortest one
Daniel Elazar in his 1987 book, Exploring Federalism
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is the shortest one
The simplest possible definition is self-rule plus shared rule.
italicized part repeated

like a mantra in most
discussions of federalism
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is the shortest one
The simplest possible definition is self-rule plus shared rule.
divided powers
shared sovereignty
Another famous definition of federalism
William H. Riker in his 1975 article, Federalism in Handbook of

Political Science, Volume Five
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Another famous definition of federalism
William H. Riker in his 1975 article, Federalism in Handbook of

Political Science, Volume Five
"Federalism is a political organization in which the

activities of government are divided between
regional governments and a central government in
such a way that each kind of government has
some activities on which it makes final decisions.
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A current definition of federalism
International IDEA in its 2015 primer, Federalism
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Federalism is a system of government that establishes

a constitutionally specified division of powers between
different levels of government.
Federalism is a system of government that establishes

a constitutionally specified division of powers between
different levels of government.
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system of government
Unitary system
of government
relationship between the

single
central central government
source of
authority
vertical
subordinate
to the
local government
central
Federal system
of government

central government
in certain
policy areas
where
vertical
central
government
has
exclusive
jurisdiction local government
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Federal system
of government

local government
in certain
policy areas
where local
vertical
government
has
exclusive
jurisdiction
central government
Federal system
of government

in certain
policy areas local government
where both
governments
have vertical
jurisdiction
(concurrent/
shared)
central government
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Federal system
of government

in certain
policy areas
where both
governments
central local vertical
have
government government
jurisdiction
(concurrent/
shared)
II.B. List of Federal Countries
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Handbook of Federal Countries in 2005 listed 25 federal countries:
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Handbook of Federal Countries in 2005 listed 25 federal countries:
Argentina India Switzerland

Australia Malaysia United Arab Emirates
Austria Mexico United States
Belgium F.S. Micronesia Venezuela
Bosnia and Nigeria
Herzegovina Pakistan
Brazil Russia
Canada Serbia and Montenegro
Comoros South Africa
Ethiopia Spain
Germany Saint Kitts-Nevis
Forum of Federations in October 2016 lists 24 federal countries:
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Forum of Federations in October 2016 lists 24 federal countries:
Argentina Iraq Switzerland

Australia Malaysia United Arab Emirates
Austria Mexico United States
Belgium Nepal Venezuela
Bosnia and Herzegovina Nigeria
Brazil Pakistan
Canada Russia Not in the list:
Ethiopia South Africa Comoros
Germany Spain F.S. Micronesia
India Sudan Saint Kitts-Nevis
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My Provisional List: 27 Federal States
Argentina Germany South Africa

Australia India Spain
Austria Iraq Sudan
Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis
Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland
Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates
Brazil Nepal United States
Canada Nigeria Venezuela
Comoros Pakistan
Ethiopia Russia

Austria Iraq Sudan
Comoros Pakistan
Ethiopia Russia
Cover 40 percent of the worlds population
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Austria Iraq Sudan
Comoros Pakistan
Ethiopia Russia
Cover 40 percent of the worlds population

but they constitute a minority of the total of 195 states (14%)

Austria Iraq Sudan
Comoros Pakistan
Ethiopia Russia
Freedom House Freedom in the World 2016
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Austria Iraq Sudan
Comoros Pakistan
Ethiopia Russia
18 out of 27 of federal states are electoral democracies = 67%
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Austria Iraq Sudan
Comoros Pakistan
Ethiopia Russia
107 out of 195 of non-federal states are electoral democracies = 64%

Austria Iraq Sudan
Comoros Pakistan
Ethiopia Russia
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II.C. Institutional Features of Federal System
This section is mainly based

on Ronald Wattss 1996
book, Comparing Federal
Systems in the 1990s
Many texts in the slides are

direct quotes from this book
Did not rewrite many of his

terms because of the
technical nature of his
arguments
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Professor
Department of Political Science
University of Melbourne
II.D. Six common institutional features

of federal systems according to Watts
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Different scholars list different numbers of common or essential

features of federalism
Duchacek =
Watts = lists 6 common features
Galligan = lists 4
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Different scholars list different number of common or essential

Duchacek = lists 8 (yardsticks of federalism)
Galligan = lists 4
Different scholars list different number of common or essential

Duchacek = lists 8 (yardsticks of federalism)
Galligan = lists 4
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1. Orders of Government
1. two orders of government each acting directly on their citizens
geographically or
territorially defined
federal level constituent level
a.k.a. a.k.a.
federal (exs. US, Germany) states (exs. Australia, Malaysia, US)
central (ex. South Africa) provinces (exs. Argentina, Canada)
union government regions (ex. Belgium) communities
(ex. India) cantons (ex. Switzerland)
national (ex. Sudan) autonomous communities (ex. Spain)
Lnder (exs. Austria, Germany)
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2. Distribution of Powers
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2. a formal constitutional distribution of powers and allocation of

revenue resources between the two orders of government

a.k.a. legislative competences a.k.a. jurisdiction

involves the distribution of legislative powers and executive powers
between the federal and the constituent governments
vary in terms of form and scope
Exclusive Concurrent Residual

Legislative Powers Legislative Powers Legislative Powers
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economic immigration taxing powers

maintenance defense
and
of law and social affairs
monetary interregional
security transportation international relations
union


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Exclusive Legislative Powers

the federal government
exs. Canada, Spain,
India, Australia, US,
Argentina and Pakistan
assigned only to either

or
the constituent government

exs. Canada, Spain,
and India
Canadas Constitution
Federal Jurisdiction Provincial Jurisdiction
Sections 91 and 92 (10) Sections 92, 92A, and 93
Exs. Public Debt and Exs. Direct Taxation within

Property Province
Regulation of Management/Sale of
Trade/Commerce Public Lands
Unemployment belonging to Province
Insurance Prisons
Direct/Indirect Taxation Hospitals
Postal Service Municipalities
Census/Statistics Formalization of Marriage
Available from http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/aia/index.asp?lang=eng&page=federal&doc=legis-eng.htm
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Concurrent Legislative Powers a.k.a. Shared legislative powers
shared between the federal and the constituent governments
may be legislated by both the federal

and the constituent governments
in most instances,
in case of conflicts
federal legislation prevails
between them
over constituent legislation
Concurrent Legislative Powers
Distribution of
Sample Country Cases
Concurrent Legislative Power
extensive areas of
concurrent jurisdiction Australia, Germany, India, US
limited areas of concurrent

jurisdiction Canada
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Residual Legislative Powers
Identify which order of government has jurisdiction over matters

not specified in the constitution as exclusive or concurrent
federal government constituent governments
usually in federations created usually in federations created

by the process of devolution by the process of aggregating
from a formerly unitary state previously separate units
(holding-together federalism) (coming-together federalism)
India and Canada Australia, Austria, Germany,
Switzerland, and the US
Distribution of Powers in a Sample of Federal Countries (from IDEA)
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symmetrical asymmetrical
one form: constitutional asymmetry
all constituent
governments have equal differences in the status of
juridical status and legislative and executive powers
powers assigned by the constitution to
the constituent governments

one type of constitutional asymmetry

increase the jurisdiction asymmetrical
(autonomy) of particular
constituent states
differences in the status of

concessions made to the Borneo legislative and executive powers
states (Sabah and Sarawak) assigned by the constitution to
when they joined the Malaysian the constituent governments
federation in 1963
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one type of constitutional asymmetry

increase the jurisdiction asymmetrical
(autonomy) of particular
constituent states
differences in the status of

concessions made to some of legislative and executive powers
the autonomous communities assigned by the constitution to
in Spain (esp. Basque Country, the constituent governments
Catalonia, and Galicia)

1. tax collection and revenue raising powers

fiscal
2. intergovernmental financial transfers federalism
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fiscal
federalism
Distribution of Taxing Powers

Concurrent Concurrent
Taxing Powers Federal Federal paramountcy
Customs Canada, US,

Switzerland, Australia, Belgium
Germany, Austria,
India, Malaysia, Spain,
Pakistan
Excise Canada, Switzerland, US, Belgium India

Australia, Germany,
Austria, Malaysia,
Spain, Pakistan
Based on Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Appendix A, p. 118.
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Concurrent Concurrent
Taxing Powers Federal Federal paramountcy
Customs Canada, US,

Switzerland, Australia, Belgium
Germany, Austria,
Pakistan
Excise Canada, Switzerland, US, Belgium India

Australia, Germany,
Austria, Malaysia,
Spain, Pakistan

Taxing Powers Concurrent Concurrent
Federal
Federal paramountcy
Switzerland, Austria,
US, Australia, Canada
Corporate Income India, Malaysia,
Germany*, Belgium
Spain, Pakistan
Canada, India,
Personal Income Austria, Malaysia US, Australia,
Switzerland,
Germany*, Belgium
Spain, Pakistan
Sales Switzerland,
US, Australia,
Austria, Malaysia, Canada, India
Germany*, Belgium
Spain, Pakistan
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Taxing Powers Concurrent Concurrent
Federal
Federal paramountcy
Switzerland, Austria,
US, Australia, Canada
Corporate Income India, Malaysia,
Germany*, Belgium
Spain, Pakistan
Canada, India,
Austria, Malaysia US, Australia,
Personal Income Switzerland,
Germany*, Belgium
Spain, Pakistan
Sales Switzerland,
US, Australia,
Austria, Malaysia, Canada, India
Germany*, Belgium
Spain, Pakistan
Distribution of Debt / Borrowing Powers

Debt/Borrowing Concurrent Concurrent
Federal
Powers Federal paramountcy
Canada, US,
Foreign Austria, India, Switzerland,
Australia
Borrowing Malaysia Germany, Spain,
Pakistan
Canada, US,
Domestic Switzerland, Germany,
Borrowing Australia
Pakistan
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Distribution of Debt / Borrowing Powers

Debt/Borrowing Concurrent Concurrent
Federal
Powers Federal paramountcy
Canada, US,
Foreign Austria, India, Switzerland,
Australia
Borrowing Malaysia Germany, Spain,
Pakistan
Canada, US,
Domestic Switzerland, Germany,
Borrowing Australia
Pakistan


fiscal
2. intergovernmental financial transfers federalism
a.k.a. equalization transfers
solidarity transfers
composed of conditional and unconditional grants
roughly similar to the Philippines Internal Revenue Allotment
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Fiscal imbalances that every federalism has to correct
1. vertical imbalances

constitutionally assigned
constitutionally assigned
expenditure responsibilities
revenues for the federal
for the federal and
and constituent governments
constituent governments
Main reason for the vertical imbalance
allocation of major taxing assignment of expensive

powers to the federal
governments
vs. expenditures to the
constituent governments
Fiscal imbalances that every federalism has to correct
2. horizontal imbalances
inability of constituent
revenue capacities
governments to provide
of different
their citizens with
constituent
services at the same level
governments vary
(regional imbalances)
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Correcting the horizontal and vertical imbalances
financial transfers from one level of government to another
federal governments constituent governments
exception financial transfers

Germany: interstate
conditional transfers unconditional transfers

(federal transfers to constituent (federal transfers to constituent
governments that have governments that have no conditions
conditions attached to them) attached to them)
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3. Bicameralism
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3. provision for the designated representation of distinct regional

views within the federal policy-making institutions, usually provided
by the particular form of the federal second chamber
principle of bicameralism in federalism
authoritarian regime except the

United Arab Emirates
and
microstate Saint Kitts and Nevis,
all federations are bicameral
3. provision for the designated representation of distinct regional

views within the federal policy-making institutions, usually provided
by the particular form of the federal second chamber
Unlike the first

chamber, the second
chamber is the principle of bicameralism in federalism
legislative institution
which operates on
the basis of except the
representation as United Arab Emirates
states and
Saint Kitts and Nevis,
all federations are bicameral
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Manner of Selection Implications Sample Country Case/s
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4. Constitutional Entrenchment
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4. a supreme written constitution not unilaterally amendable and

requiring the consent of a significant proportion of the constituent units
this is the principle of

constitutional entrenchment of federalism
plain English: very difficult to

amend its federal character
amendments of the constitution require the involvement of

that affect its federal character both orders of government
(ex. distribution of power) US, Canada, India,
most federations require: and Malaysia
approval in both houses

of the federal legislature
+ approval either by a special majority
of the constituent unit legislatures
or by a referendum requiring
a double majority
simple absolute federally
majority majority weighted
(Australia)
(Switzerland
and Canada) special majority
(US, India,
and Malaysia)
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amendments of the constitution require the involvement of

that affect its federal character both orders of government
(ex. distribution of power) US, Canada, India,
most federations require: and Malaysia
approval in both houses

of the federal legislature
+ approval either by a special majority
of the constituent unit legislatures
or by a referendum requiring
a double majority
simple absolute federally
majority majority weighted
(Australia) 1. overall majority and
(Switzerland
special majority 2. majorities in a majority
and Canada)
(US, India, of constituent units
and Malaysia) (Switzerland and Australia)
4. a supreme written constitution not unilaterally amendable and

requiring the consent of a significant proportion of the constituent units
clauses that cannot be

changed by amendment
this is the principle of

Qualify Watts: some constitutional entrenchment of federalism
federal constitutions
certain cases:
have eternity clauses
not possible
for their federal
to revoke
character
exs. plain English: very difficult to
Brazil and Germany amend its federal character
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5. Adjudication
5. an umpire (in the form of courts or provision for referendums)

to rule on disputes between governments
even more necessary need for processes to adjudicate

in federations disputes and resolve conflicts
unavoidability of
referendum
overlaps of jurisdiction
(Switzerland)
between governments
and the consequent likelihood judicial

of intergovernmental judicialization of politics
competition and conflict
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5. an umpire (in the form of courts or provision for referendums)

to rule on disputes between governments
two types of courts
supreme court constitutional court
final adjudicator in relation to specializes in constitutional

all laws including the constitution interpretation
US, Canada, Australia, India, Germany, Belgium, and Spain

Malaysia, and Austria
Methods of Appointment to the Supreme Courts
Methods of Appointment Sample Country Case/s
appointed solely by the president but

ratified by the Senate where the state US
electorates are equally represented
Bundesrat representing the Lnder
appoints half the members of the Germany
Constitutional Court and the Bundestag
the other half
appointment by federal cabinet but
required by the constitution to consult
India and Malaysia
certain bodies before making the
appointments
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the other half
India and Malaysia
appointments

the other half
India and Malaysia
appointments
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6. Intergovernmental Collaboration
6. processes and institutions to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration

for those areas where governmental responsibilities are shared or
inevitably overlap
two important dimensions
relations between the federal

and unit governments inter-unit relations
exs. standing and ad hoc meetings involving ministers,

legislators, officials and agencies of different governments
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Institutions of Intergovernmental Collaboration within Federations

Institutions Forms of Institutions
formal standing and ad hoc meetings involving ministers,

legislators, officials and agencies of different governments
executive federalism (parliamentarism) = predominant role

of governmental executives (ministers and their officials)
federal legislature (presidentialism) and a variety of channels
e.g. extensive lobbying of federal legislator by various state
and cantonal representatives
interlocked federalism = there is a constitutional requirement that a

considerable portion of federal legislation must be administered by
the governments of the regional units (Germany)
II.E. Primary and Secondary Characteristics

of Federalism
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Neat Institutional Design Technique to Make Sense of the Institutional

Features of Federalism
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Neat Institutional Design Technique to Make Sense of the Institutional

Features of Federalism
1. Orders of Government Primary
2. Distribution of Powers characteristics
3. Bicameralism
4. Constitutional Entrenchment
5. Adjudication
6. Intergovernmental Collaboration Secondary
7. ______________ characteristics
(that make possible the
8. ______________
primary characteristics)
9. onwards ______________
III. Why and Why not Federalism?
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Potential Advantages of Federalism (International IDEA, 2015)

1. Federalism is offered as an institutional solution to the problems
associated with scale and diversity
2. Federal government is rooted in constitutionalism and pluralism
3. Broaden the base of power-sharing
4. Encourage innovative and pragmatic approaches to policy
development
5. Reduce the burden on the central authorities
6. Share resources across geographical space
7. Develop capacity and democratic responsibility
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Potential Disadvantages of Federalism (International IDEA, 2015)
1. Duplication of work and lack of coherence
2. Additional operating costs
3. Increasing regional discrepancies of wealth, resources and

outcomes
4. Harmful economic competition between sub-national units
5. Judicialization of politics
Nine Potential Disadvantages of Federalism (International IDEA, 2015)
6. Potential exclusion of minorities
7. The strengthening of local elites who misuse power
8. Ineffective governance because of a lack of capacity
9. Instability and threats to democracy
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IV. Three Cautionary Insights

from the Institutional Design Literature
IV.1. First cautionary insight:

No consensus on the superiority of one form/system to another
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there is no consensus on the superiority of the
federal parliamentary /semi-presidential
to the to the
or
unitary presidential
system of government form of government

or vice versa
Critics of the superiority argument give two intertwined reasons:
1. Institutional bundle
a package of institutional features
federal unitary
just a few examples: just a few examples:
distribution of devil manner of recruitment
legislative/executive powers in the national/local
is
type of constitutional bureaucracy
in appointment powers of the
entrenchment
design of upper house
the president to bureaucracy
details level and type of decentralization
mechanisms for intergovern-
mental coordination level and type of devolution
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At the level of institutional bundle, helps explain performance
federal unitary
distribution of devil manner of recruitment
legislative/executive powers in the national/local
is
type of constitutional bureaucracy
in appointment powers of the
entrenchment
design of upper house
the president to bureaucracy
details level and type of decentralization
mechanisms for intergovern-
mental coordination level and type of devolution
At the level of institutional bundle, helps explain performance
form of government
parliamentary presidential
type of confidence vote veto power of the president
devil
dissolution power of the legislative proactive
is powers of the president
prime minister
in impeachment rules
design of legislature
(unicameral/bicameral) the impoundment and other
power of legislative committees details budgetary powers
cabinet powers reelection rule
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2. Institutional configuration how different types of

institutions affect each other
(e.g. how party system is
affected by the electoral
system)
this means that institutions must

not be analyzed independently
from other institutions that may
affect their functioning
2. Institutional configuration
form of government
performance affected by other institutions
parliamentary form of government presidential form of government

just one
pair of
devil
examples: party system is party system
in timing of
Westminster the elections SMD
(SMD) details
electoral system electoral system
PR MM PR
run-off
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At the level of institutional design, helps explain performance
form of government
parliamentary form of government presidential form of government

just one
pair of
devil
in timing of
Westminster the elections SMD
(SMD) details
electoral system electoral system
PR MM PR
run-off
At the level of institutional design, helps explain performance
federal system of government unitary system of government

just one
pair of
devil
in
the
electoral system details electoral system
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Note that non-institutional factors are not yet factored here:

exs. level of economic development, colonial heritage, political culture,
political elite composition, length of democracy, geographical location
federal system of government unitary system of government

just one
pair of
devil
in
the
electoral system details electoral system
IV.2. Second cautionary insight: Reform not Overhaul
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the recommendation of is to reform

top scholars for rather than
democratic countries with overhaul their
already functioning systems or forms of
systems or forms of government
government
revival of institutional design questions

government
fundamental
institutional choices for
new democracies:
revival of institutional design questions most important is the
= linked with the most recent wave form of government
of democratization
where from 1974-1994:
75 countries transited to democracies role of Juan Linzs 1990 article
including the Philippines in 1986 The Perils of Presidentialism
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government
fundamental
institutional choices for
picked up by Filipino parliamentary new democracies:
advocates by mid-1990s, most important is the
when we have already made our form of government
choice of form of government in
the 1987 Constitution role of Juan Linzs 1990 article
The Perils of Presidentialism
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government
fundamental
these regimes in transition institutional choices for
have no option but to make new democracies:
these constitutional choices most important is the
form of government
the difficulty and danger of these
choices are captured by the subtitle of
Jon Elster et al.s book on post- role of Juan Linzs 1990 article
communist transitions in Eastern Europe The Perils of Presidentialism
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government
fundamental
even for most scholars arguing institutional choices for
the superiority of parliamentary new democracies:
and/or federal, there is no most important is the
recommendation to dump form of government
existing presidential/unitary
systems
role of Juan Linzs 1990 article
The Perils of Presidentialism

government
fundamental
even for most scholars arguing institutional choices for
the superiority of parliamentary new democracies:
and/or federal, there is no most important is the
recommendation to dump form of government
existing presidential/unitary
systems
role of Juan Linzs 1990 article
analogy: Sagada vs. Manila The Perils of Presidentialism
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government
among the reasons why strongly

discouraged:
1. unnecessary: if there is no superiority,
then there is no need for overhaul

government
and
especially for
federalism among the reasons why strongly
where state discouraged:
governments, 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
constitutions, courts, and intellectually complex for lofty goals
and bureaucracy, Philippine time
etc. would have to (institutional bundle)
be created
frame is 10 years! + (institutional configuration)
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government
and
no democratic among the reasons why strongly
country has been discouraged:
crazy enough to 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
make these and intellectually complex for lofty goals
overhauls at the
same time! (institutional bundle)
+ (institutional configuration)
Just when you think it is to reform

very tricky could not get crazier,
executive rather than
veto gates semi-presidentialism overhaul their
systems or forms of
fast becoming a government
grocery list of
dual executive
institutions! and
no democratic among the reasons why strongly
country has been discouraged:
crazy enough to 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
make these and intellectually complex for lofty goals
overhauls at the
same time! (institutional bundle)
+ (institutional configuration)
85
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government
and
institutional design
literature has among the reasons why strongly
sobered from the discouraged:
enthusiasm of the 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
early 1990s on the and intellectually complex for lofty goals
power to get
right
And this is just about one aspect of the

institutional configuration: electoral system
86
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hubris? is to reform
Philippines constitutional
rather than
overhaul project in 2016:
and/or overhaul their
height of intellectual irony
systems or forms of
sheer government
ignorance of
the literature? and
literature has clearly among the reasons why strongly
sobered from the discouraged:
enthusiasm of the 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
1990s on the power and intellectually complex for lofty goals
to get institutional
design right
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
and
discouraged:
2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
and intellectually complex for lofty goals
87
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is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
and
discouraged:
88
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89
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90
11/8/2016
91
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92
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93
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is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
and
discouraged:
94
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is to reform
hyperrationality (Croissant and Merkel) rather than
hyperinstitutionalism overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
and
Taagepera: among the reasons why strongly
discouraged:
95
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is to reform
hyperrationality (Merkel and Croissant) rather than
hyperinstitutionalism overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
and
Taagepera: among the reasons why strongly
excessive optimism discouraged:
in institutional design 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
easily leads to and intellectually complex for lofty goals
excessive
disillusionment
afterwards undermining rather than deepening democracy
96
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is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
and
discouraged:
3. Unsafe (highly risky): will be discussed
in cautionary insight 3

government
reforms
1. More justifiable
do not need constitutional revisions
two reform principles only legislation
from Larry Diamond or constitutional amendments
97
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98
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government
reforms
1. More justifiable
do not need constitutional revisions
two reform principles only legislation
from Larry Diamond or constitutional amendments
A. reform only in the face of manifest flaws
B. reform should correct those flaws as specifically as possible

government
reforms
2. Less risky: Messed-up
reforms are more reformable do not need constitutional revisions
only legislation
If there are errors in the reforms, or constitutional amendments
easier to return to the old setup
or to push it further to the new setup
through new legislation/amendment
99
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government
piecemeal reforms that move to a

2. Less risky: Messed-up more parliamentary-like direction
reforms are more reformable (example: party system reforms
against turncoatism)
If there are errors in the reforms, or a more federal-like direction
easier to return to the old setup (exs.: increased regional autonomy
or to push it further to the new setup or a more robust local govt. code)
through new legislation/amendment involve only legislation
For scholars, may yet be the is to reform

most crucial prerequisite rather than
before any talk of a overhaul their
constitutional shift to systems or forms of
parliamentary form government

more parliamentary-like direction
(example: party system reforms
or a more federal-like direction
(exs.: increased regional autonomy
or a more robust local govt. code)
involve only legislation
100
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Sartori:
101
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Sartori:
undisciplined political
parties in a presidential
democracy
becoming disciplined in a
parliamentary shift is
against all odds

Mainwaring and Shugart:

102
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Mainwaring and Shugart:

undisciplined political
parties in a parliamentary
shift could exacerbate
problems of governability
and instability more than
in a presidential democracy
103
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Croissant and Merkel:


Croissant and Merkel:

different time horizon
the consolidation of the new party system
takes much longer than changing the constitution
old, fragmented, clientelistic, and irresponsible parties

would not be able to create strong and stable governments
104
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government
2. Less risky: Messed-up very different from messed-up

reforms are more reformable constitutional revisions involving
system or form of government
If there are errors in the reforms,
or to push it further to the new setup especially for shift to federalism
because of constitutional is to reform

entrenchment protecting rather than
its status, no federal overhaul their
country negotiated under systems or forms of
democratic conditions has government
ever returned to unitary

105
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because of constitutional is to reform

entrenchment protecting rather than
its status, no federal overhaul their

106
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because of constitutional forced- is to reform

entrenchment protecting together rather than
its status, no federal federalism overhaul their

IV.3. Third cautionary insight:

Institutional design is political design
107
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According to Adam Przeworski:
108
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There are no optimal democratic institutions
and even if
B there were,

the distributive impact of institutional design
means opposing political forces will most likely not choose them
and even if
B there were,
109
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A and even if
B there were,
B1

(most A and even if
important B there were,
political
economy of actors are
institutional those who B1
design/ will write the
constitution) each
constitutional B2 institutional
engineering opposing design outcome
political forces B3 reflects the
balance of power
110
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political
economy of
the
federalism only president to
project in support was Arroyo
the (in her campaign
Philippines different from the
platform in 2004)
under federalism project
but haphazard support
Duterte before Duterte
(1986-early 2016)
111
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112
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very strong
political
support of the
economy of
president
the
federalism (prominent in his
only president to
project in campaign platform)
support was Arroyo
platform in 2004)
(1986-early 2016)
only played second
fiddle to the
parliamentary project
113
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clear primacy over the

very strong parliamentary/semi-
political
support of the presidency project
economy of
president
the
federalism (prominent in his
only president to
project in campaign platform)
support was Arroyo
platform in 2004)
(1986-early 2016)
only played second
fiddle to the
parliamentary project
U F How do we
reach here?
political Constituent (P/SP)
economy of Assembly Current preferred
the mode:
federalism - Philippine President
project in - House Speaker
the - Senate President
Philippines - House Committee
under on Constitutional
Duterte Amendment
114
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U F How do we
reach here?
economy of Assembly Current preferred
the mode:
federalism - Philippine President
project in - House Speaker
the - Senate President
Philippines - House Committee
under on Constitutional
Duterte Amendment
115
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ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this

Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all
its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Constituent assembly mode

(Note: term never appears in the Constitution)
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this

Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all
its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
?
116
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117
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October 10, 1986
118
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U F How do we
reach here?
economy of Assembly
the
federalism
project in
the
Philippines
under
Duterte
U F How do we
reach here?
economy of Assembly
the
federalism assuming that the Duterte administration could get
project in the 3/4ths vote (18/24) in the Senate = big question mark
the
Philippines and (223/297) in the Lower House = sure ball, as of now
under
Duterte
119
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Philippine Congress
(especially its HoR) U F How do we
reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Just two comments
Assembly
1. very low level of one of the most crucial indicators:
institutionalization of political parties party switching
current 17th Congress (the one that will become the ConAss):
election result for HoR = PDP-Laban only had 3 out of 297 representatives
LP had 116 members
post-election = PDP-Laban membership and allies swelled
party-switching to a supermajority of 260-plus
and re-alignment = official minority: 20-plus but also the majority's minority
= real minority; down to 7 members
Philippine Congress
reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Just two comments
Assembly
1. very low level of one of the most crucial indicators:
institutionalization of political parties party switching
higher level of payoffs to More incoherent
move legislative agenda lawmaking as more More unstable
of the executive policy side payments political support
pork barrel by any are made with more for the president,
other name players representing especially when
(CDF, PDAF, DAP, particularistic interests his popularity
Dutertes pork) goes down
120
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Philippine Congress
reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Just two comments
Assembly
2. High level of barrier to entry one of the most crucial indicators:
political dynasty
Not aware of any scholarly study yet on the 16th Congress (2013-2016)
and the current 17th Congress (2016-2019)
But there are at least two on the House of Representatives of the 15th
Congress (2010-2013) by Mendoza et al., 2012
121
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Philippine Congress
reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Just two comments
Assembly
political dynasty
HoR of the 15 Congress (2010-2013)
th
70 percent of members belong to a political dynasty
with kinship links to at least one legislator in the 12th, 13th,

14th, or 15th Congress, or at least one local government
official elected in 2001, 2004, 2007, or 2010 (Dynasty3 Type)
Philippine Congress
reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Just two comments
Assembly
political dynasty
Not aware of any scholarly study yet on the 16th Congress (2013-2016)
and the current 17th Congress (2016-2019)
But there are at least two on the House of Representatives of the 15th
Congress (2010-2013) by Mendoza et al., 2012
by Rivera, 2011
122
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Philippine Congress
reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Just two comments
Assembly
political dynasty
HoR of the 15 Congress (2010-2013)
th
34 out of 77 provinces or 44 percent had the

same political family winning the governorship
and at least one congressional district
123
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Philippine Congress
reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Just two comments
Assembly
political dynasty
Self-perpetuating
in politics by
nature of clan
replication
124
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125
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Philippine Congress
reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Just two comments
Assembly
political dynasty
Self-perpetuating
Highly clientelistic
in politics by nature
(patronage-based) Prevents party
of clan replication
because familial/clan institutionalization
interests take as dynasties act
precedence over any as surrogates of
national interests political parties
U F How do we
reach here?
ConAss
(P/SP)
members
who are
winners of
the old
unitary/
presidential
setup
126
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U F How do we
reach here?
ConAss
(P/SP)
members
who are
winners of
the old
unitary/ compromises with F1
presidential groups that have (P/SP1)
each
setup benefited from existing institutional
institutional design outcome
overwhelmingly for arrangements reflects the
non-institutionalized balance of power
and dynastic interests
127
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U F How do we
reach here?
ConAss
(P/SP)
members
who are
winners of
the old
unitary/
F1
presidential
(P/SP1)
each
setup
distributive
swing could be
F institutional
2 design outcome
overwhelmingly for
more dramatic (P/SP2) reflects the
U F How do we
reach here?
because of (P/SP)
the sheer
multiplicity
of features
involved
(think F1
institutional (P/SP1)
bundle and each
configuration)
F institutional
2 design outcome
overwhelmingly for (P/SP2) reflects the
128
11/8/2016
U F How do we
reach here?
because of (P/SP)
the sheer
multiplicity
of features
involved
(think F1
bundle and each
configuration)
F institutional
2 design outcome
overwhelmingly for
non-institutionalized F3 (P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
and dynastic interests (P/SP3)
U F How do we
reach here?
hybrid because of (P/SP)
outcomes the sheer
that leave multiplicity
lines of of features
accountability
unclear and
combine the
involved
(think F1
worst bundle and each
of both
worlds
configuration)
F institutional
2 design outcome
institutional F3 (P/SP2) reflects the

balance of power
Frankenstein outcomes (P/SP3)
129
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among the most important factors:

(existing vested interests)
U F How do we
reach here?
ConAss
(P/SP)
members
who are
institutional winners of
endogeneity the old
unitary/
F1
presidential
(P/SP1)
what explains each
setup
institutional
choices?
F institutional
2 design outcome
and performance? F3 (P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
(P/SP3)

U F How do we
reach here?
assumption of ConAss
(P/SP)
some kind of members
displacement who are
of the vested winners of
interests of
the old order
the old
unitary/
F1
presidential
(P/SP1)
each
setup
premium on F institutional
2 design outcome
democratic regime
transitions F3 (P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
(P/SP3)
130
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U
F How do we
reach here?
ConAss
(P/SP)
Worst-case members
scenario of who are
constitution- winners of
making for
Przeworski
the old
unitary/
F1
presidential
(P/SP1)
each
setup
F institutional
2 design outcome
F3 (P/SP2) reflects the

balance of power
(P/SP3)
131
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U
Worst-case
F How do we
reach here?
scenario of ConAss
(P/SP)
constitution- members
making for who are
Przeworski winners of
When the the old
unitary/
F1
relation of (P/SP1)
forces is known presidential each
setup
and uneven,
F institutional
2 design outcome
the institutions are
custom-made for a particular F3 (P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
person, party or alliance (P/SP3)
Elster: U
F How do we
reach here?
ConAss
(P/SP)
members
who are
winners of
the old
unitary/
F1
presidential
(P/SP1)
each
setup
F institutional
2 design outcome
F3 (P/SP2) reflects the

balance of power
(P/SP3)
132
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Elster: U
F How do we
reach here?
Constitutions ConAss
(P/SP)
ought to members
be written by who are
specially winners of
convened
assemblies
the old
unitary/
F1
not by presidential
(P/SP1)
each
bodies setup
that also F institutional
2 design outcome
serve as
ordinary F 3
(P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
legislatures (P/SP3)
133
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Elster:
U F How do we
reach here?
Constitutions ConAss
(P/SP)
ought to members
be written by who are
specially winners of
convened
assemblies
the old
unitary/
F1
not by presidential
(P/SP1)
each
bodies setup
that also
serve as
F institutional
2 design outcome
ordinary to reduce the scope for (P/SP2) reflects the

balance of power
legislatures institutional interest

U F How do we
reach here?
political ConAss
(P/SP)
economy of members
the who are
federalism winners of
project in
the
the old
unitary/
F1
Philippines presidential
(P/SP1)
each
under setup
Duterte F institutional
2 design outcome
analogy: same inept driver
with brand new vehicle F3 (P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
from Manila to Sagada (P/SP3)
134
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IV.4. Other cautionary insights
4. Institutional design as mis-design

(strategic miscalculations of actors)
a.k.a. law of unintended consequences
135
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5. Institutional design as design-less

(upstream and downstream quality of new constitutional choices)
Thank you very much
136
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The Federalism Project in the Philippines:

Cautionary Insights from the Institutional Design Literature
Gene Lacza Pilapil
137

Federalism Ongpin

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Federalism Ongpin

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11/8/2016

The Federalism Project in the Philippines:

Gene Lacza Pilapil

I would like to thank Mrs. Maria Isabel G. Ongpin and the

Equally important, I am honored to be associated with the

His example should continue to inspire this generation of

I would also like to thank everyone in the audience.

Although the topic is a worrying one, it should nevertheless

Among the audience are former professors, former students,

A million thanks to everyone for attending.

Three Main Aims of the Lecture

1. Give a working knowledge of a federal political system

2. Introduce the importance of the institutional design literature

3. Give fair warning on the grave dangers of constitutional overhauls

Outline of the Lecture

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

formal rules institutions

rules that influence the strategies

written down somewhere

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

formal rules institutions

rules that influence the strategies

written down somewhere

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

formal rules institutions

rules that influence the strategies

written down somewhere

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

differences in the arrangement of formal rules

one basic example: form of government

relation between the executive and legislative

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

such as the studies how the design

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

such as the studies how the design

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

such as the studies how the design

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

such as the studies how the design

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

such as the studies how the design

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

such as the studies how the design

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

such as the studies how the design

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

such as the studies how the design

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

such as the studies how the design

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

such as the studies how the design

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

such as the studies how the design

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

such as the studies how the design

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

such as the studies how the design

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

such as the studies how the design

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

constitutional engineering literature

constitutional design literature

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature