Lochner v.

New York

Brief Fact Summary. A New York labor law required employees to work no more than sixty hours in one week.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The 1897 Labor Law limiting the hours that an employee in a biscuit, bread, or cake bakery or
confectionery establishment may work is an abridgement to their liberty of contract and a violation of due process.

Facts. The 1897 Labor Law stated that no employee can be required or permitted to work in a biscuit, bread, or cake bakery or
confectionery establishment more than sixty hours in a week or more than ten hours in one day, unless to make work on the last day
of the week shorter. And the number of hours worked in a week could not average out to be more than ten hours per day.

Issue. Does the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment protect liberty of contract and private
property against unwarranted government interference

Held. Justice Peckham opinion. This law is an abridgment to the liberty of contract and a violation of due process.
The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. No state can deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The right to purchase or sell labor
is part of that liberty protected. The only way a state may counter this right is to show they are exercising a valid police power with their
regulation. Those powers relate to the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the public.
The Court rejected the labor law justification of the statute on police power grounds because this was not a valid exercise of police
power.
First, that power is extended to the protection of public welfare and not the readjustment of bargaining power between employees
and employers. The effect of this legislation was to regulate labor conditions and not to protect workers. The effect of such statutes,
not just the stated or proclaimed purpose, is determinative in whether this statute is repugnant to the United States Constitution.
Second, there is no valid health of safety rationale in this case. Bakers were not endangered like miners were in the Holden v. Hardy
case. Mining is a profession that needed regulation, but this is not. The state could accomplish its goals with means that did not
interfere with the freedom to contract. Because the police power exercised here is not strong, the Court suspected that there were
legislative motives behind the enactment of this law. New York was using its power to upset the free market.

Dissent. Justices Holmes, Harlan, White and Day dissenting.

J. Holmes: States may regulate life in many ways which might seem injudicious or tyrannical and which may interfere with the liberty to
contract. Sunday laws and usury laws are examples. Liberty of a citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not interfere with the
liberty of others to do the same, has been interfered with by school laws, the Post Office, every state or city which takes his money in
taxes for purposes thought desirable which he may or may not like. The states have interfered with the liberty to contract with the
prohibition of sales of stock on margins for future delivery and the eight-hour law for miners.
J. Holmes: A Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory. Finding certain opinions natural and familiar or
novel ought not to determine whether the statutes conflict with the Constitution. The word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is
improperly construed when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair
man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental traditions, which have been understood by the
traditions of our people and law.
J. Harlan: If a state is to interfere with the right to contract, it may do so only if the regulation involves a states police power to protect
the health of its citizens. The Court should not be concerned with the policy of legislation. The only question is whether the means
devised by the state are germane to a valid end.

Discussion. In 1917, without mentioning its opinion in Lochner, the Court upheld a law, which provided for a maximum ten-hour day
for factory workers of both genders and regulated overtime pay. Bunting v. Oregon.

Olmstead v US

Brief Fact Summary. The conversations of various individuals involved in illegal liquor sales were tapped.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A standard which would forbid the reception of evidence, if obtained by other than nice ethical conduct by
government officials, would make society suffer and give criminals greater immunity than has been known heretofore. In the absence
of controlling legislation by Congress, those who realize the difficulties in bringing offenders to justice may well deem it wise that the
exclusion of evidence should be confined to cases where rights under the Constitution would be violated by admitting it.

Facts. Various individuals were convicted of liquor related crimes, including conspiracy. The operation grossed a substantial amount
of money. The leading conspirator and the general manager of the business was one of the Petitioners, Olmstead (the Petitioner).
The main office of the business was in Seattle and there were three telephones in the office, each on a different line. There were also
telephones in an office the Petitioner had in his own home, at the home of his associates and various other places in Seattle. A lot of
communication occurred between Seattle and Vancouver, British Columbia.
The information which led to the discovery of the conspiracy and its nature and extent was largely obtained by intercepting messages
on the telephones of the conspirators by four federal prohibition officers. Small wires were inserted along the ordinary telephone wires
from the residences of four of the [suspects] and those leading from the chief office. The insertions were made without trespass upon
any property of the defendants. They were made in the basement of the large office building. The taps from house lines were made in
the streets near the houses.
Various conversations were taped and testified to by government witnesses.

Issue. [W]hether the use of evidence of private telephone conversations between the defendants and others, intercepted by means of
wire tapping, amounted to a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments[?]
Held. The [Fourth] amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence
was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants. By the
invention of the telephone 50 years ago, and its application for the purpose of extending communications, one can talk with another at
a far distant place. The language of the amendment cannot be extended and expanded to include telephone wires, reaching to the
whole world from the defendants house or office. The intervening wires are not part of his house or office, any more than are the
highways along which they are stretched.
Congress may, of course, protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in
federal criminal trials, by direct legislation, and thus depart from the common law of evidence. But the courts may not adopt such a
policy by attributing an enlarged and unusual meaning to the Fourth Amendment. The reasonable view is that one who installs in his
house a telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside, and that the wires beyond his
house, and messages while passing over them, are not within the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Here those who intercepted
the projected voices were not in the house of either party to the conversation.
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions brought to our attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have
been violated as against a defendant, unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person or such a seizure of his
papers or his tangible material effects or an actual physical invasion of his house or curtilage for the purpose of making a seizure.
[The court thought], therefore, that the wire tapping here disclosed did not amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
Additionally, [t]he common-law rule is that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means by which it was
obtained.
A standard which would forbid the reception of evidence, if obtained by other than nice ethical conduct by government officials, would
make society suffer and give criminals greater immunity than has been known heretofore. In the absence of controlling legislation by
Congress, those who realize the difficulties in bringing offenders to justice may well deem it wise that the exclusion of evidence should
be confined to cases where rights under the Constitution would be violated by admitting it.

Dissent. Justice Holmes filed a dissenting opinion and argued that apart from the Constitution the government ought not to use
evidence obtained and only obtainable by a criminal act. There is no body of precedents by which we are bound, and which confines
us to logical deduction from established rules. Therefore [the Court] must consider the two objects of desire both of which [the Court]
cannot have and make up our minds which to choose. It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all
available evidence should be used. It also is desirable that the government should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they
are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained. If it pays its officers for having got evidence by crime I do not see why it may
not as well pay them for getting it in the same way, and I can attach no importance to protestations of disapproval if it knowingly
accepts and pays and announces that in future it will pay for the fruits
. [The Court has] to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part.

Dissent. Justice Brandeis filed a dissenting opinion and argued [a]pplying to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments the established rule of
construction, the defendants objections to the evidence obtained by wire tapping must, in my opinion, be sustained. It is, of course,
immaterial where the physical connection with the telephone wires leading into the defendants premises was made. And it is also
immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of law enforcement. Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the governments purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-
minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
When the government, having full knowledge, sought, through the Department of Justice, to avail itself of the fruits of these acts in
order to accomplish its own ends, it assumed moral responsibility for the officers crimes and if this court should permit the
government, by means of its officers crimes, to effect its purpose of punishing the defendants, there would seem to be present all the
elements of a ratification. If so, the government itself would become a lawbreaker.

Skinner v. Oklahama

Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, Skinner (Petitioner), was sentenced to involuntary sterilization under Oklahomas Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act (the Act) and now alleges that the Act deprives him of equal protection under the laws.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The right to have offspring is a fundamental right, requiring a compelling state interest to interfere with it.

Facts. Oklahoma defined a habitual criminal as a person who, having been convicted two or more times for crimes amounting to
felonies involving moral turpitude either in Oklahoma or another State, is thereafter convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and is
sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a Oklahoma penal institution. Such habitual criminals could be subject to forced sterilization.
The Petitioner had been twice arrested for theft offenses before being arrested and confined for armed robbery. During his third
incarceration, the Act was passed and proceedings were instituted against him.

Issue. May the State sterilize an individual against his will for being convicted of three felonies involving moral turpitude?

Held. No. Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruling reversed.

Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) notes that sterilization of habitual offenders in no way guarantees that new offenders will not be
born. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that habitual offenders would spawn offenders themselves.
J. Douglas cannot justify the distinction between larceny (involving moral turpitude) and embezzlement (not involving moral turpitude)
in the eyes of the statute. This is clear discrimination in J. Douglass view. In terms of fines and imprisonment the crimes are identical
to the State. Only when it comes to sterilization do the crimes differ. As such, equal protection is violated.
Concurrence. Chief Justice Harlan Stone (J. Stone) concurs in the judgment, but rests his decision on due process grounds, arguing
that the invasion of personal liberty is too great.

Griswold v. Connecticut
Brief Fact Summary. Appellants were charged with violating a statute preventing the distribution of advice to married couples
regarding the prevention of conception. Appellants claimed that the statute violated the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The right of a married couple to privacy is protected by the Constitution.

Facts. Appellant Griswold, Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and Appellant Buxton, a licensed
physician who served as Medical Director for the League at its Center in New Haven, were arrested and charged with giving
information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons on means of preventing conception. Appellants were found guilty as
accessories and fined $100 each. Appellants appealed on the theory that the accessory statute as applied violated the 14th
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellants claimed standing based on their professional relationship with the married
people they advised.

Issue. Does the Constitution provide for a privacy right for married couples?

Held. The First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion, which although not expressly
included in the Amendment, is necessary to make the express guarantees meaningful. The association of marriage is a privacy right
older than the Bill of Rights, and the States effort to control marital activities in this case is unnecessarily broad and therefore
impinges on protected Constitutional freedoms.

Dissent. Justice Stewart and Justice Black. Although the law is silly, it is not unconstitutional. The citizens of Connecticut should use
their rights under the 9th and 10th Amendment to convince their elected representatives to repeal it if the law does not conform to their
community standards.

Concurrence. Justice Goldberg, the Chief Justice, and Justice Brennan. The right to privacy in marriage is so basic and fundamental
that to allow it to be infringed because it is not specifically addressed in the first eight amendments is to give the 9th Amendment no
effect.
Justice Harlan. The relevant statute violates the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment because if violates the basic values
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.

Eisenstadt v. Baird

Brief Fact Summary. Appellee was convicted for exhibiting and distributing contraceptive articles under a law that forbid single as
opposed to married people from obtaining contraceptives.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Dissimilar treatment between married and unmarried persons is unconstitutional when the dissimilar
treatment is unrelated to a rational State objective.

Facts. Appellee William Baird was convicted under a Massachusetts State law for exhibiting contraceptive articles and for giving a
woman a package of Emko vaginal foam. The Massachusetts Supreme Court set aside the conviction for exhibiting contraceptives on
the grounds that it violated Appellees First Amendment rights, but sustained the conviction for giving away the foam. The law
permitted married persons to obtain contraceptives to prevent pregnancy, but forbid single persons from obtaining them.

Issue. Is there a rational ground for the different treatment of married and unmarried persons under the Massachusetts State law?

Held. The dissimilar treatment of similarly situated married and unmarried persons under the Massachusetts law violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
First, the deterrence of premarital sex cannot be reasonably regarded as the purpose of the law, because the ban has at best a marginal
relating to the proffered objective.

Second, if health is the rationale of the law, it is both discriminatory and overbroad.

Third, the right to obtain contraceptives must be the same for married and unmarried individuals.

Dissent. Chief Justice Burger. The law is a justified exercise of the States police power because of the hazards of introducing a foreign
substance into the human body.

Goldberg v Kelly

Brief Fact Summary. Appellees were financial aid recipients whose benefits were terminated without being afforded a pre-termination
hearing, which they challenged as a denial of due process.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded is influenced by the extent to which he may
be condemned to suffer grievous loss. Due process required a pre-termination hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits.

Facts. This case was brought by residents of New York City who received financial aid under the federally assisted program of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or under New York States Home Relief Program. Their complaint alleged that City officials
administering these programs terminated such aid without prior notice and hearing, denying them due process of law. After the suit
was filed, the City adopted procedures for notice and hearing, which the plaintiff-appellees then challenged as constitutionally
inadequate. The procedure allowed the recipient to challenge the proposed termination of benefits within seven days and submit a
written statement for the reviewing official to make a final determination. Appellees challenged the procedures lack of an opportunity
to personally appear before the reviewing officer for oral testimony and cross-examination of adverse witnesses. The procedure did
allow for a post-termination fair hearing, however. The District Court held that only a pre-termination hearing would satisfy the
constitutional due process requirement.

Issue. Does a State that terminates public assistance benefits to a particular recipient without affording him an opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing prior to termination deny the recipient due process of law?

Held. Yes. Affirmed. Where welfare is concerned, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural due
process. For qualified recipients, welfare provides the only means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing and medical care. The
crucial factor is that the termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy might deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by
which to live while he waits. Dissent. No provision in the Constitution should paralyze the governments efforts to protect itself against
making payments to people who are not entitled to them. There are large numbers of undeserving welfare recipients, and States
should be able to fight back against them. Concurrence. None.

Roe v Walde

Brief Fact Summary. Appellant Jane Roe, a pregnant mother who wished to obtain an abortion, sued on behalf of all woman similarly
situated in an effort to prevent the enforcement of Texas statutes criminalizing all abortions except those performed to save the life of
the mother.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Statutes that make criminal all abortions except when medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of
the mother are an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.

Facts. Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except when medically advised for the purpose of saving the
life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional on their face and an
injunction to prevent defendant Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged that she was unmarried
and pregnant, and that she was unable to receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician because her life was not threatened by the
continuation of her pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant
sued on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague and abridged
her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Issue. Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the appellant to terminate her pregnancy embodied in the
concept of personal liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause, in the personal marital, familial, and sexual
privacy protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, or among the rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment?

Held. The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation.
The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively recent vintage, deriving from statutory changes generally enacted
in the latter half of the 19th century. At common law abortion performed before quickening (the first recognizable movement of the fetus
in utero) was not an indictable offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly established common law crime even when it
destroyed a quick fetus.

Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal abortion laws. The first is that the laws are the product of a
Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has been taken seriously by neither courts nor
commentators. The second reason is that the abortion procedure is hazardous, therefore the States concern is to protect pregnant
women. However, modern medical techniques have altered the situation, with abortions being relatively safe particularly in the first
trimester. The third reason is the States interest is in protecting the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the
pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.

For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant
womans attending physician, and may not be criminalized by statute.

For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State may regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to
maternal health based upon the States interest in promoting the health of the mother.

For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where necessary for the preservation
of the mothers life, based upon the States interest in the potential of the potential life of the unborn child.

Dissent. Justice Rehnquist. The right to an abortion is not universally accepted, and the right to privacy is thus not inherently involved
in this case.
Bowers v Hardwick

Brief Fact Summary. A male homosexual was criminally charged for committing consensual sodomy with another male adult in the
bedroom of his home.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. There is no constitutional right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy.

Facts. The Respondent, Hardwick (Respondent), brought suit in a federal district court challenging the constitutionality of a Georgia
statute insofar as it criminalized consensual sodomy. The Respondent asserted that he was a practicing homosexual, that the Georgia
statute placed him in imminent danger of arrest and that the statute violated his constitutional rights. The District Court granted a
motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision ruling that the statute violated the
Respondents fundamental rights because his homosexual activity was a private and intimate association . . . . The Eleventh Circuit
remanded the decision for trial ruling that the Georgia statute must pass strict scrutiny before it can be upheld.

Issue. Whether the act of consensual homosexual sodomy is protected under the fundamental right to privacy.

Held. Justice Byron White (J. White). No. The act of consensual sodomy is not protected under the fundamental right to privacy or any
right protected under the United States Constitution (Constitution). There is no precedent to support the Respondents claimed
constitutional right to commit sodomy. Fundamental liberty interests recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme
Court) throughout history and through its traditions have in no way set any foundation to include a case such as this under the
Constitutional umbrella of protection. The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. . . . There should be, therefore,
great resistance to expand the substantive reach of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to
be fundamental. The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is reversed.

Dissent. The dissenting opinions are as follows:

Justice Harry Blackmun (J. Blackmun). [T]he right of an individual to conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of his or her own
home [as seen in this case] seems . . . to be the heart of the Constitutions protection of privacy.
Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens). The Court orders the dismissal of respondents complaint even though the States statute
prohibits all sodomy; even though that prohibition is concededly unconstitutional with respect to heterosexuals; and even though the
States post hoc explanations for selective application are belied by the States own actions. At the very least, . . . it [is] clear at this
early stage of the litigation that respondent has alleged a constitutional claim sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.
Concurrence. The concurring opinions are as follows:
Chief Justice Warren Burger (J. Burger). I find nothing in the Constitution depriving a State of the power to enact the statute
challenged here.
Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell). Even though the Respondent has no fundamental right to engage in consensual sodomy, he may be
protected by the Eight Amendment of the Constitution because the Respondent may be imprisoned for his homosexual acts for up to
20 years for a single private, consensual act of sodomy.

Lawrence v Texas

Brief Fact Summary. Police found two men engaged in sexual conduct, in their home, and they were arrested under a Texas statute
that prohibited such conduct between two men.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. While homosexual conduct is not a fundamental right, intimate sexual relationships between consenting
adults are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Facts. In Houston, Texas, Harris County Police officers were dispatched to a private home in response to a reported weapons
disturbance. They entered (the right to enter does seem to have been questioned) the home where John Geddes resided, and observed
Lawrence and another man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a sex act. The men were arrested, held over night and charged with violating a
Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. Specifically the statute
provided A person commits and offense if he engaged in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex and goes
on to define deviate sexual intercourse as follows: any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus
of another person or the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object. The two men were then convicted
before a Justice of the Pease.

Issue. The issue is whether a statute prohibiting specific sex acts violates liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Held. Yes, intimate sexual conduct, between consenting adults, is a liberty protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Dissent. Justice Scalia: He believes that since the court does not find homosexual sodomy to be a fundamental right, and merely
describes it as an exercise in liberty, a rational basis scrutiny should be applied, and in doing so, the law would be upheld. In addition,
the courts willingness to overturn Bowers rather than use stare decicis, is inconsistent with other case law such as Planned Parenthood,
and thus, feels the court should be consistent and stable rather than being manipulative in invoking the doctrine. Since all laws, by
definition (as example, prostitution, using heroin, etc) affect liberty, they would all be unconstitutional under this courts ruling.

Concurrence.

Justice OConnor: She does not join the court in overturning Bowers, but rather, reaches her conclusion based on equal protection,
rather than any due process clause. She states that even using a rational basis review we have consistently held that some objectives,
such as a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group, are not legitimate state interests. She comes to this conclusion based on
the fact that sodomy is not prohibited between opposite sex partners, thus unfairly targets same sex partners and makes them unequal
in the eyes of the law. Since this law brands homosexuals as criminals, it makes it more difficult for them to be treated like everyone
else, thus violating equal protection and legally sanctioning discrimination.

Discussion. (Written by Justice Kennedy) The court does not focus on protecting sodomy specifically, but rather, personal
relationships. It explains that despite the fact that the statutes in questions purport to only prohibit sex, Their penalties and purposes,
though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private
of places, the home. The court found it alarming that the statute in question sought to control a personal relationship, stating that
forming personal relationships is one of the liberties we have, and should be able to choose such relationships without fear of being
punished or classified as criminals.

The court focuses on the fact that the laws should not target relations between consenting adults in private, as this is what liberty hinges
on. The court states that adults are entitled to respect for their private lives, and Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause
gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. The court ultimately applies a rational basis
review, stating that the Texas statute in question furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify an intrusion into a personal and
private life of an individual.

This case overrules Bowers v Hardwick, which had held that there is no fundamental right to engage in sodomy, or homosexual
activities. Bowers was based on the fact that historically sodomy has been outlawed, but this court finds that historically it was only
outlawed to protect individuals from sexual predators, and that rationale should not be used when consenting adults are involved,
specifically stating "The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are
situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter."

Board of Education v Earls

The Tecumseh Public Schools adopted the Students Activities Drug Testing Policy, which requires all middles and high school
students to consent to drug testing before they can participate in competitive extra- curricular activities.

Under this program, students must submit to random drug testing while participating in their respective activities and must agree to be
tested at any time upon reasonable suspicion. However, this policy was not accepted by everyone.

Two students involved in the covered extra- curricular activities, as represented by their parents, filed a case questioning the
constitutionality of the said policy.

They contended that it violates their right to privacy, which is protected under the 4 th Amendment (guards against unreasonable
searches and seizures). The District Court dismissed the petition while the Court of Appeals concluded that it is unconstitutional.

Is the said policy unconstitutional?

1. NO. It is still constitutional.

Unlike in other establishments, there is no need to

apply the reasonable test when it comes to public schools. This is because it would duly interfere with the maintenance of s wift and
informal disciplinary measures that are needed.
 In public schools, a search unsupported by a probable cause may be considered reasonable when there are special needs which are
beyond the normal need for special enforcement.

Moreover, the reasonableness inquiry cannot just disregard the public schools custodial responsibility for children. The court also
applied the Verona ruling which states that what was conducted was a fact-specific balancing of the intrusion on the childrens 4th
Amendment rights against the promotion of legitimate government interest.

As for privacy interests, the court ruled that the students covered by the policy are already used to voluntarily subjecting themselves
to many similar intrusions to privacy since its quite normal in the nature of the activities they participate in.

Meanwhile, theres only minimal intrusion on the implementation of the policy.

o First, the faculty monitor will have to wait

outside the closed restroom stall for the sample and will listen to normal sound of urination in order to guard against tampering with
the sample, which affects the accurateness of the result.

o The results will then be kept in confidential file separate from the students educational records. It may only be released to school
personnel on a need-to-know basis.

These will not be turned over to law enforcement authorities. Instead, it can only affect the students privilege of participating in extra-
curricular activities.

On the other hand, preventing drug use by children is a very important government concern. There is really no need to first have a
pervasive drug problem before the government can conduct drug testing. In this case, however, there was even a substantial amount of
evidence which became the basis for implementing the drug testing policy.

Court of Appeals decision REVERSED