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EconomyTheRealFaceof

StrategicParadigmShiftinSouthAsia MiddleEastCrisis
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Afghanistan
SouthAsiahostseightSaarcstatesnamelyPakistan,India,Bangladesh,Nepal, USatACrossroads

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ancientculturesintheworld,housingoverafifthofpopulation.SouthAsia THEMYTHOFINDIAASA
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accessandnumerousresources)andstrategiclocation.Theregionbecame Strategy,GrandFailures
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moresignificantafterIndiaandPakistandeclaredtheirnuclearstatus.The East
worldunderstandsthatthenuclearweaponsinSouthAsiaarealarmingforthe AsianInfrastructure

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SouthAsiahasalwaysbeenasourceofstrategicandeconomicattractionforregionalandinternationalpowers.Fromancient
Central Asian invaders and Medieval Muslim conquerors to European colonisers, this resourcerich region has assumed
irreversible significance even in the modern era. For instance, during the Cold War period, the capitalist world under the
leadership of the US, and the communist bloc led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) sought to win allies in
modern South Asia. Little wonder then, postpartition India, ensconced in the Nehruvian understanding of global capital and
politics,optedtoapparentlystaynonaligned.However,theIndianstate,inrealterms,couldnothideitssocialistinclinations
thatwereonlytobethwartedduringthe1962SinoIndiawar.Ontheotherhand,Pakistan,fromveryearlyon,chosetoally
withtheUSanditsallies.Pakistan'sstrategicvisionwaslargelyshapedbytheindividual,ifnotinstitutional,socialisationofits
firstgenerationpoliticalandbureaucraticleaderships.

Beside India and Pakistan, Afghanistan has also been an active actor in regional politics. Indeed, since the Czarist days,
RussianslookedtoAfghanistanforstrategic,politicalandeconomicpenetrationinsideSouthAsiaandbeyond.Moreover,the
modernIndianstateviewedAfghanistanasapotentialsourcetomakeinroadsintoCentralAsiaalongwiththecontainmentof
Pakistan. Paradoxically, Afghanistan declined to recognise Pakistan as a sovereign and independent state in 1947, more on
account of its nationalistic aspirations than any conspiracy theory. However, once grounded in the Afghan state mentality,
mutualdistrustfurthergrew,especiallyduringthe1970s.

ThefollowingdecadedidbringPakistanalmostintomainstreamAfghanistanstrategically,economicallyandevenpolitically.The
USandtheUSSRfoughtthefinalroundoftheColdWar,whichendedinthewithdrawalofSoviettroopsfromAfghanistan.In
thepostColdWarperiod,SouthAsianpoliticsandeconomyweregreatlyinfluencedbypoliticalandstrategicdevelopmentsthat
engulfed the poor and warravaged country. By and large, there is now a consensus among the scholarly and political
communitiesthatWashington'sengagementlevelwithAfghanistanwasmuchlowerduringthe90s.Bydefault,thisprovided
an opportunity to both Pakistan and India, along with other regional stakeholders, such as Iran and China, to make and
maintainastrategicpresenceinsideAfghanistan.

Thesocalledstrategicdepthdoctrinecanbeseeninthisrespect.Unsurprisinglythen,Pakistanbecameoneofthethreestates
torecognisetheestablishmentofanIslamicstatebytheTalibanin1996.Afghanistan'sneighbours,especiallyIranandIndia,
5/25/2016 jworldtimes.com/Article/12015_Strategic_Paradigm_in_South_Asia
viewedtheTalibangovernmentinoppositionalterms.TheUS,whichwasleastinterestedinthestrategicgameinSouthAsia,
becamethetopmoststakeholdernotonlyinSouthAsiabutalsoAfghanistanintheimmediateaftermathof9/11.'Eitherwith
oragainstus'wasthecommunicatedpolicyoftheUStobringastrategicparadigmshiftinSouthAsia.

Acting very rationally, Musharrafled Pakistan saw more benefits than cost in cooperation with the global superpower. This
apparent policy shift on the part of the Pakistani security establishment gave birth to concepts such as soft strategic depth,
whichbelievedincooperationwithWesternpowers,theTalibanandthelikesimultaneously.Moreover,regionalactors,Indiain
particular, also sought to cultivate the Afghan power elite in the hopes of building a longterm relationship based on mutual
exchange of views and products. Iran and China also became alert given their security and commercial concerns. In other
words,sincethereplacementoftheTalibanledIslamicstatewiththeKarzailednationstate,internationalandregionalactors
engagedeachotherinaconstantgameofstrategic,politicalandsocioeconomicinfluencebuilding.Collectively,theUSplayed
the role of an arbitrator and financer of such activism. Afghanistan and Pakistan were the chief beneficiaries, at least
economically.Nevertheless,Pakistandidfacethehumanandinfrastructuralcostoftheconflictbutthisislargelybecauseof
ourambiguousstrategicpolicyfortheSouthAsianregion.

NowthattheUShasalreadypursuedits(partial)withdrawalpolicy,thepoliticalandstrategicsituationthatAfghanistanand
SouthAsiaarelikelytofacedemandsourseriousattention.HowwillGhaniAbdullahledAfghanistanrebuilditself?Whatrole
cantheUSanditsNATOalliesplayinthisrespect?HowareRussiaandChinaviewingthepoliticalchangeinKabul?IsPakistan
goingtofullysupportthenewpoliticalsetup?WillIndiaagreetoPakistan'sroleinthereconstructionofAfghanistan?Whatrole
canbeplayedbyIran?Thesearesomerelevantquestionsthatneedtobeaddressedbypolicymakers,academics,etc.More
importantly,owingtoitsinvolvementinAfghanistan'sinternalmatters,Pakistan,atthiscriticaljuncture,needstodecideforits
ownlargerinterestswhetherithasconcludedameaningfulrevisitofitsstrategicvisionofSouthAsiaandtheworldaroundit.
Inthisrespect,therecentpublicstatementsbytheformerarmychief(PervezMusharraf)andtheservingarmychief(Raheel
Sharif)meritattention.TheformerlamentedtherecognitionoftheTalibangovernmentbythePakistanstatewhereasGeneral
RaheelSharif,whilereferringtoPakistan'seffortsinthewaronterror,arguedthattheenemyliveswithinusandlookslike
us.

OnewonderswhytheformergeneralwascriticisedbytheUSandothersforplayingadualpolicywithrespecttotheTaliban
whosegovernmentwasrecognisedbythePakistanmilitary.Whydidhenotrealisetheflawsintherecognitionpolicywhenhe
wasrulingtheroost?GeneralRaheelSharif'sstatementcanbecontextualisedinhisrecentvisittotheUS.Pakistan'srolein
Afghanistan,ifnotinSouthAsia,hasbeentermedasabindingforcebytheInterServicesPublicRelations(ISPR).Monetary
assistance assured the other day, under the terms of the Coalition Support Fund, is still conditional. This, in the view of Dr
EhsanAhrari,whohasadvisedtheObamaAdministrationonPakistanandAfghanistan.HepointstothefactthattheUSisstill
not clear and satisfied with the strategic policy of the Pakistani security establishment. By default, this also complicates the
debateonthestrategicparadigmshiftinSouthAsia.Inordertobereveredregionallyandglobally,thisisthetimePakistan
shouldengageitselfinaseriousdebateonitsgrandpolicy.

Courtesy:SouthAsiaMonitor

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