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First Chechnya War - 1994-1996

Russian troops entered Chechnya in December 1994, in order to prevent Chechnya's effort
to secede from the Russian Federation, and after almost 2 years of fighting, a peace
agreement was reached. As part of that agreement, resolution of Chechnya's call for
independence was postponed for up to 5 years. Tens of thousands of civilians were killed
and over 500,000 persons displaced since the conflict began.

The origins of the conflict are complex. Relations between Russia and the people of
Chechnya have long been contentious, dating to the period of Russian expansion in the
Caucasus in the 19th Century. Since their forced annexation to the Russian empire, the
Chechens have never willingly accepted Russian rule. During the Russian Civil War
(1917-20), the Chechens declared their sovereignty until the Red Army suppressed them in
1920. Located on the north slope of the Caucasus Mountains within 100 kilometers of the
Caspian Sea, Chechnya is strategically vital to Russia for two reasons. First, access routes
to both the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea go from the center of the federation through
Chechnya. Second, vital Russian oil and gas pipeline connections with Kazakstan and
Azerbaijan also run through Chechnya.

The Russian Federation's Republic of Chechnya in the northern Caucasus declared itself
independent from the Russian Federation in 1991 under the leadership of Dzhokar
Dudayev, was a former pilot of the Soviet Strategic Aviation (Dalnya Aviatsia) who flew
nuclear bombers for many years. The declaration of full independence issued in 1993 by
the Chechen government of Dudayev led to civil war in that republic, and several Russian-
backed attempts to overthrow Dudayev failed in 1993 and 1994. In the summer of 1994,
the Russian Government intensified its charges against the government of secessionist
President Dudayev, accusing it of repressing political dissent, of corruption, and of
involvement in international criminal activities. Chechnya had become an outpost of
organized crime, gun-running and drug smuggling. Several armed opposition groups
financially and militarily supported by Russian government entities sought to overthrow
President Dudayev. In August 1994 they bombed a telephone station and the Moscow-
Baku railroad line. The Dudayev government blamed the acts on the political opposition
and introduced a state of emergency, followed in September 1994 by martial law.
Restrictions included a curfew, limits on exit and entry procedures, and restrictions on
travel by road in some areas.

The opposition launched a major offensive on 26 November 1994 with the covert support
of "volunteers" from several elite regular Russian army units. Russian military officials
initially denied any official involvement in the conflict. The operation failed to unseat
Dudayev. By December 1994 Russian military forces were actively working to overthrow
the Dudayev regime. Having relied on clandestine measures to remove Dudayev, detailed
planning for a wide-scale conventional military operation did not begin until early
December.

After a decision of unclear origin in the Yeltsin administration, three divisions of Russian
armor, pro-Russian Chechen infantry, and internal security troops -- a force including units
detailed from the regular armed forces -- invaded Chechnya on 10-11 December 1994. The
objective was a quick victory leading to pacification and reestablishment of a pro-Russian
government. The result, however, was a long series of military operations bungled by the
Russians and stymied by the traditionally rugged guerrilla forces of the Chechen
separatists.

Russian military aircraft bombed both military and civilian targets in Groznyy, the capital
of the republic. Regular army and MVD troops crossed the border into Chechnya on
December 10 to surround Groznyy. Beginning in late December 1994, following major
Chechen resistance, there was massive aerial and artillery bombardment of Chechnya's
capital, Groznyy, resulting in a heavy loss of civilian life and hundreds of thousands
of internally displaced persons. Air strikes continued through the month of December and
into January, causing extensive damage and heavy civilian casualties. According to press
reports, there were up to 4,000 detonations an hour at the height of the winter campaign
against Groznyy.

Beyond the large number of civilians injured and killed, most residential and public
buildings in Groznyy, including hospitals and an orphanage, were destroyed.

These actions were denounced as major human rights violations by Sergey Kovalev,
President Yeltsin's Human Rights Commissioner, and by human rights NGO's. The
Russian Government announced on December 28 that Russian ground forces had begun an
operation to "liberate" Groznyy one district at a time and disarm the "illegal armed
groupings." Dudayev supporters vowed to continue resisting and to switch to
guerrilla warfare.

Troops who were sent to Chechnya had in many cases only just arrived for their
mandatory conscription service. As a result, they had only been through about half of what
U.S. soldiers would consider basic training. Since Russian planners wanted to conserve
their good stuff the 6,000 tanks that they considered to be combat worthy against the
West older models were pulled out of depot storage and issued to troops. As a result,
few tankers were trained on any of the systems they would have to fight in, and even
trained ones were assigned to the wrong tanks. Trained T-72 drivers wound up in T-80BV
tanks, and T-80 tankers in T-72As. Crews were thrown together and had to train and
become familiar with each other during the road march to Groznyy.

All of this was compounded by two major errors at the top. First off, all units assigned
were kept on peacetime relationships, not wartime. Under wartime regulations, all troops
in a given area belonged to the designated commander. Under peacetime, they still were
responsible to their own chains of command. This was true with the VDV units sent into
the country, as well as the MVD Internal Troops units, which comprised some 40 percent
of the original troops deploying (15,000 out of 38,000).

Secondly, the North Caucasus Military District commander organized the operation as a
classic Soviet front, with too many levels of command for the forces deployed. The result
was an unmitigated disaster, highlighted by the nearly complete destruction of the 131st
Independent Maykop Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 81st Guards Motorized Rifle
Regiment on New Years Eve 1994-95.
The Soviets had a very good system of long-term conservation and storage, but it relied on
skilled depot-level preparation and storage of equipment to work properly. This is why in
1991 Lieutenant General Dmitry Volkogonov noted that the Soviet Union, at the moment
of its breakup, had 77,000 tanks on its books, albeit in various states of operational service
or repair. In the breakup, most of the restoration factories charged with the depot-level
rebuilding and some of the storage work were lost to Belarus and Ukraine. As skilled
personnel left in the drawdown, many vehicles had to be stored by use of troop labor.
These personnel were untrained in proper preparation of vehicles, and as a result, when the
tanks were drawn out of storage, many of them failed nearly at once. Colonel General
Sergey Mayev, head of the Tank and Automotive Directorate of the Russian Army,
(GABTU), stated on several occasions that this was the primary reason for their failures
and problems.

Tanks which should have taken six hours to prepare for combat now took seven to nine
days, and frequently suffered failures of key systems shortly afterward (cooling being the
number one problem with the T-72s and BMPs). Improperly stored batteries another
major weakness of Soviet-era tanks, as there were never enough of them around for proper
rotation and stowage also died quickly, forcing the troops to replace them under very
trying conditions.

The T-80BV tanks used by the Maykop Brigade had no explosive plates in their reactive
armor boxes (actually just a protective shield over the 4S20 explosive plates), and as a
result had no chance against skilled Chechen antitank teams firing down on them from
buildings. The image of a T-80BV, with a few boxes still visible on its glacis, blown
completely apart near the train station in Groznyy sums up the total waste of the attacks by
these forces and units. Whether they were stolen or simply not installed as nobody
thought to do that is anyones guess. The vehicles were also using Winter fuels, with
a shot of naphtha added for thinner to ease flow and starting, which caused the diesel fuels
to ignite much more readily when hit by HEAT projectiles.

Although Russian forces leveled the Chechen capital city of Groznyy and other population
centers during a long and bloody campaign of urban warfare, Chechen forces held
extensive territory elsewhere in the republic through 1995 and into 1996. Two major
hostage-taking incidents -- one at Budennovsk in southern Russia in June 1995 and one at
the Dagestani border town of Pervomayskoye in January 1996 -- led to the embarrassment
of unsuccessful military missions to release the prisoners. The Pervomayskoye incident led
to the complete destruction of the town and numerous civilian casualties.

The Chechen conflict sparked a major debate over accountability in government


decisionmaking and the Government's commitment to the rights of its citizens and
international norms. The Constitutional Court found President Yeltsin's deployment of
military forces in Chechnya without parliamentary approval to be constitutional. However,
the Court ruled that international law was binding on both government and rebel forces,
although neither was in compliance with Protocol II Additional of the Geneva
Conventions, specifically with the provision that every effort must be made to avoid
causing damage to civilians and their property.

Russian forces used indiscriminate and disproportionate force in attacks on other Chechen
towns and villages. After federal forces captured several major cities and towns in the
Chechen Republic, Chechen fighters employed guerrilla and terrorist tactics against forces
of the Ministries of Defense and Internal Affairs, as well as against Russian civilians in the
town of Budennovsk.

As the campaign's failures and substantial casualties were being well documented by
Russia's independent news media (an estimated 1,500 Russian troops and 25,000 civilians
had died by April 1995), public opinion in Russia turned strongly against continued
occupation. However, fearing that capitulation to a separatist government in one ethnic
republic would set a precedent for other independence-minded regions, in 1995 President
Yeltsin wavered between full support of Chechnya operations and condemnation of the
supposed incompetence of Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and his generals. Yeltsin fired
several top generals, including Deputy Minister of Defense Boris Gromov, who were
critical of the war. In 1995 and early 1996, Grachev's inability to obtain a favorable
outcome and continued disarray in top command echelons indicated that he had lost
control of the military establishment.

On 30 July 1995 the Government and forces loyal to Chechen president Dudayev signed a
military protocol calling for a cease-fire, the disarming of rebel formations, the withdrawal
of most federal troops, and the exchange of prisoners. Implementation of the protocol was
slow and came to a halt in the fall, following the assassination attempt on General
Romanov, former commander of the federal forces in Chechnya.

In late 1995, the Russian government announced elections to replace the Moscow-backed
government that assumed power after Dudayev was driven from Groznyy. Prominent
human rights organizations called for cancellation of the 17 December 1995 elections in
Chechnya due to the conditions in the region, which they described as a virtual state of
emergency. They warned that the results of the elections would lack credibility and
predicted that the elections would exacerbate preexisting tensions and prevent political
reconciliation. The OSCE Assistance Group (AG) temporarily departed Groznyy rather
than monitor elections that they judged could not be "free and fair." Dokur Zavgayev won
the elections, but there were widespread allegations of fraud and manipulation of the
results.

Violations of international humanitarian law and human rights committed by Russian


forces occured on a much larger scale than those of the Chechen separatists. Russian
forces engaged in the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force, resulting in
numerous civilian deaths. They also prevented civilians from evacuating from areas of
imminent danger and humanitarian organizations from assisting civilians in need. Security
forces were also responsible for disappearances in Chechnya. Chechen forces executed
some members of the federal forces and repeatedly seized civilian hostages. Both parties
to the conflict at times used torture, mistreated prisoners of war, and executed some of
them.

On 21-22 April 1996 President Dzhokar Dudayev, leader of the Chechen uprising, was
lethally wounded in his head by a shell fragment. He died shortly afterwards. According to
one report, he was killed in the field while trying to establish a connection via a satellite
phone. A few seconds before his death he complained to other party about noise from
overflying aircraft. It is believed that he was targeted by some sort of air-to-ground
missile. Russian officials denied the presence of Russian aircraft in the area, but according
to reports Dudayev had been deliberately targeted by a rocket fired from the air which
homed in on him by following the signal of his satellite telephone. It is reliably reported
that Russian forces routinely called in air and ground-launched rocket strikes on locations
of satellite telephone operations identified with radiolocation equipment.

Second Chechnya War - 1999-2006

When the Russian incursion into Chechnya began in October 1999, Russia said its
objectives were limited to subduing bandits hiding in Chechnya's mountains. However,
over time it became apparent that in this second phase of the Chechen war Russia was
evidently intent on reversing the humiliating defeat it suffered in Chechnya 3 years prior.
The Russian authorities presented the war in Chechnya as a crusade against terrorism and
an ultimate attempt to avoid the secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation. The
fighting was the worst in the region since Russia's 1994-1996 civil war with Chechnya.

The aftermath of the first conflict in Chechnya had set the stage for the Russian incursion
in 1999. In February 1997, after the signing of the Khasavyurt accords in August 1996 and
the withdrawal of Russian military units from Chechen territory in December 1996, the
Chechen people elected Aslan Maskhadov as the republic's president. However, the terms
of the Khasavyurt accords were violated by the Chechen side. The commitments assumed
by the Chechen leadership to combat crime, terrorism and manifestations of national and
religious enmity were not fulfilled. Moreover, since 1996 the ethno-political and
humanitarian situation in Chechnya deteriorated.

Yevgeny Primakov and then Sergei Stepashin were the Prime Ministers of Russia during
the period. Their strategy focused on working with Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov,
who was a moderate and a former Soviet Army officer. When the Russians, at the
initiative of General Aleksandr Lebed agreed to withdraw from Chechnya, and agreed on
a timetable for Chechen self-determination, they also promised major aid. The promised
aid to repair the destruction from the 1994-96 war never arrived, and the Russians did
nothing to moderate the situation in Chechnya. Under those circumstances the more
radical elements in Chechnya came to the top. The areas controlled by criminal gangs of
extremist groups grew wider, and rebels in Dagestan declared their independence.

A wave of kidnappings hit the Caucasus region soon after Russian troops pulled out of
Chechnya in 1996. Most of the blame was placed on criminal gangs that were able to
operate freely in the lawless region. Russian Interior Ministry statistics showed that up to
1,300 people were kidnapped in Chechnya between 1996 and 1999. Many of the hostages
were Russian conscripts that served in army units in the Caucasus. Other victims included
President Boris Yeltsin's envoy to Chechnya who was freed in 1998, Russian
television journalists, and more than 60 foreigners, who were considered
especially lucrative targets.

In March 1999, Russia's top envoy to Chechnya, Russian Interior Ministry General
Gennady Shpigun, was kidnapped from the airport in Chechnya's capital, Grozny. In
response, the Interior Ministry deployed more troops to the Chechen border region and
threatened force if the hostage was not released (he was later executed in 2000). Later that
same month, an explosion rocked a public market place in the North Caucasus city of
Vladikavkaz, killing 60 people. Vladikavkaz was the capital of the North Ossetia region
and was located just 30 miles from the Chechen border.

The main rebel commander in 1999 was Shamil Basayev. He led the Chechen militant
group known as Riyadus Salihin against Russian forces. He would later be replaced by
Doku Umarov, who would lead the Islamic insurgency that had engulfed the Caucasus in
the 2000s. There was another Muslim leader who went by the name of Ibn Al-Khattab. He
led the Wahhabi Islamic movement in Dagestan, which was aided by the Chechen rebels.

The initial death toll was certainly in the thousands, including several thousand innocent
civilians. As of late November 1999, Russian forces claimed to have killed more than
4,000 rebels, while losing 187 soldiers since the offensive began In October 1999.
Chechen officials disputed those figures, saying rebel fighters had suffered minimal losses
while killing thousands of Russian troops. They said the heaviest casualties had been
among civilians, with nearly 5,000 killed. None of the figures could be independently
confirmed, and both sides had tended to exaggerate enemy casualties while minimizing
their own. As of early 2000 the Russian side admitted that over 1,100 of its troops had
been killed since August 1999, but the Russian Soldiers' Mothers Committee reported
3,000 dead and 6,000 wounded. Estimates of Chechen killed and wounded were far
higher, and far less certain. Russian defense officials said at least 10,000 rebels had died.
Chechen sources put the figure at less than half that, but said the number of civilians killed
was far higher. The number of internally displaced persons was put at more than 230,000
people. Some were kept from fleeing the fighting when Russian authorities closed the
Chechnya-Ingushetia border.

Each side accused the other of preparing chemical or toxic agents for use in the conflict.
Chechen parliamentarians said they had information that Russian troops attacked
2 districts in Grozny with chemical weapons in early December 1999, though this report
could not be independently verified. They said they were afraid Russian troops might
destroy a nuclear waste storage facility just outside Grozny if the military was forced to
leave. The Russian military said Chechen militants exploded canisters of toxic agents in a
village on the outskirts of Grozny on 10 December 1999. General Alexander Baranov said
he believed the canisters contained chlorine and ammonia and the blast resulted in a cloud
of fumes. There was no way to verify the claim, since the Russian military had a near-
monopoly on information coming from Chechnya. In early December 1999, Moscow-
based defense analyst Pavel Felganhauer said that the Russian military's bombardment of
Grozny would include "so-called aerosol bombs or vacuum bombs that can
penetrate dugouts, bunkers and kill everyone inside of course, including civilians."
Although widely reported, these comments represented a misunderstanding of the effects
of fuel-air explosives. Such fuel-air munitions were reportedly used beginning on 6
December 1999.

The prospect of another full-scale war in Chechnya prompted Western governments to


issue statements of concern over Russian tactics against rebels in the breakaway republic.
However, there appeared to be little appetite among outside powers to intervene in the
conflict with anything more than public complaints.
The Russian government benefited from the criticism, because it allowed Russian leaders
to portray themselves as standing up for Russia against the West at no cost. Some
observers connected the course of the war with the appointment of Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin in early August 1999. It was widely believed in Russia that the war has
something to do with the presidential election coming up in mid-2000. With Yeltsin's
approval rating standing at something near 2 percent in the polls, Putin won public support
that he could not have gotten any other way. Russia's public expected the Chechen issue to
be resolved for good, and the intervention enjoyed the support of practically all political
forces in Moscow. Former Russian Finance Minister Mikhail Zadornov estimated that the
Chechen offensive was costing from 115-million to 150-million dollars a month.

Human rights groups had repeatedly charged Russian troops with employing brutal tactics,
amid signs the conflict had attracted foreign fighters. The Kremlin's tight control over
major broadcast media kept the conflict largely out of the public eye, in spite of an almost-
daily death toll among Russians and Chechens alike. Russian President Putin ruled out
negotiating with Chechen separatist leaders, whom he called terrorists. Any attempt to talk
with moderate Chechen separatists would probably bring little result, as hard-liners would
continue their fight against Russia.

From Moscow's point of view, it could not afford to lose the Caucasus, the pathway to
Caspian Sea oil and to Russian influence in the Middle East and Central Asia. While
Russia remained, it could block efforts by other powers like Turkey and Iran to become
established in the Caucasus. Russia's policy in Chechnya was a part of a broader Russian
policy across the entire Caucasus designed to freeze out other people and allow Russian
influence to come back. By its re-conquest of Chechnya, Russia served notice to the US
that Russia had stopped retreating from the Caucasus and intended to scuttle US plans to
gain control over the region.

Historically, energy from the Caspian had gone north, only north, and then from Russia
into world markets. In 1995 a consortium of international companies decided to build 2
pipelines from Azerbaijan. The western line to Supsa, Georgia, opened in April 1999. The
pipeline to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossisk opened, and then closed because of
events in Chechnya. The countries and the energy companies that operated in the region
believed that they needed to have a multiple pipeline system.

After long negotiations, in November 1999 Turkmenistan, Azarbaijan, Georgia, Turkey


and the United States agreed on the development of a commercial pipeline to sell gas from
Turkmenistan through Georgia and Azerbaijan to Turkey and on to Europe. The pipeline
would bring the Caspian Sea's oil to the Mediterranean without crossing Russia and Iran.
The Turkish export route for Azerbaijan's huge reserves of oil and natural gas was aimed
at reducing the former Soviet republic's dependency on Moscow. This deal represented a
long-term strategic triumph over Russia's historic aspirations and interests in Central Asia.
The second Chechen War was the best argument in favor of the agreement on an oil
pipeline from Baku to Turkey as an alternative to a Russian pipeline, paradoxically
confirming the Russian assumption that the United States benefited from Chechnya
because it wanted to bring the Caucasus under its influence.

There was some speculation that the war ended in 2002 due to the cessation of major
Russian military operations in Chechnya. The war then appeared to enter a transitional
phase between 2002 to 2006, in which militant groups began to reorganize their structure
and leadership. The leadership became more radical and heavily religious due to the
increasing assassinations of the previous leadership by Russian forces. The militants
moved away from the idea of creating an independent Chechnya and instead the resistance
headed toward what seemed to be an autonomous Islamic region which incorporated the
Caucasus republics. Their operations were no longer limited to Chechnya, with militants
operating in Dagestan and Ingushetia as well.

Bibliography

Basok, Tanya. Chechnya: The Russian Policymakers Tragedy. Canadas Periodical on


Refugees: Special Issue on Chechnya. March. 1995: 1-2

Benifand, Alexander. 1995. Chechnya: The War Without an End. Canadas Periodical on
Refugees Special Issue on Chechnya. March 7.

Chechnya-Based Terrorists. Council on Foreign Affairs. July 11th, 2006.

<http://www.cfr.org/publication/9181/>.

Gakaev, Dzhabrail. 2005. Chechnya in Russia and Russia in Chechnya. Why Chechnya?

Chechnya: From Past to Future. London: Anthem Press. 33.

Gorbachev, Mikhail S. 2004. Forward. Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society. Los Angeles:
University of California Press.

Joint Letter to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell on the Crisis in Chechnya. Russia and
Chechnya: Renewed Catastrophe. Human Rights Watch. Feb. 16, 2001. 2006.
<http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/russia/chechnya/powell_letter.htm>.

Pain, Emil. 2005. The Chechen War in the Context of Contemporary Russian Politics.
Why
Chechnya? Chechnya: From Past to Future. London: Anthem Press. 71

Plekhanov, Sergei. 1995. The War in Chechnya and the New Russian
State. Canadas
Periodical on Refugees: Special Issue on Chechnya. March. 1995: 4.

Regions and Territories: Chechnya. BBC News. 15 Nov. 2006.


http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/2565049.stm

Russell, John. A War by any Other Name: Chechnya, 11 September, and the War Against
Terrorism. Chechnya: From Past to Future. London: Anthem Press. 239, 248-53.

Sakwa, Richard. 2005. Why Chechnya? Chechnya: From Past to Future. London:
Press. 13-14.
MINISTERUL EDUCAIEI AL REPUBLICII MOLDOVA

UNIVERSITATEA DE STAT DIN MOLDOVA

FACULTATEA RELAII INTERNAIONALE,

TIINE POLITICE I ADMINISTRATIVE

DEPARTAMENTUL RELAII INTERNAIONALE

Morari Anatolie

Gr. 203, R.I.

,, Chechnyan Wars

LUCRU INDIVIDUAL

Conductor tiinific: Ejov Cristina

Autorul:

CHIINU, 2017
PLAN

First Chechnya War - 1994-1996

Second Chechnya War - 1999-2006

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