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BIBIANO V. BAAS, JR., petitioner, 1976 Declaration of Income on Disposition of Capital Asset subject to Tax:
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AQUILINO T. LARIN, RODOLFO TUAZON AND PROCOPIO Initial Payment P461,754.00
TALON, respondents.
Less: Cost of land and other incidental Expenses ( 76,547.90)
QUISUMBING, J.:
Income P385,206.10
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-C.R. CV No. 17251 promulgated on
November 29, 1991. It affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39,
Manila, in Civil Case No. 82-12107. Said judgment disposed as follows:
Income subject to tax (P385,206. 10 x 50%) P192,603.65
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Court hereby renders judgment
DISMISSING the complaint against all the defendants and ordering plaintiff [herein
petitioner] to pay defendant Larin the amount of P200,000.00 (Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos) as actual and compensatory damages; P200,000.00 as moral damages; and In the succeeding years, until 1979, petitioner reported a uniform income of two hundred thirty
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorneys fees of P100,000.00. 1 thousand, eight hundred seventy-seven (P230,877.00) pesos 4 as gain from sale of capital asset. In
his 1980 income tax amnesty return, petitioner also reported the same amount of P230,877.00 as
the realized gain on disposition of capital asset for the year.
The facts, which we find supported by the records, have been summarized by the Court of Appeals
as follows:
On April 11, 1978, then Revenue Director Mauro Calaguio authorized tax examiners, Rodolfo
Tuazon and Procopio Talon to examine the books and records of petitioner for the year 1976. They
On February 20, 1976, petitioner, Bibiano V. Baas Jr. sold to Ayala Investment Corporation discovered that petitioner had no outstanding receivable from the 1976 land sale to AYALA and
(AYALA), 128,265 square meters of land located at Bayanan, Muntinlupa, for two million, three concluded that the sale was cash and the entire profit should have been taxable in 1976 since the
hundred eight thousand, seven hundred seventy (P2,308,770.00) pesos. The Deed of Sale income was wholly derived in 1976.
provided that upon the signing of the contract AYALA shall pay four hundred sixty-one thousand,
seven hundred fifty-four (P461,754.00) pesos. The balance of one million, eight hundred forty-
seven thousand and sixteen (P1,847,016.00) pesos was to be paid in four equal consecutive Tuazon and Talon filed their audit report and declared a discrepancy of two million, ninety-five
annual installments, with twelve (12%) percent interest per annum on the outstanding balance. thousand, nine hundred fifteen (P2,095,915.00) pesos in petitioner's 1976 net income. They
AYALA issued one promissory note covering four equal annual installments. Each periodic recommended deficiency tax assessment for two million, four hundred seventy-three thousand, six
payment of P461,754.00 pesos shall be payable starting on February 20, 1977, and every year hundred seventy-three (P2,473,673.00) pesos.
thereafter, or until February 20, 1980.
Meantime, Aquilino Larin succeeded Calaguio as Regional Director of Manila Region IV-A. After
The same day, petitioner discounted the promissory note with AYALA, for its face value of reviewing the examiners' report, Larin directed the revision of the audit report, with instruction to
P1,847,016.00, evidenced by a Deed of Assignment signed by the petitioner and AYALA. AYALA consider the land as capital asset. The tax due was only fifty (50%) percent of the total gain from
issued nine (9) checks to petitioner, all dated February 20, 1976, drawn against Bank of the sale of the property held by the taxpayer beyond twelve months pursuant to Section 34 5 of the
Philippine Islands with the uniform amount of two hundred five thousand, two hundred twenty-four 1977 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). The deficiency tax assessment was reduced to nine
(P205,224.00) pesos. hundred thirty six thousand, five hundred ninety-eight pesos and fifty centavos (P936,598.50),
inclusive of surcharges and penalties for the year 1976.
In his 1976 Income Tax Return, petitioner reported the P461,754 initial payment as income from
disposition of capital asset.2 On June 27, 1980, respondent Larin sent a letter to petitioner informing of the income tax
deficiency that must be settled him immediately.
Unrealized Gain
P1,847,016.00
On June 8, 1981, the matter was endorsed to the Acting Chief of the Legal Branch of the National III. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF
Office of the BIR. The Chief of the Tax Fraud Unit recommended the prosecution of a criminal case PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NOS. 1740 AND 1840, AMONG OTHERS, PETITIONER'S
for conspiring to file false and fraudulent returns, in violation of Section 51 of the Tax Code against IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.
petitioner and his accountants, Andres P. Alejandre and Conrado Baas.
The finding of the court a quo that plaintiff-appellant's actions against defendant-
The only evidence to establish the alleged extortion attempt by defendants-appellees is
appellee Larin were unwarranted and baseless and as a result thereof, defendant-
the plaintiff-appellant's self serving declarations.
appellee Larin was subjected to unnecessary anxiety and humiliation is therefore
supported by the evidence on record.1wphi1.nt
As found by the court a quo, "said attempt was known to plaintiff-appellant's son-in-law
and counsel on record, yet, said counsel did not take the witness stand to corroborate
Defendant-appellee Larin acted only in pursuance of the authority granted to him. In
the testimony of plaintiff."8
fact, the criminal charges filed against him in the Tanodbayan and in the City Fiscal's
Office were all dismissed.
As repeatedly held, findings of fact by the Court of Appeals especially if they affirm factual findings
7 of the trial court will not be disturbed by this Court, unless these findings are not supported by
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
evidence.9 Similarly, neither should we disturb a finding of the trial court and appellate court that an
allegation is not supported by evidence on record. Thus, we agree with the conclusion of
Hence this petition, wherein petitioner raises before us the following queries: respondent court that herein private respondents, on the basis of evidence, could not be held liable
for extortion.
II. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE
WAS AN ALLEGED ATTEMPT TO EXTORT [MONEY FROM] PETITIONER BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
P.D. No. 1740. CONDONING PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS c) The amnesty tax paid by the taxpayer under this Decree shall not be less
OF THE INCOME TAX LAW UPON VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE OF than P1,000.00 per taxable year; and
UNDECLARED INCOME FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES AND
REQUIRING PERIODIC SUBMISSION OF NET WORTH STATEMENT.
d) The taxpayer must file a statement of assets, liabilities and net worth as
of December 31, 1980, as required under Section 6 hereof. (emphasis
xxx xxx xxx ours)
Sec. 1. Voluntary Disclosure of Correct Taxable Income. Any individual who, for any It will be recalled that petitioner entered into a deed of sale purportedly on installment. On the
or all of the taxable years 1974 to 1979, had failed to file a return is hereby, allowed to same day, he discounted the promissory note covering the future installments. The discounting
file a return for each of the aforesaid taxable years and accurately declare therein the seems questionable because ordinarily, when a bill is discounted, the lender (e.g. banks, financial
true and correct income, deductions and exemptions and pay the income tax due per institution) charges or deducts a certain percentage from the principal value as its compensation.
return. Likewise, any individual who filed a false or fraudulent return for any taxable Here, the discounting was done by the buyer. On July 2, 1981, two weeks after the filing of the tax
year in the period mentioned above may amend his return and pay the correct amount evasion complaint against him by respondent Larin on June 17, 1981, petitioner availed of the tax
of tax due after deducting the taxes already paid, if any, in the original declaration. amnesty under P.D. No. 1740. His amended tax return for the years 1974 - 1979 was filed with the
(emphasis ours) BIR office of Valenzuela, Bulacan, instead of Manila where the petitioner's principal office was
located. He again availed of the tax amnesty under P.D. No. 1840. His disclosure, however, did not
include the income from his sale of land to AYALA on cash basis. Instead he insisted that such sale
xxx xxx xxx was on installment. He did not amend his income tax return. He did not pay the tax which was
considerably increased by the income derived from the discounting. He did not meet the twin
requirements of P.D. 1740 and 1840, declaration of his untaxed income and full payment of tax due
Sec. 5. Immunity from Penalties. Any individual who voluntarily files a return under
thereon. Clearly, the petitioner is not entitled to the benefits of P.D. Nos. 1740 and 1840. The mere
this Decree and pays the income tax due thereon shall be immune from the penalties,
filing of tax amnesty return under P.D. 1740 and 1840 does not ipso facto shield him from immunity
civil or criminal, under the National Internal Revenue Code arising from failure to pay
against prosecution. Tax amnesty is a general pardon to taxpayers who want to start a clean tax
the correct income tax with respect to the taxable years from which an amended return
slate. It also gives the government a chance to collect uncollected tax from tax evaders without
was filed or for which an original return was filed in cases where no return has been
having to go through the tedious process of a tax case. To avail of a tax amnesty granted by the
filed for any of the taxable years 1974 to 1979: Provided, however, That these
government, and to be immune from suit on its delinquencies, the tax payer must have voluntarily
immunities shall not apply in cases where the amount of net taxable income declared
disclosed his previously untaxed income and must have paid the corresponding tax on such
under this Decree is understated to the extent of 25% or more of the correct net
previously untaxed income.10
taxable income. (emphasis ours)
It also bears noting that a tax amnesty, much like a tax exemption, is never favored nor presumed
P.D. NO. 1840 GRANTING A TAX AMNESTY ON UNTAXED INCOME
in law and if granted by statute, the terms of the amnesty like that of a tax exemption must be
AND/OR WEALTH EARNED OR ACQUIRED DURING THE TAXABLE
construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. 11 Hence, on this
YEARS 1974 TO 1980 AND REQUIRING THE FILING OF THE
matter, it is our view that petitioner's claim of immunity from prosecution under the shield of
STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES, AND NET WORTH.
availing tax amnesty is untenable.
b) The taxpayer must file an amnesty return on or before November 30, Petitioner resorts to Section 43 of the NIRC and Sec. 175 of Revenue Regulation No. 2 to support
1981, and fully pay the tax due thereon; his claim.
Sec. 43 of the 1977 NIRC states, property, other than evidences of indebtedness of the purchaser, is received during the
first year, the purchaser having promised to make two or more payments, in later
years.
Installment basis. (a) Dealers in personal property. . . .
Petitioner asserts that Sec. 43 allows him to return as income in the taxable years involved, the
(b) Sales of realty and casual sales of personalty In the case (1) of a casual sale or respective installments as provided by the deed of sale between him and AYALA. Consequently,
other casual disposition of personal property (other than property of a kind which would he religiously reported his yearly income from sale of capital asset, subject to tax, as follows:
properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the
taxable year), for a price exceeding one thousand pesos, or (2) of a sale or other
disposition of real property if in either case the initial payments do not exceed twenty-
Year 1977 (50% of P461,754) P230,877.00
five percentum of the selling price, the income may, under regulations prescribed by
the Minister of Finance, be returned on the basis and in the manner above prescribed 1978 230,877.00
in this section. As used in this section the term "initial payment" means the payments
received in cash or property other than evidences of indebtedness of the purchaser 1979 230,877.00
during the taxable period in which the sale or other disposition is made. . . . (emphasis
ours) 1980 230,877.00
Any person who seeks to be awarded actual or compensatory damages due to acts of another has
the burden of proving said damages as well as the amount thereof. 22 Larin says the extortion cases Now, however, what would be a fair amount to be paid as compensation for moral damages also
filed against him hampered his immediate promotion, caused him strong anxiety and social requires determination. Each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances. 31 On this
humiliation. The trial court awarded him two hundred thousand (P200,000,00) pesos as actual score, Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals,32 cites several cases where no actual damages were
damages. However, the appellate court stated that, despite pendency of this case, Larin was given adjudicated, and where moral and exemplary damages were reduced for being "too excessive,"
a promotion at the BIR. Said respondent court: thus:
We find nothing on record, aside from defendant-appellee Larin's statements (TSN, pp. In the case of PNB v. C.A., [256 SCRA 309 (1996)], this Court quoted with approval the
6-7, 11 December 1985), to show that he suffered loss of seniority that allegedly barred following observation from RCPI v. Rodriguez, viz:
his promotion. In fact, he was promoted to his present position despite the pendency of
the instant case (TSN, pp. 35-39, 04 November 1985). 23
** **. Nevertheless, we find the award of P100,000.00 as moral damages in
favor of respondent Rodriguez excessive and unconscionable. In the case
Moreover, the records of the case contain no statement whatsoever of the amount of the actual of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System,Inc. (148 SCRA 440 [1987])
damages sustained by the respondents. Actual damages cannot be allowed unless supported by we said: . . . [I]t is undisputed that the trial courts are given discretion to
evidence on the record.24 The court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guesswork as to the determine the amount of moral damages (Alcantara v. Surro, 93 Phil. 472)
fact and amount of damages.25 To justify a grant of actual or compensatory damages, it is and that the Court of Appeals can only modify or change the amount
necessary to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty, the actual amount of loss. 26 Since we awarded when they are palpably and scandalously excessive "so as to
have no basis with which to assess, with certainty, the actual or compensatory damages counter- indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part
claimed by respondent Larin, the award of such damages should be deleted. of the trial court" (Gellada v. Warner Barnes & Co., Inc., 57 O.G. [4] 7347,
7358; Sadie v. Bacharach Motors Co., Inc., 57 O.G. [4] 636 and Adone v.
Bacharach Motor Co., Inc., 57 O.G. 656). But in more recent cases where
Moral damages may be recovered in cases involving acts referred to in Article 21 27 of the Civil the awards of moral and exemplary damages are far too excessive
Code.28 As a rule, a public official may not recover damages for charges of falsehood related to his compared to the actual loses sustained by the aggrieved party, this Court
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice. ruled that they should be reduced to more reasonable amounts. . . . .
In Babst, et. al. vs. National Intelligence Board, et. al., 132 SCRA 316, 330 (1984), we reiterated (Emphasis ours.)
In other words, the moral damages awarded must be commensurate with
the loss or injury suffered.
In the same case (PNB v. CA), this Court found the amount of exemplary damages
required to be paid (P1,000,000,00) "too excessive" and reduced it to an "equitable
level" (P25,000.00).
It will be noted that in above cases, the parties who were awarded moral damages were not public
officials. Considering that here, the award is in favor of a government official in connection with his COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL G.R. No. 159647
official function, it is with caution that we affirm granting moral damages, for it might open the REVENUE,
floodgates for government officials counter-claiming damages in suits filed against them in Petitioner, Present:
connection with their functions. Moreover, we must be careful lest the amounts awarded make Pang
citizens hesitate to expose corruption in the government, for fear of lawsuits from vindictive aniban, J.,
government officials. Thus, conformably with our declaration that moral damages are not intended Chairman,
to enrich anyone,33 we hereby reduce the moral damages award in this case from two hundred Sandoval-Gutierrez,
thousand (P200,000.00) pesos to seventy five thousand (P75,000.00) pesos, while the exemplary - versus - Corona,
damage is set at P25,000.00 only. Carpio Morales, and
Garcia, JJ
CENTRAL LUZON DRUG Promulgated:
The law allows the award of attorney's fees when exemplary damages are awarded, and when the CORPORATION,
party to a suit was compelled to incur expenses to protect his interest. 34 Though government Respondent. April 15, 2005
officers are usually represented by the Solicitor General in cases connected with the performance x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
of official functions, considering the nature of the charges, herein respondent Larin was compelled
to hire a private lawyer for the conduct of his defense as well as the successful pursuit of his
counterclaims. In our view, given the circumstances of this case, there is ample ground to award in DECISION
his favor P50,000,00 as reasonable attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1991, is hereby PANGANIBAN, J.:
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION so that the award of actual damages are deleted; and that
petitioner is hereby ORDERED to pay to respondent Larin moral damages in the amount of
P75,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount
of P50,000.00 only.1wphi1.nt
he 20 percent discount required by the law to be given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not
No pronouncement as to costs.
merely a tax deduction from the gross income or gross sale of the establishment concerned.
SO ORDERED.
T
A tax credit is used by a private establishment only after the tax has been computed; a tax
deduction, before the tax is computed. RA 7432 unconditionally grants a tax credit to all covered
entities. Thus, the provisions of the revenue regulation that withdraw or modify such grant are void.
Basic is the rule that administrative regulations cannot amend or revoke the law.
The Case
compliance with [R.A.] 7432. Unable to obtain affirmative response from
petitioner, respondent elevated its claim to the Court of Tax Appeals [(CTA
or Tax Court)] via a Petition for Review.
These two issues may be summed up in only one: whether respondent, despite incurring a net
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
loss, may still claim the 20 percent sales discount as a tax credit.
The CA affirmed in toto the Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) ordering petitioner to
private establishments prior to the availment of a tax credit. Moreover, such credit is not
Sole Issue:
Claim of 20 Percent Sales Discount
tantamount to an unintended benefit from the law, but rather a just compensation for the taking of as Tax Credit Despite Net Loss
Section 4a) of RA 7432 [10] grants to senior citizens the privilege of obtaining a 20 percent discount
The Issues claim the cost of the discount as a tax credit.[12] But can such credit be claimed, even though an
to avoid, if not entirely confuse, the issue. A tax credit is used only after the tax has been
Tax Credit versus
Tax Deduction
computed; a tax deduction, before.
amount that is subtracted directly from ones total tax liability. [14] It is an allowance against the tax
itself[15] or a deduction from what is owed [16] by a taxpayer to the government. Examples of tax Since a tax credit is used to reduce directly the tax that is due, there ought to be a tax
credits are withheld taxes, payments of estimated tax, and investment tax credits. [17] liability before the tax credit can be applied. Without that liability, any tax credit application will be
useless. There will be no reason for deducting the latter when there is, to begin with, no existing
Tax credit should be understood in relation to other tax concepts. One of these is tax deduction -- obligation to the government. However, as will be presented shortly, the existence of a tax credit or
defined as a subtraction from income for tax purposes, [18] or an amount that is allowed by law to its grant by law is not the same as the availment or use of such credit. While the grant is
reduce income prior to [the] application of the tax rate to compute the amount of tax which is due. mandatory, the availment or use is not.
[19]
An example of a tax deduction is any of the allowable deductions enumerated in Section 34 [20] of
the Tax Code. If a net loss is reported by, and no other taxes are currently due from, a business establishment,
there will obviously be no tax liability against which any tax creditcan be applied.[24] For the
A tax credit differs from a tax deduction. On the one hand, a tax credit reduces the tax due, establishment to choose the immediate availment of a tax credit will be premature and
including -- whenever applicable -- the income tax that is determined after applying the impracticable. Nevertheless, the irrefutable fact remains that, under RA 7432, Congress has
corresponding tax rates to taxable income.[21] A tax deduction, on the other, reduces the income granted without conditions a tax credit benefit to all covered establishments.
tax due. The tax credits in both instances allude to the prior payment of taxes, even if not made to
Although this tax credit benefit is available, it need not be used by losing ventures, since there is our government.
no tax liability that calls for its application. Neither can it be reduced to nil by the quick yet callow
stroke of an administrative pen, simply because no reduction of taxes can instantly be effected. By Under Section 110, a VAT (Value-Added Tax)- registered person engaging in transactions --
its nature, the tax creditmay still be deducted from a future, not a present, tax liability, without whether or not subject to the VAT -- is also allowed a tax credit that includes a ratable portion of
which it does not have any use. In the meantime, it need not move. But it breathes. any input tax not directly attributable to either activity. This input tax may either be the VAT on the
purchase or importation of goods or services that is merely due from -- not necessarily paid by --
Prior Tax Payments Not
Required for Tax Credit
such VAT-registered person in the course of trade or business; or the transitional input tax
determined in accordance with Section 111(A). The latter type may in fact be an amount equivalent
While a tax liability is essential to the availment or use of any tax credit, prior tax payments are not.
to only eight percent of the value of a VAT-registered persons beginning inventory of goods,
On the contrary, for the existence or grant solely of such credit, neither a tax liability nor a prior tax
materials and supplies, when such amount -- as computed -- is higher than the actual VAT paid on
payment is needed. The Tax Code is in fact replete with provisions granting or allowing tax credits,
the said items.[25]Clearly from this provision, the tax credit refers to an input tax that is either due
For example, in computing the estate tax due, Section 86(E) allows a tax credit -- subject to certain
limitations -- for estate taxes paid to a foreign country. Also found in Section 101(C) is a similar
In Section 111(B), a one and a half percent input tax credit that is merely presumptive is allowed.
provision for donors taxes -- again when paid to a foreign country -- in computing for the donors
For the purchase of primary agricultural products used as inputs -- either in the processing of
sardines, mackerel and milk, or in the manufacture of refined sugar and cooking oil -- and for the
contract price of public work contracts entered into with the government, again, no prior tax foreign tax credit will be given by the domiciliary country in an amount equivalent to taxes that are
payments are needed for the use of the tax credit. merely deemed paid.[27] Although true, this provision actually refers to the tax credit as
a condition only for the imposition of a lower tax rate, not as a deductionfrom the corresponding tax
More important, a VAT-registered person whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, liability. Besides, it is not our government but the domiciliary country that credits against the
under Section 112(A), apply for the issuance of a tax creditcertificate for the amount of creditable income tax payable to the latter by the foreign corporation, the tax to be foregone or spared. [28]
input taxes merely due -- again not necessarily paid to -- the government and attributable to such
sales, to the extent that the input taxes have not been applied against output taxes. [26] Where a In contrast, Section 34(C)(3), in relation to Section 34(C)(7)(b), categorically allows as credits,
taxpayer against the income tax imposable under Title II, the amount of income taxes merely incurred -- not
is engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales and also in taxable or exempt sales, the necessarily paid -- by a domestic corporation during a taxable year in any foreign country.
amount of creditable input taxes due that are not directly and entirely attributable to any one of Moreover, Section 34(C)(5) provides that for such taxes incurred but not paid, a tax credit may be
these transactions shall be proportionately allocated on the basis of the volume of sales. Indeed, in allowed, subject to the condition precedent that the taxpayer shall simply give a bond with sureties
availing of such tax credit for VAT purposes, this provision -- as well as the one earlier mentioned -- satisfactory to and approved by petitioner, in such sum as may be required; and further
shows that the prior payment of taxes is not a requisite. conditioned upon payment by the taxpayer of any tax found due, upon petitioners redetermination
of it.
It may be argued that Section 28(B)(5)(b) of the Tax Code is another illustration of a tax
credit allowed, even though no prior tax payments are not required. Specifically, in this provision, In addition to the above-cited provisions in the Tax Code, there are also tax treaties and special
the imposition of a final withholding tax rate on cash and/or property dividends received by a laws that grant or allow tax credits, even though no prior tax payments have been made.
nonresident foreign corporation from a domestic corporation is subjected to the condition that a
Under the treaties in which the tax credit method is used as a relief to avoid double periods, and even their application against internal revenue taxes, did not necessitate the
taxation, income that is taxed in the state of source is also taxable in the state of residence, but the existence of a tax liability.
tax paid in the former is merely allowed as a credit against the tax levied in the latter. [29] Apparently,
payment is made to the state of source, not the state of residence. No tax, therefore, has The examples above show that a tax liability is certainly important in the availment or use, not
been previously paid to the latter. the existence or grant, of a tax credit. Regarding this matter, a private establishment reporting
a net loss in its financial statements is no different from another that presents a net income. Both
Under special laws that particularly affect businesses, there can also be tax credit incentives. To are entitled to the tax credit provided for under RA 7432, since the law itself accords that
illustrate, the incentives provided for in Article 48 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1789, as unconditional benefit. However, for the losing establishment to immediately apply such credit,
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 391, include tax credits equivalent to either five percent of where no tax is due, will be an improvident usance.
the net value earned, or five or ten percent of the net local content of exports. [30] In order to avail of
Sections 2.i and 4 of Revenue
Regulations No. 2-94 Erroneous
such credits under the said law and still achieve its objectives, no prior tax payments are
necessary.
RA 7432 specifically allows private establishments to claim as tax credit the amount of discounts
they grant.[33] In turn, the Implementing Rules and Regulations, issued pursuant thereto, provide
From all the foregoing instances, it is evident that prior tax payments are not indispensable to the
the procedures for its availment. [34] To deny such credit, despite the plain mandate of the law and
availment of a tax credit. Thus, the CA correctly held that the availment under RA 7432 did not
its finding[32] that the carry-over of tax credits under the said special law to succeeding taxable
First, the definition given by petitioner is erroneous. It refers to tax credit as the amount the part of the seller and a purchase discount on the part of the buyer, it may be expressed in
representing the 20 percent discount that shall be deducted by the said establishments from such
their gross income for income tax purposes and from their gross sales for value-added tax or other terms as 5/10, n/30.[42]
percentage tax purposes.[35] In ordinary business language, the tax credit represents the amount of
such discount. However, the manner by which the discount shall be credited against taxes has not A quantity discount, however, is a reduction in price allowed for purchases made in large
been clarified by the revenue regulations. quantities, justified by savings in packaging, shipping, and handling. [43] It is also called
By ordinary acceptation, a discount is an abatement or reduction made from the gross amount or
value of anything.[36] To be more precise, it is in business parlance a deduction or lowering of an A percentage reduction from the list price x x x allowed by manufacturers to wholesalers and by
amount of money;[37] or a reduction from the full amount or value of something, especially a price. wholesalers to retailers[45] is known as a trade discount. No entry for it need be made in the manual
[38]
In business there are many kinds of discount, the most common of which is that affecting or computerized books of accounts, since the purchase or sale is already valued at the net price
the income statement[39] or financial report upon which the income tax is based. actually charged the buyer. [46] The purpose for the discount is to encourage trading or increase
sales, and the prices at which the purchased goods may be resold are also suggested. [47] Even
Business Discounts
Deducted from Gross Sales
a chain discount -- a series of discounts from one list price -- is recorded at net.[48]
A cash discount, for example, is one granted by business establishments to credit customers for
Finally, akin to a trade discount is a functional discount. It is a suppliers price discount given to a
their prompt payment.[40] It is a reduction in price offered to the purchaser if payment is made within
purchaser based on the [latters] role in the [formers] distribution system. [49] This role usually
a shorter period of time than the maximum time specified. [41] Also referred to as a sales discount on
involves warehousing or advertising.
The term sales discounts is not expressly defined in the Tax Code, but one provision adverts to
Based on this discussion, we find that the nature of a sales discount is peculiar. Applying generally amounts whose sum -- along with sales returns, allowances and cost of goods sold[56] -- is
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in the country, this type of discount is reflected in deducted from gross sales to come up with the gross income, profit or margin[57] derived from
the income statement[50] as a line item deducted -- along with returns, allowances, rebates and business.[58] In another provision therein, sales discounts that are granted and indicated in the
other similar expenses -- from gross sales to arrive at net sales.[51] This type of presentation is invoices at the time of sale -- and that do not depend upon the happening of any future event --
resorted to, because the accounts receivable and sales figures that arise from sales discounts, -- may be excluded from the gross sales within the same quarter they were given. [59] While
as well as from quantity, volume or bulk discounts -- are recorded in the manual and determinative only of the VAT, the latter provision also appears as a suitable reference point for
computerized books of accounts and reflected in the financial statements at the gross amounts of income tax purposes already embraced in the former. After all, these two provisions affirm
the invoices.[52] This manner of recording credit sales -- known as the gross method -- is most that sales discounts are amounts that are always deductible from gross sales.
widely used, because it is simple, more convenient to apply than the net method, and produces no
Reason for the Senior Citizen Discount:
The Law, Not Prompt Payment
material errors over time.[53]
A distinguishing feature of the implementing rules of RA 7432 is the private establishments outright
However, under the net method used in recording trade, chain or functional discounts, only the net
deduction of the discount from the invoice price of the medicine sold to the senior citizen. [60] It is,
amounts of the invoices -- after the discounts have been deducted -- are recorded in the books of
therefore, expected that for each retail sale made under this law, the discount period lasts no more
accounts[54] and reflected in the financial statements. A separate line item cannot be shown,
than a day, because such discount is given -- and the net amount thereof collected -- immediately
[55]
because the transactions themselves involving both accounts receivable and sales have
upon perfection of the sale.[61] Although prompt payment is made for an arms-length transaction by
already been entered into, net of the said discounts.
the senior citizen, the real and compelling reason for the private establishment giving the discount its tax credit benefit. While the former is a deduction before, the latter is a deduction after,
is that the law itself makes it mandatory. the income tax is computed. As mentioned earlier, a discount is not necessarily a sales discount,
and a tax credit for a simple discount privilege should not be automatically treated like a sales
What RA 7432 grants the senior citizen is a mere discount privilege, not a sales discount or any of discount. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. Where the law does not distinguish,
the above discounts in particular. Prompt payment is not the reason for (although a necessary we ought not to distinguish.
consequence of) such grant. To be sure, the privilege enjoyed by the senior citizen must be
equivalent to the tax credit benefit enjoyed by the private establishment granting the discount. Yet, Sections 2.i and 4 of Revenue Regulations No. (RR) 2-94 define tax credit as the 20 percent
under the revenue regulations promulgated by our tax authorities, this benefit has been discount deductible from gross income for income tax purposes, or from gross sales for VAT or
erroneously likened and confined to a sales discount. other percentage tax purposes. In effect, the tax credit benefit under RA 7432 is related to a sales
discount. This contrived definition is improper, considering that the latter has to be deducted
To a senior citizen, the monetary effect of the privilege may be the same as that resulting from from gross sales in order to compute the gross income in the income statement and cannot be
a sales discount. However, to a private establishment, the effect is different from a simple deducted again, even for purposes of computing the income tax.
reduction in price that results from such discount. In other words, the tax credit benefit is not the
same as a sales discount. To repeat from our earlier discourse, this benefit cannot and should not When the law says that the cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means that the
be treated as a tax deduction. amount -- when claimed -- shall be treated as a reduction from any tax liability, plain and simple.
The option to avail of the tax credit benefit depends upon the existence of a tax liability, but to limit
To stress, the effect of a sales discount on the income statement and income tax return of an the benefit to a sales discount-- which is not even identical to the discount privilege that is granted
establishment covered by RA 7432 is different from that resulting from the availment or use of
by law -- does not define it at all and serves no useful purpose. The definition must, therefore, be In the present case, the tax authorities have given the term tax credit in Sections 2.i and 4 of RR 2-
stricken down. 94 a meaning utterly in contrast to what RA 7432 provides. Their interpretation has muddled up the
intent of Congress in granting a mere discount privilege, not a sales discount. The administrative
Laws Not Amended
by Regulations
agency issuing these regulations may not enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it
administers; it cannot engraft additional requirements not contemplated by the legislature. [67]
Second, the law cannot be amended by a mere regulation. In fact, a regulation that operates to
It is a cardinal rule that courts will and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed
Availment of Tax
upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it x x x. [63] In the scheme of Credit Voluntary
judicial tax administration, the need for certainty and predictability in the implementation of tax laws
is crucial.[64] Our tax authorities fill in the details that Congress may not have the opportunity or Third, the word may in the text of the statute [71] implies that the
competence to provide.[65] The regulations these authorities issue are relied upon by taxpayers, availability of the tax credit benefit is neither unrestricted nor mandatory.[72] There is no absolute
who are certain that these will be followed by the courts. [66] Courts, however, will not uphold these right conferred upon respondent, or any similar taxpayer, to avail itself of the tax credit remedy
authorities interpretations when clearly absurd, erroneous or improper. whenever it chooses; neither does it impose a duty on the part of the government to sit back and
allow an important facet of tax collection to be at the sole control and discretion of the taxpayer.
[73]
For the tax authorities to compel respondent to deduct the 20 percent discount from either
its gross income or its gross sales[74] is, therefore, not only to make an imposition without basis in construction is thus applicable x x x. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from
law, but also to blatantly contravene the law itself. ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. [76]
What Section 4.a of RA 7432 means is that the tax credit benefit is merely permissive, not Tax Credit Benefit
Deemed Just Compensation
imperative. Respondent is given two options -- either to claim or not to claim the cost of the
discounts as a tax credit. In fact, it may even ignore the credit and simply consider the gesture as
Fourth, Sections 2.i and 4 of RR 2-94 deny the exercise by the State of its power of eminent
State, but rather from the private establishments concerned. Accordingly, the tax credit benefit
Granting that there is a tax liability and respondent claims such cost as a tax credit, then the tax
granted to these establishments can be deemed as their just compensation for private property
credit can easily be applied. If there is none, the credit cannot be used and will just have to be
and no other taxes are due, thus compelling it to close shop, the credit can never be applied and
The concept of public use is no longer confined to the traditional notion of use by the public, but
will be lost altogether.
held synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare, and public convenience.[78] The
discount privilege to which our senior citizens are entitled is actually a benefit enjoyed by the
In other words, it is the existence or the lack of a tax liability that determines whether the cost of
general public to which these citizens belong. The discounts given would have entered the coffers
the discounts can be used as a tax credit. RA 7432 does not give respondent the unfettered right
and formed part of the gross sales of the private establishments concerned, were it not for RA
to avail itself of the credit whenever it pleases. Neither does it allow our tax administrators to
expand or contract the legislative mandate. The plain meaning rule or verba legis in statutory
7432. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the While it is a declared commitment under Section 1 of RA 7432, social justice cannot be invoked to
taking of private property for public use or benefit. trample on the rights of property owners who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to
protection. The social justice consecrated in our [C]onstitution [is] not intended to take away rights
As a result of the 20 percent discount imposed by RA 7432, respondent becomes entitled to a just from a person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto. [84] For this reason, a just
compensation. This term refers not only to the issuance of a tax credit certificate indicating the compensation for income that is taken away from respondent becomes necessary. It is in the tax
correct amount of the discounts given, but also to the promptness in its release. Equivalent to the credit that our legislators find support to realize social justice, and no administrative body can alter
payment of property taken by the State, such issuance -- when not done within a reasonable that fact.
time from the grant of the discounts -- cannot be considered as just compensation. In effect,
respondent is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of its revenues To put it differently, a private establishment that merely breaks even [85] -- without the discounts yet
while awaiting actual receipt, through the certificate, of the equivalent amount it needs to cope with -- will surely start to incur losses because of such discounts. The same effect is expected if its
the reduction in its revenues.[79] mark-up is less than 20 percent, and if all its sales come from retail purchases by senior citizens.
Aside from the observation we have already raised earlier, it will also be grossly unfair to an
Besides, the taxation power can also be used as an implement for the exercise of the power of establishment if the discounts will be treated merely as deductions from either its gross income or
eminent domain.[80] Tax measures are but enforced contributions exacted on pain of penal its gross sales. Operating at a loss through no fault of its own, it will realize that the tax
sanctions[81] and clearly imposed for a public purpose.[82] In recent years, the power to tax has credit limitation under RR 2-94 is inutile, if not improper. Worse, profit-generating businesses will
indeed become a most effective tool to realize social justice, public welfare, and the equitable be put in a better position if they avail themselves of tax credits denied those that are losing,
THE CHAIRMAN. (Rep. Unico). Puwede na. Yung about the private
hospitals. Yung isiningit natin?
Fifth, RA 7432 itself seeks to adopt measures whereby senior citizens are assisted by the
MS. ADVENTO. Singit na po ba yung 15% on credit. (inaudible/did not use
the microphone).
community as a whole and to establish a program beneficial to them. [86]These objectives are SEN. ANGARA. Hindi pa, hindi pa.
at affordable cost[87] and of giving priority for the needs of the x x x elderly. [88] Sections 2.i and 4 of THE CHAIRMAN (Rep. Unico). Yung ang proposal ni Senator Shahani, e.
SEN. ANGARA. In the case of private hospitals they got the grant of 15%
RR 2-94, however, contradict these constitutional policies and statutory objectives. discount, provided that, the private
hospitals can claim the expense as a tax
credit.
Furthermore, Congress has allowed all private establishments a simple tax credit, not a deduction. SEN. ANGARA. I-tax credit na lang natin para walang cash-out ano?
"THE CHAIRMAN (Rep. Unico). By the way, before that ano, about REP. AQUINO. Oho.
deductions from taxable income. I think
we incorporated there a provision na - SEN. ANGARA. Letter A. To capture that thought, we'll say the grant of
on the responsibility of the private 20% discount from all establishments et
hospitals and drugstores, hindi ba? cetera, et cetera, provided that said
establishments - provided that private
SEN. ANGARA. Oo. establishments may claim the cost as a
tax credit. Ganon ba 'yon?
THE CHAIRMAN. (Rep. Unico), So, I think we have to put in also a
provision here about the deductions REP. AQUINO. Yah.
from taxable income of that private
hospitals, di ba ganon 'yan? SEN. ANGARA. Dahil kung government, they don't need to claim it.
THE CHAIRMAN. (Rep. Unico). Tax credit.
SEN. ANGARA. As a tax credit [rather] than a kuwan - deduction, Okay. RA 7432 is an earlier law not expressly repealed by, and therefore remains an exception to, the
requirement of prior tax payments under certain provisions of the latter, as discussed above,
Special Law
Over General Law cannot be made to apply. Neither can the instances of or references to a tax deduction under the
Tax Code[94] be made to restrict RA 7432. No provision of any revenue regulation can supplant or
Sixth and last, RA 7432 is a special law that should prevail over the Tax Code -- a general law. x x modify the acts of Congress.
x [T]he rule is that on a specific matter the special law shall prevail over the general law, which
shall WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
be resorted to only to supply deficiencies in the former. [90] In addition, [w]here there are two of Appeals AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
statutes, the earlier special and the later general -- the terms of the general broad enough to
include the matter provided for in the special -- the fact that one is special and the other is general SO ORDERED.
general,[91] one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. [92] It is a
canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing
a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. [93]
Pursuant to Revenue Regulations No. 2-941 implementing R.A. No. 7432, which states that the
discount given to senior citizens shall be deducted by the establishment from its gross sales for
value-added tax and other percentage tax purposes, respondent deducted the total amount
of P219,778 from its gross income for the taxable year 1995. For said taxable period, respondent
reported a net loss of P20,963 in its corporate income tax return. As a consequence, respondent
did not pay income tax for 1995.
Subsequently, on December 27, 1996, claiming that according to Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432, the
amount of P219,778 should be applied as a tax credit, respondent filed a claim for refund in the
amount of P150,193, thus:
G.R. No. 148512 June 26, 2006 Merchandise Inventory, beg P 1,232,740.00
Purchases 41,145,138.00
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,
vs. 8,521,557.00 33,856,621.00
CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION, Respondent. Merchandise Inventory, end
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the nullification of the Total Income 3,416,978.00
Decision, dated May 31, 2001, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60057, entitled
"Central Luzon Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue," granting herein Operating Expenses 3,199,230.00
respondent Central Luzon Drug Corporations claim for tax credit equal to the amount of the 20%
discount that it extended to senior citizens on the latters purchase of medicines pursuant to
Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7432, entitled "An Act to Maximize the Contribution of
Net Income Before Tax P 217,748.00
Senior Citizens to Nation Building, Grant Benefits and Special Privileges and for other Purposes"
otherwise known as the Senior Citizens Act.
Income Tax (35%) 69,585.00
For the period January 1995 to December 1995, in conformity to the mandate of Sec. 4(a) of R.A. Income Tax Actually Paid -0-
No. 7432, petitioner granted a 20% discount on the sale of medicines to qualified senior citizens
amounting to P219,778. Tax Refundable/Overpaid Income Tax (P 150,193.00)
As shown above, the amount of P150,193 claimed as a refund represents the tax credit allegedly The above provision explicitly employed the word "tax credit." Nothing in the provision suggests for
due to respondent under R.A. No. 7432. Since the Commissioner of Internal Revenue "was not it to mean a "deduction" from gross sales. To construe it otherwise would be a departure from the
able to decide the claim for refund on time," 2 respondent filed a Petition for Review with the Court clear mandate of the law.
of Tax Appeals (CTA) on March 18, 1998.
Thus, the 20% discount required by the Act to be given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not a
On April 24, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition, declaring that even if the law treats the 20% deduction from the gross sales of the establishment concerned. As a corollary to this, the definition
sales discounts granted to senior citizens as a tax credit, the same cannot apply when there is no of tax credit found in Section 2(1) of Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 is erroneous as it refers to tax
tax liability or the amount of the tax credit is greater than the tax due. In the latter case, the tax credit as the amount representing the 20% discount that "shall be deducted by the said
credit will only be to the extent of the tax liability. 3Also, no refund can be granted as no tax was establishment from their gross sales for value added tax and other percentage tax purposes." This
erroneously, illegally and actually collected based on the provisions of Section 230, now Section definition is contrary to what our lawmakers had envisioned with regard to the treatment of the
229, of the Tax Code. Furthermore, the law does not state that a refund can be claimed by the discount granted to senior citizens.
private establishment concerned as an alternative to the tax credit.
Accordingly, when the law says that the cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it
Thus, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Review on August 3, 2000. means that the amount -- when claimed shall be treated as a reduction from any tax liability. 8 The
law cannot be amended by a mere regulation. The administrative agencies issuing these
regulations may not enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law they administer. 9 In fact, a
On May 31, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision stating that Section 229 of the Tax Code does not regulation that "operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a mere nullity." 10
apply in this case. It concluded that the 20% discount given to senior citizens which is treated as a
tax credit pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 is considered just compensation and, as such,
may be carried over to the next taxable period if there is no current tax liability. In view of this, the Finally, for purposes of clarity, Sec. 22911 of the Tax Code does not apply to cases that fall under
CA held: Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 7432 because the former provision governs exclusively all kinds of refund or
credit of internal revenue taxes that were erroneously or illegally imposed and collected pursuant
to the Tax Code while the latter extends the tax credit benefit to the private establishments
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the CTA dated 24 April concerned even before tax payments have been made. The tax credit that is contemplated under
2000 and its resolution dated 06 July 2000 are SET ASIDE. A new one is entered granting the Act is a form of just compensation, not a remedy for taxes that were erroneously or illegally
petitioners claim for tax credit in the amount of Php: 150,193.00. No costs. assessed and collected. In the same vein, prior payment of any tax liability is not a precondition
before a taxable entity can benefit from the tax credit. The credit may be availed of upon payment
of the tax due, if any. Where there is no tax liability or where a private establishment reports a net
SO ORDERED.4
loss for the period, the tax credit can be availed of and carried over to the next taxable year.
Hence, this petition raising the sole issue of whether the 20% sales discount granted by
It must also be stressed that unlike in Sec. 229 of the Tax Code wherein the remedy of refund is
respondent to qualified senior citizens pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 may be claimed as a
available to the taxpayer, Sec. 4 of the law speaks only of a tax credit, not a refund.
tax credit or as a deduction from gross sales in accordance with Sec. 2(1) of Revenue Regulations
No. 2-94.
As earlier mentioned, the tax credit benefit granted to the establishments can be deemed as their
just compensation for private property taken by the State for public use. The privilege enjoyed by
Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 provides:
the senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from the private
establishments concerned.12
Sec. 4. Privileges for the Senior citizens. The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to utilization of 60057, dated May 31, 2001, is AFFIRMED.
transportations services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation
centers and purchase of medicines anywhere in the country: Provided, That private establishments
No pronouncement as to costs.
may claim the cost as tax credit.
SO ORDERED.
The CA and the CTA correctly ruled that based on the plain wording of the law discounts given
under R.A. No. 7432 should be treated as tax credits, not deductions from income.
It is a fundamental rule in statutory construction that the legislative intent must be determined from
the language of the statute itself especially when the words and phrases therein are clear and
unequivocal. The statute in such a case must be taken to mean exactly what it says. 5 Its literal
meaning should be followed;6 to depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the
statute.7
also known as the "Senior Citizens Act," and Revenue Regulations No. 2-94, petitioner granted to
qualified senior citizens a 20% sales discount on their purchase of medicines covering the period
from July 19, 1993 to December 31, 1994.
When petitioner filed its corresponding corporate annual income tax returns for taxable years 1993
and 1994, it claimed as a deduction from its gross income the respective amounts of P80,330
and P515,000 representing the 20% sales discount it granted to senior citizens.
On March 28, 1995, however, alleging error in the computation and claiming that the
aforementioned 20% sales discount should have been treated as a tax credit pursuant to R.A. No.
7432 instead of a deduction from gross income, petitioner filed a claim for refund or credit of
overpaid income tax for 1993 and 1994, amounting to P52,215 and P334,750, respectively.
Petitioner computed the overpayment as follows:
Differential 65%
For 1993
G.R. No. 142299 June 22, 2006
For 1994
AZCUNA, J.:
The controversy primarily involves the proper interpretation of the term "cost" in Section 4 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7432, otherwise known as "An Act to Maximize the Contribution of Senior On December 29, 1995, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
Citizens to Nation Building, Grant Benefits and Special Privileges and for Other Purposes." in order to toll the running of the two-year prescriptive period for claiming for a tax refund under
Section 230, now Section 229, of the Tax Code.
Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 7432, entitled "An Act to Maximize the Contribution of The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, on the other hand, maintained that the aforesaid section
Senior Citizens to Nation Building, Grant Benefits and Special Privileges and for Other Purposes," providing for a 20% sales discount to senior citizens is a misnomer as it runs counter to the solemn
duty of the government to collect taxes. The Commissioner likewise pointed out that the provision
Net Sales P31,080,508.00
in question employs the word "may," thereby implying that the availability of the remedy of tax
credit is not absolute and mandatory and it does not confer an absolute right on the taxpayer to Add: 20% Discount to Senior Citizens 80,330.00
avail of the tax credit scheme if he so chooses. The Commissioner further stated that in statutory
construction, the contemporaneous construction of a statute by executive officers of the
government whose duty is to execute it is entitled to great respect and should ordinarily control in
its interpretation. Gross Sales P31,160,838.00
In its Decision, dated August 27, 1998, the CTA declared that: Total Goods available for Sale P33,460,947.00
Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 gave a new meaning to the phrase "tax credit," interpreting it to Gross Income P 2,575,835.00
mean that the 20% discount granted to qualified senior citizens is an amount deductible from the
establishments gross sales, which is completely contradictory to the literal or widely accepted
meaning of the said phrase, as an amount subtracted from an individuals or entitys tax liability to
arrive at the total tax liability (Blacks Law Dictionary). Less: Operating Expenses 1,706,491.00
Contrary to the findings of the independent CPA, aside from the unverifiable 20% sales discounts Net Taxable Income P 920,884.00
in the amount of P18,653.70 (Exh. R-3), the Court noted some material discrepancies. Not all the
details listed in the 1994 "Summary of Sales and Discounts Given to Senior Citizens" correspond Tax Due (P920,884 x 35%) P 322,309.40
with the cash slips presented. There are various sales discounts granted which were not properly
computed and there were also some cash slips left unsigned by the buyers. Less: 1) Tax Credit (Cost of 20% Discount)
[(28,585,003.00/31,160,838.00)
x 80,330.34] P 73,690.03
xxx
2) Income Tax Payment for the Year 294,194.00 P 367,884.03
After a careful scrutiny of the documents presented, the Court, allows only the amount of sales
discounts duly supported by the pre-marked cash slips x x x.
P 45,574.63
AMOUNT REFUNDABLE
Hence, only the above amounts which are properly documented can be used as base in
computing for the cost of 20% discount as tax credit. The overpaid income tax therefore is
computed as follows: 3 For 1994
The Commissioner, on the other hand, moved for a re-computation of petitioners tax liability
Total Goods available for Sales P 33,014,047.00 averring that the sales discount of 20% should be deducted from gross income to arrive at the
taxable income. Such discount cannot be considered a tax credit because the latter, being in the
Less: Merchandise Inventory, End 5,036.117.00 27,977,930.00 nature of a tax refund, is treated as a return of tax payments erroneously or excessively assessed
and collected as provided under Section 204(3) of the Tax Code, to wit:
Gross Income P 2,441,804.00 (3) x x x No credit or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in
writing with the Commissioner a claim for credit or refund within two (2) years after the payment of
Less: Operating Expenses 1,880,153.00
the tax or penalty.
Add: Miscellaneous Income 82,207.00 In its Resolution, dated December 7, 1998, the CTA modified its earlier decision, thus:
Less: 1) Tax Credit (Cost of 20% Discount) Consequently, the Commissioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals asking for the
[(28,585,003.00/31,160,838.00) reversal of the CTA Decision and Resolution.
x 80,330.34] P316,156.48
The Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision on October 19, 1999, the dispositive portion
2) Income Tax Payment for the Year 34,384.00 P 350,540.48
of which reads:
AMOUNT REFUNDABLE P 135,906.48 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The
resolution issued by the Court of Tax Appeals dated December [7], 1998 is SET ASIDE and the
Decision rendered by the latter is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
No costs.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioners claim for refund is hereby partially
GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ORDERED to REFUND, or in the alternative, to ISSUE a tax
credit certificate in favor of the petitioner the amounts of P45,574.63 and P135,906.48, SO ORDERED.6
representing overpaid income tax for the years 1993 and 1994, respectively.
Otherwise stated, the matter to be determined is the amount of tax credit that may be claimed by a
taxable entity which grants a 20% sales discount to qualified senior citizens on their purchase of
medicines pursuant to Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 which states:
Sec. 4. Privileges for the Senior citizens. The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:
a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to utilization of
transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation
centers and purchase of medicines anywhere in the country: Provided, That private establishments
may claim the cost8 as tax credit.
The term "cost" in the above provision refers to the amount of the 20% discount extended by a
private establishment to senior citizens in their purchase of medicines. This amount shall be
applied as a tax credit, and may be deducted from the tax liability of the entity concerned. If there
is no current tax due or the establishment reports a net loss for the period, the credit may be G.R. No. 159610 June 12, 2008
carried over to the succeeding taxable year. This is in line with the interpretation of this Court
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation 9 wherein it affirmed that
R.A. No. 7432 allows private establishments to claim as tax credit the amount of discounts they COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
grant to senior citizens. vs.
CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION, respondent.
The Court notes that petitioner, while praying for the reinstatement of the CTA Resolution, dated
December 7, 1998, directing the issuance of tax certificates in favor of petitioner for the respective DECISION
amounts of P45,574.63 and P135,906.48 representing overpaid income tax for 1993 and 1994,
asks for the refund of the same.10 CARPIO, J.:
In this regard, petitioners claim for refund must be denied. The law expressly provides that the The Case
discount given to senior citizens may be claimed as a tax credit, and not a refund. Thus, where the
words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation.11 This petition for review on certiorari1 assails the 13 August 2003 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 70480. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal filed by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue (petitioner) questioning the 15 April 2002 Decision 3 of the Court of Tax Appeals
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of (CTA) in CTA Case No. 6054 ordering petitioner to issue, in favor of Central Luzon Drug
Appeals, dated October 19, 1999 and February 18, 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R SP No. 49946 Corporation (respondent), a tax credit certificate in the amount of P2,376,805.63, arising from the
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals, dated December 7, alleged erroneous interpretation of the term "tax credit" used in Section 4(a) of Republic Act No.
1998, directing the issuance of tax credit certificates in favor of petitioner in the amounts (RA) 7432.4
of P45,574.63 and P135,906.48 is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.
The Facts
SO ORDERED.
Respondent is a domestic corporation engaged in the retail of medicines and other pharmaceutical
products.5 In 1997, it operated eight drugstores under the business name and style "Mercury
Drug."6
Pursuant to the provisions of RA 7432 and Revenue Regulations No. (RR) 2-94 7 issued by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), respondent granted 20% sales discount to qualified senior
citizens on their purchases of medicines covering the calendar year 1997. The sales discount
granted to senior citizens totaled P2,798,508.00.
On 15 April 1998, respondent filed its 1997 Corporate Annual Income Tax Return reflecting a nil
income tax liability due to net loss incurred from business operations
of P2,405,140.00.8 Respondent filed its 1997 Income Tax Return under protest. 9 Add: 20% Sales Discount to Senior Citizens
On 19 March 1999, respondent filed with the petitioner a claim for refund or credit of overpaid
income tax for the taxable year 1997 in the amount of P2,660,829.00.10 Respondent alleged that
the overpaid tax was the result of the wrongful implementation of RA 7432. Respondent treated the Sales, Gross
20% sales discount as a deduction from gross sales in compliance with RR 2-94 instead of treating
it as a tax credit as provided under Section 4(a) of RA 7432.
On 6 April 2000, respondent filed a Petition for Review with the CTA in order to toll the running of Less: Cost of Sales
the two-year statutory period within which to file a judicial claim. Respondent reasoned that RR 2-
94, which is a mere implementing administrative regulation, cannot modify, alter or amend the
clear mandate of RA 7432. Consequently, Section 2(i) of RR 2-94 is without force and effect for
being inconsistent with the law it seeks to implement. 11
Merchandise inventory, beg. P 20,905,489.00
In his Answer, petitioner stated that the construction given to a statute by a specialized
administrative agency like the BIR is entitled to great respect and should be accorded great
weight. When RA 7432 allowed senior citizens' discounts to be claimed as tax credit, it was silent
as to the mechanics of availing the same. For clarification, the BIR issued RR 2-94 and defined the Purchases 168,762,950.00
term "tax credit" as a deduction from the establishment's gross income and not from its tax liability
in order to avoid an absurdity that is not intended by the law. 12
The Ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals Merchandise inventory, end -27,281,439.00
On 15 April 2002, the CTA rendered a Decision ordering petitioner to issue a tax credit certificate in
the amount of P2,376,805.63 in favor of respondent.
Gross Profit
The CTA stated that in a number of analogous cases, it has consistently ruled that the 20% senior
citizens' discount should be treated as tax credit instead of a mere deduction from gross
income.13 In quoting its previous decisions, the CTA ruled that RR 2-94 engraved a new meaning
to the phrase "tax credit" as deductible from gross income which is a deviation from the plain
Add: Miscellaneous income
intendment of the law. An administrative regulation must not contravene but should conform to the
standards that the law prescribes. 14
The CTA also ruled that respondent has properly substantiated its claim for tax credit by
Total Income
documentary evidence. However, based on the examination conducted by the commissioned
independent certified public accountant (CPA), there were some material discrepancies due to
missing cash slips, lack of senior citizen's ID number, failure to include the cash slips in the
summary report and vice versa. Therefore, between the Summary Report presented by
respondent and the audited amount presented by the independent CPA, the CTA deemed it proper Less: Operating expenses
to consider the lesser of two amounts.
The re-computation of the overpaid income tax 15 for the year 1997 is as follows:
Net Income
Sales, Net
Less: Income subjected to final tax (Interest Income 16)
The Court of Appeals found no legal basis to support petitioner's opinion that actual payment by
the taxpayer or actual receipt by the government of the tax sought to be credited or refunded is a
condition sine qua non for the availment of tax credit as enunciated in Section 229 20 of the Tax
Code. The Court of Appeals stressed that Section 229 of the Tax Code pertains to illegally
collected or erroneously paid taxes while RA 7432 is a special law which uses the method of tax
credit in the context of just compensation. Further, RA 7432 does not require prior tax payment as
a condition for claiming the cost of the sales discount as tax credit.
Net Taxable Income
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Income Tax Due (35%)
Less: Tax Credit (Cost of 20% discount as adjusted17) 1. Whether the appellate court erred in holding that respondent may claim the 20%
senior citizens' sales discount as a tax credit deductible from future income tax
liabilities instead of a mere deduction from gross income or gross sales; and
Income Tax Payable 2. Whether the appellate court erred in holding that respondent is entitled to a refund.
The issues presented are not novel. In two similar cases involving the same parties where
respondent lodged its claim for tax credit on the senior citizens' discount granted in 1995 22 and
Income Tax Refundable 1996,23 this Court has squarely ruled that the 20% senior citizens' discount required by RA 7432
may be claimed as a tax credit and not merely a tax deduction from gross sales or gross income.
Under RA 7432, Congress granted the tax credit benefit to all covered establishments without
conditions. The net loss incurred in a taxable year does not preclude the grant of tax credit
because by its nature, the tax credit may still be deducted from a future, not a present, tax liability.
Aggrieved by the CTA's decision, petitioner elevated the case before the Court of Appeals.
However, the senior citizens' discount granted as a tax credit cannot be refunded.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with petitioner's contention that the CTA's decision applied a literal Section 4(a) of RA 7432 states:
interpretation of the law. It reasoned that under the verba legis rule, if the statute is clear, plain, and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. This
SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. - The senior citizens shall be entitled to
principle rests on the presumption that the words used by the legislature in a statute correctly
the following:
express its intent and preclude the court from construing it differently. 18
Sec. 4. Recording/Bookkeeping Requirement for Private Establishments Section 4(a) of RA 7432 expressly provides that private establishments may claim the cost as a tax
credit. A tax credit can only be utilized as payment for future internal revenue tax liabilities of the
taxpayer while a tax refund, issued as a check or a warrant, can be encashed. A tax refund can be
xxx
availed of immediately while a tax credit can only be utilized if the taxpayer has existing or future
tax liabilities.
The amount of 20% discount shall be deducted from the gross income for
income tax purposes and from gross sales of the business enterprise concerned for
If the words of the law are clear, plain, and free of ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
purposes of the VAT and other percentage taxes. (Emphasis supplied)
and applied without any interpretation. Hence, the senior citizens' discount may be claimed as a
tax credit and not as a refund.30
Tax credit is defined as a peso-for-peso reduction from a taxpayer's tax liability. It is a direct
subtraction from the tax payable to the government. On the other hand, RR 2-94 treated the
RA 9257 now specifically provides that all covered establishments
amount of senior citizens' discount as a tax deduction which is only a subtraction from gross
may claim the senior citizens' discount as tax deduction.
income resulting to a lower taxable income. RR 2-94 treats the senior citizens' discount in the
same manner as the allowable deductions provided in Section 34, Chapter VII of the National
Internal Revenue Code. RR 2-94 affords merely a fractional reduction in the taxes payable to the On 26 February 2004, RA 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003,"
government depending on the applicable tax rate. was signed into law and became effective on 21 March 2004. 31
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation,24 the Court ruled that RA 9257 has amended RA 7432. Section 4(a) of RA 9257 reads:
petitioner's definition in RR 2-94 of a tax credit is clearly erroneous. To deny the tax credit, despite
the plain mandate of the law, is indefensible. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central
Luzon Drug Corporation, the Court declared, "When the law says that the cost of the discount may "Sec. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. - The senior citizens shall be entitled to the
be claimed as a tax credit, it means that the amount- when claimed shall be treated as a following:
reduction from any tax liability, plain and simple." The Court further stated that the law cannot be
amended by a mere regulation because "administrative agencies in issuing these regulations may
not enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers; it cannot engraft additional (a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the
requirements not contemplated by the legislature." Hence, there being a dichotomy in the law and utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and
the revenue regulation, the definition provided in Section 2(i) of RR 2-94 cannot be given effect. recreation centers, and purchase of medicinesin all establishments for the exclusive
use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death
of senior citizens;
The tax credit may still be deducted
from a future, not a present, tax liability.
xxx
In the petition filed before this Court, petitioner alleged that respondent incurred a net loss from its
business operations in 1997; hence, it did not pay any income tax. Since no tax payment was The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h)
as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services
rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from (1) The BIRs disallowance of ICCs claimed expense deductions for professional and
gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided, further, security services billed to and paid by ICC in 1986, to wit:
That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable,
shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to
proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as (a) Expenses for the auditing services of SGV & Co., 3 for the year ending
amended." (Emphasis supplied) December 31, 1985;4
Contrary to the provision in RA 7432 where the senior citizens' discount granted by all covered (b) Expenses for the legal services [inclusive of retainer fees] of the law
establishments can be claimed as tax credit, RA 9257 now specifically provides that this discount firm Bengzon Zarraga Narciso Cudala Pecson Azcuna & Bengson for the
should be treated as tax deduction. years 1984 and 1985.5
With the effectivity of RA 9257 on 21 March 2004, there is now a new tax treatment for senior (c) Expense for security services of El Tigre Security & Investigation
citizens' discount granted by all covered establishments. This discount should be considered as a Agency for the months of April and May 1986.6
deductible expense from gross income and no longer as tax credit. 32 The present case, however,
covers the taxable year 1997 and is thus governed by the old law, RA 7432.
(2) The alleged understatement of ICCs interest income on the three promissory notes
due from Realty Investment, Inc.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 13 August 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70480.
The deficiency expanded withholding tax of P4,897.79 (inclusive of interest and surcharge) was
allegedly due to the failure of ICC to withhold 1% expanded withholding tax on its claimed
No pronouncement as to costs. P244,890.00 deduction for security services.7
SO ORDERED. On March 23, 1990, ICC sought a reconsideration of the subject assessments. On February 9,
1995, however, it received a final notice before seizure demanding payment of the amounts stated
in the said notices. Hence, it brought the case to the CTA which held that the petition is premature
G.R. No. 172231 February 12, 2007 because the final notice of assessment cannot be considered as a final decision appealable to the
tax court. This was reversed by the Court of Appeals holding that a demand letter of the BIR
reiterating the payment of deficiency tax, amounts to a final decision on the protested assessment
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, and may therefore be questioned before the CTA. This conclusion was sustained by this Court on
vs. July 1, 2001, in G.R. No. 135210. 8 The case was thus remanded to the CTA for further
ISABELA CULTURAL CORPORATION, Respondent. proceedings.
DECISION On February 26, 2003, the CTA rendered a decision canceling and setting aside the assessment
notices issued against ICC. It held that the claimed deductions for professional and security
services were properly claimed by ICC in 1986 because it was only in the said year when the bills
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
demanding payment were sent to ICC. Hence, even if some of these professional services were
rendered to ICC in 1984 or 1985, it could not declare the same as deduction for the said years as
Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) assails the September 30, 2005 Decision 1 of the amount thereof could not be determined at that time.
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78426 affirming the February 26, 2003 Decision 2 of the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in CTA Case No. 5211, which cancelled and set aside the Assessment
The CTA also held that ICC did not understate its interest income on the subject promissory notes.
Notices for deficiency income tax and expanded withholding tax issued by the Bureau of Internal
It found that it was the BIR which made an overstatement of said income when it compounded the
Revenue (BIR) against respondent Isabela Cultural Corporation (ICC).
interest income receivable by ICC from the promissory notes of Realty Investment, Inc., despite
the absence of a stipulation in the contract providing for a compounded interest; nor of a
The facts show that on February 23, 1990, ICC, a domestic corporation, received from the BIR circumstance, like delay in payment or breach of contract, that would justify the application of
Assessment Notice No. FAS-1-86-90-000680 for deficiency income tax in the amount of compounded interest.
P333,196.86, and Assessment Notice No. FAS-1-86-90-000681 for deficiency expanded
withholding tax in the amount of P4,897.79, inclusive of surcharges and interest, both for the
Likewise, the CTA found that ICC in fact withheld 1% expanded withholding tax on its claimed
taxable year 1986.
deduction for security services as shown by the various payment orders and confirmation receipts
it presented as evidence. The dispositive portion of the CTAs Decision, reads:
The deficiency income tax of P333,196.86, arose from:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Assessment Notice No. FAS-1-86-90-000680 for
deficiency income tax in the amount of P333,196.86, and Assessment Notice No. FAS-1-86-90-
000681 for deficiency expanded withholding tax in the amount of P4,897.79, inclusive of is created an enforceable liability. Similarly, liabilities are accrued when fixed and determinable in
surcharges and interest, both for the taxable year 1986, are hereby CANCELLED and SET ASIDE. amount, without regard to indeterminacy merely of time of payment. 14
SO ORDERED.9 For a taxpayer using the accrual method, the determinative question is, when do the facts present
themselves in such a manner that the taxpayer must recognize income or expense? The accrual of
income and expense is permitted when the all-events test has been met. This test requires: (1)
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the CTA fixing of a right to income or liability to pay; and (2) the availability of the reasonable accurate
decision,10 holding that although the professional services (legal and auditing services) were determination of such income or liability.
rendered to ICC in 1984 and 1985, the cost of the services was not yet determinable at that time,
hence, it could be considered as deductible expenses only in 1986 when ICC received the billing
statements for said services. It further ruled that ICC did not understate its interest income from the The all-events test requires the right to income or liability be fixed, and the amount of such income
promissory notes of Realty Investment, Inc., and that ICC properly withheld and remitted taxes on or liability be determined with reasonable accuracy. However, the test does not demand that the
the payments for security services for the taxable year 1986. amount of income or liability be known absolutely, only that a taxpayer has at his disposal the
information necessary to compute the amount with reasonable accuracy. The all-events test is
satisfied where computation remains uncertain, if its basis is unchangeable; the test is satisfied
Hence, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition contending where a computation may be unknown, but is not as much as unknowable, within the taxable
that since ICC is using the accrual method of accounting, the expenses for the professional year. The amount of liability does not have to be determined exactly; it must be determined
services that accrued in 1984 and 1985, should have been declared as deductions from income with "reasonable accuracy." Accordingly, the term "reasonable accuracy" implies
during the said years and the failure of ICC to do so bars it from claiming said expenses as something less than an exact or completely accurate amount.[15]
deduction for the taxable year 1986. As to the alleged deficiency interest income and failure to
withhold expanded withholding tax assessment, petitioner invoked the presumption that the
assessment notices issued by the BIR are valid. The propriety of an accrual must be judged by the facts that a taxpayer knew, or could
reasonably be expected to have known, at the closing of its books for the taxable year.
[16] Accrual method of accounting presents largely a question of fact; such that the taxpayer bears
The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals correctly: (1) sustained the deduction of the burden of proof of establishing the accrual of an item of income or deduction. 17
the expenses for professional and security services from ICCs gross income; and (2) held that ICC
did not understate its interest income from the promissory notes of Realty Investment, Inc; and that
ICC withheld the required 1% withholding tax from the deductions for security services. Corollarily, it is a governing principle in taxation that tax exemptions must be construed
in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority; and one who
claims an exemption must be able to justify the same by the clearest grant of organic or statute
The requisites for the deductibility of ordinary and necessary trade, business, or professional law. An exemption from the common burden cannot be permitted to exist upon vague implications.
expenses, like expenses paid for legal and auditing services, are: (a) the expense must be And since a deduction for income tax purposes partakes of the nature of a tax exemption, then it
ordinary and necessary; (b) it must have been paid or incurred during the taxable year; (c) it must must also be strictly construed.18
have been paid or incurred in carrying on the trade or business of the taxpayer; and (d) it must be
supported by receipts, records or other pertinent papers. 11
In the instant case, the expenses for professional fees consist of expenses for legal and auditing
services. The expenses for legal services pertain to the 1984 and 1985 legal and retainer fees of
The requisite that it must have been paid or incurred during the taxable year is further qualified by the law firm Bengzon Zarraga Narciso Cudala Pecson Azcuna & Bengson, and for reimbursement
Section 45 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) which states that: "[t]he deduction of the expenses of said firm in connection with ICCs tax problems for the year 1984. As testified by
provided for in this Title shall be taken for the taxable year in which paid or accrued or paid or the Treasurer of ICC, the firm has been its counsel since the 1960s. 19 From the nature of the
incurred, dependent upon the method of accounting upon the basis of which the net income is claimed deductions and the span of time during which the firm was retained, ICC can be expected
computed x x x". to have reasonably known the retainer fees charged by the firm as well as the compensation for its
legal services. The failure to determine the exact amount of the expense during the taxable year
when they could have been claimed as deductions cannot thus be attributed solely to the delayed
Accounting methods for tax purposes comprise a set of rules for determining when and how to
billing of these liabilities by the firm. For one, ICC, in the exercise of due diligence could have
report income and deductions.12 In the instant case, the accounting method used by ICC is the
inquired into the amount of their obligation to the firm, especially so that it is using the accrual
accrual method.
method of accounting. For another, it could have reasonably determined the amount of legal and
retainer fees owing to its familiarity with the rates charged by their long time legal consultant.
Revenue Audit Memorandum Order No. 1-2000, provides that under the accrual method of
accounting, expenses not being claimed as deductions by a taxpayer in the current year when they
As previously stated, the accrual method presents largely a question of fact and that the taxpayer
are incurred cannot be claimed as deduction from income for the succeeding year. Thus, a
bears the burden of establishing the accrual of an expense or income. However, ICC failed to
taxpayer who is authorized to deduct certain expenses and other allowable deductions for the
discharge this burden. As to when the firms performance of its services in connection with the
current year but failed to do so cannot deduct the same for the next year. 13
1984 tax problems were completed, or whether ICC exercised reasonable diligence to inquire
about the amount of its liability, or whether it does or does not possess the information necessary
The accrual method relies upon the taxpayers right to receive amounts or its obligation to pay to compute the amount of said liability with reasonable accuracy, are questions of fact which ICC
them, in opposition to actual receipt or payment, which characterizes the cash method of never established. It simply relied on the defense of delayed billing by the firm and the company,
accounting. Amounts of income accrue where the right to receive them become fixed, where there
which under the circumstances, is not sufficient to exempt it from being charged with knowledge of
the reasonable amount of the expenses for legal and auditing services.
In the same vein, the professional fees of SGV & Co. for auditing the financial statements of ICC
for the year 1985 cannot be validly claimed as expense deductions in 1986. This is so because
ICC failed to present evidence showing that even with only "reasonable accuracy," as the standard
to ascertain its liability to SGV & Co. in the year 1985, it cannot determine the professional fees
which said company would charge for its services.
ICC thus failed to discharge the burden of proving that the claimed expense deductions for the
professional services were allowable deductions for the taxable year 1986. Hence, per Revenue
Audit Memorandum Order No. 1-2000, they cannot be validly deducted from its gross income for
the said year and were therefore properly disallowed by the BIR.
As to the expenses for security services, the records show that these expenses were incurred by
ICC in 198620 and could therefore be properly claimed as deductions for the said year.
Anent the purported understatement of interest income from the promissory notes of Realty
Investment, Inc., we sustain the findings of the CTA and the Court of Appeals that no such
understatement exists and that only simple interest computation and not a compounded one
should have been applied by the BIR. There is indeed no stipulation between the latter and ICC on
the application of compounded interest. 21 Under Article 1959 of the Civil Code, unless there is a
stipulation to the contrary, interest due should not further earn interest.
Likewise, the findings of the CTA and the Court of Appeals that ICC truly withheld the required G.R. No. 143672 April 24, 2003
withholding tax from its claimed deductions for security services and remitted the same to the BIR
is supported by payment order and confirmation receipts. 22 Hence, the Assessment Notice for COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
deficiency expanded withholding tax was properly cancelled and set aside. vs.
GENERAL FOODS (PHILS.), INC., respondent.
In sum, Assessment Notice No. FAS-1-86-90-000680 in the amount of P333,196.86 for deficiency
income tax should be cancelled and set aside but only insofar as the claimed deductions of ICC for CORONA, J.:
security services. Said Assessment is valid as to the BIRs disallowance of ICCs expenses for
professional services. The Court of Appeals cancellation of Assessment Notice No. FAS-1-86-90-
000681 in the amount of P4,897.79 for deficiency expanded withholding tax, is sustained. Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) assails the resolution 1 of the Court
of Appeals reversing the decision2 of the Court of Tax Appeals which in turn denied the protest filed
by respondent General Foods (Phils.), Inc., regarding the assessment made against the latter for
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The September 30, 2005 Decision of the deficiency taxes.
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78426, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
Assessment Notice No. FAS-1-86-90-000680, which disallowed the expense deduction of Isabela
Cultural Corporation for professional and security services, is declared valid only insofar as the The records reveal that, on June 14, 1985, respondent corporation, which is engaged in the
expenses for the professional fees of SGV & Co. and of the law firm, Bengzon Zarraga Narciso manufacture of beverages such as "Tang," "Calumet" and "Kool-Aid," filed its income tax return for
Cudala Pecson Azcuna & Bengson, are concerned. The decision is affirmed in all other respects. the fiscal year ending February 28, 1985. In said tax return, respondent corporation claimed as
deduction, among other business expenses, the amount of P9,461,246 for media advertising for
"Tang."
The case is remanded to the BIR for the computation of Isabela Cultural Corporations liability
under Assessment Notice No. FAS-1-86-90-000680.
On May 31, 1988, the Commissioner disallowed 50% or P4,730,623 of the deduction claimed by
respondent corporation. Consequently, respondent corporation was assessed deficiency income
SO ORDERED. taxes in the amount of P2,635, 141.42. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration but the same
was denied.
On September 29, 1989, respondent corporation appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals but the
appeal was dismissed:
With such a gargantuan expense for the advertisement of a singular product, which Deductions for income tax purposes partake of the nature of tax exemptions; hence, if tax
even excludes "other advertising and promotions" expenses, we are not prepared to exemptions are strictly construed, then deductions must also be strictly construed.
accept that such amount is reasonable "to stimulate the current sale of merchandise"
regardless of Petitioners explanation that such expense "does not connote
unreasonableness considering the grave economic situation taking place after the We then proceed to resolve the singular issue in the case at bar. Was the media advertising
Aquino assassination characterized by capital fight, strong deterioration of the expense for "Tang" paid or incurred by respondent corporation for the fiscal year ending February
purchasing power of the Philippine peso and the slacking demand for consumer 28, 1985 "necessary and ordinary," hence, fully deductible under the NIRC? Or was it a capital
products" (Petitioners Memorandum, CTA Records, p. 273). We are not convinced with expenditure, paid in order to create "goodwill and reputation" for respondent corporation and/or its
such an explanation. The staggering expense led us to believe that such expenditure products, which should have been amortized over a reasonable period?
was incurred "to create or maintain some form of good will for the taxpayers trade or
business or for the industry or profession of which the taxpayer is a member." The term
Section 34 (A) (1), formerly Section 29 (a) (1) (A), of the NIRC provides:
"good will" can hardly be said to have any precise signification; it is generally used to
denote the benefit arising from connection and reputation (Words and Phrases, Vol. 18,
p. 556 citing Douhart vs. Loagan, 86 III. App. 294). As held in the case of Welch vs. (A) Expenses.-
Helvering, efforts to establish reputation are akin to acquisition of capital assets and,
therefore, expenses related thereto are not business expenses but capital
expenditures. (Atlas Mining and Development Corp. vs. Commissioner of Internal (1) Ordinary and necessary trade, business or professional expenses.-
Revenue, supra). For sure such expenditure was meant not only to generate present
sales but more for future and prospective benefits. Hence, "abnormally large
expenditures for advertising are usually to be spread over the period of years during (a) In general.- There shall be allowed as deduction from gross income all
which the benefits of the expenditures are received" (Mertens, supra, citing Colonial ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
Ice Cream Co., 7 BTA 154). in carrying on, or which are directly attributable to, the development,
management, operation and/or conduct of the trade, business or exercise
of a profession.
WHEREFORE, in all the foregoing, and finding no error in the case appealed from, we
hereby RESOLVE to DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit and ORDER the
Petitioner to pay the respondent Commissioner the assessed amount of P2,635,141.42 Simply put, to be deductible from gross income, the subject advertising expense must comply with
representing its deficiency income tax liability for the fiscal year ended February 28, the following requisites: (a) the expense must be ordinary and necessary; (b) it must have been
1985."3 paid or incurred during the taxable year; (c) it must have been paid or incurred in carrying on the
trade or business of the taxpayer; and (d) it must be supported by receipts, records or other
pertinent papers.7
Aggrieved, respondent corporation filed a petition for review at the Court of Appeals which
rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals:
The parties are in agreement that the subject advertising expense was paid or incurred within the
corresponding taxable year and was incurred in carrying on a trade or business. Hence, it was
Since it has not been sufficiently established that the item it claimed as a deduction is necessary. However, their views conflict as to whether or not it was ordinary. To be deductible, an
excessive, the same should be allowed. advertising expense should not only be necessary but also ordinary. These two requirements must
be met.
We agree.
Thus, the instant petition, wherein the Commissioner presents for the Courts consideration a lone
issue: whether or not the subject media advertising expense for "Tang" incurred by respondent
corporation was an ordinary and necessary expense fully deductible under the National Internal There is yet to be a clear-cut criteria or fixed test for determining the reasonableness of an
Revenue Code (NIRC). advertising expense. There being no hard and fast rule on the matter, the right to a deduction
depends on a number of factors such as but not limited to: the type and size of business in which
the taxpayer is engaged; the volume and amount of its net earnings; the nature of the expenditure
It is a governing principle in taxation that tax exemptions must be construed in strictissimi itself; the intention of the taxpayer and the general economic conditions. It is the interplay of these,
juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority; 5 and he who claims an among other factors and properly weighed, that will yield a proper evaluation.
exemption must be able to justify his claim by the clearest grant of organic or statute law. An
exemption from the common burden cannot be permitted to exist upon vague implications. 6
In the case at bar, the P9,461,246 claimed as media advertising expense for "Tang" alone was
almost one-half of its total claim for "marketing expenses." Aside from that, respondent-corporation
also claimed P2,678,328 as "other advertising and promotions expense" and another P1,548,614, exclusively to the study and consideration of tax problems. It has necessarily developed an
for consumer promotion. expertise on the subject. We extend due consideration to its opinion unless there is an abuse or
improvident exercise of authority.13 Since there is none in the case at bar, the Court adheres to the
findings of the CTA.
Furthermore, the subject P9,461,246 media advertising expense for "Tang" was almost double the
amount of respondent corporations P4,640,636 general and administrative expenses.
Accordingly, we find that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it declared the
subject media advertising expense to be deductible as an ordinary and necessary expense on the
We find the subject expense for the advertisement of a single product to be inordinately large. ground that "it has not been established that the item being claimed as deduction is excessive." It
Therefore, even if it is necessary, it cannot be considered an ordinary expense deductible under is not incumbent upon the taxing authority to prove that the amount of items being claimed is
then Section 29 (a) (1) (A) of the NIRC. unreasonable. The burden of proof to establish the validity of claimed deductions is on the
taxpayer.14 In the present case, that burden was not discharged satisfactorily.
Advertising is generally of two kinds: (1) advertising to stimulate the current sale of merchandise or
use of services and (2) advertising designed to stimulate the future sale of merchandise or use of WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of
services. The second type involves expenditures incurred, in whole or in part, to create or maintain the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Pursuant to Sections 248 and 249 of
some form of goodwill for the taxpayers trade or business or for the industry or profession of which the Tax Code, respondent General Foods (Phils.), Inc. is hereby ordered to pay its deficiency
the taxpayer is a member. If the expenditures are for the advertising of the first kind, then, except income tax in the amount of P2,635,141.42, plus 25% surcharge for late payment and 20% annual
as to the question of the reasonableness of amount, there is no doubt such expenditures are interest computed from August 25, 1989, the date of the denial of its protest, until the same is fully
deductible as business expenses. If, however, the expenditures are for advertising of the second paid.
kind, then normally they should be spread out over a reasonable period of time.
SO ORDERED.
We agree with the Court of Tax Appeals that the subject advertising expense was of the second
kind. Not only was the amount staggering; the respondent corporation itself also admitted, in its
letter protest8 to the Commissioner of Internal Revenues assessment, that the subject media
expense was incurred in order to protect respondent corporations brand franchise, a critical point
during the period under review.
G.R. No. L-24059 November 28, 1969
The protection of brand franchise is analogous to the maintenance of goodwill or title to ones
property. This is a capital expenditure which should be spread out over a reasonable period of C. M. HOSKINS & CO., INC., petitioner,
time.9 vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
Respondent corporations venture to protect its brand franchise was tantamount to efforts to
establish a reputation. This was akin to the acquisition of capital assets and therefore expenses Ross, Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito and Misa for petitioner.
related thereto were not to be considered as business expenses but as capital expenditures. 10 Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R. Rosete
and Special Attorney Michaelina R. Balasbas for respondent.
True, it is the taxpayers prerogative to determine the amount of advertising expenses it will incur
and where to apply them.11 Said prerogative, however, is subject to certain considerations. The first TEEHANKEE, J.:
relates to the extent to which the expenditures are actually capital outlays; this necessitates an
inquiry into the nature or purpose of such expenditures. 12 The second, which must be applied in
We uphold in this taxpayer's appeal the Tax Court's ruling that payment by the taxpayer to its
harmony with the first, relates to whether the expenditures are ordinary and necessary.
controlling stockholder of 50% of its supervision fees or the amount of P99,977.91 is not a
Concomitantly, for an expense to be considered ordinary, it must be reasonable in amount. The
deductible ordinary and necessary expense and should be treated as a distribution of earnings and
Court of Tax Appeals ruled that respondent corporation failed to meet the two foregoing limitations.
profits of the taxpayer.
We find said ruling to be well founded. Respondent corporation incurred the subject advertising
Petitioner, a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business as brokers, managing
expense in order to protect its brand franchise. We consider this as a capital outlay since it created
agents and administrators, filed its income tax return for its fiscal year ending September 30, 1957
goodwill for its business and/or product. The P9,461,246 media advertising expense for the
showing a net income of P92,540.25 and a tax liability due thereon of P18,508.00, which it paid in
promotion of a single product, almost one-half of petitioner corporations entire claim for marketing
due course. Upon verification of its return, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
expenses for that year under review, inclusive of other advertising and promotion expenses of
disallowed four items of deduction in petitioner's tax returns and assessed against it an income tax
P2,678,328 and P1,548,614 for consumer promotion, is doubtlessly unreasonable.
deficiency in the amount of P28,054.00 plus interests. The Court of Tax Appeals upon reviewing
the assessment at the taxpayer's petition, upheld respondent's disallowance of the principal item of
It has been a long standing policy and practice of the Court to respect the conclusions of quasi- petitioner's having paid to Mr. C. M. Hoskins, its founder and controlling stockholder the amount of
judicial agencies such as the Court of Tax Appeals, a highly specialized body specifically created P99,977.91 representing 50% of supervision fees earned by it and set aside respondent's
for the purpose of reviewing tax cases. The CTA, by the nature of its functions, is dedicated disallowance of three other minor items. The Tax Court therefore determined petitioner's tax
deficiency to be in the amount of P27,145.00 and on November 8, 1964 rendered judgment If such payment of P99,977.91 were to be allowed as a deductible item, then Hoskins would
against it, as follows: receive on these three items alone (salary, bonus and supervision fee) a total of P184,977.91,
which would be double the petitioner's reported net income for the year of P92,540.25. As correctly
observed by respondent. If independently, a one-time P100,000.00-fee to plan and lay down the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent is hereby rules for supervision of a subdivision project were to be paid to an experienced realtor such as
modified. Petitioner is ordered to pay to the latter or his representative the sum of Hoskins, its fairness and deductibility by the taxpayer could be conceded; but here 50% of the
P27,145.00, representing deficiency income tax for the year 1957, plus interest at 1/2% supervision fee of petitioner was being paid by it to Hoskins every year since 1955 up to 1963 and
per month from June 20, 1959 to be computed in accordance with the provisions of for as long as its contract with the subdivision owner subsisted, regardless of whether services
Section 51(d) of the National Internal Revenue Code. If the deficiency tax is not paid were actually rendered by Hoskins, since his services to petitioner included such planning and
within thirty (30) days from the date this decision becomes final, petitioner is also supervision and were already handsomely paid for by petitioner.
ordered to pay surcharge and interest as provided for in Section 51 (e) of the Tax
Code, without costs.
The fact that such payment was authorized by a standing resolution of petitioner's board of
directors, since "Hoskins had personally conceived and planned the project" cannot change the
Petitioner questions in this appeal the Tax Court's findings that the disallowed payment to Hoskins picture. There could be no question that as Chairman of the board and practically an absolutely
was an inordinately large one, which bore a close relationship to the recipient's dominant controlling stockholder of petitioner, holding 99.6% of its stock, Hoskins wielded tremendous power
stockholdings and therefore amounted in law to a distribution of its earnings and profits. and influence in the formulation and making of the company's policies and decisions. Even just as
board chairman, going by petitioner's own enumeration of the powers of the office, Hoskins, could
exercise great power and influence within the corporation, such as directing the policy of the
We find no merit in petitioner's appeal.
corporation, delegating powers to the president and advising the corporation in determining
executive salaries, bonus plans and pensions, dividend policies, etc. 1
As found by the Tax Court, "petitioner was founded by Mr. C. M. Hoskins in 1937, with a capital
stock of 1,000 shares at a par value of P1.00 each share; that of these 1,000 shares, Mr. C. M.
Petitioner's invoking of its policy since its incorporation of sharing equally sales commissions with
Hoskins owns 996 shares (the other 4 shares being held by the other four officers of the
its salesmen, in accordance with its board resolution of June 18, 1946, is equally untenable.
corporation), which constitute exactly 99.6% of the total authorized capital stock (p. 92, t.s.n.); that
Petitioner's Sales Regulations provide:
during the first four years of its existence, Mr. C. M. Hoskins was the President, but during the
taxable period in question, that is, from October 1, 1956 to September 30, 1957, he was the
chairman of the Board of Directors and salesman-broker for the company (p. 93, t.s.n.); that as Compensation of Salesmen
chairman of the Board of Directors, he received a salary of P3,750.00 a month, plus a salary
bonus of about P40,000.00 a year (p. 94, t.s.n.); that he was also a stockholder and officer of the
Paradise Farms, Inc. and Realty Investments, Inc., from which petitioner derived a large portion of 8. Schedule I In the case of sales to prospects discovered and worked by a
its income in the form of supervision fees and commissions earned on sales of lots (pp. 97-99, salesman, even though the closing is done by or with the help of the Sales Manager or
t.s.n.; Financial Statements, attached to Exhibit '1', p. 11, BIR rec.); that as chairman of the Board other members of the staff, the salesmen get one-half (1/2) of the total commission
of Directors of petitioner, his duties were: "To act as a salesman; as a director, preside over received by the Company, but not exceeding five percent (5%). In the case of
meetings and to get all of the real estate business I could for the company by negotiating sales, subdivisions, when the office commission covers general supervision, the 1/2-rule
purchases, making appraisals, raising funds to finance real estate operations where that was does not apply, the salesman's share being stipulated in the case of each subdivision.
necessary' (p. 96, t.s.n.); that he was familiar with the contract entered into by the petitioner with In most cases the salesman's share is 4%.(Exh. "N-1").2
the Paradise Farms, Inc. and the Realty Investments, Inc. by the terms of which petitioner was 'to
program the development, arrange financing, plan the proposed subdivision as outlined in the
prospectus of Paradise Farms, Inc., arrange contract for road constructions, with the provision of It will be readily seen therefrom that when the petitioner's commission covers general supervision,
water supply to all of the lots and in general to serve as managing agents for the Paradise Farms, it is provided that the 1/2 rule of equal sharing of the sales commissions does not apply and that
Inc. and subsequently for the Realty Investment, Inc." (pp. 96-97. t.s.n.) the salesman's share is stipulated in the case of each subdivision. Furthermore, what is involved
here is not Hoskins' salesman's share in the petitioner's 12% sales commission, which he
presumably collected also from petitioner without respondent's questioning it, but a 50% share
Considering that in addition to being Chairman of the board of directors of petitioner corporation, besides in petitioner's planning and supervision fee of 8% of the gross sales, as mentioned above.
which bears his name, Hoskins, who owned 99.6% of its total authorized capital stock while the This is evident from petitioner's board's resolution of July 14, 1953 (Exhibit 7), wherein it is recited
four other officers-stockholders of the firm owned a total of four-tenths of 1%, or one-tenth of 1% that in addition to petitioner's sales commission of 12% of gross sales, the subdivision owners
each, with their respective nominal shareholdings of one share each was also salesman-broker for were paying to petitioner 8% of gross sales as supervision fee, and a collection fee of 5% of gross
his company, receiving a 50% share of the sales commissions earned by petitioner, besides his collections, or total fees of 25% of gross sales.
monthly salary of P3,750.00 amounting to an annual compensation of P45,000.00 and an annual
salary bonus of P40,000.00, plus free use of the company car and receipt of other similar
allowances and benefits, the Tax Court correctly ruled that the payment by petitioner to Hoskins of The case before us is similar to previous cases of disallowances as deductible items of officers'
the additional sum of P99,977.91 as his equal or 50% share of the 8% supervision fees received extra fees, bonuses and commissions, upheld by this Court as not being within the purview of
by petitioner as managing agents of the real estate, subdivision projects of Paradise Farms, Inc. ordinary and necessary expenses and not passing the test of reasonable
and Realty Investments, Inc. was inordinately large and could not be accorded the treatment of compensation.3 In Kuenzle & Streiff, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenuedecided by this
ordinary and necessary expenses allowed as deductible items within the purview of Section 30 (a) Court on May 29, 1969,4 we reaffirmed the test of reasonableness, enunciated in the earlier 1967
(i) of the Tax Code. case involving the same parties, that: "It is a general rule that 'Bonuses to employees made in
good faith and as additional compensation for the services actually rendered by the employees are
deductible, provided such payments, when added to the stipulated salaries, do not exceed a
reasonable compensation for the services rendered' (4 Mertens Law of Federal Income Taxation,
Sec. 25.50, p. 410). The conditions precedent to the deduction of bonuses to employees are: (1)
the payment of the bonuses is in fact compensation; (2) it must be for personal services actually
rendered; and (3) the bonuses, when added to the salaries, are 'reasonable . . . when measured
by the amount and quality of the services performed with relation to the business of the particular
taxpayer' (Idem., Sec. 25, 44, p. 395).
"There is no fixed test for determining the reasonableness of a given bonus as compensation. This
depends upon many factors, one of them being 'the amount and quality of the services performed
with relation to the business.' Other tests suggested are: payment must be 'made in good faith';
'the character of the taxpayer's business, the volume and amount of its net earnings, its locality,
the type and extent of the services rendered, the salary policy of the corporation'; 'the size of the
particular business'; 'the employees' qualifications and contributions to the business venture'; and
'general economic conditions' (4 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, Secs. 25.44, 25.49,
25.50, 25.51, pp. 407-412). However, 'in determining whether the particular salary or
compensation payment is reasonable, the situation must be considered as whole. Ordinarily, no
single factor is decisive. . . . it is important to keep in mind that it seldom happens that the
application of one test can give satisfactory answer, and that ordinarily it is the interplay of several
factors, properly weighted for the particular case, which must furnish the final answer."
Petitioner's case fails to pass the test. On the right of the employer as against respondent
Commissioner to fix the compensation of its officers and employees, we there held further that
while the employer's right may be conceded, the question of the allowance or disallowance thereof
as deductible expenses for income tax purposes is subject to determination by respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Thus: "As far as petitioner's contention that as employer it has
the right to fix the compensation of its officers and employees and that it was in the exercise of G.R. No. L-13325 April 20, 1961
such right that it deemed proper to pay the bonuses in question, all that We need say is this: that
right may be conceded, but for income tax purposes the employer cannot legally claim such
bonuses as deductible expenses unless they are shown to be reasonable. To hold otherwise would SANTIAGO GANCAYCO, petitioner,
open the gate of rampant tax evasion. vs.
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
"Lastly, We must not lose sight of the fact that the question of allowing or disallowing as deductible
expenses the amounts paid to corporate officers by way of bonus is determined by respondent Benjamin J. Molina for petitioner.
exclusively for income tax purposes. Concededly, he has no authority to fix the amounts to be paid Office of the Solicitor General and Special Attorney Antonio A. Garces for respondent.
to corporate officers by way of basic salary, bonus or additional remuneration a matter that lies
more or less exclusively within the sound discretion of the corporation itself. But this right of the CONCEPCION, J.:
corporation is, of course, not absolute. It cannot exercise it for the purpose of evading payment of
taxes legitimately due to the State."
Petitioner Santiago Gancayco seeks the review of a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, requiring
him to pay P16,860.31, plus surcharge and interest, by way of deficiency income tax for the year
Finally, it should be noted that we have here a case practically of a sole proprietorship of C. M. 1949.
Hoskins, who however chose to incorporate his business with himself holding virtually absolute
control thereof with 99.6% of its stock with four other nominal shareholders holding one share
each. Having chosen to use the corporate form with its legal advantages of a separate corporate On May 10, 1950, Gancayco filed his income tax return for the year 1949. Two (2) days later,
personality as distinguished from his individual personality, the corporation so created, i.e., respondent Collector of Internal Revenue issued the corresponding notice advising him that his
petitioner, is bound to comport itself in accordance with corporate norms and comply with its income tax liability for that year amounted P9,793.62, which he paid on May 15, 1950. A year later,
corporate obligations. Specifically, it is bound to pay the income tax imposed by law on on May 14, 1951, respondent wrote the communication Exhibit C, notifying Gancayco, inter alia,
corporations and may not legally be permitted, by way of corporate resolutions authorizing that, upon investigation, there was still due from him, a efficiency income tax for the year 1949, the
payment of inordinately large commissions and fees to its controlling stockholder, to dilute and sum of P29,554.05. Gancayco sought a reconsideration, which was part granted by respondent,
diminish its corresponding corporate tax liability. who in a letter dated April 8, 1953 (Exhibit D), informed petitioner that his income tax defendant
efficiency for 1949 amounted to P16,860.31. Gancayco urged another reconsideration (Exhibit O),
but no action taken on this request, although he had sent several communications calling
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs in both instances respondent's attention thereto.
against petitioner.
On April 15, 1956, respondent issued a warrant of distraint and levy against the properties of (Sections 331 and 332 of the Tax Code). In the case at bar, respondent made three (3)
Gancayco for the satisfaction of his deficiency income tax liability, and accordingly, the municipal assessments: (a) the original assessment of P9,793.62, made on May 12, 1950; (b) the first
treasurer of Catanauan, Quezon issued on May 29, 1956, a notice of sale of said property at public deficiency income tax assessment of May 14, 1951, for P29,554.05; and (c) the amended
auction on June 19, 1956. Upon petition of Gancayco filed on June 16, 1956, the Court of Tax deficiency income tax assessment of April 8, 1953, for P16,860.31.
Appeal issued a resolution ordering the cancellation of the sale and directing that the same be
readvertised at a future date, in accordance with the procedure established by the National Internal
Revenue Code. Subsequently, or on June 22, 1956, Gancayco filed an amended petition praying Gancayco argues that the five-year period for the judicial action should be counted from May 12,
that said Court: 1950, the date of the original assessment, because the income tax for 1949, he says, could have
been collected from him since then. Said assessment was, however, not for the deficiency income
tax involved in this proceedings, but for P9,793.62, which he paid forthwith. Hence, there never
(a) Issue a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the respondents from enforcing the had been any cause for a judicial action against him, and, per force, no statute of limitations to
collection of the alleged tax liability due from the petitioner through summary speak of, in connection with said sum of P9,793.62.
proceeding pending determination of the present case;
Neither could said statute have begun to run from May 14, 1951, the date of the first deficiency
(b) After a review of the present case adjudge that the right of the government to income tax assessment or P29,554.05, because the same was, upon Gancayco's request,
enforce collection of any liability due on this account had already prescribed; reconsidered or modified by the assessment made on April 8, 1953, for P16,860.31. Indeed, this
last assessment is what Gancayco contested in the amended petition filed by him with the Court of
Tax Appeals. The amount involved in such assessment which Gancayco refused to pay and
(c) That even assuming that prescription had not set in the objections of petitioner to respondent tried to collect by warrant of distraint and/or levy, is the one in issue between the
the disallowance of the entertainment, representation and farming expenses be parties. Hence, the five-year period aforementioned should be counted from April 8, 1953, so that
allowed; the statute of limitations does not bar the present proceedings, instituted on April 12, 1956, if the
same is a judicial action, as contemplated in section 316 of the Tax Code, which petitioner denies,
upon the ground that
xxx xxx xxx
a. "The Court of Tax Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to entertain an action
In his answer respondent admitted some allegations the amended petition, denied other
for the collection of the tax due;
allegations thereof an set up some special defenses. Thereafter Gancayco received from the
municipal treasurer of Catanauan, Quezon, another notice of auction sale of his properties, to take
place on August 29, 1956. On motion of Gancayco, the Court of Tax Appeals, by resolution dated b. "The proper party to commence the judicial action to collect the tax due is the
August 27, 1956, "cancelled" the aforementioned sale and enjoined respondent and the municipal government, and
treasurer of Catanauan, Quezon, from proceeding with the same. After appropriate proceedings,
the Court of Tax Appeals rendered, on November 14, 1957, the decision adverted to above.
c. "The remedies provided by law for the collection of the tax are exclusive."
Gancayco maintains that the right to collect the deficiency income tax in question is barred by the
statute of limitations. In this connection, it should be noted, however, that there are two (2) civil Said Section 316 provides:
remedies for the collection of internal revenue taxes, namely: (a) by distraint of personal property
and levy upon real property; and (b) by "judicial action" (Commonwealth Act 456, section 316). The
first may not be availed of except within three (3) years after the "return is due or has been The civil remedies for the collection of internal revenue taxes, fees, or charges, and
made ..." (Tax Code, section 51 [d] ). After the expiration of said Period, income taxes may not be any increment thereto resulting from delinquency shall be (a) by distraint of goods,
legally and validly collected by distraint and/or levy (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Avelino, L- chattels, or effects, and other personal property of whatever character, including stocks
9202, November 19, 1956; Collector of Internal Revenue v. Reyes, L-8685, January 31, 1957; and other securities, debts, credits, bank accounts, and interest in and rights to
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Zulueta, L-8840, February 8, 1957; Sambrano v. Court of Tax personal property, and by levy upon real property; and (b) by judicial action. Either of
Appeals, L-8652, March 30, 1957). Gancayco's income tax return for 1949 was filed on May 10, these remedies or both simultaneously may be pursued in the discretion of the
1950; so that the warrant of distraint and levy issued on May 15, 1956, long after the expiration of authorities charged with the collection of such taxes.
said three-year period, was illegal and void, and so was the attempt to sell his properties in
pursuance of said warrant.
No exemption shall be allowed against the internal revenue taxes in any case.
The "judicial action" mentioned in the Tax Code may be resorted to within five (5) years from the
Petitioner contends that the judicial action referred to in this provision is commenced by filing, with
date the return has been filed, if there has been no assessment, or within five (5) years from the
a court of first instance, of a complaint for the collection of taxes. This was true at the time of the
date of the assessment made within the statutory period, or within the period agreed upon, in
approval of Commonwealth Act No. 456, on June 15, 1939. However, Republic Act No. 1125 has
writing, by the Collector of Internal Revenue and the taxpayer. before the expiration of said five-
vested the Court of Tax Appeals, not only with exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review decisions
year period, or within such extension of said stipulated period as may have been agreed upon, in
of the Collector (now Commissioner) of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
writing, made before the expiration of the period previously situated, except that in the case of a
assessments, like the one at bar, but, also, with authority to decide "all cases involving disputed
false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or of a failure to file a return, the judicial action
assessments of Internal Revenue taxes or customs duties pending determination before the court
may be begun at any time within ten (10) years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud or omission
of first instance" at the time of the approval of said Act, on June 16, 1954 (Section 22, Republic Act
No. 1125). Moreover, this jurisdiction to decide all cases involving disputed assessments of internal (2) Any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements,
revenue taxes and customs duties necessarily implies the power to authorize and sanction the or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate;
collection of the taxes and duties involved in such assessments as may be upheld by the Court of
Tax Appeals. At any rate, the same now has the authority formerly vested in courts of first instance
to hear and decide cases involving disputed assessments of internal revenue taxes and customs (3) Any amount expended in restoring property or in making good the exhaustion
duties. Inasmuch as those cases filed with courts of first instance constituted judicial actions, such thereof for which an allowance is or has been made; or
is, likewise, the nature of the proceedings before the Court of Tax Appeals, insofar as sections 316
and 332 of the Tax Code are concerned.
(4) Premiums paid on any life insurance policy covering the life of any officer or
employee, or any person financially interested in any trade or business carried on by
The question whether the sum of P16,860.31 is due from Gancayco as deficiency income tax for the taxpayer, individual or corporate, when the taxpayer is directly or indirectly a
1949 hinges on the validity of his claim for deduction of two (2) items, namely: (a) for farming beneficiary under such policy. (Emphasis supplied.)
expenses, P27,459.00; and (b) for representation expenses, P8,933.45.
Said view is, likewise, in accord with the consensus of the authorities on the subject.
Section 30 of the Tax Code partly reads:
Expenses incident to the acquisition of property follow the same rule as applied to
(a) Expenses: payments made as direct consideration for the property. For example, commission paid
in acquiring property are considered as representing part of the cost of the property
acquired. The same treatment is to be accorded to amounts expended for maps,
(1) In General All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the abstracts, legal opinions on titles, recording fees and surveys. Other non-deductible
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including a reasonable allowance for expenses include amounts paid in connection with geological
salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered; traveling explorations, development and subdividing of real estate; clearing and grading;
expenses while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business; and rentals or restoration of soil, drilling wells, architects's fees and similar types of expenditures. (4
other payments required to be made as a condition to the continued use or possession, Merten's Law of Federal Income Taxation, Sec. 25.20, pp. 348-349; see also sec. 75 of
for the purposes of the trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer has not the income Regulation of the B.I.R.; Emphasis supplied.)
taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity. (Emphasis supplied.)
The cost of farm machinery, equipment and farm building represents a capital
Referring to the item of P27,459, for farming expenses allegedly incurred by Gancayco, the investment and is not an allowable deduction as an item of expense. Amounts
decision appealed from has the following to say: expended in the development of farms, orchards, and ranches prior to the time when
the productive state is reached may be regarded as investments of capital. (Merten's
Law of Federal Income Taxation, supra, sec. 25.108, p. 525.)
No evidence has been presented as to the nature of the said "farming expenses" other
than the bare statement of petitioner that they were spent for the "development and
cultivation of (his) property". No specification has been made as to the actual amount Expenses for clearing off and grading lots acquired is a capital expenditure,
spent for purchase of tools, equipment or materials, or the amount spent for representing part of the cost of the land and was not deductible as an expense. (Liberty
improvement. Respondent claims that the entire amount was spent exclusively Banking Co. v. Heiner 37 F [2d] 703 [8AFTR 100111] [CCA 3rd]; The B.L. Marble Chair
for clearing and developing the farm which were necessary to place it in a productive Company v. U.S., 15 AFTR 746).
state. It is not, therefore, an ordinary expense but a capitol expenditure. Accordingly, it
is not deductible but it may be amortized, in accordance with section 75 of Revenue
Regulations No. 2, cited above. See also, section 31 of the Revenue Code which An item of expenditure, in order to be deductible under this section of the statute
provides that in computing net income, no deduction shall in any case be allowed in providing for the deduction of ordinary and necessary business expenses, must
respect of any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements, fall squarely within the language of the statutory provision. This section is intended
or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate. (Emphasis primarily, although not always necessarily, to cover expenditures of a recurring nature
supplied.) where the benefit derived from the payment is realized and exhausted within the
taxable year. Accordingly, if the result of the expenditure is the acquisition of an
asset which has an economically useful life beyond the taxable year, no deduction of
We concur in this view, which is a necessary consequence of section 31 of the Tax Code, pursuant such payment may be obtained under the provisions of the statute. In such cases, to
to which: the extent that a deduction is allowable, it must be obtained under the provisions of the
statute which permit deductions for amortization, depreciation, depletion or loss. (W.B.
Harbeson Co. 24 BTA, 542; Clark Thread Co., 28 BTA 1128 aff'd 100 F [2d] 257 [CCA
(a) General Rule In computing net income no deduction shall in any case be allowed 3rd, 1938]; 4 Merten's Law of Federal Income Taxation, Sec. 25.17, pp. 337-338.)
in respect of
Gancayco's claim for representation expenses aggregated P31,753.97, of which P22,820.52 was
(1) Personal, living, or family expenses; allowed, and P8,933.45 disallowed. Such disallowance is justified by the record, for, apart from the
absence of receipts, invoices or vouchers of the expenditures in question, petitioner could not
specify the items constituting the same, or when or on whom or on what they were incurred. The
case of Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F (2d) 540, cited by petitioner is not in point, because in that Respondent Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc., a mining corporation duly organized and existing in
case there was evidence on the amounts spent and the persons entertained and the necessity of accordance with the laws of the Philippines, filed on January 13, 1961, its income tax return for the
entertaining them, although there were no receipts an vouchers of the expenditures involved fiscal year 1959-1960. It declared a taxable income of P114,368.04 and a tax due thereon
therein. Such is not the case of petitioner herein. amounting to P26,310.41, for which it paid on the same day, the amount of P13,155.20 as the first
installment of the income tax due. On May 17, 1961, petitioner filed an amended income tax
return, reporting therein a net loss of P331,707.33. It thus sought a refund from the Commissioner
Being in accordance with the facts and law, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is hereby of Internal Revenue, now the petitioner.1wph1.t
affirmed therefore, with costs against petitioner Santiago Cancayco. It is so ordered.
On February 14, 1962, respondent Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. filed its income tax return for the fiscal
year 1960-1961, setting forth its income tax liability to the tune of P97,345.00, but deducting the
amount of P13,155.20 representing alleged tax credit for overpayment of the preceding fiscal year
1959-1960. 0n December 18, 1962, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed
against the respondent the amount of P1,512.83 as 1% monthly interest on the aforesaid amount
of P13,155.20 from January 16, 1962 to December 31, 1962. The basis for such an assessment
was the absence of legal right to deduct said amount before the refund or tax credit thereof was
approved by petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 1
Such an assessment was contested by respondent before the Court of Tax Appeals. As already
noted, it prevailed. The decision of September 30, 1965, now on appeal, explains why. Thus:
"Respondent assessed against the petitioner the amount of P1,512.83 as 1% monthly interest on
the sum of P13,155.20 from January 16, 1962 to December 31, 1962 on the ground that petitioner
had no legal right to deduct the said amount from its income tax liability for the fiscal year 1960-
1961 until the refund or tax credit thereof has been approved by respondent. As aforestated,
petitioner paid the amount of P13,155.20 as first installment on its reported income tax liability for
the fiscal year 1959-1960. But, it turned out that instead of deriving a net gain, it sustained a net
loss during the said fiscal year. Accordingly, it filed an amended income tax return and a claim for
the refund of the sum of P13,155.20, which sum it subsequently, deducted from its income tax
G.R. No. L-25299 July 29, 1969 liability for the succeeding fiscal year 1960-1961. The overpayment for the fiscal year 1959-1960
and the deduction of the overpaid amount from its 1960-1961 tax liability are not denied by
respondent. In this circumstance, we find it unfair and unjust for the Commissioner to exact an
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, interest on the said sum of P13,155.20, which, after all, was paid to and received by the
vs. government even before the incidence of the tax in question." 2
ITOGON-SUYOC MINES, INC., and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
That is the question before us in this petition for review by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R. Rosete He argues that the Court of Tax Appeals should not have absolved respondent corporation "from
and Special Attorney Oscar S. de Castro for petitioner. liability to pay the sum of P1,512.83 as 1% monthly interest for delinquency in the payment of
Ramon O. Reynoso, Jr. and Melchor R. Flores for respondents. income tax for the fiscal year 1960-1961." 3 As noted at the outset, we find such contention far from
persuasive.
FERNANDO, J.:
It could not be error for the Court of Tax Appeals, considering the admitted fact of overpayment,
entitling respondent to refund, to hold that petitioner should not repose an interest on the aforesaid
The question presented for determination in this petition for the review of a decision of the Court of sum of P13,155.20 "which after all was paid to and received by the government even before the
Tax Appeals, one that is of first impression, would not have arisen had respondent Itogon-Suyoc incidence of the tax in question." It would be, according to the Court of Tax Appeals, "unfair and
Mines, Inc., the taxpayer involved, duly paid in full its liability according to its income tax return for unjust" to do so. We agree but we go farther. The imposition of such an interest by petitioner is not
the fiscal year 1960-61. Instead, it deducted right away the amount represented by claim for refund supported by law.
filed eight (8) months back, for the previous year's income tax, for which it was not liable at all, so it
alleged, as it suffered a loss instead, a claim subsequently favorably acted on by petitioner
Commissioner of Internal Revenue but after the date of such payment of the 1960-1961 tax. The National Internal Revenue Code provides that interest upon the amount determined as a
Accordingly, an interest in the amount of P1,512.83 was charged by petitioner Commissioner of deficiency shall be assessed and shall be paid upon notice and demand from the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue on the sum withheld on the ground that no deduction on such refund should be Internal Revenue at the specified. 4It is made clear, however, in an earlier provision found in the
allowed before its approval. When the matter was taken up before the Court of Tax Appeals, the same section that if in any preceding year, the taxpayer was entitled to a refund of any amount due
above assessment representing interest was set aside in the decision of September 30, 1965. That as tax, such amount, if not yet refunded, may be deducted from the tax to be paid. 5
is the decision now an appeal by petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue. We sustain the
Court of Tax Appeals.
There is no question respondent was entitled to a refund. Instead of waiting for the sum involved to
be delivered to it, it deducted the said amount from the tax that it had to pay. That it had a right to
do according to the law. It is true a doubt could have arisen due to the fact that as of the time such
a deduction was made, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had not as yet approved such a
refund. It is an admitted fact though that respondent was clearly entitled to it, and petitioner did not
allege otherwise. Nor could he do so. Under all the circumstances disclosed therefore, the
applicability of the legal provision allowing such a deduction from the amount of the tax to be paid
cannot be disputed.
This conclusion is in accordance with the principle announced in Castro v. Collector of Internal
Revenue. 6 While the case is not directly in point, it yields an implication that makes even more
formidable the case for respondent taxpayer. As there held, the imposition of the monthly interest
was considered as not constituting a penalty "but a just compensation to the state for the delay in
paying the tax, and for the concomitant use by the taxpayer of funds that rightfully should be in the
government's hands ...."
What is therefore sought to be avoided is for the taxpayer to make use of funds that should have
been paid to the government. Here, in view of the overpayment for the fiscal year 1959-1960, the
sum of P13,155.20 had already formed part of the public funds. It cannot be said, therefore, that
respondent taxpayer was guilty of any delay enabling it to utilize a sum of money that should have
been in the government treasury.
How then, as a matter of pure law, even if we lay to one side the demands of fairness and justice,
which to the Court of Tax Appeals seem to be uppermost, can its decision be overturned?
Accordingly, we find no valid ground for this appeal.
WHEREFORE, the decision of September 30, 1965 of the Court of Tax Appeals is affirmed.
Without pronouncement as to costs.1wph1.t
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Capistrano and
Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.