Jacques Rancire's Contribution to the Ethics of Recognition

Author(s): Jean-Philippe Deranty

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Feb., 2003), pp. 136-156
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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 JACQUESRANCIERE'SCONTRIBUTION
TO THEETHICSOF RECOGNITION

In 1965, at the age of twenty-five,JacquesRancierestartedhis philosophi-

cal careerwith a coupdemaltre.Hisnameappearednext to the nameof Louis
Althusseron the coverpage of Lirele Capatal (ReadingCapital),the seminal
work by one of the most influentialmaltresa penserof the time. However,
soon after, Ranciere parted company with the master and with orthodox
Marxism. This gesture and the book that ensued, La lefon d'Althusser
(Althusser'sLesson),announced what has since been Ranciere's place in
contemporaryFrenchphilosophy:thatof an original thinkerwho has devel-
oped a distinctiveposition thatmakes it impossible to afilliate him with any
of the mainstream philosophical strands. The concepts and arguments
Ranciere has developed reflect some of the major intuitions of post-1945
Frenchphilosophy,but it is impossible adequatelyto label them with any of
the usual tags. He is a thinkerdeeply influenced by Marx, who has totally
rejected Marxist sociology. An existentialist who casts away the notion of
self-consciousness. A theoristof postmodernsociety who rejects Lyotard's
philosophy of language. A theorist of social domination who criticizes
Foucault's definition of power. A sociologist and a historianfocusing his
intereston the misery of the world, but critical of Bourdieu's most famous
paradigms.A thinkerof recognitionwho rejectsthe notion of understanding.
A Deleuzian who puts the notion of the subject at the centerof his political
thought. The list goes on. Ranciere was out of place in the 70s, when
Althusser'sbrandof Marxismwas the ofElcialdogma of Frenchintelligen-
tsia. He was out of place in the 80s, when the utopianmomentwas weeded out
of political philosophy.He is out of place today with his neo-Hegelian aes-
thetics and his reading of literaturefocused on proletarianemancipation.
This knack of occupying a paradoxicalposition has actuallyenabledhim to
create,throughthe fifteenbooks he has publishedto date,his own conceptual
world,a "system,"as it were, of impressivedepthand coherence.It must also
be said thatmuch of the appealof his workrests not only on Ranciere'sbril-
liantcapacityfor paradoxicaldialectics,buton his luminousprosethatmakes
the most abstrusenotions seem evident and seductive.
There are two distinct periods in Ranciere's work. The first, covering
twentyyears and encompassingeight books, is dedicatedto social andpoliti-
POLITICALTHEORY,Vol. 31 No. 1, February2003 136-156
DOI: 10.1177/0090591702239444
C)2003 Sage Publications

136
 Deranty/ REVIEWESSAY 137

cal philosophy,fromthe firstpublication,La leqon d'Althusser(1974) to the

final conceptualelaborationof La me'sentente(Disagreement)(1995). After
this Rancieremoved on to aesthetic questions. Seven books have been pub-
lished since La mesentente.Indeed,Rancierehas publisheda book everyyear
since 1995.1However,a strongthematicunity keeps all these distinctworks
together.Ranciere's "system"combines two theoretical concerns. First, it
gives an account of social and political dominationwhich is connected with
an accountof the logic of social andpoliticalemancipation.This firstconcern
is rootedin the young Marxandin existentialism.(This may explainthe diffi-
cult relationshipwith those authors,like Althusserand his school, who took
their cue from the late Marx.) Ranciere'ssecond concern is one that causes
problemswith post-Nietzscheanphilosophy,andalso with old criticaltheory.
It is the belief, put into practicein every one of Ranciere'spolitical texts, that
the role of the philosopheris not to give his/hervoice to the silent aspirations
of the dominated,but to add his/her voice to theirs, therefore,to hear their
voices, rather than interpretthem, and to help them resound. Politics in
Ranciereis fundamentallyaestheticsince it sets out to challengethe received
perceptionof social reality,andto offer alternativeexpressionsfor a new per-
ception;thus, art accomplishes the same task as politics, namely to reorga-
nize the accepted perceptionsof reality.
Ranciere's fundamentalpolitical concern is the denial of recognition
experienced by the dominated. The purpose of this essay is to offer an
accountof Ranciere'sworkas a contributionto the ethics andpolitics of rec-
ognition. By puttingthis issue at the heartof political theory,Ranciereindi-
rectlyhighlights some of the abstractionsof the consensus model used in the
theory of deliberativedemocracy.By opposing the logic of the social to the
logic of the political, social identityto political identity,he also helps us dis-
cover some problematicfeaturesin Axel Honneth'srelianceon processes of
identity-buildingin political struggles.Ranciere'stheoryof the political sub-
ject also poses a seriouschallenge to some of the tenets of the philosophyof
multiculturalism.His assertionof radicalequality as the centralprincipleof
political theory certainlyleaves many questions unanswered.He does not
supporthis political theses with full-fledged sociological, legal, andpsycho-
logical theories. However, this is not a real shortcomingsince his explicit
claim is thatthere is a specific logic of the political thatis not derivedfrom
social or developmentallogics. Indeedhis main contributionis to isolate and
emphasizethe democraticmomentin politics andto denounceall reductions
to the social.
Ranciere gained most of his historical material and theoreticalinsights
while immersed in extensive researchinto the "archivesof the proletarian
dream."2The result of this research can be read in his second book, The
138 POLITICALTHEORY/ February2003

Nights of Labor (1981). This book and La leqon d'Althusserwere crucialin

the definition and delineation of his political project. I will focus on them
first, before analyzingthe key concepts of his political thoughtin relationto
the ethics and politics of recognition.
The gestureby which JacquesRancierebrokefree from the orthodoxyof
Althusserianism,in La leqon d'Althusser,signaled right from the startthe
constellationof themes that he would continue to pursuein his laterworks.
Interestingly,it also demonstratedthe same theoreticalconcerns thatwould
draw some thinkersof the ethics of recognition away from Habermas.The
threadof Ranciere'scriticismof Althusserseems atfirstglance to be unilater-
ally political. It looks like a typical gauchiste attack on a philosopherthat
remainedwithin the orthodoxy of Marxist science. It seems that Ranciere
holds a grudge againstAlthusserfor his ambiguousattitudetowardthe stu-
dentmovementsof the late 60s which culminatedin the eventsof May 1968.
Ranciere establishes a genealogy of Althusser's writings in which the
groundforce of Althusser'sdevelopmentis the constantfearof losing his par-
adoxicalpositionwithinthe CommunistParty.His was a marginalpositionin
thatit was bereftof anyexecutivepower,buta positionof extremeintellectual
prestige. A crucial effect of his constant tactical maneuveringwithin the
ideological discourse is Althusser'sprojectionof the division of labor into
the relationof praxis and intellectuallabor.The famous notion of "coupure
epistemologique,"the autonomyof the process of knowledgefromprocesses
of praxis,is interpretedby the young Ranciereas the theoreticaljustification
of the symbolic power of the "maitrea penser"and as a way to secure and
defend this position: "acrossall the texts [of that period], correlativeto the
denialof anycreativecapacityof the masses, is drawna certainfigureof theo-
retical heroicism:if masses can make history,it is because the heroes make
the theory of it."3Althusseris portrayedas a guardianof communistortho-
doxy and academic purity againstthe two revolutionsthat threatenhis two
intellectual identities: the Maoist revolution in world politics and the stu-
dents' rebellion in the French academia. However, it would be unfair to
Ranciere,and we would be missing somethingimportantin our topic, if we
were to reducehis firstbook to a sadexampleof the odd outburstsof ideologi-
cal fanaticismthatinflamedFrenchintellectuallife in the 70s. The personal
andpoliticalattacksaremadeon thebasis of a seriousconceptualobjectionto
Althusser'sepistemology andphilosophyof history,an objectionwhich is in
fact quite similarto the kind of objections thinkersof recognitionhave for-
mulated against their own traditions.What Ranciere objects to most pro-
foundly in Althusser are his antihumanist, antidemocratic, and
antisubjectiviststances, as these threetheoreticalgestures sever the Marxist
heritage from its potential for effective emancipation.Against Althusser's
 Deranty/ REVIEWESSAY 139

criticism of humanismand historicism as categories of bourgeois ideology,

even against the grain of many of Marx's writings, Rancieremaintainsthe
humanistheritageof Marxism.This is fundamentalto an effective philoso-
phy of emancipation.A philosophyof revolution,which claims thatordinary
men andwomen do not have the abilityto change the worldin which they are
exploited,is in effect a conservativephilosophy.The same appliesto a philos-
ophy that rejects the categories of subject and genuine social praxis.4In
effect, in practical,political terms, it is a philosophy that becomes unable
effectively to conceptualizeemancipation.Finally, a philosophythatrejects
the notion of democracy,that is, the radical equality of all individuals, is
unableto representthe interestsof those who are denied social and political
recognition.
The most endearingfeatureof Ranciere'sthoughtappearsalreadyin this
briefoutline.The cruxof his critiquesandpositive contributionsis alwaysthe
consideration of the practical effects, in reality, of action and discourse.
Indeed,one consequenceof this attitudeis thatdiscourseis to be approached
as a kind of practicalinteraction.Ranciere'sphilosophy could be described
as methodologicalor practicalmaterialism.To conceive of truthin termsof a
dialecticof illusion anddisillusionment,of ideology andscience, is to remain
within an idealist theoryof discoursethatis, ultimately,a theoryof represen-
tation.A consistentmaterialismmustnot limit itself to a materialisticepiste-
mology. It has to be materialisticall the way, in its ontology, in its principles
and its methods, in its philosophy of history,in its sociology and its poetics,
and finally in its model for a good life. It must believe in the materialnature
andthe materialeffect of languageanddiscourse.It mustapproachsocial and
political reality in terms of material, that is practical, effective, modes of
dominationand exploitation,and not limit itself to the denunciationof the
ideological reproduction of underlying relations of production. Conse-
quently it cannot reduce the fight against those relations of dominationto
forms of alienatedconsciousness. To take one example: againstthe classic
denunciationof the ideology of humanrights, Ranciererecalls that in fact,
"whenthe bourgeois law erases the class differences,it is not out of natural
dissimulation,or throughthe sole evolutionof the relationsof production,it
is because workershave forced it to do so."5A serious studyof the historyof
class relations shows thatthe exploiting minorityhas always triedto justify
its position over the lower classes throughthe discourse of naturalsuperior-
ity. The concept of universalequality had to be argued,and fought for, by
workingandrebellingsubjects.To deny the existence andrelevanceof these
fights is to vindicate the bourgeois division of humanityinto those who can
speak and act meaningfully and those whose speech and praxis are mere
sound and violence.
140 POLITICALTHEORY/ February2003

Two importantcorrelatedprinciples accompanythis fundamentalposi-

tion. The first is a methodologicalconsequence. The division of labor that
keeps apart the intellectual's science and ordinary consciousness is
denouncedas a counterproductivemistakethatperpetuatesthe metaphysics
of representationand therefore traditionalrelations of domination. This
means that the analysis of domination can no longer be carriedout from
above or behind the back of the exploited but has to be carriedout imma-
nently, in the exploited's own words and actions. For Ranciere,the herme-
neutics of the social and political fields demandthat the observertake the
positionof a participant.The same can be expresseddifferently,startingfrom
a positive basis. The fundamentalprincipleof politics is the radicalequality
of all individuals.If this principleis taken seriously,in other words, if this
principle is to be an effective, practical, principle, it must be transformed
from a politicalimperativeinto a methodologicalrule, thatis, the rulethatall
individualshave the equal abilityto express anddefendtheirown rights.The
confiscationof speech is the beginning of exploitation.The end of exploita-
tion demandsthatspeechbe given back to the exploited.The role of the intel-
lectualis not to formulateon behalf of the exploitedmasses whatis inaccessi-
ble to their consciousness, to educate and/or lead them. It is to help them
express their own experience, their thoughts, and their desires for recogni-
tion, by helping to pull down the barriersthatexclude their speech from the
authorizedforms of speech. In fact, to learnaboutdominationandemancipa-
tion, the intellectualwill haveto be taughtby those who sufferandrebel.This
is a point whereRancieremeets one importantaspectin the theoryof recogni-
tion. The methodological rule that social hermeneuticsbe conductedfrom
the participant'spoint of view echoes one of Habermas'sessential tenets.
Habermashas repeatedlyhighlightedthe confusionin the Weberianmodel of
sociological understanding,which stems from his inability to relatethe pole
of interpretationto the pole of explanation.6Habermas'sprojectis an attempt
to drawout a revisedsocial hermeneuticsthatwould synthesizebothmethod-
ological proceduresandtheirown theoreticaldemands.Also, one of the fun-
damental points in Honneth's criticism of Habermasis the deficiency of
Habermas'smodel in practically accounting for the moral experience of
denial of recognition.7The theoreticaldemandis for the inclusion of the per-
spective of the exploited.
The second correlatedprinciplethat alreadyappearsin this first book is
one thatRancierelatercalls "lalogique du tort,"the logic of the wrongor the
logic of the tort.This logic is not fully sketchedin La leton d'Althusser,butit
is alreadyat play. In formalterms,it is a logic based on the dialecticalarticu-
lation of universalityand particularitywithin the polis. It is the problematic
combinationof the two structuralfeaturesof the political:the radicaluniver-
 Deranty/ REVIEWESSAY 141

salityof equalityversusthehierarchycreatedby socioeconomicdifference.

InLia le f on, thislogic appearsonlyin thespecificcontextof a critiqueof the
mandarins,the typical1968 mottoof the abolitionof relationsof power
betweenteacherandstudent.8 Itappearsmuchmorebrieflyinthecontextof a
revisionof thehistoryof theworkers'movement.9
As we can see, Ranciere'sexampleshowsthatone unexpectedconse-
quenceof the Maoistcritiqueof orthodoxMarxismin Francewas a strong
rejectionof the death of the subject.This death was perpetratedand
announced inallcornersof Parisianintellectual
life inthelate60s,andit gave
a strongthematiccommunityto otherwiseverydifferentgroups,fromthe
Marxiststo the structuralists, the Nietzscheansto the Heideggerians.In
Francetoday,at a timewhenall theschoolsthatperpetrated thatmurderare
overshadowed by thereturnto Kantandtheflightintoliberalism,thestrand
thatis stillableto offera valuabledissentingvoiceis theheritageof thisMao-
ist critiqueof Marxism,as symbolizedby JacquesRanciereand Alain
Badiou.Theiremphasison processesof subjectivation andpraxisenables
theirworksto withstandthechallengeof changingtimes.
Rancieredid not leave this critiqueat the abstractlevel of academic
debate.Havingdenouncedthehypocrisyof classicAlthusserianism forshy-
ing awayfromthereal,practicalconsequenceof politicaltheory,he applied
practicallyhis hermeneuticrule by undertakinga long bibliographical
researchintothe"archivesof theproletarian dream," in orderto uncoverthe
forgottenvoicesof nineteenth-century workerswhohadcalledforemancipa-
tion.Rancierecoherentlychosea mostsignificantexampleof socialrebel-
lion andemancipation in the utopianmovementsin Francefromthe after-
mathof the July Revolutionof 1830 untilthe 1848 Revolution.Against
classicalandMarxistsociology,againsttheclassicalmethodsof historians,
Rancierewas carefulto centerhis researchon one very specifictype of
worker,andnotthosethatfitthepreconceived cliche'sof proletarianfolklore
ortheclassictopoiof therebellingworkers.ForRanciere,theusualfocusby
historiography on the heroicfiguresof workersresistingas workersonly
reinforcesthe divisionof laborbetweenthe workingclasses andthe idle
classesthatcandevotetheirfreetimeto intellectualtasks.lInstead,he fol-
lowedthedreamsandthoughtsof thesemenandwomenwho attempted to
conceptualize in theory,orexpressin literaryworks,themoral,intellectual,
social, aesthetic,andpoliticalexperiencesof the exploited.llThesewere
individuals twiceexcludedfromsocialintegration: firstasrenegadesof their
ownclass,secondasnonbourgeois daringto undertake occupationsreserved
forthebourgeois.Inthelivesandwordsof theseproletarian philosophers and
poets,thelogicof thetortis perfectlyembodied,sincetheyvoicedtheuniver-
sal claimfor equalityas singularvoices, as trueexamplesof politicalsub-
142 POLITICALTHEORY/ February2003

jects. They were the representativesof the working classes against the
exploiting minority, and as such they defended the rights of the universal
againstthe particularprivilegesof domination.But they could only act as the
representativesof the universalcause because they had somehow left it, as
idle proletarians,proletariansduringthe day andidle thinkersat night.12This
is an illustrationof Ranciere'sontological choice of focusing on paradoxical
processes of subjectivation,againstthe generalizationand substantialization
of social sciences. By reducing all the individualhistories of the workers'
movement to general features of one anonymous, collective identity, the
identity of a class, historiansand sociologists attachthe proletariansto an
essence anda destiny.The questionof whetheror not this identityunderliesa
historyof emancipationbecomes irrelevantin view of the overridingpracti-
cal, political consequence of such reduction.In the end, the proletariansare
unableto free themselves by themselves. As the etymology of the word tort
tells us,13Ranciere'slogic, the logic of the tort,is twisted logic. It is not dia-
lectical logic leading to higher synthesis. As the embodimentof that logic,
proletarianphilosophers and poets mostly had doomed fates; they were
rejectedby all the forces of the social field.14 But their dreamsof emancipa-
tion reveal much aboutthe logic of dominationand the fight againstit.
Having engaged directly with the voice of the dominated,Rancierewas
then able to gatherall the philosophicalcontentof his previousbooks into a
more explicit and systematicexposition, which lays out in full detail his the-
ory of recognition and social and political integration.The central work
where he fully explains the logic of the tort is La mesentente,as well as a
series of key articles publishedas a book in Aux bords du politique (On the
Shoresof Politics) (1998, second edition).To demonstratethe contributionof
Ranciereto the ethics of recognition,one mustunderstandthe fundamentals
of this logic.
Ranciere'spoliticalphilosophyandontology arestructuredby a paradoxi-
cal logic. His thesis is thatpolitics (la politique) is opposed in essence to phi-
losophy,or thatthereis no such thing as politicalphilosophy.It is not false to
say thatRanciere'spolitical philosophy attemptsto prove thatpolitical phi-
losophy is a logical impossibility.
Typically,when turningits attentionto the organizationof the polis, phi-
losophy does so with the resourcesof rationalityas a means of criticallyana-
lyzing existing communitiesand normativelyestablishing principles,rules
of functioning,andso on, of whatis in essence a political community,a polis.
Philosophyattendsto politicalmattersas it does with all othermatters.It pre-
supposes thatthere are rationalways of accountingfor the existence, struc-
turing, and functioning of political communities. This in turn means that
thereareunderlyinglogical or ontologicalprinciplesthatgive rationaljustifi-
 Deranty/ REVIEWESSAY 143

cation for the social and political order.The presuppositionof the existence
of an arkhe,an underlyingprinciple,of the political communityimplies that
there are good reasons for linking certaingroupsof individualswith certain
political functions within the polis. In otherwords, philosophy poses one or
severalprinciplesof the communityby somehow articulatingthe political to
the social. Political philosophyhas always been aboutgiving reasonfor the
specific link between individualsas citizens, andbetween the communityas
a whole and the particularindividuals.Even in the liberal tradition,the ulti-
matereasonbehindthe structuralprincipleof the communityis a certainrela-
tion to a social orderanalyticallyreducedto atomisticindividuals.However,
the ultimateconsequence of this rationalisticapproachto the science of the
polis, is the denialof the polis as the productof its citizens' activity.If the task
of politicalphilosophyis indeedto find a rationaljustificationforthepolitical
orderthatis based on a stateof the social order,all this amountsto is ajustifi-
cation of social hierarchy,and a justificationof the projectionof this hierar-
chy into the political;in otherwords, a justificationof domination.By defin-
ing its object in relation to social hierarchy,political philosophy ends up
defining a nonpolitical object. This is evident in the classical metaphorsof
the communityas an organism,a geometricalorder,a well-oiled machine,or
a Leviathan.
Ranciere sets out to develop a thinking that opposes this movement by
which the politicalmomentis ejected out of politicalthinking,a thinkingthat
encapsulatesthe originallogic or the specific ontology of the political.To do
that,one mustrupturethe traditionalrelationbetweenthe social andthepolit-
ical and oppose them. The social field is always the field of hierarchyand
domination,the absence andthe ultimatedenialof an independentlogical or
ontological status of the political. Its basic logic is that of inequality.The
structurethat regulates the articulationand good functioning of that field,
Rancierecalls the police, la police, in referenceto the broad,nonaxiological
sense of the termin eighteenth-centuryFrenchpolitical economy (the same
sense that can be found in the Hegelian Polizei). In essence, la police is oli-
garchic. On the other hand, the political works on the basis of the opposite
principle, that of radical equality, the equality of anyone with anyone. La
politique is therefore in essence democratic. Ranciere's political thinking
rests upon this opposition.51I will now relate some of the argumentsput for-
wardby Ranciereon the basis of this opposition.
The social does not found the political;rather,the political notionfounds
the social. The condition of possibility of inequalityis equality.The reason
Ranciere gives for this has a strongresemblanceto the logic of the master/
servantrelationshipin Hegel. The mastersdemandto be recognizedas mas-
ters by those they dominate.However,for this recognitionof inequalityto be
144 POLITICALTHEORY/ February2003

possible, the mastersmust recognize the ability of the dominatedto recog-

nize at all. Underneaththe existence of social hierarchy,therelies the more
fundamentalrecognitionof pure, ontological equality.
The same can be expressedin linguistic-pragmaticterms.Understanding
has contradictorylayersof pragmaticmeaningthatarenot well accountedfor
by Habermas.In society,to understandis to understanda problemandalso to
understandan order.Understandingis mostly understandingthe orders of
those who understandthe problems. This understandingof ordersis there-
fore, at this level of social domination,the denial of understandingas com-
municativeaction. One telos of language is understanding,but it is under-
standingas denial of intersubjectivity,throughthe denial of the capacity of
those who understandonly too well the language of domination.However,
when those who understandthe problemsassume that the rest only have to
understandtheir orders, they must also assume that they understand,and
thereforethey implicitlyrecognize thatthe understandingof ordershides the
possibility of a communicativereciprocalunderstanding.'6
To continueto presentthe relationof the political to the social in substan-
tialist terms, however, is still wrong. Indeed it is the very logic that groups
individualsand gives them institutionalor "political"power in accordance
with what they are sociologically, the fundamentalroot of the process of
inequality,in reality and in thought. This is where the logic of the tort, the
logic of the wrong, develops. As the social hierarchicalorderis made possi-
ble by the more radicalontological equality,this social ordermust be called
both wrong and wrung. It gives birthto a tort, a moral tort, and a logical or
ontological torsion,a logical or ontologicaltwisting, or wringing.The social
orderis morally wrong as it groups individualsinto a dominatingminority
and dominatedmajorityas a matterof course when this, in fact, presupposes
the bracketingof all domination.But this moralwrongnessis just the appar-
ent side of the ontological "wrungness"of that order.The social order is
wrungin thatit supposesthatone is not equalto one in the community,when
the only possible way of defining one is by posing thatone = one. The social
orderis wrungbecauseit mustarriveat ontologicalinequalitysince hierarchy
is its basic arkhe,while at the same time this inequalityis only logically pos-
sible on the basis of radicalequality.
If we only had the head-onoppositionbetween la police and la politique,
the possibility of political activity and political thinking would be nonexis-
tent. Thus, we need a thirdtermto mediatebetween the two. This mediation,
however,must not be thoughtof as a synthesis, since the logic of the tort is
decidedly nondialectical. Ranciere calls this third term le politique, and
defines it as the place where la police and la politique meet. Here struggle
takes place between the two diverging,yet relatedprinciples.Put in abstract
 Deranty/ REVIEWESSAY 145

formal terms, this struggle consists in the verificationof radicalequalityin

any given system of inequality.Or expressed differently,it consists in high-
lighting the wrongness and "wrungness"of a social orderthat is otherwise
presentedas naturallyordered.It thereforeidentifies victims of the tort and
those who perpetratethe tort. In simple words, le politique is always a
demandforjustice. As Rancieresays, class struggleis not behindthepolitical
as the Marxistsclaim, it is the political.17
Le politique is not a fight for the political capacityof categoriesor attrib-
utes. It is a pragmaticverification(i.e., a verificationin practiceandin speech
thatis always limited to a situation)of the universalityof equalityandthere-
fore a denunciationof the wrongnessand "wrungness"of a social order.18 It
opposes the unequal principle of domination to the universal principalof
equality in a particularpragmaticscene. For example, it confrontsthe dis-
course of the bourgeoisdenying the workersthe rightto express theirrights
with the universalisticdiscourse of the declarationof human rights, and it
demandsthatthis particular"wrungness"be redressed.This can only happen
if the first discourse is made compatible with the second. The pragmatic
politicalfight aimsatpragmaticoutcomesandit is foughtin pragmaticterms.
The political strugglecan thereforebe defined as a fight for rights,butonly if
one remembersthat the newly acquiredrights arejust one expression of a
morefundamentalnew dimensionof recognitionof equality,andthatthe fun-
damentaltorsion of the social order can never be fully redressed. This is
anotherpoint where Ranciere'spolitical thoughtis close in spiritto the pro-
gramof the ethics of recognition,and even to Habermas'sanalysis of politi-
cal strugglesin contemporarydemocracies.In all threecases, recognitioncan
only be achievedthroughstrugglesfor recognition.The differencebetween
the models lies in the differentconceptuallines thatdivide the politicalfrom
the nonpolitical.In Honnethand othertheoristsof recognition,any genuine
strugglefor the recognitionof a valid featureof identityinvolves a potential
political content. In Habermas the line runs between the private
preinstitutionalsphere and the public institutionalizedsphere. Ranciere's
model is more plastic. Any struggle that seeks to vindicate the universal
equality of speakers denied their right to express their voice is a political
struggle.This meansthatsome strugglescommonlyviewed as politicalarein
fact all about the assertion of a particularsocial identity and are therefore
antipolitical,while some struggles rooted in the privatesphere might have
political meaningif they highlight a particulartortperpetratedagainstsome
individuals.A strikecan be antipoliticalwhile the demandsof womenin their
homes can be political.The politicalis not attachedto a spherebutto a kindof
speech.
146 POLITICALTHEORY/ February2003

The applicationof the antiontologicallogic to the political fight defines

antiontological subjects. The subjects that engage in the political fight as
definedabove do not do so on accountof theiridentity.They do so on account
of their being in between two or more identities. The political subject is
defined sociologically as both dominatedand democraticallyas equal. This
contradictorynatureis what makes it possible as a political subject.It exists
as such when it engages in the pragmaticpersonificationof thatparadoxical,
or paratacticalidentitythatis nonidentical."9 It is a paratacticalidentitysince
it defines subjectsas bothbeing andnotbeing. This explainswhy the political
subjectcan, or even must, claim an identityit does not have as an ontological
subject.For instance,it can claim to be a proletarianwithoutbeing a worker,
or converselyto be a poet withoutbeing a bourgeois.Rancieregives political
meaning to the 1968 catchphrase:"nous sommes tous des Juifs allemands"
("we are all GermanJews").20In his laterarticles,Rancierebemoansthe fact
thattoday one can no longer claim thatone is, say, a woman victim of preju-
dice, if one is not a woman. He sees this contemporaryimpossibility as the
symptom of the world of postdemocracy,in which the political has been
finally ejected and political subjectivationmade finally impossible, where
the fight for emancipationhas been reducedto the fight for identity.Ranciere
opposes stronglyemancipatorymovementsthatarebased on identityclaims
to movements based on universality claims, in the nonontological sense
definedabove. In thathe remainsvery much within the universalisticFrench
tradition.
The pragmaticverification of equality creates situations of speech and
dialogue which did not exist previously.This is because the logic of the tort
destabilizes and shortcutsthe whole power structureof the social order.The
logic of the tortis a logic thataddressesthe denial of recognition.This denial
is the denialof the abilityandrightof dominatedindividualsto engage in dia-
logue with the dominatingclasses. By holdingfirmto the principleof univer-
sal equality,political subjectsreshapethe whole social situation.They make
themselves visible as speaking subjects where previously the dominating
classes only perceivedthe noise of the alienatedor rebellingindividuals,and
they make the objects of theirrecriminationvisible as worthyobjects of dia-
logue. Against the substantialistlogic thathas dominatedthe definitionsand
proceduresof political philosophy, Ranciere argues that the political in its
specificity is in fact a form of aesthetics,in thatit producesa rearrangement
of social realityfor a refreshedperception,wherebodies andvoices thatwere
neitherseen nor heardcan be includedin a communicativecontext.2' There-
fore, the understandingaimedat in a genuinepolitical situationalwayshas, as
a conditionof possibility,a morefundamentalmisunderstandingor disagree-
 Deranty/ REVIEWESSAY 147

ment(mesentente).22 Indeedthe political,as such, attemptsto createscenes of

dialogue which did not exist, but this polemic irruptionof political speakers
by definitionmust oppose, and impose itself, againstall those that deny the
exploited speakersthe right to speak and the existence of the object of their
recrimination.Rancierecriticizes the Habermasianmodel for presupposing
unproblematicallysituationsof dialogue as given and the participantsto the
dialogue as preexistingsubjectsrecognized by all as valid speakers.23Quite
the opposite is the case. The very contestedobject of political conflict is pre-
cisely the existence of a situationof speech andthe identityof the validpartic-
ipants in that situation.The fight of the dominatedindividuals consists in
appearingas worthyspeakersand in making the situationof speech visible.
This is why Rancierecalls these situationsof dialogue "polemicscenes"and
makes la mesentente,the conflict over the understandingof the whole situa-
tion of speech, the foundingeventof political communities.Political subjects
are created within a wrung situation, a situation of tort, and throughtheir
effort to redress it. Since political subjects do not exist as such before the
political fight has started,it is impossible to claim thatthe telos of language,
in the political context,is understanding.Moreover,since the logics of radi-
cal equality and social inequality are always both incommensurableand
interrelated,the treatmentof the litigationis indefinite.Therecan be no end
to the history of emancipation.
Ranciere'spolitical thinkingis in many respects similarto the ethics and
politics of recognition,despite theirvery differenttraditions.As in Honneth
and Hegel, the subject'sidentity dependson a conflicting interrelationwith
others where the dimension of struggleis crucial for the subject's develop-
ment.In both cases, initial fundamentalequalityis deniedby subjectsassert-
ing themselves as particular.The strugglefor recognitionis aboutreinstating
thebasis of equality.In all cases, inequalityis madepossible by an underlying
equality.Languageis the mediumin which the denialof recognitionbecomes
manifest and through which the struggle for recognition is often fought.
Againstthe unproblematicnotion of understandingin Habermas,theoristsof
recognitionand Ranciereboth thinkof recognitionas the result of struggle.
This struggleis infinitein its structure,since the very developmentof the self
consists in feeling unrecognized in particularintersubjectivecommunities
and in struggling to assert its nonrecognized individual features, thereby
enlargingthe contentof consciousness in itself andthe others.However,the
logic of recognitionalso gives normativeguidelines, which make it possible
to differentiatecritically between societal and political models and to give
historical accounts of social developmentin terms of a widening of moral
consciousness within a community (Honneth and Siep).24Ranciere also
acknowledgesthe notion of moraland historicalprogressin the recognition
148 POLITICALTHEORY/ February2003

of minoritiesand theirrights. Therefore,he escapes the criticism leveled by

Habermasat Foucault'snotion of power;namely,thatit dissolves all norma-
tive and differentiatingjudgments. Like Honneth and Hegel, Ranciere
stresses the importanceof the law in anchoringthe recognition of superior
levels of universalityand equality within a community.
However, Ranciere's position also enables us to highlight some of the
shortcomingsof the ethics of recognition.The logic of the tortis whatdiffer-
entiatesRanciere'sthoughtspecifically from the traditionof recognitionand
it implies as a consequence a differentapproachto relations of domination
and exploitation.
Proponentsof the ethics of recognition,althoughthey all distancethem-
selves fromHegel in some way or another,continueto thinkof recognitionin
basically idealistic terms, because what they keep from Hegel is a dialectic
understandingof intersubjectivestructures.For all these writers,Habermas
included,the groundbreakingcontributionmade by Hegel to moralandpolit-
ical philosophyis, first,the drawingout of a formalor logical scheme of rec-
ognition, and, second, the fleshing out of this program in his theory of
Sittlichkeit.They differ on their assessments of the realizationof this pro-
gram,butthey all agreethatthe logic of intersubjectivity,thatcan be foundin
the early Jena writings or in the Phenomenology,provides a valid starting
point for any accountof personalidentity in relationto others. This logic is
perfectly summarizedby Honnethat the beginning of Strugglefor Recogni-
tion: a subjectknows that it is recognized by anothersubjectin some of its
abilities or attributesand this constitutes a first form of community.This
communityenables the subjectto get to know some otheraspects of its own
particularity,since it has developed more aspects of its own identity.How-
ever,these aspectsarestill ignoredby the others,andthe subjectmustlaunch
into a new struggleto have these new aspectsrecognized,and so on.25This is
a powerfulmodel because it providesa coherentaccountof the formationof
communities and of self-consciousness as interrelatedprocesses, as pro-
cesses conditionedby each other.Eventually,the I can only relate to itself
throughotherYou's andthroughthe We, butthe We is madepossible only by
the relationof I's to themselves and to You's.26
However, Honneth is soon obliged to use the notion of reconciliation
(Versohnung).Processes of recognition in the ethics of recognition are
always thoughtof as processes towardreconciliation.The scission between
subjectsis supersededby a widening of self-representationand of the repre-
sentationof others,which is supposedto takethe selves backto a situationof
commonality, to restore the communal, communicative context. Even if
these processes takethe subjectsto higherdegrees of self-representationand
to higherdegrees of communicativelife, the formallogic remainswithinthe
 Deranty/ REVIEWESSAY 149

frameworkof Spiritas a return,a Riickkehr,to itself. The logical Riickkehris

only the formalexpressionof the moral/socialnotion of reconciliation.Rec-
ognitionunderstoodin this interpretationof the Hegelianframeworkremains
the path toward reconciliation, the return of Spirit to itself through the
negative.
Thatreconciliationis religious and metaphysical.In the 1802 Systemder
Sittlichkeit,which Honnethuses as the best example of the Hegelian scheme
for intersubjectivity,the political is presentedas the sphere where the first
two reconciliationsof the family andof the sphereof the law aretied together
into a superiorreconciliationthatunites the emotive side of the family to the
universal,abstractside of the law. This ultimatesphere,however,which hosts
the ultimatereconciliation,needs an "absolutegovernment"to be madepos-
sible andfunctioning.The reasonfor this is thatthe circles of nonrecognized
differenceneed to be closed eventually if partialrecognitionis to end up in
true reconciliation.But this "absolutegovernment"that closes the circle of
consecutive strugglesfor recognition,is explicitly defined by Hegel as "the
appearanceof God."Although Hegel's speculativelogic changed from this
earlytext to the laterJenawritings,the teleological, metaphysicalfoundation
of recognition was present as a necessary requisite and it remained
unchangeduntil the maturesystem.
The problemthatthe thinkersof the ethics of recognitionarefaced with is
thereforea particularfeatureof the greaterproblemof the use of Hegel in a
nonmetaphysicalage. Of course, they are well awareof this and they take it
into account in their revised applicationof Hegel's theory of recognition.
Indeedthe whole Habermasianprojectcould be describedas an attemptat a
nonmetaphysicalrenewalof Hegelian Sittlichkeit.27 But I would arguethat,
despite this awareness, the thinkers of recognition retain the Hegelian
scheme of a strugglefor recognitionas leadingtowardgreaterdegreesof rec-
onciliation. Thus, they retain some of the problematic consequences of
Hegel's idealisticmodel. Rancierehelps us respondto exactlythisproblem.
Two crucialaspectsof the Hegelian shortcomingarethe treatmentof con-
flict andthe treatmentof domination.It is strikingto note thatin all his writ-
ings on ethical life, fromthe earlyJenatextsto the Philosophyof Right,Hegel
always kept the same theoreticalplace for the treatmentof crime and unethi-
cal behaviorin general;namely,in the early,more abstractphases leadingto,
butseparatefrom,the full ethicallife. A theoryof conflict withinthe interper-
sonal, social, and political fields cannotreceive full systematictreatmentin
the synthetic parts of the ethical construct, since they are based on the
assumptionthatthey somehow reflect the fundamentalmetaphysicalprinci-
ple of returnto a reconciledsubjectivity.Equally,in all the authorsthatcanbe
included in the ethics of recognition, the place of conflict and struggle is
150 POLITICALTHEORY/ February2003

always a circumscribedone. Struggle is defined as only a transitoryphase

leading to higherreconciliation.Fromthe outset,it is minimizedthroughthe
teleological logic of reconciliation.Both the outbreakandthe overcomingof
strugglefor recognitionare defined as necessary structuralcorrelataof self-
definitionthroughothers,but as correlataonly, which do not warrantspecific
analysis. Thereforeit is possible to claim that despite its key role in leading
from one stage of identity to another,struggle has no real, structuralauton-
omy within the logic of communicativeintegration.Struggle is in the end
removedfrom the differentfields considered,in favor of pacified visions of
these fields. This criticism which can be leveled with good reason at
Habermas28 also applies,to my mind,to his followers and opponentswho try
to capitalize on the struggle for recognition. All of them presentmodels in
which the moment of struggle is downplayed to a moment of mediation,
essential perhapsin the entiredialecticalprogress,but secondaryto the telos
of communication,andthereforein the end supersededby the achievementof
thattelos. Dominationis just a sadfact thatmightpromptthe strugglefor rec-
ognition but in the end does not requirea special analysis. It is treatedas just
the pathology of the personal, social, and political worlds.
The appealof Ranciere'spoliticalwritingslies in the fact thatit is a type of
ethics of recognition,but one thatalso deals seriouslywith the phenomenaof
dominationand exploitation,puttingthem at the conceptualheartof theory.
Rancieredoes not operatewith a dialectical, teleological logic. In his logic,
the positive and the negative are interconnectedand reciprocallycondition
each other.In a sense, it is closer to the spirit of Hegelian dialectic than its
heirs apparent,in that it puts alienation and scission at the heart of every
(would-be) reconciled moment. It is a logic that truly gives the negativeits
full power.Whatmakes this logic departfrom Hegel is its refusalto assume
the metaphysicaledge of dialectics. The consequence is a suspensivelogic,
that is, a logic where differenceis constantlycalled to disruptthe effects of
identity andidentification,withoutbeing assigned as a determination,in the
subject,in the social field, and in the political.
Understandingcan be thoughtof as the telos of languageandthe basis for
all social interactions.At the heartof living togetheris the fundamentalshar-
ing of the same language and the communal life it supportsand expresses.
But this life and this language are always inextricablyintertwinedwith the
language and the world of separation.Ranciere marks this by positing,
againstthe logic of the social order,his logic of equality,which can be sum-
marized in the double, contradictoryterm, partager, which means both to
shareandto separate(i.e., to divide). Those who strugglefor recognitionare
those who manifestthe fundamentalcommonalityof the sharedlife, butthey
can only do so in the constantconfrontationwith the logic that denies this
 Deranty/ REVIEWESSAY 151

commonality.AgainstHabermas'sidealizedview which takesthe possibility

of dialogue and understandingfor granted at the transcendentallevel,
Ranciereinsists that, at this very level, the object of dialogue is nothing but
the verypossibility of dialogue, since some of the partnersarenot recognized
as valid speakers by the others. Thus, understandingcan only be reached
throughmisunderstanding.
Political recognitionthereforeis not to be thoughtof in the logic of self-
consciousness and the formationof personal,social, or culturalidentity.The
self thatemerges in the strugglefor recognitionis indeed a subjectbut a split
or 'suspensive'subject.The suspensivenatureof the subjectresultsfrom the
confrontationbetween the two logics. Political subjects emerge when the
hierarchicalorder of society is questioned on the basis of radical equality.
Social hierarchyordersbeings accordingto their naturalabilities. It is dis-
ruptedby individualsor communitiesof individualsholding firmon the fun-
damentalnotion that all beings are equal. When they challenge and disrupt
the organizationalprinciple of society, these individuals make themselves
visible as social partners,they make theirvoices heardas logos. They recon-
figure the field of experience and appearas subjects. Obviously,the disrup-
tive subjectscould not achieve the reconfigurationof the field of communal
experience in the same ontological, organized, hierarchical manner that
social configurationis achieved. They must retain their disruptivestatus.
They appearas subjectsonly in the pragmaticreconfigurationof the field of
experience,throughthe disruptionof the ontology of the social order.They
appearhere andnow as subjectsof wordandaction,butthey arenot ontologi-
cal entities. The subjectthatemerges in the struggle againstthe tortis itself
torn;it is a political identitythatretainsthe social difference,andis therefore
the trueidentityof identityanddifference.This is an antiontologicalidentity
that is nonontologicalbecause it proclaimsto be differentfrom ontological
difference.FromRanciere'sperspective,it appearsparadoxicalthata theorist
of recognitionlike Honnethshould denouncethe paradigmof the monology
of spirit in the matureHegel while himself adopting a philosophy of con-
sciousness in his grammarof social conflict, wherebythe aim of recognition
is the formationof a reconciled self. By contrast,Ranciereseems very close
to the spiritof Hegelianlogic, which places othernessat the heartof identity.
This aspect of Ranciere's thought provides the strongest challenge to
Honneth'sethics. If the social orderis inevitablyconstitutedas a hierarchical
structure,thereis greatdangerin the attemptto define the strugglefor recog-
nition in terms of a strugglefor the recognitionof the individual'scontribu-
tion to society, as Honnethdoes. Ultimately,this recognition only achieves
the conservationof a social orderthatis structurallybased on inequality.By
focusing on the subjects' identity and by defining identities in strict social
152 POLITICALTHEORY/ February2003

intersubjectiveterms, the ethics of recognition turn out to be a kind of

sociologism that is unable to provide the theoreticalbasis for a radicalcri-
tique of the social system. Once workershave achievedrecognitionof their
social contributionas workers,what they have in fact achievedis symmetri-
cally the recognitionof theirmastersas masters,andthe whole power struc-
turehas been reaffirmedandreinstatedas it is. Againstthe politics andethics
thatfocus on the identity,the cultureand the ethos of the dominatedclasses,
Rancieredrawsout his politics of subjectivation.Politics cannotbe based on
the social hierarchy.Politics is the theoreticalandpracticalassertionof abso-
lute equality and it must radicallybreakwith the social order.
Ranciere'sthinkingis thereforedecidedly antisociological.Not only does
it oppose radically the community as a socioeconomic mechanism to the
community as a political imperative,but also, as a methodological conse-
quence, it refuses to link political theory to the results of sociological
research.29As we saw, the paradigmaticexperiences he based his political
thinkingon arenot those momentswhere workersfoughtfor theirrightsas a
group,or those culturalachievementsthatare supposedto express the ethos
and consciousness of a whole "class."Instead,Ranciere'sparadigmis to be
found in the workerswho transgressedand subvertedthe orderof things,by
claiming the right to be poets, playwrights,philosophers,and so on, that is,
the right to have a meaningful voice beyond the constraintsof their social
destiny.
For Ranciere,the political expressionof emancipationis democracy,the
basic political equalityof anyonewith anyone,butthe regimesthatlate capi-
talismhas createdin the Westernworlddo not correspondin essence to egali-
tariandemocracy,even if they tend to secureindividualrights, since they are
based on an ontology of the social orderthatdenies the logic of politics. Our
democratictimes are the times of postdemocracy.The reigns of the experts,
social scientists, andpublic relationconsultantssignal thatsomehow philos-
ophers and governmentshave successfully achieved the end of politics.
And yet Ranciere's philosophy is not anotherversion of postmodernist
wisdom either.The motto of the end of politics is just as illusionaryas the
enlightenmentcredo and for the same reason, namely the obliterationof the
polemic foundation of the political. The whole fifth chapter of La
mesentente,"Democratieou consensus"(pp. 135-65), is a subtle articulation
of two apparentlycontradictoryimperatives.It rejectsthe optimisticvision of
Westernliberalism,the Etat de droit,the Rechtsstaat,as the final andrational
stage in political evolution, but without resorting to Marxist or
poststructuralistsuspicion, and by giving due recognitionto the democratic
advancesbroughtaboutby two centuriesof political struggleswithin a state
framework.This articulationis made possible by Ranciere'skey notion of
 Deranty/ REVIEWESSAY 153

"inscription."Democratic advances, new rights, are institutionalized.As

such they can be both victories for democracy, true political (politiques)
moments, but also, as institutionalizedmoments, elements integratedin the
police system, which denies theirpolitical value. The history of democratic
rights is not thatof a cumulativeacquisitiontowardthe telos of communica-
tive transparency,but a historyof singularsolutionsto the dialectic of equal-
ity and inequality,a series of locally situatedinscriptionsof equalityinto the
realmof inequality.This change of perspectiveallows for an originalcritical
perspectiveon societies wherehumanrightshavebeen secured,a perspective
that is not establishedby measuringthe gap between social reality and the
ideal intersubjectivemodel, but by detecting the points where the logic of
socioeconomic rationalitytwists the egalitarianimperative.30 Those histori-
cal inscriptionsof equality within inequality can become ossified and lose
theiremancipatoryinspiration,but they can also be reclaimedat any time by
new struggles as references or principles. They can be reinscribedin new
contexts, reinterpreted,rewritten,and so on. There is thereforean essential
link between memory, history, and democracy. Democractic struggles
always occur as reiterationsof previousinscriptionsof equality.3'
In sum, Ranciere'sposition is thatof a criticalparticipantin the ethics of
recognition,who providesa particularlyinventiveand coherentway of deal-
ing with the majorproblemof contemporaryphilosophy,the statusof other-
ness. Against the optimismof all those who returnto Kantand the visions of
Enlightenment,he remindsus of the irreduciblefact thathumancommunity
is structurallybased on dominationandexploitation.But he also gives us the
tools for understandingstrugglefor recognitionas the otherirreduciblefact
of human community. His supple theory of the pragmaticverification of
equality makes it well adapted to understandand analyze contemporary
social, political, and cultural struggles. Ranciere's original thinking has
opened up a new direction in the traditionof the philosophy of recognition
that is well worthpursuing.

NOTES
1. JacquesRanciere'swritings to date are as follows:
Contributionto Lire le Capital (1964; reprint,Paris:PUF, 1996). Reading Capital,2nd ed.,
trans.Ben Brewster(London:Verso Books, 1998).
La legon d'Althusser(Paris:Gallimard,1974). Quoted as La leqon.
La nuit des proletaires (Paris:Fayard,1981). Quotedas La nuit. TheNights of Labor,trans.
John Drury(Philadelphia:Temple UniversityPress, 1991).
Lephilosophe et sespauvres (Paris:Fayard,1983). ThePhilosopherand His Poor(Philadel-
phia: Temple UniversityPress, 1991).
154 POLITICALTHEORY/ February2003

Le maitre ignorant (Paris:Fayard, 1987). The IgnorantSchoolmaster,trans. KristinRoss

(Stanford,CA: StanfordUniversityPress, 1991).
Courtsvoyages au pays du peuple (Paris:Seuil, 1990).
Les noms de l'histoire (Paris:Seuil, 1992). The Names of History, trans.Hayden V. White
and Hassan Melehy (Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1994).
La mesentente(Paris:Galilee, 1995). Quotedas La mesentente.Disagreement:Politics and
Philosophy,trans.Julie Rose (Minneapolis:University of MinnesotaPress, 1998).
Mallarme.La politique de la sirene (Paris:Hachette, 1996).
Arretsur histoire (avec Jean-LouisComolli) (Paris:CentreGeorges Pompidou, 1997).
La parole muette(Paris:Hachette, 1998).
La chair des mots (Paris:Galilee, 1990, 1998).
Aux bords du politique, 2nd ed. (Paris:La fabrique, 1998). Quoted as Aux bords. On the
Shores of Politics, trans.Liz Heron (London:Verso Books, 1995).
Le partage du sensible (Paris:La fabrique,2000).
L'inconscientesthetique (Paris:Galilee, 2001).
Lafable cinematographique(Paris:Galilee, 2001).
2. This is the subtitleto TheNightsof Labor.Ranciereeditedthreebooks as a directresultof
this research:La parole ouvriere (with Alain Faure) (Paris:U.G.E., 1976); Gabriel Gauny,Le
philosophe plebeien (Paris:La D6couverte/PressesUniversitairesde Vincennes, 1985); and La
politique des poetes (Paris:Albin Michel, 1992).
3. See the second chapterof La lecon.
4. La lecon, 176. Ranciereshows thateven if Marxdid not focus theoreticallyon the notion
of the subject,he neverlost sight of it in the practicaloutcomesof his theoreticalpraxis.The sub-
ject is "thepoint that makes possible the very aims of science."
5. La lemon,163.
6. See for instanceOn the Logic of the Social Sciences, trans.ShierryWeberNicholsen and
JerryStark(Cambridge,UK: Polity, 1988), 1-16.
7. Axel Honneth,"Ladynamiquesociale du mepris,"Habermas,la raison, la critique,ed.
C. BouchindhommeandR. Rochlitz(Paris:Le Cerf, 1996), 225-26. Quotedas La dynamique.
8. La lecon, 76-111, 131-47.
9. La lecon, 155-75.
10. See the powerful first chapterof La nuit, particularly21-40.
11. In theoriesof moraleducation,social recognition,andpolitical emancipationin La nuit
andLephilosophe et ses pauvres;in theoriesof intellectualemancipationin Le maitreignorant.
In Le philosopheplebeien, Rancierepresentsthe writingsof one such representativelife: thatof
the philosopher/carpenterGabrielGauny.
12. "... . as those who hadunderstood,they no longerbelong to a worldto which, on the other
hand, they must continuallyreturn,as workersor apostles"(La nuit, 207).
13. Fromtortus,pastparticipleof the Latinverbtorquere:twisted,distorted,the wrongway.
14. See the tragic fate of the Icarians,in the last chapterof La nuit, 356-440.
15. La mesentente,chap. 2. Fora cleardelineationof the threenotions (lapolitique, lapolice,
and le politique), see Aux bords, 83-85.
16. La mesentente,71-77.
17. La mesentente,39.
18. La mesentente,61-62.
19. Aux bords, 89.
20. La mesentente,173, andAux bords, 89.
 Deranty/ REVIEWESSAY 155

21. See moreparticularlyLa mesentente,88-89, where Ranciereconfrontshis own notionof

communityto the Kantianuniversalitywithout concept of the thirdCritique.Ranciere'slater
works on poetics and aestheticscontinueto questionthe specific aestheticscreatedby the logic
of democracy.See the end of the 1993 article"L'inadmissible,"reprintedin Aux bords, 138-47,
which links the powerof literatureto the democraticprinciple.See also his controversial"repub-
lican"readingof Mallarme:Mallarme, la politique de la sirene (Paris:Hachette, 1996). In the
last chapterof Les noms de l'histoire (Paris:Seuil, 1990), Ranciereanalyzes furtherhis theory
that literatureand democracy share essential features. The two books published in 1998, La
parole muette(Paris:Hachette, 1998) and La chair des mots (Paris:Galilee, 1998) both apply
Ranciere'skey notion of "suspensive"subjects, the failure of full overlappingbetween words
and things, body and speech, to the theory of literature.
22. Ranciere opposes "la m6sentente"to "la m6connaissance"(failure to recognize), "le
malentendu"(misunderstanding/misapprehension), and"le differend"(difference/disagreement).
See La mesentente, 12-14.
23. The thirdchapterof La mesententeis dedicatedto this critique.
24. See the last chapterin Honneth,KampfumAnerkennung.ZurmoralischenGrammatik
sozialer Konflikte (Frankfurtam Main: SuhrkampTaschenbuch, 1994), 272-86. Quoted as
Kampf.See also Ludwig Siep, Anerkennungals PrinzipderpraktischenPhilosophie (Freiburg:
Alber Verlag, 1979), 278-98. Quoted as Anerkennung.
25. Kampf,28.
26. Anerkennung,123-25.
27. As Habermashimself defines it in his Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.
28. The expression"pacifiedvision of the social field"comes fromFranckFischbach,Fichte
et Hegel: La reconnaissance (Paris: PUF, 1999), 126. See also, E. Renault, Mepris social:
Ethiqueet politique de la reconnaissance (Begles: Editions du Passant,2000).
29. Lephilosophe et sespauvres, 239-89. The lastpartof his ThePhilosopherand His Pooris
a virulentcritiqueof Bourdieu'stheory of education.
30. At the end of La mesentente,Rancierehighlights the paradoxesof the postdemocratic
age. It is an age which views itself as having finally abandonedthe polemical understandingof
politics for a conceptionof democracyas a process towardconsensus, a conceptionsupposedto
spreaduniversallythanksto its rationalsuperiority.Unfortunately,this optimisticvision of poli-
tics spreadsitself at the same time as the multiplicationof wars and terroristactivitiesbased on
identity claims, and the increasing rejection of alien populations by Western societies. For
Ranciere these phenomenaare linked because they belong to a time when the triumphof the
sociological understandingof politics has madethe symbolic identificationwith othersimpossi-
ble. In the full immanenceof the social body, every one is a self and a self can be no other.In a
sense, Ranciere'sphilosophyof history,his theoryof postdemocracy,could thereforebe quali-
fied as a kind of pessimisticpostmodernism.However,La mesententeexplicitlypresentsthe the-
ses on the political as being still valid in the postdemocraticage, andin effect most of the texts of
Aux bordsdupolitique relatehis definitionof the political to strugglesin contemporaryFrance,
like the 1968 students'strike,the debate over immigration,the 1988 presidentialelections, and
so on.
31. Rancieredevotedone book in his "politicalperiod"to the statusof historyin the demo-
craticage. See Les nomsde I 'histoire(TheNamesof History) (1992). The seventhchapterin par-
ticular,"Une histoire h6r6tique,"articulatesRanciere'stheory of democracyand his theses on
history.

-Jean-Philippe Deranty
Macquarie University
156 POLITICALTHEORY/ February2003

Jean-PhilippeDeranty teaches French and Germanphilosophy at Macquarie Univer-

sity, Sydney,Australia.He has published a translationinto Frenchof Hegel's 1817 lec-
tureson the Philosophyof Right,as well as severalarticles on Hegel andpolitical philos-
ophy.His currentresearchproject is on the ethics and politics of recognition.