BOOK IV

1. Bel Chem Phil. Inc., v. Zafra

FACTS: Petitioner Zafra was hired as a "wiper" by Belchem, through its local manning agent United Phil. Lines, for a period
of 4 months under a duly approved contract of employment. He boarded MT Chemtrans Havel and on September 30, 2009,
he sustained injuries on his left knee after hitting the floor on his way to the ship's engine room to check for leaks in the
machineries there. He was subsequently repatriated and the petitioner's designated physician found him to have "probable
Medial Meniscal Tear, Left knee" and "Anterior Cruciate Ligament (ACL) Tear, Left Knee" which required surgery. After his
"Arthroscopic ACL Reconstruction" surgery for which he was confined for 1 week, he underwent rehabilitation measures for
him to walk again. On April 19, 2010, or within the 240-day treatment period, the attending doctor, Dr. Chuasuan, Jr. wrote a
letter stating that the suggested disability grading of Zafra's injuries was 20% of Grade 10, which under the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration - Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), was equivalent to US$3,590.73. But
petitioner filed a complaint for payment of permanent total disability benefits, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees. The LA declared Zafra entitled to disability benefits in the amount of US$3,590.73.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the findings of the LA and awarded US$60,000.00 to Zafra after finding his
injury permanent and total. CA affirmed NLRC decission.
ISSUE: WON Zafra suffered from permanent total disability?
HELD: YES. Total permanent disability means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work that
he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do.
It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is
the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity. While, partial disability, on the one hand, is when
the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body as a result of the injury or sickness.
The test of whether or not an employee suffers from permanent total disability is a showing of the capacity of the employee
to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Thus, if by reason of the injury or sickness he
sustained, the employee is unable to perform his customary job for more than 120 or 240 days and he does not come within
the coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability (which, in a more detailed manner, describes
what constitutes temporary total disability), then the said employee undoubtedly suffers from permanent total disability
regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. (Vicente v. ECC)
Permanent partial disability presupposes a seafarer's fitness to resume sea duties before the end of the 120/240-day medical
treatment period despite the injuries sustained. The premise is that such partial injuries did not disable a seafarer to earn
wages in the same kind of work or similar nature for which he was trained.
For the courts and labor tribunals, determining whether a seafarer's fitness to work despite suffering an alleged partial injury
generally requires resort to the assessment and certification issued within the 120/240-day period by the company-designated
physician. Through such certification, a seafarer's fitness to resume work or the degree of disability can be known, unless
challenged by the seafarer through a second opinion secured by virtue of his right under the POEA-SEC. Such certification,
as held by this Court in numerous cases, must be a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent
disability.As stated in Oriental Shipmanagement Co., Inc. v. Bastol, the company-designated doctor must declare the seaman
fit to work or assess the degree of his permanent disability. Without which, the characterization of a seafarer's condition as
permanent and total will ensue because the ability to return to one's accustomed work before the applicable periods elapse
cannot be shown.
Section 20 (B)(3) of the POEA-SEC requires the declaration of fit to work or the degree of permanent disability by the
company-designated physician and not by anyone else. In the case, it was only Dr. Chuasuan, Jr. who signed the suggested
assessment, addressing the letter solely to Dr. Lim, the company-designated physician. Taken in this context, no assessment,
definitive in character, from the company-designated physician's end was issued to reflect whether Zafra was fit or unfit to
resume duties within the 120/240 day period, as the case may be. Thus, the Court deems him unfit to resume work on board
a sea vessel.
Zafra has remained in a state of disability that has become permanent and total considering that no certification, compliant
with the POEA-SEC and the Labor Code, was issued within the 120/240-day period.

2. Cagatin v. Magsaysay Maritime Corp

FACTS: On March 16, 2001 respondent Magsaysay Maritime, in behalf of its principal C.S.C.S International NV, employed
Petitioner Normilito Cagatin as cabin steward on board M/V Costa Atlantica under a POEA approved contract for 7 months
with $298 monthly salary. After starting his work on MV Costa Atlantica he was transferred to MV Costa Tropical where he
performed tasks such as cleaning the ship and lifting objects like furniture, steel vaults and others until mid-July 2001. He
returned to MVCosta Atlantica and while petitioner was performing his official duty as Cabin Steward, he felt what he described
as a "crackle" or a slip in his back or spinal bone, which was followed by an intense pain in the lower back and an inability to
bend. Upon disembarkation in Italy, he underwent a medical examination and an X-ray procedure and was told by the doctor
that he could no longer continue working in the vessel. Thus, petitioner was signed off the ship and, on Aug 1, 2001, he
returned to the Philippines. In the Philippines, Magsaysay Maritime referred him to Medical Center Manila and the company-
designated physician Dr. Cruz diagnosed petitioner as suffering from "small central disc protrusion with annular fissure
formation L5S1; disc annular bulge L4L5." On January 15, 2002, Dr. Cruz declared petitioner as fit to work and executed an
affidavit to such effect.
On August 6, 2002, petitioner went to another physician, Dr. Enrique Collantes, Jr., for another opinion and the later made a
finding that petitioner is "no longer fit to work at sea" in a vessel and gave him a disability grading of 8 (33.59%) for his injury.
Petitioner filed a complaint before the NLRC for Disability Benefits and damages. The LA ordered Magsaysay Maritime and
C.S.C.S to pay petitioner US$16,795.00 or its equivalent in peso. Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision and ordered
respondents in solidum to pay the complainant-appellee his sickness allowance for one hundred twenty (120) days.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to disability benefits as recommended by his chosen physician, contrary to the finding that
he was "fit to work" as earlier reported by his employer's company-designated physician?
HELD: NO. The relations between the parties and the procedure that is followed in case of a conflict in medical findings during
claims for disability benefits is governed by the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino
Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels (also known as POEA Standard Employment Contract) and Section 20
(Compensation and Benefits) thereof provides it is the findings and evaluations of the company-designated physician which
should form the basis of the seafarer's disability claim but his assessment is not final since the seafarer may seek a second
opinion and consult a doctor of his choice regarding his ailment or injury. If the physician chosen by the seafarer disagrees
with the assessment of the company-designated physician, the company and the seafarer may agree jointly to refer the latter
to a third doctor whose decision shall be final and binding on them. Petitioner's failure to comply with the requirement under
the POEASEC to have the conflicting assessments of his disability determined by a third doctor also militates against his
claim. It is held that without such a binding third opinion, the original certification of the company-designated physician that
the claimant was "fit to work" should stand. And in jurisprudence interpreting the aforequoted provision of the POEA-SEC, a
temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company-designated physician within the periods
he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either
fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability. The 240-day period is meant to harmonize the provision of the
POEA-SEC above with the provisions of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Book IV of the Labor Code, specifically
Rule X, Section 2, on disability benefits. Where before it was held that permanent disability is the inability of a seafarer to
perform his work for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body, now the rule
is that if the injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days, the company-designated physician has,
including the initial 120 days, up to a maximum of 240 days to declare either fitness to work or permanent disability, beyond
which and with or without any declaration, the disability is considered total and permanent.
In the case at bar, the declaration by Dr. Cruz that petitioner was "fit to work" went beyond the 120-day period; however, as
the reason therefor was that petitioner still required additional medical treatment, his declaration as "fit to work" was made
within the maximum 240 days which therefore forestalls the automatic classification of petitioner's injury as total and
permanent and, thus, entitled to the pertinent disability benefits.

3. One Shipping Corp v. Penafiel

FACTS: Petitioner One Shipping Corp., in behalf of its principal One Shipping Kabushiki Kaisha/Japan, hired the late Ildefonso
S. Peafiel as Second Engineer on board the vessel MV/ACX Magnolia with a monthly basic salary of US$1,120.00 and for
a duration of twelve (12) months. Peafiel boarded the vessel on August 29, 2004 and died on July 2, 2005. His wife then
filed for monetary claims arising from his death. Respondent alleged that while her husband felt a throbbing pain in his chest
and shortening of breath while performing his work and despite asking for medical attention after his initial deployment
petitioner One shipping allegedly informed that he was already scheduled for his next deployment. Thus, Ildefonso was
required to undergo the pre-employment medical examination at the PMP Diagnostic Center, Inc., but after completing the
medical and laboratory examinations, Ildefonso collapsed and was immediately brought to the Philippine General Hospital
where he died due to myocardial infarction. Petitioners, on the other hand, denied any liability for the claims of the respondent
and maintained that at the time Ildefonso died he was no longer an employee of the petitioners as he voluntarily terminated
his employment contract with the petitioners when, on April 9, 2005, Ildefonso requested for a leave and pre-terminated his
contract. Thus, he disembarked from the vessel on May 21, 2005. They also alleged that in the early part of June 2005,
Ildefonso reported at petitioner's office applying for a new employment and requested that he be lined up for another vessel.
Accordingly, he was advised to undergo the usual pre-employment medical examination before considering his request. The
LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. NLRC affirmed. Upon appeal. CA reversed the decision and Private respondents
One Shipping Corporation and One Shipping Kabushiki Kaisha/Japan are hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay the
following death benefits to petitioner Imelda C. Peafiel: US$50,000.00 for herself, US$21,000.00 for her 3 minor children and
US$1,000.00 as burial expenses.
ISSUE: WON respondents are entitled to death benefits?
HELD: NO. Since Ildefonso pre-terminated his contract of employment the employer-employee relationship between Ildefonso
and the petitioners had already been terminated. Thus, the LA was correct in concluding that the terms and conditions
contained in the contract of employment ceased to have force and effect, including the payment of death compensation
benefits to the heirs of a seafarer who dies during the term of his contract as provided for in Section 20 (A) of the POEA
Standard Employment Contract, which states: A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH "1. In case of work-related
death of a seafarer during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent
of the amount of Fifty Thousand US Dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US Dollars (US$7,000)
to each child under the age of twenty one (21), but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the
time of payment. "
In Southeastern Shipping v. Navarra, Jr.,14 this Court declared that in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the
employee should occur during the effectivity of the employment contract. The death of a seaman during the term of
employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. Once it is established that the seaman
died during the effectivity of his employment contract, the employer is liable. In the present case, Ildefonso died after he pre-
terminated the contract of employment. That alone would have sufficed for his heirs not to be entitled for death compensation
benefits.
Furthermore, there is no evidence to show that Ildefonso's illness was acquired during the term of his employment with
petitioners. As found by the LA, there are no indications that Ildefonso was already suffering from an ailment at the time he
pre-terminated his employment contract with petitioners. No proof was presented to substantiate complainant's claim that her
husband suffered chest pain and difficulty in breathing. There was no report of any illness suffered by complainant's husband
while on board the MV ACX Magnolia. Also, upon his arrival in the Philippines on May 21, 2005, or at any time within three
working days from the date of his return, there is no showing that the deceased required any medical treatment nor did he
report to petitioners any ailment being suffered by him. Instead, he immediately signed up for another tour of duty, thereby
indicating that he was physically fit to take on another assignment. Thus, the death of Ildefonso Peafiel was not compensable
under the aforequoted provisions of the POEA Contract of Employment.
No substantial evidence to prove that Ildefonso's illness which caused his death was aggravated during the term of his
contract. [T]he death of a seaman several months after his repatriation for illness does not necessarily mean that: (a) the
seaman died of the same illness; (b) his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the illness which caused his
death; and (c) the death is compensable, unless there is some reasonable basis to support otherwise.

4. Montierro v. Rickmers Marine Agency Phils Inc.,

FACTS: Respondent Rickmers, on behalf of its foreign principal, Global Management Limited, hired
petitioner Noriel Montierro as Ordinary Seaman on board MV CSAV Maresias with a basic monthly salary of USD420.
Sometime in May 2010, while on board the vessel and going down from a crane ladder, Montierro lost his balance and twisted
his legs, thus injuring his right knee. He was examined in Livorno, Spain by Dr.Santini, who recommended surgical treatment
at home and found him unfit for duty. Thus, on 2 June 2010, Montierro was repatriated to the Philippines. On 4 June 2010,
Montierro reported to Dr. Alegre II, the company-designated physician and he underwent a MRI scan which showed he had
"meniscal tear, posterior horn of the medical meniscus, and minimal joint fluid." Upon the recommendation of Dr. Alegre,
Montiero underwent arthroscopic partial medical meniscectomy of his right knee on at St. Lukes Medical Center. Montierro
had his second check-up with Dr. Alegre, who noted that the formers surgical wounds had healed, but that there was still
pain and limitation of motion on his right knee on gaits and squats, advised him to undergo rehabilitation medicine and continue
physical therapy. On 3 September 2010, the 91st day of Montierros treatment, Dr. Alegre issued an interim disability grade
of 10 for "stretching leg of ligaments of a knee resulting in instability of the joint" and advised Montierro to continue with the
latters physical therapy and oral medications. On 3 January 2011, the 213th day of Montierros treatment, Dr. Alegre issued
a final assessment of Disability Grade of 10. Meanwhile, on 3 December 2010, Montierro filed with the LA a complaint
for recovery of permanent disability compensation, damages and attorneys fees relying on a Medical Certificate dated 3
December 2010 issued by his physician of choice, Dr. Jacinto, recommending total permanent disability grading where he
was assessed to be physically unfit to go back to work.
The LA held that Montierro was entitled to permanent total disability benefits POEA-SEC relying on the 120-day rule
introduced by the 2005 case Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad which equates the inability of the seafarer to perform work for
more than 120 days to permanent total disability and awarded one-month sickness allowance and attorneys fees. NLRC
affirmed. Upon appeal, CA partially granted the Petition downgraded the claim to "Grade 10" permanent partial disability
benefits and dropping the award of attorneys fees.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to full permanent total disability benefits? NO.
HELD: NO. In Kestrel Shipping Co. Inc. v. Munar the SC has already delineated the effectivity of the Crystal Shipping and
Vergara ruling and based on the said case if the maritime compensation complaint was filed prior to 6 October 2008, the 120-
day rule applies; if, on the other hand, the complaint was filed from 6 October 2008 onwards, the 240-day rule applies. In this
case, Montierro filed his Complaint on 3 December 2010, hence, it is the 240-day rule that applies to this case, and not the
120-day rule. Applying the 240-day rule Montierros treatment by the company doctor began on 4 June 2010 and ended on 3
January 2011, when the company doctor issued a "Grade 10" final disability assessment. Counting the days the assessment
by the company doctor was made on the 213th day, well within the 240-day period. The extension of the period to 240 days
is justified by the fact that Dr. Alegre issued an interim disability grade of "10"on 3 September 2010, the 91st day
of Montierros treatment, which was within the 120-day period. Thus, Montierros condition cannot be deemed a permanent
total disability.
Moreover there is a procedure to be followed regarding the determination of liability for work-related death, illness or injury in
the case of overseas Filipino seafarers under 2000 POEA-SEC, the execution of which is a sine qua non requirement in
deployments for overseas work. The procedure is as follows: when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while
on board the vessel, his fitness for work shall be determined by the company-designated physician. The physician has 120
days, or 240 days, if validly extended, to make the assessment. If the physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the
assessment of the company-designated physician, the opinion of a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer
and the seafarer, whose decision shall be final and binding on them. Vergara ruled that the procedure in the 2000 POEA-SEC
must be strictly followed; otherwise, if not availed of or followed strictly by the seafarer, the assessment of the company-
designated physician stands.
In this case, Montierro and Rickmers are covered by the provisions of the same 2000 POEA-SEC. It is the law between them.
Hence, they are bound by the mechanism for determining liability for a disability benefits claim. Montierro, however, preempted
the procedure when he filed on 3 December 2010 a Complaint for permanent disability benefits based on his chosen
physicians assessment, which was made one month before the company-designated doctor issued the final disability grading
on 3 January 2011, the 213th day of Montierros treatment. Hence, for failure of Montierro to observe the procedure provided
by the POEA-SEC, the assessment of the company doctor should prevail.

5. Gargallo v. Dohle Seafront Crewing (Manila) Inc., (Sept. 2015)

FACTS: Respondent Dohle, in behalf of Dohle Manning Agencies, Inc., hired petitioner Jakerson Gargallo as a wiper on board
MV Widar with a basic monthly salary of $516. On Feb. 28,2012 while petitioner was lifting heavy loads of the lube oil drum,
the vessel rolled slightly, which trigerred the drum to swing as a result of which caused the petitioner to lose his balance and
fall on deck with his left arm hitting the floor first bearing his full body weight. Thus he was subjected to medical examination
and was subsequently repatriated. Afther his repatriation, Petitioner reported to the company-designated physician Dr. Cruz
and was confined in Manila Doctors Hospital. He was referred to the company-designated orthopedic surgeon Dr. Tacata
who performed an Open reduction and Internal Fixation Surgery. He was discharged on March 19,2012 but continued out-
patient treatment from March 22 to Sept. 21,2012. On sept. 12,2012, Dr. Cruz in a medical report declared petitioner fit to
work. Dissatisfied, petitioner consulted an independent doctor Dr. Garcia who issued an orthopedic surgeon report declaring
petitioner unfit to work. Petitioner filed a complaint for permanent total disability benefits pursuant to the unsigned International
Transport Workers' Federation Standard Collective Agreement (ITF CBA), damaged and atty's fees. The LA ordered
repondents to pay $156,816 or its equivalent as permanent total disability benefits plus 10% atty's fees. NLRC affirmed but
reduced the award to $125,000. Upon appeal, CA dismissed the complaint for disability benefits.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to permanent total disabilities benefits?
HELD: No. In the case, petitioner executed his employment contract with respondents during the effectivity of the 2010 POEA-
SEC hence its provisions are applicable and should govern their relations. Petitioner failed to comply with the prescribed
procedure under the afore-quoted Section 20 (A) (3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC on the joint appointment by the parties of a third
doctor, in case the seafarers personal doctor disagrees with the company-designated physicians fit to work assessment. The
IBF CBA similarly outlined the procedure, viz.: 25.2 The disability suffered by the seafarer shall be determined by a doctor
appointed by the Company. If a doctor appointed by or on behalf of the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor
may be nominated jointly between the Company and the Union and the decision of this doctor shall be final and binding on
both parties. x x x x 25.4. A seafarer whose disability, in accordance with 25.2 above is assessed at 50% or more shall, for
the purpose of this paragraph, be regarded as permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity and be entitled to
100% compensation. Furthermore, any seafarer assessed at less than 50% disability but certified as permanently unfit for
further sea service in any capacity by the Company-nominated doctor, shall also be entitled to 100% compensation. Any
disagreement as to the assessment or entitlement shall be resolved in accordance with clause 25.2 above.
In the recent case of Ace Navigation Company v. Garcia, citing Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., the Court
reiterated that the company-designated physician is given an additional 120 days, or a total of 240 days from repatriation, to
provide the seafarer further treatment and, thereafter, make a declaration as to the nature of the latters disability. If the 120
days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then
the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to
declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared
fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition. x x x x A temporary total disability only becomes
permanent when so declared by the company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of
the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent
disability.
It is undisputed that petitioner was repatriated on March 11, 2012 and immediately subjected to medical treatment. Despite
the lapse of the initial 120-day period on July 9, 2012, such treatment continued due to persistent pain complained of by
petitioner, which was observed until his 180th day of treatment on September 7, 2012. In this relation, the CA correctly ruled
that the filing of the complaint for permanent total disability benefits on July 20, 2012 was premature, and should have been
dismissed for lack of cause of action, considering that at that time: (a) petitioner was still under the medical treatment of the
company-designated physicians within the allowable 240-day period; (b) the latter had not yet issued any assessment as to
his fitness or disability; and (c) petitioner had not yet secured any assessment from his chosen physician, whom he consulted
only more than two (2) months thereafter, or on October 2, 2012.
Considering, however, the undisputed fact that petitioner still needed medical treatment beyond the initial 120-day treatment
period, which lasted for 194 days from his repatriation he is entitled to the income benefit for temporary total disability provided
under Section 2 (a), Rule X of the Rules implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code, during the extended period of
treatment or for 194 days, computed from petitioners repatriation on March 11, 2012 until September 21, 2012 when he last
visited the company-designated physician.

6. Austria v. Crystal Shipping

FACTS: Petitioner Alberto Austria was hired as a cook by Crystal Shipping thru its manning agency Larvik Shipping A/S for 8
months with the basic monthly salary of $758 with an overtime pay of $442 each month. Under his contract petitioner was
covered by Norwegian International Ship Register (NIS) CBA. On Aug. 27,2008, petitioner commenced his work as Chief
Cook on MV Yara Gas. While on board the vessel he started suffering from chronic cough, excessive phlegm and difficulty in
breathing. He was subjected to medical examination, diagnosed with Bronchitis; Pharynx Irritation but was declared fit to work
thus he resumed his work. In January 2009, he again experienced similar symptoms and was diagnosed with Dilated
Cardiomyopathy secondary to Myocarditis which requires further medical treatment thus he was repatriated. On Feb 14, 2009
he was confined to Metro Hospital and was found suffering from Dilate Cardiomyopathy, Bicuspid Aortic Stenosis rendering
him unfit for any sea duty. Petitioner filed a complaint for disability benefits, damages and attorney's fees. The LA ordered
respondents to pay petitioner $110,000 as total disability benefits pursuant to the CBA. NLRC affirmed. Upon appeal, CA
reversed the decision giving credence to the findings of the company accredited physician that the illness of the petitioner
was congenital in nature and could not be caused by his working condition in any way.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to disability benefits?
HELD: YES. For disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1)
the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the
seafarer's employment contract. In other words, to be entitled to compensation and benefits under this provision, it is not
sufficient to establish that the seafarer's illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled; it must also be
shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarer's illness or injury and the work for which he had been
contracted.
For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be
satisfied: The seafarer's must involve the risks described herein; The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's
exposure to the described risks; The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors
necessary to contract it; and There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
In the case, petitioner was employed by respondent as Chief Cook which constantly exposes him to heat while preparing the
food for the entire crew all throughout the day while he was under employ. The steady and prolonged exposure to heat
naturally causes exhaustion which could unduly burden his heart and interfere with the normal functioning of his cardio-
vascular system. Even if it were shown that petitioner's condition is congenital in nature, it does automatically take his ailment
away from purview of compensability. Pre-existence of an illness does not irrevocably bar compensability because disability
laws still grant the same provided seafarer's working conditions bear causal connection with his illness. As succinctly pointed
above, petitioner's working environment as chef constantly exposed him to factors that could aggravate his heart condition.
Compensability of an ailment does not depend on whether the injury or disease was pre-existing at the time of the employment
but rather if the disease or injury is work-related or aggravated his condition. It is not necessary, in order for an employee to
recover compensation, that he must have been in perfect condition or health at the time he received the injury, or that he be
free from disease. Every workman brings with him to his employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the
insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds them, and assumes the risk of having the weakened condition
aggravated by some injury which might not hurt or bother a perfectly normal, healthy person.
Although the employer is not the insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk
of liability. The quantum of evidence required in labor cases to determine the liability of an employer for the illness suffered
by the employee under the POEA-SEC is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but mere substantial evidence. xxx. 26
Petitioner having established through substantial evidence that his illness was aggravated by his work condition, and hence,
compensable, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed against the NLRC in upholding the Labor Arbiter's grant of
disability benefits.

SSS LAW
1. PICOP Resources Inc., v. Social Security Commission
FACTS: Private Respondent Mateo A. Belizar filed case before the SSC to establish his actual period of employment with
petitioner PICOP and compel the latter to remit unpaid Social Security System (SSS) premium contributions, in order that he
may collect his SSS retirement benefits. The SSC intervened and issued a resolution declaring that petitioner was
continuously employed as a preventive maintenance mechanic by respondent Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc/PICOP and the
repeated and continuous need for his services constitutes evidence of the necessity and indispensability of his services to the
respondent, thus, his employment is regarded as regular. Considering that the respondent only remitted 22 monthly SS
contributions for and in behalf of the petitioner despite his continuous employment from November 1966 to December 1978,
the respondent is liable to pay the unremitted SS contributions corresponding to the said period, as well as the 3% per month
penalty imposed thereon for late payment until fully paid, pursuant to Section 22(a) of R.A. No. 8282 or the Social Security
Act of 1997. Moreover, since the petitioner has reached the retirement age of sixty (60) on October 9, 2001, it appearing in
his SSS records that he was born on October 9, 1941, the respondent is also liable to pay damages pursuant to Section 24(b)
of the same law for failure to remit any contribution due prior to the date of contingency resulting into the reduction of benefits
equivalent to the difference between the amount of benefit to which the employee member or his beneficiary is entitled to
receive had the proper contributions been remitted to the SSS and the amount payable on the basis of the contributions
actually remitted. CA dismissed the petition for review filed by the Petitioner.
Petitioner maintains that with its availment of the condonation program under RA 9903 and payment of delinquent and unpaid
SSS contributions relative to Belizar's account within the period allowed by the law and applicable circulars, its other adjudged
liabilities for penalties and damages should be eliminated and condoned as well; that since it is now undergoing rehabilitation,
RA 9903 should be applied liberally in its case to allow it to fully recover; and that SSS's opposition, intervention, and chosen
courses of action in the case are inconsistent with the concept of condonation mandated by RA 9903.
ISSUE: WON petitioner can avail of the provisions of RA 9903?
HELD: NO. RA 9903, or the Social Security Condonation Law of 2009, provides: Section 2. Condonation of Penalty. - Any
employer who is delinquent or has not remitted all contributions due and payable to the Social Security System (SSS),
including those with pending cases either before the Social Security Commission, courts or Office of the Prosecutor involving
collection of contributions and/or penalties, may within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act:
(a) remit said contributions; or
(b) submit a proposal to pay the same in installments, subject to the implementing rules and regulations which the Social
Security Commission may prescribe: Provided, That the delinquent employer submits the corresponding collection lists
together with the remittance or proposal to pay installments: Provided, further, That upon approval and payment in full or in
installments of contributions due and payable to the SSS, all such pending cases filed against the employer shall be withdrawn
without prejudice to the refiling of the case in the event the employer fails to remit in full the required delinquent contributions
or defaults in the payment of any installment under the approved proposal.
In order to avail of the benefits under the said law, the employer must pay "all contributions due and payable" to the SSS, and
not merely a portion thereof. In petitioner's case, it paid only the delinquent contributions corresponding to Belizar's account
but the penalties and damages, however, remain unpaid up to present.
Had the PRI applied for condonation of penalties under R.A. No. 9903 involving only one employee, Mateo Belizar, the same
would be denied considering that the availment of the condonation of penalty program under RA. 9903 should be for all
employees of the delinquent employer.
SSS Circular No. 2010-004, Series of 2010, which provides for the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9903, states
that "[a]ny employer who is delinquent or has not remitted all contributions due and payable to the SSS may avail of the
condonation program under the law. In order to be covered by the program, the employer must a) "remit within the period of
the Program the full amount of the delinquent contributions through any SSS Branch with tellering facility or authorized
collection agents of the SSS e.g. banks, payment centers," or b) "[s]ubmit a proposal x x x within the period of the Program
to pay the delinquent contributions in installment to the SSS Branch having jurisdiction over its place of business or household
address." It would appear from the February 28, 2013 Certification issued by the SSS Bislig City Branch that petitioner failed
to pay the full amount of its delinquent contributions; nor did it submit a proposal to pay the same in installments. Therefore,
petitioner has not placed itself under the coverage of RA 9903.
The clear intent of the law is to grant condonation only to employers with delinquent contributions or pending cases for their
delinquencies and who pay their delinquencies within the six (6) month period set by the law." It was never the intention of
RA 9903 to give the employer the option of remitting and settling only some of its delinquencies, and not all; of paying the
lowest outstanding delinquencies and ignoring the most burdensome; of choosing the course of action most beneficial to it,
while leaving its employees and government to enjoy the least desirable outcome. If this were so, then the purpose of the
law would be defeated.