G.R. No.

135981 September 29, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.

RESOLUTION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

It is a hornbook rule that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire records to review. The Court may
pass upon all relevant issues, including those factual in nature and those that may not have been
brought before the trial court. This is true especially in cases involving the imposition of the death
penalty, in which the accused must be allowed to avail themselves of all possible avenues for their
defense. Even novel theories such as the "battered woman syndrome," which is alleged to be equivalent
to self-defense, should be heard, given due consideration and ruled upon on the merits, not rejected
merely on technical or procedural grounds. Criminal conviction must rest on proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

The Case

For resolution by the Court is an Urgent Omnibus Motion filed by Appellant Marivic Genosa y Isidro in
connection with the automatic review of the September 25, 1998 "Judgment"1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Ormoc City2in Criminal Case No. 5016-0. The RTC found her guilty of parricide aggravated
by treachery and sentenced her to death.

In an Information3 dated November 14, 1996, Provincial Prosecutor I Rosario D. Beleta charged
appellant-movant with parricide allegedly committed as follows:

"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province
of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a
hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following
wounds, to wit:

'Cadaveric spasm.

'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.

'Face, black, blown[ ]up & swollen w/ evident post- mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from its sockets and
tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.

'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting [in] laceration of
the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of
the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.
'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.

'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'

which caused his death."

After arraignment and trial, the court a quo promulgated its Judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused, Marivic Genosa
y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide as provided under Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic
aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the
penalty of DEATH.

The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages."

The Antecedents

Prior to the filing of her Appeal Brief, appellant submitted an Urgent Omnibus Motion,4 to bring "to the
attention of the x x x Court certain facts and circumstances which, if found valid, could warrant the
setting aside of [her] conviction and the imposition of the death penalty."

Appellant alleges that the trial court grievously erred in concluding that she had lied about the means
she employed in killing her husband. On the contrary, she had consistently claimed that she had shot
her husband. Yet the trial judge simply ruled that the cause of his death was "cardiopulmonary arrest
secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital bone," which
resulted from her admitted act of "smashing" him with a pipe. Such conclusion was allegedly
unsupported by the evidence on record, which bore no forensic autopsy report on the body of the
victim.

Appellant further alleges that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe beatings she had
suffered at the hands of her husband, the trial court failed to appreciate her self-defense theory. She
claims that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her husband was equivalent to self-
defense. Furthermore, she argues that if she "did not lie about how she killed her husband, then she did
not lie about the abuse she suffered at his hands."

She thus prays for the following reliefs:5

"1. The Honorable Court allow an exhumation of the body of the victim, Ben M. Genosa, and a re-
examination of the cause of death.
2. The Honorable Court submit accused-appellant for examination by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists of the Court to determine her state of mind at the time of the killing of her spouse, Ben M.
Genosa.

3. Thereafter, the Honorable Court allow the reports of the psychologists and psychiatrists to form part
of the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, to allow a partial
re-opening of the case before a lower court in Metro Manila to admit the testimony of said
psychologists and psychiatrists."

On August 22, 2000, the solicitor general, on behalf of the State, filed his Comment,6 which substantially
objected to the Motion on the ground that appellant had not been "deprived of her right to due process,
substantial or procedural."

The Issues

In brief, the issues for our resolution are (1) whether the body of the victim should be exhumed and
reexamined in order to ascertain the cause of his death, and (2) whether the appellant should be
examined by qualified psychologists or psychiatrists in order to determine her state of mind at the time
of the killing.

The Court's Ruling

The Court grants in part the Motion of appellant. We remand the case to the RTC for the reception of
evidence from qualified psychologists or psychiatrists whom the parties may present to establish her
state of mind at the time of the killing.

First Issue: No Need for a Reexamination of Cause of Death

Accused-appellant seeks the exhumation of the victim's body to be able to determine his exact cause of
death, assailing the court a quo's conclusion that he was "smashed or beaten at the back of his head"
rather than shot, as claimed by appellant.

Considering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his
nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes that exhumation
is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually caused the victim's death.
There is no need to exhume the body at this time and conduct an autopsy thereon for the purpose.

Moreover, the matter of proving the cause of death should have been made before the trial court. Time
and again, we have said that this Court is not a trier of facts. Neither will it authorize the firsthand
reception of evidence, where the opportunity to offer the same was available to the party during the
trial stage. Consistent with this principle alone, the prayer sought by appellant for the exhumation of the
victim's body cannot be granted.

Second Issue: The Need to Determine Appellant's State of Mind at the Time of the Killing
In seeking to be "examined and evaluated by psychologists and psychiatrists to bring into evidence the
abuse inflicted upon her; [and] to determine whether such abuse will support the 'battered woman
syndrome'," the appellant brings to the fore a novel defense theory. Through Counsel Katrina Legarda,
she asks the Court to "re-evaluate the traditional elements" used in determining self-defense and to
consider the "battered woman syndrome" as a viable plea within the concept of self-defense.

Allegedly, there are four characteristics of the syndrome: (1) the woman believes that the violence was
her fault; (2) she has an inability to place the responsibility for the violence elsewhere; (3) she fears for
her life and/or her children's lives; and (4) she has an irrational belief that the abuser is omnipresent and
omniscient.7 Living in constant danger of harm or death, she knows that future beatings are almost
certain to occur and will escalate over time. Her intimate knowledge of the violent nature of her
batterer makes her alert to when a particular attack is forthcoming, and when it will seriously threaten
her survival. Trapped in a cycle of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she would succumb
to her helplessness and fail to perceive possible solutions to the problem other than to injure or kill her
batterer. She is seized by fear of an existing or impending lethal aggression and thus would have no
opportunity beforehand to deliberate on her acts and to choose a less fatal means of eliminating her
sufferings.

Appellant further alleges that the syndrome is already a recognized form of self-defense in the United
States and in Europe. In the US particularly, it is classified as a post-traumatic stress disorder, rather
than a form of mental illness.8 It has been held admissible in order to assess a defendant's perception of
the danger posed by the abuser.9

In view of the foregoing, Appellant Genosa pleads that she be allowed to present evidence to prove that
her relationship with her spouse-victim had afflicted her with the syndrome. Allegedly, an expert can
explain how her experiences as a battered woman had affected her perception of danger and her
honest belief in its imminence, and why she had resorted to force against her batterer.

The records of the case already bear some evidence on domestic violence between appellant and her
deceased husband. A defense witness, Dr. Dino Caing, testified that she had consulted him at least six
(6) times due to injuries related to domestic violence and twenty-three (23) times for severe
hypertension due to emotional stress.10Even the victim's brother and mother attested to the spouses'
quarrels every now and then. The court a quo, however, simplistically ruled that since violence had not
immediately preceded the killing, self-defense could not be appreciated.

Indeed, there is legal and jurisprudential lacuna with respect to the so-called "battered woman
syndrome" as a possible modifying circumstance that could affect the criminal liability or penalty of the
accused. The discourse of appellant on the subject in her Omnibus Motion has convinced the Court that
the syndrome deserves serious consideration, especially in the light of its possible effect on her very life.
It could be that very thin line between death and life or even acquittal. The Court cannot, for mere
technical or procedural objections, deny appellant the opportunity to offer this defense, for any criminal
conviction must be based on proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Accused persons facing the
possibility of the death penalty must be given fair opportunities to proffer all defenses possible that
could save them from capital punishment.

In People v. Parazo,11 after final conviction of appellant therein, this Court granted his Urgent Omnibus
Motion and allowed him to undergo mental, neurologic and otolaryngologic examination and evaluation
to determine whether he was a deaf-mute. Based on findings that he really was deaf and mute, yet
unaided during the trial by an expert witness who could professionally understand and interpret his
actions and mutterings, the Court granted him re-arraignment and retrial. It justified its action on the
principle that "only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt may [the accused] be consigned to the
lethal injection chamber."

More recently in People v. Estrada,12 we likewise nullified the trial proceedings and remanded the case
"to the court a quo for a conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a determination
of his competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings." In that case, the defense counsel had
moved to suspend the arraignment of the accused, who could not properly and intelligently enter a plea
because of his mental defect, and to confine him instead in a psychiatric ward. But the trial court denied
the Motion, after simply propounding questions to the accused and determining for itself that he could
understand and answer them "intelligently." After trial, he was convicted of murder aggravated by
cruelty and thus sentenced to death.

In nullifying the trial proceedings, this Court noted:13

"The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is
not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of
determining the state of a person's mental health. To determine the accused-appellant's competency to
stand trial, the court, in the instant case, should have at least ordered the examination of accused-
appellant, especially in the light of the latter's history of mental illness."

It was held that in denying appellant an examination by a competent medical expert, the trial court
practically denied him a fair trial prior to conviction, in violation of his constitutional rights.

Moreover, proof of insanity could have exempted appellant from criminal liability. If the accused had
not performed the act voluntarily, then he could not have been criminally liable. The Court, through Mr.
Justice Reynato S. Puno, emphasized:

"The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him.
Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is
human free will. Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose between good
and evil. When he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been
done voluntarily, i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent. Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held
accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired."14

In the instant case, it is equally important to determine whether Appellant Genosa had acted freely,
intelligently and voluntarily when she killed her spouse. The Court, however, cannot properly evaluate
her battered-woman-syndrome defense, absent expert testimony on her mental and emotional state at
the time of the killing and the possible psychological cause and effect of her fatal act. Unlike in Parazo,
we cannot simply refer her for proper psychological or psychiatric examination and thereafter admit the
findings and evaluation as part of the records of the cases for purposes of automatic review. The
prosecution has likewise the right to a fair trial, which includes the opportunity to cross-examine the
defense witnesses and to refute the expert opinion given. Thus, consistent with the principle of due
process, a partial reopening of the case is apropos, so as to allow the defense the opportunity to present
expert evidence consistent with our foregoing disquisition, as well as the prosecution the opportunity to
cross examine and refute the same.

WHEREFORE, the Urgent Omnibus Motion of Appellant Marivic Genosa is PARTLY GRANTED. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion
on the "battered woman syndrome" plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to
forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant
documentary evidence, if any, submitted.

SO ORDERED.

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It
filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral
grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and
quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public
policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal
Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule
65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also
claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech
and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national
political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It
also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

Held:

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only
those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution
and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was
grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection
is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society.

We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a
mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings
and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads
registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia

Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and
economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support
and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the
said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court
issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO
should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted
the required comment as it would be an axercise in futility.

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection
clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being an unwanted product of an invalid law.

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise
the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to
annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was
not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity
of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and
violative of the equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process
clause of the Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the
family as a basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an
undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial
court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers Union, the Court ruled that all
that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the
class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause
by favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its
protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones
defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners contention that by not
allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that
the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a
subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the
power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is
an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy.
Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.
G.R. No. 193960 January 7, 2013

KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING
JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS-QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY
(PAMPANGA); AND ABC,1 Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The Court will not read into Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 a provision that would render it toothless in the
pursuit of the declared policy of the State to protect women and children from violence and threats to
their personal safety and security.

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Orders dated September 13,
20102 and October 5, 20103 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case
No. 09-5210 which denied petitioners Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion
to Quash the Information.

The Facts

Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch
59, in an Information which states:

That on or about the 13th day of July, 2009, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the boyfriend of the
complainant, x x x did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use personal violence on the
complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainants back, shoulder and left eye, thereby
demeaning and degrading the complainants intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in violation of
Section 5(a) of the Republic Act 9262.4

After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a
warrant of arrest against petitioner on November 19, 2009. The latter posted a cash bond for his
provisional liberty and on August 12, 2010, filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
with Motion to Quash the Information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July
13, 2009, he was no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was
inapplicable.

In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the
subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of the money she had lent to
petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from petitioner if he was responsible for
spreading rumors about her which he admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner
causing the latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information.
The RTC Ruling

The RTC denied petitioners motion. It did not consider material the fact that the parties dating
relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the parties had admitted a prior
dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of violence against women
and their children as defined in Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262.

Issues

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues: 1) whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the
offense; 2) whether RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor the accused; and 3)
whether the Information alleging a fact contrary to what has been admitted should be quashed.

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is not covered by
RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead, he claims that the
offense committed was only slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code which falls under the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.

The Court is not persuaded.

Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers
to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has
a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. x x x.

The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be
considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed
against a woman or her child and the woman is the offenders wife, former wife, or with whom he has
or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely
to result in physical harm or suffering.

In Ang v. Court of Appeals,5 the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against women
through harassment, to wit:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against
the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.6

Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a
consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying
the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts,
then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender
has or had a sexual or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the
relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence
of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed.
Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner's
assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.

Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity7 because there is
no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the degree of physical harm
under RA 9262 and Article 2668 of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient justification
for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely impose a
more severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom they
have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end in view of promoting the
protection of women and children.

Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the crime, such as: a
dating relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of violence committed
by the petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the offense is covered by RA
9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the said law which reads:

SEC. 7. Venue The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of
such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial
Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.

Finally, the Court finds the Order9 of the RTC, giving the prosecutor a period of two (2) days to amend
the Information to reflect the cessation of the dating relationship between the petitioner and the
offended party, to be in accord with Sec. 4 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of
the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an
amendment be made.1wphi1

Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information may be amended, in
form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. In the
present case, the accused petitioner has not yet been arraigned, hence, the RTC was correct in directing
the amendment of the Information and in denying the motion to quash the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 13, 2010 and October 5, 2010 of
the Regional Trial Court ( RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210 are AF.FI RM ED.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is LIFTED and the RTC is directed to continue with
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 09-5210.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 193225 February 9, 2015

BBB,* Petitioner,
vs.
AAA,* Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Petitioner BBB is now before this Court with a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure to assail the Decision2 dated November 6, 2009 and Resolution3 dated August 3,
2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89581, which affirmed with modification the
issuance against him on August 14, 2007 of a Permanent Protection Order (PPO)4 by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 162, in favor of his wife, herein respondent AAA.

Antecedent Facts

The CA aptly summarized as follows the facts of the case until the RTCs issuance of the PPO against
BBB:

Both [BBB] and [AAA] allege that they first met in 1991 but started to date seriously only in 1996. [AAA]
was then a medical student and was raising her first child borne from a previous relationship, a boy
named [CCC], with the help of her parents.

During the relationship with [BBB], [AAA] bore two more children namely, [DDD] (born on December 11,
1997) and [EEE] (born on October 19, 2000).

To legalize their relationship, [BBB] and [AAA] married in civil rights on October 10, 2002 and thereafter,
the birth certificates of the children, including [CCCs], was amended to change their civil status to
legitimated by virtue of the said marriage.

The relationship, both admit, was far from ideal and has had its share of happy moments and heated
arguments. The two however have contradicting statements as to the cause of their present situation.

[BBB] alleges that [AAAs] irrational jealousy has caused their frequent arguments. According to [BBB],
[AAA] has been suspicious of [BBB] and his relationship with his female co-workers, which [BBB] alleges,
contrary to [AAAs] suspicion, are purely professional. According to [BBB], because of their repeated
fights, he was forced to leave the family home to prevent the brewing animosity between him and his
wife. Soon after [BBB] left, [AAA] herself decided to leave the family home and brought the children
with her, which made it difficult for [BBB] to see their kids regularly. This has also caused the family
expense to double, making it even more difficult for [BBB] to fulfill his financial obligations.

[AAA], on the other hand, alleges that their heated arguments were often due to [BBBs] incessant
womanizing. When confronted about it, [BBB], instead of denying the same, would even curse [AAA].

The breaking point for [AAA] came when, [BBBs] alleged mistress, a woman by the name of [FFF],
insulted and humiliated [AAA] in public, in the presence of [BBB] himself, who, according to [AAA], did
nothing to stop the same. Extremely hurt, [AAA] decided to leave the conjugal home with the children
and lived temporarily at a friends house. She however went back to the conjugal home with [DDD] and
[EEE] after some time, leaving her son [CCC] at her friends house.

What made matters worse, according to [AAA], was the apparent biases of [BBB] in favor of [DDD] and
[EEE]. That despite his promise to treat [CCC] as his own, [BBB] would still treat the latter differently
from the two kids, putting [CCC] at a disadvantage. [AAA], cites as example the instances when, [BBB]
would buy food and toys for [DDD] and [EEE] only, buying nothing for [CCC].

While living separately from [BBB], [AAA] discovered that [BBB] was not paying the rentals due on the
condominium unit they were occupying, forcing [AAA] to move out. [AAA] was likewise compelled to
find work to support the family, after [BBB] has started to be remiss in his financial obligations to the
family. According to [AAA], the amounts given by [BBB] were not sufficient to cover the family expenses,
forcing her to request for loans from friends.

[AAA] likewise feels threatened after discovering [that BBB] was stalking her and/or their children. [AAA]
alleges that she found out that [BBB] has sought the help of one [GGG], a friend of [BBB] who lives
within the same compound where [AAA] lives, to go through the guards logbook to monitor their every
move, i.e., who visits them, what time [AAA] leaves and returns back home, etc.

Citing the foregoing as constituting economic and psychological abuse, [AAA] filed an application for the
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order with a request to make the same permanent after due
hearing, before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.

Finding good ground in [AAAs] application, the court a quo issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO).
The TPO was thereafter, made permanent by virtue of a Decision of the RTC dated August [14, 2007],
the dispositive portion of which orders:

"x x x x

a. Prohibiting [BBB], directly and indirectly, from stalking, harassing, annoying, or otherwise verbally
abusing [AAA], directly or indirectly, to refrain from insulting her, cursing her and shouting invectives at
her;
b. Prohibiting [BBB] from committing or threatening to commit any act that may cause mental and
emotional anguish to [AAA], i.e. publicly displaying her extramarital relations with his mistress [FFF] and
anyone else for that matter;

c. Prohibiting [BBB] from exposing the minor children to immoral and illicit environment, specifically
prohibiting him to allow her (sic) mistress[FFF] and anyone else to be with them in instances where he
would be allowed by this Court to see their children;

d. Allowing [BBB] ALONE to see and visit his children once a month (for a total of 12 visits per year) at the
latters residence for a maximum period of 2 years [sic]each visit, subject to further orders from this
Court. For this purpose, [BBBs every visit] shall be accompanied by the Court Sheriff, who shall
coordinate with [AAA] as to the availability of time and date of children for such visit, at the expense of
[BBB]. For every visit, the Court Sheriff is directed to submit his report within 5 days from the date [BBB]
visited the children;

e. Directing [BBB] to allow [AAA] to continue to have lawful use and possession of the motor vehicle
more particularly described as follows:

One (1) Hyundai Starex Van

1997 Model

Plate Number: WJP 902

Chassis Number:

Serial Number KMJWH7HPXU158443

f. Granting [AAA] permanent sole custody over their common children until further orders from this
Court;

g. Ordering [BBB] to provide support in the amount of Php 62,918.97 per month (not Php 81,650.00
being prayed by [AAA]) to [AAA] as monthly support, inclusive of educational expenses, groceries,
medicines, medical bills, and insurance premiums, starting from the month of January 2007 to be given
within the first five (5) days of the month through the Court Sheriff, who shall coordinate with [AAA] in
receiving such support;

h. Requiring [BBB] to stay away from the offended party and any designated family or household
member at a distance of 100 meters;

i. Requiring [BBB] to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment or any specified place
frequented regularly by the offended party and children and any designated family or household
member;
j. Ordering [BBB] to post bond of Php 300,000.00 to keep peace pursuant to Section 23 of RA 9262 with
the undertaking that [BBB] will not commit the violence sought to be prevented and that in case such
violence is committed[,] he will pay the amount determined by the Court in its judgment;

k. Ordering [BBB] to pay the sum of Php 100,000.00 (not Php 200,000.00 being prayed by [AAA])
representing both reasonable attorneys fees and cost of litigation, including cost of suit.

x x x x."5

Ruling of the CA

BBB filed before the CA an appeal6 to challenge the RTC Decision dated August 14, 2007.1wphi1 BBB
alleged that the RTCs (a) issuance of the PPO against him, (b) award to AAA of the sole custody over
their children, (c) directives for him to pay attorneys fees and costs of litigation and to post an excessive
amount of bond, and (d) declaration that he had an abusive character lack factual bases.

On November 6, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the factual findings and
dispositions of the RTC, but ordering the remand of the case for the latter to determine in the proper
proceedings who shall be awarded custody of the children. Like the RTC, the CA found that under the
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,7 BBB had subjected AAA and their children to psychological,
emotional and economic abuses. BBB displayed acts of marital infidelity which exposed AAA to public
ridicule causing her emotional and psychological distress. While BBB alleged that FFF was only a
professional colleague, he continued to have public appearances with her which did not help to dispel
AAAs accusation that the two had an extra-marital relation. Further, BBB verbally abused AAA either in
person or through text messages. The CA likewise did not favorably consider BBBs claim that he cannot
provide financial support to AAA and the children in the amount required by the RTC as his income
merely depended on contractual hosting and events management assignments. The CA emphasized that
AAA was in the position to know the sources of BBBs income. Citing Section 288 of R.A. No. 9262 and
Article 2139 of the Family Code, the CA, however, ordered the RTC to determine who shall be entitled to
exercise custody over the children, who at that time were already older than seven years of age.

The CA denied BBBs Motion for Partial Reconsideration10 by way of the Resolution11 dated August 3,
2010 which is likewise assailed in the instant petition.

Issues

Undaunted, BBB now comes before this Court raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA]COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE RTCS DECISION TO MAKE THE
[TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TPO)] PERMANENT.

II
WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA]COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE RTCS AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES
AND COST OF LITIGATION IN FAVOR OF [AAA].

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA]COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE RTCS ORDER REQUIRING [BBB] TO
POST AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNTOF BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE.12

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA AND THE RTC CORRECTLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCETHE
UNAUTHENTICATED TEXT MESSAGES ADDUCED BY AAA.13

WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF SUPPORT SHOULD BE DELETED AS THE SPOUSES COMMON
BIOLOGICAL CHILDREN, DDD AND EEE, ARE ALREADY UNDER BBBS ACTUAL CARE AND CUSTODY SINCE
AUGUST 2010 WHEN AAA LEFT TO WORK AS A NURSE IN THE UNITED STATES.14

In support of the instant petition, BBB merely reiterates his factual claims in the proceedings below
relative to his financial position and AAAs supposedly baseless accusations and demands from him. In
addition, he posits that the text messages offered by AAA as evidence were unauthenticated; hence,
doubt exists as to their admissibility. Further, he points out that due to the current whereabouts and
circumstances of the parties, the PPO issued against him is rendered moot. He now has actual care and
custody of DDD and EEE, while CCC, who is not his biological son, resides in a college dormitory. BBB and
AAA barely get in touch with each other except when the latter initiates the same.

In her Comment15 to the petition, AAA counters that BBB erroneously raises factual issues which are
subjects beyond the contemplation of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Further, BBB continuously violates the PPO, which under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262, is supposed to
be immediately executory upon its issuance by the RTC. AAA claims that BBB still verbally abuses her.
BBB has not posted the 300,000.00 bond required from him. He likewise has not paid the attorneys fees
and costs of litigation awarded to AAA. He does not provide support for CCC, who, in the eyes of the
law, is also among his legitimated children. AAA further alleges that in2010, she left DDD and EEE under
the care of BBB only because the circumstances then obtaining forced her to do so. Three years had
then lapsed from the time she filed an application for a protection order and still, no execution of the
PPO ensued. She could not depend for financial support from BBB. She was thus left with no choice but
to yield custody over DDD and EEE even if the set-up exposed the children to BBBs illicit affairs. AAA
points out that since their children are all older than seven years of age, they are already capable of
choosing for themselves whom they want to exercise custody over them.

Pending the Courts deliberation of the instant case, BBB filed a Manifestation and Motion to Render
Judgment Based on a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).16 BBB alleges that on July 29, 2013, he and
AAA had entered into a compromise anent the custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support
of DDD and EEE.17
AAAs counsel, Atty. Shielah Elbinias-Uyboco (Atty. Uyboco), filed a Comment to the MOA18 pointing out
that AAA signed the MOA while emotionally distressed and sans the formers advice and guidance. Atty.
Uyboco likewise emphasizes that BBBs illicit relationship with FFF continues in violation of the PPO
issued by the RTC.

In BBBs Reply,19 he counters that AAA should be presumed to have acted with due care and full
knowledge of the contents of the MOA which she signed. Further, BBBs alleged involvement with FFF is
an issue which need not be resolved in a judgment based on compromise.

Disquisition of the Court

The instant petition is not a proper subject of a compromise agreement.

The Court cannot take the simplest course of finally writing finis to the instant petition by rendering a
judgment merely based on compromise as prayed for by BBB due to reasons discussed below.

Alleging psychological violence and economic abuse, AAA anchored her application for the issuance of a
TPO and a PPO on the basis of the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. In the instant petition, what is essentially
being assailed is the PPO issued by the RTC and which was affirmed by the CA. The rules, however,
intend that cases filed under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 be not subjects of compromise agreements.

It bears stressing that Section 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC20 explicitly prohibits compromise on any
act constituting the crime of violence against women. Thus, in Garcia v. Drilon,21 the Court declared that:

Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the
issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. x x x.22 (Emphasis deleted) AM No. 10-4-16-
SC,23 on the other hand, directs the referral to mediation of all issues under the Family Code and other
laws in relation to support, custody, visitation, property relations and guardianship of minor children,
excepting therefrom those covered by R.A. No. 9262.

While AAA filed her application for a TPO and a PPO as an independent action and not as an incidental
relief prayed for in a criminal suit, the instant petition cannot be taken outside the ambit of cases falling
under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. Perforce, the prohibition against subjecting the instant petition to
compromise applies.

The courts a quo committed no error in issuing a PPO against BBB.

Anent the main issues raised in the instant petition, the Court finds no error in the CAs ruling that the
RTC properly issued a PPO against BBB and that a remanding of the case to the trial court is necessary to
determine who shall exercise custody over CCC, DDD and EEE. However, the choices of the children as
with whom they would prefer to stay would alter the effects of the PPO. Hence, this Court affirms the
herein assailed PPO except items (d), (f), (g), (h) and (i)24 thereof relative to who shall be granted
custody over the three children, how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount and
manner of providing financial support, which are matters the RTC is now directed to determine with
dispatch.
The Court notes BBBs manifestation that he and AAA had arrived at an amicable settlement as regards
the issues of custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD and EEE. While these
matters can be lawful subjects of compromise, AAAs vacillation, as expressed by her counsel, compels
the Court to exercise prudence by directing the RTC to resolve with finality the aforesaid issues. The
parties are, however, not precluded from entering into a compromise as regards the aforesaid issues,
but the Court now requires the RTCs direct supervision lest the parties muddle the issues anew and fail
to put an end to their bickering.

No grounds exist which compel this Court to resolve the first three issues raised by BBB since they are
merely factual in character.

In Padalhin v. Lavia,25 the Court declared that:

Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition filed shall raise
only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as
to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to
the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.
Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of
fact.

x x x [T]he substantive issue of whether or not the petitioners are entitled to moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorneys fees is a factual issue which is beyond the province of a petition for review
on certiorari. x x x

In the case at bar, the petitioner spouses present to us issues with an intent to subject to review the
uniform factual findings of the RTC and the CA. Specifically, the instant petition challenges the existence
of clear and substantial evidence warranting the award of damages and attorneys fees in Lavias favor.
Further, the instant petition prays for the grant of the Spouses Padalhins counterclaims on the
supposed showing that the complaint filed by Lavia before the RTC was groundless. It bears stressing
that we are not a trier of facts. Undoubtedly, the questions now raised before us are factual and not
legal in character, hence, beyond the contemplation of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.26 (Italics in the original and emphasis ours)

In BBBs case, he avers that the RTC and the CAs (a) issuance of the PPO, (b) award of attorneys fees
and costs of litigation in AAAs favor, and (c) directive for him to post a bond in the amount of
300,000.00 all lack factual bases. The first three issues presented unmistakably call for a re-calibration of
evidence. While the general rule that only legal issues can be resolved in a petition filed under Rule 45
recognizes exceptions,27 BBBs case does not fall in the latter category. The RTC and the CA are in accord
with each other as to their factual findings, which are supported by substantial evidence, thus, binding
upon this Court.
The doubt raised by BBB anent the admissibility of the text messages as evidence is not genuinely a legal
issue.

In the case of Justice Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud,28 it is stated that any question as to the admissibility of
text messages as evidence is rendered moot and academic if the party raising such issue admits
authorship of the subject messages.29

BBB argues that the RTC and the CA erred in admitting as evidence the text messages which were sent
by him and FFF to AAA since they were unauthenticated. However, BBB himself effectively admitted in
the pleadings filed with this Court and the CA that he indeed sent the text messages attributed to him by
AAA. The Appellants Brief30 filed before the CA stated in part that:

[AAA] conveniently chose to leave out the initiatory messages to which [BBB] replied to. It is totally
obvious that the alleged messages from [BBB] are only messages that are in response to an ongoing
verbal or virtual tussle and the adamant refusal of [AAA] to bring the children home despite the
entreaties of [BBB]. Be it noted that [BBB], for the past several months leading up to their separation,
and up to the time that the instant case has been filed, continuously endured the extreme mood swings,
malicious accusations, haranguing, curses, insults, and even violence from [AAA].31 (Emphasis and
underscoring in the original and italics ours)

Further, in the instant petition, BBB repleads that:

[I]t is utterly apparent that the alleged messages from [BBB] are only messages that are in response to
an ongoing verbal or virtual tussle between the parties.32

In the above-quoted portions of the pleadings, BBB attempted to justify why he sent the messages to
AAA. However, in doing so, he, in effect, admitted authorship of the messages which AAA adduced as
evidence. It is likewise noted that BBB did not deny ownership of the cellphone number from which the
text messages were sent.

Hence, while at first glance, it would seem that the issue of admissibility of the text messages requires
an interpretation of the rules of evidence, this Court does not find the same to be necessary. While BBB
had admitted authorship of the text messages, he pleads for this Court to consider those messages as
inadmissible for allegedly being unauthenticated. BBBs arguments are unbearably self-contradictory
and he cannot be allowed to take refuge under technical rules of procedure to assail what is already
apparent.

The deletion from the PPO of the directive of the RTC and the CA relative to the award of support is not
warranted. While CCC is not BBBs biological son, he was legitimated under the latters name. Like DDD
and EEE, CCC is entitled to receive support from BBB.

BBB claims that DDD and EEE are now under his sole care and custody, which allegedly renders moot the
provision in the PPO relative to support. BBB points out that CCC is not his biological son. Impliedly then,
BBB justifies why CCC is not entitled to receive support from him. This Court is not persuaded.
Article 177 of the Family Code provides that "[o]nly children conceived and born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other may be legitimated." Article 178 states that "[l]egitimation shall take place by a
subsequent valid marriage between parents."

In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCCs biological father. Such being
the case, it was improper to have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAAs marriage.
Clearly then, the legal process of legitimation was trifled with. BBB voluntarily but falsely acknowledged
CCC as his son. Article 1431 of the New Civil Code pertinently provides:

Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.

At least for the purpose of resolving the instant petition, the principle of estoppel finds application and it
now bars BBB from making an assertion contrary to his previous representations. He should not be
allowed to evade a responsibility arising from his own misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects of
the legitimation process. CCC remains to be BBBs son, and pursuant to Article 179 of the Family Code,
the former is entitled to the same rights as those of a legitimate child, including the receipt of his
fathers support.

Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute preclusion for BBB from raising before the proper court
the issue of CCCs status and filiation. However, BBB cannot do the same in the instant petition before
this Court now. In Tison v. CA,33 the Court held that "the civil status [of a child] cannot be attacked
collaterally." The childs legitimacy "cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in
another action for a different purpose."34 The instant petition sprang out of AAAs application for a PPO
before the RTC. Hence, BBBs claim that CCC is not his biological son is a collateral issue, which this Court
has no authority to resolve now.

All told, the Court finds no merit in BBBs petition, but there exists a necessity to remand the case for
the RTC to resolve matters relative to who shall be granted custody over the three children, how the
spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount and manner of providing financial support.

The RTC and the CA found substantial evidence and did not commit reversible errors when they issued
the PPO against BBB. Events, which took place after the issuance of the PPO, do not erase the fact that
psychological, emotional and economic abuses were committed by BBB against AAA. Hence, BBBs claim
that he now has actual sole care of DDD and EEE does not necessarily call for this Courts revocation of
the PPO and the award to him of custody over the children.

This Court, thus, affirms the CAs order to remand the case for the RTC to resolve the question of
custody. Since the children are now all older than seven years of age, they can choose for themselves
whom they want to stay with. If all the three children would manifest to the RTC their choice to stay
with AAA, then the PPO issued by RTC shall continue to be executed in its entirety. However, if any of
the three children would choose to be under BBBs care, necessarily, the PPO issued against BBB relative
to them is to be modified. The PPO, in its entirety, would remain effective only as to AAA and any of the
children who opt to stay with her. Consequently, the RTC may accordingly alter the manner and amount
of financial support BBB should give depending on who shall finally be awarded custody over the
children. Pursuant to Articles 201 and 202 of the Family Code, BBBs resources and means and the
necessities of AAA and the children are the essential factors in determining the amount of support, and
the same can be reduced or increased proportionately. The RTC is reminded to be circumspect in
resolving the matter of support, which is a mutual responsibility of the spouses. The parties do not
dispute that AAA is now employed as well, thus, the RTC should consider the same with the end in mind
of promoting the best interests of the children.

A final note on the effectivity and violation of a PPO

The Court reminds the parties that the application for the issuance of a PPO is not a process to be trifled
with. It is only granted after notice and hearing. Once issued, violation of its provisions shall be
punishable with a fine ranging from Five Thousand Pesos (5,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(50,000.00) and/or imprisonment of six (6) months.35

Section 16 of R.A. No. 9262, on the other hand, provides that "[a] PPO shall be effective until revoked by
a court upon application of the person in whose favor the order was issued." Pending the resolution of
the instant petition, BBB claims that he and AAA had executed a MOA, upon which basis a judgment by
compromise is sought to be rendered. Atty. Uyboco, on her part, pointed out AAAs vacillation anent the
MOAs execution. With the foregoing circumstances, the parties, wittingly or unwittingly, have imposed
upon this Court the undue burden of speculating whether or not AAAs half-hearted acquiescence to the
MOA is tantamount to an application for the revocation of the PPO. The Court, however, refuses to
indulge the whims of either parties. The questions raised in the instant petition for the Court to dispose
of revolve around the propriety of the PPOs issuance. The Court resolves that principal query in the
affirmative. The PPO thus stands unless AAA, categorically and without any equivocation, files an
application for its revocation.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 6, 2009 and
Resolution dated August 3, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89581 are AFFIRMED. The
Permanent Protection Order, dated August 14, 2007, issued against BBB by the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 162STANDS except items (d), (f), (g), (h) and (i)36 thereof. The case is hereby
remanded to the trial court for it to accordingly modify the aforecited items after determining with
dispatch the following:

(1) who between BBB and AAA shall exercise custody over the three children;

(2) how the parties shall exercise their respective visitation rights; and

(3) the amount and manner of providing financial support.

The Reply and Manifestation dated November 10, 2014 and December 4, 2014, respectively, are NOTED.

SO ORDERED.
Obergefell v.Hodges

Facts of the case

Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and
Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to
recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The
plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the
Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to
recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment
rights to equal protection and due process.

Question

(1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the
same sex?

(2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the
same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state?

Conclusion:

54 DECISION FOR OBERGEFELL

Yes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of the
fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it
does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty
because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the most intimate association
between two people, it safeguards children and families by according legal recognition to building a
home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized as the keystone of social order.
Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an opposite-sex union with respect to
these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also
guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that right would deny same-sex
couples equal protection under the law. Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed through both
parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply
with equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects the fundamental right of same-sex
couples to marry. The Court also held that the First Amendment protects the rights of religious
organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow states to deny same-sex couples the
right to marry on the same terms as those for opposite-sex couples.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, while same-sex marriage might
be good and fair policy, the Constitution does not address it, and therefore it is beyond the purview of
the Court to decide whether states have to recognize or license such unions. Instead, this issue should
be decided by individual state legislatures based on the will of their electorates. The Constitution and
judicial precedent clearly protect a right to marry and require states to apply laws regarding marriage
equally, but the Court cannot overstep its bounds and engage in judicial policymaking. The precedents
regarding the right to marry only strike down unconstitutional limitations on marriage as it has been
traditionally defined and government intrusions, and therefore there is no precedential support for
making a state alter its definition of marriage. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that the majority
opinion relied on an overly expansive reading of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment without engaging with the judicial analysis traditionally applied to such claims
and while disregarding the proper role of the courts in the democratic process. Justice Antonin Scalia
and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the
majority opinion overstepped the bounds of the Courts authority both by exercising the legislative,
rather than judicial, power and by doing so in a realm that the Constitution reserves for the states.
Justice Scalia argued that the question of whether same-sex marriage should be recognized is one for
the state legislatures, and that for the issue to be decided by unelected judges goes against one of the
most basic precepts of the Constitution: that political change should occur through the votes of elected
representatives. In taking on this policymaking role, the majority opinion departed from established
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to create a right where none exists in the Constitution. Justice
Thomas joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the
majority opinion stretched the doctrine of substantive due process rights found in the Fourteenth
Amendment too far and in doing so distorted the democratic process by taking power from the
legislature and putting it in the hands of the judiciary. Additionally, the legislative history of the Due
Process Clause in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments indicates that they were meant to protect
people from physical restraint and from government intervention, but they do not grant them rights to
government entitlements. Justice Thomas also argued that the majority opinion impermissibly infringed
on religious freedom by legislating from the bench rather than allowing the state legislature to
determine how best to address the competing rights and interests at stake. Justice Scalia joined in the
dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Constitution does not address
the right of same-sex couples to marry, and therefore the issue is reserved to the states to decide
whether to depart from the traditional definition of marriage. By allowing a majority of the Court to
create a new right, the majority opinion dangerously strayed from the democratic process and greatly
expanded the power of the judiciary beyond what the Constitution allows. Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas joined in the dissent.