ENBANC

PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES, G.R.Nos.16436869
Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO,C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARESSANTIAGO,
versus CARPIO,
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIOMORALES,
TINGA,
CHICONAZARIO,
VELASCO,JR.,
NACHURA,
JOSEPHEJERCITOESTRADA LEONARDODECASTRO,
andTHEHONORABLESPECIAL BRION,and
DIVISIONOFTHE PERALTA,JJ.
SANDIGANBAYAN,
Respondents. Promulgated:

April2,2009

xx

DECISION

BRION,J.:

[1]
ThePeopleofthePhilippines(thePeople)filedthisPetitionforReviewonCertiorari toseek
thereversaloftheSandiganbayansJointResolutiondatedJuly12,2004,grantingrespondentJoseph
[2]
EjercitoEstradas(Estrada)demurrertoevidenceinCrim.CaseNo.26565.

THEFACTS

OnApril4,2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No. 26558) was filed
withtheSandiganbayanagainstrespondentEstrada,amongotheraccused.AseparateInformationfor
illegal use of alias, docketed as Crim. Case No. 26565, was likewise filed against Estrada. The
AmendedInformationinCrim.CaseNo.26565reads:

That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Manila,PhilippinesandwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,theabovenamedaccused,being
then President of the Republic of the Philippines, without having been duly authorized, judicially or
administratively,takingadvantageofhispositionandcommittingtheoffenseinrelationtooffice,i.e.,in
order to CONCEAL THE illgotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identity as
THEPresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,didthenandthere,willfully,unlawfullyandcriminally
REPRESENTHIMSELFASJOSEVELARDEINSEVERALTRANSACTIONSANDuseandemploy
the SAID alias Jose Velarde which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in
signingdocumentswithEquitablePCIBankand/orothercorporateentities.

CONTRARYTOLAW.

Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently consolidated for joint trial. Still another
Information, this time for perjury and docketed as Crim. Case No. 26905, was filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Estrada. This was later consolidated, too, with Crim. Cases No. 26558 and
26565.

Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the Sandiganbayan
issued.

OnJanuary11,2005,weorderedthecreationofaSpecialDivisionintheSandiganbayantotry,
hear, and decide the charges of plunder and related cases (illegal use of alias and perjury) against
[3]
respondentEstrada.

Atthetrial,thePeoplepresentedtestimonialanddocumentaryevidencetoprovetheallegations
oftheInformationsforplunder,illegaluseofalias,andperjury.ThePeoplesevidencefortheillegal
aliascharge,assummarizedbytheSandiganbayan,consistedof:

A. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) officers Clarissa G.
Ocampo(Ocampo)andAtty.ManuelCurato(Curato)whocommonlydeclaredthatonFebruary
4,2000,Estradaopenedanumberedtrustaccount(TrustAccountC163)withPCIBandsigned
asJoseVelardeintheaccountopeningdocumentsbothOcampoandCuratoalsotestifiedthat
AprodicioLacquianandFernandoChuawerepresentonthatoccasion

B. (1) The testimony of PCIBGreenhills Branch Manager Teresa Barcelan, who declared that a
certainBabyOrtaliza(Ortaliza)transactedseveraltimeswithherthatOrtalizadepositedseveral
checksinPCIBSavingsAccountNo.0160625025undertheaccountnameJoseVelardeonthe
followingdates(asevidencedbydepositreceiptsdulymarkedinevidence):
 a.20October1999(Exh.MMMMM)
b.8November1999(Exh.LLLLL)
c.22November1999(Exh.NNNNN)
d.24November1999(Exh.OOOOO)
e.25November1999(Exh.PPPPP)
f.20December1999(Exh.QQQQQ)
g.21December1999(Exh.RRRRR)
h.29December1999(Exh.SSSSS)
i.4January2000(Exh.TTTTT)
j.10May2000(Exh.UUUUU)
k.6June2000(Exh.VVVVV)
l.25July2000(Exh.WWWWW)

(2)DocumentsdulyidentifiedbywitnessesshowingthatLucenaOrtalizawasemployedinthe
OfficeoftheVicePresidentand,lateron,intheOfficeofthePresidentwhenEstradaoccupied
these positions and when deposits were made to the Jose Velarde Savings Account No. 0160
625025.

ThePeoplefileditsFormalOfferofExhibitsintheconsolidatedcases,whichtheSandiganbayan
[4]
admitted into evidence in a Resolution dated October 13, 2003. The accused separately moved to
[5]
reconsider the Sandiganbayan Resolution the People, on the other hand, filed its Consolidated
[6]
Comment/Oppositiontothemotions. TheSandiganbayandeniedthemotionsinitsResolutiondated
[7]
November17,2003.

AfterthePeoplerestedinallthreecases,thedefensemovedtobeallowedtofileademurrerto
[8] [9]
evidence in these cases. In its Joint Resolution dated March 10, 2004, the Sandiganbayan only
grantedthedefenseleavetofiledemurrersinCrim.CaseNos.26565(illegaluseofalias)and26905
(perjury).

[10]
Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence for Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26905. His
demurrer to evidence for Crim. Case No. 26565 (illegal use of alias) was anchored on the following
[11]
grounds :

1. Ofthethirtyfive(35)witnessespresentedbytheprosecution,onlytwo(2)witnesses,Ms.Clarissa
OcampoandAtty.ManuelCurato,testifiedthatononeoccasion(4February2000),theysawmovant
 usethenameJoseVelarde

2. Theuseofnumberedaccountsandthelikewaslegalandwasprohibitedonlyinlate2001ascanbe
gleanedfromBangkoSentralCircularNo.302,seriesof2001,dated11October2001

3. Thereisnoproofofpublicandhabitualuseofaliasasthedocumentsofferedbytheprosecutionare
bankingdocumentswhich,bytheirnature,areconfidentialandcannotberevealedwithoutfollowing
properproceduresand

4.Theuseofaliasisabsorbedinplunder.

The People opposed the demurrers through a Consolidated Opposition that presented the
[12]
followingarguments:

1. ThattheuseoffictitiousnamesinbanktransactionwasnotexpresslyprohibiteduntilBSPNo.302
is of no moment considering that as early as Commonwealth Act No. 142, the use of alias was
alreadyprohibited.MovantisbeingprosecutedforviolationofC.A.No.142andnotBSPCircular
No.302

2.MovantsrelianceonUrsuavs.CourtofAppeals(256SCRA147[1996])ismisplaced

3.AssumingarguendothatC.A.No.142,asamended,requirespublicationofthealiasandthehabitual
use thereof, the prosecution has presented more than sufficient evidence in this regard to convict
movantforillegaluseofaliasand

4. Contrary to the submission of movant, the instant case of illegal use of alias is not absorbed in
plunder.

EstradarepliedtotheConsolidatedOppositionthroughaConsolidatedReplyOpposition.

THEASSAILEDSANDIGANBAYANSRULING

The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the Resolution now assailed in this petition. The
salientpointsoftheassailedresolutionare:

First the coverage of Estradas indictment. The Sandiganbayan found that the only relevant
evidence for the indictment are those relating to what is described in the Information i.e., the
testimonies and documents on the opening of Trust Account C163 on February 4, 2000. The
Sandiganbayanreasonedoutthattheuseofthedisjunctiveorbetweenonorabout04February2000
andsometimepriororsubsequenttheretomeansthattheact/sallegedlycommittedonFebruary4,
2000 could have actually taken place prior to or subsequent thereto the use of the conjunctive was
simply the prosecutions procedural tool to guard against any variance between the date stated in the
Informationandthatprovedduringthetrialinasituationinwhichtimewasnotamaterialingredient
oftheoffenseitdoesnotmeanandcannotbereadasarovingcommissionthatincludesactsand/or
events separate and distinct from those that took place on the single date on or about 04 February
2000orsometimepriororsubsequentthereto.TheSandiganbayanruledthattheuseofthedisjunctive
orpreventeditfrominterpretingtheInformationanyotherway.

SecondthePeoplesfailuretopresentevidencethatprovedEstradascommissionoftheoffense.
TheSandiganbayanfoundthatthePeoplefailedtopresentevidencethatEstradacommittedthecrime
punishedunderCommonwealthActNo.142,asamendedbyRepublicAct(R.A.)No.6085(CA142),
[13]
asinterpretedbytheSupremeCourtinUrsuav.CourtofAppeals. Itruledthatthereisanillegal
useofaliaswithinthecontextofCA142onlyiftheuseofthealiasispublicandhabitual.InEstradas
case, the Sandiganbayan noted, the application of the principles was not as simple because of the
complications resulting from the nature of the transaction involved the alias was used in connection
with the opening of a numbered trust account made during the effectivity of R.A. No. 1405, as
[14] [15]
amended, andpriortotheenactmentofRepublicR.A.No.9160.

EstradadidnotpubliclyusethealiasJoseVelarde:

a. EstradasuseofthealiasJoseVelardeinhisdealingswithDichavezandOrtalizaafter
February4,2000isnotrelevantinlightoftheconclusionthattheactsimputedtoEstradaunderthe
Informationweretheact/scommittedonFebruary4,2000only.Additionally,thephrase,Estradadid
representhimselfasJoseVelardeinseveraltransactions,standingalone,violatesEstradasrighttobe
informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation, because it is very general and vague. This
phrase is qualified and explained by the succeeding phrase and use and employ the said alias Jose
Velardewhichisneitherhisregisterednameatbirthnorhisbaptismalname,insigningdocumentswith
EquitablePCIBankand/orothercorporateentities.Thus,Estradasrepresentationsbeforepersonsother
thanthosementionedintheInformationareimmaterialOrtalizaandDichavezdonotfallwithinthe
Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities specified in the Information. Estradas
representationswithOrtalizaandDichavezarenotthereforecoveredbytheindictment.

b.TheSandiganbayanrejectedtheapplicationoftheprincipleinthelawoflibelthatmere
communicationtoathirdpersonispublicityitreasonedoutthatthatthedefinitionofpublicityisnot
limited to the way it is defined under the law on libel additionally, the application of the libel law
definitionisoneroustotheaccusedandisprecludedbytherulinginUrsuathatCANo.142,asapenal
statute, should be construed strictly against the State and favorably for the accused. It ruled that the
definition under the law on libel, even if it applies, considers a communication to a third person
coveredbytheprivilegedcommunicationruletobenonactionable.Estradasuseofthealiasinfrontof
Ocampo and Curato is one such privileged communication under R.A. No. 1405, as amended. The
Sandiganbayansaid:

Movants act of signing Jose Velarde in bank documents being absolutely confidential, the
witnessing thereof by bank officers who were likewise sworn to secrecy by the same law cannot be
considered as public as to fall within the ambit of CA 142 as amended. On account of the absolute
confidentiality of the transaction, it cannot be said that movant intended to be known by this name in
additiontohisrealname.Confidentialityandsecrecynegatepublicity.Ursuainstructs:

Hence,theuseofafictitiousnameoradifferentnamebelongingtoanotherperson
inasingleinstancewithoutanysignorindicationthattheuserintendstobeknown by
this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the
prohibitioninC.A.No.142asamended.
c.TheSandiganbayanfurtherfoundthattheintentionnottobepubliclyknownbythename
JoseVelardeisshownbythenatureofanumberedaccountaperfectlyvalidbankingtransactionatthe
time Trust Account C163 was opened. The opening, too, of a numbered trust account, the
Sandiganbayanfurtherruled,didnotimposeonEstradatheobligationtodisclosehisrealidentitythe
[16]
obligationR.A.No.6713imposesistofileunderoathastatementofassetsandliabilities. Reading
CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405 and R.A. No. 6713 together, Estrada had the absolute obligation to
disclosehisassetsincludingtheamountofhisbankdeposits,buthewasundernoobligationatallto
disclosetheotherparticularsofthebankaccount(suchasthenameheusedtoopenit).
[17]
Third the effect of the enactment of R.A. No. 9160. The Sandiganbayan said that the
absoluteprohibitioninR.A.No.9160againsttheuseofanonymousaccounts,accountsunderfictitious
names, and all other similar accounts, is a legislative acknowledgment that a gaping hole previously
existedinourlawsthatalloweddepositorstohidetheirtrueidentities.TheSandiganbayannotedthat
theprohibitionwasliftedfromBangkoSentralngPilipinas(BSP)CircularNo.251datedJuly7,2000
another confirmation that the opening of a numbered trust account was perfectly legal when it was
openedonFebruary4,2000.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No. 142, as interpreted in Ursua, must
necessarilybeharmonizedwiththeprovisionsofR.A.No.1405andR.A.No.9160undertheprinciple
thateverystatuteshouldbeconstruedinawaythatwillharmonizeitwithexistinglaws.Areasonable
scrutiny,theSandiganbayansaid,ofalltheselawsinrelationtothepresentcase,ledittoconcludethat
the use of an alias within the context of a bank transaction (specifically, the opening of a numbered
accountmadebeforebankofficers)isprotectedbythesecrecyprovisionsofR.A.No.1405,andisthus
outsidethecoverageofCANo.142untilthepassageintolawofR.A.No.9160.

THEPETITION


ThePeoplefiledthispetitionraisingthefollowingissues:

 1. WhetherthecourtaquogravelyerredandabuseditsdiscretionindismissingCrim.
CaseNo.26565andinholdingthattheusebyrespondentJosephEstradaofhisalias
Jose Velarde was not public despite the presence of Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and
FernandoChuaon4February2000

2. WhetherthecourtaquogravelyerredandabuseditsdiscretionindismissingCrim.
CaseNo.26565andinholdingthattheusebyrespondentJosephEstradaofhisalias
Jose Velarde was allowable under banking rules, despite the clear prohibition under
CommonwealthActNo.142

3. WhetherthecourtaquogravelyerredandabuseditsdiscretionindismissingCrim.
Case No. 26565 and in applying R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use of
aliaspunishableunderCommonwealthActNo.142

4. WhethertheallegedharmonizationandapplicationmadebythecourtaquoofR.A.
No.1405andCommonwealthActNo.142wereproper

5. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting the
coverageoftheamendedInformationinCrim.CaseNo.26565totheuseofthealias
JoseVelardebyrespondentJosephEstradaonFebruary4,2000

6. Whetherthecourtaquogravelyerredandabuseditsdiscretionindepartingfromits
earlierfinalfindingonthenonapplicabilityofUrsuav.CourtofAppealsandforcing
itsapplicationtotheinstantcase.

THECOURTSRULING


Thepetitionhasnomerit.

TheLawonIllegalUseofAliasandtheUrsuaRuling

Sections1and2ofCANo.142,asamended,read:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted
practice,nopersonshalluseanynamedifferentfromtheonewithwhichhewasregisteredatbirthinthe
officeofthelocalcivilregistryorwithwhichhewasbaptizedforthefirsttime,orincaseofanalien,
withwhichhewasregisteredinthebureauofimmigrationuponentryorsuchsubstitutenameasmay
havebeenauthorizedbyacompetentcourt:Provided,Thatpersonswhosebirthshavenotbeenregistered
inanylocalcivilregistryandwhohavenotbeenbaptized,haveoneyearfromtheapprovalofthisact
withinwhichtoregistertheirnamesinthecivilregistryoftheirresidence.Thenameshallcomprisethe
patronymicnameandoneortwosurnames.

Section2.Anypersondesiringtouseanaliasshallapplyforauthoritythereforinproceedingslike
thoselegallyprovidedtoobtainjudicialauthorityforachangeofnameandnopersonshallbeallowedto
securesuchjudicialauthorityformorethanonealias.Thepetitionforanaliasshallsetforththeperson's
baptismalandfamilynameandthenamerecordedinthecivilregistry,ifdifferent,hisimmigrant'sname,
 ifanalien,andhispseudonym,ifhehassuchnamesotherthanhisoriginalorrealname,specifyingthe
reasonorreasonsforthedesiredalias.Thejudicialauthorityfortheuseofalias,theChristiannameand
thealienimmigrant'snameshallberecordedintheproperlocalcivilregistry,andnopersonshalluseany
nameornamesotherthanhisoriginalorrealnameunlessthesameisoraredulyrecordedintheproper
localcivilregistry.

HowthislawisviolatedhasbeenansweredbytheUrsuadefinitionofanaliasanameornames
usedbyapersonorintendedtobeusedbyhimpubliclyandhabituallyusuallyinbusinesstransactions
inadditiontohisrealnamebywhichheisregisteredatbirthorbaptizedthefirsttimeorsubstitute
nameauthorizedbyacompetentauthority.Theremustbe,inthewordsofUrsua,asignorindication
thattheuserintendstobeknownbythisname(thealias) in addition to his real name from that day
[18]
forth[fortheuseofaliasto]fallwithintheprohibitioncontainedinC.A.No.142asamended.

UrsuafurtherrelatesthehistoricalbackgroundandrationalethatledtotheenactmentofCANo.
142,asfollows:

The enactment of C.A. No. 142 was made primarily to curb the common practice among the
Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the
fieldoftrade.Suchapracticealmostborderedonthecrimeofusingfictitiousnameswhichforobvious
reasonscouldnotbesuccessfullymaintainedagainsttheChinesewho,rightlyorwrongly,claimedthey
possessedathousandandonenames.C.A.No.142thuspenalizedtheactofusinganaliasname,unless
[19]
suchaliaswasdulyauthorizedbyproperjudicialproceedingsandrecordedinthecivilregister.

[20]
Followingthedoctrineofstaredecisis, weareguidedbytheUrsuarulingonhowthecrime
punished under CA No. 142 may be committed. Close adherence to this ruling, in other words, is
unavoidableintheapplicationofandthedeterminationofcriminalliabilityunderCANo.142.

Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid the application of the Ursua ruling
proceedsfromEstradaspositioninthegovernmentatthetimeofthecommissionoftheoffense,he
wasthePresidentoftheRepublicwhoisrequiredbylawtodisclosehistruename.Wedonotfindthis
argumentsufficienttojustifyadistinctionbetweenamanonthestreet,ononehand,andthePresident
oftheRepublic,ontheother,forpurposesofapplyingCANo.142.Inthefirstplace,thelawdoesnot
makeanydistinction,expresslyorimpliedly,thatwouldjustifyadifferentialtreatment.CANo.142as
appliedtoEstrada,infactallowshimtousehiscinemaorscreennameofJosephEstrada,whichname
he has used even when he was already the President of the Philippines. Even the petitioner has
acquiescedtotheuseofthescreennameoftheaccused,asshownbythetitleofthepresentpetition.
Additionally, any distinction we make based on the Peoples claim unduly prejudices Estrada this is
proscribedbytheUrsuadictumthatCANo.142,asapenalstatute,shouldbeconstruedstrictlyagainst
 [21]
the State and in favor of the accused. The mode of violating CA No. 142 is therefore the same
whoevertheaccusedmaybe.

The People also calls our attention to an earlier Sandiganbayan ruling (Resolution dated
February 6, 2002) denying Estradas motion to quash the Information. This earlier Resolution
effectivelyrejectedtheapplicationofUrsuaunderthefollowingtenor:

TheuseofthetermaliasintheAmendedInformationinitselfservestobringthiscaseoutsidethe
ambit of the ruling in the case of Ursua v. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]), on which the
accusedheavilyreliesinhismotiontoquash.Thetermaliasmeansotherwiseknownas(WebsterThird
NewInternationalDictionary,1993ed.,p.53).Thechargeofusinganaliaslogicallyimpliesthatanother
namehasbeenusedpubliclyandhabitually.Otherwise,hewillnotbeknownbysuchname.Inanycase,
theamendedinformationadvertstoseveraltransactionsandsigningofdocumentswiththeEquitablePCI
Bank and/or other corporate entities where the abovementioned alias was allegedly employed by the
accused.

The facts alleged in the information are distinctly different from facts established in the Ursua
casewhereanothernamewasusedbytheaccusedinasingleinstancewithoutanysignorindicationthat
[22]
that[sic]heintendedtobeknownfromthatdaybythisnameinadditiontohisrealname.

The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in applying Ursua
notwithstanding this earlier final ruling on its nonapplicability a ruling that binds the parties in the
presentcase.ThePeoplethusclaimsthattheSandiganbayanerredtothepointofgravelyabusingits
discretion when it resurrected the application of Ursua, resulting in the reversal of its earlier final
ruling.

Wefindnomeritinthisargumentfortworeasons.First,thecitedSandiganbayanresolutionisamere
[23]
interlocutoryorderarulingdenyingamotiontoquash thatcannotbegiventheattributesoffinality
andimmutabilitythataregenerallyaccordedtojudgmentsorordersthatfinallydisposeofthewhole,
[24]
of or particular matters in, a case. The Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order
becauseitseffectswouldonlybeprovisionalincharacter,andwouldstillrequiretheissuingcourtto
[25]
undertakesubstantialproceedingsinordertoputthecontroversytorest. Itisbasicremediallaw
thataninterlocutoryorderisalwaysunderthecontrolofthecourtandmaybemodifiedorrescinded
[26] [27]
uponsufficientgroundsshownatanytimebeforefinaljudgment. Perez v. Court of Appeals,
albeit a civil case, instructively teaches that an interlocutory order carries no res adjudicata effects.
SaysPerez:

TheDecisioninCAG.R.No.10415havingresolvedonlyaninterlocutorymatter,theprincipleof
resjudicatacannotbeappliedinthiscase.Therecanbenoresjudicatawherethepreviousorderin
questionwasnotanorderorjudgmentdeterminativeofanissueoffactpendingbeforethecourt
butwasonlyaninterlocutoryorderbecauseitrequiredthepartiestoperformcertainactsforfinal
 adjudication. In this case, the lifting of the restraining order paved the way for the possession of the
fishpondonthepartofpetitionersand/ortheirrepresentativespendingtheresolutionofthemainaction
forinjunction.Inotherwords,themainissueofwhetherornotprivaterespondentmaybeconsidereda
sublesseeoratransfereeoftheleaseentitledtopossessthefishpondunderthecircumstancesofthecase
[28]
hadyettoberesolvedwhentherestrainingorderwaslifted.

Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations of the
Information to determine the sufficiency of these allegations and did not consider any evidence
aliunde. This is far different from the present demurrer to evidence where the Sandiganbayan had a
fullerviewoftheprosecutionscase,andwasfacedwiththeissueofwhethertheprosecutionsevidence
was sufficient to prove the allegations of the Information. Under these differing views, the
SandiganbayanmayarriveatadifferentconclusionontheapplicationofUrsua,theleadingcaseinthe
applicationofCA142,andthechangeinrulingisnotperseindicativeofgraveabuseofdiscretion.
ThatthereisnoerroroflawisstrengthenedbyourconsiderationoftheSandiganbayanrulingonthe
applicationofUrsua.

InanexerciseofcautiongivenUrsuasjurisprudentialbindingeffect,thePeoplealsoarguesinits
petitionthatEstradascaseisdifferentfromUrsuasforthefollowingreasons:(1)respondentEstrada
usedandintendedtocontinuallyusethealiasJoseVelardeinadditiontothenameJosephEstrada(2)
Estradasuseofthealiaswasnotisolatedorlimitedtoasingletransactionand(3)theuseofthealias
JoseVelardewasdesignedtocauseanddidcauseconfusionandfraudinbusinesstransactionswhich
the antialias law and its related statutes seek to prevent.The People also argues that the evidence it
presentedmorethansatisfiedtherequirementsofCANo.142,asamended,andUrsua,asitwasalso
shownorestablishedthatEstradasuseofthealiaswaspublic.

Inlightofouraboveconclusionsandbasedonthepartiesexpressedpositions,weshallnowexamine
withintheUrsuaframeworktheassailedSandiganbayanResolutiongrantingthedemurrertoevidence.
TheprosecutionhastheburdenofprooftoshowthattheevidenceitpresentedwiththeSandiganbayan
satisfiedtheUrsuarequirements,particularlyonthematterofpublicityandhabitualityintheuseofan
alias.

Whatisthecoverageoftheindictment?

ThePeoplearguesthattheSandiganbayangravelyerredandabuseditsdiscretioninlimitingthe
coverageoftheamendedInformationinCrim.CaseNo.26565toEstradasuseofthealiasJoseVelarde
onFebruary4,2000.ItpositsthattherewasamaintransactiononethattookplaceonFebruary4,2000
buttherewereothertransactionscoveredbythephrasepriortoorsubsequenttheretotheInformation
specificallyreferredtoseveraltransactionswithEquitablePCIBankand/orothercorporateentities.
TothePeople,therestrictivefindingthatthephrasepriortoorsubsequenttheretoisabsorbedbythe
phrase on or about 04 February 2000 drastically amends the succeeding main allegations on the
constitutive criminal acts by removing the plurality of both the transactions involved and the
documents signed with various entities there is the undeniable essential relationship between the
allegationsofthemultiplicityoftransactions,ononehand,andtheadditionalantecedentofpriortoor
subsequent thereto, on the other. It argues that the Sandiganbayan reduced the phrase prior to or
subsequent thereto into a useless appendage, providing Estrada with a convenient and totally
unwarrantedescaperoute.

The People further argues that the allegation of time is the least exacting in satisfying the
constitutionalrequirementthattheaccusedhastobeinformedoftheaccusationagainsthim.Section6
ofRule110oftheRevisedRulesofCourtprovidesthatanallegationoftheapproximatedateofthe
commission of the offense will suffice, while Section 11 of the same Rule provides that it is not
necessarytostateinthecomplaintorinformationtheprecisedatetheoffensewascommittedexcept
whenitisamaterialingredientofthecrime.Thisliberalityallegedlyshapedthetimetestedrulethat
whenthetimegiveninthecomplaintisnotoftheessenceoftheoffense,thetimeofthecommissionof
theoffensedoesnotneedtobeprovenasalleged,andthatthecomplaintwillbesustainediftheproof
shows that the offense was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and
beforethecommencementoftheaction(citingPeoplev.Bugayong[299SCRA528,537]thatinturn
cited US v. Smith [3 Phil. 20, 22]). Since allegations of date of the commission of an offense are
liberally interpreted, the People posits that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
disregarding the additional clause prior to or subsequent thereto under the liberality principle, the
allegationsoftheactsconstitutiveoftheoffensefinallydeterminethesufficiencyoftheallegationsof
time.ThePeoplethusclaimsthatnosurprisecouldhavetakenplacethatwouldpreventEstradafrom
properlydefendinghimselftheinformationfullynotifiedhimthathewasbeingaccusedofusingthe
aliasJoseVelardeinmorethanjustoneinstance.

Weseenomeritinthesearguments.

Atitscore,theissueisconstitutionalinnaturetherightofEstradatobeinformedofthenature
andcauseoftheaccusationagainsthim.UndertheprovisionsoftheRulesofCourtimplementingthis
constitutional right, a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused the
designationoftheoffensegivenbythestatutetheactsoromissionscomplainedofasconstitutingthe
offenseinthenameoftheoffendedpartytheapproximatedateofthecommissionoftheoffenseand
[29]
theplacewheretheoffensewascommitted. As to the cause of accusation, the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
statedinordinaryandconciselanguageandnotnecessarilyinthelanguageusedinthestatute,butin
termssufficienttoenableapersonofcommonunderstandingtoknowtheoffensechargedand
 [30]
thequalifyingandaggravatingcircumstances,andforthecourttopronouncejudgment. The
date of the commission of the offense need not be precisely stated in the complaint or information
exceptwhentheprecisedateisamaterialingredientoftheoffense.Theoffensemaybeallegedtohave
[31]
beencommittedonadateasnearaspossibletotheactualdateofitscommission.

Theinformationmustatalltimesembodytheessentialelementsofthecrimechargedbysetting
forththefactsandcircumstancesthatbearontheculpabilityandliabilityoftheaccusedsothathecan
[32]
properly prepare for and undertake his defense. In short, the allegations in the complaint or
information,aswritten,mustfullyinformoracquainttheaccusedtheprimaryreaderofandtheparty
directlyaffectedbythecomplaintorinformationofthecharge/slaid.

TheheretoforecitedInformationstatesthatonorabout04February2000,orsometimeprior
or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
HonorableCourt,theabovenamedaccused[did]willfully,unlawfullyandcriminallyREPRESENT
HIMSELFASJOSEVELARDEINSEVERALTRANSACTIONSANDuseandemploytheSAID
aliasJoseVelardewhichISneitherhisregisterednameatbirthnorhisbaptismalname,insigning
documentswithEquitablePCIBankand/orothercorporateentities.

WefullyagreewiththedisputedSandiganbayansreadingoftheInformation,asthiswashowthe
accusedmighthavesimilarlyreadandunderstoodtheallegationsintheInformationand,onthisbasis,
preparedhisdefense.Brokendownintoitscomponentparts,theallegationoftimeintheInformation
plainlystatesthat(1)ONFebruary4,2000(2)ORbeforeFebruary4,2000(3)ORsometimeprior
orsubsequenttoFebruary4,2000,intheCityofManila,EstradarepresentedhimselfasJoseVelarde
inseveraltransactionsinsigningdocumentswithEquitablePCIBankand/orothercorporateentities.

Underthisanalysis,theseveraltransactionsinvolvingthesigningofdocumentswithEquitable
PCIBankand/orothercorporateentitiesallhadtheirreferencetoFebruary4,2000theywereallmade
onoraboutorpriororsubsequenttothatdate,thusplainlyimplyingthatallthesetransactionstook
placeonlyonFebruary4,2000oronanothersingledatesometimebeforeorafterFebruary4,2000.To
be sure, the Information could have simply said on or about February 4, 2000 to capture all the
alternative approximate dates, so that the phrase sometime prior or subsequent thereto would
effectivelybeasurplusagethathasnomeaningseparatelyfromtheonoraboutalreadyexpressed.This
consequent uselessness of the prior or subsequent thereto phrase cannot be denied, but it is a direct
and necessary consequence of the use of the OR between the two phrases and the THERETO that
referredbacktoFebruary4,2000inthesecondphrase.Ofcourse,thereadingwouldhavebeenvery
different (and would have been clearly in accord with the Peoples present interpretation) had the
Information simply used AND instead of OR to separate the phrases the intent to refer to various
transactionsoccurringonvariousdatesandoccasionsallproximatetoFebruary4,2000couldnotbe
disputed.UnfortunatelyforthePeople,theimprecisionintheuseofORistherealitythecasehasto
livewith.ToactcontrarytothisrealitywouldviolateEstradasrighttobeinformedofthenatureand
cause of accusation against him the multiple transactions on several separate days that the People
claimswouldresultinsurpriseanddenialofanopportunitytoprepareforEstrada,whohasarightto
relyonthesingledaymentionedintheInformation.

SeparatelyfromtheconstitutionaldimensionoftheallegationoftimeintheInformation,another
issuethattheallegationoftimeandouraboveconclusionraiserelatestowhatactoracts,constitutinga
violationoftheoffensecharged,wereactuallyallegedintheInformation.

TheconclusionwearrivedatnecessarilyimpactsonthePeoplescase,asitdealsafatalblowon
thePeoplesclaimthatEstradahabituallyusedtheJoseVelardealias.For,toourmind,therepeateduse
ofanaliaswithinasingledaycannotbedeemedhabitual,asitdoesnotamounttoacustomarypractice
or use. This reason alone dictates the dismissal of the petition under CA No. 142 and the terms of
Ursua.
Theissuesofpublicity,numberedaccounts,and
theapplicationofCANo.142,R.A.No.1405,
andR.A.No.9160.

Weshalljointlydiscusstheseinterrelatedissues.

ThePeopleclaimsthatevenontheassumptionthatOcampoandCuratoarebankofficerssworn
to secrecy under the law, the presence of two other persons who are not bank officers Aprodicio
LaquianandFernandoChuawhenEstradassignedthebankdocumentsasJoseVelardeamountedtoa
publicuseofanaliasthatviolatesCANo.142.

On the issue of numbered accounts, the People argues that to premise the validity of Estradas
prosecution for violation of CA No. 142 on a mere banking practice is gravely erroneous, improper,
andconstitutesgraveabuseofdiscretionnobankinglawprovisionallowingtheuseofaliasesinthe
openingofbankaccountsexistedatmost,itwasallowedbymereconventionorindustrypractice,but
not by a statute enacted by the legislature. Additionally, that Estradas prosecution was supposedly
based on BSP Circular No. 302 dated October 11, 2001 is wrong and misleading, as Estrada stands
chargedwithviolationofCANo.142,penalizedsince1936,andnotwithaviolationofamereBSP
Circular. That the use of alias in bank transactions prior to BSP Circular No. 302 is allowed is
inconsequentialbecauseasearlyasCANo.142,theuseofanalias(exceptforcertainpurposeswhich
donotincludebanking)wasalreadyprohibited.NothinginCANo.142exemptedtheuseofaliasesin
banking transactions, since the law did not distinguish or limit its application it was therefore grave
error for the Sandiganbayan to have done so. Lastly on this point, bank regulations being mere
issuancescannotamend,modifyorprevailovertheeffective,subsistingandenforceableprovisionof
CANo.142.
On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 and its relationship with CA No. 142, that
since nothing in CA No. 142 excuses the use of an alias, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretionwhenitruledthatR.A.No.1405isanexceptiontoCANo.142scoverage.Harmonization
of laws, the People posits, is allowed only if the laws intended to be harmonized refer to the same
subjectmatter,orareatleastrelatedwithoneanother.ThethreelawswhichtheSandiganbayantriedto
harmonize are not remotely related to one another they each deal with a different subject matter,
[33]
prohibitsadifferentact,governsadifferentconduct,andcoversadifferentclassofpersons, and
there was no need to force their application to one another.Harmonization of laws, the People adds,
presupposes the existence of conflict or incongruence between or among the provisions of various
laws,asituationnotobtaininginthepresentcase.

The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not apply to trust transactions, such as Trust
AccountNo.C163,asitappliesonlytotraditionaldeposits(simpleloans).Atrustaccount,according
to the People, may not be considered a deposit because it does not create the juridical relation of
creditor and debtor trust and deposit operations are treated separately and are different in legal
contemplation trust operation is separate and distinct from banking and requires a grant of separate
authority,andtrustfundsarenotcoveredbydepositinsuranceunderthePhilippineDepositInsurance
Corporationlaw(R.A.No.3591,asamended).

The People further argues that the Sandiganbayans conclusion that the transaction or
communicationwasprivilegedinnaturewaserroneousacongruentinterpretationofCANo.142and
R.A.No.1405showsthatapersonwhosignsinapublicorprivatetransactionanameoralias,other
thanhisoriginalnameorthealiasheisauthorizedtouse,shallbeheldliableforviolationofCANo.
142, while the bank employees are bound by the confidentiality of bank transactions except in the
circumstancesenumeratedinR.A.No.1405.Atmost,thePeopleargues,theprohibitioninR.A.No.
1405coversbankemployeesandofficersonly,andnotEstradathelawdoesnotprohibitEstradafrom
disclosingandmakingpublichisuseofanaliastootherpeople,includingOcampoandCurato,ashe
didwhenhemadeapublicexhibitanduseofthealiasbeforeMessrs.LacquianandChua.

Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan ruling that the use of an alias before bank
officers does not violate CA No. 142 effectively encourages the commission of wrongdoing and the
concealment of illgotten wealth under pseudonyms it sustains an anomalous and prejudicial policy
thatusesthelawtosilencebankofficialsandemployeesfromreportingthecommissionofcrimes.The
People contends that the law R.A. No. 1405 was not intended by the Legislature to be used as a
subterfugeorcamouflageforthecommissionofcrimesandcannotbesointerpretedthelawcanonly
beinterpreted,understoodandappliedsothatrightandjusticewouldprevail.

Weseenomeritinthesearguments.

Weagree,albeitforadifferentreason,withtheSandiganbayanpositionthattheruleinthelaw
oflibelthatmerecommunicationtoathirdpersonispublicitydoesnotapplytoviolationsofCANo.
142.OurclosereadingofUrsuaparticularly,therequirementthattherebeintentionbytheusertobe
culpableandthehistoricalreasonswecitedabovetellsusthattherequiredpublicityintheuseofalias
ismorethanmerecommunicationtoathirdpersontheuseofthealias,tobeconsideredpublic,must
bemadeopenly,orinanopenmannerorplace,ortocauseittobecomegenerallyknown.Inorderto
be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a
personwhoshallpubliclybeknownunderthatothername.Inotherwords,theintenttopubliclyuse
thealiasmustbemanifest.

To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and
opened Trust Account No. C163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known
henceforthasJoseVelarde.InrelationtoEstrada,LacquianandChuawerenotpartofthepublicwho
hadnoaccesstoEstradasprivacyandtotheconfidentialmattersthattranspiredinMalacaanwherehe
sat as President Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and
strictestconfidence,whileChuawasalawyerfriendboundbyhisoathofofficeandtiesoffriendship
to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have
intendedhissigningasJoseVelardetobeforpublicconsumptionbythefactalonethatLacquianand
Chuawerealsoinsidetheroomatthattime.ThesameholdstrueforEstradasallegedrepresentations
withOrtalizaandDichavez,assumingtheevidencefortheserepresentationstobeadmissible.All of
Estradasrepresentationstothesepeopleweremadeinprivacyandinsecrecy,withnoiotaofintention
ofpublicity.

The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords Estrada a reasonable
expectationofprivacy,astheallegedcriminalactrelatedtotheopeningofatrustaccountatransaction
[34]
thatR.A.No.1405considersabsolutelyconfidentialinnature. Wepreviouslyrejected,inEjercito
[35]
v. Sandiganbayan, the Peoples nitpicking argument on the alleged dichotomy between bank
depositsandtrusttransactions,whenwesaid:

Thecontentionthattrustaccountsarenotcoveredbythetermdeposits,asusedinR.A.1405,by
themerefactthattheydonotentailacreditordebtorrelationshipbetweenthetrustorandthebank,does
notlie.Anexaminationofthelawshowsthatthetermdepositsusedthereinistobeunderstoodbroadly
 andnotlimitedonlytoaccountswhichgiverisetoacreditordebtorrelationshipbetweenthedepositor
andthebank.

ThepolicybehindthelawislaiddowninSection1:

SECTION1.It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give encouragement to the
peopleto deposittheirmoneyinbankinginstitutionsandtodiscourageprivatehoardingsothatthesame
maybeproperlyutilizedbybanksinauthorizedloanstoassistintheeconomicdevelopmentofthecountry.
(Underscoringsupplied)


If the money deposited under an account may be used by bank for authorized loans to third
persons, then such account, regardless of whether it creates a creditordebtor relationship between the
depositorandthebank,fallsunderthecategoryofaccountswhichthelawpreciselyseekstoprotectfor
thepurposeofboostingtheeconomicdevelopmentofthecountry.

Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement between
petitioner and Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers deposit, placement or investment of
fundsbyUrbanBankforandinbehalfofpetitioner.ThemoneydepositedunderTrustAccountNo.858,
was,therefore,intendednotmerelytoremainwiththebankbuttobeinvestedbyitelsewhere.To hold
thatthistypeofaccountisnotprotectedbyR.A.1405wouldencourageprivatehoardingoffundsthat
couldotherwisebeinvestedbybankinotherventures,contrarytothepolicybehindthelaw.

Section2ofthesamelawinfactevenmoreclearlyshowsthatthetermdepositswasintendedto
beunderstoodbroadly:

SECTION2.AlldepositsofwhatevernaturewithbankorbankinginstitutionsinthePhilippines
including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political
subdivisionsanditsinstrumentalities,areherebyconsideredasofanabsolutelyconfidentialnature
and maynotbeexamined, inquired or looked into by any person, governmentofficial,bureauor
office,exceptuponwrittenpermissionofthedepositor,orincasesofimpeachment,oruponorder
ofacompetentcourtincasesofbriberyorderelictionofdutyofpublicofficials,orincaseswhere
themoneydepositedorinvestedisthesubjectmatterofthelitigation.(Emphasisandunderscoring
supplied)

Thephraseofwhatevernatureproscribesanyrestrictiveinterpretationofdeposits.Moreover,itis
clearfromtheimmediatelyquotedprovisionthat,generally,thelawappliesnotonlytomoneywhichis
depositedbutalsotothosewhichareinvested.Thisfurthershowsthatthelawwasnotintendedtoapply
onlytodeposits in the strict sense of the word. Otherwise, there would have been no need to add the
phraseorinvested.

[36]
Clearly,therefore,R.A.1405isbroadenoughtocoverTrustAccountNo.858.


We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank
[37]
DepositsLaw)arestatutorilyprotectedorrecognizedzonesofprivacy. Giventheprivatenatureof
EstradasactofsigningthedocumentsasJoseVelarderelatedtotheopeningofthetrustaccount,the
PeoplecannotclaimthattherewasalreadyapublicuseofaliaswhenOcampoandCuratowitnessed
thesigning.WeneednotevenconsiderheretheimpactoftheobligationsimposedbyR.A.No.1405on
thebankofficerswhatisessentiallysignificantistheprivacysituationthatisnecessarilyimpliedin
these kinds of transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate a
conclusionthatthetransactionwasdonepubliclyorwiththeintenttousethealiaspublicly.

TheenactmentofR.A.No.9160,ontheotherhand,isasignificantdevelopmentonlybecauseit
clearly manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered accounts or anonymous accounts were
permittedbankingtransactions,whethertheybeallowedbylaworbyamerebankingregulation.Tobe
sure, an indictment against Estrada using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained without
violatingtheconstitutional

[38]
prohibitionontheenactmentanduseofexpostfactolaws.

Wehastentoaddthatthisholisticapplicationandinterpretationofthesevariouslawsisnotan
attempttoharmonizetheselaws.AfindingofcommissionoftheoffensepunishedunderCANo.142
must necessarily rest on the evidence of the requisites for culpability, as amplified in Ursua. The
application of R.A. No. 1405 is significant only because Estradas use of the alias was pursuant to a
transactionthatthelawconsidersprivateor,attheveryleast,wherethelawguaranteesareasonable
expectation of privacy to the parties to the transactions it is at this point that R.A. No. 1405
tangentiallyinterfaceswithanindictmentunderCA142.Inthislight,thereisnoactualfrontalclash
between CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 that requires harmonization. Each operates within its own
sphere,butmustnecessarilybereadtogetherwhenthesespheresinterfacewithoneanother. Finally,
R.A. No. 9160, as a law of recent vintage in relation to the indictment against Estrada, cannot be a
sourceoraninfluencingfactorinhisindictment.

In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply looked at the totality of the
circumstancesobtaininginEstradasuseofthealiasJoseVelardevisvistheUrsuarequisites. We do
notdecideherewhetherEstradasuseofanaliaswhenheoccupiedthehighestexecutivepositioninthe
landwasvalidandlegalwesimplydetermined,astheSandiganbayandid,whetherhemaybemade
liablefortheoffensechargedbasedontheevidencethePeoplepresented.Aswithanyotheraccused,
hisguiltmustbebasedontheevidenceandproofbeyondreasonabledoubtthatafindingofcriminal
liabilityrequires.IfthePeoplefailstodischargethisburden,astheydidfailinthiscase,theruleoflaw
requiresthatwesodeclare.Wedosonowinthisreviewandaccordinglyfindnoreversibleerroroflaw
intheassailedSandiganbayanruling.

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,weDENYthepetitionforlackofmerit.

SOORDERED.

ARTUROD.BRION