Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A. Context
1. First approach to interpreting statute in isolation: discovering plain/ordinary meaning, context and
purpose (Commission of Taxation v Unit Trend).
Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority:
Plain and ordinary (grammatical) meaning; natural default context of words, grammatical
absurdities, purpose of the act, may require a different meaning (335).
Process of construction must always begin by examining the context of the provision that is being
construed. (347)
CIC Insurance v Bankstown Football club
Modern approach requires context considered at first instance, not later ambiguity.
2. Definitions
In finding ordinary/natural meaning, context incs the language used in the Act as a whole:
Engineers Case (350).
AIA s 13 says what is in an Act: start 1st section end nth section (or schedule); long title;
preamble; enacting words; all headings.
Notes permissible as legit source to help (though not part of act). Weak aid; [they] cannot control
the meaning of a section: Ombudsman v Moroney (354).
Punctuation permissible: Re Collins; Ex parte Hockings (355-6).
Examples may extend operation of act: AIA s 15AD.
4. External context
Other relevant legislation, similar in subject matter; grounded in assumption Parliament intended
legislation to operate rationally, efficiently and justly: CSD v Permanent Trustee (363).
Particularly for reciprocal legislation: Abdi v Release on License Board (363).
Doesnt necessarily hold; defined in one act & not in another may indicate Parliament
intended special meaning in the first & ordinary meaning in the latter: R v Scott (363).
(Intended) audience: Herbert Adams v FCT (364) [pastry case].
Usually to effect a technical meaning.
Technical meaning is presumed re recognised legal terms unless contrary intention appears
[legal profession an audience of all statutes]: AG (NSW) v Brewery Union of NSW (364).
Prior or existing law.
Prior (statutory history): important to note that while it may be helpful, must not reinstate
problems that current legislation was intended to cure: DCT v Clark (364) [where
possible, try not to use this; use presumption that re-enactment of a provision constitutes
approval of previous judicial interpretation]
Existing law: generally regarding common law principles: affirmed Fisher v Bell [note:
before s 15AA] (365-6).
5. Maxims
B. Purposive
Use at CL already established by CIC: may consider reports of law reform bodies to ascertain the
mischief which a statute is intended to cure (334): (parliamentary docs/commissions: Wacando v
Commonwealth; international agreements: Enzed Holdings; The Banco (even if not mentioned in Act);
D & R Henderson (enacted before ratification). Only permits reference to discover the mischief being
remedied, rather than the actual meaning of a provision. So goes more to purposive.
Extrinsic materials recourse under s 15AB much more useful, can ascertain meaning of a provision
(but so this means it goes to contextual approach).
But only permitted under 3 circumstances (triggers):
(1)(b)(ii) ordinary meaning (in context/purpose) leads to "a result that is manifestly
absurd or unreasonable". See Re Shingles (340).
(2) lists everything considered extrinsic materials for (1); know all, but esp:
(a) bits of Act not covered by s 13,
(e) explanatory memorandum,
(f) second reading speech.
(3) weight of considered extrinsic material is (a) level of consistency with ordinary meaning of
provisions text in context/purpose.
D. Presumptions