Professional Documents
Culture Documents
,
Respondents
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
Facts: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died. He was
survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: (Beatriz, Rosario,
Teresa and Filomena, Benito, Alejandro and Jose). The real properties left by Benito
were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the
heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by
Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena died intestate and without issue. Her sole heiress was her mother,
Filomena Races. Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself the
properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena. As a result,
Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of
the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of
the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her
sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). Mrs. Legarda and her
six surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in
the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation
of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will. The decree
of probate was affirmed by the CA.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed
a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which
she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said
properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's
three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and
Jose. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Beatriz filed an ordinary civil action
against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the
purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable properties.
Lower court dismissed the action of Beatriz.
Issue: whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal under art.
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister
from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous
title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3)
the reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the
(prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario) who is within the
third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which
the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the
ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came.
Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren
the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena
because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate. The reservor
cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the
reservees survived the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all
the nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are
the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the
reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share
therein.
Consuelo
Rita
+Benito Legarda de la Paz Filomena Roces
Beatriz
Rosario
Teresa
+Filomena
Benito Carmen Legarda y Fernandez
Alejandro Ramon Legarda y Hernandez
Jose Filomena Legarda y Lobregat
Jaime Legarda y Lobregat
Celso Legarda y Lobregat
Alejandro Legarda y Lobregat
Ma. Teresa Legarda y Lobregat
Ma. Antonia Legarda y Lobregat
Jose Legarda y Lobregat
Rosario Legarda y Lobregat
Benito Legarda y Lobregat
Eduardo Legarda y Lobregat
Trinidad Legarda
FACTS: Benito Legarda y dela Paz (Benito II), son of Benito Legarda y Tuazon (Benito
I), died and was survived by his widow, Filomena and their 7 children. The real
properties left by his deceased father, Benito I, were partitioned in 3 equal parts by Benito
IIs sisters and his heirs pro-indiviso. One of his daughters, Filomena, died without issue
and her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena vda de Legarda
1. Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself the properties she
inherited from her daughter as a result of which she succeeded her deceased
owner as co-owner of the properties held pro-indiviso by her other 6 children.
Later, Mrs. Legarda executed 2 handwritten documents disposing of the
properties which she inherited from her daughter in favor of her 16 grandchildren
(the children of her sons). Eventually, Mrs. Legarda and her 6 surviving children
partitioned the co-owned property
2. Mrs. Legarda died and in the testate proceeding of her estate, Beatriz Gonzales,
one of her daughters, filed a motion to exclude in the inventory of the properties
inherited from Filomena, the deceased daughter, on the ground that said properties
were reservable and should be inherited by Filomenas 3 sisters and 3 brothers,
not by the 16 grandchildren of Mrs. Legarda, or Filomenas nephews and nieces.
She also filed an action securing a declaration that the properties are reservable
which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her
grandchildren to the exclusion of her 6 chidlren
3. It is contended here than the properties in question are not reservable properties
because only relatives within the third paternal line have survived and that when
Mrs. Legarda willed the properties to her grandchildren, who are third degree
relatives of Filomena and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the
reserva troncal has been satisfied: to prevent persons outside a family from
securing, by some special accident of life, property that should otherwise have
remained therein.
HELD: No. Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her 16
grandchildren the reservable properties she inherited from her daughter because the
reservable properties did not form part of her estate. The reservoir cannot make a
disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the
reservoir.
Art 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the
nearest within the third degree from prepositus who in this case are the 6 children of Mrs.
Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom to the reservable properties should
be given and deprive the other reservees of their shares therein. To allow the reservoir to
make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favor the reservees in the
third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a
glaring violation of Art 891, this cannot be allowed.
Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of the properties in question in her will even if the
disposition is in favor of relatives within the third degree from Filomena. The said
properties, by operation of Art 891, should go to Mrs. Legardas 6 children as reservees
within the second degree from Filomena. Reservees do not inherit from the reservor but
from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the
condition that they must survive the reservor.
The reservation could be extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of
Mrs. Legardas death. Since at the time of her death, there were reservees belonging to
the second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their reservable
character. The disposition of the properties should be made in accordance with Art 891
and in accordance with the reservors holographic will.
Facts:
Jose Frias Chua had 2 marriages. First with Patricia, he had 3 children- Ignacio, Manuel and Lorenzo.
When Patricia died, he married Consolacion de la Torre and had one child- Juanito Frias Chua. Jose
Frias Chua died intestate. After the intestate proceeding the court adjudicated half of lot in question
to Consolacion and the other half to their only son, Juanito. The two sons in the first marriage,
Lorenzo and Ignacio, received P3k and P1550 respectively. (Manuel already died).
Juanito also died intestate without issue. Consolacion de la Torre executed a declaration of heirship
adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito in the lot in question. When dela
Torre died, Ignacio and the heirs of Lorenzo filed a complaint praying that the one-half portion of the
Lot be declared as a reservable property for the reason that the lot in question was subject to reserval
troncal pursuant to Article 981 NCC.
Issue: WON property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias Chua
gratuitously (as first requisite of Reserva Troncal).
Held: Yes
Ratio:
Inorderthatapropertymaybeimpressedwithareservable
characterthefollowingrequisitesmustexist,towit:(1)that
thepropertywasacquiredbyadescendantfromanasscendantor
fromabrotherorsisterbygratuitoustitle;(2)thatsaid
descendantdiedwithoutanissue;(3)thatthepropertyis
inheritedbyanotherascendantbyoperationoflaw;and(4)that
therearerelativeswithinthethirddegreebelongingtotheline
fromwhichsaidpropertycame.
Alloftheforegoingrequisitesarepresent.Thus,asborneoutby
therecords,JuanoitoFriasChuaofthesecondmarriagedied
intestatein1952;hediedwithourleavinganyissue;hispro
indivisoof1/2shareofLotNo.399wasacquiredbyhismother,
ConsolaciondelaTorredied,JuannnitoFriasChuawhodied
intestatehadrelativeswithinthethirddegree.Theserelatives
areIgnacioFriasChuaandDominadorChuaandRemidiosChua,the
supposelegitimatechildrenofthedeceasedLorenzoFriasChua,
whoarethepetitionersherein
AccordingtoManresa,"Thetransmissionisgratuitousorby
gratuitoustitlewhentherecipientdoesnotgiveanythingin
return."Itmattersnotwhetherthepropertytransmittedbeorbe
notsubjecttoanypriorcharges;whatisessentialisthatthe
transmissionbemadegratuitously,orbyanactofmereliberality
ofthepersonmakingit,withoutimposinganyobligationonthe
partoftherecipient;andthatthepersonreceivingtheproperty
givesordoesnothinginreturn.
"theessentialthingisthatthepersonwhotransmitsitdoesso
gratuitously,frompuregenerosity,withoutrequiringfromthe
transfereeanyprestation."Itisevidentfromtherecordthatthe
transmissionofthepropertyinquestiontoJuanitoFriasChuaof
thesecondmarriageuponthedeathofhisfatherJoseFriasChua
wasbymeansofahereditarysuccessionandthereforegratuitous.
Aslongasthetransmissionofthepropertytotheheirsisfree
fromanyconditionimposedbythedeceasedhimselfandthe
propertyisgivenoutofpuregenerosity,itgisgratuitous
Edroso v. Sablan
G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913
FACTS:
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on
September 22, 1882. In this marriage they had a son named Pedro who at his
fathers death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902,
unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two parcels of land
passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the
hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her
ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of VictorianoSablan that is, two uncles german
of Pedro Sablan appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming
one of two things: Either that the registration be denied, or that if granted to
her the right reserved by law to the opponents be recorded in the registration
of each parcel.
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land
in question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved
and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the
names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Land Registration erred in denying the
registration of the reservable properties by reservista, Edroso.
RULING:
YES. The Court held that applicant is entitled to register in her own name the
two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the applicants, recording
in the registration the right required by the law to be reserved to either or
both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive
her.
The reservista has all the rights inherent in ownership, he can use,
enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in
fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it, although under a condition.
The ascendants who inherits from descendants, whether by the latters wish
or by operation of law, requires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly
transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership
belong to him exclusively use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery.
During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the
right required by law to be reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives
within the third degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain to them
has been assured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not even
have the capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.
EDROSO vs. SABLAN
FACTS:
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882. In this
marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's death
inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue and by
this decease the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso..
Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her ownership. Two
legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan appeared in
the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the registration be denied,
"or that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents be recorded in the registration of
each parcel." The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed
through a bill of exceptions.
Appellants Contention:
The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan
had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano
Sablan had likewise acquired them by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria
Rita Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property had
between him and his brothers. These are admitted facts.
The appellant also contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question have been
acquired by operation of law, and that only property acquired without a valuable consideration,
which is by operation of law, is required by law to reserved.
Appellees Contention:
Argue that the appellants defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance, but only herein.
Certainly, the allegation in first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property in
question in 1882, before the enforcement of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right
required by law to be reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of
action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed and that they had
it"
RTC Ruling:
The trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of the nature of property required by
law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of
the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
ISSUE
Whether or not the lands which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to be
reserved
HELD
YES.
The hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration [gratuitous title]. He who acquires by
inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives and a very definite conclusion of law also is
that the uncles german are within the third degree of blood relationship.
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a valuable
consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what
he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the
line whence the property proceeded.
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he
acquired without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father
Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to reserve them intact for the
claimants, who are uncles or relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano
Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they
partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the
law.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left at
death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her as
the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant. [Art. 809, OCC.] In such case only the half constituting the
legal portion would be required by law to be reserved, because it is what by operation of law would
fall to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to be
reserved.
Proof of testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be admitted that a
half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The law provides
that the other half is also presumed to be acquired by operation of law that is, by intestate
succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this presumption must be presented by the interested party,
that is, that the other half was acquired by the man's wish and not by operation of law. In this case,
the interested party has not proved that either of the lots became Marcelinas inheritance through the
free disposal of her son.
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code.
"Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a second marriage
shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage the ownership of all
the property he or she may have acquired from the deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by
gift, or other transfer w/out a valuable consideration."
From principles of jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court of Spain, it is inferred that if from
December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case had occurred of a right required to be reserved by article 811,
the persons entitled to such right would have been able to institute, against the ascendants who must
make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that articles 977 and 978 grant to
the children of a first marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The
proceedings for assurance, under article 977, are: Inventory of the property subject to the right
reserved, annotation in the property registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal
of the personal property; and the guaranty, under article 978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the
case of realty, of the value of what is validly alienated.
Article 199 of amended Mortgage Law: "The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by
article 811 of the Civil Code can only be required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be
reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be required by the persons who should legally represent
them. In either case the right of the persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be
secured by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding articles (relative to the right reserved by
article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with
respect to the father."
The lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the period for the exercise of this
right of action by the persons in whose favor the right must be reserved, but really the
commencement thereof, and enables them to exercise it at any time, since no limit is set in the law. So,
if the annotation of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question
must be made in the property registry of the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now
institute proceedings to that end, and an allegation of prescription against the exercise of such right
of action cannot be sustained.
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of
article 811 of the Old Civil Code?
The person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use
and usufruct. He has, moreover, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent.
Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved,
and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he
is the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable
one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he
lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a
genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right is reserved cannot
dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their
possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of fee simple which they can
transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should
die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place
in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree, that is to say, a
second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future
legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their right has been
assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be
reserved his act would be null and void, for it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain
therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of
the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may
disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as it may even become absolute
should that person die."
No act of disposal inter vivos of the person required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by
him in whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in
ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may
ascertain from the registry in order to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition
subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons
other than relatives within the third degree of the descendant from whom he got the property to be
reserved must be prohibited to him, because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent
persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would
otherwise have remained therein."
Can the heir of the property required by law to be reserved himself alone register the
ownership of the property he has inherited?
YES. When the persons in whose favor the reservation must be made agree thereto and provided that
the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land is recorded, as the law provides.
Sienesv.Esparcia
G.R.No.L12957,March24,1961
FACTS:
Lot3368originallybelongedtoSaturninoYaeso.Withhisfirstwife,TeresaRuales,hehadfourchildren
namedAgaton,Fernando,PaulinaandCipriana,whilewithhissecondwife,AndreaGutang,hehadan
onlysonnamedFrancisco.OCTNo.10275coveringLot3368,hisinheritance,wasissuedinthename
ofFrancisco.BecauseFranciscowasaminoratthetime,hismotheradministeredtheproperty.
WhenFranciscodiedsingleandwithoutanydescendant,hismotherAndrea,ashissoleheir,executedan
EXTRAJUDICIALSETTLEMENTANDSALEwhereby,amongotherthings,forandinconsiderationof
thesumofP800.00shesoldthepropertyinquestiontoappellants.
WhenthereaftersaidvendeesdemandedfromPaulinaYaesoandherhusbandJoseEsparcia,thesurrender
ofOOCTNo.10275whichwasintheirpossessionthelatterrefused.
Thereafter, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving halfsisters of Francisco,and who as such had
declared the property in their name, on January 1, 1951 executedadeed of saleinfavorof the
spousesFidelEsparciaandPaulinaSienes.
ISSUE:
WhetherornotthesalemadebythereservistaAndreawasvoidtherebeingnorighttodisposethesame.
RULING:
NO. The Court held that the reservista has the legal title anddominionto thereservable property but
subjecttoaresolutorycondition;thatheislikealifeusufructuaryofthereservableproperty;thathemay
alienatethesamebutsubjecttoreservation,saidalienationtransmittingonlytherevocableandconditional
ownershipofthereservists,therightsacquiredbythetransfereebeingrevokedorresolvedbythesurvival
ofreservatariosatthetimeofthedeathofthereservista.
ThesalemadebyAndreaGutanginfavorofappelleeswas,therefore,subjecttotheconditionthatthe
vendeeswoulddefinitelyacquireownership,byvirtueofthealienation,onlyifthevendordiedwithout
beingsurvivedbyanypersonentitledtothereservableproperty.InasmuchmuchaswhenAndreaGutang
died,CiprianaYaesowasstillalive,theconclusionbecomesinescapablethattheprevioussalemadeby
theformer infavorof appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable propertysubject matter
thereofpassedinexclusiveownershiptoCipriana.
Ontheotherhand,itisalsoclearthatthesaleexecutedbythesistersPaulinaandCiprianaYaesoinfavorof
thespousesFidelEsparciaandPaulinaSieneswassubjecttoasimilarresolutorycondition.Thereserve
institutedbylawinfavoroftheheirswithinthethirddegreebelongingtothelinefromwhichthereservable
propertycame,constitutesarealrightwhichthereserveemayalienateanddisposeof,albeitconditionally,
theconditionbeingthatthealienationshalltransferownershiptothevendeeonlyifandwhenthereservee
survivesthepersonobligedtoreserve.Inthepresentcase,CiprianaYaeso,oneofthereservees,wasstill
alivewhenAndreaGutang,thepersonobligedtoreserve,died.Thustheformerbecametheabsoluteowner
ofthereservablepropertyuponAndreasdeath.